The full dataset viewer is not available (click to read why). Only showing a preview of the rows.
{'validation'}
Error code: UnexpectedError
Need help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
text string |
|---|
rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. both alike are concerned |
with such things as come more or less within the general ken of |
all men and belong to no definite science. accordingly all men make |
use more or less of both for to a certain extent all men attempt |
to discuss statements and to maintain them to defend themselves and |
to attack others. ordinary people do this either at random or through |
practice and from acquired habit. both ways being possible the subject |
can plainly be handled systematically for it is possible to inquire |
the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously |
and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function |
now the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed |
but a small portion of that art. the modes of persuasion are the only |
true constituents of the art everything else is merely accessory. |
these writers however say nothing about enthymemes which are the |
substance of rhetorical persuasion but deal mainly with non essentials. |
the arousing of prejudice pity anger and similar emotions has nothing |
to do with the essential facts but is merely a personal appeal to |
the man who is judging the case. consequently if the rules for trials |
which are now laid down some states especially in well governed states were |
applied everywhere such people would have nothing to say. all men |
no doubt think that the laws should prescribe such rules but some |
as in the court of areopagus give practical effect to their thoughts |
and forbid talk about non essentials. this is sound law and custom. |
it is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy |
or pity one might as well warp a carpenter s rule before using it. |
again a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged |
fact is so or is not so that it has or has not happened. as to whether |
a thing is important or unimportant just or unjust the judge must |
surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants he must |
decide for himself all such points as the law giver has not already |
now it is of great moment that well drawn laws should themselves |
define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be |
to the decision of the judges and this for several reasons. first |
to find one man or a few men who are sensible persons and capable |
of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a |
large number. next laws are made after long consideration whereas |
decisions in the courts are given at short notice which makes it |
hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and |
expediency. the weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the |
lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general whereas members |
of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite |
cases brought before them. they will often have allowed themselves |
to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self interest |
that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement |
obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. in general |
then the judge should we say be allowed to decide as few things |
as possible. but questions as to whether something has happened or |
has not happened will be or will not be is or is not must of necessity |
be left to the judge since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. if this |
is so it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other |
matters such as what must be the contents of the introduction or |
the narration or any of the other divisions of a speech is theorizing |
about non essentials as if they belonged to the art. the only question |
with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a |
given frame of mind. about the orator s proper modes of persuasion |
they have nothing to tell us nothing that is about how to gain |
hence it comes that although the same systematic principles apply |
to political as to forensic oratory and although the former is a |
nobler business and fitter for a citizen than that which concerns |
the relations of private individuals these authors say nothing about |
political oratory but try one and all to write treatises on the |
way to plead in court. the reason for this is that in political oratory |
there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. political oratory |
is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic because it |
treats of wider issues. in a political debate the man who is forming |
a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. there |
is no need therefore to prove anything except that the facts are |
what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. in forensic oratory |
this is not enough to conciliate the listener is what pays here. |
it is other people s affairs that are to be decided so that the judges |
intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality surrender |
themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. hence |
in many places as we have said already irrelevant speaking is forbidden |
in the law courts in the public assembly those who have to form a |
judgement are themselves well able to guard against that. |
it is clear then that rhetorical study in its strict sense is |
concerned with the modes of persuasion. persuasion is clearly a sort |
of demonstration since we are most fully persuaded when we consider |
a thing to have been demonstrated. the orator s demonstration is an |
enthymeme and this is in general the most effective of the modes |
of persuasion. the enthymeme is a sort of syllogism and the consideration |
of syllogisms of all kinds without distinction is the business of |
dialectic either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. |
it follows plainly therefore that he who is best able to see how |
and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled |
in the enthymeme when he has further learnt what its subject matter |
is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. |
the true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty |
it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for |
what is true and usually do arrive at the truth. hence the man who |
makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities. |
it has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat |
of non essentials it has also been shown why they have inclined more |
rhetoric is useful one because things that are true and things that |
are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites |
so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be |
the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves and they must be |
blamed accordingly. moreover two before some audiences not even the |
possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we |
say to produce conviction. for argument based on knowledge implies |
End of preview.