Output: As far as we know, traditional Chinese philosophy, Confucianist philosophy in particular, is strikingly different from Western philosophy and religion. The Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle had already divided the world into two parts: a transcendental noumenon and a real world. Thereafter Christianity was concerned especially with an outer transcendent God, whereas traditional Chinese philosophy was characterized by "inner transcendence." What Confucius means by "nature and the doctrine of Heaven" is a matter of inner transcendence, and what Mencius meant by "thinking hard, knowing nature and Heaven" is also a matter of "inner transcendence." There is a sentence in Xici saying: "A feminine (yin ) and a masculine (yang ) equal a world, and it is followed by virtue (shan ) and will have a nature," which is a matter of "inner transcendence." According to this, one may reach a realm leading to a transcendental "way of Heaven" through one's own inner moral cultivation, without the help of an outer


Output: moral cultivation, without the help of an outer transcendent power. But for Ricci, one can hardly reach the culminating realm just through one's inner moral cultivation; one must be pushed by an outer transcendent power or God; thus it is necessary to believe in God. That is to say, Ricci considers the doctrines of Catholicism to be more perfect than those of Confucianism.


Output:
iv．Concordance with Confucianism (furu)

This concept means that it is necessary to make some revisions of the Catholic doctrines or to yield to some of the Confucianist ideas in order to concord or chime in with China's traditional Confucianist thought. The editor's Preface to the French 1978 edition of Lettere dalla China says:


Output: Immediately before Ricci's death, the methods adopted by the Chinese missionary group led by him had already become an issue argued both at home and abroad. It was disputed with two objections. In practice, he was accused of paying too much attention to developing his relation to the Confucianist elite instead of pushing forward the missionary cause. In theory, he was also opposed for his positive evaluation of Confucianism. Some people even pointed out that, if so, it would run a risk of sullying the purity of Christianity. Only by means of a heightened religious emphasis can the missionary preach the Gospel to the broad masses of people and make evident the characteristics of Christianity. 13


Output:
I have already pointed out that Matteo Ricci had some opinions of China's Confucianist tradition and attempted to link Western and Eastern cultures. Naturally, he knew clearly that there were many differences and conflicts between Confucianism and Catholicism and probably would have dealt with these by the methods of "complementing Confucianism" and "transcending Confucianism." If his missionary work were completely according to Catholic doctrines, however, he would have been confronted with more difficulties. Therefore, he had to make some revisions of the Catholic doctrines so as to cater to the Chinese tradition and it is not strange that he was criticized. As to how he adapted Catholicism to Confucianism, the following should be noted.

(1) In order to fit Catholicism to Chinese society, he explained its differences from Chinese society. In the Italian edition of his Lettere dalla China , there is a passage describing how the Confucianist offers sacrifices to gods.


Output: However, according to an old law, there is a grand Confucian temple in every big city where the literati gather, with a figure of Confucius enshrined and his name; every year, the literati offer sacrifices to him four times, with a candle burning and a beast is killed. However, as they do not think of him as godly or want anything of him, such a rite cannot be called a real offering. 14


Output: In Matteo Ricci's books, there are many signs of the Catholic stance against idolatry; the criticism of Buddhist idolatry is particularly strong. However, he never criticizes Confucian offerings to the Sage, nor does he criticize the Chinese offerings to their ancestors. The issue concerning offerings is an important reason why China later forbad the preaching of Catholicism. In 1704, the Vatican gave orders that Chinese Catholics should not follow traditional Chinese rites that did not conform to Catholicism. Obviously, offering sacrifices to Confucius as well as to ancestors is especially counter to Catholicism; this led the Chinese government to limit and even forbid the preaching of Catholicism. Since Matteo Ricci well understood Chinese conditions, he adopted the method of compromising with the Chinese tradition for the sake of adapting to Chinese society as well as his missionary work, although the attempts did not conform to the doctrines of Catholicism.


Output: (2) He makes some Catholic ideas conform to traditional Chinese Confucianist thought so as to enable the Chinese to accept Catholicism. As mentioned previously, the "Lord of Heaven" in Catholicism is, of course, the supreme personified God, but Ricci's The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven does not mean this according to its original title. In that book he often uses such words as "God" and "Heaven" of Chinese origin, instead of the "Lord of Heaven." According to Fang Hao's Collected Essays on the History of Chinese Catholicism , in contrast to the edition of the Ming Dynasty, it is found that the later edition has changed the words "God" or "Heaven" in the Ming to "Lord of Heaven" or "Supreme Lord" in 79 places. 15 In the Chinese language there are already such words as "God" (shangdi ) and "Heaven" (tian ), but in traditional Chinese thought tian has several meanings. Among these Ricci takes the meanings "God," "Heaven" and the supreme personified God, but for the Chinese people there may be some other


Output: for the Chinese people there may be some other meanings. In 1715, after Ricci's death, the Pope gave an edict that the name "Lord of Heaven" was a legal one and such names as "God" and "Heaven" should no longer be used because they could be interpreted in different ways.


Output: Also, according to Professor Luo Guang, "Ricci's Twenty-five Sayings from Epictetus is actually composed of 25 chapters. Every chapter is short and concise. It advises people to live simply and to restrain desire and feeling. Happiness lies in one's secure state of mind without being stirred either by good fortune or misfortune. The purpose of human life lies in one's obedience to the Lord of Heaven. . ." It is apparent then that the book is intended to conform to Chinese conditions.


Output: (3) Ricci made some revisions in the "idea of sin" in order that it should approach more closely the "idea of virtue" in China's Confucianist tradition. As the "idea of sin" in Catholicism implies, human nature cannot be considered "virtuous," which is entirely different from the "idea of human nature being virtuous" in China's traditional Confucianist thought. In accordance with St. Augustine's interpretation, man is born to be "sinful" because of his rational choice. In the final analysis, what causes man to choose evil with reason is his vanity, or an ego-centric desire that puts himself over God. Such a desire usually drives him into following his own intention and holding in contempt God's decree, which is particularly apparent in human desire. Augustine then adds that, since man intentionally chooses evil and commits sins violating God, he can never recover his original state with his own effort. For such a "sin" causes him to degenerate inevitably, being characteristically ego-centric in willing and


Output: characteristically ego-centric in willing and desiring and able only to choose "committing sin" or tending to "evil."


Output: In this regard in the 7th discourse of The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven , Ricci thinks that the "human nature" refers to what differentiates man from metal and stone, grass and wood, bird, beast and even spirit, and this is why man "can reason things out." So he says: "What can reason things out is alone called human nature, which is different from other creatures." "Virtue and morality come after reason, which itself is something dependent, and not human nature itself." Thus, "reasoning things out" refers simply to this virtuous "ability," and "human nature is born to be virtuous." This obviously caters to Confucianist ideas. But since Matteo Ricci could not completely violate the doctrines of the Lord of Heaven, he thinks that man is "able to reason things out." How can he get such an ability? Just as farmers plough, weed, remove the stones and irrigate before they sow seeds in order to get good harvests, so "learners should first of all get rid of evil before they could be virtuous. Only by standing


Output: before they could be virtuous. Only by standing aloof from worldly success can they be successful." As this idea is associated with that of "sin" in Catholicism, it could not but conflict with the so-called idea of "good ability." Thus it is quite difficult to reconcile one cultural tradition with another.


Output:
From the above four points we can see that Matteo Ricci preached the doctrines of Catholicism for the purpose of linking Oriental and Occidental culture together. Whether his attempt was successful or not will not be evaluated here, but that he was the very first Westerner to make such an attempt is certainly of historical importance.

II． "Body and Use" and the Correlation of Chinese and Western Harmony


Output: In trying to link Western and Chinese culture, often we encounter the problem of the "body and use" (tiyong ), of Chinese learning and Western learning. In preaching Catholicism in China, Matteo Ricci could not but consider his relation to traditional Chinese thought and culture. Similarly, in receiving Catholicism, the Chinese had to consider such a relation. Above I have discussed how he dealt with this problem. Now let us consider how the Chinese intellectuals at the time received Catholicism. In my opinion, such receivers of Catholicism at the time as Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao and others in receiving or studying Western learning took the attitude: "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use." We know that although the Protestants were active at that time even at the court in Beijing, yet "the Chinese court made use of them only by employing their techniques." "For example, Ricci once repaired clocks and other machines in the court, and Tang Ruowang (Johann Adam Schall von Bell), Nan Huairen


Output: (Johann Adam Schall von Bell), Nan Huairen (Ferdinand Verbiest) and others joined in revising the calendar." "What China's enlightened literati were particularly interested in was to learn from them their science and knowledge." "They did not have great success in shaping China's intellectuals," 16 for few Chinese intellectuals received the doctrines of Catholicism. As these were received chiefly due to his association with traditional Chinese thought, especially the Confucianist morality, his attempt can be regarded as another earlier form of "regarding Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use" formulated in the 1860s.


Output: During subsequent centuries there have been various attempts to correlate "Chinese learning" and "Western learning" with that between "body" (ti ) and "use" (yong ), such as "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use," or "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use" and even "both the learnings as body and for use interchangeably." Those who regard "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use" are called "all-Westernizers" (quanpan xihua pai ); those who regard "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use" are called "Chinese culture supremacists" (guocui pai ). Such confusions are caused by the attempt to describe the relationship between "Chinese learning" and "Western learning" with that between "body and use." As a matter of fact, none of the above ideas are tenable.


Output: As a pair of important categories in the history of Chinese philosophy, "body" and "use" are not substantial categories, but rather fundamental relations. "Body" (ti ) generally refers to the "inner transcendental spirit" or "transcendental noumenon." It corresponds to what Mencius means by "conscience" (liangzhi or liangneng ) and Wang Yangming by "mind" (xin ), etc.; the latter corresponds to "God's will" (tianming ), " taiji ," "God's word" (tianli ) and "logos" (dao ), etc. "Use" (yong ) refers to the various functions demonstrated by such an "inner transcendental spirit" or "transcendental noumenon." According to traditional Chinese philosophy, ti and yong are unified, with the former presenting the latter for, as Wang Bi in the Wei-Jin dynasties pointed out, there would be no corresponding yong without ti . The so-called concept of "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use" is nothing but an effort to preserve the inner transcendental noumenon in Chinese tradition, so as to reject the


Output: in Chinese tradition, so as to reject the Western spirit. For how could we make "Western learning for use" if we should do like that? Similarly, it is impossible to regard "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use." The former will inevitably result in "Chinese learning both as body and for use" and, the latter, "Western learning both as body and for use."


Output: As for "both the learnings as body and for use interchangeably," it can be interpreted as: if something in Chinese learning is good we should regard "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use"; also, if something in Western learning is good we should in turn regard "Western learning as body and Chinese learning for use." Such an idea is obviously untenable. It will do nothing but include both attitudes in the so-called concept of regarding "both learnings as body and for use interchangeably," which is just eclectic. Professor Fang Keli involves himself in a confused eclectic situation although he criticizes the above two attitudes in his "'Chinese Learning as Body and Western Learning for Use' and 'Western Learning as Body and Chinese Learning for Use.'" 17


Output: It would give rise to "stealthily substituting one culture for another" if we use the relation of tiyong to explain the relationship between Chinese culture and Western culture. If we do not improve the cultural soil and other conditions, but just stealthily substitute one culture for another, the cultural foundation will not be solid. Thus to my mind, our modern society should have its modern spirit and various systems embodying such a spirit. If we use the relation of tiyong to explain this problem, we might probably regard "the modern spirit as body and the systems and their functions embodying such a spirit for use." If so, one might ask: what is the "modern spirit"? And what are the "systems and their functions embodying the spirit"? Here I would refer to the point of view put forward by Mr. Yan Fu, who once criticized the idea of regarding "Chinese learning as body and Western learning for use." He also points out that body and use should be unified rather than dual. Particularly, he lays emphasis on


Output: than dual. Particularly, he lays emphasis on the significance of science and puts forward a very meaningful proposition: "liberty as body and democracy for use." I do think that such an idea of his is probably of certain modern significance. So in my opinion, "liberty" is the concentrative embodiment of the modern spirit, or an inner spirit in the modern era and a universal ideal that the people in modern society are pursuing; whereas "democracy" consists of various systems of modern society ensuring everyone "liberty," rather than certain people only. We now live in Chinese society. It is most important to give everyone "liberty" and have a set of democratic systems ensuring its realization if we want to enable our society to become modernized. Only in this way, can people give full play to their enthusiasm and creativity, and our country set foot on the road not only of the "four modernization" but also of all-around modernization.


Output:
陆　论利玛窦汇合东西文化的尝试 *

从历史上看，一种外来文化在它开始传入另一国家或民族时，必然会遇到如何对待原有文化传统的问题。如果想使外来文化在所传入的国家或民族能比较容易流传和发生影响，就必须与原有文化有所认同。利玛窦对中国传统文化持什么态度，其目的虽与他的传教有关，但是在他与中国文化（主要是儒家思想）接触的过程中，对中国文化有了相当的了解，并对儒家文化的价值有了肯定的正面认识。因此，利玛窦的传教活动就涉及文化史上的一重要问题：即如何调和两种不同背景的文化传统，它们不仅是接触而且是融会贯通成为一体。这就是文化的移植问题。利玛窦很可能了解解决这个问题的重要意义。因此，在总体上利玛窦对儒家文化采取了肯定的态度。这个问题我们可以从两个方面来看：一是看看利玛窦本人对此问题的说法；二是看看当时或稍后的知识分子（士大夫）对利玛窦是如何看的。

利玛窦不仅精通汉语，而且懂得中国的礼仪和风俗，他不仅全身着儒装，头戴方巾，自称“西儒”，而且见客时用秀才礼节。他对中国典籍进行了深入钻研，认为孔子是一位博学的伟大人物；他翻译了《四书》，认为《四书》“是四位很好的哲学家写的，书里有很多合理的伦理思想”， 1 因此他认为“仅知道我们的学术，不通晓他们的学术，毫无用处”。 2

那么利玛窦如何看待中国文化呢？在1609年2月15日他给另一位传教士的信中说：

“正如我逐步说明的那样，他们（按：指中国人）同样地倾慕着孝道，尽管其他人可以持相反的看法。如果从头说起，他们在古代就像在我们的国家里那样忠诚地遵循自然法则。在1500年中间，这一民族简直没有崇拜过偶像，而他们崇拜的那些偶像也不像我们的埃及人、希腊人和罗马人的偶像那样可憎。某些神灵甚至很有德性，并以他们的善行而享有盛名。事实上，在文人们最古老的、成为权威的著作中也仅仅崇拜天地和这两者的共同主宰。当我们仔细研究一下所有这些著作时，我们就会发现其中很少有什么东西是和理性之光相反的，而大量的倒是与之相一致的，他们的自然哲学家并不比任何人差。” 3


Output:
从上面引的这段话中，我们可以看出：（1）利玛窦对中国传统文化，主要是儒家思想有比较深入的了解。中国古代社会是以宗法制为纽带的，所以重孝道，以“亲亲”为原则，所以“自然法则”（按：罗光《利玛窦传》译为“天理”）也是带有某种道德性的，而中国对天地和祖先的崇拜也只是某种道德性的，所以是合乎“理性”的。可见利玛窦对中国文化有相当认识，所以他不把儒家看成是一种宗教，而以为它是建立在“自然法则”基础上的哲学。（2）利玛窦对中国的儒家文化的评价是很高的。他认为，中国古代文化在对偶像崇拜上不像埃及人、希腊人和罗马人那样，所以中国古代哲学在讲人性天理的问题上超西方古代。他在回答徐光启时有一段话可以说明他对中国文化的看法，他说：“比至中华，获瞻仁义礼乐声明文物之盛，如复拨云雾见青天焉。” 4 我想，这一点是与天主教也把反对偶像崇拜和伦理道德问题看得很重有关。所以利玛窦极力反对佛教和道教的偶像崇拜，而不把对孔圣人的崇拜和祖先崇拜看成为偶像崇拜。因此，我们可以说，利玛窦对中国文化的正统儒家思想从总体上是肯定的和赞赏的。

徐光启由于结识利玛窦而信奉了天主教，他很敬重利玛窦的学问和道德，说利玛窦的言谈“百千万言中，求一语不合忠孝大旨，求一语无益于人心世道者，竟不可得。” 5 徐光启看重“忠孝”实是深受中国传统思想的影响，谓利玛窦所传天主教义之基本点亦在“忠孝”，利玛窦接受中华文化当是事实。在《畸人十篇》中有一段记录龚大参对利玛窦言论评论的话说：

“窃听精论，即心思吾中国经书与贵邦经典，相应相证，信真圣人者，自东自西，自南自北，其致一耳。” 6

以上中国学者大都认为利玛窦所宣讲的学说和中国传统思想，特别是儒家思想相合，而最基本的相合点就在“忠孝大旨”。我们知道，当时的中国知识分子对利玛窦的天文、历算、科技等知识虽甚看重，但他们更为重视的实是利玛窦所言与中国文化相合者。这也许正是“中学为体，西学为用”的一种最早表现形式，这个问题我们后面再讨论。

一、天主教与儒家文化汇合的尝试


Output:
一、天主教与儒家文化汇合的尝试

从以上两个方面看，利玛窦在中国传教时，实际上在作着使东西文化汇合的尝试。有了这个前提，我们就可以进而讨论利玛窦汇合东西文化的尝试了。我以为，利玛窦采用了“合儒”，即以天主教义与儒家学说相合；“补懦”，天主教义可以补充儒家学说；“超儒”，天主教义某些方面超过儒家学说；“附儒”，对天主教义作某些修改，以附会儒家思想。利玛窦大体从这些方面搜东西文化的结合部。

1．合儒

利玛窦有三部讲天主教教义的重要著作：《天主实义》《畸人篇》《二十五言》。《天主实义》这部书原名《天学实义》，看来利玛窦最初考虑避免用中国原来没有的“天主”这一名称，而“天学”本身又无多大宗教性，中国较易接受。冯应京序中对这部书有如下的说明：

“《天主实义》，大西国利子及其乡会友，与吾中国人问答之词也。天主何，上帝也；实云者，不空也。……是书也，历引吾六经之语，以证其实，而深诋谭空之误。”

明版《天主实义》多用“上帝”与“天”之名命名“天主”或“上主”，而今本多改“上帝”与“天”为“天主”或“上主”，可见利玛窦为使中国人便于接受，采用了“上帝”或“天”这样中国原有的名称。对中国人来说，古代有祭天、祭社稷、祭祖先，但没有对“天主”的崇拜，对这个问题利玛窦引经据典论证“天主”就是中国古代的“上帝”。他引用的中国古书包括《诗》《书》《礼》《易》和《中庸》等。这样的情况在《天主实义》中还有多处，如下卷第六篇回答“赏善罚恶”问题，亦多引中国经典以证天主教义与儒家思想相合，不详述。上面引的一段话说明：（l）利玛窦确实觉察到我国古代有一至高无上的人格神“上帝”，他以此论证西方天主教的“天主”和中国的“上帝”不过是名称不同，实际上是一回事。（2）为此他又论证“至高无上者”只能是一个，而不能是两个（天地），并批评了朱熹的解释。在他作的《天主实义引》中说：“平治庸理，惟竟于一，古贤圣劝臣以忠。忠也者无二之谓也；五伦甲乎君，君臣为三纲之首。……邦国有主，天地独无主乎？国统于一，天地有二主乎？”此均为用中国儒家思想来解释天主教义者也。（3）又引经典说明上帝是有意志的，可以降祸福人间；（4）所以上帝有“庭”，和自然界的“天”不是一回事。从这些看，利玛窦无非是要证明天主教和儒家学说、中国古代经典是相合的。

2．补儒


Output:
2．补儒

《利玛窦中国札记》是利玛窦用意大利语在中国写的札记，后来一位传教士金民阁把它从意大利文译成拉丁文，并增添了一些有关传教史和利玛窦本人的内容，附有利玛窦死后荣哀的记述。在这部书中有一段话：

在问到基督教法的主要内容是什么的时候，徐光启博士就非常确切地用四个字来概括：‘驱佛补儒’。这就是说：它驱除佛教的偶像，并补足儒生的教法。 7

任何宗教都有排斥其他宗教的特性，因此利玛窦要想使天主教进入中国，他就必然要批评佛教和道教，特别是佛教，这点在他的各种著作中都表现出来。圣·奥古斯丁曾经提出，对异教徒的信仰主体而言，应该坚决摒弃；而对异教徒他们代表某些异教哲学家的教诲说，则应予以考虑，或接受或赞同，假如它们是合乎理性的。利玛窦实际上是采用了这种方法对待儒家学说。他宣称儒家与宗教无关，而是一种哲学。他特别推崇孔子，并且说孔子是生活在耶稣五百年以前，他不可能知道五百年以后的事情和道理，因此“利玛窦就把儒家经典引为己用，只讲孔夫子以后所应增补的东西。” 8 在《畸人十篇》中有一段龚大参与利玛窦讨论“善恶之报在身后”的问题。龚大参首先提出：由于中国经典在孔子之后经过秦始皇焚书，因而记载天堂地狱报应的文献散失了，而西方经典常存，“故天堂地狱之说，至为详备”。在中国后世报应之说“且不明不谙焉。因而使儒者，疑信半混之，有无之间也”。龚大参虽也引古代经典说明可有天堂，但仍对“大德必得其位，必得其寿”有所疑问。于是利玛窦据天主教义为之解。他认为对有德者的报应并不在于“位”与“寿”，一个人生活在世界上应为天主而劳苦，并不要求得到今生的善报，他应相信终归可以进入天堂。所以在他回答徐光启时说：“为义被窘难者……若为利禄，为功名，为邪淫，又种种非义者，徒芚苦也。若为天主为义，而受窘难，此乃真福也，故谓已得天国矣。” 9 这显然是企图用天主教义补充儒家思想，但利玛窦采用的方法不是否定儒家经典，而是顺着它加以引申发挥，说明中土学说与西方教义并不相悖，只是还可以补充而已。

在《天主实义》中讨论“善恶报应”的地方很多，第六篇“论死后必有天堂地狱之赏罚以报”，其中对儒家的“积善之家，必有余庆；积不善之家，必有余殃”的观念也有所补正。照利玛窦看，不仅可以有现世之报或由子孙受报（利玛窦似不赞成“子孙受报”），但重要的是死后受报。行善事死后可登天堂免地狱，否则要入地狱，但行善事并非仅仅是为了“登天堂免地狱”，故利玛窦说：


Output:
“凡行善者有正意三状：下曰，因登天堂免地狱之意；中曰，因报答所重蒙天主恩德之意；上曰，因翕顺天主圣旨之意也。” 10

“下意”是引导人们达到“上意”的桥梁，人们行善最终应是顺应上帝的意旨。但是儒家不了解这一点而对天堂地狱的说法加以批评，那是因为它对其中的深刻道理还不了解，“儒者攻天堂地狱之说，是未察此理耳。” 11 从这里我们已大体可以看出天主教与中国儒家传统不同。盖儒家讲“善恶报应”是从个人的道德修养上讲的，因此，每个人应该“修身”，或者说应该“明明德”，这仅仅是求得个人内在的道德上的完善，就这一意义说它是追求一种“内在的超越”。但天主教行善终目的应是为了“天主”，而“天主”是一种“外在的超越”力量，所以它所追求的，所崇奉的是一种“外在的超越”。这个问题下面再进一步讨论。

3．超儒

中国儒家学说以追求“内在超越”为目标，天主教则以追求“外在超越”为目标，利玛窦《天文实义》在批评儒家缺点时指出了这一点。 12

我们知道中国传统哲学（特别是儒家哲学）和西方哲学与宗教很不相同。古希腊哲学，在柏拉图、亚里士多德那里大体上把世界二分为超越性的本体和现实世界，其后基督教更是要有一个外在的超越性的上帝，而中国传统哲学则是以“内在的超越性”为其特征。孔子的“性与天道”问题是一内在超越的问题，孟子的“尽心知性，知天”更是一由内在而超越的“内在超越性”问题；《系辞》中说：“一阴一阳之谓道，继之者善，成之者性”则是一由超越而内在的“内在超越性”问题。这一“内在超越性”问题认为，人们可以通过其内在道德修养（因为人性善）而达到与超越的“天道”汇通的境界，不需要有一外在的超越力量来促使他们如此。但上面所引的利玛窦那段话，显然他认为仅仅靠人自身的内在道德修养是很难达到完满的境界，必须有一外在的超越力量上帝来推动，因此信仰上帝是完全必要的。这就是说，利玛窦以为天主教教义比儒家的学说更圆满。

4．附儒

所谓“附儒”就是说，为了附会中国儒家传统思想，而对天主教义作某些修改或牵就某些儒家思想。1978年利玛窦的《利玛窦中国札记》法文版序言中说：


Output:
早在利玛窦的生命临终时，他领导的中国传教团的方式就已经成为中外聚讼纷纭的对象，人们提出两个反对意见。在实践方面，人们指责利玛窦过分关注发展与儒家杰出人物的关系，而不是布教事业的进展；在理论方面，他对儒家的积极评价也受到非议。有人提出，这样做则会冒有损于基督教义纯洁性的危险，而更明确的宗教方法才可以使传教士们直接向人民大众传播福音并突出基督教的特点。 13

上面我们已经讲过利玛窦对中国儒家传统的某些看法，以及他对汇合东西文化所作的若干尝试。当然，利玛窦也知道儒家学说与天主教也有相当多的冲突处，他或者可以用“补儒”和“超儒”的办法来补救，但是如果他的传教要完全按照天主教义的一套，那肯定会遇到更多的困难。在此，他为了迎合中国传统也不得不对天主教某些方面有所修改，所以上面引用的那段话中对他的批评也不是无的放矢的。利玛窦如何使天主教附会儒家学说，我认为有以下几点可以注意：

（1）为中国传统与天主教不合处开脱，以便使天主教适合中国社会。在《利玛窦中国札记》意大利原文本中有一段说，它对儒家的祭祀作了简明的叙述，他说：

然而，根据一条古老的法则，在文人荟萃的各大城市中，都建有一座庄严的孔庙以供他的塑像，写着他的姓名和尊号；在每次朔望以及一年四次，文人们都要向他奉献一次祭祀，点燃香烛并供一只已宰杀的牲畜，尽管他们不承认他有任何神性，也丝毫无求于他。所以，这种礼节不能称之为真正的祭祀。 14

天主教反对偶像崇拜，在利玛窦书中比比皆是，例如对佛教和道教偶像崇拜的批评十分严厉。但利玛窦从不批评儒家对孔子的祭祀，甚至也不批评中国人对祖先的祭祀。关于祭祀问题是后来中国禁止天主教传教的一个重要原因。1704年，罗马教廷曾有命令要求中国天主教的信徒不得遵照与天主教不合的中国传统的礼仪，其中的主要问题就是祭孔和祭祀祖先的问题，这样就引起了当时中国政府对天主教传教的限制和禁止。看来，利玛窦比较了解中国的国情，为适应中国社会和便于他们传教，他采用了向中国传统妥协的办法，虽然这种做法与天主教义不甚相合，利玛窦也这样做了。


Output:
（2）使天主教某些思想附会中国传统的儒家思想，以便中国人能接受。前面我们已经说过，天主教的“天主”当然是至高至尊的人格神，但利玛窦的《天主实义》原名《天学实义》，而书中“天主”常采用“上帝”和“天”这样中国原有的名称，据方豪的《中国天主教史论丛》中说：他取明版与后来的版本相对照，发现后来的版本改明版“上帝”或“天”为“天主”或“上主”共七十九处。 15 原中国有“上帝”和“天”之名词，但“天”在中国传统思想中实有多种涵义，利玛窦虽取“上帝”、“天”即至高至尊人格神的涵义，但在中国人看来仍可有其他的涵义。这个问题到利玛窦死后的1715年教皇格来孟第十一世下令规定“天主”二字为法定名称，不准再采用“上帝”与“天”这样的名称，就是因为“上帝”和“天”可以引起不同的解释。

又如利玛窦的《二十五言》，据罗光教授分析，认为：“《二十五言》为二十五章，每篇简短，书中劝人终日乾乾，克制欲情，人生的幸福，在人平生心常安定，不为祸福所动。人生的目的，为事奉天主……”可见《二十五言》是有意适应当时中国人的需要而作如是说。

（3）对天主教的“原罪说”作了某些修改，以便它接近中国儒家传统的“性善说”。照天主教的“原罪”学说，人性不可谓“善”，这和中国传统的儒家思想的“性善说”相径庭。据圣·奥古斯丁说，人类之所以有“原罪”，是人类用理性选择的结果，究其根本，导致人运用理性去选择罪恶的是人的骄傲心，一种把自己置于上帝之上的自我中心的欲望。这种欲望驱使他顺从自己的意向蔑视上帝的旨意。它特别表现在人性的欲望中。奥古斯丁接着论证，自从人有意识地选择了恶，犯下了违抗上帝的罪行，人类便再也没有可能通过自己的努力来恢复他堕落的状态，因为这种“原罪”使他无可挽回地向下堕落，总想以自己为中心，顺从自己的意志和欲望，只能选择“犯罪”或倾向于“罪恶”。


Output:
关于这个问题，在《天主实义》第七篇“论人性本善而述天主门士正学”中，利玛窦认为，所谓“人性”是指人区别于金石、草本、鸟兽以至于鬼神的，这就是人“能推理论者”。他说：“能推理论者，立人为本类，而别其体于他物，乃所谓人性也。”而像“仁义礼智，则在推理之后。理也，乃依附之品，不得为人性。”因此，所谓“能推理论者”是说有这样的为善的“良能”，就此意义说“人性本善”。这自然是为了迎合儒家的观点而有的。但利玛窦又不能全然违背天主教义，他又认为人虽有此“能推理论者”（得到理的能力，理即仁义礼智等），但如何才能得到，照他看应如农夫先耕地、除草、除瓦石、灌水，然后再播种，才会有好收获。因此，“学者先去恶，而后能致善，所谓有所不为，方能有为焉。”这一观点又和天主教“原罪说”联系起来，从而不能不与关于所谓“良能”的说法形成矛盾。看来，要把两种不同文化传统全然调和起来是有相当困难的。

由以上四点可以看出，利玛窦的传播天主教义，实想通过汇合东西文化而达到其目的。他的汇合东西文化的尝试是否成功，姑且不论，不过他毕竟是西方人士的一个最早尝试者，总是有其历史意义的。

二、“中学”“西学”与“体”“用”之辨

在探讨中西文化的汇合或沟通时，我们常常会碰到中学和西学的“体用”问题。利玛窦在中国传播天主教不得不考虑它和中国传统思想文化的关系；同样中国人接受天主教也不得不考虑它和中国传统思想文化的关系。上面我们已经讨论过利玛窦如何处理这个问题，下面我们再来看看当时中国知识分子是如何接受天主教的。我以为，那时接受天主教义的如徐光启、李之藻等以及其他知识分子大都实际上也是用“中学为体，西学为用”的态度接受或者了解西学的。我们知道，那时耶稣会士在华活动，尽管也进入北京宫廷，但“中国朝廷利用他们严格限于利用他们的技术”，“如利玛窦之入宫修理钟表机械，汤若望、南怀仁等人之参与历局修订历法等等，正有如中国开明士大夫真正感兴趣的，主要也仅限于向他们学习科学知识”，“他们在归化中国知识分子方面并没有获得多少成功”。 16 至于对天主教义，中国极少数知识分子接受它，主要认为它和中国传统思想，特别是儒家伦理相合才被接受下来。因此可以说，它是较之19世纪60年代以后更早的“中学为体，西学为用”的一种形式。


Output:
长期以来，有所谓用“体用”关系来论证“中学”与“西学”的关系的种种说法，有“中学为体，西学为用”，有“西学为体，中学为用”，还有“中学西学互为体用”等。所谓“西学为体，中学为用”，一切都应照搬西方，这也许就是“全盘西化”派的主张；“中学为体，西学为用”，一切西方好的东西，中国古已有之，这大概是“国粹”派的观点。为什么在“中学”和“西学”关系上造成种种不同说法和各种混乱，我以为主要就是企图用“体用”关系来说“中学”与“西学”的关系造成的，因此我认为无论上述哪种说法都难以成立。

“体”和“用”在中国哲学史上是一种重要的范畴，但它不是一对实体性的范畴，而是一对带有根本性质的关系性范畴。“体”一般是指“内在性的超越精神”或“超越性的本体”，前者如孟子的“良知”“良能”，王阳明的“心”等等；后者如“天命”“太极”“天理”“道”等等。“用”是指此“内在超越精神”或“超越性本体”所表现的种种功能。照中国传统哲学的看法，“体”和“用”是统一的，“用”是表现“体”的。这一点早在魏晋时王弼已经提出：“虽贵以无为用，不能舍无以为体”，也就是说离开了“体”就无相应的“用”。所谓“中体西用”，无非是想保存中国固有的内在精神或超越本体，以便排斥西方精神，这样如何能以“西学为用”呢？同样，“西学为体，中学为用”也不可能。前者实质上必然导致“中体中用”，后者必然也只能是“西体西用”。

至于“中西互为体用”，据说它的意思是：中国的好东西就以“中学为体，西学为用”；西方的好东西就以“西学为体，中学为用”。这样的说法显然是很难成立的。它无非是要把“中学为体，西学为用”和“西学为体，中学为用”都包容在所谓“互为体用”之中。这不过是一折中主义东西。方克立在他的《“中体西用”和“西体中用”》一文中批评了“中体西用和西体中用”，但他自己却陷入了一种十分混乱的“互为体用说”的折中主义之中。 17


Output:
因此，我认为用“体用”关系来解释中西文化的关系只能造成文化上的“移花接木”。如果不改良文化生长的土壤和其他种种条件，用“移花接木”的方法，其根基是不行的，总难以长成参天大树。所以我想，对我们现代社会来说，这个社会应有其现代化的精神和体现这种现代精神的种种制度。如果要用“体用”关系来说明这个问题，那也许可以说以“现代精神为体，保证体现现代精神的制度及其功用为用”。也许有人会问：什么是“现代精神”？什么是体现“现代精神的制度及其功用”？这里我想借用严复的说法，他曾批评“中体西用”，并指出体用不能二元，应是统一的，特别强调了科学的意义，同时他又提出一非常有意义的命题：“自由为体，民主为用”。我认为，严复这个提法或许有现代意义。照我看，“自由”是现代精神的集中体现，或者说它是一种现代内在精神，是现代社会人们所追求的一种普遍理想；而“民主”是现代社会的各种各样的保证人们“自由”的制度，它应是保证每一个人应有的“自由”，而不光保证某一个人或者几个人的“自由”的制度。我们生活在中国今天的社会中，要使我们的社会成为现代的社会，最重要的就是要给每个人应有的“自由”，并以一套民主的制度来保证他的实现。只有这样，人们的积极性和创造性才能得到充分发挥，我们的国家才能不仅走上“四个现代化”的道路，而且是全面现代化的道路。

VII．QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CATEGORICAL SYSTEM OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY


Output:
Aristotle's Categories outlined the philosophical categories of Ancient Greece, putting forward and thoroughly analyzing ten categories. Hegel's Logik outlined contemporary Western philosophical categories in a comparatively complete categorical system. Did China's traditional philosophy (China's ancient philosophy) have a categorical system? Why and how should we study the question of traditional Chinese philosophy's concepts and categories? This essay attempts to contribute to the discussion of these questions.

I．The Significance of Studying the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

The study of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy has its general and particular significance. Its general significance can be expounded in at least the following three aspects:


Output: First, while the study of the history of philosophy necessarily requires the study of the historical function of philosophers and philosophical schools, the ultimate value of such a study is to reveal the necessary logic that determined the specific development of certain philosophical thinking in history. For instance, what is the necessary logic of the development of the pre-Qin philosophical thinking from Confucius to Mencius to Xunzi? A scientific history of philosophy with Marxism as its guiding thought should reveal not only the developmental causes of philosophical thought but also the inner logic of the growth of such thought. Since philosophy is a science of the most general laws of nature, society and human thought presented in the form of abstractions, the development of the content of philosophical thought is therefore a history of the continuous advancement of concepts and categories and of their continuous clarification, enrichment and growth. We should study how concepts and categories were


Output: We should study how concepts and categories were advanced in the history of philosophy, how their contents became clearer, richer and more systematic, and how the categorical system became more complicated, more comprehensive and more systematic. We should conduct a concrete analysis of the development of concepts and categories. This will enable us to discover the laws governing the development of philosophical thought and reveal its inner logic.


Output: Second, when we say that the history of philosophy is one of the struggle between materialism and idealism we do not mean to imply that this struggle and the development of man's cognition are two separate processes. It was the one and same process through which man's knowl edge of the world has been developing in the struggle between materialism and idealism which manifests the law of the development of man's knowledge. As the process of knowledge calls for the use of concepts and categories, every stage of development in the history of philosophy is marked by differing explanations of certain basic concepts and catego ries out of which emerged materialism and idealism. In the history of Chinese philosophy, for example, the struggle between materialism and idealism before the Qin Dynasty generally centered around the differing explanations of the Heavenly way and the human way, name and content, knowledge and conduct, and the variable and the constant. During the Wei and Jin dynasties it centered around


Output: the Wei and Jin dynasties it centered around such pairs of concepts as being and non-being, essence and function, word and idea, ethical code and spontaneity. During the Song and Ming dynasties it focused on principle and force, mind and matter, mind and nature, subject and object. A study of the development of concepts and categories is a key to the exposure of the law governing the struggle between materialism and idealism.


Output: What is more, this study will enable us to understand the necessity of the emergence of certain concepts and categories in the history of cognition and to overcome the shortcomings of maintaining an oversimplified negative attitude toward idealism which can be found in the past studies of the history of philosophy. Wang Bi was an idealist philosopher, but it was he who advanced some categories such as essence and function, the one and the many, word and idea "which help us recognize and master the focal point in the web of natural phenomena." Despite his incorrect presentation of these categories, his advancement of them marked a step forward in man's knowledge, which deserves recognition for its position in the history of philosophy. Only after Wang Bi first posed the concepts of "taking nonbeing as essence" and "forget the words having grasped the concept" did there appear Ouyang Jian's later theory of "The Word Expresses the Concept" (Yan jin yi lun ) and Pei Wei's "On the Exaltation of Being" (Chong you


Output: Pei Wei's "On the Exaltation of Being" (Chong you lun ). Therefore the study of the concepts and categories in the history of philosophy and their development constitutes an indispensable link in correctly appraising materialism and idealism in the history of philosophy.


Output: Third, Engels believed that the study of philosophies of the past was the only way to temper one's theoretical thinking. A scientific history of philosophy can certainly play such a role, and a scientific history of man's knowledge essentially would be the history of the development of concepts and categories. Since concepts and categories in the history of philosophy reflect man's deepening knowledge, when we study its development we are rethinking in our own thought the process of man's coming to know the world. Of course we discard the accidental and secondary factors and grasp the essential, normative content. This process of rethinking inevitably deepens our own thought. In our study of the development of concepts and categories, we not only relive the process of mankind using concepts and categories to understand the world, but invariably use certain methods to revisualize them. That method can only be one of making a theoretical analysis of the contents of the concepts and categories and the


Output: contents of the concepts and categories and the relationships between them and the logical relationships in their development. Such a process of analysis itself is a kind of theoretical thinking. In this sense, this study can help us improve our ability for theoretical thinking.


Output: The above-mentioned three points give only the general significance of studying philosophical concepts and categories, for that significance exists in the study of the history of any philosophy (e.g., the Western or Indian). However, the study of the categories of traditional Chinese philosophy and its history of development also has its particular significance; namely, it will enable us to understand the characteristics and level of development of traditional Chinese philosophy. Western philosophy has its own categorical system; its characteristics and the different levels of development of its philosophical thinking at different historical stages are reflected in the development from Aristotle's Categories to Hegel's Logik . The categories used in the primitive Indian Buddhism and the categories of the Kunya and Bhava sects of Mahayana, more or less in succession and each with its striking features, represent the fairly high level Indian Buddhism attained in logical thought and categorical analysis.


Output: in logical thought and categorical analysis. Traditional Chinese philosophy has its own concepts and categories which gradually formed a fairly comprehensive system. Because of this it will not do just to take them in terms of the concepts and categories of Western philosophy, nor will it do to take them in terms of the Marxist philosophical concepts and categories.


Output: Except for a few concepts taken from Indian Buddhism, the concepts and categories which have taken form in the long history of Chinese philosophy basically developed independently, hence their striking features. For example, the Heavenly way (tian dao ) and the human way (ren dao ) as a pair of categories were very important in the history of Chinese philosophy. Therefore traditional Chinese philosophy not only paid considerable attention to the study of the relationship between the Heaven and man, but paid special attention to the study of the relationships between man and man (society). Another example is the pair of categories ti and yong which contain the meanings of not only noumenon and phenomenon, but also base and function, whole and part, and abstract and concrete. Such series of pairs of concepts and categories reflect not only the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy, but also the level of theoretical thinking at a certain stage of historical development. To make a not completely apt


Output: development. To make a not completely apt comparison: traditional Chinese medicine certainly has its own particular tradition with its own particular theoretical system, particular medical terms and concepts. Despite the fact that we have not found clear scientific explanations for some of the theories and achievements, since it does achieve good results in medical treatment it must reflect certain aspects of objective reality and contain fairly profound truths. Since concepts and categories are necessary conditions for the formation of knowledge and play a pivotal role in linking the subjective to the objective, definite concepts and categories reflect definite achievements made by man in recognizing certain aspects of objective reality through his theoretical practice; hence, different concepts and categories mark different depths of man's cognition. Therefore, when we study the concepts and categories at different stages of the development of traditional Chinese philosophy, we can see the level of


Output: Chinese philosophy, we can see the level of theoretical thinking at the different stages of development of Chinese history.


Output:
In the history of Chinese philosophy, there are three periods during which schools made major contributions to the formation of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy, namely, the various pre-Qin schools, the metaphysical school (Xuanxue ) of the Wei and Jin, and the Neo-Confucianism (Lixue ) of the Song and Ming dynasties. When we compare the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy in the three stages with those of the Western philosophy, we are impressed by its distinct features and fairly high level. This comparison between the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and those of other countries, nations and regions constitutes an important subject in comparative philosophy.

II． How to Study the Concepts and Categories of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output: Fundamentally speaking, the study of the concepts and categories of traditional Chinese philosophy requires the scientific analytical method of Marxism. Merely to pose the concepts and categories used in the history of Chinese philosophy is contrary to the goal of our study. For that will not uncover the laws governing the development of philosophical thought, nor will it help us better to understand the laws of the struggle between materialism and idealism, or to improve our theoretical thinking; in particular, we will be unable to recognize the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy. To achieve our goal, it is necessary to use the scientific analytical method of Marxism to: 1) analyze the meaning of the concepts and categories, 2) investigate the development of those meanings, 3) analyze the systems of concepts and categories of philosophers or philosophical schools, and 4) study the similarities and differences between the concepts and categories of Chinese and foreign philosophies.


Output: categories of Chinese and foreign philosophies. It is only on the basis of such an analysis that it is possible to advance the study of the history of Chinese philosophy along a scientific path.


Output: i．Analysis of the Meaning of Concepts and Categories


Output: The advancement of one or of a pair of concepts (categories) marks the level of man's understanding of the world, yet it is up to us to make an analysis of the meaning of such a concept or pair of concepts. When ancient philosophers advanced a new concept they did not have as clear and scientific an understanding of its meaning as we do today; this is particularly true of the concepts they used to explain the origin of the world. For instance, Laozi (Lao Tzu) was the first man to advance the "way" (dao ) as the paramount category in his philosophical system. This concept of the "way" he advanced as an antithesis to the contemporary concept of "respecting Heaven." By taking the "way" as the origin of the world, Laozi (Lao Tzu) certainly raised the level of ancient Chinese philosophical thinking. But what was the meaning of the "way"? Laozi(Lao Tzu) himself found it difficult to give a clear definition. He said: "I do not know its name; I call it Dao . If forced to give it a name, I shall call it Great."


Output: forced to give it a name, I shall call it Great." Therefore he used quite a number of adjectives to describe the "way," such as "soundless and formless," "eluding and vague" and "deep and obscure." Obviously, with the limitations of the objective conditions and their level of knowledge, the ancient philosophers found it difficult to give lucid definitions of the concept of the origin of the world. Thus it is necessary for us to investigate the meaning of the concept of the "way" in the light of the book Laozi (Lao Tzu ). 1 The term "spontaneity" (ziran ) was widely used by ancient Chinese philosophers but each had his own definition. It was Laozi (Lao Tzu), too, who was the first to use "spontaneity" as a philosophical concept, by which he generally meant non-activity. Wang Chong of the Han Dynasty continued this usage when he wrote: "The Heavenly way is spontaneous non-activity." By the time of the Wei and Jin dynasties, the proponents of non-activity such as Wang Bi and Xiahou Xuan practically took


Output: such as Wang Bi and Xiahou Xuan practically took "spontaneity" for the "way"—that is, the primal stuff of the universe. Xiahou Xuan wrote: "Heaven and earth operate with spontaneity and the sage functions following spontaneity. Spontaneity is the way, which originally had no name and Laozi (Lao Tzu) was forced to give it a name."


Output: Even the same philosopher had different definitions for "spontaneity." We can use Guo Xiang's definitions of "spontaneity" as an example for analysis. He identified at least five connotations for "spontaneity." First, the actions of Heaven and man are "spontaneous." In his Annotations of Zhuangzi (the chapter, The Great Teacher) he wrote: "He who knows the deeds of both Heaven and man is a sage,"—knowing the deeds of Heaven and man is spontaneity." Thus, Guo Xiang looked not only at the natural phenomena but also at man's deeds as in a sense spontaneous; in what sense could this be so? Second, "working for oneself" (ziwei ) is "spontaneity." Guo Xiang said: "To say that matter is spontaneous means non-activity." He also wrote: "We value this non-activity and matter's working for itself." Then why is "working for itself" a kind of "non-activity"? Third, "being self-willed" is "spontaneity." Guo Xiang held that "working for oneself" is "spontaneity," but "working for oneself" does not mean acting wilfully, but


Output: for oneself" does not mean acting wilfully, but "acting by one's nature," namely, "acting in accordance with one's nature, that is spontaneity, thus called nature (xing )." "According to spontaneity" means "according to one's nature," that is, neither making others succumb to oneself nor allowing oneself to succumb to another. Fourth, "inevitability" is "spontaneity." Guo Xiang wrote: "Knowing the reality of destiny one will not seek what lies beyond it, but just to fulfill one's nature." One who "knows his destiny" will not ask for what cannot be done—this is called "spontaneity." Destiny here means "inevitability." Fifth, "chance is spontaneity." Guo Xiang wrote: "Things are all spontaneous, acting without knowing why or how it should be so." By not knowing the reason of action, "spontaneity" implies "chance." Therefore, when the philosophers were trying to explain "self-generation" they often employed such terms as "suddenly" or "abruptly"—all meaning that things exist without reason, the causality being


Output: things exist without reason, the causality being beyond explanation.


Output:
According to Guo Xiang, "spontaneity" has the above-mentioned five inter-connected meanings, of which the last two are most important, that is, "spontaneity" has the meaning of both "inevitability" and "chance."Actually, they are a pair of antagonistic concepts and, from the dialectical point of view, are mutually connected and transform themselves into each other, with inevitability manifesting itself through chance. Guo Xiang used the term "spontaneity" to explain both "inevitability" and "change," precisely because he saw the relationship of mutual dependence between them: that a matter so exists is "inevitable" in one respect because "things emerge by themselves abruptly." In Guo Xiang's philosophical system, things must have these two aspects. From this analysis of Guo Xiang's definition of the concept of "spontaneity" we can see the general characteristics and level of the philosophy of Guo Xiang.

ii．Analysis of the Development of the Meanings of Concepts and Categories


Output: Not only do the meanings of concepts and categories differ from one philosopher to another, at different times they also differ in meaning. Nevertheless, if philosophical thoughts follow one another, it is always possible to discover the relationship of succession between these concepts and categories. The study of their development is extremely important for understanding the laws of the development of man's knowledge. In the following, we will analyze the growth of the concept of qi (often translated as material force, ether, or fluid— tr .) in traditional Chinese philosophy.


Output: Some thinkers as early as the Spring and Autumn Period already discussed the impact of qi on man. For example, the Zuo Zhuan mentioned "the six qi " in the medical theory recorded in the first year of the reign of Duke Zhao of Lu (541 BC). By the Warring States Period, qi became a general concept. People not only believed that the body of man was made of qi , but some believed that the spirit of man also was made of qi . In "White Heart," "Inner Function," and "Mechanism of the Heart" of the book Guanzi , it was said: "As for essence (jing ), it is the essence of qi ;" "the qi of all things changes and thus becomes life;" "when qi goes to the ground, grains grow; when it goes into the heavens, there emerge the constellations; when it floats in the air, it becomes ghosts and spirits; when it goes into a man's chest, the man becomes a sage" and "therefore when there is qi , there is life; when there is no qi , there is death," etc. According to these thinkers, among the " qi " there is an "essential qi ," the


Output: among the " qi " there is an "essential qi ," the life-giver. When such an "essential qi " enters the body of a man, he becomes wise and turns into a sage.


Output: During the Warring States Period this unscientific theory of "essential qi " was used to explain man's spirit. If we considered it materialist, it would be a materialist viewpoint with grave defects which, under certain circumstances, was used by idealists and turned into a component part of their system. It could also be utilized by the supernaturalists who transformed it into a basis for advocating "life without end." We know that Mencius also talked about qi , and posed a sort of qi called the " qi of vastness" (haoran zhi qi ). The "White Heart" chapter of the book Guanzi mentions the "essential qi " that can give man wisdom and "this qi should not be checked by strength but should be accommodated by moral power (de )," which is to say, qi itself possesses an intelligence which should be consolidated by moral power. And in the theory of Mencius, his " qi of vastness" is "obtained through accentuating righteousness." Obviously, qi in Mencius' theory has already become spiritual. By the Han Dynasty, Dong


Output: become spiritual. By the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu went a step further and moralized and mystified qi which became the manifestation of the will and power of God. Dong Zhongshu held that qi had the power of meting out punishment and award, that there were good and vicious qi and that qi had emotions such as happiness, anger, grief and joy. So qi , though still retaining material appearance, already lost its material substance. Later, during the Han period, there were all sorts of superstitious explanations of qi which were indeed the outgrowth of the viewpoint of Dong Zhongshu.


Output: From the historical data of the pre-Qin period and the Han Dynasty, we can see that the concept of qi is closely linked with questions of spirit and form, and thus has much to do with the question of the preservation of health, which often was deemed a means to becoming a deity. In Zhuangzi the "true man" (zhenren ), the "spiritual man" (shenren ) and others were often described as "with the spirit guarding the form to achieve longevity," "drinking dew and breathing the wind instead of eating grain," "unifying their nature and preserving their qi ." They made their spirit integrate with their form so that they could accomplish the goal of "keeping their form perfect and replenishing their spirit to be merged into one with Heaven and earth." The Lü Shi Chun Qiu includes numerous discussions of the "preservation of good health" and considers that to "achieve longevity," qi should be made to flow constantly within the body, and "with essential qi renewed daily, the vicious qi will go and a full life span will


Output: the vicious qi will go and a full life span will be reached; this is called truth." In Huai Nan Zi the preservation of qi , of form and of nature are the same thing; moreover all are linked together with qi . The writers of both of these two books were influenced by the "theory of essential qi " in "White Heart" and other philosophical works. They all thought that "spirit" (jingshen ) is also a kind of qi , or "essential qi which can reside or leave the body and that when spirit and body are at one, there will be long life."


Output: Meanwhile, some philosophers of the pre-Qin and Han periods held a materialist view of qi and considered it to be the matter that constitutes the world. Xunzi held that everything in the universe, including man, was made of qi . He wrote: "Water and fire have qi but no life, plants have life but no senses, birds and beasts have senses but know not righteousness and man has qi , life, senses and also righteousness." The chapter "On Spirit" of the book Huai Nan Zi says that the universe was originally a murky body of original qi without any shape and that later the interaction of the positive and negative forces gave birth to everything, so "the dirty qi became worms and the pure essential qi became human beings." Wang Chong put it with even greater clarity. He wrote: "The merging of the qi of Heaven and earth gave birth to everything," and that was the result of the movement of qi . He said: "When Heaven moves, it gives qi . . . qi comes out and it gives birth to things." In order to oppose Dong Zhongshu's


Output: to things." In order to oppose Dong Zhongshu's idealist view of qi , Wang Chong particularly pointed out that qi has no will, no aim. He said: " Qi is void of ambition, purpose or scheme"; " qi is like smoke and cloud, how can it listen to man's request?" Nevertheless, like the book Huai Nan Zi , Wang Chong took the spirit of man (or the phenomenon of life) as "essential qi ." He said: "Man lives because he has essential qi ; when man dies, the essential qi vanishes." An analysis of the contents of the concept qi in the history of ancient Chinese philosophy reveals clearly the development of this concept. The three doctrines, or rather definitions, mentioned above, however, were all merged into the thought of Daoism (Taoism) toward the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, which we will not discuss here.


Output: iii．Analysis of the Systems of Concepts and Categories of Philosophers (or Philosophical Schools)


Output: Historically major philosophers, in establishing their philosophical systems, have invariably used a series of concepts and categories. Thus the study of the relationships between these concepts and categories is necessary for us to make a thorough analysis of their theoretical systems. The level a philosopher's thought reaches often can be judged by how richly and systematically his concepts and categories reflect the essential relationships between the objects they are meant to reflect. Divergent views in the study of a past philosopher (or philosophical school) sometimes arise from the lack of a comprehensive, systematic study of the system of concepts and categories of that philosopher or school. For example, if we merely take into account Guo Xiang's concepts of "being" and "nonbeing" and their relationship, we might conclude that he was a materialist. But the reason why Guo Xiang's philosophy was the zenith of the Wei and Jin metaphysical school was not that he put forth a view different from that of


Output: that he put forth a view different from that of Wang Bi's on the relationship between "being" and "nonbeing," but that he had a fairly complete philosophical system, an analysis of which reveals that it comprises the following four groups of basic concepts. (Though there are other important concepts in Guo's philosophical system, we will not deal with them here.)


Output: "Being" and "nonbeing": The central topic of discussion among the Wei and Jin metaphysicians was the question of "origin and outcome, being and nonbeing." The philosophy of Guo Xiang might be considered to originate from the discussion on this topic. Guo believed that "being"(the "being of everything") is the only thing that exists; it is constantly present; "although being undergoes infinite changes and transformations, it cannot in any instance become nonbeing," and "we say the Heaven and earth constantly exist because there is no time they have not existed." As for "nonbeing," he held that the creator above "being," or "the nonbeing" serving as noumenon, is non-existence, that is, "nothing." Thus he said: "Nonbeing is simply nonbeing, it cannot produce being," and "I venture to ask whether there is a creator or not? If not, how can he create things?" Therefore, from the very beginning, Guo Xiang denied the existence of a "creator" above the being of "everything," or a "nonbeing" which is the antithesis of


Output: or a "nonbeing" which is the antithesis of "being" which as the primal body serves as the basis for the existence of being. However, Guo Xiang's philosophy did not stop here, but went further.


Output: "Nature" and "destiny": Since the existence of things is not based on "nonbeing" as the primal body, then is there an inherent cause for the existence of things? According to Guo Xiang, one cannot say that the being of "everything" is groundless. Since things exist, their very existence is the basis for their existence. Specifically, the basis of their existence is their own "nature": "Everything has its own nature and every nature has its limit." "The nature" Guo Xiang meant is "the reason that things are what they are" which has the sense of "necessity." Thus he said: "Each gets what he deserves by nature; there is no avoiding it nor adding more." He also said: "Things have their own nature, so the wise stays wise till his last day while the dull goes on being dull till his death, neither able to change halfway." As for "destiny" Guo Xiang defined it as "inevitability"; as he put it "destiny means things all act spontaneously without anything acting on them," and "being aware of the impossible." Obviously,


Output: and "being aware of the impossible." Obviously, his "nature" and "destiny" are two concepts he employed to prove the point that "being" alone exists and that "nonbeing" as creator or primal body is absolutely non-existent.


Output: "Self-generated" and "self-sufficient": The "nature" of things is the basis for their existence, but how does this "nature" originate? Is its emergence with some purpose, or condition? Guo Xiang said: "Things exist by themselves without a source; this is the way of Heaven" and "the emergence of things is just out of their own accord." If the "nature" of a thing is not "self-generated," then it must be given by others or intentionally produced by a creator. Yet this thing becoming this thing and that thing becoming that thing is not something else making this or that thing emerge and exist, nor even making itself emerge and exist; therefore "self-generation" can only be produced "unexpectedly," "abruptly" and "spontaneously" by itself. Were there any reason or purpose for the emergence and existence of a thing, it would inevitably lead to the admission of the existence of an initiator. Then what is the relation between one "self-generated" thing and another "self-generated" thing? Guo Xiang held that


Output: "self-generated" thing? Guo Xiang held that everything is "self-generated" and its existence is "entirely in keeping with its own nature" and therefore is "self-sufficient" (wudai ). On the one hand, "self-sufficiency" is possible because "things produce themselves"; "things produce themselves without relying on anything else." On the other hand, anything can be "self-sufficient" as long as it "conforms with its own nature," and "is content with its own nature," "for when satisfied with its own nature, a giant roc does not despise the sparrow and the sparrow does not covet the heavenly lake and both are quite satisfied. Thus, big or small, all live in complacence." So, to insist on the premise that the "nature" of things is the only basis for their existence, one must recognize that it is "self-generated" and "self-sufficient."


Output: "Self-transformation" and "mutual indispensability": To support the concepts of "self-generated" and "self-sufficient" requires the solution of another question. Suppose everything exists by itself, this being this and that being that with one differing from another, then are not all the things related? Suppose all the things are relative, then are not they limited? Suppose they are limited, then are not they "insufficient" (you dai )? To answer this question, Guo Xiang advanced the concept of "self-transformation" (duhua ). By "self-transformation," he meant that everything emerges and generates independently, hence "self-sufficiency" is absolute. If we try to seek the cause and basis of the emergence and generation of things, ostensibly we can pursue this question infinitely, but ultimately we can come only to the conclusion of "self-sufficiency." Thus he said: "If we try to find out what a thing relies on and what is the cause of its creation, there will be no end and finally we will come to


Output: there will be no end and finally we will come to selfsufficiency and the working of self-transformation will be obvious." In his "Annotations on (Zhuangzi's) Qi Wu Lun " Guo Xiang cited an absolute example. He said that the bodily form, the shadow and the penumbra are all beings of absolute independence, for "thus throughout the realm of things, there is nothing, not even the penumbra, which is not 'selftransformed.'"


Output: If one thing does not exist independently, then everything else is not independent, which will inevitably lead to the existence of a primal body(or creator) above "everything," serving as the basis of their existence and inevitably recognized as "a cause of creation and generation." Although things exist independently and self-sufficiently, as long as everything fully realizes its "nature," brings it into full play and "the wise stays wise till his last day and the dull goes on being dull till his death," then the ideal realm will be achieved where "Heaven and earth are not so long-lived but live along with me, and things in the world are not divergent, but the same as me." Relating this way to every other thing has the greatest function; that is, "the greatest function of mutual indispensability is the perfection of self-transformation." Seen from another angle, everything is indispensable as long as it exists. Guo Xiang said: "A man, though only seven feet tall, possesses the five constant virtues; thus


Output: tall, possesses the five constant virtues; thus this mere body is provided with everything in the universe. Therefore none of the things in the world can be dispensed for one day. With one thing lacking, the living will not have means to live; with one law lacking, the living cannot fulfill their natural life-span." Thus, everything existent is rational, inevitable and not mutually exclusive. This view appears to contradict the doctrine of "self-transformation," but it does not. According to Guo Xiang, everything that exists is rational, inevitable and not mutually exclusive precisely because, as the condition for the existence of everything else, everything fully and absolutely brings its "nature" into full play, creates itself and generates self-sufficiently.


Output:
From this analysis of Guo Xiang's system of philosophical categories, we can see that his philosophy finally arrives at the doctrine of "self-transformation," and the concept of "exalted being" (chongyou ) is merely a bridge to "self-transformation." What is more, in Guo Xiang's system, only after the establishment of the doctrine on "self-transformation" can one support "sublime being" and a relatively thorough refutation of a "nonbeing" above everything as the basis of the latter's existence.

If we want to know whether a philosopher is a materialist or idealist, or the characteristic of his philosophy, its ideological relations with its predecessors and successors and its place in history, we must first make an analysis of his categorical system.

iv．Analysis of the Similarities and Differences Between the Concepts and Categories of Chinese and Foreign Philosophies


Output: A comparison between the categorical systems of Chinese and foreign philosophies will undoubtedly enable us to have a better understanding of the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy. Because of the breadth of this topic and the limited study conducted by this author, we can make only a rather superficial comparison here between Wei and Jin metaphysics and the Buddhist doctrine of Prajñā introduced into China in that period.


Output: The central theme of Wei and Jin metaphysics is the question of "being and nonbeing, origin and outcome." Therefore "being" and "nonbeing" are two basic categories in the Wei and Jin metaphysics. The Buddhist Prajñā doctrine also discussed the question of "being" and "nonbeing" (or the "void," kong ), hence Dao-an said: "Of the twelve books, Vaipuliya is most copious and its doctrine on the void of being and non-being is similar to the teachings of Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi, thus the doctrine of Mahayana has been easy to spread in China." The concept of the "void" (or "nonbeing") of the Buddhist Prajñā school is actually different from the "nonbeing" advocated by Wang Bi and other Chinese metaphysicians, despite their apparent similarity. The Buddhist concept of original nonbeing, or Tathata in Sanskrit, has the meaning that "all the different dharmas are in their original nature void and empty" and that all things have no original actual forms. Wang Bi and other metaphysicians also talked about "original


Output: other metaphysicians also talked about "original nonbeing" by which, however, they meant that everything "is based on nonbeing as its origin." Although the two concepts of "original nonbeing" cannot be considered to be entirely different, they do have vast differences in meaning. In Wei and Jin metaphysics, Wang Bi's thought succeeded the doctrines of Laozi(Lao Tzu). In his philosophical system, the category "nonbeing" is one and the same thing as "the way" or "principle"; as he said: "The extreme of greatness is nothing but the way! . . . though it is important that it has nonbeing as its phenomenon, yet it cannot do without nonbeing as its noumenon"; "nothing exists without principle; everything operates according to its own law." Obviously, the "nonbeing" used by Wang Bi is not the "void" or "non-existence," but the "substance" of a thing. The "original nonbeing" of the Buddhist Prajñā doctrine on the void only means that "all the different dharmas are in their original nature void and empty. "They held


Output: their original nature void and empty. "They held that everything is void of nature, but created through the association of hetupratyaya . From this one can see that the Buddhist Prajñā School in its discourse on the void refers not to "substance," but to "non-existence." As for the content of "being," the Wei and Jin metaphysicians usually referred to "universal being," namely, all sorts of actually existing things, whereas, on the other hand, in the translation of Buddhist scripts, terms denoting different meanings of "being" (existence) were all translated into the term "being."


Output: After its introduction into China, Buddhism first attached itself to Daoist necromancy during the Eastern Han Dynasty and then to Wei and Jin metaphysics. The various schools of the Prajñā doctrine formed by Chinese monks during the Eastern Jin period generally still used metaphysical thought to explain the teachings of Prajñā until the arrival in China of Kumarajiva whose translations of Madhyamika-sastra , Sata-sastra and Dvadasa-mikaya-sastra of the Maha-prajñāparamita-sastra provided Chinese Buddhist with the material for understanding the true meaning of Buddhist Praj Seng Zhao's On No Real Non-Existence is more or less close to the original meaning of "neither being nor nonbeing" of the Buddhist Prajñā doctrine.


Output:
A comparison and analysis of the Chinese and foreign philosophical concepts and categories can thus show their characteristics and level of development as well as the impact of foreign culture on indigenous traditional culture and the process of a foreign culture being assimilated and becoming a component of the culture of the country (nation, or region) into which the foreign culture was introduced.

III．A Tentative Theory of the Categorical System of Traditional Chinese Philosophy


Output: The term category has myriad definitions in the history of philosophy in the West. Aristotle in his Categories treated it as the basic mode of being and put forward ten categories such as substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, state, action and passion. And Kant described his twelve categories as principles related to cognition or as the precondition for constituting experience. Lenin said: "Categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognizing the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it." 4 A Dictionary of Philosophy published in the Soviet Union defines category as "the basic concept that reflects the most general and most essential character, aspect and relationship of the various phenomena and knowledge of reality." "Category" then is generally explained from the two aspects of the existence and knowledge of reality: from the aspect of existence it is defined as "the basic mode of existence" or "the most general and most essential character, aspect


Output: most general and most essential character, aspect and relationship of the phenomena of reality"; from the aspect of knowledge it is defined as the "precondition for constituting experience" or "focal points in the web, which assist in cognizing and mastering it." The necessary precondition for knowledge is certainly the reflection and manifestation of the "basic mode of existence"while the "basic mode of existence" is meaningful only in the process of man's knowledge. From what we listed above, we can see the relationship between "category" and "concept": a category is a basic concept whereas a concept is not necessarily a category. Thus, what we are discussing here is what are the categories or basic concepts of traditional Chinese philosophy. If, using the basic concepts of classic Chinese philosophers, we can form a system which shows how traditional Chinese philosophy identified and explained "the basic mode of existence" and which reveals the line of development of the traditional Chinese philosophical


Output: of the traditional Chinese philosophical thinking, then we have proven that traditional Chinese philosophy does have a categorical system. This is presented first in the following diagram and further explained below.


Output: In this diagram, twenty pairs of basic concepts make up the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy. This is certainly a very preliminary proposition. However, despite its many possible defects, it is intended to initiate discussion and study on this question. Here the author would like to explain some points:


Output: i．This diagram is divided into three major parts. Part I is intended to indicate what basic concepts are used in traditional Chinese philosophy on the question of the existence of the world; Part II is meant to show what basic concepts are used to present the form of being; and Part III is meant to show what basic concepts are used to denote the existence and knowledge of man. The relationship between "Heaven" (or the Heavenly way) and "man" (or the way of man) has always been a central theme for discussion in traditional Chinese philosophy and it is around this question that the struggle between materialism and idealism has been waged in the history of Chinese philosophy. Zi Chan was the first Chinese philosopher to make a proposition on the relationship between the two when he wrote: "The way of Heaven is remote, whereas the way of man is near." Confucius attached importance to the "mandate of the Heaven" but he gave even greater attention to the "affairs of man." Although he mentioned that he "began to


Output: of man." Although he mentioned that he "began to know the mandate of Heaven at the age of fifty," he seldom discussed this question. "The master was seldom heard discussing the question of nature and the Heavenly way," reports the Analects which, however, extensively records Confucius' sayings on the question of the "way of man." Mencius talked about "obeying nature, and knowing fate and Heaven," and the Doctrine of the Mean says: "Sincerity is the way of Heaven; knowing sincerity is the way of man." Xunzi said: "Grasp the way of Heaven and man." Laozi (Lao Tzu), the founder of Daoism (Taoism) said: "The Heavenly way is spontaneous non-activity," and he played down the importance of "humanness and righteousness"(the way of man). And Zhuangzi "was misguided by Heaven and ignorant of man." Dong Zhongshu, the Confucian master of the Han Dynasty, described his research as a study of "the relationship between Heaven and man." Sima Qian who was much influenced by Daoist thinking said that his Historical Records


Output: Daoist thinking said that his Historical Records was a work of "investigations into the relationship between Heaven and man and the changes past and present." The Wei and Jin metaphysicians concentrated on the question of "spontaneity" (the way of Heaven) and "ethics" (the way of man). Hence, He Yan said: "Only with people like Wang Bi, can you discuss the question of the relationship between Heaven and man." The Song Neo-Confucians of both the School of Principle (Lixue ) and School of Mind (Xinxue ) strongly believed: "The supreme ultimate (the principle of Heaven) is simply an utterly excellent and supremely good normative principle"; the supreme ultimate is an appellation for "all that is good in heaven and on earth, and among men and things." The "principles of Heaven" and the "desires of man" are still a question of the relationship between Heaven and man. Even Wang Fuzhi still made this a focal point in his philosophical discourse. He held that "Rites, no matter how pure they are, are merely


Output: "Rites, no matter how pure they are, are merely expressions of the principles of Heaven inevitably to be found in the desires of man," and that "the desire of man, when reaching superb altruism is the perfection of the principle of Heaven." Thus, traditional Chinese philosophy proceeded from the discussion of the pair of categories: (the way of) Heaven and (the way of) man, an indication of the main attention and particular content of traditional Chinese philosophy.


Output: ii．This diagram shows the development of the categories of traditional Chinese philosophy and their relationships. Proceeding from the study of the relationship between Heaven and man, traditional Chinese philosophy branches out into two parts: Daoism (Taoism) and Confucianism. Laozi (Lao Tzu) advanced the relationship between the "way" and "all things." He said: "The way creates one, one creates two, two create three and three create all things." He also said: "All things in the world are produced by being and being is produced by nonbeing," therefore the relationship between the "way" and the "thing" is also represented by the pair of categories "being" and "nonbeing." The Confucian School however proposed the categories the "way" and the "instrument" in the Commentary on the Book of Changes , which says: "That which shapes and is above is called the way and that which shapes and is below is called the instrument," and adds: "Change contains the supreme ultimate which produces two extremes," and "the


Output: ultimate which produces two extremes," and "the alternation of yin and yang is called the way"; thus the relationship between the way and the instrument is reflected in the categories of the supreme ultimate and yin and yang . The Han Dynasty witnessed some development in philosophical thought, but it seems that practically no new and influential philosophical categories were advanced. The Wei and Jin metaphysics upheld three philosophical classes, Laozi (Lao Tzu) , Zhuangzi and Zhou Yi , which brought a gradual merging of Daoism(Taoism) with the Confucianism of the Zhou Yi system. This established the theory of a primal body as the origin of the universe, a theory with Laozi (Lao Tzu)'s and Zhuangzi's thought as the framework. The Wei and Jin metaphysicians used categories such as "essence" and "function," "stem and branch," the "one" and the "many" to illustrate "nonbeing" (the primal) and "being" (everything or the various manifestations of this substance). They used "spontaneity" (essence) and "ethics"


Output: They used "spontaneity" (essence) and "ethics" (function) to present the relationship between the "originality of the universe"(primal body) and "human social relations" (the various social positions and codes), and used the pair of categories "idea" and "word" to explain questions on understanding the substance of the universe. From the Wei and Jin dynasties and the Northern and Southern dynasties onward, traditional Chinese philosophical thought, under the impact of Buddhism introduced from India, evolved into the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty. If the Wei and Jin metaphysical doctrine on substance has the thought of Laozi (Lao Tzu) and Zhuangzi as the framework, then Neo-Confucianism of the Song-Ming period alternately were based on an objective idealism (represented by Zhu Xi), a subjective idealism(represented by Wang Yangming) and a fairly high level materialism(represented by Wang Fuzhi). The philosophical categories of this period succeeded Wei and Jin metaphysics and also absorbed Tang


Output: Wei and Jin metaphysics and also absorbed Tang Buddhist thought in the Sui and Tang periods. Thus, there was a confluence of the thinking of Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism) and Buddhism within a Confucian framework. The most basic philosophical categories of the time became "principle" and qi , "mind" and "matter"; the question of "mind" and "nature" grew into the question of whether "mind is principle" or "nature is principle." Categories such as "subject" and "object," "investigation of things" and "fulfillment of principle" were used in the discussion of the question of knowledge and the categories "Heavenly principle" and "human desire" were used to discuss social issues. Lenin in his On the Question of Dialectics wrote:


Output:
"Circles" in philosophy: (is a chronology of persons essential? No!) Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus. . . . Modern: Holbach—Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel—Feuerbach—Marx. 5

In his "Conspectus of Hegel's Book Lectures on the History of Philosophy ," he wrote:

Comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle. . . a circle on the great circle (a spiral) of the development of human thought in general. 6

Hegel's comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle, as pointed out by Lenin, is a penetrating reflection of the law of development of the philosophical thought. This is of tremendous importance in our study of the development of traditional Chinese philosophic thought.


Output: From the above diagram, we can see that the development of traditional Chinese philosophy is roughly made up of three spiraling circles. The first covers the period prior to the Qin Dynasty: the Confucian School, including Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi (or the Commentary on the Book of Changes); Daoism (Taoism) including Laozi(Lao Tzu), the School of Jixia (i.e., the "White Heart" and other works) and Zhuangzi, with the two Han dynasties forming a transitional period. The second circle was the period of the Wei and Jin dynasties represented by Wang Bi, Xiang Xiu, and Guo Xiang (or Wang Bi, Guo Xiang, and Seng Zhao). Buddhism was in vogue from the Northern and Southern dynasties through the Sui and Tang dynasties and after a period of development, Buddhism in China grew into several sects such as the Huayan (Avatamsaka ) Sect and the Chan (Zen) Sect. The third circle covers the Song and Ming dynasties represented by Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, and Wang Fuzhi.


Output: iii．In the second column of the diagram only three pairs of categories are listed, of which the most fundamental is the pair "quiescence" and "movement," whose manifestation is the pair "constant" and "variable," though in fact "positive" and "negative" are also peculiar manifestations of "quiescence" and "movement." Although many philosophers of traditional Chinese philosophy discussed the question of "quiescence" and "movement," little discussion on the question of "time" and "space" was conducted among Chinese philosophers (except for the pre-Qin philosophers of the School of Names and philosophers of the later Mohist School). Philosophical propositions in traditional Chinese philosophy seem not to have been restricted by time or space and they paid little attention to the question whether movement took place in time and space. That is why we have not included the categories "time" and "space" in our diagram.


Output: iv．The question of man (the way of man) was much discussed in traditional Chinese philosophy which was especially characterized by the study of the question of "morals" (ethics). Therefore careful consideration should be given to what should be included in the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy. In this diagram (column III) five pairs of categories (in fact not all of them are related to the way of man) seem to be sufficient as basic concepts. "Spirit" and "form," or the relationship between spirit and body, are used for the study of the phenomena of the human life. This was discussed from pre-Qin days onward, with materialists and idealists holding different views. The question of "nature" and "emotion" might be looked at as the key ethical issue. There have been divergent views on the question of "nature" ever since the pre-Qin days, such as "man is born good by nature"; "man is born evil by nature"; "man is born with a mixed nature both good and evil"; "man is born neither good nor evil


Output: and evil"; "man is born neither good nor evil by nature" and "man is born good or evil by nature, all depending on the specific man," etc. On the question of nature and emotion, there were views that "nature is good whereas emotion is bad," "nature is quiescent and emotion is active," etc. The Wei and Jin metaphysicians paid considerable attention to this question, but concentrated on a discussion of the difference and similarity between the sage and the ordinary man. The Song and Ming Neo-Confucians divided nature into "the universal nature" and "the humoral nature," with the former stemming from the "principle of Heaven" and the latter from man's inherent emotion and desire or from the qi that makes up the body. Hence, this is still a question of nature and emotion and the importance of ethical education is to "maintain the principle of Heaven and suppress human desire." The question of "knowledge" and "action" also occupies a very important position in traditional Chinese philosophy. Most of the past


Output: traditional Chinese philosophy. Most of the past Chinese philosophers upheld both "acknowledge" and "action" and thought the latter was even more important. The categories "name" and "actuality" were always contained in traditional Chinese philosophy and the categories "subject" and "object" were borrowed from Buddhism, but all four are related to the question of knowledge. Therefore column III of the diagram contains categories involving existence and knowledge.


Output:
IV．Discussion

As the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy is a rather broad and complicated issue, it calls for an earnest and extensive discussion. The following are only preliminary views on some of the questions:

i．Should the categories in the categorical system be in pairs?


Output: This question should be discussed in two aspects. On the one hand, in the history of philosophy, the philosophical categories used by a philosopher may not be in pairs. For example, the concept "spontaneity" used by Laozi (Lao Tzu) seems not to have its opposite in the book Laozi (Lao Tzu ). The concept qi used as the most general concept in the "White Heart" chapter of Guanzi did not seem to have its opposite either. However, taking the development of traditional Chinese philosophy as a whole, the categories are in pairs. For example, the concept "spontaneity" is paired with "ethics," and "principle" with qi . On the other hand, everything is contradictory, with two contradictory aspects, of which one does not exist without the other. Therefore, the categories which reflect the essential relationships of things must be in pairs of opposites. Some of the philosophical concepts and categories of traditional Chinese philosophy indeed seem to have no pairs of opposites, such as the "mean." We certainly cannot


Output: such as the "mean." We certainly cannot say there is a "counter-mean." Yet an analysis of the meaning of the mean may possibly lead to the solution to this question. Confucius advanced his "doctrine of the mean" to oppose "excess"; he said: "Excess amounts to insufficiency." Thus, the "mean" has the sense of "middle" or "correct." Therefore it would be sufficient to have the concepts of the "positive" and the "negative" in traditional Chinese philosophy since "mean" is included in the meaning of "positive."


Output: Not all the categorical systems used by Western philosophers necessarily reflect the unity of opposites. Among the ten categories used by Aristotle, some can be paired up as opposites such as "quality" and "quantity," but "substance" has no specific opposite, though the other nine categories might be considered to be the opposites of "substance." The twelve categories used by Kant and the categories of the categorical system of Hegel's Logik are mostly pairs of opposites. Though divergent in their views on the categorical system, all Marxist philosophers agree that categories are in pairs, for instance, essence and phenomenon, content and form, necessity and chance, possibility and actuality, etc. Marxist philosophy holds that categories must be pairs of opposites; this is certainly a correct view and reflects the reality of things. Thus when we today study the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and try to make it more systematically and scientifically reflect the characteristics and level


Output: reflect the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy, we should try to find out the law of unity of opposites in its categorical system.


Output: ii．How many categories should the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy contain in order to be sufficient to indicate "the basic pattern of being" or "the basic concepts that reflect the most fundamental characteristics, aspects and relationships of the phenomena and knowledge of the reality"? The twenty pairs of opposite basic concepts of the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy are merely a tentative proposition. They indicate mostly what the "world" and "man" are; for example, the existence of the "world" comprises "principle" and qi and the existence of "man" comprises "spirit" and "form." The categories used by Western philosophers, however, generally show the mode of existence and the "principles of knowledge." The contemporary categories of Marxist philosophy as a whole also show the characteristics and aspects of being and do not include the most basic concepts such as "mind" and "thing" in the categorical system. By this criterion, some of the categories listed above


Output: criterion, some of the categories listed above should not be included in the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy and some other concepts should be added. However, the way we have indicated the system of traditional Chinese philosophy might be just one approach, for the various categories listed in the diagram do indicate the "basic mode of existence" so far as their contents are concerned, and are also "focal points in the web" of man's knowledge. Would not, then, our way seem to be better suited to reflect the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy? Of course it would be even better if we could use less basic concepts to indicate traditional Chinese philosophy, such as the following diagram.


Output: iii．Can "the categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy" reflect its characteristics and level? This is a major question because serious research and thorough discussion are needed to ascertain the characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy and its level. Could we venture to say that our diagram of the categorical system more or less reflects the characteristics and level of traditional Chinese philosophy? Apparently, traditional Chinese philosophy paid special attention to the study of the basic mode of existence and the existence of man and the relationships between things; that is, the identity of things, hence the multitude of concepts such as the "Heaven and man combine as one," the "knowledge and action combine as one," "essence and function are like one," "nonbeing originates in being," the "spirit and form combine as one," and "mind and matter are not two." Although traditional Chinese philosophy did not devote much discussion to such concepts as time and space, cause and effect


Output: such concepts as time and space, cause and effect which are not included in our diagram, yet as a categorical system, traditional Chinese philosophy already attained a fairly high level as compared with ancient Western and Indian philosophy in that it covered a vast scope, with basic concepts all in pairs and the development of the meaning of its concepts reflecting the world with increasing depth.


Output:
The categorical system of traditional Chinese philosophy has not been widely discussed and is a fairly new topic. Here, the author has ventured to propose some preliminary propositions with the aim of arousing interest in the discussion of this topic in the hope that the study of the history of Chinese philosophy, under the guidance of Marxism, will advance even more scientifically.

柒　论中国传统哲学范畴体系的诸问题 *

亚里士多德的《范畴篇》对古希腊哲学的范畴作了总结，提出十个范畴并进行了深入分析。黑格尔的《逻辑学》对西方近代哲学的范畴作了总结，提出了一个较完整的范畴体系。中国传统哲学（即中国古代哲学）有没有一个范畴体系？为什么要研究和如何研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴问题？本文打算对这些问题作一初步的讨论。

一、研究中国传统哲学范畴体系的意义

研究中国传统哲学的范畴体系有它的一般意义和特殊意义两个方面。就其一般意义说至少有以下三点：

1．研究哲学史当然要研究某一哲学家或哲学派别在历史上的作用，但哲学史的研究最终要解决的问题应该是揭示历史上哲学思想如此发展的逻辑必然性。比如说先秦哲学由孔子而孟子而荀子的哲学思想这样发展有什么逻辑必然性。一部以马克思主义为指导的科学的哲学史应当是既能揭示哲学思想发展的动因，又能揭示出哲学思想这样一种理论思维发展的内在逻辑。哲学是关于自然、社会、人类思维最一般规律的科学，它是以抽象思维形式表现出来的，因此可以说哲学思想的发展就其内容说是概念、范畴的提出，概念、范畴涵义的明确、丰富和不断发展的历史。我们研究哲学史上的概念、范畴是如何提出的，它的涵义如何由不明确、不很丰富到比较明确、比较丰富，概念、范畴的体系如何由简单到复杂、由不完整、不系统到比较完整、比较系统，对概念、范畴的发展过程进行具体的分析，就可以掌握哲学思想发展的规律，揭示出其发展的内在逻辑。


Output:
2．我们说，哲学史是唯物主义与唯心主义斗争的历史，并不是说唯物主义与唯心主义的斗争和人类认识发展的规律是两个过程，而是同一个过程。人类认识世界的历史是在唯物主义和唯心主义斗争中发展的，也就是说唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争就表现了人类认识发展的规律。而认识必然要使用概念和范畴，所以哲学史上的每一发展阶段都是围绕着对某些基本的概念或范畴的解释而展开，从而形成唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争的。例如，从中国哲学史上看，在先秦唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争，大体上是围绕着天（道）人（道）、名实、知行、变常等等的不同解释而展开的；魏晋时期则是围绕着有无、体用、言意、名教和自然等几对概念而展开的；宋明是围绕着理气、心物、心性、能所等等的不同看法而展开的。研究概念、范畴发展的历史，正是揭示唯物主义和唯心主义斗争规律的关键。

不仅如此，而且可以认识某些概念、范畴在认识史上出现的必然性，有助于克服在以往哲学史的研究中所出现的对唯心主义持简单否定态度的缺陷。王弼是个唯心主义哲学家，但他首先提出了若干“帮助我们认识和掌握自然现象之网的网上纽结”的范畴，如体用、一多、言意等，尽管他的解释是不正确的，而他能提出这些范畴毕竟表现了人类认识的深化，这在哲学史上就应该肯定，给以应有的地位。有王弼“以无为本”“得意忘言”这样的思想的提出，才会有欧阳建的《言尽意论》和裴頠的《崇有论》的出现。所以研究哲学史上的概念、范畴和它的发展历史，也是正确评价哲学史上唯心主义和唯物主义不可缺少的一环。


Output:
3．恩格斯说：“迄今为止，学习哲学史是锻炼人们理论思维的唯一方法。”恩格斯这里说的哲学史并没有限定必须是科学的哲学史，倘若学习科学的哲学史当然更能起这样的作用。科学的哲学史必然是能揭示人类认识在唯物主义和唯心主义斗争中发展的规律的，而人类认识发展的历史最基本的内容则是概念、范畴发展的历史。由于概念、范畴在哲学史中的发展反映着人们认识的深入，我们研究它的发展历史就是把人类认识世界的过程在自己的思想中再想一次，当然是排除了种种偶然的、次要的因素，而抓住本质的、带规律性的内容的。这个重新思想的过程，必然使我们自己的思想也深化了。在我们研究概念、范畴发展的历史时，不仅要使人类使用概念、范畴认识世界的过程再现，而且必然要用某种方法使之再现，它只能是对概念、范畴的涵义、诸概念范畴之间的关系以及前后发展的逻辑联系进行理论上分析的方法，这种对概念、范畴的理论分析本身就是一种理论思维活动，就这一方面说，它也会有助于提高我们的理论思维能力。

以上三点都说的是研究概念、范畴的一般意义，因为研究任何哲学发展的历史（如西方的、印度的）都有这样的意义。而研究中国传统哲学的概念范畴和它发展的历史还有其特殊的意义，这就是可以使我们了解中国传统哲学的特点和发展的水平。西方哲学有它自己一套范畴体系，从亚里士多德的《范畴篇》到黑格尔的《逻辑学》表现了西方哲学的特点和不同历史时期哲学思想发展的水平。印度哲学也有它自己的一套范畴体系，就印度佛教说，从原始佛教到大乘空有二宗所使用的范畴大体上是前后相继，有其鲜明的特点，并表现了印度佛教在运用逻辑思维、分析概念涵义上的较高水平。中国传统哲学确有它自己的一套概念、范畴，并且逐渐形成了一个较系统的体系。正因为中国传统哲学有自己一套概念、范畴，对这些概念、范畴就不能简单地用西方哲学的概念、范畴去套，甚至也不能简单地和马克思主义哲学的概念、范畴等同。


Output:
在我国哲学史上，长期形成的一套概念、范畴，除少量吸收了印度佛教的概念之外，基本上是独立发展的，所以它的特点也是很鲜明的，例如，在中国哲学史上，“天（道）”和“人（道）”这对范畴就非常重要，因此在中国传统哲学中不仅对天人关系的问题比较重视，而且特别重视人和人（社会）之间关系问题的研究。又如“体”和“用”这对范畴，它不仅包含有“本体”和“现象”的意思，而且有“根据”和“功用”、“全体”和“部分”、“抽象”和“具体”等等的意思，这样一些成对的概念、范畴及其体系自然充分地表现了中国传统哲学的特点，并反映了一定历史发展阶段上的理论思维水平。用一个不十分恰当的比方说，中国医学有其独特的传统，有着特殊的理论体系，使用着特殊的医学名词概念，尽管有些理论和成就我们还不能作出明确的科学解释，但既然在医疗实践上能取得良好的效果，它肯定反映了事物本质的某些侧面，包含着相当深刻的道理。就概念、范畴是知识成立的必要条件，是主观对客观联系的枢纽来说，一定概念、范畴的提出总是人们在思维实践上对客观事物某些侧面的认识获得的一定成果的反映，有什么样的概念、范畴就标志着人们的认识深化到什么程度。因此，我们研究中国传统哲学各个历史发展时期的概念、范畴，就可以看到我国历史上各个时期的理论思维水平。

在中国哲学史上，有三个时期的哲学对中国传统哲学范畴体系的形成有着较大的意义：一是先秦的诸子学；二是魏晋的玄学；三是宋明的理学。如果把这三个时期我国传统哲学的范畴体系和西方同期相比较，应当可以看到它有明显的特点和较高的水平。这样把我国传统哲学和其他国家、民族、地域哲学的范畴体系相比较，是比较哲学应当研究的重要课题。

二、怎样研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴

研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴，从根本上说必须用马克思主义的科学分析方法，我们如果仅仅提出在中国哲学史上曾经使用过哪些概念、范畴，这远不是我们研究中国传统哲学的概念、范畴所要达到的目的。因为那样并不能揭示出哲学思想发展的规律、了解唯物主义与唯心主义斗争的规律和使我们的理论思维得到提高，特别是不能认识中国传统哲学的特点和水平。要达到上述目的就必须用马克思主义的科学方法：（l）分析概念、范畴的涵义；（2）分析概念、范畴涵义的发展；（3）分析哲学家（或哲学派别）的概念、范畴体系；（4）分析中外哲学概念、范畴的异同。只有在作了这样一些具体的分析研究的基础上，才有可能使中国哲学史的研究在科学化的道路上前进。


Output:
1．分析概念、范畴的涵义

一个或一对哲学概念（范畴）的提出，反映着人们对世界认识的水平，但是这个或这对概念的涵义是什么则要我们去分析。古代哲学家提出一新的概念，其涵义往往不如我们今天科学、明确，特别是在说明世界的本原时所用的概念更是不确定，而且有时含糊不清。例如，老子是第一个把“道”作为他的哲学体系的最高概念提出来的。他提出“道”这个概念，在春秋战国时期具有和“尊天”思想相对立的意义。他把“道”作为世界的本原，这当然是提高了中国古代哲学的思想水平，但“道”的涵义如何？老子自己也感到难以说清，他说：“吾不知其名，字之曰道，强为之名曰大”，所以他用了许多形容词来说明“道”：“寂兮寥兮”“恍兮惚兮”“窈兮冥兮”等等。看来，古代哲学家限于当时的客观条件和认识水平，要给表明世界本原的概念作出明确说明是多么不容易呀！因此，这就要求我们根据《老子》一书对“道”这一概念的涵义进行分析。 2 “自然”这一概念在中国哲学史上被广泛地使用，但各个哲学家对它的解释却不相同。最早把“自然”作为一哲学概念使用的也是老子，他的“自然”大体上是“无为”的意思，汉朝王充继承了这个意思，说“天道自然无为”。到魏晋，王弼、夏侯玄等“贵无派”，把“自然”看成就是“道”—宇宙本体。夏侯玄说：“天地以自然运，圣人以自然用。自然者道也，道本无名，故老氏强为之名。”


Output:
而且同一哲学家对“自然”的解释也并不一致，往往从几个方面去解释。这里我们以郭象的“自然”概念为例作些分析。郭象的“自然”至少有五点相互联系的涵义：第一，天人之所为皆“自然”。郭象注《庄子·大宗师》“知天之所为，知人之所为者，至矣”，说：“知天人之所为皆自然”。这就是说，郭象不仅把“天然”看成是“自然”，而且“人为”从某种意义上说也是“自然”。那么在什么意义上说“人为”也是“自然”呢？第二，“自为”是“自然”。郭象说：“言物自然者，无为之者也”，又说：“贵其无为而物之自为也”，可见他的“自然”有“任物之自为”的意思。那么为什么“自为”是一种“无为”呢？第三，“任性”即“自然”。郭象认为“自为”是“自然”，但“自为”并非任意而为，而是“率性而动”，即“任性而为”，“自然耳，故曰性”。“任自然”就是“任性”，既不使人从己，亦不舍己从人。第四，“必然”即“自然”。郭象说：“达命之情者，不务命之所无奈何也，全其自然而已”，“知命”的不做“无奈何”的事这就叫“自然”，这里所谓“命”即“必然性”的意思。第五，“偶然”即“自然”。郭象说：“物各自然，不知其所以然而然”，就“不知其然”说，“自然”又有偶然性的意思。所以，在说明事物的“自生”时往往用“突然”“掘然”等等，都是说事物的存在是没有道理、说不出原因的。

按郭象“自然”概念的涵义有以上相互联系的五点，而其中最重要的是后面两点，即“自然”既有“必然”又有“偶然”的意思。必然和偶然本是一对相对立的概念，但从辩证的观点看必然和偶然是相互联系的，是能互相转化的，必然性又是通过偶然性表现出来。郭象用“自然”一词既说明“必然”又说明“偶然”，正是因为他认识到“必然”和“偶然”的相互联系：此一事物作为此一事物如此地存在，从一方面说是“必然”的，“物各有性”；从另一方面说又是“偶然”的，“忽尔自生”。在郭象的体系中，事物的存在必须兼有这两方面，缺一方面就无郭象哲学。从对郭象的“自然”概念涵义的分析，我们大体可以看到郭象哲学的特点和水平。

2．分析概念、范畴涵义的发展


Output:
2．分析概念、范畴涵义的发展

不仅每个哲学家的概念、范畴的涵义不同，而且各个时代的概念、范畴的涵义往往也不相同。尽管如此，如果这种哲学思想是前后相承的，那么总可以发现概念、范畴涵义之间的继承关系。研究概念、范畴发展的历史，对于了解人们认识发展的规律是非常重要的。下面就中国传统哲学中“气”概念的涵义的发展作些分析，以便说明分析概念、范畴涵义发展的重要性。

早在春秋时期，就有思想家提出“气”对人的影响问题，如《左传·昭公元年》所记载的医知论“六气”。到战国，“气”成一普遍概念，不仅多以为人的形体由“气”构成，而且有以为人的精神也是由“气”构成。在《管子》书中有《白心》《内业》《心术》等篇，中说：“精也者，气之精者也”“凡物之精，化则为生”“下生五谷，上为列星，流于天地之间谓之鬼神，藏于胸中谓之圣人”“故有气则生，无气则死”等等。这就是说，“气”之中一种叫“精气”，凡是能得到它的似乎就有生命，这种“精气”如果到人的身体中，就会有聪明智慧，可以使人成为圣人。

战国时期，这种对“精神”作不科学解释的“精气说”，如果说仍是一种唯物主义，那么这种唯物主义观点已包含了很大的缺陷，致使在一定条件下可以被唯心主义所利用而成为其体系的组成部分；也可以为神仙家所吸收而改造，使之成为其鼓吹“长生不死”的根据。我们知道，孟轲也讲“气”，提出有一种“气”叫“浩然之气”。在《白心》等篇中说，“精气”能给人以聪明智慧，且“此气也，不可止之以力，而安之以德”，“气”本身就有聪明智慧，要由道德力量巩固它。到孟轲那里，他所说的“浩然之气”，就是“集义所生”的了。显然，孟轲所讲的这种“气”就成为精神性的。到汉朝，董仲舒进一步把“气”道德化、神秘化，致使“气”成为上帝的意志和力量的表现。他认为“气”有刑、赏的能力，有善、恶的分别，有喜、怒、哀、乐的感情，这就使它虽保存了物质的外观，而失去了物质的特性。后来两汉谶纬迷信中关于“气”的种种说法，大体都是沿着董仲舒的观点发展的。


Output:
从先秦到两汉的一些史料中我们还可以看到，“气”和神形问题相联系多与“养生”有关，而“养生”则往往又是“成神”的一种手段。在《庄子》书中，所描写的“真人”“神人”等多是“神将守形，守形乃长生”者，他们“吸风饮露，不食五谷”，“一其性，养其气”，神与形合，即可达到“形全精复，与天地为一”的境界。《吕氏春秋》亦多载“养生”之谈，认为要做到“长生久视”则“气”必能在身体中不断流通，而“精气日新，邪气尽去，及其天年，此之谓真。”在《淮南子》中把“养气”“养形”“养性”往往看成是一回事，而且都和“气”的作用联系在一起，无论《吕氏春秋》还是《淮南子》都受到《白心》等篇“精气说”的影响，认为“精神”也是一种“气”（精气），它可以自由出入于身体，神形不离则可长生久视。

与此同时，从先秦到两汉也有继承此前把“气”看成是物质性的、构成天地万物的东西的哲学家。荀子认为天地万物包括人都是由“气”构成，“水火有气而无生，草木有生而无知，禽兽有知而无义，人有气有生有知亦且有义”。《淮南子·精神训》说宇宙最初是没有具体形象的混沌未分的元气，后由阴阳二气的互相作用而产生天地万物，“浊气为虫，精气为人”。王充更明确地说“天地合气，万物生焉”，而且万物的产生正是“气”运动的结果，“天之动行也，施气也；体动气乃出，物乃生矣”。为了反对董仲舒对“气”的唯心主义观点，王充特别提出“气”是无意志、无目的的，“气也，恬澹无欲，无为无事者也”“气若云烟，安能听人辞”。但是，王充和《淮南子》书中的观点一样，仍然把人的精神（或生命现象）看成是“精气”，他说：“人之所以生者，精气也，死而精气灭”。可见在我国古代哲学史上关于“气”的学说，从对这个概念涵义的分析上，就可以明显地发现其间的前后继承关系了。上述三个方面关于“气”的学说，或者说关于“气”的几种涵义，到东汉末都汇合在道教的思想之中，兹不详述。

3．分析哲学家（或哲学派别）的概念、范畴体系


Output:
3．分析哲学家（或哲学派别）的概念、范畴体系

在哲学史上，比较重要的哲学家在建立其哲学体系时，必然要使用一系列的概念、范畴，因此研究其概念、范畴相互之间的关系，是我们深入解剖其思想体系的基本要求。一个哲学家思想体系水平的高低往往和他使用概念、范畴是否丰富、是否成体系，以及其概念、范畴的涵义是否反映事物之间的本质联系有关系。从对哲学史上的哲学家（或哲学派别）的研究方面说，有时看法不同或者也是由于没有对其概念、范畴体系作全面而系统的分析引起的。例如，郭象的哲学如仅从他分析“有”和“无”这对范畴的关系看，或者可以说他的思想是唯物主义的，但是郭象的哲学之所以成为魏晋玄学发展的髙峰，并不是由于他对“有”和“无”的关系提出了和王弼不同的看法，而在于他有一比较完整的思想体系。郭象的哲学思想体系分析起来，大体上可以说是由下述四组基本概念构成的（当然在郭象哲学中还有其他一些重要概念，这里就不说了）。

“有”和“无”：魏晋玄学所讨论的中心是“本末有无”问题，郭象的哲学也可以说是从讨论这个问题开始的。郭象认为，“有”（或“万有”）是唯一的存在，是“常存”的，“夫有之为物，虽千变万化，而不得一为无”，“言天地常存，乃无未有之时”。至于“无”，他则认为在“有”之上的造物主或作为本体的“无”是不存在（non-existence），就是“无物”（nothing），所以他说：“无则无矣，则不能生有”；“请问造物者，有邪无邪？无也则胡能生物？”“无”既然是“无”，怎么能生物？所以郭象哲学一开始就否定在“万有”之上有一个“造物主”，或者说有一个与“有”相对立的本体之“无”作为它存在的根据。但是，郭象哲学并未就此止步，而是继续讨论下去了。


Output:
“性”和“命”：事物的存在既然不是以本体的“无”为根据，那么事物的存在有没有什么根据呢？照郭象看，不能说“万有”的存在是没有任何根据，万物既然存在了，其存在本身就是其存在的根据，具体地说，其存在的根据就在于其“自性”，“物各有性，性各有极”。郭象的所谓“性”就是指“此物之所以为此物者”，有“规定性”的意思，所以他说：“天性所受，各有本分，不可逃，亦不可加。”“物各有分（性分），故知者守知以待终，而愚者抱愚以至死，岂有能中易其性？”所谓“命”，郭象则把它解释为“必然性”，如他说：“命也者，言物皆自然而无为之者”，“知不可奈何者命也”。很明显，他的“性”和“命”两概念的涵义都是为了论证“有”是唯一的存在，而作为造物主或本体的“无”是根本不存在的。

“自生”和“无待”：事物的“自性”是其存在的根据，而此“自性”又是如何产生的？它的产生是不是有目的、有条件的？郭象说：“物各自生，无所出焉，此天道也，”“物之生也，莫不颓然而自生。”如果事物的“自性”不是“自生”的，那么就是其他事物所给予的，是造物主有目的创造的。然而此事物之所以成为此事物，彼事物之所以成为彼事物，是没有什么使它这样或那样地产生和存在，甚至也不能认为是它自己使它这样或那样地产生和存在，所以“自生”只能是“欻然自生”“突然自生”“自然而生”。事物的产生和存在如有什么原因和目的，则必然导致承认有主使者。那么“自生”的事物和其他“自生”的事物是个什么关系呢？郭象认为，任何事物都是“自生”的，其存在都是“自足其性”的，所以是“无待”的。一方面“无待”之所以可能是因为“物各自造”，“物各自造，而无所待焉”；另一方面只要“适性”“安性”，则“无待”对于任何事物来说都是可以达到的，“苟足于其性，则虽大鹏无以自贵于小鸟，小鸟无羡于天池，而荣愿有余矣。故小大虽殊，逍遥一也。”所以要坚持事物存在的根据除其自身的“自性”外，再没有其他任何根据和条件，就必须承认它是“自生”的“无待”的。


Output:
“独化”和“相因”：要把“自生”和“无待”的观点坚持下去，还有一个重要问题要解决。如果说，每个事物都是一个个的存在，此事物就是此事物，彼事物就是彼事物，互相分别，那么所有的事物岂不都是相对的？如果都是相对的，那么岂不还要受到限制？如果要受到限制，那么岂不仍是“有待”的？为了解决这个问题，郭象提出了“独化”的概念。所谓“独化”是说任何事物的生生化化都是独立自足的，因此“无待”是绝对的。如果要追求事物生生化化的原因和根据，表面上看来可以无穷无尽地追求下去，但追求到最后只能得出“无待”的结论来，所以他说：“若责其所待，而寻其所由，则寻责无极，卒至乎无待，而独化之理明矣”。郭象在《齐物论注》中举了一个极端的例子，他说形、影和罔两（影外之阴）都是独立自足的、绝对的存在，“是以涉有物之域，虽复罔两，未有不独化于玄冥者也”。

如果有一物不是独立自足的存在，那么其他任何事物也都不能独立自足的存在，这样就必然引出在“万有”之上仍有一作为其存在根据的本体（或造物主），而势必承认有“生化之本”了。事物尽管是独立自足的存在，只要每个事物都完满地实现其“自性”，充分地发挥其“自性”，“知者守知以待终，而愚者抱愚以至死”，那么就可以达到“天地未足为寿，而与我并生；万物未足为异，而与我同得”的境界。这样对其他任何事物就有最大的功用，“相因之功，莫若独化之至”。从另一个角度看，任何存在着的事物，只要是存在着的它就是不可少的，就不能不存在，郭象说：“人之生也，形虽七尺，而五常必具，故区区之身，乃举天地以奉之。故天地万物，凡所有者，不可一日相无也。一物不具，则生者无由得生；一理不至，则天年无缘得终。”因此，凡是存在的都是合理的、必然的，而且是不互相排斥的。这个观点似乎与“独化”说有矛盾，其实不然。因为照郭象看，存在着的事物都是合理的、必然的，而不是互相排斥的，正是以每一事物都能充分地、绝对地发挥其“自性”、独立自足地生生化化为条件。

从对郭象哲学范畴体系的分析看，他的哲学最后要建立的是“独化”说，而“崇有”不过是达到“独化”说的阶梯。而且在郭象的体系中唯有建立其“独化”学说，才可以坚持“崇有”，而较为彻底地否定在“万有”之上还有一作为其存在根据的“无”。

我们要了解一个哲学家是唯物主义还是唯心主义、他的哲学的特点以及他的哲学思想的前后继承关系和历史地位，都必须通过对其范畴体系的分析才可以得到。

4．分析中外哲学概念、范畴的异同


Output:
4．分析中外哲学概念、范畴的异同

在对中外哲学概念范畴的分析比较中，可以更好地认识中国传统哲学的特点和水平，这点是毫无疑义的。由于这个问题比较大，作者又没有作过仔细、深入的研究，这里只就魏晋玄学和当时传入的印度佛教般若学这一个问题作一点粗浅的比较分析。

魏晋玄学所讨论的主要问题是“本末有无”问题，所以“无”和“有”两个概念是玄学的最重要的基本概念。佛教般若学所讨论的问题也是“有”和“无”（或“空”）的问题，所以道安说：“于十二部，毗目罗部最多，以斯邦人老庄教行，与方等经兼忘相似，故因风易行耳。”但佛教般若空宗讲的“空”（或“无”）虽与玄学家王弼等讲的“无”有相似处，实并不相同。汉末灵帝光和二年（179年）支娄迦谶译出《道行般若波罗蜜经》中有“本无品”，“本无”是梵文Tathatā的意译，后来译为“真如”，而在《道行经·本无品》中所说的“本无”是“诸法本无自性”的意思，所有的事物都没有实在的自体。玄学家王弼等也讲“本无”，意思是说万物“以无为本”，所有的事物都以“无”为本体。这两种“本无”思想虽不能说全然不同，但其涵义却有很大差别。从魏晋玄学说，王弼的“本无”思想是继承了老子的学说，在他的哲学体系中“无”这一概念和“道”或“理”是同一的，“夫大之极也，其唯道乎！……虽贵以无为用，不能舍无以为体”；“物无妄然，必由其理”，所以王弼的“无”不是说“虚空”或“不存在”（non-existence），而是指事物的“本体”（substance）。佛教般若空宗的“本无”只是讲的“诸法本无自性”，他们认为任何事物都是因缘和合而成，并无实在的自性。从这里看，般若空宗说的“空”不是指的“本体”（substance）而是说的“虚空”（non-existence）。至于“有”的涵义，魏晋玄学所讲的“有”一般都是说“万有”，即形形色色的具体存在物，但在我们所翻译的佛经中，把佛教中不同涵义的“有”（存在）往往都译为同一个“有”。 3

佛教传入中国，在东汉先是依附于中国的道术，到魏晋玄学流行以后又依附于玄学，东晋时所出现的我国僧人的般若学各派大体上也还是用玄学思想了解般若学，一直到鸠摩罗什来华，译出《般若经》的释论《大智度论》和《中论》《百论》《十二门论》等，在中国才对印度佛学的般若学的原意了解了。僧肇的《不真空论》是比较近印度佛教般若学讲“非有非无”的原意的。


Output:
我们在对中外哲学概念、范畴的比较分析中，可以看到它们各自的特点和水平，也可以看到一种外来文化思想的传入对原有的传统文化思想发生影响的过程，以及外来文化思想如何被吸收而成为所传入的国家（民族、地域）文化思想的一个组成部分。

三、关于中国传统哲学范畴体系的构想

“范畴”从西方哲学史上看有种种解释，亚里士多德的《范畴篇》把它看作是存在的基本样式（mode），他提出十个范畴：本质（substance）、量（quantity）、质（quality）、关系（relation）、位置（place）、时（time）、占有（state）、作用（action）、遭受（passion）等。康德的12范畴说是与认识有关的原则或说是构成经验的条件。列宁说：“范畴是在区分过程中的一些小阶段，是帮助我们认识和掌握自然现象之网的网上纽结。”苏联《哲学辞典》说：“反映现实世界各种现象和认识的最一般的和最本质的特性、方面和关系的基本概念。”看来，对“范畴”大体上是从现实界的存在和认识两个方面来说明的：说它是“存在的基本样式”或“现实界各种现象的最一般的和最本质的特性、方面和关系”，是就存在方面说的；说它是“构成经验的条件”或“认识和掌握自然现象之网的网上纽结”，是就认识方面说的。而认识的必要条件必然是反映和表现“存在的基本样式”；而“存在的基本样式”又只是在人们的认识过程中才有意义。从上述一些说法中，我们还可以看出“范畴”和“概念”的关系，范畴是基本概念，概念并不都是范畴。因此，在这里我们要讨论的是，中国传统哲学的基本概念即范畴应有哪些。如果我们能根据中国古代哲学家所使用的基本概念构成一个能表现中国传统哲学是如何用以认识和说明“存在的基本样式”的体系，并能从中揭示中国传统哲学思想发展的线索，那就证明中国传统哲学确有其范畴体系。下面先用一图表（见下图）来表明，然后再作一些必要的说明：

在这个图表中共用了20对中国传统哲学的基本概念构成中国传统哲学的范畴体系，这当然是一个很初步的构想，问题一定很多，目的是想引起大家进一步地研究和讨论。对这个中国传统哲学范畴体系的构想图表，我想说明以下几点：


Output: 1．这个构想图表分为三大栏，第一栏（Ⅰ）是想说明中国传统哲学中用了哪些基本概念表述世界的存在；第二栏（Ⅱ）是想说明用了哪些基本概念表述存在的形式；第三栏（Ⅲ）是想说明用了哪些基本概念表述人的存在和认识。“天（道）”和“人（道）”的关系问题一直是中国传统哲学讨论的中心，中国哲学史上的唯物主义和唯心主义的斗争大都也是围绕这个问题进行的。子产第一个明确地提出这两者之间关系的命题：“天道远，人道迩”。孔子一方面很重视“天命”，而另一方面更重视“人事”。他“五十而知天命”，却比较少讲这个问题，“夫子之言性与天道，不可得而闻也”，可是《论语》大量记载他讲“人道”的问题。孟子讲“尽心，知性，知天”，《中庸》说“诚者天之道，诚之者人之道”，荀子讲“制天命而用之”，都是讲的“天人关系”问题。道家的老子讲“天道自然无为”，而压低“仁义”（人道）；庄子“蔽于天而不知人”。汉朝的儒家大师董仲舒说他自己讲的是“天人相与之际”的学问；受道家影响比较深的司马迁也说《史记》是“究天人之际，通古今之变”的著作。魏晋玄学讨论的“本末有无”问题，就其内容说仍是“自然”（天道）与“名教”（人道）的关系问题，所以何晏说：“若王弼者，始可与言天人之际。”宋儒无论理学还是心学，都把“人心惟危，道心惟微，惟精惟一，允执厥中”称为“十六字心传”。朱熹认为“太极（天理）只是个极好至善底道理”，“是天地人物万善之好底表德”，“天理”和“人欲”问题仍是天人关系问题。直到王夫之仍然把这个问题作为他讨论的重点，他认为“礼虽纯为天理之节文，而必寓于人欲以见”，“人欲之大公即天理之至正矣”。所以，中国传统哲学是从讨论“天（道）”和“人（道）”这对范畴的关系开始而展开的，它反映了中国传统哲学所注重的问题和特殊内容。


Output:
2．这个构想图中表述了中国传统哲学范畴的发展及诸范畴之间的关系。中国传统哲学从研究“天（道）”和“人（道）”的关系开始，而分为两支：一支为道家，老子提出“道”和“万物”的关系，他说：“道生一，一生二，二生三，三生万物”，又说：“天下万物生于有，有生于无”，因此“道”和“物”的关系又以“无”和“有”这对概念表现；另一支是儒家，在《易传》中提出“道”和“器”这对范畴，说：“形而上者谓之道，形而下者谓之器”，又说：“易有太极，是生两仪”，“一阴一阳谓之道”，所以“道”和“器”的关系又以“太极”和“阴阳”这对概念表现。两汉时哲学思想虽有发展，但似乎没有提出新的有影响的范畴。魏晋玄学主三玄（《老子》《庄子》《周易》），而使道家系统的思想和儒家《周易》系统的思想渐结合，而实是以老庄思想为骨架而建立了关于宇宙本原问题的本体论。魏晋玄学用“体”“用”、“本”“末”、“一”“多”等概念说明“无”（本体）和“有”（万物，本体的种种表现），用“自然”（体）和“名教”（用）这对概念表述“宇宙本然”（即本体）和“人类社会关系”（即名分教化之类）的关系，用“意”和“言”这对概念说明对宇宙本体的认识问题。自魏晋南北朝以后，中国传统哲学经过印度佛教的冲击，到宋形成理学。理学实是吸收了佛教的思想而形成的新儒学体系。如果说魏晋玄学讲的本体论是以老庄思想为骨架，那么宋明理学确为儒家学说建立了客观唯心主义体系（朱熹）、主观唯心主义体系（王守仁）和较高水平的唯物主义体系（王夫之）。这个时期的哲学概念继承了魏晋玄学的，又吸收了隋唐佛学的，而使儒、道、佛三家在儒家思想基础上汇合了。“理”和“气”、“心”和“物”成为当时哲学的最基本的概念；“心”与“性”展开为“心即理”和“性即理”的问题；“能”和“所”、“格物”和“穷理”等是认识论的问题；“天理”和“人欲”是社会问题。列宁在《谈谈辩证法问题》中说：

“哲学史上的圆圈：古代：从德谟克利特到柏拉图以及赫拉克里特的辩证法。……近代：霍尔巴赫——黑格尔（经过贝克菜、休谟、康德）。黑格尔——费尔巴哈——马克思。”

在《黑格尔<哲学史讲演录>一书摘要》中说：

“把哲学史比做圆圈……”

“每一种哲学思想=整个人类思想发展的大圆圈（螺旋）上的一个圆圈。”

列宁所指出的黑格尔关于“把哲学史比做圆圈”的思想，深刻地反映了哲学思想发展的规律，这对我们研究中国传统哲学思想发展有非常重要的意义。


Output:
从这个范畴体系的构想图中，我们可以看到中国传统哲学基本上是由三个螺旋上升的圆圈构成的：第一个是先秦，从儒家说是孔子—孟子—荀子（或《易传》）；从道家说是老子—稷下学派（即《白心》等篇）—庄子，两汉是个过渡阶段。第二个是魏晋，王弼—向秀—郭象（或王弼—郭象—僧肇）。南北朝到隋唐佛教盛行，经过一段时间的发展形成了中国的宗派如华严宗、禅宗等。第三个是宋明，张载—朱熹—王夫之。

3．在构想图中的第二栏（Ⅱ）只列了3对范畴，而最根本的一对范畴是“静”和“动”，“常”和“变”是“静”和“动”的表现，其实“正”和“反”也是“静”和“动”的一种特殊表现形式。中国传统哲学中虽然讨论“静”和“动”的哲学家很多，但“时”“空”问题除先秦名家和后期墨家有较多的讨论外，以后讨论的则不太多，也不普遍。从中国传统哲学看，它的哲学命题似乎不受时、空的限制；运动是否在时空中也不注意。所以，在这里我们没有把“时”“空”这类概念列在这个范畴体系构想图中。

4．在中国传统哲学中，关于“人（道）”方面的问题研究得比较多，特别是“道德”（伦理）问题的讨论更是中国传统哲学的特点，因此到底在范畴体系中应列入哪些，要很好地研究。在这个构想图中（见Ⅲ栏）只列了5对（有些也不全是“人（道）”问题），作为哲学的基本概念是不是大体也够了。“神”和“形”是说“精神”和“身体”的关系问题，是讨论人的生命现象，这个问题从先秦一直讨论下来，有唯物主义的和唯心主义的不同看法。“性”“情”问题可以说是伦理道德的核心问题，对“性”自先秦以来就有种种不同看法，有“性善说”“性恶说”“善恶混说”“无善无不善说”“善恶以人异说”等等；而“性”和“情”的关系又有“性善情恶”“性静情动”等不同说法。到魏晋玄学对这个问题仍很注意，它成为讨论“圣人”与“一般人”的异同的一个重要问题。宋明理学分“性”为“天命之性”和“气质之性”，而所谓“天命之性”是从“天理”来的；“气质之性”是生来固有的感情、欲望等，是从构成身体的“气”得来的，这还是一个“性”“情”问题，而道德教化的重要就在“存天理，灭人欲”。“知”“行”问题在中国传统哲学中占有很重要的地位，就中国传统哲学看，多数哲学家都主张既要“知”又要“行”，而且以为“行”更重要。“名”“实”问题是中国传统哲学原来就有的，而“能”“所”这对概念则是从佛教中吸取的，都是关于人的认识问题。因此，构想图的第三栏（Ⅲ）所列是表明人的存在和认识的概念。