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a thing that is most true, it has yet to be shown why this must be the same
thing. Aquinas perhaps had in mind a principle requiring the cause of a
thing ’ s being also to be the cause of its other positive attributes or the cause
of its perfections. If so, such a premise would need to be inserted into the
argument before C4.
In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and
less true, more and less noble, etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse
things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a
given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches
that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally
true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal
being; for according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are
maximally true are maximally beings.
But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus
is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fi re, which
is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something
that is a cause for all beings of their esse , their goodness, and each of their
perfections – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
P1. There are some things that are more or less good, more or less true, or
more or less noble.
P2. If something is more or less F, then there is something maximally F.
C1. There is something maximally good, something maximally true, and
something maximally noble (substitution, and modus ponens , P1, P2).
C2. There is something maximally true (simplifi cation, C1).
P3. If something is maximally true, then it is maximally being.
C3. Something is maximally being ( modus ponens , C2, P3).
P4. If something is maximally F, then it is the cause of all things that are F.
C4. There is something that is the cause for all beings, their goodness,
and each of their perfections ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
C5. We call that thing which is the cause of the being, goodness, and
perfection of all other things “ God ” (defi nition).
The Fifth Way – The Argument from the Governance
Aquinas argues in the Fifth Way that if things always or for the most part
act for a particular end, that is evidence of their being directed at that end
by an intelligent agent. In nature, most natural things act always or for the
most part for a particular end, and so nature is directed by an intelligent
agent. Note that, for Aquinas, to act for the sake of an end does not require
intentionality. In Aquinas ’ way of speaking, fi re acts for the sake of the end
Aquinas’ Five Ways 17
when it burns upwards and the stone acts for the sake of the end when
falling down to the earth. One might think that evolutionary biology allows
a way out of the design or chance dilemma, since, given evolutionary
biology, something could always or for the most part act for the sake of an
end but not due to either design or chance but rather natural selection.
Aquinas ’ argument, however, is not aimed solely at biological entities. An
electron, for instance, attracts positively charged particles always or for the
most part, but it did not acquire this property via some evolutionary
process. So even if natural selection narrows the scope of Aquinas ’ argument,
it alone does not defeat the argument.
We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the
sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently
act in the same way in order to bring about that which is best, and
from this it is clear that it is not by chance, but by design, that they attain
the end.
But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed
by something that has cognition and intelligence, in the way that an arrow is
directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something intelligent by which all
natural things are ordered to an end – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3,
response)
P1. If something always or for the most part acts in the same way in order
to bring about that which is best, then it acts for the sake of an end.
P2. Beings in nature always or for the most part act in the same way in
order to bring about that which is best.
C1. Beings in nature act for the sake of an end ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. If beings in nature act for the sake of an end, then beings in nature are
directed by something that has cognition and intelligence.
C2. Beings in nature are directed by something that has cognition and
intelligence ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
C3. We call that director of unthinking things “ God ” (defi nition).
2
The Contingency
Cosmological Argument
Mark T. Nelson
The Contingency Argument is a version of the cosmological argument for
the existence of God, proposed by Samuel Clarke (1675 – 1729) and rescued
from obscurity by William Rowe (b. 1931). The cosmological argument is
not, in fact, a single argument but a family of arguments that attempt to
prove, or at least render plausible, the existence of God based on the existence
of the cosmos. Typically, these arguments have two stages: the fi rst
arguing from the existence of the cosmos to the existence of a necessary
being or fi rst cause of this cosmos; the second arguing that this necessary
being or fi rst cause is God. Regarding the fi rst stage of the argument, scholars
sometimes distinguish between two versions: those based on the idea
that infi nite causal regresses do not exist and those not based on this idea.
The fi rst three of Thomas Aquinas ’ (1224/5 – 74) “ Five Ways ” (#1) are
examples of the former; Clarke ’ s contingency argument is an example of
the latter. Aquinas argues, for example, that an uncaused fi rst cause of
Clarke , Samuel . A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and
Other Writings , edited by Enzio Vailati . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
University Press , 1998 .
Rowe , William L. The Cosmological Argument . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
University Press , 1975 .
___. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction . Belmont, CA : Wadsworth ,
1978 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Contingency Cosmological Argument 19
“ sensible beings with effi cient causes ” must exist, because, if it did not,
there would be an infi nite regress of caused causes, but such infi nite causal

a thing that is most true, it has yet to be shown why this must be the same

thing. Aquinas perhaps had in mind a principle requiring the cause of a

thing ’ s being also to be the cause of its other positive attributes or the cause

of its perfections. If so, such a premise would need to be inserted into the

argument before C4.

In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and

less true, more and less noble, etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse

things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a

given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches

that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally

true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal

being; for according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are

maximally true are maximally beings.

But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus

is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fi re, which

is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something

that is a cause for all beings of their esse , their goodness, and each of their

perfections – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)

P1. There are some things that are more or less good, more or less true, or

more or less noble.

P2. If something is more or less F, then there is something maximally F.

C1. There is something maximally good, something maximally true, and

something maximally noble (substitution, and modus ponens , P1, P2).

C2. There is something maximally true (simplifi cation, C1).

P3. If something is maximally true, then it is maximally being.

C3. Something is maximally being ( modus ponens , C2, P3).

P4. If something is maximally F, then it is the cause of all things that are F.

C4. There is something that is the cause for all beings, their goodness,

and each of their perfections ( modus ponens , C1, P4).

C5. We call that thing which is the cause of the being, goodness, and

perfection of all other things “ God ” (defi nition).

The Fifth Way – The Argument from the Governance

Aquinas argues in the Fifth Way that if things always or for the most part

act for a particular end, that is evidence of their being directed at that end

by an intelligent agent. In nature, most natural things act always or for the

most part for a particular end, and so nature is directed by an intelligent

agent. Note that, for Aquinas, to act for the sake of an end does not require

intentionality. In Aquinas ’ way of speaking, fi re acts for the sake of the end

Aquinas’ Five Ways 17

when it burns upwards and the stone acts for the sake of the end when

falling down to the earth. One might think that evolutionary biology allows

a way out of the design or chance dilemma, since, given evolutionary

biology, something could always or for the most part act for the sake of an

end but not due to either design or chance but rather natural selection.

Aquinas ’ argument, however, is not aimed solely at biological entities. An

electron, for instance, attracts positively charged particles always or for the

most part, but it did not acquire this property via some evolutionary

process. So even if natural selection narrows the scope of Aquinas ’ argument,

it alone does not defeat the argument.

We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the

sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently

act in the same way in order to bring about that which is best, and

from this it is clear that it is not by chance, but by design, that they attain

the end.

But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed

by something that has cognition and intelligence, in the way that an arrow is

directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something intelligent by which all

natural things are ordered to an end – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3,

response)

P1. If something always or for the most part acts in the same way in order

to bring about that which is best, then it acts for the sake of an end.

P2. Beings in nature always or for the most part act in the same way in

order to bring about that which is best.

C1. Beings in nature act for the sake of an end ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. If beings in nature act for the sake of an end, then beings in nature are

directed by something that has cognition and intelligence.

C2. Beings in nature are directed by something that has cognition and

intelligence ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

C3. We call that director of unthinking things “ God ” (defi nition).

2

The Contingency

Cosmological Argument

Mark T. Nelson

The Contingency Argument is a version of the cosmological argument for

the existence of God, proposed by Samuel Clarke (1675 – 1729) and rescued

from obscurity by William Rowe (b. 1931). The cosmological argument is

not, in fact, a single argument but a family of arguments that attempt to

prove, or at least render plausible, the existence of God based on the existence

of the cosmos. Typically, these arguments have two stages: the fi rst

arguing from the existence of the cosmos to the existence of a necessary

being or fi rst cause of this cosmos; the second arguing that this necessary

being or fi rst cause is God. Regarding the fi rst stage of the argument, scholars

sometimes distinguish between two versions: those based on the idea

that infi nite causal regresses do not exist and those not based on this idea.

The fi rst three of Thomas Aquinas ’ (1224/5 – 74) “ Five Ways ” (#1) are

examples of the former; Clarke ’ s contingency argument is an example of

the latter. Aquinas argues, for example, that an uncaused fi rst cause of

Clarke , Samuel . A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and

Other Writings , edited by Enzio Vailati . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge

University Press , 1998 .

Rowe , William L. The Cosmological Argument . Princeton, NJ : Princeton

University Press , 1975 .

___. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction . Belmont, CA : Wadsworth ,

1978 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Contingency Cosmological Argument 19

“ sensible beings with effi cient causes ” must exist, because, if it did not,

there would be an infi nite regress of caused causes, but such infi nite causal