| {"_id":"c64_0","text":"holding \"a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c64_1","text":"holding that, in an obviousness analysis, “[r]igid preven- tative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c64_2","text":"holding that where the \"only novel feature\" of an \"otherwise conventional\" method is an unpatentable algorithm, the mere addition of the conventional method steps to an unpatentable claim does not confer patentability, because to do otherwise \"would make the determination of patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftman's art\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c64_3","text":"holding that absence of allegation that corporation or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the proposed project, the corporation, which claimed special interest in conservation of natural game refuges and forests, lacked standing under Administrative Procedure Act to maintain the action","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c64_4","text":"holding that the plaintiff tribe was not a \"person\" who could sue under Section 1983 to vindicate sovereign rights, namely, a claimed immunity from the state court process","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c406_0","text":"holding that the FDA's decision not to take enforcement actions to prevent violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 301 et seq., is not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 500 et seq.","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c406_1","text":"holding that \"Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation,\" which means \"that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c406_2","text":"holding that an implied private cause of action exists under Title IX, which states that \"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied to the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c406_3","text":"holding that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII and stressing that \"[t]he critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c406_4","text":"holding that Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, thereby prohibits retaliation because “[r]etaliation ... is a form of ‘discrimination’ ” and is “ ‘discrimination on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response to ... an allegation of sex discrimination”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c290_0","text":"holding that a sentencing court imposing restitution under the MVRA “must reduce the restitution amount by the amount of money the victim received in selling the collateral, not the value of the collateral when the victim received it”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c290_1","text":"holding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the date the defendants' tax returns were initially due, but rather on the date they actually filed the returns after the defendants obtained an extension","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c290_2","text":"holding that pledging securities as collateral for a loan constitutes an \"offer or sale\" under § 17(a) of the Securities Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c290_3","text":"holding that a taxpayer's trade or business must be the \"dominant motivation\" for a loan","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c290_4","text":"holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right of defendant acquitted in federal court of robbery of federally insured savings and loan association was not violated by subsequent state prosecution based on same acts","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c127_0","text":"holding that 15 U.S.C. § 1692e \"do[es] not merely impose procedural requirements upon debt collectors, but instead 'create a private duty owed personally to' a consumer by a debt collector to refrain from using false, deceptive, or misleading means or representations in attempting to collect a debt\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c127_1","text":"holding that federal bankruptcy law preempted a state law that interfered with federal bankruptcy law’s goal of providing uniform standards for determining discharge of debt","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c127_2","text":"holding that settlement agreement of underlying suit, which did not settle the issue of fraud, did not bar plaintiff from showing that the settlement debt actually arose out of fraud and was, therefore, nondischargeable under § 523","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c127_3","text":"holding that post-petition interest on nondischargeable tax debt remained a personal liability of the debtor after bankruptcy, finding \"the reasons—and thus the rule—inapplicable\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c127_4","text":"holding that lawyers who regularly collect consumer debt through litigation may be considered \"debt collectors\" under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692- 1692o, and are therefore subject to liability for litigation activities","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c488_0","text":"holding that the State's asserted interest in political stability amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition generated by independent candidates who have previously been affiliated with a party, an interest that conflicts with First Amendment values","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c488_1","text":"holding political subdivision's five percent signature requirement for independent candidates and new political parties violative of the Equal Protection Clause insofar as it required more than the 25,000 signatures required for candidates to appear on state-wide ballots","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c488_2","text":"holding no compelling interest in “leveling the playing field” via election funding statute for Free Speech Clause purposes","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c488_3","text":"holding that the independent candidates’ challenge to Illinois’s ballot access signature requirement was not moot without explicitly addressing the likelihood that the same independent candidates would seek to run again","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c488_4","text":"holding that although the 1972 election was long over, the case was not moot because the issues presented and their effects on independent candidates would persist since the challenged statutes would apply to future elections","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c36_0","text":"holding that under traditional principles of vicarious liability, a corporation is the principal of its employees/agents, and thus corporate owners and officers are not liable for the unlawful acts of an employee simply on the basis that the owner or officer controlled (or had the right to control) the actions of that employee","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c36_1","text":"holding that notwithstanding the presumption that parent corporations are not liable for the acts of their subsidiaries, a parent may be directly liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act as an \"operator\" of a subsidiary's facility when its \"actions ... are eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c36_2","text":"holding that an international union can be held liable for the acts of a local only if the local was its agent","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c36_3","text":"holding that a local government may be held liable for its employee’s constitutional violation only when the employee is “execut[ing the] government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c36_4","text":"holding that the United States is liable for the intentional torts committed by an investigative or law enforcement officer even when the officer is not carrying out the law enforcement proviso's statutorily prescribed duties","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c186_0","text":"holding that \"the recovery of witness fees under § 1920 is strictly limited by § 1821, which authorizes travel reimbursement and a $40 per diem\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c186_1","text":"holding that the IDEA's predecessor statute grants courts the power \"to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c186_2","text":"holding that a plaintiff who prevails and obtains relief under the predecessor to the IDEA was not entitled to further relief under the Rehabilitation Act and reversing decisions of lower courts granting counsel fees under the Rehabilitation Act to such prevailing party","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c186_3","text":"holding that \"in absence of special circumstances a district court not merely 'may' but must award fees to the prevailing plaintiff","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c186_4","text":"holding that expert witness fees are not available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) because \"when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c122_0","text":"holding that the initial illegal entry of the premises did not require the suppression of evidence later obtained in the execution of the search warrant because the warrant affidavit was based only on the information obtained before the illegal entry","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c122_1","text":"holding that the officers reasonably believed that the scope of a warrant, which was approved by a prosecutor and issued by a neutral magistrate, was supported by probable cause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c122_2","text":"holding that a subsequent warrant can provide a valid independent source so long as the initial entry did not affect the police’s “decision to seek the warrant” or the judge’s “decision to issue the warrant”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c122_3","text":"holding that evidence obtained from a warrant that lacked probable cause should be suppressed only if it is \"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable\" (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part))","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c122_4","text":"holding that where a judge accompanies police officers on a search to broaden the scope of the warrant as the search progresses, the search is unreasonable despite an initially valid warrant","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c298_0","text":"holding that § 2 does not require the creation of below-majority \"opportunity districts,\" reasoning that \"a party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c298_1","text":"holding that a statutory scheme that did not permit pretrial detainees to vote by absentee ballot was unconstitutional where inmates were denied alternative means of voting (citing Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973))","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c298_2","text":"holding that determination or certification of the Attorney General under section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973b(b), was not subject to judicial review when section 4(b) provided that such actions were \"not reviewable in any court\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c298_3","text":"holding that Court need not reach question of influence-dilution claim because complainant failed to prove Gingles's third requirement (white bloc voting)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c298_4","text":"holding that plaintiff who does not reside in a majority-minority district and has not alleged any specific facts showing that he personally has been subjected to a racial classification lacks standing to assert a racial gerrymandering claim","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c174_0","text":"holding that Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) standard for constitutional error applies to Sandstrom error","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c174_1","text":"holding that federal court must defer to state court harmless error analysis unless it was in \"conflict with the reasoning or the holdings of [Supreme Court] precedent\" or if it \"applied harmless-error review in an 'objectively unreasonable' manner\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c174_2","text":"holding that trial court error is harmless (i.e. not prejudicial) when \"there is no reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c174_3","text":"holding that \"in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the \"substantial and injurious effect\" standard set forth in Brecht whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the [former federal standard]\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c174_4","text":"holding that a federal court must apply both the Boyde test and the Brecht harmless error test before granting habeas corpus relief in death penalty case based on state trial court's erroneous sentencing jury instruction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c459_0","text":"holding Florida's capital sentencing scheme, which entailed a jury making a sentencing recommendation and a judge finding the facts necessary to impose a death sentence, violated the Sixth Amendment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c459_1","text":"holding that \"courts should employ the same 'interests of justice' standard that they apply in non-capital cases under a related statute, [18 U.S.C. ] § 3006A,\" to capital cases as well","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c459_2","text":"holding that \"No legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with intellectual disability. To do so contravenes the Eighth Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c459_3","text":"holding that Virginia's \"interest in shielding its citizens from information about activities outside Virginia's borders, activities that Virginia's police powers do not reach ... was entitled to little, if any, weight\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c459_4","text":"holding that the Eighth Amendment “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender” (quotation omitted)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c159_0","text":"holding that a jury may infer the existence of knowledge from the defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen mail where there was no plausible explanation for possession that was consistent with innocence","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c159_1","text":"holding that \"like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited\" and that \"nothing in [this] opinion should be taken to case doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c159_2","text":"holding that, although private parties do not have standing to sue other private parties under the Act, “an ‘appropriate’ role for private parties under § 9011(b) [is] to bring suits against the FEC to challenge its interpretations of various provisions of the Act”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c159_3","text":"holding that prison guards employed by a private prison are not entitled to qualified immunity from suits under § 1983, but that whether the private defendants acted under color of state law in violation of § 1983 was a matter to be determined by the district court","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c159_4","text":"holding that where the employee plan document reserved amendment rights to a specific entity, the rights are reserved for that entity, and \"not to any union, not to any third-party trustee, and not to any of the other kinds of outside parties that, in many other plans, exercise amendment authority\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c401_0","text":"holding that district court could review railroad's claim of discriminatory state taxation under the federal Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, where that Act expressly declared exception from § 1341","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c401_1","text":"holding that plaintiff's common law tort action constituted a rule of state tort law subject to preemption by federal regulations","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c401_2","text":"holding that Locomotive Inspection Act prevented plaintiff from pursuing a state-law design defect claim","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c401_3","text":"holding that state statutes of limitations which provide for abbreviated time periods in which to file discrimination lawsuits with the state administrative agencies are preempted, and therefore will not bar constitutional claims brought pursuant to the federal civil rights acts","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c401_4","text":"holding that Federal Railroad Safety Act regulations did not preempt common law negligence claim for failure to maintain railroad crossing warning devices, but that regulatory speed limits preempted claim that conductor was proceeding too fast under the circumstances","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c436_0","text":"holding that a Kentucky statute requiring posting of copy of Ten Commandments on walls of each public school classroom in state had pre-eminent purpose which was plainly religious in nature, and statute was thus violative of establishment clause and that avowed secular purpose was not sufficient to avoid conflict with first amendment; emphasis added","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c436_1","text":"holding that high filing fees for candidates imposed by Texas law were unconstitutional because of the \"obvious likelihood that this limitation would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c436_2","text":"holding that even though Texas may have had more contacts than any other state with the employment relationship at issue, its right-to-work law did not apply because the predominant situs of the employ- ment was not in Texas","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c436_3","text":"holding that \"[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause\" (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 687, 104 S.Ct. 1355 )","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c436_4","text":"holding that copies of the Ten Commandments posted in municipal courtrooms were hung to advance sectarian purpose, in part based on statements made by judicial official at the time the Commandments were posted","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c377_0","text":"holding that the portion of § 113(f) cited above \"rebuts any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling clause is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a [potentially responsible party]\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c377_1","text":"holding the scope of a court's power to tax costs to a non-prevailing party pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is \"narrow\" and strictly limited to the \"specific categories of costs set forth by Congress.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c377_2","text":"holding CERCLA section 107 provides potentially responsible parties with cause of action to recover necessary costs of response from other PRPs","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c377_3","text":"holding that “the award of monetary damages ... to fund a future clean-up of ... property violate CERCLA” because § 113(g) provides that under § 107 the remedy for future response costs is a declaratory judgment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c377_4","text":"holding that, in an enforcement action under the Clean Water Act, \"a determination of a civil penalty is not an essential function of a jury trial, and that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial for that purpose in a civil action.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c145_0","text":"holding that if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in a prosecution, the government will prove conduct which constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted, the second prosecution is barred on double jeopardy grounds","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c145_1","text":"holding that Double Jeopardy Clause is an absolute bar against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense following a determination by the trial judge that the evidence supporting the offense was insufficient as a matter of law","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c145_2","text":"holding that the trial court’s erroneous ruling that the prosecution had failed to prove the existence of an alleged element of the crime at defendant's trial that it was not, in fact, required to prove was not subject to appellate review","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c145_3","text":"holding that 6 \"where the evidence offered by the State and admitted by the 7 trial court -- whether erroneously or not -- would have been 8 sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the Double Jeopardy 9 Clause does not preclude retrial\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c145_4","text":"holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar a second prosecution because a first prosecution was terminated at the defendant's request","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c85_0","text":"holding that, in the statutory phrase \"with per-pupil expenditures ... above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures in the State,\" \"[t]he word ‘such’ refers to ‘per-pupil expenditures’ \"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c85_1","text":"holding that \"the Secretary's litigating position before the Commission is as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary's promulgation of a workplace health and safety standard,\" and that \"the Secretary's interpretation is not undeserving of deference merely because the Secretary advances it for the first time in an administrative adjudication\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c85_2","text":"holding that where \"a court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action, and the process was not issued in aid of determining that jurisdiction, then the process is void.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c85_3","text":"holding that Establishment Clause was not violated when the state paid a blind student's tuition at a Christian college through a generally-applicable aid program because any public aid that reached religious institutions under the program was \"a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c85_4","text":"holding that a federal law providing that counties \"may use [certain specified federal] payments for any governmental purpose\" preempted a state law requiring counties to allocate those payments to school districts; rejecting as \"seriously flawed\" the state's argument that no preemption existed simply because the funding of school districts constituted a governmental purpose","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c425_0","text":"holding that the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950 and Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 do not provide a cause of action to the Navajo Nation against the United States for breach of trust in its approval of coal mining leases","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c425_2","text":"holding that a union member's interest was not adequately represented by the Secretary of Labor because the Secretary had a \"duty to serve two distinct interests, which are related, but not identical:\" that of the individual union member and that of the general public","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c425_3","text":"holding that a tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by an Indian plaintiff against a non-Indian defendant for conduct involving the sale of fee land within Indian country","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c425_4","text":"holding that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act and relevant regulations, which do not contain \"elaborate\" provisions nor assign a comprehensive managerial role to the Government, do not imply any fiduciary obligations, even when the statutes impose one or more specific obligations","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c412_0","text":"holding that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him is violated when the confession of a non-testifying co-defendant, in which the defendant is expressly implicated as a participant in the crime, is admitted in the joint trial of the two defendants","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c412_1","text":"holding that to determine whether the judge-found fact increased the defendant’s sen- tence above the statutory maximum, courts must look at “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defen- dant”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c412_2","text":"holding that the Sixth Amendment does not inhibit states from assigning to judges, rather than to juries, the factual findings necessary to the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for multiple offenses","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c412_3","text":"holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c412_4","text":"holding that error involving Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury, like the failure to submit an element on an offense to the jury, is not structural error and is therefore subject to harmless error review","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c405_0","text":"holding that a change in the law, if merely procedural, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even if detrimental to the defendant","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c405_1","text":"holding that application of a revision of Florida's sentencing guidelines applied to a defendant convicted before the legislature passed the guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the new guidelines increased the length of the defendant's punishment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c405_2","text":"holding that sentencing a defendant \"under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts\" violates the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution if \"the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c405_3","text":"holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution precluded application of a statute to offenses committed before its effective date","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c405_4","text":"holding that while \"limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process,\" the Due Process Clause does not incorporate the specific prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c537_0","text":"holding that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of a death sentence did not have to be made by a jury because the existence of aggravating factors was not an element of the offense but merely a \"sentencing factor\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c537_1","text":"holding that \"a capital sentencing scheme must `genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty'\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c537_2","text":"holding that the Arizona capital sentencing scheme, which allowed the court and not the jury to make factual findings underlying a capital sentencing decision, did not offend the Sixth Amendment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c537_3","text":"holding Walton compelled conclusion Kansas capital sentencing scheme satisfied Eighth Amendment requirements because Kansas scheme was functionally identical to scheme found constitutional in Walton, except it provided benefit to defendants by placing no evidentiary burden on them","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c537_4","text":"holding that it is unconstitutional for the sentencing judge to instruct an advisory jury not to consider, and for the sentencing judge to refuse to consider, evidence of non-statutory mitigating circumstances","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c531_0","text":"holding that petitioner did not have a \"constitutional right to counsel on appeal from the state habeas trial court judgment\" and that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during state habeas appellate proceedings does not constitute cause to excuse the procedural defects","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c531_2","text":"holding that the constitutional right to appointed counsel extends only to a prisoner's first appeal of right and does not apply to postconviction collateral proceedings","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c531_3","text":"holding that the right to appointed counsel in federal habeas proceedings “adheres prior to the filing of a formal, legally sufficient habeas corpus petition” because it “includes a right to legal assistance in the preparation of a habeas corpus application”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c531_4","text":"holding that immunity doctrine inapplicable to court-appointed defense counsel in legal malpractice suit because \"primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels the office of privately retained counsel.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c59_1","text":"holding that\" l[o]ppose' goes beyond `active, consistent' behavior\" and includes instances in which an individual \"has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it \"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c59_2","text":"holding that petitioner's remedy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c59_3","text":"holding that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, because \"Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c59_4","text":"holding that the phrase \"any action or proceeding\" as used in section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) (1976","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c155_0","text":"holding that retrial for capital murder did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause where previous jury deadlocked on a lesser included offense during \"acquittal-first\" deliberations","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c155_1","text":"holding that where jury was -19- instructed on both a greater offense and lesser-included offense and the jury convicted on the lesser-included offense, the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c155_2","text":"holding that a conviction for a lesser included offense did not bar prosecution for the greater offense, where severance of the charges occurred upon the defendant's motion","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c155_3","text":"holding that instruction on lesser-included offense was not required under Beck where evidence could not reasonably have supported a verdict of guilt on the lesser-included offense","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c155_4","text":"holding that the failure to give lesser included offense instruction does not render a capital verdict unreliable if the jury has been instructed on another lesser offense because the jury is not forced into an all-or-nothing choice","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c280_0","text":"holding that a corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business are bases for general jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c280_1","text":"holding that a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce must have sufficient intrastate contacts before a State can require the corporation to qualify to do business","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c280_2","text":"holding that service of process upon a non-resident defendant while he is physically present in the forum state confers personal jurisdiction, even though the defendant was only briefly in the state and the litigation did not arise out of his activities there","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c280_3","text":"holding that “mere purchases [made in the forum state], even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of [general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions” (footnote omitted)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c280_4","text":"holding that the relationship between the defendant and forum state \"must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates\" and the contacts must be \"with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c119_0","text":"holding that the lower statutory minima and maxima for crack cocaine offenses adopted by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, apply to defendants who are sentenced after the effective date of the Act, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after that date","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c119_1","text":"holding that, if legislation includes a provision that expressly applies to cases pending on the date of enactment and another provision that does not, the construction “indicat[es] implicitly” that the latter applies only to cases filed after the date of enactment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c119_2","text":"holding that the trial court did not err because it considered the merits of the claim only as they applied to a class certification finding and made no determination on the merits","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c119_3","text":"holding that res judicata can apply to § 1983 claims but noting that \"[c]ollateral estoppel does not apply where the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c119_4","text":"holding that an amendment to a criminal statute did not apply retroactively to offenses committed prior to the effective date of the amendment, even though the defendants were sentenced after that date","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c551_0","text":"holding proper standard for judging whether prima facie case had arisen was Batson \"inference of discriminatory purpose\" standard, not California's Wheeler \"strong likelihood\" test for successful prima facie showing of bias","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c551_1","text":"holding the decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c551_2","text":"holding that \"[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c551_3","text":"holding that in a case alleging intentional employment discrimination by means of termination of employment, a prima facie case is established \"when a member of a protected group is discharged under circumstances which, if unexplained, would support an inference that the decision to discharge was `based on the consideration of impermissible factors.'\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c551_4","text":"holding that a defendant of one race has standing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the exclusion of individuals of another race from his jury, and noting that this rule aligns with the goal of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 in \"assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c167_0","text":"holding “that § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions,” and that the lower court correctly applied the state's three-year statute of limitations governing actions “for an injury to the person or reputation of any person”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c167_1","text":"holding that \"laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief\" and observing that \"the dissent has come up with no case in which this Court has approved the application of laches to bar a claim for damages brought within the time allowed by a federal statute of limitations\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c167_2","text":"holding that \"attorney's fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion\" and \"the policies served by the Copyright Act are more complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of meritorious suits for copyright infringement.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c167_3","text":"holding that statutory requirement that, with limited exceptions, a copyright holder must register its work before suing for copyright infringement is \"a precondition to filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c167_4","text":"holding that I.R.C. § 6501’s three-year statute of limitations commences with the filing of a taxpayer’s return, instead of the filing date of the pass-through entity","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c264_0","text":"holding that, despite party's failure to raise issue of whether state or federal law provided proper standard, court of appeals \"was not free to promulgate a federal common law ... rule without identifying the proper source of federal common law\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c264_1","text":"holding that a district court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims by considering a \"host\" of factors, \"including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, and the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c264_2","text":"holding that the Coast Guard’s deci sion not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly pre empt petitioner’s tort claims","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c264_4","text":"holding that state common law claims were preempted by frustration of purpose conflict with the Federal Clean Water Act and noting \"[i]t would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear [effluent discharge] standards, to tolerate common law suits that have the potential to undermine the regulatory system\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c230_0","text":"holding that misconduct by a prosecutor in a state criminal trial violates the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment only where the remark \"by itself so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c230_1","text":"holding that even though trial court erred in qualifying a juror, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated because he had to use a peremptory challenge to excuse the juror, stating, \"we reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c230_2","text":"holding that the Due Process Clause does not require strict observance of state procedural rules","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c230_3","text":"holding peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected rights but, rather, one means to achieve a constitutionally required impartial jury and a prohibition on the use of peremptory challenges does not impair the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and fair trial","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c230_4","text":"holding that \"a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to Rule 24(b) is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c105_0","text":"holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 had a comprehensive remedial scheme because \"[t]hese Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement provisions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on government officials and private citizens\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c105_1","text":"holding that the statutory definition of “new drug” confers authority upon the FDA","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c105_2","text":"holding that act of patent infringement under Hatch-Waxman Act is \"submitting an ANDA . . . that is in error as to whether [development, manufacture, sale, etc. of the generic's proposed product] . . . violates the relevant patent\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c105_3","text":"holding that uses which are not ultimately included in a submission to the FDA are nonetheless exempted by the safe harbor","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c105_4","text":"holding that an FDA order that a drug is a \"new drug\" within the meaning of FFDCA and therefore requires the filing and approval of an NDA \"is reviewable by the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c202_0","text":"holding that the undergraduate admissions policy was not narrowly tailored because the “automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified underrepre- sented minority applicant”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c202_1","text":"holding that Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq., does “not allow compensatory relief in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c202_2","text":"holding that a claim for racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c261_0","text":"holding that \"scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c261_1","text":"Holding that filing of a Complaint (or Amended Complaint as plaintiff might argue) does not relate back to the date on which a right to sue letter was filed with the Court, because a right to sue letter does not constitute a complaint within the meaning of Rule 3","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c261_2","text":"holding that the lower courts erred in finding that the question of the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was jurisdictional, even though “nothing in the analysis of the courts below turned on th[is] mistake”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c261_3","text":"holding that abstention was proper, and finding \"significant ... the apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c261_4","text":"holding that district court erred in denying relation back under Rule 15(c)(C) where newly-added corporate defendant was a closely-related entity represented by the same counsel and had \"constructive notice\" of plaintiff's complaint within the Rule 4(m) time period","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c136_0","text":"holding that the State of Washington's use of IOLTA to pay for legal services that were provided to the needy qualified as a \"public use,\" as required for exercise of the state's authority to confiscate private property under the Takings Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c136_1","text":"holding that the admission of a test that was not prepared to furnish evidence against a specific individual did not implicate the Confrontation Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c136_2","text":"holding a sworn certificate from a crime lab analyst identifying a controlled substance qualified as testimonial evidence because it was created for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact in trial and it was functionally identical to in-court testimony","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c136_3","text":"holding that the rule established in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) was a “new rule” for retroactivity purposes, even though it simply returned Confrontation Clause standards back to that which had prevailed prior to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c136_4","text":"holding that Confrontation Clause requires analyst who conducted blood alcohol testing to testify, not surrogate analyst","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c532_0","text":"holding that employee may not merely identify vague unfairness to one group, but rather needs to identify \"any specific test, requirement, or practice within the [challenged] plan that had an adverse impact on older workers\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c532_1","text":"holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not allow for reverse age discrimination suits even though plain reading of the statute appeared to allow for such suits","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c532_2","text":"holding that based on the language of the ADEA, a \"plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the \"but-for\" cause of the challenged adverse employment action\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c532_3","text":"holding that the correlation of age with pension status did not, by itself, support an inference of age discrimination and to state an ADEA disparate-treatment claim a plaintiff must show that the differential treatment was \"actually motivated\" by age, not pension status","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c532_4","text":"holding that age was not a proper BFOQ defense of the airline's discriminatory policy, which prohibited the employment of pilots older than 60","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c222_0","text":"holding that similar cross-examination did not violate the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c222_1","text":"holding that state's use of informant to obtain incriminating evidence from defendant about pending charges violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, notwithstanding that state was also investigating other charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c222_2","text":"holding that, to warrant habeas relief, a state court’s ruling must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c222_3","text":"holding that defendant's statement obtained in violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel was inadmissible to prove guilt but admissible to impeach defendant's inconsistent testimony","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c222_4","text":"holding that \"the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c288_0","text":"holding that free speech clause not violated by regulations by Department of Health and Human Services, prohibiting recipients of federal subsidies under Title X of Public Health Service Act from engaging in abortion counseling or referral","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c288_1","text":"holding that § 233 \"grants absolute immunity to PHS officers and employees for actions arising out of the performance of medical or related functions within the scope of their employment by barring all actions against them for such conduct\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c288_2","text":"holding that, absent evidence that Congress intended a federal statute to provide the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff's claims, the question of preemption by federal law is solely a defense, and does not justify removal","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c288_3","text":"holding that the notice requirements of state tort claims legislation do not apply to actions brought in state court alleging violations of federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c288_4","text":"holding that in action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, plaintiff could not assert state claims against a second defendant without independent base of federal jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c507_1","text":"holding that by using “and” to describe “the elements of discriminatory purpose and effect in the conjunctive, Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c507_2","text":"holding that federal courts cannot order the alteration of the size of a local governmental body as a remedy for a violation of Section two of the Voting Rights Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c507_3","text":"holding that, in cases brought under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Arlington Heights framework should guide a court's inquiry into whether a jurisdiction had a discriminatory purpose in enacting a voting change","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c507_4","text":"holding that a voting qualification that satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment's one-person, one-vote rule may nevertheless violate the Fifteenth Amendment's \"race neutrality command,\" because the \"Fifteenth Amendment has independent meaning and force\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c523_1","text":"holding the Fourth Amendment, not the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, controls the search and that the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 do not require the executing officers to show the warrant before conducting the search","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c523_2","text":"holding that probable cause must be accompanied by a warrant, exigent circumstances, or some other exception to the warrant requirement to make a search constitutional","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c29_0","text":"holding that where the state is the plaintiff in a parens patriae suit, even where the claim for restitution is based on injuries suffered by many citizens of the state, the suit does not constitute a “mass action” under CAFA","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c29_2","text":"holding that where § 301 of the Taft Hartley applies, the case is removable even if only state law claims appear in the complaint","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c29_3","text":"holding that, where ERISA completely preempts all state law claims raised, the case is removable under federal question jurisdiction despite the lack of any federal issues raised in the plaintiffs “well-pleaded” complaint","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c126_0","text":"holding that the tribe's authority to tax nonmember mining and drilling on tribal land derived from its inherent power to govern and pay for the costs of self-government and stating that such regulations were also within the tribe's inherent power to condition the continued presence of nonmembers on tribal land","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c126_1","text":"holding that federal district court had diversity jurisdiction over insurance dispute, but that a federal court may not exercise diversity jurisdiction over a civil dispute relating to reservation affairs before an appropriate Indian tribal court system has had an opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c126_2","text":"holding that \"the retained sovereignty of the tribe as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the authority to impose criminal sanctions\" on a nonmember Indian who committed murder on the tribe's reservation","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c126_4","text":"holding \"tribal courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c504_0","text":"holding that plaintiff who sought damages against territory of Guam and its officials in their official capacities could not state a S 1983 claim because the territory and its officials are not \"persons\" under the section","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c504_1","text":"holding that, whereas official capacity suits are an attempt to sue the government entity by naming the officer as a defendant, personal capacity suits \"seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c504_2","text":"holding that neither the state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are \"persons\" under § 1983, and therefore are not subject to suit under the statute in either federal or state court, except insofar as they are sued for prospective injunctive relief","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c504_3","text":"holding that “RLUIPA’s authorization of ‘appropriate relief against a government,’ is not the unequivocal expression of state consent that [the Court’s] precedents require” for a finding that the state has waived its sovereign immunity from damages suits (internal citations omitted","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c504_4","text":"holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim for injunctive relief based on state law against a state or against a state officer in his or her official capacity, even if otherwise within the court's pendent (now supplemental) jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c486_0","text":"holding that the \"costs provision of the FDCPA is not contrary to the federal rule of civil procedure governing awards of costs... so a district court may award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA cases without finding that the plaintiff brought the case in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c486_3","text":"holding that “the bona fide error defense in § 1692k(c) does not apply to a violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector’s incorrect interpretation of the requirements of that statute” and reversing the contrary judgment of the court of appeals","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c486_4","text":"holding that the inherent power of the court to award attorney's fees applies where the losing party has \"acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c5_0","text":"holding that application of Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\") to transportation employees employed by local government does not contravene the Commerce Clause because labor conditions of those employees affect interstate commerce","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c5_1","text":"holding that the \"plain language\" of the Fair Labor Standards Act's \"willful\" liquidated damages standard requires that \"the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute,\" without regard to the outrageousness of the conduct at issue","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c5_2","text":"holding that an opinion letter by the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act was not entitled to deference as a matter of law, but only \"respect\" to the extent that it has the \"power to persuade\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c5_3","text":"holding that \"hearing\" under the Administrative Procedure Act requires that parties have fair notice of what agency intends to do and that parties have opportunity to comment; but \"hearing\" does not require oral testimony, cross-examination, or oral argument","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c5_4","text":"holding that the anti-retaliation provision makes FLSA's “enforcement scheme effective by preventing ‘fear of economic retaliation’ from inducing workers ‘quietly to accept substandard conditions' ”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c457_0","text":"holding that the Grable & Sons test determines the reach of \"arising under\" jurisdiction for purposes of the jurisdictional grant in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c457_1","text":"holding that although the Securities Exchange Act does not include a private cause of action for Section 10(b) violations, there is a right of action implied in the Act's words and its implementing regulation and declining to extend said right \"beyond its boundaries\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c457_2","text":"holding that, although the claims over which the court had original jurisdiction had been dismissed, the court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims; the decision to relinquish jurisdiction over those claims was therefore discretionary and not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c457_4","text":"holding that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings unless expressly authorized by an Act of Congress, where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c404_0","text":"holding that the appellant had no constitutional right to represent himself on appeal and no right to a “hybrid” form of representation in which he would be represented by counsel while also acting simultaneously as his own counsel","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c404_1","text":"holding that the denial of the right to counsel of one’s choice is structural error not subject to harmlessness review because “[h]armless-error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c404_2","text":"holding that the acts of a defendant's criminal trial standby counsel did not deprive the defendant of his right of self-representation","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c404_3","text":"holding that a defendant charged with contempt has a right to an opportunity to be heard, to be represented by counsel, and to file motions and pleadings essential to his claims","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c404_4","text":"holding that because \"a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals,\" \"he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file [a timely] application\" for discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c450_0","text":"holding that federal Controlled Substance Act does not authorize Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c450_1","text":"holding that delegation from Congress to the Attorney General, and from the Attorney General to the DEA, neither violated the Constitution nor the Controlled Substances Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c450_2","text":"holding that only a controlled substance violation that is punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act can constitute an aggravated felony and finding that it is not enough that the crime is punishable as a felony under state law","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c450_3","text":"holding that to qualify as a conviction relating to a federally controlled substance, \"a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must 'necessarily' proscribe conduct that is an offense under the [Controlled Substances Act], and the [Act] must 'necessarily' prescribe felony punishment for that conduct\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c450_4","text":"holding that 21 U.S.C. § 879, which governs warrants for searches for controlled substances, requires no special showing for a nighttime search, other than a showing of probable cause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c496_0","text":"holding that so long as a trial court explains the basis of its ruling, it has “wide discretion” under Rule 403 to exclude “testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination at the hands of supervisors of the defendant company who played no role in the adverse employment decision challenged by the plaintiff”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c496_2","text":"holding that to establish an adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, \"a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c496_4","text":"holding that adverse judgment at liability stage of class action alleging pattern and practice of companywide discrimination did not automatically preclude, by virtue of res judicata or collateral estoppel, later individual discrimination lawsuits by class members","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c70_0","text":"holding that once an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c70_1","text":"holding that, while “the punitive damages award in this case is more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages” and “may be close to the line,” the award “d[id] not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c70_2","text":"holding that a warrantless search of a vehicle is not justified when the defendant is already in police custody","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c70_3","text":"holding that it is not unreasonable for officers to \"stop[ ] an automobile and detain[ ] the driver in order to check his driver's license and registration of the automobile\" where \"either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law[ ]\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c70_4","text":"holding that automobile passengers are seized during traffic stops even though the police command to stop is directed to the driver because a reasonable person in the passenger seat would not feel free to leave once the police have stopped the vehicle","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c61_0","text":"holding that the State's legitimate interest in preventing political party raiding was not sufficient to justify the substantial restraint of a statute prohibiting voters from voting in a party primary if they had voted in another party's primary within the preceding twenty-three months","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c61_1","text":"holding that although minor party candidates face numerous problems in obtaining political office, state is under no duty to ameliorate those problems; rather, state legislation \"may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c61_2","text":"holding courts should \"[e]xercis[e] judicial restraint\" to prevent \"premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c61_3","text":"holding that Wisconsin's asserted compelling interests in preserving the integrity of the election process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters did not justify the State's substantial intrusion into the associational freedom of members of a minor party","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c61_4","text":"holding that a California statute requiring that political candidates pay a fixed filing fee was unconstitutional as applied to an indigent political candidate to the extent the statute failed to provide reasonable alternative means of ballot access","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c539_0","text":"holding that federal law, as the \"law of the Land\" is also the law of the states and that \"[t]he Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to disassociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c539_1","text":"holding that the Nonintercourse Act of 1793 did not displace the Oneidas' federal common law right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights because the Act did \"not speak directly to the question of remedies for unlawful conveyances of Indian land\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c539_2","text":"holding that landowner could challenge proposed use of neighboring land because his economic, environmental, and aesthetic interests fell within the zone of interests of a statute that had the purpose of acquiring land for Native American tribes’ economic development","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c539_3","text":"holding that the Apology Resolution did not strip Hawaii of its sovereign authority to alienate the lands the United States held in absolute fee and granted to the State upon its admission to the Union","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c539_4","text":"holding that “§ 479 limits the Secretary's authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c91_0","text":"holding that Congress may abrogate States' immunity when legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, since its powers under that amendment are plenary","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c91_1","text":"holding that an individual has standing to assert a Tenth Amendment claim that a federal statute interferes with state sovereignty, subject to a showing of all Article III requirements, i.e. that he or she has suffered a concrete, particular harm fairly traceable to the conduct complained of and redressable by a favorable decision","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c91_2","text":"holding that, \"[b]ecause the duty is directly imposed upon the States by the Constitution itself, there can be no need to weigh the performance of the federal obligation against the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c91_3","text":"holding that the interception of a wife's conversations on her home telephone was incidental, and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because her criminal activities were not foreseen when the Title III wiretap order targeting her husband was obtained","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c91_4","text":"holding that \"the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law; rather it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c208_0","text":"holding that Illinois's failure-to-report offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, was a relatively passive offense that did not involve conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and did not qualify as \"violent felony\" under the Armed Career Criminal Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c208_1","text":"holding that a conviction under Indiana law of the driver of an automobile who knowingly or intentionally flees from a police officer constitutes a \"violent felony\" prior conviction under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c208_2","text":"holding that a federal court may not impose sentences under both § 924(c) and the weapon enhancement under the armed bank robbery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 2113, based on a single criminal transaction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c208_3","text":"holding that the \"residual clause\" of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is constitutionally vague","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c208_4","text":"holding that a federal court may not impose sentences under both § 924(c) and the weapon enhancement under the armed bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, based on a single criminal transaction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c512_0","text":"holding that the federal \"Partial-Birth Abortion Act,\" 18 U.S.C. § 1531, which banned the D&X procedure, did \"not construct a substantial obstacle to the abortion right,\" because the D&E procedure—the \"most commonly used and generally accepted method\" of second trimester abortions—remained available","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c512_1","text":"holding that a provision of a Pennsylvania statute requiring health care providers to inform patients of the availability of certain information regarding abortion and childbirth prior to obtaining an abortion was a valid regulation of the practice of medicine and so did not violate physicians' First Amendment right not to speak","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c512_3","text":"holding that physicians, asserting the rights of their patients, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal abortion statute even though \"the record does not disclose that any one of them has been prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution, for violation of the State's abortion statutes\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c512_4","text":"holding that the government has the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement and discussing the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the automobile exception, and the plain-view-seizure exception","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c562_0","text":"holding that for federal employees, Title VII is “a dispute resolution system that requires a complaining party to pursue administrative relief prior to court action, thereby encouraging quicker, less formal, and less expensive resolution of disputes within the Federal Government and outside of court”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c562_1","text":"holding that the Arbitration Act \"leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c562_2","text":"holding that class arbitration \"changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c562_3","text":"holding that it is presumed that parties intend for the courts, not arbitrators, to decide disputes about \"arbitrability,\" such as \"whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c562_4","text":"holding that the ADEA's provision for \"out-of-court dispute resolution\" is not inconsistent with permitting arbitration under the FAA and that it even \"suggests that out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c439_0","text":"holding that \"there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c439_1","text":"holding that the Federal Election Commis- sion had no authority to litigate in the Supreme Court without the authorization of the Justice Department despite the fact that the agency had done so previously","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c439_2","text":"holding that \"filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance - it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c439_3","text":"holding that the summary judgment standard “mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c439_4","text":"holding that \"the Court waives filing fees and costs for indigent individuals in order to promote the interests of justice. The goal of fairly dispensing justice, however, is compromised when the Court is forced to devote limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c118_0","text":"holding that a naturally occurring DNA segment was a \"product of nature\" and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA was patent eligible because it was not naturally occurring","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c118_1","text":"holding that “federal law is ‘exclusive’ in its regulation” of “artificial islands and fixed structures erected” out on the OCS (quoting Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, sec. 4, 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953) (codified as amended 43 U.S.C. § 1333) [hereinafter OCSLA])","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c118_2","text":"holding that, even as to state workers’ compensation regimes, the Longshore Act does not preempt claims arising from “land-based injuries”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c118_3","text":"holding that provision requiring reimbursement of social security disability benefits for workers' compensation but not for recovery of tort damages is not unconstitutional","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c118_4","text":"holding that in contrast to § 1333, the OCSLA's provision for workers' compensation, § 1333(b), covers employees who can establish a \"substantial-nexus\" between their injury and extractive operations on the OCS","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c144_0","text":"holding that a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a secured creditor's lien, but does not permit the secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale is not capable of confirmation under the \"fair and equitable\" standard of section 1129(b)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c144_1","text":"holding that Bankruptcy Code section 522(d) refers to a debtor's \"interests\" in the assets categorically described, not the assets themselves","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c144_2","text":"holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtor's bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor--the IRS--held a secured interest--a tax lien--in the property","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c144_3","text":"holding that, when calculating the present value of a secured creditor's claim, courts should consider the \"risk of nonpayment\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c144_4","text":"holding that, under section 506(a), the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the cram down option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same proposed use; with the amount by which a creditor's secured claim exceeds such amount (if any","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c317_0","text":"holding that a parent cannot be incarcerated for civil contempt for failure to pay child support, absent an express finding on inability to pay","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c317_1","text":"holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review Ohio Supreme Court's decision remanding for trial because the Court can only review final judgments, defined by the imposition of a sentence","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c317_2","text":"holding that “clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the Supreme Court for the purposes of § 2254(d), includes Supreme Court decisions in existence at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c317_3","text":"holding that if the state supreme court’s disposition does not state whether the petition was timely or untimely, the federal court of appeals must make that determination itself","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c317_4","text":"holding that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent where no Supreme Court decision \"squarely addresses the issue\" in the case or gives a \"clear answer to the question presented\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c460_0","text":"holding that \"a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the default,\" or a showing that the petitioner \"is actually innocent of the underlying offense\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c460_1","text":"holding that defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal cannot pursue it in a habeas petition unless he demonstrates either cause for the default and ensuing prejudice for the default or actual innocence, the latter meaning \"factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c460_2","text":"holding that on collateral review, a court examines the time the error occurred in determining how “novel” a rule is for purposes of providing cause for a procedural default","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c460_3","text":"holding that failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence is an error subject to harmless error analysis","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c460_4","text":"holding that the double jeopardy clause does not apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings; the case involved a “three-strikes” sentencing enhancement where the State had failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove one of the predicate offenses","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c481_0","text":"holding that the core judicial inquiry in cases where prison officials are accused of using excessive force in the prison disturbance context is \"whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c481_1","text":"holding that a prisoner's claim for injunctive relief and a declaration that his transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security prison without a hearing was unconstitutional was moot because the prisoner had been transferred back to the medium-security prison","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c481_2","text":"holding that a court \"must examine the record to see whether the [party moving for summary judgment], in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits and the like, has demonstrated the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact, and his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c481_3","text":"holding that in the First Amendment context “a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c481_4","text":"holding that, where prison overcrowding was due to state budget shortfalls, a court-mandated prison-population limit was \"necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners' constitutional rights\" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c192_0","text":"holding that federal employees suing under section 15 of the ADEA are not entitled to a jury trial on their claims because Congress did not grant that right by statute as they did in section 7(a)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c192_1","text":"holding that an expectation of privacy in the contents of a container, even if lawfully frustrated, may be regained by a gap in surveillance; provided only, however, that \"there is a substantial likelihood that the contents of the container have been changed during the gap in surveillance\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c192_2","text":"holding that harm alleged is not cognizable where it is based upon (instructing courts to determine whether \"the physical or mental condition of the person is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c192_3","text":"holding that the Fourth Amendment protects only \"the people\" of the United States and has no application to search-and-seizure challenges where the challenger is a non-citizen/non-resident alien with no voluntary attachment to the United States and the area searched is located outside of the United States","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c192_4","text":"holding that a former Central Intelligence Agency employee's disclosure of intelligence information was unprotected by the First Amendment even though the employee was \"also engaged in criti- cism of the Government\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c293_0","text":"holding that the operation of the regulatory scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not sufficiently implicate the State in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge to make the latter \"state action\" within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c293_1","text":"holding that even the \"wide latitude\" to regulate liquor sales expressly conferred upon states by the Twenty-first Amendment \"did not entirely remove state regulation of alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c293_2","text":"holding that in-state liquor wholesalers had standing to raise a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a Hawaii tax regime exempting certain alcohols produced in-state from liquor taxes because the tax raised the price of the imported goods they sold relative to the exempted in-state beverages","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c293_3","text":"holding that because there was no tradition of tribal sovereignty in the area of liquor licensing, and because application of the state liquor licensing laws did not impair a right granted or reserved by federal law, the state could require a tribal member selling liquor on the reservation to obtain a license","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c293_4","text":"holding that \"regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c339_0","text":"holding that the rational basis standard of review is not \"toothless\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c339_1","text":"holding that \"a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceedings along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c339_2","text":"holding that in equal protection cases not involving a suspect classification or fundamental right, courts apply a rational basis test","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c339_3","text":"holding that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection—which presupposes that like individuals should be treated alike, and that to treat them differently is to classify them in a way that must survive at least rationality review—is simply a poor fit in the public context”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c339_4","text":"holding that concerns about administrative expense provided a rational basis for classification","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c241_2","text":"holding that the decennial census report was not subject to judicial review, because it carried \"no direct consequences for the reapportionment,\" and the President was \"not expressly required to adhere to the policy decisions reflected in the Secretary's report\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c241_4","text":"holding that attempted burglary under Florida statute qualified as a predicate “violent felony” because overt conduct directed toward unlawfully entering or remaining in a dwelling, with the intent to commit a felony therein, is “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” within the meaning of ACCA's residual clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c352_0","text":"holding that Congress had not clearly stated its intent to abrogate in a statute that authorized \"parties aggrieved . . . to 'bring a civil action . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy'\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c352_1","text":"holding that the term “any court,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), was limited to domestic courts because that Congress “ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application,” and because reading the statute to include foreign courts would create anomalies that Congress could not have intended","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c352_2","text":"holding that a South Carolina conviction for possession of cocaine is a conviction for a \"felony drug offense\", as that term is used in § 841(b), because it is \"punishable by more than one year,\" regardless of the fact that the state of conviction classified the offense as a misdemeanor","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c352_3","text":"holding that \" criminal investigation surely falls within the meaning of 'any matter'\" as that phrase is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a federal statute that prohibits knowingly making a false statement \"in any matter within the jurisdiction of the [United States]\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c330_0","text":"holding that when an agency is charged with administering a statute, part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statute's textual ambiguities","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c330_1","text":"holding that Tennessee statute requiring defendant to testify before any other testimony for the defense if he wished to testify at all violates right of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by limiting counsel's ability to evaluate the need for such testimony, even though statute is based on legitimate interest in preventing testimonial influence","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c330_2","text":"holding that the First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation and speech or symbolic acts to intimidate lack First Amendment protection","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c330_4","text":"holding that statutes targeting the \"communicative impact\" of flag-burning are unconstitutional while reserving the question of whether flag-burning could be limited by other \"laws regulating conduct\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c32_0","text":"holding that a challenge to a spending decision made by the executive branch pursuant to general appropriations does not satisfy Flast ’s first prong","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c32_1","text":"holding that \"the same limitations on delegation do not apply where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter,\" such as delegations to the Executive Branch of matters that traditionally fall within executive discretion, like commander-in-chief power","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c32_2","text":"holding that a claim of potential harm to national security does not provide the executive branch with unconstrained authority to override the freedom of the press","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c32_3","text":"holding that it was sufficient to confer standing under Article III where it was clear that at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law in question, and that there was no need to \"consider the standing issue as to the [other plaintiffs]\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c32_4","text":"holding that the legislative branch is not “a law enforcement or trial agency” as those “are functions of the executive and judicial departments”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c77_0","text":"holding that \"it would be patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for EPA to insist on seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not designed to grant ,\" and finding that a \"long-extant statute [did not give EPA] an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c77_1","text":"holding that the Clean Air Act provided Massachusetts a procedural right to challenge the EPA’s rulemaking and that Massachusetts suffered an injury in its capacity as a quasi-sovereign landowner due to rising sea levels associated with climate change","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c77_2","text":"holding that pre-enforcement review of EPA regulation's validity was not premature since EPA had made clear its final position on how the regulation would be applied","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c77_3","text":"holding that EPA's order under the Clean Air Act prohibiting the Alaskan Department of Environment from issuing permits to a zinc mining company was a final agency action because the order effectively halted construction of the mine through the threat of civil and criminal penalties, despite lack of alteration of EPA's legal regime","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c77_4","text":"holding that \"the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired powerplants\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c42_0","text":"holding that a § 2254 habeas petitioner was entitled to habeas relief on the basis of a Batson claim","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c42_3","text":"holding that a petitioner imprisoned in Alabama on unrelated Alabama state convictions may contest his right to a speedy trial on a Kentucky detainer by § 2241 petition in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c42_4","text":"holding that a petitioner must \"show that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further\" (alteration accepted)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c33_0","text":"holding that a Montana statute that conditioned \"the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally\" was preempted by the FAA because the statute made the arbitration provision suspect and placed it on unequal footing with other contracts in violation of the FAA","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c33_1","text":"holding that sections 10 and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act specify the exclusive grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting an arbitration award under the Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c33_2","text":"holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) permits a motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award to be brought either where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c33_3","text":"holding that the FAA \"creates substantive federal law ... requiring courts to place [arbitration] agreements upon the same footing as other contracts,\" but that nothing in the FAA \"purports to alter background principles of state contract law regarding the scope of [arbitration] agreements\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c33_4","text":"holding that when the parties in court proceedings include claims that are subject to an arbitration agreement, the FAA requires that agreement to be enforced even if a state statute or common-law rule would otherwise exclude that claim from arbitration","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c237_0","text":"holding that a “husband‟s interest in the entireties property constitute[s] „property‟ or „rights to property‟ for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c237_1","text":"holding that \"a penalty can relate to a partnership-item adjustment even if the penalty cannot be imposed without additional, partner-level determinations\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c237_2","text":"holding that the collection of tax revenue under the label of a \"tax penalty\" against a responsible corporate officer constituted the collection of a \"tax\" within the meaning of the predecessor statute to Section C","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c237_3","text":"holding that a party who, though not assessed a tax, paid a tax under protest to remove a federal tax lien from her property was a “taxpayer” entitled to bring administrative tax refund claim","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c237_4","text":"holding that a taxpayer has discretion in structuring a transaction but is bound by its tax consequences","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c409_0","text":"holding that a suspicionless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment where the defendant was a state parolee and California law required that parolees \" agree in writing to be subject to search . . . with or without cause\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c409_3","text":"holding that in the absence of exigent circumstances, the warrantless search of a container in police custody violates the Fourth Amendment despite the fact that the police had probable cause to search the container","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c409_4","text":"holding that a warrantless search of the probationer's home without probable cause was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment under a lesser standard of reasonable suspicion where the terms of probation included consent to a warrantless search","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c204_1","text":"holding that the defendant was not \"in custody\" because, inter alia, he \"was not physically restrained or threatened\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c204_2","text":"holding that a petition for habeas corpus is the only federal procedure for attacking \"the validity of the fact or length\" of a state prisoner's confinement and applying this principle to \"areas of particular state administrative concern\" such as the deprivation of a prisoner's good-conduct-time credits in state prison disciplinary proceedings","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c204_4","text":"holding that prisoner was entitled to relief under § 2255 where his sentence was imposed outside of the prisoner’s or counsel’s presence","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c371_2","text":"holding that an Internal Revenue Service investigation to determine a taxpayer's civil tax liability is not \"preliminar[y] to or in connection with a judicial proceeding\" within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(C), and therefore no disclosure is available under that Rule","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c371_3","text":"holding that this issue is governed by Section 2 of the Securities Act and Section 3 of the Exchange Act, both of which define the term \"security\" to include \"any note.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c371_4","text":"holding that Congress did not delegate health insurance policy to Internal Revenue Service","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c50_0","text":"holding that although § 2254(d) relieves a federal court of AEDPA deference when the state court makes an unreasonable determination of facts, it \"does not repeal the command of § 2254 that habeas relief may be afforded to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground’ that his custody violates federal law\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c50_1","text":"holding that where a state habeas court issues an opinion that addresses some issues but does not expressly address the federal habeas claim in question, that claim \"must be presumed to have been adjudicated on the merits by the [state habeas court] ... the restrictive standard of review set out in § 2254(d) applies\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c50_4","text":"holding that a claim had not been adjudicated on the merits where state courts had found it to have been previously litigated (and dismissed it on that ground), but in fact it had not been","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c148_0","text":"holding that to be “disabled” under the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) one must have “limitations that are in fact substantial” and because every determination of whether an individual is disabled is “case-by-case,” par- ticularized evidence is needed","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c148_1","text":"holding that parents have separately enforceable rights under the IDEA and, thus, 4 Case: 12-13277 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 Page: 5 of 5 declining to reach the question of whether parents may litigate their children’s claims pro se","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c148_2","text":"holding unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act which allowed an illegitimate child to obtain benefits if a disabled parent either contributed to the child's support or lived with the child prior to the disability","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c148_4","text":"holding that a state engages in disability discrimination if it institutionalizes individuals with disabilities when community- based placement could be reasonably accommodated, accounting for the resources available to the state and the needs of others with disabilities.","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c196_0","text":"holding that the Sixth Circuit erred in finding that the state court's jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c196_1","text":"holding that the First Amendment does not require showing of actual malice for recovery of presumed and punitive damages for false statements about private figures involving matters of purely private concern","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c196_2","text":"holding that courts in the District of Columbia are local rather than federal because Congress \"expressly created\" the courts pursuant to its plenary authority and created a body with authority over matters of \"strictly local concern\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c196_3","text":"holding that the \"framework used to govern Speech Clause claims\" will also apply to claims arising out of the Petition Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c196_4","text":"holding that where a state college professor claimed First Amendment retaliation based on his disagreement with the policies of the board of regents, the district court erred in granting summary judgment without analyzing whether he had been terminated for \"public criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c57_0","text":"holding that a violation of § 7206 can be serious enough to be an aggravated felony and deportable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c57_1","text":"holding that the defendant's prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a \"controlled substance offense\" because the plain language of § 4B1.2(b) requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c57_3","text":"holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which authorizes increased sentence for a deported alien's illegal return if the deportation was subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction, is a penalty provision and that the aggravated felony need not be charged in the indictment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c57_4","text":"holding that a defendant convicted of a possession offense that has not been enhanced based on a prior conviction has not been convicted of an aggravated felony","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c275_0","text":"holding that because “Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so,” and the statute in question did not include the words “aid” and “abet,” the statute did not provide for aiding and abetting liability","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c275_1","text":"holding that there must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition” to conclude that a state crime is overbroad","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c567_0","text":"holding that the defendant's prosecution for a continuing criminal enterprise under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 following his earlier prosecution for marijuana importation did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c567_2","text":"holding that Congress can constitutionally prohibit the importation of obscene material from abroad, even if it is imported for personal use rather than for commercial distribution","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c567_3","text":"holding that, in the analogous context of a preliminary injunction under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, \"the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial\" such that it was the government's burden to satisfy RFRA's strict scrutiny standard and not the plaintiff's burden to disprove it","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c567_4","text":"holding that defendant who distributed drugs used by victim who died of a drug overdose after also using other drugs could not be convicted under penalty enhancement provision of Controlled Substance Act applicable when death results from use of the distributed substance unless such use is a \"but-for\" cause of the death","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c150_0","text":"holding that the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary manner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c150_1","text":"holding that “the inconvenience” of the process of going to the state Bureau of Motor Vehicles to obtain an ID “does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c150_3","text":"holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the execution of a person who was under sixteen years of age at the time of his or her offense","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c150_4","text":"holding that, because a federally issued writ of habeas corpus can only reach convictions obtained in violation of the United States Constitution, they may only be issued to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c285_2","text":"holding that a California law requiring classwide arbitration was preempted by the FAA because it \"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,\" which is to promote arbitration and enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c285_3","text":"holding that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a challenge to an arbitration provision is for the courts to decide, while a challenge to an entire contract which includes an arbitration provision is an issue for the arbitrator","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c285_4","text":"holding that when determining whether to vacate an Award under Section 10 of the FAA, \"an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must stand, regardless of a court's view of its (de)merits\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c561_0","text":"holding that rules requiring local fleet operators to purchase or lease only vehicles that met state motor vehicle pollution standards were related to controlling emissions and were preempted by the CAA","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c561_1","text":"holding that the inclusion of successorship clauses in bargaining agreements cannot bind a subsequent buyer to the substantive terms of the agreements where it was clear that the new employer refused to assume any obligations under the agreements","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c561_2","text":"holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l ) \"unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of ... guests\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c561_3","text":"holding that where municipality had refused to lease utility pole space to respondent cable company, \"the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First Amendment interests\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c561_4","text":"holding that abandonment of any of the three statutory elements of the franchise operation—1","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c179_0","text":"holding that petitioner had preserved objection to jury instruction even though, in the district court, it had proposed a different replacement instruction than the one it proposed on appeal","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c179_1","text":"holding that the First Amendment demands that an “objective” standard govern political speech, and that such a standard must “entail minimal if any discovery, to allow parties to resolve disputes quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation” and “eschew the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors” which invites “complex argument” and “appeal”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c179_4","text":"holding that the federal carjacking statute, as it existed when the defendant was indicted, established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties, and recognizing that this construction avoided \"serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c226_0","text":"holding Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to its Commerce Clause power under Article I of the Constitution as long as it clearly expresses its intent to do so","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c226_1","text":"holding that a dispute under the Origination Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, which mandates that all bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives, did not present a nonjusticiable political question","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c226_2","text":"holding that pursuant to the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, Congress may condition its appropriation of money to the states on their agreement to impose restrictions that would be beyond Congress’s constitutional legislative authority to enact directly","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c226_3","text":"holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue to enforce the Accounts Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, which provides that \"a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c226_4","text":"holding that a proceeding to determine dischargeability of a debt guaranteed by a State entity is not a \"suit\" for Eleventh Amendment purposes even though it must be brought by adversary proceeding and requires service of a summons upon the State","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c39_0","text":"holding that \"inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c39_1","text":"holding that requiring libraries to install filtering software on every computer with Internet access if the library receives any discount or funds from specified federal programs “does not ‘penalize’ libraries that choose not to install such software” because libraries that “wish to offer unfiltered access ... are free to do so without federal assistance”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c39_2","text":"holding that a statutory provision prohibiting any visual depiction that \"is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct\" violated the First Amendment insofar as it prohibited virtual imagery of minors that was neither obscene nor involved actual children","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c39_3","text":"holding that the FCC could not regulate pole attachments for internet services because they did not qualify as telecommunications services","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c39_4","text":"holding that \"a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance, under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c49_0","text":"holding that a political majority may not restructure the political process to make it more difficult for a political minority to obtain favorable government action in a race discrimination case","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c49_1","text":"holding that government may not retaliate against contractors or \"regular provider of services\" for exercising First Amendment rights of political association or expression of political allegiance \"unless political affiliation is a reasonably appropriate requirement for the [services] in question\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c49_2","text":"holding that Idaho's limitation on public employee payroll deductions did not implicate the First Amendment, as the prohibition simply prevented organizations from enlisting the state's support of their speech","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c49_3","text":"holding that a state may not, however, \"grant its political subdivisions a power to discriminate against interstate commerce that the state lacked in the first instance\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c49_4","text":"holding that \"[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute,\" and Congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c337_0","text":"holding that person who trades drugs for a gun does not “use” a firearm “during and in relation to . . . drug trafficking crime” within the meaning of Section 924(c)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c337_1","text":"holding that the residual clause in the definition of crime of violence in using, carrying, or possessing a firearm, found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(B), is unconstitutionally vague","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c337_2","text":"holding that under statute prohibiting the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, fact that firearm was a machine gun was an element of the offense to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than a sentencing factor","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c337_3","text":"holding that § 924(c) constitutes a continuing offense for purposes of venue where the predicate offense is a continuing offense: \"In our view, § 924(c) does not define a `point-in-time' offense when a firearm is used during and in relation to a continuing crime of violence.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c337_4","text":"holding that for purposes of §924(c)(1), \"the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c262_0","text":"holding that, when it is an open question whether a federal statute provides private parties with a cause of action enforceable under section 1983, there is a sufficient controversy to support jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c262_1","text":"holding that the design-to-conceal element \"can[not] . . . be satisfied solely by evidence that a defendant concealed the funds during their transport\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c262_2","text":"holding that a company’s contractual obligation to pay royalties for the use of inventor’s product design was enforceable despite the fact that the design was not patentable and other competitors were free to copy the design without paying royalties","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c262_3","text":"holding that for the offense of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(B) and 1957, the existence of criminally generated proceeds was a circumstance element of the offense and, therefore, that where the laundered funds were unlawfully generated was irrelevant for venue purposes","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c262_4","text":"holding that venue for money laundering conspiracy is proper either in the district where the complete substantive money laundering offense had been accomplished or where an over act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c24_0","text":"holding that \"a one-element approach\" is \"flatly incompatible\" with the Court's precedent","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c24_1","text":"holding that under narrow circumstances a sentencing court can look beyond the state statutory definition of burglary and examine the charging instrument and jury instructions to determine whether the defendant was actually convicted of generic burglary","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c24_2","text":"holding that, in offense of making false statement within jurisdiction of agency of United States, the federal agency element is a jurisdictional requirement only and conviction does not require the defendant knew of that element at the time of the offense","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c24_3","text":"holding that courts \"may look only to the statutory definitions—i.e ., the elements—of a defendant’s prior offenses\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c456_0","text":"holding that courts should look to a financial instrument's name and characteristics alone and not to the economic realities underlying that instrument when determining whether it is common stock","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c456_1","text":"holding that a determination of whether a person is a \"member of the crew\" is, when the facts are disputed, a decision for the jury and will not be disturbed if reasonable, but that whether the facts meet the legal standard of the statutory definition is a matter of law","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c456_2","text":"holding that the ADA’s direct-threat defense may apply not only to “other individuals in the workplace,” as the statute states, but to the disabled individual himself","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c456_3","text":"holding that the Court of Federal Claims is not the appropriate authority to determine retirement issues, as that arena of federal employee litigation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MSPB and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c456_4","text":"holding that whether an organization can hire or fire or set the rules and regulations of the individual's work is relevant to whether one is an employee","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c266_0","text":"holding that NEPA does not require the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to evaluate the environmental effects of cross-border motor carrier operations because the agency lacked the discretion to prevent those operations","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c266_1","text":"holding agency's issuance of an administrative complaint was not subject to review until final agency action despite its evident assumption that the propriety of the initial charging decision would not be subject to administrative review","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c266_2","text":"holding that EPA implementation policy was final agency action because EPA published the policy in the Federal Register within the preamble to air quality regulations and stated in that preamble that it had settled on a new policy, which would immediately apply to the implementation of ozone standards","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c266_4","text":"holding that, with respect to the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees in the plaintiff's action under the Clean Air Act, \"absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not `appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees under § 307(f) [of the Clean Air Act]\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c56_0","text":"holding that state supreme court's determination that change it announced in definition of statutory term had evolved over time supported not applying the decision retroactively, but remanding for determination of due process question whether definitional change had evolved when defendant's conviction became final","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c56_1","text":"holding that another Supreme Court decision finding that a particular warrantless search lacked probable cause and contravened the Fourth Amendment would not be applied retroactively to defendant's case even though it was pending on appeal on date the decision was announced","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c56_2","text":"holding that Mills announced a new rule of constitutional law that nevertheless may not be applied retroactively","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c56_3","text":"holding that, subject to certain exceptions, \"a decision of this Court construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c56_4","text":"holding that where a state court decision does not create a new rule, but merely interprets a state criminal statute, that decision applies to any § 2254 petitioner whose conviction under that statute was final at the time of the state court’s decision","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c2_0","text":"holding that the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act,which ordered a debtor railroad company's bankruptcy estate to pay benefits to former employees of the debtor, was a law on the subject of bankruptcies and violated the Bankruptcy Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c2_1","text":"holding that, in a case involving a mortgage on real property, a bankruptcy discharge \"extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim namely, an action against the debtor in personam while leaving intact another namely, an action against the debtor in rem. \"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c2_3","text":"holding that \"it is sensible to view the debtor-in-possession as the same `entity' which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with its contracts and property in a manner it could not have employed absent the bankruptcy filing\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c2_4","text":"holding that bankruptcy court’s final order was binding 12 and that appellant could not later collaterally attack that order 13 when the appellant had notice of the proceedings leading up to 14 the entry of the order but never appealed the order","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c229_0","text":"holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury, meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendant's unlawful acts","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c229_1","text":"holding that mailboxes, although paid for by the customer, are an essential part of the Postal Service for purposes of forum analysis","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c229_2","text":"holding that a telephone customer had no legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers he had dialed because in dialing he voluntarily conveyed the information to the telephone company and thereby assumed the risk that the telephone company would disclose it","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c229_3","text":"holding that a firm with no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at all is under no obligation to provide those rivals with a \"sufficient\" level of service","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c229_4","text":"holding that because the rent controls were not \"a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,\" the court \"need not address whether . . . they would be exempt under the state-action doctrine from antitrust scrutiny\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c508_0","text":"holding that a defendant's \"sentence of 25 years to life in prison\" for a third strike consisting of the theft of three golf clubs \"is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c508_1","text":"holding that imposition of mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole, for possessing 650 grams of cocaine, without any consideration of mitigating factors, such as fact that petitioner had no prior felony convictions, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c508_2","text":"holding that \"the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c508_3","text":"holding that, under the Eighth Amendment, juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide crimes may not be sentenced to life in prison without parole and that such offenders must be given \"some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c508_4","text":"holding that double jeopardy is violated when a juvenile is subject to adjudication in the juvenile system, determined to be unamenable to treatment at the juvenile disposition, and then transferred and retried in the adult system","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c48_0","text":"holding that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction, but no monetary damages, was a \"prevailing party\" under § 1988 because the injunction ordered the defendants to change their behavior in a way that directly benefited the plaintiff","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c48_1","text":"holding that certain categories of speech, including \"advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to criminal conduct; so-called ‘fighting words'; child pornography; fraud; true threats; and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent\" are not protected by the First Amendment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c48_2","text":"holding that the ongoing permanent injunction in a defamation suit prevented the plaintiff's death from mooting the defendant's appeal","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c48_3","text":"holding that, in a case where a \"private figure\" brings a defamation claim based on a matter \"of public concern,\" the \"common law's rule on falsity—that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth—must ... fall ... to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c48_4","text":"holding that an appeal from a preliminary injunction was not rendered moot by an order granting a permanent injunction, where the issue appealed “[was] independent of [the plaintiffs’] claim on the merits” and 2 “ha[d] nothing to do with the validity of the permanent injunction”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c513_0","text":"holding that the Ninth Circuit erred because the state appellate court's conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was not unreasonable","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c513_2","text":"holding that an indictment is constitutionally sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense charged, fairly informs the defendant of the charge against him which he must defend, and enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or a conviction in bar of future prosecution for the same offense","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c513_3","text":"holding that double jeopardy bars retrial on the same offense if the defendant's conviction was reversed based on the insufficiency of the evidence at the first trial, but the defendant may be retried if the conviction was set aside as against the weight of the evidence","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c513_4","text":"holding that under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, the predecessor of the MVRA, a trial court is authorized to make \"an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c166_0","text":"holding that, over the prosecutor's objection, a court may not grant a postverdict motion for a judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the time limit allowed by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(c); this Court did not characterize the Rule as \"jurisdictional\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c166_1","text":"holding that the time limit for filing a petition for certiorari is not jurisdictional","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c166_2","text":"holding NEPA inapplicable to HUD action on developer's filing under Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act because 30-day time limit made it impracticable for HUD to prepare EIS","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c166_3","text":"holding that court of appeals had no jurisdiction where district court had reopened the time to appeal for seventeen days and the notice of appeal was filed within that period but after the 14-day period allowed by Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107(c)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c166_4","text":"holding that, if the United States has not intervened in an FCA case, relators may not take advantage of the appellate filing deadline that applies when “the United States or its officer or agency is a party”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c386_0","text":"holding that a buccal swab to collect DNA constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c386_1","text":"holding that the Constitution does not require the jury to be instructed on offenses that are not lesser-included offenses of the charged crimes","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c386_3","text":"holding that the government’s electronic surveillance of the defendant’s telephone conversations in a telephone booth violated the fourth amendment and stating that “the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c386_4","text":"holding that crimes authorizing punishment for over six months are \"serious\" under Duncan for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c480_0","text":"holding that warrantless search does not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when search is based upon consent of third party whom officers reasonably believe possesses authority over searched premises","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c480_1","text":"holding that to determine whether an officer had qualified immunity in a warrantless search case, the court applies an objective test in which the court determines whether a reasonable officer could have believed the warrantless search to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officer possessed","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c480_4","text":"holding that police could search the defendant's apartment after obtaining the consent of a woman who lived with him, even though the defendant had objected to the search before his arrest","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c338_0","text":"holding that a federal prisoner cannot assert a Bivens claim against a private individual employed by private entity operating federal prison because state law provides the prisoner with an alternative, adequate remedy against the private individual employee","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c338_1","text":"holding that the First Amendment prohibits public figures and public officials from recovering for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the advertisement parody at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c338_2","text":"holding government's taking and transferring private property to another private person for purpose of increasing tax revenue was proper use of eminent domain power under Fifth Amendment of United States Constitution","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c338_3","text":"holding that messages on - 16 - protest signs at a private funeral related to broad issues of interest to society at large and were matters of public import","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c338_4","text":"holding that the private-analogue inquiry is not restricted to \"the samecircumstances ,\" but extends \"further afield\" and providing, as an example, that a negligence claim against a private person who undertakes a duty to warn is a private analogue for the government’s failure to maintain a lighthouse","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c349_0","text":"holding that there is no proce- dural error where a sentencing judge could have “added explicitly that he had heard and considered the evidence and argument[s]” but the “context and the record [made] clear that . . . similar[ ] reasoning underlies the judge’s conclusion.”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c349_1","text":"holding that \"while the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences--whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range--under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c349_2","text":"holding \"we now clarify that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c110_0","text":"holding that an Alabama county was not liable for the constitutional torts resulting from the law enforcement policy of the county's sheriff because, under Alabama law, sheriffs acting in a law enforcement capacity constitutes officers of the state rather than the county","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c110_1","text":"holding that \"inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability\" but only where \"the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom the police come into contact\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c110_2","text":"holding that the occupant of an office has standing to challenge warrantless search of his office because entitled to expect only invitees to enter his office","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c110_3","text":"holding that remand to district court was required to consider whether upsurge in inmate population at county jail was foreseen by county officials, so as to preclude modification of consent decree requiring single celling of pretrial detainees","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c110_4","text":"holding that a district attorney’s office cannot be held liable for failing to train its prosecutors when the plaintiff proves only a single violation that has allegedly arisen from the inadequate training","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c63_0","text":"holding that the goal of judicial scrutiny is to “distinguish between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c63_1","text":"holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier, and noting that \"precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c63_2","text":"holding that New 7 York’s resale price maintenance scheme for liquor was preempted by the Sherman Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c63_3","text":"holding that the only vertical restraints that create a per se antitrust violation are price-fixing schemes","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c233_0","text":"holding that juvenile and his parents must be advised of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings and the mother's \"knowledge that she could employ counsel was not an `intentional relinquishment or abandonment' of a fully known right\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c233_1","text":"holding that a seizure occurs \" 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave' \"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c233_3","text":"holding that \"[i]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c233_4","text":"holding that where police are required to examine circumstances that \" ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect's position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave,’.... ‘the ‘subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned’ are irrelevant\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c403_0","text":"holding that it was the ―right‖ of Arizona state courts to take ―no account of federal standing rules‖ in state court, even on a matter interpreting federal law","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c403_1","text":"holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents federal courts from providing a declaratory judgment that state officials violated federal law in the past if there is \"no claimed continuing violation of federal law\" or \"any threat of state officials violating the ... law in the future\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c403_2","text":"holding that a state law regulating unauthorized alien employment did not interfere with federal immigration law where the federal program \"operates unimpeded by the state law\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c403_3","text":"holding that state procedural law applied in state-court litigation of a federal-law claim","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c403_4","text":"holding that Arizona statute that \"authoriz[ed] state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable ... violate[d] the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government\" and thus \"create[d] an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c239_1","text":"holding that \"to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent,\" the government \"may show that permission to search was -17- obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c239_2","text":"holding that warrantless searches of a home are valid if done “with the voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority . . . [either] the householder against whom evidence is sought, or a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when the suspect is absent.”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c239_3","text":"holding that “[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c472_0","text":"holding that statute that provided different rights to the children of unwed U.S. citizen mothers than the children of unwed U.S. citizen fathers violated the equal protection clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c472_1","text":"holding that a citizen has “a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c472_2","text":"holding unconstitutional intestacy statute that permitted child born out of wedlock to inherit only from his or her mother","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c472_3","text":"holding that the Indian Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, even though the children were born off the reservation, because the children were “domiciled” on the reservation for purposes of the ICWA","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c359_0","text":"holding that “[n]o reasonable construction of [claim]-processing rules . . . would allow a litigant” to prevail if he or she he objected to the claim-processing violation “after the party has litigated and lost the case on the merits”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c359_3","text":"holding that federal law provides no authority for bankruptcy courts to exercise equitable power to disallow an exemption based on a ground not specified in the Bankruptcy Code, i.e. debtor's bad faith","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c359_4","text":"holding that \"[e]quality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code,\" and that \"[s]ection 547(b) furthers this policy by permitting a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain preferential payments made before the debtor files for bankruptcy\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c112_0","text":"holding that \"a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification [for an adverse employment action] is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c112_1","text":"holding that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA” (emphasis omitted)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c112_3","text":"holding that in order to receive a mixed motive instruction under Title VII, \"a plaintiff need only produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his or her protected status] was a motivating factor for any employment practice\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c112_4","text":"holding that Title VII \"vest broad equitable discretion in the federal courts to `order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring or employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate'\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c4_0","text":"holding that “there is no difference, insofar as the validity of agency action is concerned, between an agency's exceeding the scope of its authority (its ‘jurisdiction’) and its exceeding authorized application of authority that it unquestionably has”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c4_3","text":"holding that \"administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c4_4","text":"holding that rule requiring cable operators to originate local programming fell within FCC's statutory jurisdiction","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c473_0","text":"holding that \"[o]nly if the mailings were `a part of the execution of the fraud,' or...were `incident to an essential part of the scheme,' do they fall within the ban of the federal mail fraud statute\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c473_1","text":"holding that a plaintiff does not show loss causation if the lower share price reflects “not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c473_2","text":"holding that a plaintiff \"must, of course, be able to show a causal connection between the price discrimination in violation of the Act and the injury suffered\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c473_4","text":"holding that a state’s general police power over fraud did not trigger the presumption because states had not “traditionally occupied” the field of “[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies” (emphasis added)","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c522_0","text":"holding that the date an action accrues under the Federal Tort Claims Act is the date when the plaintiff becomes aware of his injury, not the date when the plaintiff discovers that the alleged injury may have resulted from negligence, or the date when a plaintiff recognizes the legal claim","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c522_1","text":"holding that where every Article III judge had an interest in the outcome of the case, the common law rule of necessity prevailed","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c522_2","text":"holding that a case is moot if \"an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c522_3","text":"holding that a case typically becomes 4 moot when the issue presented no longer is “live” or when the 5 parties lack a cognizable interest in the case’s outcome","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c246_0","text":"holding that § 1344 \"includes the requirement that a defendant intend to 'defraud a financial institution'; indeed, that is § 1344's whole sum and substance\" but \"nothing in additionally demands that a defendant have a specific intent to deceive a bank\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c246_1","text":"holding that petitioner bank's \"administrative hold\" on the debtor's checking account was not a setoff within the meaning of Section 362 since the bank simply refused to pay its debt temporarily while it sought relief from the stay; and since there was no setoff, the bank did not violate the automatic stay","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c246_2","text":"holding that the agreement not merely must be in the bank's records at the time of an examination, but also must have been executed and become a bank record contemporaneously with the making of the note","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c246_3","text":"holding that a national bank's agreements with banks in which it held 5% stock did not violate the Sherman Act because the 5% banks fell within the terms of the grandfather provision in the Bank Holding Company Act","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c383_0","text":"holding that Arizona law requiring voter registration officials to reject registration application when not accompanied by a state-promulgated citizenship form in addition to form promulgated by federal Election Assistance Commission that NVRA requires states to \"accept and use\" was preempted by NVRA","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c383_2","text":"holding that the governor and legislature of Arkansas were bound by the Supreme Court's previous desegregation decisions though they were not parties to those decisions and stating that the Court's interpretations of the Constitution are \"the supreme law of the land\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c383_3","text":"holding that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c383_4","text":"holding that the Court did not need to address whether “a freestanding ‘market-participant exception’ ” limited the express terms of a preemption clause, because the appellants had abandoned that argument, and concluding that the regulation at issue was preempted by the plain terms of the federal preemption clause","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c511_0","text":"holding that a state law requiring insurers to provide certain benefits \"regulates insurance\" and is therefore not preempted; and suggesting along the way that the interpretation of an insurance policy is at \"the core of the 'business of insurance,' \" (emphasis added","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c511_2","text":"holding that Congress \"had the power to impose the exaction in § 5000A under the taxing power\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c511_3","text":"holding that “[l]itigants may not evade” the mandate of jurisdiction in the circuit courts by “requesting the District Court to enjoin action that is the outcome of the agency's order”","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c511_4","text":"holding that the principles of the AEDPA apply in general to a recall of the mandate because a \"State's interests in finality are compelling when a federal court of appeals issues a mandate denying federal habeas relief;\" exempting claims of \"fraud upon the court, calling into question the very legitimacy of the judgment\"","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c306_1","text":"holding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from individual suits because abrogation exceeded Congress's authority under § 5 of -10- Fourteenth Amendment, and reiterating that no such authority exists under Article I","title":""} | |
| {"_id":"c306_3","text":"holding that the ADEA, which contains a federal-sector provision “patterned ‘directly after’ Title VII's federal-sector discrimination ban,” prohibits retaliation against a federal employee and allows that employee to bring a private cause of action based on retaliation","title":""} | |