Output:
四、问题讨论

关于中国传统哲学的范畴体系是个很复杂、又涉及很多方面的问题，因而需要大家来切实地研究讨论，这里提出几个问题作一点初步的讨论：

1．范畴体系中的范畴是否应成对？

关于这个问题要分成两个问题来讨论，一个问题是从哲学史上说一个哲学家使用的概念、范畴并不一定都成对，例如老子提出“自然”这个概念，在《老子》书中或者还没有另一与之相对的概念；在《管子》书《白心》等篇中“气”作为最一般的概念似乎也没有一相对的概念。但是，从整个中国传统哲学的发展看，范畴都是成对的。如“自然”和“名教”就构成一对范畴；“气”和“理”就构成一对范畴。另一问题是，就任何事物来说都是矛盾的，都有矛盾的双方，决没有只有一方而无另一方，因此反映事物本质联系的范畴也应是成对的。在中国传统哲学中有一些概念、范畴似乎并不成对，例如“中庸”，我们当然不好说“反中庸”和它构成了一对相对的概念。但是，我们从“中庸”的涵义方面来分析，这个问题或者可以解决。孔子提出“中庸之道”是为了反对“过”的，他说：“过犹不及。”所以就“中庸”的涵义说是“中”或“正”的意思，因此中国传统哲学的范畴体系中有“正”和“反”这对范畴就可以了，“正”可以包含“中庸”。

从西方哲学史上看，一些哲学家的范畴体系似乎也并不都是根据对立统一而表现的，在亚里士多德的10个范畴中有的是成对的，例如“质”和“量”，但“本质”（substance）则没有一具体相对的范畴，当然也可以说其他9个范畴都和“本质”构成一对范畴。康德的12范畴和黑格尔的《逻辑学》的范畴体系分析起来，所列范畴大都是成对的，马克思主义哲学家关于范畴体系的看法虽不一致，但都认为范畴应是成对的，例如“本质和现象”“内容和形式”“必然性和偶然性”“可能性和现实性”等等，马克思主义哲学认为范畴必然是成对的，这无疑是正确的，它反映了事物的本来面貌。因此，我们今天研究中国传统哲学的范畴体系，使中国传统哲学的范畴系统化，比较科学地反映中国传统哲学的特点和水平，也应该在它的范畴体系中体现对立统一的规律。


Output:
2．中国传统哲学范畴体系中应包含多少对范畴就足够表明“存在的基本样式”或“反映现实界各种现象和认识的最一般的和最本质的特性、方面和关系的基本概念”？这里提出20对基本概念构成中国传统哲学的范畴体系，只是一个尝试，可能不能成立。这20对范畴大都说“世界”和“人”是什么，如说“世界”的存在有“理”有“气”，“人”的存在有“形”有“神”等等。西方哲学家所说的范畴往往是说的“存在的样式”或“认识的原则”。就目前马克思主义哲学的范畴说，一般也是说的存在的特性方面和关系，而并不把“心”和“物”这样的最基本的概念放在范畴体系中。如果用这个标准看，上面所列中国传统哲学范畴体系中有些范畴就不能列入，而应补充另外一些概念。但是，我们这样来表述中国传统哲学的范畴体系是不是也是一种方式，因为图表中所列诸范畴从它们的涵义说是表明“存在的基本样式”的，也是人们认识事物之网的网上纽结。这样表述是不是更适合反映中国传统哲学的特点和水平？当然，如果用更少一些基本概念来表述中国传统哲学的范畴体系应该说是更理想的，比如说也可以如下图只列12对：

3．“中国传统哲学的范畴体系”是否能反映出中国传统哲学的特点和水平？这个问题比较大，因为中国传统哲学的特点有哪些，和怎样看一种哲学水平的高低，都是要进行认真研究和充分讨论的。但我们这个构想图，是不是也可以说多少反映了中国传统哲学的特点和水平呢？看来，中国传统哲学比较重视研究存在的基本样式和人的存在问题，而且注重事物之间的联系，即其同一性的方面，所以在中国传统哲学中讲“天人合一”“知行合一”“体用如一”“无因于有”“神形合一”“理气一元”“心物不二”等等比较多。在这个构想图中虽然没有列“时”“空”、“因”“果”等概念（在中国传统哲学中讨论这方面问题确实比较少），但作为一个范畴体系相对于西方古代或印度古代哲学来说它并不逊色，它包含的范畴很广，基本概念都是成对的，而且从它的发展上看概念的涵义是越来越深刻地反映世界，都表明了中国传统哲学已有较高的水平。

关于中国传统哲学范畴体系问题过去研究讨论得不多，还是一个较新的课题，这里只是提出一些不成熟的看法，希望能引起讨论，使中国哲学史的研究在马克思主义指导下进一步科学化。


Output: VIII．A RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF "THE TRUE, THE GOOD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL" IN TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY


Output: What is the highest ideal in spiritual life human beings quest for? I believe it is "the true, the good and the beautiful" and the unity of the three in one system. Of course, ideas of philosophers are different regarding what constitutes each of these three ideals. As far as how these are unified in one system, opinions differ from each other. There cannot be any final conclusion to this discussion, and actually there is no need for such one. As long as people quest for truth, goodness and beauty, thinkers will undoubtedly want to construct systems unifying the concepts. In my opinion, the quest for spiritual realm of life in Chinese traditional philosophy can be referred to as ancient philosophers' quest for "the true, the good, and the beautiful" in another way. I wrote an article entitled "The Question of the True, the Good and the Beautiful in Traditional Chinese Philosophy" 1 which was largely a historical discussion of the Confucian view about the question. This article is, however, not confined to a


Output: This article is, however, not confined to a discussion of the Confucians and is not historical in its approach because such an approach would entail too unfocussed and lengthy an article. We will therefore analyze and discuss selected representative thinkers.


Output:
Influence on the development of Chinese philosophy has always been exerted by China's pre-Qin philosophers, among whom Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi have been the most influential. If we regard these three as typical and through them discuss the question of the different spiritual realm of life (rensheng jingjie ) advanced by different traditional Chinese philosophies, we may perhaps be able to derive a unified understanding of spiritual realm of life held by traditional Chinese philosophy.

Forty years ago, Shen Youding, who was engaged in research at Oxford University, wrote to friends in China, saying:

The value theories of Kant and of Hegel have one important difference which we can represent as follows:

Kant: the good ← the beautiful ← the true

Hegel: the true ← the beautiful ← the good

From this we can see that Kant was perhaps closer to the Chinese, while Hegel was closer to the Indian or Greek. 2


Output:
This conclusion of Mr. Shen is particularly insightful and innovative. From Confucian thought, which formed the mainstream in the development of traditional Chinese philosophy, we can see that this scheme holds, but if we examine the different schools of thought and philosophies which make up traditional Chinese philosophy we find that it does not. As I see it, in traditional Chinese philosophy there were in fact three different systems integrating the true, the good and the beautiful. The systems of Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi are set out below:

Confucius: the good ← the beautiful ← the true

Laozi: the true ← the good ← the beautiful

Zhuangzi: the beautiful ← the good ← the true


Output:
Zhuangzi: the beautiful ← the good ← the true

Drawing analogies from this diagram we can say in overall terms that in terms of value regarding the question of the true, the good and the beautiful, Confucius approximates Kant, Laozi approximates Hegel, while in a limited way Zhuangzi approximates Schelling or Aristotle. Of course such analogies are limited and we cannot extrapolate them to all other aspects of the ideas of these thinkers, but they do serve to direct the lines along which we can think.

I．Confucius' Demands of the Realm of Life

In the section of The Analects entitled "Wei Zheng" (Practicing Government) the following statement is attributed to Confucius:

At fifteen I set my heart upon learning, at thirty I had established myself, at forty I was not subject to doubt, at fifty I came to know the commands of Heaven, at sixty I could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said, and at seventy I followed my heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules.


Output: We know that Confucius and later Confucians believed that life and death or wealth and honor were not attained by mere individual efforts, but that the level of a person's morality or learning could differ because of the amount of individual effort. These words of Confucius are at one and the same time a description of the course of his life, an outline of the process of self-cultivation he pursued, and a summation of his quest for and understanding of the true, the good and the beautiful. The years from fifteen to forty can be seen as the preparatory stage for his assumption of sagehood, and the statements that he was "not subject to doubt" and that he could "follow" his "heart's dictates, and not transgress the rules" reveal that deepening of the process whereby he acquired sagehood. The statement that he had come "to know the commands of Heaven" explains how he acquired knowledge and understanding of "Heaven" (the ultimate questions of life and the universe), which may perhaps be considered to fall within


Output: which may perhaps be considered to fall within the scope of the quest for the true. Here Confucius sees Heaven as a cognitive object and he has not attained the stage where he is "one with Heaven," having not yet entered that realm of unity. In his "Preface to Zhuangzi ," Guo Xiang wrote:


Output:
Zhuangzi can be said to have known the origin. . . . although he said he did not have that understanding, he alone responded to it. To respond without understanding is, however, to have no need to apply effort.

To be able to respond to the noumenon of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things can be called knowing "the root," but this entails the cognitive subject being apart from the noumenon of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and to see this noumenon as the object of cognition necessarily means that one has not yet attained oneness with that noumenon. While this noumenon exists on a higher realm, Zhuangzi was not yet able to "follow" his "heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules."


Output: Confucius' statement that at sixty he "could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said" (liushi er ershun ) has, in fact, been subject to varying interpretations over the ages. Yang Bojun, whose interpretation presented in Lunyu Yizhu (Analects , Vernacular Translation and Annotation , Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1958) is used here, writes that the expression ershun "is extremely difficult to explain. Many have sought to do so, but I feel all their explanations to be forced. . . ." I believe that Yang's interpretation is close to what Confucius intended by the statement. Yang's interpretation is probably based on the explanation of Li Chong of the Jin Dynasty who wrote that ershun means "the heart and the ear follow each other" (xinyu' er xiangcong ). Sun Chuo, also of the Jin Dynasty, provided a more metaphysical explanation when he wrote:


Output:
Ershun means to discard the logic which governs listening, to intuit the mystery of the meaning, and not to pursue but nevertheless obtain—what can be termed following the principle of the supreme one unconsciously and unknowingly.

This is the intuitive understanding which transcends experience of the entirety of the principles governing the universe, and is in the realm of "inner transcendence." According to the views of modern hermeneutics all explanations of our predecessors' ideas contain within them the ideas of the explicator; by definition, there must be connections between the person doing the explanation and what he is explaining. Most of the explanations of Confucius' thought by thinkers throughout the ages reveal this to be the case. I would like to turn to Zhu Xi's explanation of these words of Confucius. He wrote:

As the sounds enter, the heart communes with them, finding nothing in them to evade or oppose, thereby understanding their ultimate sense, acquired without any thought.


Output: Zhu Xi's "sounds" (sheng ) relate to voice (shengyin ) and they encompass both the "articulated sounds" (yousheng zhi yin ) and the "unarticulated sounds" (wusheng zhi yin ). "Understanding their ultimate sense" should transcend the realm in which Confucius knew the commands of Heaven, and so this realm "acquired without any thought" transcends knowledge. I believe that this can be explained as an intuited aesthetic realm, and what is thereby acquired is an intuited image transcending experience. This can also be explained as an artistic realm, the realm of "beauty." This explanation of Confucius' statement may also be "forced," but as Yang Bojun asserts that most explanations of this line have, throughout history, been forced, I see no harm in building on this legacy. But I also believe that such an explanation does have a basis, particularly from the viewpoint of philosophy, in which it may have a new sense. We know that Confucius regarded music as a form of cultivation and that "when in the kingdom of Qi


Output: cultivation and that "when in the kingdom of Qi he heard the music of Shao" he was "unable to savor the taste of meat for three months," a detail revealing that he had entered a sublime aesthetic realm "acquired without any thought." Confucius had his own explanation of this realm he had attained: "I had not anticipated that music could transport me to such a state." He thus unintentionally attained a realm in which he enjoyed a form of transcendental beauty.


Output:
Zhu Xi commented as follows on Confucius' statement that at seventy he "followed" his "heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules":

Ju , the carpenter's square, is an instrument for measuring patterns, but here it refers generally to pattern or custom. While following his heart's dictates, Confucius did not transgress his pattern, and so he was at ease in his deeds and attained the mean without effort.

The passage from The Analects being commented on here therefore refers to a realm at one with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things, where one "knows truth" (zhi zhen ), "acquires beauty" (de mei ), and later arrives in a perfect realm of "ultimate goodness" (zhi shan ). Confucius believed that "perfect beauty" could not compare with "perfect beauty combined with perfect goodness." The Analects contains the following passage in "The Eight Yi":


Output:
Discussing the music of Shao, Confucius commented: "It possesses perfect beauty, as well as perfect goodness." Of the music of King Wu, he commented: "It has perfect beauty, but does not possess perfect goodness."

To say that something possesses perfect goodness is, to a certain extent (at least for the Confucians), connected with a judgment concerning ethical value. Mencius said: "Complete truthfulness is called beauty." "Beauty" here contains the idea of ethical evaluation. Zhu Xi annotated this line as follows:

When one has strenuously implemented goodness until it is filled to completion and has accumulated truth, then the beauty will reside within it and will not depend on externals.


Output: "Goodness" here is a form of internalized "beauty," the highest beauty of character. It can be seen that Zhu Xi believed that "goodness" in one respect can encompass "beauty." "Perfect goodness" was held to be superior to "perfect beauty" because "perfect goodness" was in fact both "perfect goodness and perfect beauty." We would now seem to be able to assert that Confucius' realm of life (or his realm of the sage) proceeds from "knowing truth" and "acquiring beauty" to a realm of perfect goodness in which "one can be at ease in one's deeds and attain the mean without effort." In other words, from "truth" we proceed to "beauty" and then we finally attain "goodness."


Output: "The good←the beautiful←the true" was the special characteristic of Kant's philosophy. As Kant saw it, practical reasoning was superior to speculative reasoning. In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason ) the object of research was the phenomenal world and it was subject to the control of the laws of necessity of nature. In his Critique of Practical Reasoning the object of research was the noumenon of rational functioning, which was not subject to laws of necessity, and so was free. The former was nature, the latter morality. The former belonged to the realm of theoretical knowledge, the latter to the realm of ethical belief, and there was no direct channel connecting the two. The question, therefore, was how to build a bridge between theoretical knowledge(epistemology) and ethical belief (ethics); and to resolve the question of how to connect the two, Kant wrote his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment ), at the beginning of which he said:


Output: Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the second; and yet the second is to have an influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose enjoined by its laws. Hence it must be possible to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at least the possibility of [achieving] the purposes that we are to achieve in nature according to laws of freedom. So there must after all be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically, even though the concept of this basis does not reach cognition of it either theoretically or


Output: not reach cognition of it either theoretically or practically and hence does not have a domain of its own, though it does make possible the transition from our way of thinking in terms of principles of nature to our way of thinking in terms of principles of freedom. 3


Output: Kant believes that it was the power of judgment which united reason(pure reason) and rationality (practical reasoning), yet while judgment had something of the nature of each of these forms of reasoning, it was not the same thing as them. Kant divided man's soul into intelligence, feeling and idea. The cognitive ability of intelligence was pure reason, the cognitive ability of idea was rationality or practical reasoning which transcended experience, and the cognitive ability of feeling was what Kant called "judgment." Because feeling was the intermediary between intelligence and idea, it, like intelligence, was moved by external stimuli, and like idea it played its role regarding external things, and thus judgment functioned as an intermediary between reason and rationality.


Output: In one respect, judgment, like reason, confronted incomplete phenomena. In another respect, like rationality, it aimed to reconcile incomplete aspects with a totality. Thus, the understanding of confronted incomplete phenomena and the rationality which addresses itself to a totality meet in judgment. Judgment seeks to include the parts within the whole and then subjects them to reflection, so judgment is able to act as a bridge between reason and rationality. 4 Thus Kant constructed his philosophical trilogy of "the good ← the beautiful ← the true."


Output: Of course, while there are similarities in value between the philosophies of Confucius and Kant, their aims in constructing their philosophies were dissimilar. Confucius established a philosophy of life, whereas Kant constructed a complete rational philosophical system. This is perhaps one of the differences between Chinese and Western philosophy. If we compare Confucius' process which led him from knowing the commands of Heaven to being able to immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said and then on to "following his heart's dictates without transgression," with the basic theme of the true, the good and the beautiful in traditional Chinese philosophy, then we can say that Confucius' statement that "at fifty I came to know the commands of Heaven" represents the stage of seeking "the unity of Heaven and Man" (tian ren heyi ). His statement that "at sixty I could immediately discriminate the truth or falsity of what others said" represents attaining the stage of "the unity of feeling and


Output: attaining the stage of "the unity of feeling and scene" (qing jing heyi ), and his statement that "at seventy I followed my heart's dictates, but did not transgress the rules" represents the stage at which he was able to realize "the unity of knowledge and action" (zhi xing heyi ).


Output:
The unity of Heaven and Man belongs to the domain of "intelligence"(knowledge). The unity of feeling and scene belongs to the domain of "appreciation" (feeling), and the unity of knowledge and action belongs to "praxis" (idea or intention). According to the Confucians, these three were inseparable. Being human entailed an understanding of the flow of the cosmos and creation, as well as an ability to appreciate the achievements of the cosmos and creation. Moreover, in one's life practice one should re-manifest the perfect beauty and the perfect goodness of the cosmos. The process that Confucius outlined represented the demands made by the human in the realm of life. This was the summation of Confucius' personal quest for the true, the beautiful and the good.

II．Laozi's Quest in the Realm of Life


Output: Laozi seems to have upheld an attitude of denial regarding the demands of most people (including the Confucians) for the true, the good and the beautiful. His call to "deny the sages and discard knowledge" (juesheng qizhi ) would seem to be a denial of the quest for ordinary knowledge. His statement that "the five colors blind one's vision" (wuse ling ren mu mang ) is an opposition to the general quest for beauty; and his assertion that "when the Great Way declines, compassion and righteousness come into existence" (dadao fei, you ren yi ) is an opposition to the general moral concept of goodness. Does Laozi therefore not argue for any quest for the true, the good and the beautiful in the human realm? I disagree with this proposition. He called for a quest after such ideals which would transcend the banal, a quest that for him was within a realm "equal with the Way" (tongyu dao ). We can see that Laozi regarded "the Way" as the unity of the true, the good and the beautiful.


Output: The 25th chapter of Dao De Jing (The Classic of the Way and Power ) contains the following passage: "The model for man is the earth, the model for earth is Heaven, the model for Heaven is the Way, and the model for the Way is Nature." This is a description of Laozi's views of the quest of the realm of life. He believed that man's highest ideal was imitation of the Way, while the Way itself was natural and spontaneous. What was the Way he discussed? Dao De Jing contains a number of definitions, but the most basic is of a transcendental highest criterion. 5 Chapter 14 of that classic reads:


Output:
Viewing it, it cannot be seen and so it is described as "beyond color;" listening to it, it cannot be heard and so it is described as "beyond sound;" grasping for it, it cannot be grasped and so it is described as "formless." These three are beyond imagination, all being aspects of the one chaotic whole. Upwardly, it emits no light; downwardly, no darkness. It is endless, so that words cannot describe it, and it returns to nothingness. This is formless form, shape without matter, and is called seemingness. Meeting it, it has no front; pursuing it, it has no rear. Cleave to the eternal Way, to govern what exists in the present; if one can understand its ancient origin, one finds the laws governing the Way.

Examining this we find it contains three levels of meaning:


Output:
i．"The Way" transcends sensory experience and this transcendence is described as "beyond color," "beyond sound" and "formless." Monk Deqing in the Ming Dynasty wrote in his Dao De Jing Jie (Explanation of The Classic of the Way and the Power): "The one chaotic whole" which cannot be imagined is the Way.

ii．While the Way is transcendental, it is nevertheless based on the existence of real things, i.e. "formless form, shape without matter." Wang Bi comments on this line:

One may want to say that it is nothingness, but from it things can be formed; one wants to say that it exists, but one cannot see its form. . . .

That which is without form and without name is the basic principle of the myriad things.

The seemingness" which is formless form and shape without matter can constitute the basic principle underlying the existence of all forms and shapes. Wang Bi comments that "seemingness" means "one cannot grasp and define it."


Output:
In other words, the Way has no specificity. All things which possess specificity fall within the realm of experience and that which lacks specificity transcends experience. In Chapter 21 of Dao De Jing we read:

This Way is seemingness, but within this seemingness forms can be discerned and real things do exist. In this darkness there is essence. This essence is exceptionally real and can be authenticated.

Therefore while the Way lacks specificity, from it all "things" possessing specificity can be formed, and so it constitutes the most real existence, being the noumenon of things.

iii．The Way is the basis of the existence of all things and is the highest criterion of transcendence. "The laws governing the Way" are said to be "principles." 6 "The laws governing the Way" are then the Way as the highest criterion of the myriad things from ancient times to the present.


Output:
The above three points show that Laozi's philosophy was a quest for the origin of Heaven, Earth and the myriad things and for the basis of their existence, from which he created a philosophical system in which the Way was the highest criterion of transcendence. Laozi's discussion of the noumenon of the cosmos in fact falls within the scope of the quest for truth.

Laozi made the Way the highest category in his philosophical system. If man grasped the Way then he grasped the truth, and this was in fact the aim of life. Thus for Laozi "being one with the Way" was the highest aim in life. He said: "Serving the Way is being one with the Way." Wang Bi commented:

The Way relies on non-form and non-action to form the myriad things and so if, in serving the Way, one relies on non-action, then one will be a superior man and teach without words. In the continuity of seeming existence things will follow their reality, and the Way will be one with the body. This is called being one with the Way.


Output: "Being one with the Way" is thus equivalent to being of one body with the Way. It can be seen that Laozi believed that the relationship between man and the Way did not entail man regarding the Way as an ordinary object of cognition (because the Way lacked name and form). Rather it involved man becoming one with the Way. Therefore being one with the Way was merely the highest realm man's life could assume, a realm in which man could transcend the mundane and "acquire the Way" (de Dao ). This was the supreme realm after which Laozi sought.


Output: How then did Laozi regard the good and the beautiful? We know that Laozi regarded the basic character of the Way as "nature and nonaction" (ziran wuwei ), and this then was his criterion for goodness and beauty. He said: "When the Great Way declines, compassion and righteousness arise." Because moral concepts such as compassion and righteousness are man-made, not only are they incompatible with the principles of "nature and non-action," but also destroy the Way. Only when these man-made things are discarded can man acquire true "goodness." Therefore he said: "Only when compassion is terminated and righteousness discarded can people return to genuine filial piety and kindness." Only when all man-made moral concepts are discarded can people return to their natural relationships. Chapter 8 of Dao De Jing contains the following passage:


Output:
Those who possess supreme goodness are like water. Water serves to nourish the myriad things and does not harm them; if one remains in the lowest place that people most loathe, one is closest to the Way.

Ethical persons have the nature of water. Water may benefit the myriad things, but it does not strive for high places. It is content to remain in the lowest place and therefore it approaches the Way. In Chapter 66 we read:

The rivers and oceans are the kings of the waterways, because they choose the lowest places. Because everything flows into them, the oceans and mighty rivers are called the rulers of the valleys.


Output:
This is Laozi's explanation of how persons possessing morality are close to the realm of the Way, while not yet being one with the Way. To use Feng Youlan's exposition of "the four realms" in his Xin Yuanren (A New Exposition of Man ), those who possess the highest goodness belong only to "the realm of morality," while those who are one with the Way belong to "the realm of Heaven and Earth." Thus, in terms of value, the good is on a lower level than the true.

In Chapter 12 of Dao De Jing we read:

The five colors dazzle and blind the eyes; the five sounds deafen the ears; the five flavors numb the palate; indulgence in hunting them leads to dissipation and craziness.

Wang Bi comments:

The eyes, mouths and hearts all follow their own nature; one acts not to follow their nature, then one harms nature, and blindness, deafness, numbness and madness result.


Output:
In other words, the five colors, the five sounds and the five flavors are all "man-made" and have lost the original character of Nature. Laozi regarded plain simplicity as beauty (jian su bao pu ). 7 One should heed what is natural. Artifice results in a loss of the beauty of original nature and a lack of artifice preserves natural beauty. Thus in Chapter 41 of Dao De Jing the following passage occurs:

The supreme note has no sound, the supreme image has no form, the Way loses itself in anonymity, yet it alone excels in starting and completing.

Wang Bi commented:

One listens to the supreme note, but cannot hear it, because it has no sound. A note that has sound will fall, necessarily, into either the second note on the pentatonic scale or the first. When it is thus discriminated, it cannot assemble a crowd. Therefore a note that has sound is not the supreme note.


Output:
If an image has form then there will be discrimination, and if there is discrimination then it will either be warm or burning. If not burning, it will be cold. And so an image that has form is not the supreme image.

All these good things are completed by the Way. In terms of image, it is the supreme image among all images, and is image without form. In terms of note, it is the supreme note among notes, and is the note of silence.


Output:
The music which is one with the Way is supreme music and the image which is one with the Way is supreme image. The supreme music encompasses all music, while the supreme image encompasses all forms. Music is dependent on sound and painting is dependent on form, but for Laozi the supreme music is without sound and the supreme painting lacks all forms. Because lack of sound or form harmonizes with the principles of "nature and non-action," they constitute true beauty. From this we can see that for Laozi the good and the beautiful derive from the true (the Way) and are specific manifestations of the Way. In the final chapter of Dao De Jing , Chapter 81, the following passage occurs:

Fealty words are not beautiful,

Beautiful words are not about fealty.

Good persons don't argue,

Those who argue are not good.

Men of knowledge are without depth,

Those who have depth do not (seek) knowledge.


Output:
Those who have depth do not (seek) knowledge.

I believe that this passage expresses Laozi's hierarchy of the good, the true and the beautiful. "The beautiful" is spoken of in terms of speech(which can stand for literature), "the good" is spoken of in the context of deeds or actions, and "the true" is spoken of in terms of intelligence. "True knowing" is superior to "true goodness," which in turn is superior to "true beauty," thereby creating a hierarchical series of criteria. This is the model of Laozi's quest in the realm of life.


Output: When we say that Laozi's view of "the good, the true and the beautiful" has certain points in common with Hegel's philosophy, we are only saying that there are certain similarities in the arrangement of these three criteria of value orientation. In Hegel's philosophical system, "morality," "art," and "philosophy" all belong to the realm of spiritual philosophy. Spiritual philosophy is the third part of Hegel's philosophical system; it constitutes the third great stage of self-development in the direction of pure spirit—the description of the spiritual stage. The spiritual stage is the unity of the logical and natural stages, and it is self-existing and self-acting. During the transition from self-existing to self-acting, spirit experienced a complicated developing process which consists of three stages: (1) Subjective spirit, (2) Objective spirit, and (3) Absolute spirit. "Morality" belongs to objective spirit. Objective spirit means the spirit that manifested itself in the external objective world, which


Output: itself in the external objective world, which refers not to the natural world, and only to the spiritual world, say, different spheres of human social life and human history. It consists of (1) Abstract law(property law), (2) Morality, and (3) three ethic (family, citizen society, country) developing stages. Objective spirit is inferior to absolute spirit in the stage of spirit development, thus also inferior to "art" and "philosophy" which belong to absolute spirit. To Hegel, both subjective spirit and objective spirit are partial: Subjective spirit such as soul, sense, consciousness, mind, will, etc. is inner conscious state of individuals, not yet actualized as the reality of existence. Objective spirit such as property, law, morality, politics, family, society, country, etc. is objective though, with no self-consciousness. The essence of spirit is unlimited, absolute, and free, therefore it has to keep on developing to avoid the partiality of subjective spirit and objective spirit and to prevent the


Output: spirit and objective spirit and to prevent the incident of their opposition between each other, as a result of which spirit could ascend to the supreme stage. Absolute spirit is the complete and full realization of spirit unto itself. It is both subjective and objective. And apart from taking itself as the object and manifesting its essence self-consciously, it has no other purpose, hence truly unlimited, absolute, and free. "Art," "religion," and "philosophy" as three developing stages of the absolute spirit are identical as far as their contents are concerned, for their differences are only forms. Hegel said: "The element of the universal spirit's existence (Dasein) is characterized by intuition and image in art, feeling and representational thought in religion, and pure and free thought in philosophy." 8 By listing those three stages of absolute spirit as such, Hegel tries to show that the self-realization of absolute spirit also accords to the process from sensuous intuition, through the representational


Output: sensuous intuition, through the representational thought (he also names it as "pictorial thinking"), and to abstract thinking. Therefore, philosophy is the highest, freest, wisest state of absolute spirit. He said, "The most perfect method of knowledge proceeds in the pure form of thought, and here the attitude of man is one of entire freedom." 9 By saying "pure form of thought," he means pure conception and logical category. The sensuous form of art can not fully embody infiniteness, absoluteness and freeness of absolute spirit (idea), because it was confined by the sensuous form somehow. "This at the same time makes it plain that the manifestation of truth in a sensuous form is not truly adequate to the spirit." 10 Only philosophy is the prefect way to realize "truth." According to Hegel's philosophy of mind, "philosophy" is the most accomplished form of truth, the supreme one; and the quest of "beauty" ("art") being the sensuous manifestation of the idea, only in the developing stage, apparently inferior


Output: only in the developing stage, apparently inferior to "philosophy."Being the inner belief of good or bad, "morality" is even inferior to the developing stage of "art." 11 That is to say, as far as the value theory is concerned, Hegel's idea about the sequence of "the true, the good, and the beautiful" can be referred to as "the true ← the beautiful ← the good." In this sense, his point is not the same as Laozi's philosophy, but they share the same view that "the true" is superior to both "the beautiful" and "the good." As we have said before, Chinese traditional philosophy tends to actually reach a kind of spiritual realm of "the true, the good, and the beautiful," while Western philosophy tries to establish a kind of thought system to rationalize the value of "the true, the good, and the beautiful." Arguably, the former is pursuing a kind of enlightenment, and the latter is only discussing about its quest for "knowledge."


Output:
III．Zhuangzi's Quest in the Realm of Life

Like Laozi, Zhuangzi made the Way the highest category in his philosophy, but Zhuangzi's philosophy did not concentrate on proving the limitlessness, absoluteness and eternity of the Way (even though he devoted quite a bit of space in his writings to these questions), but rather on proving the spiritual limitlessness, absoluteness and eternity of those persons, such as perfected men, spirits and sages, who had acquired the Way.


Output: The first chapter of his Zhuangzi is entitled "Roaming Free" (Xiaoyao You ) and the theme of this chapter is a discussion of the question of how man can attain absolute spiritual freedom. According to Zhuangzi, while the roc (peng creature) had a wing span of three thousand li and could rise to a height of ninety thousand li and Liezi could ride on the wind over eight hundred li in a day, actions which would seem sufficiently free, they did not in fact constitute true freedom. For the roc to fly ninety thousand li a vast expanse of space was required; to travel those eight hundred li , Liezi had to rely on the force of the wind. These actions were "conditional" (youdai ), and only the "unconditional" (wudai ) can be described as the attainment of true freedom. Thus he said: "If one is able to follow the laws of nature and grasp the transformations of the six breaths and roam freely in a limitless domain, what does one need to rely on?" Relying on nothing, this "roaming free" was "unconditional." It


Output: this "roaming free" was "unconditional." It constituted absolute freedom. But how could one attain this realm? Zhuangzi believed that ordinary mortals could not attain this realm. Only perfected men, deities and sages could do so, because "perfected men have no self, deities exert no effort and sages know no name." To have no self (wu ji ) is to "extinguish the self" (sang wo ) and in "Discussion of the Equality of Things" (Qiwu Lun ) Zhuangzi wrote: "Now I have extinguished myself." In the chapter entitled "Great Master" (Da Zongshi ) there is a passage which describes "sitting in forgetfulness" (zuowang ), which can be called a description of "having no self" in this realm of absolute freedom:


Output:
"I have made progress," Yan Hui said.

"How have you progressed?" Confucius asked.

"I have forgotten benevolence and righteousness," Yan Hui replied.

"Fine, but that's not enough," Confucius said.

Several days later Yan Hui again saw Confucius, and said, "I have made progress."

"How have you progressed?" Confucius asked.

"I have forgotten the rites and music," Yan Hui replied.

"Fine, but that's not enough," Confucius said.

Several more days passed, and Yan Hui again saw Confucius and announced, "I have made progress."

"How have you progressed?" Confucius asked.

"I sat in forgetfulness," Yan Hui replied.

"What do you mean by saying you sat in forgetfulness?" Confucius asked in alarm.

Yan Hui replied, "My limbs fell away, I cast aside my intelligence, I left behind my body, and I forgot all that I know. I merged with the Great Way. That is what I meant by saying that I sat in forgetfulness."


Output: "To be of one body with the myriad things and to have no preferences, and to participate in the transformations of the myriad things and to depend on no things—this means you have become a sage! I wish to follow in your footsteps."


Output: The realm to which Zhuangzi's "sitting in forgetfulness" belongs is the realm in which he describes one as "transcending self" or "having extinguished the self." In the text quoted above, Yan Hui sets out from a denial of mundane morality, then enters a state in which the various fetters imposed on the spirit by the body and knowledge which befuddles the spirit are all eliminated. He then finally attains a mental realm in which "his body is like desiccated timber and his mind is like cold ashes," a realm which transcends material gain, morality, life and death, and in which there are no restrictions from internal and external truths, untruths, likes, hatreds, beauty, and ugliness. That realm was, moreover, typified by "the oneness of Heaven and Earth" and "unity with the Way." The most significant feature of that realm was "the rejection of knowledge," which was the elimination of all discriminatory and conceptual cognitive activities, what Zhuangzi elsewhere called "mental fasting," or "following the inner


Output: called "mental fasting," or "following the inner channels of the ear and eye, yet being beyond the knowledge of the mind."


Output:
"The perfected men, deities and sages" Zhuangzi describes had all transcended the mundane world in this way and had achieved an absolute spiritual freedom conferred by "sitting in forgetfulness" and "mental fasting." In the chapter entitled "Tian Zifang" we read:

The perfected man looks down from the blue sky above, conceals himself in the Yellow Springs below, and soars in every direction, his expression remaining unchanged.

The "deities" are described in the chapter entitled "Heaven and Earth":

The supreme deities ride on the light and their form vanishes. This is called abandoning space. To exhaust life and scatter the emotions, to share in the delight of Heaven and Earth and to be unencumbered by the myriad things so that the myriad things return to their true feelings—this is called merging with the dark mystery.

In the chapter "Curbing the Mind" we read:


Output:
In the chapter "Curbing the Mind" we read:

The sage in life moves with Heaven and in death blends with external matter. . . . he rejects all knowledge and deceit and follows the constant laws of nature. . . . he is empty and indifferent to gain, and is one with the power of Heaven.

The ability of perfected men, deities and sages to transcend time and space and roam freely beyond the coordinates of space was the result of their ability to "leave their bodies and discard knowledge," to rely in everything on nature and non-action, and to make no demands of the real world. Thus they were able to roam freely in "a land of nothingness." Such roaming could, of course, only take place in the spirit. This spiritual realm of absolute freedom could only be an aesthetic realm of art. In the section entitled "Zhi's Journey to the North" (Zhi Bei You ) we read:


Output:
Heaven and Earth possess great beauty, but speak no language. The seasons move in accordance with clear laws which they do not discuss. The myriad creatures have reasons for their lives but do not speak. The sages can go to the source of the great beauty of Heaven and Earth and commune with the reasons of the myriad creatures, and thus do the perfected men possess non-action. The great sages do not act, and so are said to partake of the reasons of Heaven and Earth.

And in Tian Zifang :

To attain that realm is to gain supreme beauty and supreme joy. The gaining of supreme beauty and roaming in supreme joy define the sage.


Output:
The attaining of "truth" in the above passage admits the sage into the realm where "one can wander in the heart to the beginnings of things." This is the realm of nature's inarticulate non-action. The highest form of beauty is "the supreme beauty of Heaven and Earth." "Sages, the perfected and the divines" are waiting to "go to the source of the beauty of Heaven and Earth" (or "prepared for the beauty of Heaven and Earth"). Because of the very existence of Nature and non-action, "the abandonment of form and the rejection of knowledge," one can gain "ultimate beauty and roam in the midst of ultimate pleasure," this realm of "ultimate beauty and ultimate pleasure" also constituting the highest aesthetic realm of art.

In the philosophy of Zhuangzi the relationship between "truth" and "beauty" is also discussed. There is a passage in "Autumn Floodwaters" (qiushui ):


Output: Horses and oxen have four hooves, which are from Heaven. Bridle the horse's head, and pierce the bull's nostrils, this is the work of a human being. So we say: do not use human powers to destroy Heaven, do not use reason to destroy a good name, and do not use gain to harm the people. If one diligently keeps this rule and does not lose it, this is to return to the Dao .


Output: Zhuangzi's emphasis on "imitating Heaven and respecting truth" (fatian guizhen ) was opposition to all "human actions" (renwei ) which ran counter to original nature. The authenticity of the horse is its "chewing the pasture and drinking water, raising its hooves and shaking them,"but if the horse's head is bridled and the bull's nostrils are pierced, then horses and bulls lose their original nature (authenticity), and lose their freedom, thereby losing beauty and their truth. Truth and beauty are one and the same in Zhuangzi's philosophy, but truth must be "follow the way (Dao ) of nature." "Truth" is defined in the chapter entitled "The Venerable Fisherman" as "the acme of the spirit, and that which is not spirit is not sincere, and so cannot influence man's feelings." The ability to "influence man's feelings" exists when there are true feelings which cause man to gain an appreciation of beauty. "Accomplished beauty is not uniform in its traces," but the most accomplished beauty is not contrived and is


Output: most accomplished beauty is not contrived and is able to freely manifest its authenticity. Therefore Zhuangzi's "quest for truth" was also in order to "seek beauty." If there is no beauty, then there is also no truth to speak of. "The quest for truth" is a quest for a spiritual realm of untrammeled freedom.


Output:
Zhuangzi rarely affirmed morality and his thought was characterized by an anti-ethical trend. He believed that all ethical restraints were "man-made" and that they destroyed man's authenticity. Therefore he opposed "using humaneness and righteousness to transform man's nature." Zhuangzi believed that the realization of the freedom of the individual personality was not only "great beauty" (damei ) but the highest form of "morality" (de ) and supreme goodness (shan ). In the chapter entitled "Curbing the Mind" (Ke Yi ) we read:

If we do not hone the intellect but are noble, if we do not practice humaneness and righteousness but are self-cultivated, if we have no great achievements but rule, if we have no rivers and oceans to roam among but roam as if we did, if we practice no breath techniques but possess longevity, we forget everything and possess nothing, then we have no limits and all beauty follows us. This is the Way of Heaven and Earth and the complete virtue of the sage.

Cheng Xuanying explains:


Output:
Cheng Xuanying explains:

When the heart is not impeded by a single obstacle, and the traces of darkness complement the Five Elements, then we have unlimited peace, are empty and expansive and arrive at the Way that cannot be exhausted. The beauty of true virtue follows and resides in the self.

By this he means that when the mind is not trapped, follows nature and practices non-action, then one sits in forgetfulness, and in total freedom. Thus one attains the ultimate whereby every beauty gathers about and follows the self. This is the movement of natural spontaneity of Heaven and Earth, as well as being the path by which the sage perfects his goodness. According to this interpretation, the "good" for Zhuangzi encompasses the highest beauty ("great beauty") within it.


Output: From the above discussion we can see that in Zhuangzi's philosophy, "the true, the good and the beautiful" are a unity and they are unified in an aesthetic realm of spiritual freedom. Zhuangzi, like Laozi, sought "oneness with the Way," but Laozi's unity with the Way entailed understanding and realizing the Way, which were both epistemological concerns, as well as being a form of philosophical enlightenment. For Zhuangzi, however, "unity with the Way" was an appreciation of, and reflection on the Way, which involved direct aesthetic perception. From this we can see that the question of "the true, the good and the beautiful" in the philosophy of Zhuangzi differed from that in the philosophy of Laozi, and for Zhuangzi "the beautiful" was paramount.


Output: The quest for the good, the true and the beautiful in the philosophical axiology of Western philosophy can be seen to have some points in common with the views of Zhuangzi. The philosophy of Aristotle, and more especially that of Schelling, would seem to be similar to that of Zhuangzi regarding this question.


Output: Regarding the quest for the unity of truth, goodness and beauty, Aristotle stated: "Beauty is goodness, and the keen perception it imparts is in fact because it is goodness." But the manifestation of good conduct and beautiful art requires the cognition of things as its basis. From the perspective of values (axiology), Aristotle did not impart the same significance to goodness, truth and beauty. In demarcating human activities, he believed that of the three activities of cognition, practice and creation, cognition was the highest form of activity, because it was only on the basis of this particular activity that man could confront highest truths. But from the perspective of the products resulting from these three activities, Aristotle believed that the fruits of "the quest for truth" were theoretical sciences (such as mathematics, physics and metaphysics), knowledge for the sake of knowledge; the quests for goodness and beauty yielded the practical sciences (including politics and ethics) and the creative


Output: (including politics and ethics) and the creative sciences (including poetics and rhetoric), all of which have higher external goals. The former directs action, the latter directs creation. Aristotle believed that the basic nature of art was creation. He said: "The arts are a form of creative ability, which encompasses the true process of inference." Here, creative activities become those activities most able to realize man's basic nature, which is logical reasoning (Aristotle once defined the parameters of man's nature as rationality). Accordingly, it would seem that we could say that in Aristotle's philosophy artistic creation which can manifest beauty itself attains the highest value, followed by actions with an external aim (such as moral practice, which belongs to the realm of the "good"), and then followed by knowledge for knowledge's sake which constitutes an activity involving "the quest for truth." 12


Output: Schelling proposed the philosophical problem of "absolute unity." According to his view, "absolute unity" was neither subject nor object, but "the absolute undifferentiated unity of both subject and object." This "unity" can only be realized within an "intellectual direct perception." "Intellectual direct perception" is the activity producing the directly perceived object. The unity of the two (subject and object) is, in fact, an activity of direct perception. By means of direct perception, the ego unites the self with the cosmic spirit which has unconsciously produced the natural world. Schelling believed that even the activity of "intellectual direct perception," which is possible only with a philosophical genius, but not with just any one, cannot be regarded as achieving an absolute unity of subject and object because a discrepancy still exists between the direct perceiver and the directly perceived object (although this directly perceived object is produced by the free action of the direct perceiver).


Output: by the free action of the direct perceiver). Thus, Schelling also believed that only within "the direct perception of art" could a truly undifferentiated absolute unity between subject and object be realized.


Output: This "truly undifferentiated absolute unity" is analogous in some aspects to Zhuangzi's concept of the realm entered through "mental fasting" and "sitting in forgetfulness." Schelling believed that "the direct perception of art" is derived from inspiration and from an intense yearning of great internal power within the inner spirit. This can only be described as a mysterious spiritual realm of direct perception. Thus, for Schelling, art constitutes a supreme undifferentiated ideal world. On the basis of the view that "the direct perception of art" is a higher "intellectual direct perception," Schelling regarded "beauty" as the highest value. As he saw it, "truth" was a question of necessity, "goodness" was a question of freedom, and "beauty" was the synthesis of the two. "Beauty" synthesized in art the scientific knowledge of "truth" and the ethical behavior of "goodness." Schelling said: "I believe that the highest ideal activity encompasses all idealized aesthetic activities. Truth and goodness can only be


Output: activities. Truth and goodness can only be brought into proximity within beauty. Philosophers, like poets, must have aesthetic powers." Thus, from the perspective of the theory of value, "the beautiful" for Schelling constitutes a higher value than "the true" or "the good." 13 This schema reveals some similarities with Zhuangzi's view of these values.


Output: IV．Brief Conclusion


Output: i．In the world of man Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi pursued three different quests, and their philosophies manifest three different value orientations. I believe that in philosophical systems embodying any value we find a quest for the unity of truth, goodness and beauty, but philosophers have different views on how to effect and attain this unity. From the perspective of the development of mankind's culture, we cannot demand that philosophies are similar. In China's pre-Qin period, philosophy richly flowered because of this very diversity of value orientation. Philosophers at that time were able to approach the ultimate questions of life from an unusually broad perspective and realm, and this enabled Chinese philosophy to take its place beside that of other great contemporary cultures, such as Indian and Greek. It is right because it is pluralistic, not monistic. It can quest the issue of ultimate concern about universe and life from different approaches. If the development of pre-Qin philosophy could have


Output: the development of pre-Qin philosophy could have some value nowadays, I believe one of the important elements is its plurality. Plurality of philosophy could make itself fully developed, and "centralization" would only suffocate the vitality of philosophy eventually. Currently, world culture and philosophy are showing the tendency of pluralistic development under the global consciousness; we can follow with this developing tide to establish the Chinese modernized philosophy.


Output: ii．If the historical philosophies could betray its modern implication, and be practiced in reality in society, we have to give them a modern interpretation. The interpretation of the philosophical thought of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi above is an attempt doing this. The interpretation of their thought can only be "both their philosophy and yet not their philosophy." Because what we said in this article is the interpretation derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, and its foundation is the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi, thus we can say it IS "the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi." Also it is "the interpretation derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi," since it is an inferred interpretation, hence it is NOT (or not totally) the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Only by this can we extend the implication of the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Right because it is derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi,


Output: derived from the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi nowadays, the modern implication has actualized, and philosophy has developed. Making a comparative study of the philosophy of Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi from the point of axiology, and revealing their different orientation in the axiology of their philosophy, can not only show us what "plurality" means to the cultural and philosophical development, but also make an example of distinctive type of philosophical system and respective orientation of life value. Meanwhile it can also show our attention and comprehension to "the true, the good, and the beautiful" today. Undoubtedly, this would be very meaningful for the philosophical studies today.


Output: iii．It is significant to understand (interpret, study) the characteristics of Chinese philosophy with Western philosophy as a frame of reference. In the history of traditional Chinese philosophy, although there had never been a particular philosopher who explicitly elaborated on "the true, the good and the beautiful," it on no accounts means these concepts are nowhere to be found in traditional Chinese philosophy. This article is an endeavor to demonstrate the rich content concerning "the true, the good, and the beautiful" in traditional Chinese philosophy, with Western philosophy as a frame of reference. By so doing, the connotations of traditional Chinese philosophy get extended against the background of Western philosophy; the same can be said of Western philosophy as well. In comparison and juxtaposition with each other, the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy and of Western philosophy can be brought into high relief, despite their own peculiarities. Thus the two can be complementary to


Output: Thus the two can be complementary to each other. If we can say the discussion about "the true, the good, and the beautiful" on the part of Western philosophers belongs to the sphere of knowledge (or belief, say, Christianity), the Chinese philosophers' quest in that regard, generally falls within the spiritual realm. All in all, traditional Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy, though each having its own peculiar characteristics, can also enrich and enlighten each other.


Output:
捌　再论中国传统哲学的真善美问题 *

人类的精神生活的最高追求是什么？我想应该是追求“真”“善”“美”，并使三者在一系统中统一起来。当然，什么是“真”，什么是“善”，什么是“美”，不同的思想家的看法肯定是不相同的，而“真”“善”“美”如何统一在一个系统中，更可能是仁者见仁，智者见智了。这样的问题没有办法有什么共同的定论，也不需要有什么定论。但是，人们要去追求真、善、美，思想家们要建构真、善、美统一的系统，则是无可怀疑的。中国传统哲学对人生境界的追求也可以说是中国古代哲学家对真、善、美的追求。过去我写过一篇《论中国传统哲学中的真善美问题》， 1 主要是讨论儒家对真、善、美问题的看法，而且是一种历史性的论述。现在这篇文章将不仅限于儒家，也不想用历史论述的写法，因为那样不易集中，而且文章将会很长。因此，本文将选有代表性的典型哲学家的思想来进行分析。

我国先秦哲学家们的思想一直影响着中国哲学的发展，其中孔子、老子、庄子的思想影响可以说是最大。如果我们把这三位大哲学家作为典型，并通过他们来讨论中国传统哲学中不同类型哲学家的人生境界问题，也许会对中国传统哲学关于人生境界的问题有一总体的了解。

四十年前，沈有鼎先生在英国牛津大学作研究时，曾给国内朋友写过一封信，他在信中说：

康德的价值论和黑格尔的价值论有一个重要不同点，如下所示：

康德：善←美←真

黑格尔：真←美←善

从这里可以看出康德是中国人，黑格尔是印度人（或希腊人）。 2

沈先生的这个论断非常有见地，并富有启发性。从中国传统哲学的主流儒家思想来看确实如此，但如果从中国传统哲学价值论的角度看不同学派或不同哲学家就不全然如此了。照我看，中国传统哲学在真、善、美问题上大体可以分为三大系统，这就是孔子、老子和庄子的思想在真、善、美问题上有如下的不同：

孔子：善←美←真

老子：真←善←美

庄子：美←善←真

照这个图式，如果我们作点比附，大体可以说在真、善、美问题的价值论上，孔子接近于康德，老子接近于黑格尔，庄子从一个有限的方面看则接近于谢林或者亚里士多德。当然比附总是有局限性的，不可能照顾到各个方面，但它或者能给人们提供一个思考的方向。

一、孔子对人生境界的追求


Output:
一、孔子对人生境界的追求

在《论语·为政》篇中记载着孔子的一段话，他说：“吾十有五而志于学，三十而立，四十而不惑，五十而知天命，六十而耳顺，七十而从心所欲不逾矩。”我们知道，孔子和以后的儒家都认为，人们的生死和富贵不是能靠其自身的努力而追求到的，但人们的道德和学问的高低却因其自身努力的不同而有不同。上面引的孔子的那段话可以说是孔子对他一生的生活道路的描述，或者说是他一生修养的过程，也就是孔子本人对真、善、美的追求和了解的过程。从“十有五而志于学”到“四十而不惑”，可以说是他成圣成贤的准备阶段，从“知天命”到“从心所欲不逾矩”可以说是他成圣人的深化过程。“知天命”可以解释为对“天”（宇宙人生的终极关切问题）有了一种认识和了解，这也许可以算是“求真”的范围，因为这一阶段孔子仍然把“天”看成认识的对象，还没有达到“同于天”的阶段，也就是说还没有达到与“天”合一的境界。郭象在《庄子序》中说：“夫庄子者，可谓知本矣……言虽无会而独应者也。夫应而非会，则虽当无用。”盖能与天地万物之本体相应者可谓“知”本。既为“知”本，则仍与天地万物之本体为二，仍把天地万物之本体视为认识的对象，尚未与天地万物之本体会合为一。此境界虽高，但还不能“从心所欲不逾矩”。


Output: “六十而耳顺”，这句话向来有不同解释，杨伯峻先生在《论语译注》中说：“‘耳顺’这两个字很难讲，企图把它讲通的人也有很多，但都觉牵强……”我认为，杨先生的注解大概是符合孔子原意的。晋李充曾说“耳顺”是“心与耳相从”，这也许是杨先生的解释所本。晋孙绰用玄学思想解释这句话说：“耳顺者，废听之理也，朗然自玄悟，不复役而后得，所谓不识不知顺帝之则。”这应是一种超乎经验的直观而得宇宙大全之理的境界，是一种“内在超越”的境界。照现代解释学的看法，凡是对前人思想的解释，都有解释者的意见在内；不过，解释和被解释之间总有某些联系，否则也就无所谓“解释”了。历来的思想家对孔子思想的解释大都如此。这里，我再引用朱熹对这句话的解释，他说：“声入心通，无所违逆，知之之至，不思而得也。”“声入心通”当和“声音”有关（“有声之音”和“无声之音”都可以包括在内）；“知之之至”应是超于“知天命”的境界，这种境界是“不思而得”的，所以是超于认识的。我想，它可以解释为一种直觉的审美境界，它所得到的是一种超乎经验的直觉意象，也可以说是一种艺术的境界、“美”的境界。这种对“六十而耳顺”的解释或许“牵强”，但照杨伯峻的看法，自古以来的“解释”大都牵强，我的这一解释无非是在诸种“牵强”的解释中再增加一种而已。但我自信这种解释不能说全无道理，特别是由哲学的观点看，它或许是有新意的。我们知道，孔子对音乐很有修养，他“在齐闻韶”“三月不知肉味”；“三月不知肉味”自然是“不思而得”的一种极高的审美境界。孔子还对他所达到的这种境界有所说明，他说：“不图为乐之至于斯也。”即想不到听音乐竟能达到如此境界。这种境界是一种超越的美的享受。


Output: “七十而从心所欲不逾矩”，朱熹注说：“矩，法度之器，所以为方者也。随其心之所欲，而自不过于法度，安而行之，不勉而中。”这是一种与天地万物为一体的境界，它是在“知真”“得美”而后达到的一种圆满的“至善”的境界。孔子认为“尽美”比不过“尽善尽美”，《论语·八佾》篇中记载：“子谓韶，‘尽美矣，又尽善也’；谓武，‘尽美矣，未尽善也’。”这里的“尽善”是说“极好”，但说事物“极好”总在一定程度上（至少在儒家那里）是和道德的价值判断联系在一起的。孟子说：“充实之谓美。”此处的“美”实也含有某种道德价值判断的意义。朱熹注说：“力行其善，至于充满而积实，则美在其中，而无待于外矣。”“善”是一种内在的“美”，极高的人格美。看来，朱熹认为“善”从某方面说可以包含“美”。“尽善”之所以高于“尽美”，实因为“尽善”即“尽善尽美”。这里我们似乎可以说，孔子的人生境界（或圣人的境界）是由“知真”“得美”而进于“安而行之，不勉而中”的圆满至善的境界，即由“真”而达于“美”再达于“善”。


Output:
“善←美←真”正是康德哲学的特点。照康德看，实践理性优于思辨理性。他的《纯粹理性批判》所研究的是以理智行使职能的现象界为对象，它受自然的必然律支配；《实践理性批判》所研究的是以理性行使职能的本体为对象，它不受必然律支配，它是自由的。前者是自然，后者是道德。前者属于理论认知的范围，后者属于道德信仰的范围，两者之间无法直接沟通。因此就有一个问题，即如何在理论认知（认识论）与道德信仰（伦理学）之间架起一座桥梁，使之得以沟通，这就是康德哲学所必须解决的一个问题，于是他又写了《判断力批判》。在该书的开头处他写道：“在自然概念的领域，作为感觉界，和自由概念的领域，作为超感觉界之间，虽然固定存在着一不可逾越的鸿沟，以致从前者到后者（即以理性的理论运用为媒介）不可能有过渡，好像是那样分开的两个世界，前者对后者绝不能施加影响；但后者却应该对前者具有影响，这就是说，自由概念应该把它的规律所赋予的目的在感性世界里实现出来；因此，自然界必须能够这样地被思考着：它的形式的合规律性至少对于那些按照自由规律在自然界中实现目的的可能性是互相协应的——因此，我们就必须有一个作为自然界的基础的超感觉界和在实践方面包含于自由概念中的那些东西的统一体的根基。虽然我们对于根基的概念既非理论地、也非实践地得到认识的，它自己没有独特的领域，但它仍使按照这一方面原理的思想形式和按照那一方面原理的思想形式过渡成为可能。” 3 康德认为，正是判断力把理智（纯粹理性）与理性（实践理性）联合起来，而判断力既略带有理智的性质，也略带有理性的性质，又不同于二者。康德把人的心灵分为知、情、意三个部分。有关“知”的部分的认识能力是理智，这是纯粹理性；有关“意”的部分的认识能力是理性，这是超于经验之上的实践理性；有关“情”的部分的认识能力则正是康德所说的“判断力”。由于“情”介于“知”和“意”之间，它像“知”一样地对外物的刺激有所感受，它又像“意”一样地对外物发生一定的作用，所以判断力介于理智与理性之间。

一方面，判断力像理智，它所面对的是个别的局部的现象；另一方面，它又像理性一样，要求个别事物符合于一般的整体的目的。这样，面对局部现象的理解力和面对理念整体的理性，就在判断力上碰头了。判断力要求把个别纳入整体中来思考，所以判断力能够作为桥梁来沟通理智和理性。 4 从而康德建构了他的“善←美←真”哲学的三部曲。


Output:
当然，孔子的哲学和康德的哲学从价值论上看虽然确有其相似之处，但是他们建构哲学的目标则是不相同的。孔子建构的是人生哲学的形态，而康德则要建构一个完满的哲学理论体系。这也许可以视为中西哲学的一点不同吧。如果我们把孔子这一由“知天命”到“耳顺”再到“从心所欲不逾矩”的过程和我们所概括的中国传统哲学关于真、善、美的基本命题相对照，也许可以说“五十而知天命”是追求“天人合一”的层次，“六十而耳顺”是达到“情景合一”的层次，“七十而从心所欲不逾矩”则是实践“知行合一”的层次。

“天人合一”属于“智慧”（知）的方面，“情景合一”属于“欣赏”（情）的方面，“知行合一”则属于“实践”（意）的方面。照儒家看，这三者是不可分的。做人既要了解宇宙大化之流行，又要能欣赏天地造化之功，更应在生活实践中再现宇宙的完美和完善。就以上的分析看，孔子的“知天命”、“耳顺”和“从心所欲不逾矩”都是就人生境界的追求说的，这是孔子对自己追求真、美、善的总结。

二、老子对人生境界的追求

对一般人（包括儒家）所追求的真、善、美，老子似乎都持否定态度。如他说“绝圣弃知”，反对追求一般的知识；“五色令人目盲”，反对一般的对美的追求；“大道废，有仁义”，反对一般的道德观念的“善”。是否老子就不主张追求真、善、美的人生境界呢？我想不是的。他追求的是一种超越世俗的真、善、美，这就是所谓“同于道”的境界。看来，老子把“道”视为真、善、美的统一。

《道德经》第二十五章中说：“人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然。”这可以说是老子对人生境界追求的叙述。他认为，人最高的理想是效法“道”，而“道”是自然而然的。他所说的“道”是什么？在《道德经》中有多种涵义，但最基本的涵义应是指超越性的最高的准则。 5 《道德经》第十四章中说：“视之不见，名曰夷；听之不闻，名曰希；搏之不得，名曰微。此三者不可致诘，故混而为一。其上不皦，其下不昧，绳绳不可名，复归于无物。是谓无状之状，无物之象，是谓惚恍。迎之不见其首，随之不见其后，执古之道，以御今之有。能知古始，是谓道纪。”这段话分析起来有以下三层意思：

1．“道”是超于感官经验的，“无色”（夷）、“无声”（希）、“无形”（微）都是用以说明“道”的超越性。明释德清《道德经解》：“致诘，犹言思议。”“不可致诘”，即不可思议。此“不可致诘”的“混而为一”者就是“道”。


Output:
2．“道”虽是超越性的，但它却是最真实的事物存在的根据，“无状之状，无物之象”。王弼注说：“欲言无耶，而物由以成；欲言有耶，而不见其形”，“无形无名者，万物之宗也”。“宗”者主宰义、根据义。“无状之状，无物之象”的“惚恍”可以作为一切“状”“象”存在之根据。“惚恍”，王弼注谓：“不可得而定也。”这就是说，“道”无规定性。凡有规定性者，均在经验之中；而无规定性者，则超越于经验之外。所以《道德经》第二十一章说：“道之为物，惟恍惟惚。惚兮恍兮，其中有象；恍兮惚兮，其中有物。窈兮冥兮，其中有精；其精甚真，其中有信。”“道”虽无规定性，但可做成一切有规定性之“物”，故为最真实的存在，亦即事物之本体。

3．“道”作为一切事物存在的根据，是就其为超越性的最高准则说的。“纪者，理也。” 6 “道纪”，即“道”作为从古至今天地万物的最高准则。

从以上三点可以说明，老子的哲学是要探求天地万物之本源、存在之根据，从而创造了以“道”为超越性的最高准则的哲学体系。老子的这种对宇宙本体的讨论，实属对终极“真理”探求的范围。

老子把“道”作为他的哲学体系的最高范畴，人掌握了“道”也就是掌握了“真理”，而人生的目的正在于此。因此，老子把“同于道”作为人生的最高追求，他说：“从事于道者同于道。”王弼注说：“道以无形无为成济万物，故从事于道者以无为为君，不言为教，绵绵若存，而物得其真，与道同体，故曰同于道。”“同于道”即是“与道同体”。看来，老子认为人和道的关系不是把“道”作为一般认识的对象（因“道”无名无形），而是应“体道”，即与“道”合一，所以“同于道”只是一种极高的人生境界，一种超越世俗的“得道”的境界。这正是老子所追求的最高境界。


Output:
那么老子对“善”和“美”又如何看呢？我们知道，老子的“道”的基本特性是“自然无为”，所以他也把“自然无为”作为“善”和“美”的标准。他说：“大道废，有仁义。”因为“仁义”等等都是“人为”的，不仅不合“自然无为”的原则，而且破坏了“道”，只有把这些“人为”的东西去掉，人们才可以有真正的“善”，所以他说：“绝仁弃义，民复孝慈。”只有抛弃掉“仁义”等一切“人为”的道德观念，人们才可以恢复自然而然的人际关系。《道德经》第八章中说：“上善若水，水善利万物而不争，处众人之所恶，故几于道。”有道德的人其性如水，水对万物都有利，可是并不争说于万物有利，它能处于在下的地位（第六十六章说：“江海所以能为百谷王者，以其善下之，故能为百谷王”），因此近于“道”。这说明有道德的人只是接近于“道”的境界，而不是“同于道”的境界。如果用冯友兰先生《新原人》中的“四种境界”的说法，“上善”的人只是“道德境界”，而“同于道”者才是“天地境界”。所以，从价值论上看，“善”较“真”为低一层次的。

《道德经》第十二章中说：“五色令人目盲，五音令人耳聋，五味令人口爽，驰骋畋猎令人心发狂。”王弼注说：“耳目口心皆顺其性也，不以顺性命，反以伤自然，故曰盲、聋、爽、狂也。”这就是说，“五色”“五音”“五味”等都是“人为”的，是失去“自然”本性的。老子把朴素看成是“美”，“见素抱朴”， 7 一切都应听其自然，按其本然，有做作则失去其本然之“美”，无做作才可存其自然之“美”。因此《道德经》第四十一章中说：“大音希声，大象无形，道隐无名，夫唯道，善贷且成。”王弼注说：“听之不闻曰希，不可得闻之音也，有声则有分，有分则不宫而商矣，分则不能统众，故有声者非大音也。”“有形则有分，有分者不温则炎，不炎则寒，故象而形者非大象。”“凡此诸善，皆是道之所成也。在象则为大象，而大象无形；在音则为大音，而大音希声。”合乎“道”的音是“大音”，合乎“道”的象是“大象”，“大音”可以统括一切“音”，“大象”可以成就一切“形”。就音乐看必有声音，就绘画看必有图形，但老子认为最高超的音乐应是无声的，最绝妙的绘画应是无形的。因为“无声”“无形”合乎“自然无为”的原则，所以是真正的“美”。从这里看，老子的“善”和“美”都是由“真”（“道”）派生的，都是“道”的特性的表现。《道德经》的最后一章即第八十一章中说：

信言不美，美言不信；

善者不辩，辩者不善；

知者不博，博者不知。


Output:
信言不美，美言不信；

善者不辩，辩者不善；

知者不博，博者不知。

我认为，这一由“美”（言词“美”的标准在于平实）而“善”（行为“善”的标准在于诚实）而“真”（智慧“知”的标准在于真实）也许是老子对“真”“善”“美”的一种次第的安排。“美”是就言词（可作文学的代表）说的，“善”是就行为（可作道德的代表）说的，“知”是就智慧（可作知识的代表）说的。“真知”高于“真善”，又高于“真美”，这样就构成了一个层次的序列。这是老子对人生境界追求的一个模式。


Output: 我们说老子哲学关于真、善、美的看法和黑格尔哲学有某些相似之处，这仅仅是就他们对真、善、美在价值取向的安排上有某些相似之处而言。在黑格尔哲学体系中，“道德”“艺术”“哲学”都是属于精神哲学的范围。精神哲学是黑格尔哲学体系的第三部分，它是对于绝对精神在其自身发展的第三大阶段——精神阶段的描述。精神阶段是逻辑阶段和自然阶段的统一，它是自在而又自为的。精神从自在到自为也有一个复杂的发展过程，这个过程包括三个阶段：（1）主观精神；（2）客观精神；（3）绝对精神。“道德”属于客观的精神。所谓“客观精神”是指精神把自己体现在外在的客观世界中，但这客观世界不是指自然界，而是指具有精神性的世界，即人类社会生活和人类历史的不同领域，它包括：（1）抽象法（财产法）；（2）道德；（3）伦理（家庭、市民社会、国家）三个发展阶段。客观精神在精神发展的阶段上低于绝对精神，因而低于属于绝对精神的“艺术”和“哲学”。照黑格尔看，主观精神和客观精神都各有其片面性：前者如灵魂、感觉、意识、理智、意志等等都是个人的内在的意识状态，没有实现为现实的存在；后者如财产、法律、道德、政治、家庭、社会、国家等等，虽然是客观的，但没有意识到自己。但是，精神的本性是无限的、绝对的、自由的，因而它就必须继续向前发展，以克服主观精神和客观精神的片面性和两者的对立，从而上升到精神的最高阶段。绝对精神是精神对它自己的完全和充分的认识，它既是主体又是客体，它除去以自身为对象和自觉地表现其本质以外，再没有别的目的，从而它是真正无限的、绝对的、自由的。而“艺术”“宗教”“哲学”是绝对精神发展的三个阶段，这三者在内容上是一致的，它们的不同只是在形式方面。黑格尔说：“在艺术中是直观和形象，在宗教中是感情和表象，在哲学中是纯自由思想。” 8 黑格尔如此排列绝对精神发展的三个阶段，是要表明绝对精神对它自身的认识也要遵循从感性直观经过表象（他又称之为“图像式的思维”）上升到抽象思维的过程。所以“哲学”是绝对精神的最高的、最自由的和最智慧的形态。他说：“认识真理最完善的方式，就是思维的纯粹形式（引者按：指纯粹概念、逻辑范畴而言）。人采取纯思维方式时，就最为自由。” 9 艺术的感性形式不能完全体现绝对精神（理念）的无限、绝对和自由，因为它毕竟要受到感性形式的限制，“用感性形式表现真理，还是不能真正适合心灵的表现方式。” 10


Output: 10 只有哲学才是认识“真理”的最完善的形式。从黑格尔的精神哲学看，他把“哲学”作为真理最完善的方式，看成是最高的；而把“美”的追求（“艺术”）作为“理念的感性显现”，视为低于“哲学”的发展阶段；“道德”作为行为主体对善与恶的内在信念，则又低于“艺术”的发展阶段了。 11 这就是说，如果从价值论上看，黑格尔对“真”“善”“美”的看法就是“真←美←善”。这在层次上虽与老子哲学不完全相同，但把“真”看得高于“美”和“善”，则是与老子相同的。不过，正如我们在前面讨论孔子思想时所说，中国传统哲学所注重的是追求一种达到“真”“善”“美”的境界，而西方哲学所注重的是建立一种论证“真”“善”“美”的价值的思想体系。前者可以说主要是追求一种觉悟，而后者则主要是对“知识”的探讨。


Output:
三、庄子对人生境界的追求

和老子一样，庄子也把“道”作为他的哲学的最高范畴，但庄子哲学主要不在于论证“道”的无限性、绝对性和永恒性（虽然他对此也颇花费了不少笔墨），而主要论证的是得道之人（如至人、神人、圣人等）在精神上的无限性、绝对性和永恒性。

《庄子》书的第一篇叫《逍遥游》，这篇的主旨是讨论人如何达到精神上的绝对自由的问题。照庄子看，大鹏击水三千、扶摇九万，列子御风日行八百，看起来是够自由的，但实际上并不是完全自由。大鹏飞行九万里，需要有广大的空间；列子日行八百，也得靠风力。这些都是“有待”的，而只有“无待”才可以说达到真正的自由。所谓“无待”是说不需要任何条件，所以他说：“若夫乘天地之正，而御六气之辩，以游无穷者，彼且恶乎待哉！”这种“逍遥游”是无所待的，从而是绝对和自由的。但是如何才能达到这一无待的绝对自由的境界呢？庄子认为，这不是一般人可以达到的，只有“至人”“神人”“圣人”等才可以达到，因为“至人无己，神人无功，圣人无名”。“无己”就是“丧我”，《齐物论》中说：“今者吾丧我”。在《大宗师》中有一段话讲到“坐忘”，可以说是对“无己”这种精神绝对自由境界的描述：

颜回曰：“回益矣。”仲尼曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回忘仁义矣。”曰：“可矣，犹未也。”他日，复见，曰：“回益矣。”曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回忘礼乐矣。”曰：“可矣，犹未也。”他日，复见，曰：“回益矣。”曰：“何谓也？”曰：“回坐忘矣。”仲尼蹴然曰：“何谓坐忘？”颜回曰：“堕肢体，黜聪明，离形去知，同于大通，此谓坐忘。”仲尼曰：“同则无好也，化则无常也，而果其贤乎！丘也请从而后也。”

庄子“坐忘”的境界就是他所说的“无己”或“丧我”的境界。上引文说明，颜回从否定世俗的道德开始，“忘仁义”“忘礼乐”，进而消除身体对精神的种种束缚，消除知识对精神的困扰，达到“形如槁木，心如死灰”的超脱耳目心意，超功利，超道德，超生死，不受任何内在外在的是非、好恶、美丑等等的限制，和天地融合为一、“同于道”的境界。这一境界以“去知”最为重要，“去知”即去掉分解性和概念性的认识活动，也即庄子“心斋”所谓的“徇耳目内通，而外于心知”。这种纯粹的直觉活动，我们说它是一种审美的活动。

《庄子》书中所描述的“至人”“神人”“圣人”等就是这样一些超越世俗，达到“坐忘”或“心斋”的精神上绝对自由的人。如《田子方》篇中说：


Output:
夫至人者，上窥青天，下潜黄泉，挥斥八极，神气不变。

而所谓“神人”，如《天地》篇所说：

上神乘光，与形灭亡，此谓照旷。致命尽情，天地乐而万事销亡，万物复情，此之谓混溟。

《刻意》篇中说：

圣人之生也天行，其死也物化……去知与故，循天之理……虚无恬淡，乃合天德。

“至人”“神人”“圣人”之所以能超越时空的限制，逍遥游放于六合之外，正因为他们能“离形去知”，一切任其自然而无为，对现实世界无任何要求，从而能逍遥游于“无何有之乡”。这当然只能是精神上的逍遥游放了。这种精神上的绝对自由的境界只能是一种艺术上的审美的境界。《知北游》篇中说：

天地有大美而不言，四时有明法而不议，万物有成理而不说。圣人者，原天地之美而达万物之理。是故圣人无为，大圣不作，观于天地之谓也。

《田子方》篇中说：

夫得是，至美至乐也。得至美而游乎至乐，谓之至人。

“夫得是”按上文是说“游心于物之初”的境界。此境界为不能言说的自然无为的境界。最高的美为“天地之大美”。“圣人”“至人”“神人”等“原天地之美”（或“备于天地之美”），正是由于自然无为，“离形去知”，所以可得“至美而游乎至乐”，这一“至美至乐”的境界也就是极髙的艺术的审美境界。

在庄子哲学中对“真”和“美”的关系也有所讨论，《秋水》篇中说：“牛马四足，是谓天；落马首，穿牛鼻，是谓人。故曰：无以人灭天，无以故灭命，无以得殉名，谨守而勿失，是谓反其真。”所谓“反其真”就是返回到自然而然的本来状态。庄子主张“法天贵真”，反对一切违反自然本性的“人为”。“龁草饮水，翘足而陆”是马之真性，而“落马首，穿牛鼻”使牛马失去其自然本性（真性），这样牛马就没有自由，从而也失去其“美”，失去其“真”。在庄子哲学中“真”与“美”是一致的，而“真”必须是“顺性命之情”的。《渔父》篇中说：“真者，精诚之至也。不精不诚，不能动人。”“能动人”在于有真情，使人得到美的享受。“成功之美，无一其迹也”，最成功的美不是做作的，而是能自由自在地表现其真性情，所以庄子的“求真”也是为了“求美”，无“美”也就无所谓“真”。“求真”是追求一种自由自在的精神境界。


Output:
庄子很少肯定道德，他有反道德的倾向。他认为一切道德规范都是“人为”的，它们破坏人的真性情，所以他反对“以仁义易其性”。庄子认为，个体人格的自由的实现不仅是“大美”，而且是最高的“德”，最髙的“善”。《刻意》篇中说：“若夫不刻意而高，无仁义而修，无功名而治，无江海而闲，不道引而寿，无不忘也，无不有也，澹然无极而众美从之。此天地之道，圣人之德也。”

“澹然无极而众美从之”，成玄英疏说：“心不滞于一方，迹冥符于五行，是以澹然虚旷而其道无穷，万德之美皆从于己也。”此谓心无所执着，自然无为，坐忘无己，自由自在，以达到至极则众美就会聚于己身。这既是天地自然而然的运行，也是圣人成就其善的路径。据此，庄子的“善”是包含在其最高的“美”（大美）之中的。

就上所言，在庄子哲学中“真”“善”“美”是统一的，它们都是统一于精神自由的审美境界上。庄子和老子一样都追求“同于道”，但老子的“同于道”是了解“道”、体会“道”，它仍属于认知的范围，是一种哲理的觉悟；而庄子的“同于道”则是对“道”的欣赏、观照，这就是审美的直觉了。从这里我们可以看出，庄子哲学在“真”“善”“美”问题上和老子不同，他是以“美”为最高。


Output:
西方哲学有两个哲学家从价值论上看在“真”“善”“美”问题上和庄子有某些相似之处，一是亚里士多德，一是谢林，也许谢林与庄子更为相近。亚里士多德哲学追求真、善、美的统一，他说：“美即是善，其所以引起快感正因为它是善”，而善的行为与美的艺术表现则需要以对事物的认识为基础。从价值论的角度看，亚里士多德并没有赋予真、善、美同样的意义。在对人类活动进行划分时，他认为在认识、实践和创造这三种活动中，认识是最高的，因为只有借助这种活动，人才能面对最高真理。但就三种活动的产物而言，在亚里士多德看来，“求真”的活动所得是理论性科学（如数学、物理学、形而上学），只是为知识而知识；“求善”与“求美”的活动所得则是实践性科学（包括政治学、伦理学）和创造性科学（包括诗学和修辞学），它们都有更高的外在目的，前者指导行动，后者指导创造。亚里士多德认为，艺术的本质就是创造。他说：“艺术就是创造能力的一种状况，其中包括真正的推理过程。”这里，创造活动成了最能体现人的本质即理性的活动（亚氏曾将人的本质界定为理性）。据此，我们似乎可以说，在亚里士多德哲学中，表现美的艺术创造从而美本身获得了最高价值，其次是有外在目的的行动（即道德实践，这属于“善”），再次才是为知识而知识的“求真”的活动。 12

谢林的哲学提出“绝对同一”的问题。照他看，“绝对同一”既不是主体，又不是客体，而是“主体和客体的绝对无差别的同一”。要达到这种“同一”只能在一种“理智的直观”中实现。所谓“理智的直观”就是产生直观对象的活动，二者是同一的，这实际上是一种直觉活动。通过这种直觉活动，自我就把自己和无意识地产生自然界的宇宙精神合二而一。谢林认为，这种“理智的直观”不是任何人的意识都可以有的，只有哲学上的天才才能具有。谢林甚至认为，即使“理智的直观”活动也还不算完全地达到了主体和客体的绝对同一，因为在那里还有直观者和被直观者的差别（尽管这个被直观才是直观者的自由活动产生的）。因此，谢林又提出只有在“艺术的直观”中才能真正实现主体与客体的绝对无差别的完全同一。


Output:
这种“绝对无差别的完全同一”很接近于庄子的“心斋”和“坐忘”的境界。谢林认为，“艺术的直观”来自灵感，来自内心精神的一种内在力量的强烈追求。这只能说是一种直觉的神秘的精神境界了。这样，在谢林那里艺术就成了没有差别的至高无上的理想世界。基于这种“艺术的直观”高于“理智的直观”的看法，谢林把“美”视为有最高价值。照他看，“真”是必然性的问题，“善”是自由的问题，而“美”是二者的综合，“美”把“真”的科学知识和“善”的道德行为综合实现于艺术之中。他说：“我相信，最高的理性活动是包括一切理念的审美活动。真和善只有在美中才能接近。哲学家必须像诗人一样，具有审美的能力。”因此，从价值论的方面看，在谢林那里，“美”高于“真”和“善”。 13 这与庄子对“真”“善”“美”问题的看法从价值论上看有相似处。

四、简单结论

1．上述孔子、老子、庄子三种不同的人生境界的追求是三种不同的价值哲学，而这三种哲学表现了三种不同的价值取向。我认为，任何有价值的哲学体系总在追求着“真”“善”“美”的三者的统一，但如何统一以及达到统一的过程并不相同。从人类发展看，我们也不必求其相同。在我们的先秦时代，哲学之所以丰富多彩，正是因为它有着多元化的价值取向。当时的哲人能从非常广阔的领域来讨论宇宙人生终极关切的问题，这样就使得我国的哲学放在当时世界范围内，和世界其他地区（希腊、印度等）相比实不逊色，这正是因为它是“多元”的，而不是“一元”的，它是能从不同的路径来探讨宇宙人生的终极关切问题。如果我们说，我国先秦哲学的发展对我们今天有什么意义，我认为其中重要的一条就是它的“多元化”。哲学的多元化才能使哲学得到充分发展，“一元化”最终将窒息哲学的生命力。当今世界文化与哲学正呈现为全球意识下多元化发展的趋势，我们应顺应这一发展趋势来创造中国的现代化哲学。


Output:
2．对历史上的哲学，如果要使它具有现代意义，能在现实社会中发生作用，就必须给以现代的解释。上面对孔子、老子、庄子哲学思想的解释，就是一种对他们思想的一种现代解释的尝试。对孔子、老子、庄子思想的解释只能是“既是孔子、老子、庄子的哲学，又不是孔子、老子、庄子的哲学”。因为这篇文章中所讲的是根据孔子、老子、庄子哲学引发出来的解释：它的根据是“孔子、老子、庄子的哲学”，因此它是“孔子、老子、庄子的哲学”；它是根据“孔子、老子、庄子哲学引发出来的解释”，既是一种引发出来的解释，因此它又不是（或不全是）孔子、老子、庄子的哲学。只有这样，我们才扩大了孔子、老子、庄子哲学的意义。也正因为它是我们现时代“根据孔子、老子、庄子哲学引发出来的”，所以它才有现代意义，哲学才有发展。我们从价值论方面来比较孔子、老子、庄子的哲学，说明他们的哲学在价值论上的取向不同，除了说明“多元化”对文化和哲学的发展意义之外，还可以为我们提供不同类型的哲学体系的式样和不同取向的人生价值的追求；又可以表示我们今天的一种对“真”“善”“美”的意义的关注和了解。这无疑对我们今日的哲学研究是有意义的。

3．用西方哲学作为参照，来了解（解释、研究）中国哲学的特点应是有重要意义的。在中国传统哲学史上虽然没有哪个哲学家对“真”“善”“美”问题作过专门的讨论，但在中国传统哲学中却不能说不包含“真”“善”“美”的内容。我们用西方哲学作为参照来揭示中国历史上的哲学家的哲学中同样包含着“真”“善”“美”的丰富内容：这一方面，使中国传统哲学从西方哲学的观点来看，它的意义扩大了；另一方面，使西方哲学从中国哲学的观点来看，它的意义也扩大了。虽然中西哲学都有其自身的意义，但是在它们的差异和比较中使它们各自的特性更加鲜明地呈现出来，因而或者可以互相补充。如果说西方哲学家对“真”“善”“美”的问题的讨论，基本上是属于知识（或信仰，如基督教）的问题；那么中国哲学家对“真”“善”“美”的追求，则基本上是属于境界问题。因此，中西哲学各有各的意义，在互相参照中又可以互相发明。

IX．ON THE CLASH AND COEXISTENCE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATIONS

I．"The Clash of Civilizations" and the "New Empire" Theory


Output: In 1993, an essay entitled "Clash of Civilizations?" was published on the summer issue of Foreign Affairs by Samuel Huntington. In 1994, I criticized the American Hegemonism represented by Huntington in an essay titled as "On Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations?'", published in Philosophical Studies 1 . Between the publications of the two essays, Huntington's theory was widely discussed and criticized in all aspects by many scholars at home and abroad. To respond to these challenges as well as to amplify and revise his own theory, Huntington published his chef d'oeuvre, The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order , in 1996, which had marked some changes in his arguments. For example, in the Foreword to the Chinese translation, he writes: "The global politics, for the first time in human history, has become multipolar and multicultural." 2 In the section of "The Commonalities of Civilization," he points out:


Output: Some Americans have promoted multiculturalism at home; some have promoted universalism abroad; and some have done both. Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. Both deny the uniqueness of Western culture. The global monoculturalists want to make the world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make America like the world. A multicultural America is impossible because a non-Western America is not American. A multicultural world is unavoidable because global empire is impossible. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality. 3


Output: Though there are still some arguable points in the above-quoted paragraph, the opinion that "the security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality" is undoubtedly prudent enough. Why did this change occur in Huntington's point of view? It was because he had felt the global challenges and threats endangering the Western (or American de facto ) hegemony, and the domestic problems of racism and the like, that he proposed the "remaking of world order." In the section of "Renewal of the West?" Huntington claims:


Output: The West obviously differs from all other civilizations that have ever existed in that it has had an overwhelming impact on all other civilizations that have existed since 1500. It also inaugurated the process of modernization and industrialization that have become worldwide, and as a result societies in all other civilizations have been attempting to catch up with the West in wealth and modernity. Do these characters of the West, however, mean that its evolution and dynamics as a civilization are fundamentally different from the patterns that have prevailed in all other civilizations? The evidence of history and the judgments of the scholars of the comparative history of civilizations suggest otherwise. The development of the West to date has not deviated significantly from the evolutionary patterns common to civilizations throughout history. The Islamic Resurgence and the economic dynamism of Asia demonstrate that other civilizations are alive and well and at least potentially threatening to the West. A


Output: at least potentially threatening to the West. A major war involving the West and the core states of other civilizations is not inevitable, but it could happen. Alternatively the gradual and irregular decline of the West which started in the early 20th century could continue for decades and perhaps centuries to come. Or the West could go through a period of revival, reverse its declining influence in world affairs, and reconfirm its position as the leader whom other civilizations follow and imitate. 5


Output: We conclude from the above quotation that, on the one hand, Huntington has felt "the gradual and irregular decline" of the Western leadership in the world and the potential threat to the West coming from those countries undergoing or having undergone the process of modernization and industrialization by imitating the West. Surely this is a reality unacceptable for him and some other Western scholars, especially for certain political leaders (Mr. George W. Bush, the current American president, for instance), involved with an unsolvable complex of theirs: why do those resurgent Islamic movements or rising Asian countries which have accepted the western way of modernization and industrialization become a threat to the West instead? According to their reasoning, these countries should and could only play the role of Western adherents or loyal subjects in all spheres, especially in politics and culture. Nevertheless, the reality contradicts their expectations, resulting consequently in an anxiety in the Western


Output: consequently in an anxiety in the Western mind. On the other hand, the deep-seated dream Huntington really cherishes is the "renewal of the West," to "reconfirm its position as the leader whom other civilizations follow and imitate." The performance of the Bush administration after "9.11" incident can be regarded from this standpoint as an attempt to reconfirm American hegemonic leadership on other civilizations.


Output: After Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order , another book, Empire , coauthored by Antonio Negri(Italy) and Michael Hardt (USA), was published in 2000. The basic judgment of this work on current global situation is as follows: "Empire is materializing before our very eyes; it presents its rule as a regime with no territorial or temporal boundaries; this new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire"; "the political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world." 7 Embracing this doctrine, many scholars in the United States propagate the "New Empire" theories. For example, John J. Mearsheimer, professor of politics in the University of Chicago, puts forward in his Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, 2002) the following theory: as every state seeks the maximization of its share of world power, no balancing structure could exist, and the best defense is to offend (which provides a theoretical basis for


Output: to offend (which provides a theoretical basis for President Bush's "Preemptive Strike" theory). Another "post-modern state" theorist is Robert Cooper, Foreign Office adviser of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who divides all states into three types: first, post-modern states, e.g. North American and European countries and Japan; second, modern states, i.e. nation-states like China, India, Brazil and Pakistan; third, pre-modern states, e.g. African and Middle East countries and Afghanistan. A concept put forward and reiterated by Cooper is "New Imperialism," which means post-modern states should use their national power (including military power) to control modern states, meanwhile to contain the barbaric acts in pre-modern states such as mass slaughter. 8 More aggressive still, the American neoconservatists in the 21st century have advocated three core creeds: 1. the extreme adoration of military force; 2. the claim of an American "benign hegemony"; 3. the emphasis on the exportation of American democracy


Output: emphasis on the exportation of American democracy and values. In accordance with this tone, President George W. Bush delivered his speech at the commencement of West Point on June 1, 2002, which could be summarized as three basic principles: first, America should maintain its power of "preemptive strike"; second, American values are universal; third, the United States should maintain an unchallengeable military force. 11 This "New Empire" doctrine would inevitably arouse "clashes" among the states and nations of other civilizations, and its central rhetoric has already been echoed by Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations." Two basic proposals are made in the latter's "Clash of Civilizations?": 1. to "limit the expansion of the military strength in Islamic and Confucian states"; to "maintain the military superiority of the West in East and Southwest Asia"; to "exploit the differences and conflicts among Islamic and Confucian states"; 2. to "strengthen international institutions that reflect and


Output: international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions." 12 From these proposals we conclude that because of the "clashes of civilizations" kindled by the West, headed by the United States, on cultural differences (values, for example), the world has become a pandemonium with the upgrading of regional wars.


Output:
Should civilizations survive only in "clashes," in order to materialize the universal "New Empire" doctrine? Why couldn't they "coexist" in peace?

II．"Coexistence of Civilizations" and New Axial Age


Output: Human history has recorded enough cases of clashes caused by cultural (or religious) differences among states, nations or regions. Nevertheless, in view of the general tendency of history, we find that the development of civilizations among different states, nations and regions should be dominated by mutual absorption and convergence. In my opinion, most conflicts among these states, nations and regions were not provoked by cultural differences. As my knowledge about Western culture (both civilization and culture concern with a comprehensive life style of a nation, thus civilization is a magnified culture) is limited, I am not authoritative enough to speak on this issue. Here I would like to quote Bertrand Russell to justify a proposition that the present Western civilization is formed by absorbing and syncretizing several cultural elements. In 1922, after Russell's visit to China, he wrote in an essay titled as "Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted" the following words:


Output:
Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, medieval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. 14

Though it might be arguable whether Russell was accurate enough on every point of his views, two of which, however, are undoubtedly correct: 1. contacts between different cultures are important dynamics for the progress of human civilizations; 2. the European culture today has absorbed many elements from other national cultures, including some from the Arabian. Another observation based on the progress of Chinese culture would be even more forceful to prove that clashes of civilizations are always temporal, whereas mutual absorption and convergence are far more important.


Output: In Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, different local cultures existed in China, including Central Area (Henan) culture, Qi-Lu (Shandong) culture, Qinlong (Shaanxi) culture, Jingchu (Southern) culture, Wu-Yue (South-east) culture and Ba-Shu (South-west) culture. All of them were amalgamated later into a generally unified Chinese(Huaxia) culture. The possibility of the coexistence of two cultures would be especially illuminated by the importation of Indian Buddhism in the first century AD. Buddhism culture spread in China peacefully; its cultural differences with indigenous Confucianism or Taoism had never brought their disciples into war. Only on three occasions had the Chinese imperial courts suppressed Buddhism, which were caused without exception by political or economic factors. Generally speaking, Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist cultures coexist well in China. A famous French sinologist (Kristofer Schipper) once asked me: "Why is China multicultural?" I pondered for a while and then answered:


Output: I pondered for a while and then answered: Perhaps there are two reasons. First, from the ideological point of view, the Chinese always advocate "harmony in diversity," i.e. the harmonious coexistence of diverse cultures. Secondly, in terms of political systems, the Chinese emperor was the highest authority dominating the fates of religious, philosophical and ethical cultures in China. For the sake of social stability, the emperor did not want to see conflicts or wars provoked by cultural differences. Thus he usually sponsored the "debate of three schools," summoning the representatives of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist scholars to debate in imperial court, arbitrating their respective statuses according to the degree of success in debate, instead of allowing any conflicts or even wars.


Output:
From the above arguments and historical experiences, I conclude that Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory is, at any rate, ex parte , serving merely for American international politics. He says as follows:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. 15


Output: Huntington's observation is insightful in certain cases, such as Palestinian-Israel conflict in the Middle East, Kosovo conflict, or even the Iraqi War, where some cultural (religious and ethical) elements catalyzed the outbursts of wars. Yet in closer analysis, the basic causes of wars or conflicts are not cultural, but political and economic: Palestinian-Israel conflict was a contest for regional hegemony, Iraqi War was mainly for oil, and Kosovo conflict for the strategies of power politics. But on the other hand, cultural differences have not provoked conflicts between many nations, such as in Sino-Indian, Sino-Russian, or even Sino-European relations. In fact, there have been no serious conflicts or wars(for whatever reason) between them, especially in the last decade. Thus the "clash of civilizations" theory hardly fits the present global situation, nor will it be the future perspective of mankind. Instead, the "coexistence of civilizations" should be the only outlet for human society, and a future


Output: the only outlet for human society, and a future goal we should strive for.


Output: Perhaps a clearer picture of our age may help to illuminate this problem. In my opinion, we find ourselves in a New Axial Age.


Output: The idea of Axial Age was proposed by German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883-1969). According to his theory, around 500 BC, great thinkers appeared almost simultaneously in Ancient Greece, Israel, India and China, and they contributed their original ideas to the solution to the problems which are of great concern to humankind. Distinctive cultural traditions were then formed respectively by Socrates and Plato in Ancient Greece, Laozi and Confucius in China, Shakyamuni in India, and Jewish prophets in Israel, which, after more than two thousand years of progress, have become the principal part of human intellectual wealth. These regional cultural traditions were independent in their births and developments, without mutual influence. "Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Period, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Even since then it has been the case that recollections and


Output: then it has been the case that recollections and reawakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Period—renaissances—afford a spiritual impetus." 16 For example, the Europeans in Renaissance had traced the origin of their culture back to Ancient Greece, which had rekindled the European civilization and left its mark in world history. Similarly, the Song and Ming Neo-Confucian thinkers in China, stimulated by the impacts of Indian Buddhism, rediscovered Confucius and Mencius of the pre-Qin Period, and elevated the indigenous Chinese philosophy to a new height. In a certain sense, the current development of world multiculturalism might become a new leap forward on the basis of the Axial Age 2,000 years ago. Has the contemporary human cultures created, or will create, a New Axial Age? Judging from certain evidences, we may well draw such a conclusion.


Output: First of all, since World War II, with the gradual collapse of colonialism, the once colonized and oppressed nations have taken upon themselves an urgent task to re-affirm their independent identities by all means. Their unique cultures (such as languages, religions and social values) were the most important means for this justification. We know that Malaysia after World War II insisted on using Malay as their national tongue to emphasize the nation's unification; and after the establishment of Israel, the Israeli decided to revive Hebrew as a vernacular, though for a long period of time in the past, Hebrew had only been used in religious ceremonies. "The central elements of any culture or civilization are language and religion." 17 Some political leaders and scholars in Eastern countries also put forward the "Asian values" centered on community to distinguish themselves from the Western "universal values" centered on individual. So on and so forth. Even Huntington began to understand that "non-Western


Output: Huntington began to understand that "non-Western civilizations generally are re-affirming the value of their own cultures." 18


Output:
Secondly, the Axial Age around 500 BC was a time when axial civilizations entered the Iron Age, and a time of great leaps forward in productivity, which in consequence produced great thinkers. Now we have entered the Information Age, when another great leap forward in human society is just happening. Because of the economic globalization, the integration of science and technology, and the progress of information network, different regions all over the world are tightly connected, and local cultural progress could no longer be independent as they once were in the "Axial Age" two thousand years ago. Instead, they will be developed in the midst of discords, conflicts, and through mutual influences or mutual absorptions. The self-understanding of each culture is undoubtedly limited, as is described in a famous poem of Su Shi (1037-1101):

They know not Lushan Mountain's real face;

So long as they continue to stay in her embrace. 22


Output: This couplet tells us, a different perspective from another cultural system, i.e. from a cultural "other," might provide us with a more comprehensive view of our own culture. In an essay entitled "Why Is China Necessary for Us Westerners in Studying Philosophy?", FranÇois Jullien, a French scholar, writes: "We have chosen departure, which means a choice for leaving here, in order to create a space for thinking from a distant perspective. This detour in steady steps distinguishes itself from exoticism. We have made our trip traversing China in this manner in order to better understand Greece, which, though curtained off from our knowledge by a lapse of time, is something inborn and inherited by us through birthright. For the purpose of enhancing this perspective, we have to cut off this umbilical cord and constitute an exterior viewpoint." 23 This kind of intercultural study in the spirit of intersubjectivity and inter-reference, together with its methodology of judging one's own culture from the standpoint


Output: of judging one's own culture from the standpoint of a culture "other," is gradually accepted by scholars at home and abroad. Why, then, should we understand our culture from another's perspective? Just because we desire to inherit and develop the cultural tradition of our own. In this case, it undoubtedly becomes a serious problem in how to preserve the proper traits of a culture and pass on its lifeline. As we know, economy can be globalized, science and technology can be integrated, but cultures can never be monoculturalized. In the history of the progress of human society to date, it is neither possible nor wise enough for any culture to reject all external influences; but only when the essence of the target culture is sufficiently digested could it better absorb foreign cultures to nourish its domestic culture. "When we keep in contacts and exchanges with Western world," Mr. Fei Xiaotong said, "we should make our own treasures part of the world cultural heritage. Indigenization first, globalization


Output: heritage. Indigenization first, globalization second." 24 That is to say, our own cultural root should be protected when learning from other cultures. Thus, the cultural progress in the 21st century concerning all human societies should be both national and universal.


Output: Thirdly, judging from the status quo of human societies and cultures, a new pattern of cultural diversity with a global consciousness has already been formed or is still being formed. Perhaps the 21st century would be dominated by four principal cultural systems: the Euro-American, the East Asian, the South Asian, and the Islamic (Middle Eastern and North African). Each of the four cultures has a long tradition and a population of over a billion. Of course there are other cultures influencing the future of human society in the 21st century as well, for example, the Latin American and the African; nevertheless, at least in the present, the influence of these cultures are far less than that of the four principal cultures mentioned above. If human society hopes to terminate the present chaos, it should especially criticize the cultural Hegemonism and cultural Tribalism, it should not only face this new cultural Axial Age but also make unremitting efforts to promote the dialogues among states or nations


Output: to promote the dialogues among states or nations belonging to different cultural traditions, in order to coordinate all the cultures into a project of solving the common problems challenging human society. Undoubtedly, the four principal cultures are burdened with a major responsibility for the current human society. At present, human society is standing on a historic turning point, and every nation or country should seriously reexamine its own culture in the historical perspective. This is especially true for those nations in Euro-American, East Asian, South Asian or Islamic cultural regions, because of the crucial functions they perform in contemporary human civilization. This kind of reexamination is surely quite necessary for the future of human society. The culture tradition is a reality de facto for every nation or state, especially for those nations and states with a long history and having crucial influence on contemporary human society, for it is deeply rooted in the hearts of its people, forming


Output: rooted in the hearts of its people, forming the spiritual prop of this particular nation or state.


Output:
Let us return to our own cultural tradition, make it a starting point, and seek in it the source of our power and our spiritual prop, in order to promote the development of our contemporary culture, and to solve the pressing problems existing in human society. In this sense, the Euro-American, East Asian, South Asian and Islamic cultures, with their long historical traditions, might help to promote the human society in the 21st century to the level of a "New Axial Age," comparable to the Axial Age 2,500 years ago. Different cultural traditions would subsist in this New Axial Age, each with a population too large to be eliminated—even with wars, there would be only little or temporary effects. Thus, in the long run, the coexistence of civilizations is predictable.

Ш．Can Chinese Culture Make Contributions to the Coexistence of Civilizations?


Output: If Chinese people want to make contributions to the "coexistence of civilizations" in contemporary human society, they must first know their own culture well, which means they must have a cultural self-consciousness. The so-called "cultural self-consciousness" refers to the fact that people in a certain cultural tradition can give serious consideration or make earnest reexamination of their own culture's origin, history, characteristics (including both merits and weakness) and its tendency of progress. It is fair to say that the Chinese nation is on the eve of a national renewal. To achieve this goal, we must have some self-knowledge about Chinese culture, make a proper estimation of its place in human civilizations, and try to ascertain the genuine spirit of this ancient culture, in order to present its true essence to contemporary human society. On the other hand, we must analyze the weak points of our own culture as well, to better absorb other cultures' essences, and to give a modern reinterpretation of


Output: and to give a modern reinterpretation of Chinese culture, so that it can adapt to the general tendency in the development of modern society. Only in this way may our country become a vanguard in the development of a global culture, and create a brave new world together with other cultures.


Output:
Confucianism and Taoism were two principal schools of thinking in traditional Chinese culture, and generally considered to be complementary to each other. Of course, since Indian Buddhism was introduced into China, Buddhism has also played an important role in Chinese society and culture. Now I would like to discuss whether the Confucian and Taoist thinking can provide meaningful resources to the doctrine of "coexistence of civilizations."

i．The Confucian Doctrine of Ren (仁，benevolence, virtue) Is a Resource of Thinking with a Positive Meaning for the "Coexistence of Civilizations."


Output: "The Way originates in Emotion" (道始于情), as prescribed in "Destiny is the resource of Human nature" (性自命出), a manuscript text in Guodian Bamboo Slips (《郭店竹简》). "The Way" here means "the Way of Humanity" (人道), i.e. the principles in dealing with human(or in other words, social) relationships, which is different from "the Way of Heaven" (天道), i.e. the laws of nature or of universe. Human relationships are established on the basis of emotion, which is the starting point of the Confucian doctrine of Ren . Once a disciple named Fan Chi asked Confucius: "What is Ren ?" The answer was: "To love people." Where is the origin of this idea—"to love people"? In The Doctrine of the Mean a saying of Confucius was quoted as: " Ren is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives." 27 The spirit of Benevolence and Love (仁爱) is rooted in human nature, and to love one's relative is the most basic exercise of it. But the spirit of Ren goes far beyond this level. To quote Guodian


Output: Ren goes far beyond this level. To quote Guodian Bamboo Slips : "To love and love deep, that is love; but to enlarge the love for one's father to the love for human being, that is Ren ." 28 "The enlargement of filial piety is to love all the people below Heaven." 29 From these sayings we observe that the Confucian Doctrine of Ren demands to enlarge "the love for relatives" to "the benevolence on people," i.e. to "enlarge one's self-concern to the concern for others" (推己及人), to "treat with the reverence the elders in your own family, so that the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated; to treat with the kindness due to youth the young in your own family, so that the young in the families of others shall be similarly treated" 30 —that is Ren . It is not easy to practice the doctrine of "enlarging one's self-concern to the concern for others," which requires a "practice of Ren " rooted in "the Way of Loyalty and Forgiveness" (忠恕之道), i.e. "never do to others as you do not wish done on


Output: "never do to others as you do not wish done on yourself," 31 "wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others." 32 ("Loyalty is the complete devotion of oneself; forgiveness is the deduction of one's self-concern"朱熹：《四书集注》).


Output: If Ren is to be extended to the whole society, it would be as what Confucius once said: "To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a junzi (君子: gentleman, nobleman) can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under Heaven will return to Ren (after his example). Is the practice of Ren from a man himself, or is it from others?" 33 "To subdue one's self" and "to return to propriety" are usually interpreted as two parallel teachings, but I do not consider this the best explanation of this doctrine. "To subdue one's self and return to propriety is perfect virtue" actually means the behavior of "returning to propriety" based on the "subduing of one's self" can be regarded as Ren . Mr. Fei Xiaotong had his own interpretation about this doctrine: "Only after one has subdued one's self could one return to propriety. The return to propriety is the prerequisite for one to enter the society and become a social man. Perhaps it is just on this point Western and Eastern