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13
|
Legal
|
Our client, Alex Jones, was involved in an automobile collision on July 15, 2025. The other vehicle involved was operated by Stephanie Smith. Mr. Jones is insured by ABC Insurance. Ms. Smith is insured by XYZ Insurance. Ms. Smith made a left-hand turn in front of Mr. Jones. There was no traffic signal. The point of impact to Ms. Smith's vehicle was the rear passenger quarter panel. The point of impact to Mr. Jones' vehicle was the front bumper.
Mr. Jones submitted a property damage claim to XYZ Insurance on July 16, 2025, for repairs to the damage to his 2025 Tesla vehicle. XYZ Insurance has not completed its liability investigation. An initial estimate for the repairs to Mr. Jones' vehicle indicates that the damage is over $85,000.
Mr. Jones is concerned that the value of the vehicle had been diminished due to the extensive repairs that will be needed and would like to pursue a diminished value claim, in addition to the property damage claim. The Tesla was purchased new this year for $100,000. The vehicle had less than 1,000 miles accrued at the time of the loss. Mr. Jones spoke to a salesman at the dealership, who advised the car's value would be diminished to $80,000, due to the extensive repairs.
All parties reside in Florida and the accident occurred in Duval County, Florida.
Mr. Jones would like our opinion on whether he can recover on a diminished value claim. Draft a legal opinion addressing the following:
(1) Whether diminution of value can be recovered in the State of Florida.
(2) Whether diminution of value applies to 1st party, 3rd party, or both.
(3) Whether Mr. Jones can recover the diminished value of the Tesla.
(4) The elements required and necessary proof to recover diminution of value in the State of Florida, including any exceptions.
In reaching your conclusion, please refer to relevant statutory references and applicable case law.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Drafts the response in the format of a legal opinion or memorandum, which includes at least three of the following: a factual summary, analysis, conclusion, references to relevant statutory and legal authority.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "The prompt explicitly asks the model to 'Draft a legal opinion,' which should include a factual summary, analysis, and conclusion, with reference to relevant statutory and legal authority.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Style"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Identifies the jurisdiction for the legal analysis as the State of Florida.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "The prompt specifies that all parties reside in Florida and the accident occurred there, making Florida law the basis for the entire analysis.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Explains that diminution of value claims are recognized in the State of Florida.",
"sources": "Airtechv.MacDonald.pdf McHalev.FarmBureau.pdf Sieglev.Progressive.pdf",
"justification": "As noted in Airtech Services, Inc. v. MacDonald Construction Company, diminished value claims are recognized in the State of Florida. Citing the Restatement of Torts 928, the court noted that the rule of damages applicable to the case at bar is succinctly stated in Restatement, Torts, \u00a7 928 (1939) as follows: 'Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm to chattels not amounting to a total destruction in value, the damages include compensation for the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the value after the harm or, at the plaintiff's election, the reasonable cost of repair or restoration where feasible, with due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs. (150 So.2d at 465).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Specifically addresses whether diminution of value applies to 1st party claims, 3rd party claims, or both.",
"sources": "Sieglev.Progressive.pdf McHalev.FarmBureau.pdf",
"justification": "Regarding 1st Party Claims - The Florida Supreme Court held in Siegle v. Progressive, noted that the policy definition of 'repair' did not require the insurer to pay for the diminished value of the vehicle. (819 So.2d at 736, 738). As noted by the Supreme Court of Florida, 'proper interpretation of the policy language at hand requires that we deem diminished value a loss not covered by this policy. Acceptance of the petitioner's position that the proper definition of 'repair' includes compensation for lost value would negate the insurer's choice of remedy explicitly contained in the contractual text.' (819 So.2d at 739). Regarding 3rd Party Claims - Florida courts have held that the cost of repairs plus diminution of value are the proper measure of damages. (McHale v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 409 So.2d at 239).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "States that diminution of value is generally NOT recoverable in a first-party claim in Florida.",
"sources": "Sieglev.Progressive.pdf",
"justification": "In Siegle v. Progressive, the Florida Supreme Court held that the insurance policy was not ambiguous in defining 'repair' and did not require the insurer to pay for the diminished value of the vehicle. (819 So.2d at 736, 738). As noted by the Supreme Court of Florida, 'proper interpretation of the policy language at hand requires that we deem diminished value a loss not covered by this policy. Acceptance of the petitioner's position that the proper definition of 'repair' includes compensation for lost value would negate the insurer's choice of remedy explicitly contained in the contractual text.' (819 So.2d at 739).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "States that diminution of value is recoverable in a third-party claim in Florida.",
"sources": "McHalev.FarmBureau.pdf",
"justification": "Florida courts have held that the proper measure of damages for third party claimants is the cost of repairs plus diminution of value, where it is shown that the repairs do not put the property in as good as position as it was before. McHale v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. 409 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). 'The proper interpretation of the Restatement of Torts Rule ... is that damages are not limited to the cost of repairs actually made where plaintiff shows that the repairs did not put the property in as good a condition as it was before the injury. In such cases, the cost of the repairs made plus the diminution in value will ordinarily be the proper measure of damages, with the burden on the plaintiff to prove in addition to the cost of repairs, that he suffered the additional damage of diminution of value by virtue of the vehicle having been involved in the accident.' McHale v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. 409 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "List the elements required to prove diminution of value in Florida.",
"sources": "Airtechv.MacDonald.pdf McHalev.FarmBureau.pdf Sieglev.Progressive.pdf FlaStat.319.30.pdf FlaStat.626.9743.pdf",
"justification": "A DV claimant must prove: (1) the vehicle's pre-loss value, (2) the vehicle's post-repair fair market value after proper repairs, and (3) that repairs did not fully restore value, with causation linking the diminution to the loss. See McHale v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 409 So.2d 238, 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Restatement (First) of Torts \u00a7 928 as applied in Airtech Services, Inc. v. MacDonald Constr. Co., 150 So.2d 465. A party claiming diminished value must show that they were not at fault in causing the accident. As noted in Siegle v. Progressive, DV is only available to liability claimants. (819 So.2d at 739). As noted in McHale v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., the party must prove that the value of the vehicle has been diminished, the party must also provide the pre-accident value and an appraisal showing the post-repair value. 'Compensation for repairs is an alternative method of proving damages which purpose is to restore the defendant to same position he was in prior to the injury. The phrase 'due allowance for ... difference in value...' in application insures that the costs of repair will neither enhance nor diminish the value of the property. The proper interpretation of the Restatement of Torts Rule, quoted above, is that damages are not limited to the cost of repairs actually made where plaintiff shows that the repairs did not put the property in as good a condition as it was before the injury. In such cases, the cost of the repairs made plus the diminution in value will ordinarily be the proper measure of damages, with the burden on the plaintiff to prove in addition to the cost of repairs, that he suffered the additional damage of diminution of value by virtue of the vehicle having been involved in the accident. (409 So. 2d at 239). Exceptions - As noted in Siegle v. Progressive, DV is not applicable to 1st party claims. (819 So.2d at 739). DV is not available if the vehicle is non-repairable and deemed a total loss. (See Florida Statute 319.30 (1)(t) for definition of total loss vehicle), (See Florida Statute 627.9743 (Section 5) for the measure of damages - When a vehicle is a total loss, the insurer may offer a cash settlement based on the replacement of the vehicle's ACV or a replacement vehicle).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "Identifies Mr. Jones' claim against XYZ Insurance as a third-party claim.",
"sources": "Prompt FlaStat.626.9743.pdf",
"justification": "The prompt states that the client is pursuing a liability claim against the other driver, and, therefore, the client is a third-party claimant. Per Florida Statute 626.9743 (2), '[a]n insurer may not, when liability and damages owed under the policy are reasonably clear, recommend that a third-party claimant make a claim under his or her own policy solely to avoid paying the claim under the policy issued by that insurer. However, the insurer may identify options to a third-party claimant relative to the repair of his or her vehicle. The statute notes that a third party claimant is a party filing the claim against the other party's policy, not his/her own policy. As Mr. Jones is also filing the claim on the other party's policy, he is a third party claimant. Relevant case law in this context defining 'third party claimant' was not found.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 9": {
"description": "Correctly identifies that Mr. Jones' vehicle is a total loss (it is acceptable to state 'likely' or 'pending' based on the available estimate).",
"sources": "FlaStat.319.30.pdf Prompt",
"justification": "Per Florida Statute 319.30 (1)(t), a 'salvage' vehicle is defined as a motor vehicle or mobile home which is a total loss as defined in paragraph (3)(a). Per Florida Statute 319.30 (3)(a), a vehicle is a total loss if the cost to repair the vehicle is 80% or more of the replacement cost. The total-loss determination is made by the insurer and may involve supplements and salvage considerations. The response should explain the standard and, if undetermined, characterize the status as likely or pending without asserting definitively.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 10": {
"description": "States that diminution of value is not applicable if the vehicle is determined to be a total loss under \u00a7 319.30 and that, in such case, settlement follows \u00a7 626.9743(5); if not a total loss, DV analysis may apply.",
"sources": "FlaStat.319.30.pdf FlaStat.626.9743.pdf",
"justification": "Per Florida Statute 319.30 (1)(t), a 'salvage' vehicle is defined as a motor vehicle or mobile home which is a total loss as defined in paragraph (3)(a). Per Florida Statute 319.30 (3)(a), a vehicle is a total loss if the cost to repair the vehicle is 80% or more of the replacement cost. Per Florida Statute 627.9743, when a vehicle is a total loss, the insurer may offer a cash settlement based on the replacement of the vehicle's ACV or a replacement vehicle. (Section 5).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
9
]
}
}
|
documents/13/13_Airtechv.MacDonald.pdf
documents/13/13_FlaStat.319.30.pdf
documents/13/13_FlaStat.626.9743.pdf
documents/13/13_McHalev.FarmBureau.pdf
documents/13/13_Sieglev.Progressive.pdf
|
845
|
Legal
|
A renowned art collective calling themselves “The Roamers” has been touring the country with a pop-up art exhibit called “Circus Circus” that takes place under a circus tent erected overnight and is removed a week later. While it is in town, Circus Circus plays odd sounds and emits flashing lights, which usually stirs up lots of talk and excitement from the residents. The actual content of the exhibit is intentionally mysterious, as The Roamers want visitors to experience the art without any preconceived notions. They maintain the mystery by making visitors sign a waiver before they enter, promising that they will keep the interior exhibit a secret. In exchange for the promise, visitors are asked to write down a secret of their own, which is vetted by an attendant at the front door as worthy or unworthy for entry. The form says: "Visitors who break our secret waive their right to secrecy." Visitors then have their picture taken and posted on a page on the CircusCircus website for all to see, under the heading: “We came, we saw, we’ll never tell, we promised.” The waiver also includes a notice that reads: “Some of the contents of this exhibit may be disturbing to some viewers. By entering Circus Circus you proceed at your own risk.”
When Circus Circus came to Long Beach, California, local celebrity influencers Libby and Lonson were first in line to visit. Libby had reservations about signing the form, because she had some sensitivities to seeing blood, which usually caused her to faint, so she asked the attendant at the front if the exhibit had any blood. “I’m bound by my employer not to reveal any details so I can’t say,” was all he would say, but he did so while emphatically nodding yes.
Libby and Lonson decided to take the chance anyway. Libby filled out the form, added her secret, and handed it to the attendant. "Are you sure about this?" he asked. "I'm sure," she said, and Libby and Lonson entered the exhibit.
Sure enough, about halfway through the exhibit they turned a corner into a room that had a video projected onto all the walls to look like dripping blood. Libby immediately passed out, fell to the ground, hit her head on a sculpture, and started to actually bleed. The Roamers had a medical team on hand, and they took proper care to get her help and send her to the hospital for follow-up. Libby’s injuries were minimal, but she was severely distressed by the event, and in true influencer style, she posted a story to her Instagram account about what happened in detail, including the specifics of the room.
A day later, while looking up their pictures on the Circus Circus website, Libby saw that below her photograph were the words "I cheated on my husband," which is the secret that she wrote on her form for entry. As soon as her husband saw the post, he filed for divorce.
Libby is now seeking counsel to sue The Roamers for all of her misfortune. What are the three most viable claims can she bring against The Roamers, and which, if any, are likely to succeed?
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Identify Libby's claim against The Roamers for negligence as related to premises liability.",
"sources": "CIV_1714",
"justification": "California Civil Code outlines negligence as follows: 'Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.' [(Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1714(a)] In managing Circus Circus, The Roamers owed Libby and all visitors a duty to maintain reasonably safe premises. Libby can argue that they breached this duty by exhibiting disturbing (and dangerous) imagery, and failing to properly warn her of the potential danger. She would also have to make the case that it was reasonably foreseeable that disturbing blood imagery could cause harm, especially since they anticipated disturbing reactions (they had a medical team ready). In her case, the imagery did indeed cause her to faint. Damages may include hospital bills and emotional distress.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Conclude that Libby will fail on her negligence claim.",
"sources": "CIV_1714",
"justification": "The Roamers can rebut many of Libby's arguments in the negligence claim, but their most convincing defense is that Libby assumed the risk. Libby fainted, struck her head, and suffered injuries, but because she had prior knowledge of her sensitivity, she was also at fault (i.e., 'has willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.' [Cal. Civ. Code \u00a7 1714(a)]. The waiver warned that 'contents may be disturbing,' which may be construed as vague, but when Libby specifically disclosed her sensitivity to blood, the attendant's emphatic nod communicated that the risk of blood-like imagery was indeed present. The facts state that Libby and Lonson entered 'anyway,' implying that they were aware of the risk, and made the decision to enter regardless. The court may apportion each party's degree of fault in a comparative negligence assessment to award damages, but the assumption of the risk defense is a strong bar against Libby's negligence claim.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1
]
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Identify Libby's claim against The Roamers for public disclosure of private facts.",
"sources": "Cal. Const. art. I, \u00a71; CACI-1801",
"justification": "California places a high value on the right to privacy. ('All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.' (Cal. Const. art. I, \u00a71)) California's jury instructions for deciding the tort of public disclosure of private facts reads: '[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] violated [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] right to privacy. To establish this claim, [plaintiff] must prove all of the following: 1. That [name of defendant] publicized private information concerning [plaintiff]; 2. That a reasonable person in [plaintiff]'s position would consider the publicity highly offensive; 3. That [defendant] knew, or acted with reckless disregard of the fact, that a reasonable person in [plaintiff]'s position would consider the publicity highly offensive; 4. That the private information was not of legitimate public concern [or did not have a substantial connection to a matter of legitimate public concern]; 5. That [plaintiff] was harmed; and 6. That [defendant]'s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff]'s harm.' (CACI 1801). Libby can meet the elements of her case simply: The Roamers publicly disclosed (via the Circus Circus website), a private secret ('I cheated on my husband'), that they knew would be highly offensive to a reasonable person (scandal ensued), and not of legitimate public concern (as the inner workings of most marital relationships are not), with severe damage (divorce, reputational damage).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identify Libby's consent to disclosure as a bar to the public disclosure of private facts claim.",
"sources": "CACI-1801;",
"justification": "When ruling on public disclosure of private facts, California juries are given this guidance: 'In deciding whether the information was a matter of legitimate public concern, you should consider, among other factors ... whether [name of plaintiff] consented to the publicity explicitly or by voluntarily seeking public attention or a public office...' [CACI 1801 (c)]. Here, The Roamers can argue that Libby explicitly consented to the disclosure of her secret when she wrote it down on the form for entry, and when she affirmed to the attendant 'I'm sure.' Also, her later instagram post about the incident that included details of the exhibit can be said to have opened the door for publication of her secret.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Identify that The Roamers can defend against the public disclosure of private facts claim because Libby is a public figure.",
"sources": "CACI-1801",
"justification": "The Roamers can argue that Libby is a public figure and so her secret was fair game for publication. The analysis for 'deciding whether the information was a matter of legitimate public concern' includes 'the social value of the information.' [CACI 1801(a)]. California's jury instructions offer additional common law findings to support this particular analysis, including: '[N]ewsworthiness is not limited to 'news' in the narrow sense of reports of current events. It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published' [CACI 1801, citing (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017)10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1257]; and: 'Almost any truthful commentary on public officials or public affairs, no matter how serious the invasion of privacy, will be privileged.' [CACI 1801, citing Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d at p. 535, fn. 5]. The facts state that Libby and Lonson are 'local celebrity influencers.' Though the degree of their celebrity status may be at issue, the Roamers can make that case that their very profession willingly subjects the details of their lives to public scrutiny. Though it may not be news in the traditional sense, Libby's secret can certainly be expected to draw 'legitimate interest' whether for 'amusement' or other entertaining reasons.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Conclude that Libby will likely fail on her public disclosure of private facts claim.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "The jury instructions further explain that 'the absence of any one of these elements is a complete bar to liability,' [CACI 1801, citing (Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1129\u20131130 (91 Cal.Rptr.3d 858)], so the court only needs to agree with The Roamers in one of their arguments: that Libby consented to the disclosure of her secret, or that she was indeed a public figure. Both are convincing, and so Libby is likely to fail on her claim of public disclosure of a private fact.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
4,
5
]
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "Identify Libby's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.",
"sources": "Hughes v Pair",
"justification": "A successful claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) causation. ['A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is '(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff\u201fs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant\u201fs outrageous conduct.\u201f (Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035 (2009), p. 18.] Here, Libby can argue that publicizing her secret in a humiliating manner on the Circus Circus website qualifies as outrageous conduct; it was reasonably foreseeable that such disclosure would cause distress (and duly caused it); and that she suffered loss of her marriage and humiliation.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "Conclude that Libby will likely fail on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.",
"sources": "Hughes v Pair",
"justification": "The bar for proving IIED is high. In Hughes v Pair, the court cited a similar line of cases to emphasize the severity of a finding of IIED: 'A defendant's conduct is 'outrageous' when it is so 'extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community... And the defendant's conduct must be 'intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.'...With respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show severe emotional distress, this court has set a high bar. 'Severe emotional distress means 'emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.' ' [Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035 (2009) p. 18-19]. The Roamers can argue that their act of publishing Libby's secret did not meet the high bar of misconduct the court requires in a few ways: that it was not outrageous because Libby knew of the terms and potential for publication, and chose to offer it anyway - (i.e., that it was not surprising); or that they did not intend to cause injury, but rather to follow through on a contractual agreement designed to protect their own business interests; and that many people have endured similar revelations of adultery, and Libby should be expected to do the same. Ultimately it will be up to the court to decide whether The Roamers are guilty of IIED, but the degree of the offense is certainly mitigated by Libby's own actions and by the high bar of this tort.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
7
]
}
}
|
documents/845/CACI-1801-1802.pdf
documents/845/CIV_1668.pdf
documents/845/CIV_1714.pdf
documents/845/Hughes v Pair.pdf
|
942
|
Legal
|
On January 11th, 2025, in Compton, California, Christy Rothschild, aged 24, was babysitting Jontae Rodriguez, aged 15. Jontae finished showering and came out of the bathroom wearing a towel. As she passed Christy in the hallway, Christy deliberately grazed her elbow against Jontae's chest and winked at Jontae while making a purring sound. When Jontae turned to look at Christy, Christy stuck her finger into her mouth seductively and invited Jontae to join her in the bedroom for "more where that came from." Jontae hurried down the hallway, locked herself in her bedroom, and called her parents, who then called the police.
On January 19th, 2025, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Christy with a misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code section 288(c)(1). A jury convicted Ms. Rothschild, and Ms. Rothschild now appeals, claiming insufficiency of evidence.
Draft a client advisement letter using the attached file, assessing the likelihood that the appellate court will grant Ms. Rothschild's appeal, citing relevant California Code.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "States the California Penal Code section 288 prohibits lewd or lascivious acts.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "California Code, Penal Code - PEN \u00a7 288: '(a) Except as provided in subdivision (i), a person who willfully and lewdly ***commits any lewd or lascivious act***, including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part 1, upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years. ... (c)(1) A person who ***commits an act described in subdivision (a)*** with the intent described in that subdivision, and the victim is a child of 14 or 15 years, and that person is at least 10 years older than the child, is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year. In determining whether the person is at least 10 years older than the child, the difference in age shall be measured from the birth date of the person to the birth date of the child.' *** added for emphasis https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect-288/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "States that California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) applies only when the perpetrator is at least 10 years older than the victim.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "California Code, Penal Code - PEN \u00a7 288: '... (c)(1) A person who commits an act described in subdivision (a)*** with the intent described in that subdivision, ***and the victim is a child of 14 or 15 years, and that person is at least 10 years older than the child***, is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for one, two, or three years, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year. In determining whether the person is at least 10 years older than the child, the difference in age shall be measured from the birth date of the person to the birth date of the child.' *** added for emphasis https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect-288/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Calculates that Ms. Rothschild is not at least 10 years older than Jontae.",
"sources": "Prompt.",
"justification": "PROMPT 'On January 11th, 2025, in Compton, California, Christy Rothschild, aged 24, was babysitting Jontae Rodriguez, aged 15.' APPLICATION 24 - 15 = 9 Thus, Ms. Rothschild is not at least 10 years older than Jontae.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Concludes that there was no evidence establishing the requisite 10+ year age difference required under PC 288(c)(1).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "As established in C2/22685, Penal Code section 288(c)(1) applies only when the perpetrator is at least 10 years older than the victim. As established in C3/22686, Ms. Rothschild is not at least 10 years older than Jontae. Thus, here was no evidence establishing the requisite 10+ year age gap required under PC 288(c)(1).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
2,
3
]
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Concludes there is a very high likelihood Ms. Rothschild's appeal will be granted.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "As established in C1/22684, California Penal Code section 288 prohibits lewd or lascivious acts. As established in C7/22828, on an appeal of a criminal conviction for insufficiency of evidence, the standard of review is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. As established in C4/22687, there was no evidence establishing the requisite 10+ year age difference required under PC 288(c)(1). As such, even under the deferential substantial evidence standard, there is a very high likelihood Ms. Rothschild's appeal will be granted. This conclusion applies regardless of whether Ms. Rothschild's conduct constituted a 'lewd or lascivious act.' The 10+ year age difference requirement is an element of PC 288(c)(1), and so a conviction under that statute cannot stand where there is no evidence in support of the age-difference element. See PC 288(c)(1): '...and that person is at least 10 years older than the child...' See the jury instruction for PC 288(c)(1), CALCRIM 1112, which states that the 10+ year age-difference is a distinct element of the offense: 'To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: ...AND 4. When the defendant acted, the child was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.' https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/1000/1112/ In Ms. Rothschild's appeal, an expert appellate attorney would err on the side of caution and also argue there was not substantial evidence of a lewd or lascivious act. However, because: - under the deferential 'substantial evidence' standard there very likely was sufficient evidence of a lewd or lascivious act (deliberately grazing Jontae's chest, winking and purring, sticking her finger seductively into her mouth and inviting Jontae to the bedroom for 'more where that came from') - there is a complete lack of evidence supporting the age-gap element, and - the prompt asks for a client advisement letter addressing the likelihood that the appellate court will grant Ms. Rothschild's appeal, an expert advisement should focus exclusively on the age-gap issue and conclude that Ms. Rothschild's appeal will very likely be granted.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1,
7,
4
]
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Formats the response as a client advisement letter that includes at least three of the following: a question presented identifying the legal issue, a brief answer identifying an answer to the legal issue, a fact section, a discussion section where the legal issue is analyzed, or a conclusion summarizing the legal analysis.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "The prompt asks for a client advisement letter. While there is no single style for this, such a document usually includes a question presented identifying the legal issue, a brief answer providing the resolution of the issue, a fact section, a discussion section analyzing the issue, and a conclusion summarizing the analysis.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Style"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "States that on an appeal of a criminal conviction for insufficiency of evidence, the standard of review is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction.",
"sources": "PEOPLE v. CROMER.pdf",
"justification": "People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889: 'The standards of review for questions of pure fact and pure law are well developed and settled. Trial courts and juries are better situated to resolve questions of fact, while appellate courts are more competent to resolve questions of law. Traditionally, therefore, an appellate court reviews findings of fact under a deferential standard (substantial evidence under California law, clearly erroneous under federal law), but it reviews determinations of law under a nondeferential standard, which is independent or de novo review.'",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/942/942_PEOPLE v. CROMER.pdf
|
1,022
|
Legal
|
Our client has been arrested and charged in connection with a series of thefts at a gas station where he works. The manager of the gas station noticed that the cash register had been short on numerous nights throughout the last month, all of which coincided with nights that the defendant was recorded as working, based on the timesheets. The gas station has surveillance video, but the manager did not have access to the system and was unaware of its operation - in order to access the surveillance video, the manager had to reach out to a different employee with an IT background. The manager requested the surveillance videos for each night that the cash register was short. The manager has never met the defendant in person but has seen a photograph of him in the employee file.
The manager watched the videos several times and noticed a person he recognizes to be the defendant in the videos, scanning lottery tickets at various points throughout the night without collecting any sort of payment from a customer. The manager reviewed the cash register transaction records and saw that the transaction records indicate that a sale was made, even though the defendant was never seen collecting any money on the videos.
The manager called the police, who attended the gas station the next time the defendant was scheduled to work. The officers informed the defendant, prior to speaking with him, that he was not under arrest and was free to end the conversation with them at any time. When asked, the defendant denied stealing. The officers then showed the defendant the video surveillance footage and relevant transaction logs, and the defendant admitted to scanning lottery tickets without taking money from any customers. The police placed the defendant under arrest and the State of Florida charged the defendant with grand theft.
Please prepare a legal memo using the attached files, answering the following questions:
(1) the State intends to introduce the surveillance videos through the manager's testimony. If an objection to the admission of that evidence is made, should the objection be sustained?
Assume for questions 2 and 3 that the State successfully introduces the surveillance videos into evidence and that the surveillance videos are the only exhibits in evidence.
(2) the State will ask the manager to identify the defendant as the person depicted in the surveillance videos. If an objection to the admission of that evidence is made, should the objection be sustained?
(3) the State will also ask the manager to testify that the defendant worked each night the cash register came up short. If an objection to the admission of that evidence is made, should the objection be sustained?
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Formats the response as a legal memorandum that includes at least three of the following: a question presented identifying the legal issue, a brief answer identifying an answer to the legal issue, a fact section, a discussion section where the legal issue is analyzed, and a conclusion summarizing the legal analysis.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "The prompt indicates that the answer should be formatted as a legal memorandum that includes at least three of the following: a question presented identifying the legal issue, a brief answer identifying an answer to the legal issue, a fact section, a discussion section where the legal issue is analyzed, and a conclusion summarizing the legal analysis.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Style"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Identifies that Florida law applies.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "The prompt indicates that Florida Law should be applied in answering the questions.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Identifies that video footage may be admitted under the 'pictorial theory' if it fairly and accurately depicts what a witness personally observed.",
"sources": "WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "Under the theory of pictorial testimony a video may be admitted if the witness testifies that the video fairly and accurately depicts what the witness personally observed. Wagner v. State, 707 So.2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identifies that video footage may be admissible under the 'silent witness theory' if the video is determined to be reliable.",
"sources": "WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "'Under the 'silent witness' theory, photographic evidence may be admitted upon proof of the reliability of the process which produced the photograph or videotape.' Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Identifies that the Court considers five factors in determining if the video is reliable under the 'silent witness' theory.",
"sources": "WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "'We thus hold that relevant photographic evidence may be admitted into evidence on the 'silent witness' theory when the trial judge determines it to be reliable, after having considered the following: (1) evidence establishing the time and date of the photographic evidence; (2) any evidence of editing or tampering; (3) the operating condition and capability of the equipment producing the photographic evidence as it relates to the accuracy and reliability of the photographic product;(4) the procedure employed as it relates to the preparation, testing, operation, and security of the equipment used to produce the photographic product, including the security of the product itself; and (5) testimony identifying the relevant participants depicted in the photographic evidence.' Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Identifies factor 1 (time/date accuracy) under the silent witness test and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt, WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "In this case the manager does not know the time or date that the recording was made as he has no familiarity with the video surveillance system. This is in contrast to the witness in Wagner v. State, 707 So.2d 827, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), who testified 'as to the time and date that on which the tape was made.' Here, the manager is unable provide any testimony about the time and date the recording was made and therefore the first factor weighs against the video being reliable.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "Identifies factor 2 (no editing/tampering) on these facts and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt, WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "In this case the manager is unable to provide any testimony regarding whether the footage has been edited or tampered with. This is in contrast to the witness in Wagner v. State, 707 So.2d 827, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), who testified that the recording 'had not been tampered or edited.' Id. In this case the manager is unable to testify that the video footage was not tampered with or edited because he does not know how the recording system works, therefore the second factor also weighs against the video footage being reliable.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "Identifies factor 3 (installation/operation accuracy) on these facts and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt, WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "In this case the manager does not know the operating condition and capability of the equipment producing the photographic evidence as it relates to the accuracy and reliability of the photographic product. This is in contrast to Wagner v. State, 707 So.2d 827, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), where the witness testified 'as to the installation and operation of the video camera.' Thus, in this case the manager's inability to testify about the operating condition and capability of the equipment weighs against the video footage being reliable.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
},
"criterion 9": {
"description": "Identifies factor 4 (procedures/security; chain of custody/system integrity) on these facts and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "In this case the manager does not know the procedure employed as it relates to the preparation, testing, operation, and security of the equipment used to produce the photographic product, including the security of the product itself. In fact, the manager does not have any idea as to any of the procedures used in the preparation, testing, operation, and security of the equipment used to produce the recording. The manager is also unable to testify about the system's security. Therefore, the fourth factor weighs against the recording being reliable.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
},
"criterion 10": {
"description": "Identifies factor 5 (clear depiction of persons/events) on these facts and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "In this case the manager is able to identify on the video recording. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of the recording being reliable.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
},
"criterion 11": {
"description": "Identifies pictorial-testimony foundation on these facts and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt, WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "The manager did not see the events that were recorded and therefore cannot testify that the recording fairly and accurately depicts what he witnessed. The recording is therefore not admissible under the pictorial theory of authentication of video footage. See Wagner v. State, 707 So.2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (discussing that recording or photographs are admissible under pictorial theory of authentication if witness can testify that it fairly and accurately represents what the witness personally saw).",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3
]
},
"criterion 12": {
"description": "Identifies admissibility under the silent-witness doctrine on these facts and reaches a defended conclusion.",
"sources": "Prompt, WAGNER v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "Evidence must be authenticated before admission. Fla. Stat. \u00a7 90.901 ('Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.'). Under Florida's silent-witness doctrine, video may be admitted 'upon proof of the reliability of the process which produced the\u2026 videotape,' evaluated through five non-exclusive factors (time/date; tampering; equipment condition/capability; procedures/security/chain; participant identification). Wagner v. State enumerates the five factors and explains that reliability of the producing process governs admission. (Factors listed at (1)\u2013(5).) Here, the manager lacked access to or knowledge of the surveillance system, obtained the footage from IT, and there is no testimony about time/date metadata, operating condition, procedures/security or chain of custody; the manager can only identify the participant from a file photo. (Prompt facts.) On these facts, factor (5) (identification) may be satisfied, but factors (1)\u2013(4) are not established: no evidence of recording time/date accuracy, no affirmative proof ruling out editing/tampering, no testimony on equipment operation/capability, and no procedures/security or chain-of-custody foundation. Because the State has not shown the process to be reliable, \u00a7 90.901 authentication under silent witness is not met and the objection should be sustained. (If the State later presents a qualified IT/custodian to lay these elements, the analysis could change.)",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
10
]
},
"criterion 13": {
"description": "States Florida's lay-opinion identification rule, based on the witness's perceptions, is helpful to the jury.",
"sources": "PROCTOR v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "Fla. Stat. \u00a7 90.701(1)\u2013(2) permits lay identification only when testimony is based on the witness's perceptions and 'may be in the form of inference and opinion' where the perception cannot be 'readily\u2026 communicate[d]' otherwise and the opinion will not mislead the jury. In evaluating photo/video identifications by non-eyewitnesses with no special familiarity, Florida courts caution that 'the jurors should have been allowed to determine for themselves whether Proctor was the person shown in the surveillance video.' Proctor v. State, 97 So. 3d 313, 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Here, the manager never met the defendant and knows him only from a file photograph; he was not an eyewitness and has no specialized identification expertise, so his familiarity is no better than the jury's, triggering \u00a7 90.701's limits and Proctor's warning about invading the jury's role.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
2
]
},
"criterion 14": {
"description": "Identifies admissibility of law identification by a non-eyewitness whose familiarity derives from an employee photo.",
"sources": "Prompt, PROCTOR v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "Florida permits lay identification only when the opinion is based on the witness's own perceptions and is necessary/helpful to the jury, and it does not require specialized expertise. Fla. Stat. \u00a7 90.701(1)\u2013(2) ('testimony about what he or she perceived may be in the form of inference and opinion' if the witness cannot otherwise convey it equally well and it will not mislead). Florida courts caution against allowing non-eyewitness identification where the witness lacks special familiarity; 'The jurors should have been allowed to determine for themselves whether Proctor was the person shown in the surveillance video.' Proctor v. State, 97 So. 3d 313, 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Here, the manager had never met the defendant, had no specialized identification training, and knew him only from a single employee-file photograph. (Prompt facts.) Application. Because the manager is in no better position than jurors to identify the person in the video, and his opinion risks substituting for the jury's own comparison, \u00a7 90.701's 'helpfulness' requirement is not met on these facts; consistent with Proctor, the identification should be excluded.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 15": {
"description": "States that testifying to the contents of a business record is hearsay unless the record is admitted.",
"sources": "T.V.U. v. STATE.pdf",
"justification": "'Although section 90.803(6) permits the admission of business records under certain circumstances, testimony of a business record's contents may not be introduced when that record has not been admitted into evidence.' T.V.U. v. State, 403 So. 3d 389, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025)",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 16": {
"description": "Identifies whether the timesheet/register-log testimony is inadmissible hearsay absent a proper Section 90.903(6) foundation.",
"sources": "Prompt, YISRAEL v. STATE .pdf",
"justification": "Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth and is inadmissible unless an exception applies. Fla. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90.801(1)(c), 90.802. The business-records exception requires a proper foundation: the record was made at or near the time by a person with knowledge, kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, and 'shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness' (or by certification). Fla. Stat. \u00a7 90.803(6)(a). See Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952, 956\u201357 (Fla. 2008) (statutory predicates must be established through a records custodian/qualified witness or via \u00a7 90.902(11) certification). The State elicited the manager's testimony about what the timesheets/register logs say (who worked; sales entries) but did not introduce those records, present a custodian/qualified witness, or provide a \u00a7 90.902(11) certification; the manager lacked personal knowledge of the entries' creation. Because the State neither admitted the records nor laid the \u00a7 90.803(6) foundation, the manager's testimony relaying their contents is hearsay offered for its truth and does not fit an exception. On these facts, the objection to the timesheet/register-log testimony should be sustained (if the State later admits the records with a proper foundation, the analysis may change).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/1022/1022_PROCTOR v. STATE.pdf
documents/1022/1022_T.V.U. v. STATE.pdf
documents/1022/1022_WAGNER v. STATE.pdf
documents/1022/1022_YISRAEL v. STATE .pdf
|
1,031
|
Legal
|
A defendant was arrested in Puerto Rico and charged with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing the search of his home lacked probable cause. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant then entered an unconditional guilty plea and was sentenced to three years in prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding probable cause for the search of his home. The district attorney did not file any motions regarding the appeal. Draft a legal memo analyzing whether the appellate court has jurisdiction over this case. Please reference the attached cases in your analysis.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "States that a denial of a pretrial motion is a non-jurisdictional defect that is waived by an unconditional guilty plea.",
"sources": "US-v.-Coil.pdf",
"justification": "Federal case law provides, 'An erroneous pretrial ruling is a non-jurisdictional defect that is waived by an unconditional guilty plea.' United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 2006). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15423113561218411933&q=442+F.3d+912&hl=en&as_sdt=4006",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Identifies that the defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion by entering an unconditional plea agreement.",
"sources": "US-v.-Coil.pdf",
"justification": "LAW Per C1/25249, 'An erroneous pretrial ruling is a non-jurisdictional defect that is waived by an unconditional guilty plea.' United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 2006). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15423113561218411933&q=442+F.3d+912&hl=en&as_sdt=4006 APPLICATION Here, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of the firearm that was found in his home. The district court denied this motion. Per U.S. v. Coil, this is a non-jurisdictional defect, and the defendant waived his right to appeal this defect when he entered the unconditional plea agreement.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1
]
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Identifies that the First Circuit has jurisdiction over the case.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "LAW The First Circuit has jurisdiction over Puerto Rico. https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/about-court\\n APPLICATION The defendant was arrested and charged federally in Puerto Rico. Therefore, his appeal will be heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identifies that a majority of the United States Court of Appeals circuit courts have held that if the government does not timely invoke a defendant's waiver of appeal due to an unconditional guilty plea, the appellate court can assert jurisdiction.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Three out of the four circuit courts (Ninth, Tenth, and Fifth versus Seventh) that have addressed the issue of whether an appellate court can assert jurisdiction when the government does not timely invoke a defendant's waiver of appeal due to an unconditional guilty plea, have decided that the appellate court can assert jurisdiction, making this the majority holding.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "States that the First Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether appellate courts must raise a defendant's waiver sua sponte where an unconditional guilty plea would otherwise preclude appellate review.",
"sources": "US-v.-Da\u0301vila-Gonza\u0301lez.pdf US-v.-Combs.pdf US-v.-Jacobo Castillo.pdf US v. De Vaughn.pdf US v. Riojas.pdf",
"justification": "Only the Ninth, Tenth, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits have addressed this particular issue. See e.g., United States v. Riojas, No. 24-40378, (5th Cir. 2025) ('On that point, our sister circuits split. The Seventh Circuit treats an unconditional guilty plea as jurisdictional and enforces it sua sponte. See United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565, 568-71 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits disagree. They treat the plea as a non-jurisdictional bar\u2014a waivable claim-processing rule. See United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 951-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1154-58 (10th Cir. 2012).') https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/24/24-40378-CR0.pdf United States v. D\u00e1vila-Gonz\u00e1lez, 595 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2010), does not apply here because the crux of the issue in the prompt and among the split circuits is when the government never invokes the defendant's guilty plea as a bar to the appeal. The question then becomes whether the appellate court will enforce the guilty plea, sua sponte, or will view the government's failure to invoke the plea as a waiver. In D\u00e1vila-Gonz\u00e1lez, the defendant challenged his sentence on appeal, and the government raised the issue of his guilty plea as a bar to his appeal. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15311569676613545674&q=United+States+v.+D%C3%A1vila-Gonz%C3%A1lez,+595+F.3d+42+(1st+Cir.+2010)&hl=en&as_sdt=4006",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Concludes that if the First Circuit adopts the precedent set by the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit would not have jurisdiction.",
"sources": "US-v.-Combs.pdf",
"justification": "Per C8/28888, the Seventh Circuit enforces unconditional guilty pleas as a jurisdictional bar to appeal, sua sponte. 'Typically, the jurisdictional bar is asserted by the government in response to a defendant's attempt to raise pre-plea issues after entering an unconditional plea. Here, however, the government overlooked the absence of a conditional guilty plea and responded to Combs's brief as if there is no question about our jurisdiction to evaluate his contentions. . .' 'But Combs waived this contention by pleading guilty unconditionally, and, because he did not preserve any issues for review, we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.' United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2011). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8254559749589629717&hl=en&as_sdt=4006",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
8
]
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "Concludes that if the First Circuit adopts the precedent set by the majority of the circuit courts, the First Circuit would have jurisdiction.",
"sources": "US-v.-Jacobo Castillo.pdf US v. De Vaughn.pdf US v. Riojas.pdf",
"justification": "Per C4/25895, the Ninth, Tenth, and Fifth Circuits have held that if the government does not timely invoke a defendant's waiver of appeal due to an unconditional guilty plea, the appellate court can assert jurisdiction. United States v. Riojas, No. 24-40378, (5th Cir. 2025). https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/24/24-40378-CR0.pdf 3 United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d1141, 1158 (10th Cir. 2012). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6905964674287180458&q=United+States+v.+Riojas&hl=en&as_sdt=20006&as_ylo=2025#p1154 United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12860209247378946331&q=United+States+v.+Riojas&hl=en&as_sdt=20006&as_ylo=2025#p951",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
4
]
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "Identifies that the Seventh Circuit court enforces unconditional guilty pleas on the court's own initiative.",
"sources": "US-v.-Combs.pdf",
"justification": "In the Seventh Circuit, unconditional guilty pleas are treated as jurisdictional, and the court enforces them on the court's own initiative, regardless of whether the government invoked the waiver itself. See United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8254559749589629717&hl=en&as_sdt=4006 In United States v. Combs, the defendant, Combs, sought leave to file an untimely motion to suppress, which the district court denied. Combs subsequently entered an unconditional guilty plea. Combs then filed an appeal, challenging the district court's refusal to let him file a late motion to suppress. On appeal, the government did not argue that Combs had waived his right to appeal the district court's ruling due to him entering an unconditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit held that while 'the government can forego a defense . . . [the appellate court is] not obligated to accept the government's waiver.' The Seventh Circuit enforced Combs's unconditional guilty waiver sua sponte and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2011). https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8254559749589629717&hl=en&as_sdt=4006",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/1031/1031_US v. De Vaughn.pdf
documents/1031/1031_US v. Riojas.pdf
documents/1031/1031_US-v.-Coil.pdf
documents/1031/1031_US-v.-Combs.pdf
documents/1031/1031_US-v.-Dávila-González.pdf
documents/1031/1031_US-v.-Jacobo Castillo.pdf
|
1,041
|
Legal
|
John was a member of the Navajo Nation. John died while living with his daughter Penny in his house on the reservation. A year prior to his death, John executed a handwritten will that left all of his property (house, jewelry, car) to his best friend Kevin. However, moments before John's death, he stated among his only two children, Penny and Bill, and his wife Jill that he wanted to give his house to Penny, his jewelry to his wife Jill, and his car to Bill upon John’s death. They all agreed to honor John's wishes. Determine who will take his property, taking into consideration the documents attached.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "States that John was a member of the Navajo Nation.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "The prompt indicates: 'John was a member of the Navajo Nation. John died while living with his daughter Penny in his house on the reservation.'",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "States that John died while domiciled on the reservation.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "'John was a member of the Navajo Nation. John died while living with his daughter Penny in his house on the reservation.'",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "States that the Navajo courts have authority to govern tribal affairs.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "'The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.' Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) citing the Navajo Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 667. The Treaty of 1868 was a treaty between the Federal government and the Navajo Nation which granted governance authority to the Navajo Nation over tribal affairs and set up Navajo courts. The Supreme court confirmed the application of this treaty in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217. Case has not been attached, as it is a landmark case of the Supreme Court and should be considered common legal knowledge.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "States that probate is a tribal affair subject to tribal governance.",
"sources": "In Re Lynchs Estate.pdf",
"justification": "'We hold that since there was no question that the will of Mary Lynch had been admitted to probate in the Navajo Tribal Court, the superior court of Apache County did not have authority to inquire into the execution of the will, and should have admitted it to probate.' In re Estate of Lynch, 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962). In Re lynch is a 1962 Arizona Supreme Court case which establishes that tribal probate proceedings are within the scope of tribal authority granted by the Treaty of 1868.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "States that John's property is under Navajo jurisdiction.",
"sources": "5A-12.pdf",
"justification": "The Navajo Nation Code at tit. 8, ch. 1, \u00a7 3, Annotations 2 (Oral dispositions) states: 'The Family Court of the Navajo Nation shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving the descent and distribution of deceased Indians' unrestricted property found within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.' John's house was located on Navajo land, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo. There is no indication that it is restricted. Accordingly, this requirement is met.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "States that under Navajo Tribal Law, oral wills are accepted as valid if all immediate family members are present during the oral distribution and agree to honor the testator's wishes.",
"sources": "5A-12.pdf",
"justification": "'If all of his immediate family are present and agree that his wishes will be honored after his death, a Navajo may, under custom, orally state who shall have his property after his death.' NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 8, ch. 1, \u00a7 3, Annotations 2 (Oral dispositions).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "States that under Navajo Tribal Law, oral wills are accepted as valid if all immediate family members agree to honor the testator's wishes.",
"sources": "5A-12.pdf",
"justification": "'If all of his immediate family are present and agree that his wishes will be honored after his death, a Navajo may, under custom, orally state who shall have his property after his death.' NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 8, ch. 1, \u00a7 3, Annotations 2 (Oral dispositions).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "Concludes that the Navajo oral will conditions are met.",
"sources": "Prompt 5A-12.pdf",
"justification": "The prompt indicates: 'However, moments before John's death, he stated among his only two children, Penny and Bill, and his wife Jill that he wanted to give his house to Penny, his jewelry to his wife Jill, and his car to Bill upon John's death. They all agreed to honor John's wishes.' Per C5/6: 'If all of his immediate family are present and agree that his wishes will be honored after his death, a Navajo may, under custom, orally state who shall have his property after his death.' NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 8, ch. 1, \u00a7 3, Annotations 2 (Oral dispositions). 'We hold today that the immediate family includes all of the children of the testator and the spouse if alive. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 8, ch. 1, \u00a7 2, Annotations 4 (Oral wills). Accordingly, since John's only two children and his spouse were present during the oral will, the requirements of Navajo Nation Code have been met.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
6,
7
]
},
"criterion 9": {
"description": "States that the oral will replaced the previously made holographic will that left property to Kevin.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "'A year prior to his death, John executed a handwritten will that left all of his property (house, jewelry, car) to his best friend Kevin. However, moments before John's death, he stated among his only two children, Penny and Bill, and his wife Jill that he wanted to give his house to Penny, his jewelry to his wife Jill, and his car to Bill upon John's death. They all agreed to honor John's wishes.' Per C8, the oral will was validly made under Navajo Code. Accordingly, it replaces the previously made holographic will.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 10": {
"description": "States that Kevin would not be entitled to any property.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Per C9, John's oral will supersedes his previous holographic will. The oral will does not leave any property to Kevin.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
9
]
},
"criterion 11": {
"description": "States that Penny would be entitled to the house.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Per C9, John's oral will replaced his previous holographic will. The oral will leaves his house to Penny.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
9
]
},
"criterion 12": {
"description": "States that Jill would be entitled to the jewelry.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Per C9, John's oral will replaced his previous holographic will. The oral will leaves his jewelry to his wife Jill.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
9
]
},
"criterion 13": {
"description": "States that Bill would be entitled to the car",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Per C9, John's oral will replaced his previous holographic will. The oral will leaves his car to Bill.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
9
]
}
}
|
documents/1041/1041_5A-12.pdf
documents/1041/1041_In Re Lynchs Estate.pdf
|
1,078
|
Legal
|
Steven Smith was driving on Route 53 in Indianapolis, Indiana on June 28, 2025. Route 53 is a rural road, surrounded by farms, with one lane going in each direction. The speed limit is 55 MPH.
Steven Smith was looking for a farm where he had an appointment to view some equipment for sale. He became lost, applied the brakes, turned on his turn signal, and proceeded to turn left into a driveway as he planned to ask the workers he saw for directions.
George Green was traveling the speed limit behind Mr. Smith. He noticed that he was coming quickly upon Mr. Smith's vehicle as he saw brake lights. Rather than slowing his vehicle, Mr. Green immediately proceeded to pass Mr. Smith. He turned on his left signal to indicate that he was entering the left-hand lane to pass on the left. He did not honk his horn.
As Mr. Green's vehicle was in the left-hand lane with the front of his vehicle approximately aligned with the rear-tires of Mr. Smith's vehicle, Mr. Smith suddenly turned left. The point of impact to Mr. Green's vehicle was the right front headlight. The point of impact to Mr. Smith's vehicle was the driver-side door. At the location of the impact, the vehicles were approaching a steep hill, which impeded the view of oncoming traffic.
Mr. Smith never saw Mr. Green, nor did he see a turn signal. He did not hear Mr. Green honk his horn.
Please determine which driver had the right-of-way and then analyze whether the driver with the right-of-way was partially at fault in contributing to the accident. Please consider the attached documents in your analysis.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "States that Indiana law prohibits passing upon approach of a crest that obstructs the driver's view.",
"sources": "Indiana Code 9-21-8-8.pdf",
"justification": "Under Indiana Code 9-21-8-8(b)(1): A vehicle may not be driven to the left side of the roadway when approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the highway where the view of the person who drives the vehicle is obstructed within a distance that creates a hazard if another vehicle might approach from the opposite direction. In this situation, although another vehicle was not, in fact, approaching from the opposite direction, Indiana law prohibits driving a vehicle on the left side of the road on approaching a crest where the view is obstructed. Therefore, Mr. Green should not have initiated the pass in this area of the roadway and it was not a lawful pass.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "States that Indiana law requires a vehicle being passed to yield the right of way to a passing vehicle on audible signal.",
"sources": "Indiana Code 9-21-8-5.pdf",
"justification": "Under Indiana law, a person who drives an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and may not increase the speed of the overtaken vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle. (Indiana Code 9-21-8-5 (2)). Here, Mr. Smith had the right of way as the lead vehicle travelling in the same direction as Mr. Green. Under Indiana law, upon Mr. Green's initiation of the pass, Mr. Smith would only have been required to 'give way' or yield the right-of-way if Mr. Green honked the horn and provided the requisite audible signal. As no audible signal was provided, Mr. Smith still had the right-of-way. (IC 9-21-8-5 (2)).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "States that Indiana law requires vehicles making left-turns to yield to oncoming vehicles proceeding in the opposite direction.",
"sources": "Indiana Code 9-21-8-30.pdf",
"justification": "Under Indiana Code 9-21-8-30, '[a] person who drives a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction that is within the intersection or so close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard.' As noted in the prompt, Mr. Smith was making a left turn from a two-lane road into a driveway, when Mr. Green came up from behind him and attempted to pass. Indiana law governing left turns required Mr. Smith to yield to oncoming traffic coming from the opposite direction. The law is silent as to any requirement for a left-turning vehicle to yield to a vehicle approaching from the rear and proceeding in the same direction.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Concludes that Mr. Smith (the overtaken vehicle) had the right-of-way.",
"sources": "Indiana Code 9-21-8-5.pdf Indiana Code 9-21-8-8.pdf Indiana Code 9-21-8-30.pdf",
"justification": "As noted above, Mr. Green was prohibited from driving in the left-hand lane due to the approaching hill/crest that obstructed the vision. As such, he did not complete a lawful pass. (IC 9-21-8-8-(b)(1)). Additionally, an overtaken vehicle must yield the right-of-way to an overtaking vehicle upon audible signal. Here, Mr. Green (the overtaking vehicle) did not provide audible signal. Therefore, Mr. Smith was not required to yield the right-of-way and he maintained the right-of-way. (IC 9-21-8-5). Finally, the law governing left-turns requires the turning vehicle to yield to 'oncoming vehicles' approaching from the opposite direction. (IC 9-21-8-30). Here, Mr. Green was not an 'oncoming vehicle' and he was proceeding in the same direction. There is no reference in the law governing left-turns to require Mr. Smith to yield to a vehicle that is approaching from the rear and proceeding in the same direction.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
2,
3,
1
]
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "States that Mr. Smith breached defensive driving duties for improper look out prior to initiating the left turn.",
"sources": "Indiana Code 9-21-8-24.pdf",
"justification": "Under Indiana law, Mr. Smith was prohibited from slowing or changing direction of the vehicle unless the movement could be made with reasonable safety. (IC 9-21-8-4). Mr. Smith slowed the vehicle and, although he did use a turn signal, he did not ensure that the turn could be made safely before he turned. A driver has a duty to ensure that the movement can be made with reasonable safety prior to changing course, per Indiana Code 9-21-8-4. As Mr. Smith did not have a proper look out to ensure that the turn could be made with reasonable safety, Mr. Smith breached this duty by turning without even seeing Mr. Green's vehicle attempting to pass him.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Concludes that Mr. Smith's recovery will be reduced as he is partially at fault.",
"sources": "Indiana Code 34-51-2-5.pdf Indiana Code 34-51-2-6.pdf",
"justification": "Per Indiana law, '[i]n an action based on fault, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery except as provided in section 6 of this chapter.' (IC 34-51-2-5). If a claimant is found to be 51% or more at fault, the claimant is barred from recovery. However, if the claimant is found to be 50% or less at fault, the plaintiff may recover, but damages are reduced in proportion to the comparative fault of the plaintiff. (IC 34-51-2-6). As noted, although Mr. Smith had the right-of-way, he contributed to the accident in failing to have a proper look out before executing the left turn. As such, Mr. Smith's recovery will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributed in contributing to the accident. (IC 34-51-2-5). If the trier of fact finds that Mr. Smith's failure to keep a proper look out and failure to ensure that the left turn could be made safely was greater than Mr. Green's fault, Mr. Smith would be barred from recovery. (IC 34-51-2-6).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/1078/Indiana Code 34-51-2-5.pdf
documents/1078/Indiana Code 34-51-2-6.pdf
documents/1078/Indiana Code 9-21-8-24.pdf
documents/1078/Indiana Code 9-21-8-30.pdf
documents/1078/Indiana Code 9-21-8-5.pdf
documents/1078/Indiana Code 9-21-8-8.pdf
|
1,148
|
Legal
|
Frank Bader is a claimant for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. His claim has been denied twice, and he has appealed the latest denial. He has submitted a new Medical Opinion Statement from his treating physician, Dr. Samantha Hauler, with his appeal.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to Mr. Bader’s case is preparing for the hearing. Before the ALJ reviews the case file himself, he has requested a pre-hearing brief. Utilizing the attached documents and applicable law, draft a brief for the ALJ about Mr. Bader’s case. The ALJ wants the brief to discuss each step of the five-step sequential evaluation process in Mr. Bader’s case and determine at which step the Social Security Administration should find Mr. Bader disabled.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Determines that the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Work History.pdf",
"justification": "The first step of the five-step sequential evaluation process is described in Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 22001.001. The question at step one is whether 'the claimant [is] engaging in SGA\u2026If yes, the claimant is not disabled\u2026If no, the sequential evaluation continues.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422001001 POMS DI 25501.390 states that 'work is 'substantial' if it involves engaging in significant physical or mental activities, or a combination of both. Work is gainful if it is: \u2022 performed for pay or profit; or \u2022 the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized. Work performed on a part-time basis may be SGA. Generally, we use earnings guidelines to decide if work is SGA.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.NSF/lnx/0425501390 The source 'Frank Bader Work History.pdf' confirms that, since 2018, Mr. Bader has not engaged in SGA, as he hasn't worked and made any earnings. In 2018, he was engaging in SGA, as he earned far more each month than the 2018 SGA monthly amount of $1,180. https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/sga.html Therefore, the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process. This is because the answer to step one is no, and the sequential evaluation must continue.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Determines that the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Case File.pdf",
"justification": "The second step of the five-step sequential evaluation process is described in POMS DI 22001.001. The question at step two is whether the claimant has a 'medically determinable impairment (MDI) (or combination of MDIs) that is both severe and meets the duration requirement\u2026If no, the claimant is not disabled\u2026If yes, sequential evaluation continues.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422001001 POMS DI 24505.001 provides guidance on the definition of a not severe impairment. 'At the second step of sequential evaluation, it must be determined whether medical evidence establishes a physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments of sufficient severity as to be the basis of a finding of inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA). When medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimum effect on an individual's ability to work, such impairment(s) will be found 'not severe,' and a determination of 'not disabled' will be made without consideration of vocational factors. In such an instance, the person's impairment(s) would have no more than a minimal effect on his or her physical or mental ability(ies) to perform basic work activities, so a determination of 'not disabled' would result even if the individual's age, education, or work experience were specifically considered.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0424505001 The source 'Frank Bader Case File.pdf' is written by Mr. Bader's treating physician Dr. Samantha Hauler. With the help of detailed medical findings, this source describes Mr. Bader's medical impairment, which is Osteoarthritis in both of his knees. Dr. Hauler specifically states that 'Mr. Bader suffers from Osteoarthritis that affects both of his knees, and as such, both of his lower extremities. This impairment has a major effect on his physical ability to perform basic work activities during an 8-hour workday.' Based on this statement, Mr. Bader's impairment must be classified as 'severe.' As for duration, POMS DI 25505.030 states that 'in most cases in which evidence supports a finding of disability, it will be clear whether the MDI(s) is expected to result in death or has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months from the onset of disability.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0425505030 In the source 'Frank Bader Case File.pdf' Dr. Hauler confirms that, since 2018, Mr. Bader has suffered from an MDI: Osteoarthritis in both of his knees. Mr. Bader's MDI meets the duration requirement for step 2, as he's suffered for a continuous period of far longer than 12 months. Therefore, the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process. This is because the answer to step two is yes, and the sequential evaluation must continue.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Determines that the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step three of the five-step sequential evaluation process.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Case File.pdf",
"justification": "The third step of the five-step sequential evaluation process is described in POMS DI 22001.001. The question at step three is whether the claimant has 'an impairment(s) that meets a listing, or is medically equal to a listing in appendix 1, and meets the duration requirement\u2026If yes, the claimant is disabled\u2026If no, the sequential evaluation continues.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422001001 Criterion 2 (27275) previously discussed the duration of Mr. Bader's MDI. In the source 'Frank Bader Case File.pdf,' Dr. Hauler confirms that Mr. Bader has suffered from Osteoarthritis in both knees since 2018. Therefore, Mr. Bader has suffered from his MDI for longer than the 12 months that is necessary for the duration requirement. The appropriate listing for Osteoarthritis is Listing 1.18 \u2013 Abnormality of a major joint(s) in any extremity. This listing can only be met if 'documented by A, B, C and D: A. Chronic joint pain or stiffness. AND B. Abnormal motion, instability, or immobility of the affected joint(s). AND C. Anatomical abnormality of the affected joint(s) noted on: 1. Physical examination (for example, subluxation, contracture, or bony or fibrous ankylosis); or 2. Imaging (for example, joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis or arthrodesis of the affected joint). AND D. Impairment-related physical limitation of musculoskeletal functioning that has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months, and medical documentation of at least one of the following: 1. A documented medical need (see 1.00C6a) for a walker, bilateral canes, or bilateral crutches (see 1.00C6d) or a wheeled and seated mobility device involving the use of both hands (see 1.00C6e(i)); or 2. An inability to use one upper extremity to independently initiate, sustain, and complete work-related activities involving fine and gross movements (see 1.00E4), and a documented medical need (see 1.00C6a) for a one-handed hand-held assistive device (see 1.00C6d) that requires the use of the other upper extremity or a wheeled and seated mobility device involving the use of one hand (see 1.00C6e(ii)); or 3. An inability to use both upper extremities to the extent that neither can be used to independently initiate, sustain, and complete work-related activities involving fine and gross movements (see 1.00E4).' https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/1.00-Musculoskeletal-Adult.htm#1_18 The source 'Frank Bader Case File.pdf' provides medical evidence for elements A, B, and C that are required to meet Listing 1.18. Unfortunately, element D cannot be met in this case, as Mr. Bader does not use any assistive devices or have any issues with his upper extremities. Therefore, the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step three of the five-step sequential evaluation process. This is because the answer to step three is no, and the sequential evaluation must continue.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
2
]
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Determines that the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Work History.pdf",
"justification": "The fourth step of the five-step sequential evaluation process is described in POMS DI 22001.001. The questions at step four are about past relevant work (PRW). The questions are whether 'the claimant retain[s] the capacity to perform any PRW as they actually performed it' and whether 'the claimant retains the capacity to perform any PRW as generally performed in the national economy\u2026If the answer to either question is yes, the claimant is not disabled\u2026If the answer to both questions is no, the sequential evaluation continues.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422001001 Criterion 5 (28420) establishes that Mr. Bader does not have any PRW, as he has not worked in the past 5 years. Therefore, the Social Security Administration should not direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process. This is because both answers to step four are no, and the sequential evaluation must continue.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Identifies that Mr. Bader does not have any past relevant work.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Work History.pdf",
"justification": "SSR 24-2p reflects the 2024 changes to the law and defines the term PRW. SSR 24-2p states that 'PRW is work that an individual has done within the past 5 years, that was SGA, and that lasted long enough for the individual to learn to do it. Work that the individual started and stopped in fewer than 30 calendar days is not PRW.' https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2024-02-di-02.html The source 'Frank Bader Work History.pdf' confirms that Mr. Bader does not have any PRW. His last job was as a Construction worker in 2018, which was more than 5 years ago.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Determines that the Social Security Administration should direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Work History.pdf and Frank Bader Case File.pdf",
"justification": "The fifth step of the five-step sequential evaluation process is described in POMS DI 22001.001. The question at step five is whether 'the claimant [has] the ability to make an adjustment to any other work, considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience\u2026If yes, the claimant is not disabled\u2026If no, the claimant is disabled.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0422001001 SSR 24-1p explains that 'if we find at the fourth step of [the sequential evaluation] process that an individual cannot perform any PRW given their RFC, or that the individual has no PRW, we will decide whether the individual can adjust to other work at step five of the process. We have three medical-vocational profiles that show an inability to adjust to other work. At step five, our adjudicators must consider these medical-vocational profiles before referring to the medical-vocational guidelines. The three medical-vocational profiles are: (1) arduous unskilled work, (2) no work, and (3) lifetime commitment. If an individual's medical and vocational factors match the criteria of a medical-vocational profile, we find the individual disabled.' https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR2024-01-di-02.html Criterion 7 (28421) establishes that Mr. Bader meets the five requirements of the lifetime commitment profile: 1. Mr. Bader is not working at SGA level. 2. Mr. Bader has a lifetime commitment of 33 years to construction work, a semi-skilled job with no transferable skills. 3. Mr. Bader can no longer perform this past work, as it was performed at the heavy exertional level and his severe MDI prevents him from meeting the lifting requirements of heavy work. 4. Mr. Bader is closely approaching retirement age, as he is 61 years old. 5. Mr. Bader has no more than a limited education, as he only completed seventh grade. Therefore, the Social Security Administration should direct a decision that Mr. Bader is disabled at step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
7
]
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "Identifies that Mr. Bader meets the requirements of the lifetime commitment profile.",
"sources": "Frank Bader Work History.pdf and Frank Bader Case File.pdf",
"justification": "The lifetime commitment profile is described in detail in POMS DI 25010.001 states that 'The lifetime commitment profile demonstrates the inability to make an adjustment to other work for an individual who: \u2022 is not working at SGA level, and \u2022 has a lifetime commitment (30 years or more) to a field of work that is unskilled, or that is skilled or semi-skilled but provided no transferable skills, and \u2022 can no longer perform this past work because of a severe MDI(s), and \u2022 is closely approaching retirement age (age 60 or older), and \u2022 has no more than a limited education.' https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.NSF/lnx/0425010001 Criterion 1 (27274) discussed Mr. Bader's lack of engaging in SGA since 2018. This was based on the source 'Frank Bader Work History.pdf,' which confirms that Mr. Bader has not had a job that was at SGA level since 2018. The source 'Frank Bader Work History.pdf' also confirms that Mr. Bader worked for 33 years as a Construction Worker with no transferable skills. Directory of Occupational Titles (DOT) 869.664-014 defines a Construction Worker as a semi-skilled job performed at the heavy exertional level. Therefore, Mr. Bader has met the second requirement for the lifetime commitment profile. https://occupationalinfo.org/86/869664014.html Mr. Bader can no longer perform his past work at the heavy exertional level due to the physical limitations from his severe medically determinable impairment of Osteoarthritis in both knees. In the source 'Frank Bader Case File.pdf,' Dr. Hauler limits Mr. Bader to lifting 25 to 50 pounds during an 8-hour workday. According to CFR \u00a7\u2009416.967, work at the heavy exertional level requires 'lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds.' https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/416/416-0967.htm The source 'Frank Bader Work History.pdf' states that Mr. Bader was born on May 6, 1964. This date of birth makes Mr. Bader a person closely approaching retirement age, as he is more than 60 years old. POMS DI 25001.001A.16. defines limited education as 'formal schooling completed at the seventh through 11th grade level.' Because Mr. Bader only completed the seventh grade, he meets the definition of having a limited education. https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.NSF/lnx/0425001001#a3",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1
]
}
}
|
documents/1148/Frank Bader Case File.pdf
documents/1148/Frank Bader Work History.pdf
|
1,167
|
Legal
|
Mr. B is seeking legal representation for a capital murder in Fulton County, Georgia. Mr. B was diagnosed with auditory hallucination as a teenager. He has been in and out of mental health facilities since his diagnosis. Most of his stays were involuntary, as he would commit petty crimes around the city of Atlanta during his hallucinations. His prior crimes include petty theft, disorderly conduct, and trespassing.
On the day of the murder, he states that he had not taken his medications for a few weeks. He states that he was hearing things like “kill the next person you see wearing a black t-shirt". As a result, he complied with the voices and killed a stranger who matched the description of his hallucinations. The heinous murder was caught on camera, and a massive manhunt ensued. However, Mr. B was not found until seven months later, because he had fled Georgia by Greyhound to Nebraska based on instructions from his hallucinations. He was caught when he voluntarily went to seek mental health treatment and was extradited to Georgia.
Taking the attached document into consideration, please provide a legal memorandum analyzing whether an insanity plea from Mr. B is likely to be successful based on the facts stated above.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Identifies that a person cannot be guilty of a crime if they did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time the crime was committed.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Under GA Code \u00a7 16-3-2: 'A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence'. https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-16/chapter-3/article-1/section-16-3-2/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Identifies that a person cannot be guilty of a crime if they acted because of a delusional compulsion at the time the crime was committed.",
"sources": "The State v. Wierson.pdf",
"justification": "GA Code \u00a7 16-3-3 provides: 'A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.' https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-16/chapter-3/article-1/section-16-3-3/ In State v. Wierson, S24G1299 (May 28, 2025) the court noted that 'the statutory defense of delusional compulsion is available if there is evidence 'that the defendant was laboring under a delusion, that the act itself was connected with the delusion and furthermore that the delusion would, if true, justify the act'.' (pg.19)",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Identifies that Mr. B's failure to take his medication is not relevant to whether the insanity defenses are available to him.",
"sources": "The State v. Wierson.pdf",
"justification": "In Wierson v. The State, the court stated: 'In short, the plain language of these statutes, their context, and their long history all align: the insanity defenses are available even to a person who has 'voluntarily' induced the relevant mental state. And applied to this case, that would mean that whether Wierson stopped taking her medication some weeks before the accident is not relevant to whether the statutory insanity defenses are available to her'. State v. Wierson, S24G1299 (May 28, 2025) (pg. 17) https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/6838ee016810eefbb04b3316 Thus, the fact of Mr. B's voluntary failure to take his medication has no relevance to whether or not an insanity plea is available to him. If the State seeks to present evidence of Mr.B's failure to take his medication, Mr. B can object.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identifies that a successful insanity plea requires expert testimony from a qualified medical expert.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Under GA Code \u00a7 17-7-130.1, 'at the trial of a criminal case in which the defendant intends to interpose the defense of insanity, evidence may be introduced to prove the defendant's sanity or insanity at the time at which he is alleged to have committed the offense charged in the indictment or information. When notice of an insanity defense is filed, the court shall appoint at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine the defendant and to testify at the trial. This testimony shall follow the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, including testimony of any medical experts employed by the state or by the defense. The medical witnesses appointed by the court may be cross-examined by both the prosecution and the defense, and each side may introduce evidence in rebuttal to the testimony of such a medical witness'. Thus, a qualified medical expert will have to testify that Mr. B met the definition of either insanity tests at the time of the commission of the murder. https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-17/chapter-7/article-6/part-2/section-17-7-130-1/",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Identifies that Mr. B's insanity defense based on delusional compulsion will likely be unsuccessful.",
"sources": "The State v. Wierson.pdf",
"justification": "Under GA Code \u00a7 16-3-3, three elements must be met for insanity based on delusional compulsion: 1. The defendant was laboring under a delusion; 2. The criminal act was connected with the delusion, and 3. The delusion was as to a fact that, if true, would have justified the act. https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-16/chapter-3/article-1/section-16-3-3/ See also, State v. Wierson, S24G1299 (May 28, 2025) where the court noted that 'the statutory defense of delusional compulsion is available if there is evidence 'that the defendant was laboring under a delusion, that the act itself was connected with the delusion and furthermore that the delusion would, if true, justify the act'.' (pg.19) Mr. B will be able to satisfy the first two elements. First, he was laboring under a delusion in the form of auditory hallucinations that prompted him to commit murder. However, he will not be able to meet the third element. The delusion told him to kill someone who was wearing a black t-shirt. The fact of the delusion was that a person was wearing a black t-shirt. There is nothing about a person wearing a black t-shirt that would, in any situation, justify murder. As a result, this insanity defense will likely be unsuccessful.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
2
]
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Concludes that Mr. B's insanity defense based on an inability to distinguish between right and wrong will likely be successful.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Under GA Code O.C.G.A. \u00a7 16-3-2, a person is not criminally responsible if, at the time of the act, they lacked the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act. https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-16/chapter-3/article-1/section-16-3-2/ Assuming that a qualified medical expert provides testimony confirming that Mr. B lacked the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the murder, Mr. B has a significant chance of success using this defense. Mr. B was experiencing auditory hallucinations at the time of the murder, and he thus lacked the mental capacity to distinguish between whether his act was right or wrong. He lacked the mental capacity to make such a distinction at the time of the murder, and thus will likely be successful.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1,
4
]
}
}
|
documents/1167/The State v. Wierson.pdf
|
1,184
|
Legal
|
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is conducting a remedial action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to remove contaminated soil from a former wood treatment yard near Pendleton, Oregon. The cleanup is being conducted pursuant to a CERCLA record of decision (ROD). The response action selected in the ROD includes "dig and haul" as the primary cleanup method. The ROD contains a list of state and federal environmental applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) that the cleanup must attain, as required by Section 121(d) of CERCLA. The ROD requires that the EPA meet 'Substantive Portions of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act,' 'Substantive Portions of ORS 97.745.'
Prior to the cleanup, the EPA remedial project manager (RPM) assigned to the case contacted the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), who referred her to the applicable Oregon State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The RPM, unsure of whether there would be any impact on historic places, contacted the SHPO to discuss the cleanup. After a brief phone call discussing the matter, the SHPO and RPM agreed that, due to the Site's proximity to a schoolyard listed on the National Register of Historic Places, the EPA should contract with an archeologist to be present on site in case any historical artifacts were discovered during the cleanup. The EPA memorialized this in writing in the administrative record.
Midway through the cleanup, the EPA was in the process of excavating contaminated soil when the RPM discovered what appeared to be, and was later confirmed to be, portions of a cairn. Though the cleanup was not on land of tribal significance, the archeologist immediately stopped the cleanup for analysis of the cairn. It was later determined to have been built by Celilo Wy'am indians. The EPA's onsite archeologist consulted on the removal of the cairn from the dig site, and the cairn was transferred to the SHPO. The SHPO later transferred it to Oregon State University for restoration and display. No portion of the cairn was damaged during this process.
A member of the Celilo Wy'am Tribe has recently learned about the events and has approached our firm for guidance. Please draft an analysis of the following:
1. Was it proper for the EPA to conduct the cleanup without undergoing formal review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)?
2. Was it proper for the EPA to transfer the cairn to the SHPO?
Please reference the attached documents in the analysis.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Identifies that only substantive requirements of ARARs must be met for on-site CERCLA actions.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "For on-site CERCLA response actions, permits are not required: 'No Federal, State, or local permit shall be required for the portion of any removal or remedial action conducted entirely onsite.' 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9621(e)(1); see also NCP, 'No federal, state, or local permits are required for on-site response actions.' 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 300.400(e)(1). At the same time, a selected remedial action must, upon completion, 'at least attain [the] legally applicable or relevant and appropriate standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation (ARARs).' 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9621(d)(2)(A); NCP directs identification of ARARs on a site-specific basis. 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 300.400(g)(1)\u2013(2). The ROD expressly lists ARARs as 'Substantive Portions of Section 106 of the NHPA' and 'Substantive Portions of ORS 97.745,' and the selected remedy is an on-site 'dig-and-haul.' Application. Because this is an on-site CERCLA remedial action, procedural/permit steps are not required, but EPA must still meet the substantive portions of the identified ARARs (NHPA \u00a7 106; ORS 97.745). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/9621 https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/174076.pdf",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Identifies that NHPA consultation is a procedural requirement.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Section 106 of NHPA, 54 U.S.C. 306108, requires that federal agencies take into account the effect of their projects on any historic property, and provide the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to the undertaking. Federal agencies must also undertake planning to minimize any harm to historic places posed by their undertakings. 54 U.S. Code 306107. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/54/306108 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/54/306107 Consultation procedures are set out in 36 CFR Part 800. Per the ACHP's own guidance, an agency conducting a CERCLA action may - but is not required - to follow the Section 106 review process. https://www.achp.gov/coordination-cercla-faq In this case, the EPA alerted the SHPO (the individual who administers the NHPA at the state level) of the action, and the SHPO and EPA jointly determined that the project may affect historic property given its proximity to a school listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Importantly, the cleanup was not on a land of tribal significance, meaning that EPA did not have an obligation to consult with any Tribe or Tribal Historic Preservation Officer. After its discussion with the SHPO, the EPA agreed to contract with an archeologist and documented the conversation. This meets the requirement of Section 106 that EPA provide the ACHP (through the SHPO) a reasonable opportunity to comment. The remaining Section 106 review steps are procedural, and EPA was therefore not obligated to meet those requirements as ARARs under CERCLA. It was therefore proper for EPA to conduct the cleanup without undergoing formal NHPA review.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1
]
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Concludes that EPA was not required to engage in formal NHPA review because it is a procedural requirement.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "EPA must meet the substantive portions of ARARs. This is reflected in the prompt's statement that the ROD states that EPA must attain 'Substantive Portions of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.' EPA was therefore not required to meet procedural obligations. NHPA contains both substantive and procedural requirements. Formal review is procedural by nature. Accordingly, it was proper for EPA to conduct the cleanup without undergoing formal review under Section 106 of NHPA.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1,
2
]
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identifies that ORS 97.745(2)(a) prohibits the possession of native Indian artifacts, human remains or funerary objects having been taken from a native Indian cairn or burial.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Per ORS 97.745(2)(a): Except as authorized by the appropriate Indian tribe, no person shall: (a) Possess any native Indian artifacts, human remains or funerary object having been taken from a native Indian cairn or burial in a manner other than that authorized under ORS 97.750 (Permitted acts). Here, EPA briefly took possession of the item of an Indian cairn. The prompt requests analysis of whether this act was permissible. If prohibited by this section of ORS 97.745, it was not permissible. https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_97.745",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Identifies that ORS 97.745(1) requires that inadvertently discovered Indian cairns must be reinterred under the supervision of the appropriate Indian tribe.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "ORS 97.745 includes a requirement that 'Persons disturbing native Indian cairns or burials through inadvertence, including by construction, mining, logging or agricultural activity, shall at their own expense reinter the human remains or funerary object under the supervision of the appropriate Indian tribe.' Here, the EPA discovered a cairn which was later determined to be built by the Celilo Wy'Am Tribe during the cleanup. Under ORS 97.745(1), such objects must be reinterred under the supervision of the relevant Tribe. This must be done at the person who discovers the item's expense. https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_97.745",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Identifies that the definition of 'Indian Tribes' limits the applicability of ORS 97.745 to specific tribes.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "ORS 97.740 contains definitions applicable to ORS 97.745. Relevant here is the definition of 'Indian Tribe' as 'any tribe of Indians recognized by the Secretary of the Interior or listed in the Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. 3564 et seq., or listed in the Western Oregon Indian Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. 3691 et seq., if the traditional cultural area of the tribe includes Oregon lands.' Thus, if a tribe is not federally-recognized, nor listed in the Klamath Termination or Western Oregon Indian Termination Act, the requirements of ORS 97.745 do not apply to that tribe. https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_97.740",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "States that the Celilo Wy'am tribe is not a federally recognized tribe for the purposes of ORS 97.745.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "ORS 97.740(3) defines 'Indian tribe' as a tribe 'recognized by the Secretary of the Interior' or listed in specified termination acts, if the tribe's traditional cultural area includes Oregon lands. The object was identified as a cairn built by Celilo Wy'am Indians and the question is whether that group qualifies as an 'Indian tribe' for ORS 97.745 purposes (e.g., supervision/authorization). (Prompt facts). Because ORS 97.740(3) ties coverage to federal recognition (or the termination-act listings), whether Celilo Wy'am is covered turns on that status\u2014not on cultural association alone. Oregon's official listing of nine federally recognized tribes (e.g., CTUIR for the Pendleton area) does not include 'Celilo Wy'am' as a separate tribe, indicating the 'appropriate Indian tribe' under ORS 97.745 would be the relevant federally recognized tribe whose traditional area includes the site.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "Concludes that it was proper for EPA to transfer the cairn to the SHPO.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "The requirements of ORS 97.745 deal with artifacts, including cairns, of Indian Tribes. ORS 97.740 provides a definition of 'Indian Tribes.' The Ceililo Wy'Am tribe does not meet this definition. Thus, the EPA's actions - while morally questionable - are not strictly prohibited by the law.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
7,
4,
5,
6
]
}
}
|
documents/1184/1184_ORS97.740.pdf
documents/1184/1184_ORS97.745.pdf
documents/1184/42U.S.C.9621.pdf
documents/1184/54U.S.C.306107.pdf
documents/1184/54U.S.C.306108.pdf
|
1,189
|
Legal
|
Chen operates an immigration consulting firm in California through an LLC. She is the sole owner. The business generates $1 million in annual revenue, with a net income of $550,000 after deducting office rent, payroll and other expenses. She estimates that the net assets of her company are worth around $20,000, mostly consisting of office furniture and appliances. She is considering relocating to Nashville, Tennessee and moving her business there in Jan 2024.
Chen wants to evaluate the tax consequences of the relocation. Assuming the revenue and net income remain the same after relocation, and all the business will come from Tennssee after relocation, how would her overall tax burden change in terms of state level income tax (Chen is single) and LLC-related costs? Are there any ways to optimize Tennessee LLC related costs to make the relocation more financially worthwhile?
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "States that for a net income of $550,000, Chen's estimated California income tax liability would be $50,758 (acceptable value is 50,758).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "A Limited Liability Company (LLC) is generally viewed as a pass-through entity in California for income tax purposes, meaning the owner (member) is taxed on the income. Source: Franchise Tax Board of State of California has published guidelines for LLC: 'A disregarded entity (for federal purposes), if it has only one member Single member limited liability company (SMLLC)...An LLC must have the same classification for both California and federal tax purposes.' https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/types/limited-liability-company/index.html Chen is the owner of the LLC, therefore in California, she has to pay personal income tax for the $550,000 net earning of the LLC. California government publishes tax brackets and provides a tax calculator to calculate personal income tax. Using the calculator and applying the 2024 tax bracket, one can arrive that the estimated California state income tax for a taxable income of $550,000 is $50,758. Source: https://webapp.ftb.ca.gov/taxcalc/Home/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "States that in Tennessee, Chen does not have to pay personal income tax for earnings from the LLC.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Tennessee has no state personal income tax, this is the biggest advantage for moving to Tennessee, especially for high income persons. Source: Tennessee Constitution, Article II, section 28: 'Notwithstanding the authority to tax privileges or any other authority set forth in this Constitution, the Legislature shall not levy, authorize or otherwise permit any state or local tax upon payroll or earned personal income or any state or local tax measured by payroll or earned personal income; however, nothing contained herein shall be construed as prohibiting any tax in effect on January 1, 2011, or adjustment of the rate of such tax.' https://law.justia.com/constitution/tennessee/article-ii/section-28/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "States that in California, Chen's LLC has to pay an annual franchise tax of $800 (acceptable value is 800).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Every LLC that is doing business or organized in California must pay an annual tax of $800. See https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/types/limited-liability-company/index.html",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "States that in California, Chen's LLC has to pay an annual LLC fee of $6,000 (acceptable value is 6,000).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "If an LLC in California makes more than $250,000, you will have to pay a fee. Chen indicates her LLC makes $1 million a year, for the bracket of $1,000,000 to $4,999,999, the annual LLC fee is $6,000. https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/types/limited-liability-company/index.html",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "States that in Tennessee, Chen's LLC has to pay excise tax at the rate of 6.5% of its net earnings (acceptable value is 6.5%).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Based on information published by the Government of Tennessee, 'If you are a corporation, limited partnership, limited liability company, or business trust chartered, qualified, or registered in Tennessee or doing business in this state, then you must register for and pay franchise and excise taxes.' 'The excise tax is based on the taxpayer's net earnings or income for the tax year.' Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/franchise---excise-tax.html Excise tax is 6.5% of Tennessee net earnings. Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/franchise---excise-tax/due-dates-and-tax-rates.html Tennessee net earnings means your net earning for federal income tax purpose with Tennessee special adjustment. Source: https://revenue.support.tn.gov/hc/en-us/articles/360058272391-ET-1-Excise-Tax-Computation",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "States that in Tennessee, Chen's LLC has to pay franchise tax at the rate of 0.25% of the net worth, subject to a minimum of $100 per year (acceptable value is 0.25%).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Based on information published by the Government of Tennessee, 'If you are a corporation, limited partnership, limited liability company, or business trust chartered, qualified, or registered in Tennessee or doing business in this state, then you must register for and pay franchise and excise taxes.' 'The minimum franchise tax is $100 and is payable if you are incorporated, domesticated, qualified, or otherwise registered through the Secretary of State to do business in Tennessee, regardless of whether the company is active or inactive.' Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/franchise---excise-tax.html Franchise is 0.25% of Tennessee net worth. Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/franchise---excise-tax/due-dates-and-tax-rates.html Tennessee net worth carries the ordinary meaning of net worth, i.e. total assets minus total liability. Source: https://revenue.support.tn.gov/hc/en-us/articles/360058275991-FT-1-Franchise-Tax-Computation",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "States that in Tennessee, Chen's LLC has to pay business tax based on its gross revenue.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Based on information published by the Government of Tennessee, 'if you conduct business within any county and/or incorporated municipality in Tennessee, and your business grosses $100,000 or more, then you should register for and remit business tax. Business tax consists of two separate taxes: the state business tax and the city business tax.' Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/business-tax.html Chen's immigration consulting service business grosses $1mm and falls under Class 3 for business tax purpose. The prompt does not indicate or imply it is a law firm, which would be exempt. Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/business-tax/classifications.html The business tax rates for Class 3 business are both 0.1875% at state level and Nashville city level. Source: https://www.tn.gov/revenue/taxes/business-tax/due-dates-and-tax-rates.html (State rate) https://library.municode.com/tn/metro_government_of_nashville_and_davidson_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CD_TIT5REFI_DIVIITA_CH5.16PRTA_ARTIIIBUTA_5.16.080TAIMTARAADOPFI (Nashville city rate, in section 5.16.080 it states that the state level statutory rates are adopted)",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "States that relocating to Tennessee gives Chen a tax saving of $17,958 for 2024 (acceptable value is 17,958).",
"sources": "",
"justification": "California tax burden for Chen and her LLC is $57,558 (personal income tax $50,758 + $800 franchise tax + $6,000 LLC fee). Tennessee tax burden includes LLC excise tax, franchise tax, and business tax. Excise tax is 6.5% of the annual net income, with a $550,000 net income, the excise tax is $35,750. Franchise tax is 0.25% of net worth, with a minimum of $100. Chen estimates that her net assets are worth $20,000, this will make the minimum $100 franchise tax apply. Business Tax is 0.1875% for state and 0.1875% for city level of the gross revenue. With a 1 million gross revenue, the total business tax is $3,750. Tennessee tax burden for Chen and her LLC is $39,600 This results in a tax saving of $17,958 for 2024.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1,
3,
2,
4,
5,
6,
9
]
},
"criterion 9": {
"description": "States that Chen can minimize the Tennessee franchise tax by strategically managing the balance sheet to minimize the value of the net assets.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "To optimize the Tennessee tax burdens, one way is to strategically manage the net worth of the LLC. She can keep renting offices, use her old furniture and computers from California instead of buying new ones in Tennessee. For a consulting business with light assets, Chen should be able to keep the net worth of the LLC under $40,000, thereby only have to pay a minimum $100 franchise tax per year (100/0.25% = 40,000).",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
6
]
},
"criterion 10": {
"description": "Recommends that Chen elect S-corporation status for the LLC to reduce excise tax liabilities.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Since the Tennessee excise tax is based on the net income of the LLC, the key to minimize the excise tax is to maximize expenses to keep the net income low. S-corporation allows a member of a LLC to pay herself both a reasonable salary and a dividend. The salary to Chen will constitute expenses, thus reducing the net income of the LLC. Electing S-corporation status would not reduce California tax in the same way because California imposes a 1.5% franchise tax on S-corporation's net income. For a $550,000 net income, it would be $8250 franchise tax for a S-corporation while California only charges a $6,000 LLC fee for a 1 million revenue business. Source: https://www.ftb.ca.gov/file/business/types/corporations/s-corporations.html It's kind of common knowledge in the industry that by electing S-corporation status for an LLC, the member can pay herself both a reasonable salary and dividends. People usually take advantage of S-corp to reduce self-employment tax, but in the excise tax context, it is also helpful since it adds expenses, thus reducing the net income. See for example: https://patrickaccounting.com/blog/s-corp-and-llc-in-tennessee-guide 'Pros of S Corp: ... Shareholders can receive both salaries and dividend payments, which can be beneficial for tax planning.' https://domyllc.com/basics-of-starting-an-s-corp-in-tennessee/ 'As the owner of an S corp, you will have the flexibility in choosing how to characterize income for tax purposes. You can be considered as an employee of the company so that you can pay yourself a salary. Additionally, you can pay yourself with dividends from the company or distributions that are either tax-free or have lower rates than the salary of an employee. With this, you can reduce self-employment tax liabilities.'",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Reasoning",
"Extraction (recall)"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
5
]
}
}
|
documents/1189/Franchise Tax Computation.pdf
|
1,226
|
Legal
|
The client is a Virginia logistics and packaging company ("Company") that specializes in designing and manufacturing custom crates for fragile and high-value goods. Company was recently contacted by a Virginia public university ("University") to design, build, and ship a protective wooden container ("Crate") for a student-engineered prototype ("Prototype") being sent to Dubai for an international academic exhibition.
University informed Company that the Prototype contains advanced sensor arrays and energy storage components fabricated together with a defense contractor under a Department of Energy ("DOE") grant. University emphasized that the contents are "not classified" but "should be treated with care." On their last call, University's procurement department requested that Company send a "fixed-price proposal including everything from Crate to Dubai," and provided Company with limited technical specifications for the Crate but not for the Prototype. University also asked that Company label the Crate under its own name and arrange insurance coverage to "avoid customs delays."
That said, Company's general manager is nervous about taking responsibility for a shipment of this nature, particularly given the overseas destination and the sensitive, government-involved, and unique (and likely expensive) nature of the Prototype. Company has also never dealt with a public university procurement office and is unfamiliar with potential special rules that might apply.
To that end, prepare an agreement ("Agreement") that resolves the risks clearly implied by the facts and provides Company with protection against regulatory, operational, and liability exposure, while ensuring that the arrangement remains commercially workable and enforceable under applicable law, including the attached federal and state statutes and regulations.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Conditions University's payment obligations on the availability of appropriated funds.",
"sources": "",
"justification": "Virginia law limits public universities to contracts funded by appropriations authorized by law (Va. Code \u00a7 23.1-1301). Conditioning payment on available appropriations preserves enforceability and prevents an ultra vires obligation, which is standard practice in public contracting, and ensures Company is not relying on funds University cannot legally spend. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter13/section23.1-1301/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Designates University as the exporter of record.",
"sources": "15 CFR 758.3.pdf",
"justification": "Under 15 C.F.R. \u00a7 758.3(a), the exporter of record bears responsibility for obtaining licenses and filing export documents, so because the Prototype is owned and controlled by University, assigning this role to it aligns compliance obligations with control over the shipment and reflects industry-standard export procedures that protect Company from regulatory exposure. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-758/section-758.3",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Requires University to furnish all required export documentation to Company before shipment.",
"sources": "15 CFR 758.1.pdf",
"justification": "Exporters must furnish forwarding agents with all required licenses and supporting documents before shipment under 15 C.F.R. \u00a7 758.1(b)(2), so the Agreement should make document delivery a precondition to allow Company to pause performance until documentation is complete. This safeguard is a standard control in logistics agreements to prevent unlawful exports of sensitive or restricted equipment. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-758/section-758.1",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Requires University to identify export-controlled technical data before disclosure to Company.",
"sources": "15 CFR 734.15.pdf, 15 CFR 772.1.pdf",
"justification": "Under 15 C.F.R. \u00a7 734.15, a 'release' of controlled technology includes allowing visual inspection of equipment, oral exchanges of technical information, or the application of technical knowledge abroad, and 15 C.F.R. \u00a7 772.1 defines 'technology' as information necessary for the design, development, production, manufacture, or use of controlled items. Requiring University to identify any export-controlled data before disclosure ensures Company doesn't access restricted information without authorization and keeps the Agreement consistent with the federal framework governing controlled technology. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-734/section-734.15 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-772",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Requires University, as shipper, to certify compliance with dangerous-goods regulations for the Prototype.",
"sources": "49 CFR 172.204.pdf, 49 CFR 173.185.pdf",
"justification": "The Prototype contains 'energy storage components' which could be lithium batteries and classified as hazardous materials under 49 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 172.204 and 173.185, so making University (which has full knowledge of the Prototype's contents) responsible for a hazardous materials declaration is consistent with standard export-packing practice and avoids misdeclaration penalties. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-172/subpart-C/section-172.204 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-173/subpart-E/section-173.185",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Requires the Crate to comply with ISPM-15 wood-packaging standards.",
"sources": "7 CFR 319.40-3.pdf",
"justification": "Wood packaging used for international transport must be heat-treated and marked to meet ISPM-15 standards under 7 C.F.R. \u00a7 319.40-3(b), so the Agreement must require that Company comply with ISPM-15 to ensure that the Crate will pass customs inspection and to prevent rejection or destruction at the destination port. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-7/subtitle-B/chapter-III/part-319/subpart-I/section-319.40-3",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "States that Company provides packaging services only.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Limiting Company's role to packaging services confines its legal responsibilities to physical packing and excludes freight forwarding or export functions, which prevents Company from being treated as a regulated carrier or exporter and is consistent with industry-standard allocation of responsibilities in logistics service contracts.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "States that Company is liable for damage to the Prototype only to the extent caused by Company's negligence.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "A negligence-based standard of care ties liability to Company's own workmanship rather than to unknown defects or the actions of third parties, reflecting standard bailment principles and providing balanced risk allocation for high-value shipments.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 9": {
"description": "Requires University to provide Company with written notice of a claim within a defined period following delivery.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Fixed notice periods for claims allow Company to investigate promptly and preserve recovery rights with carriers and insurers, which is consistent with industry-standard shipping and logistics contracts and provides predictability for the fragile, overseas-bound Prototype.",
"weight": "Not primary objective",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 10": {
"description": "States that University will obtain cargo insurance that includes at least 3 of the following protections: Company named as additional insured; coverage primary and non-contributory; waiver of subrogation in favor of Company; insurer rated A- or better by A.M. Best; or loss payable to University.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Cargo insurance terms requiring additional insured status, primary coverage, and waiver of subrogation are standard protections in international logistics and limit an insurer's ability to recover against Company after paying a loss. Including these protections also aligns the risk transfer with ownership of the goods and is consistent with common commercial practice when the customer arranges insurance.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 11": {
"description": "Authorizes Company to suspend performance if shipment would violate applicable trade-compliance laws.",
"sources": "15 CFR 758.1.pdf",
"justification": "Giving Company the right to suspend performance when compliance concerns arise is a standard control in international logistics agreements, as it allows Company to halt work if continuing could breach trade-compliance laws such as export-control or sanctions regulations under 15 C.F.R. \u00a7 758.1(b)(2) and 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 4819(a)(1). Including this protection aligns with the prompt's instruction to shield Company from regulatory exposure while keeping the arrangement enforceable and commercially practical. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-758/section-758.1 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/4819",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 12": {
"description": "Requires University to reimburse Company, to the extent permitted by law, upon the occurrence of any one of the following: inaccurate or incomplete export information; failure to obtain required export authorizations; or concealed hazards in the Prototype.",
"sources": "Va._Code_2.2-1837.pdf",
"justification": "Virginia public institutions of higher education may enter an indemnification agreement only under the conditions in Va. Code \u00a7 2.2-1837, which require prior review by the Office of the Attorney General, a stated liability cap, and confirmation that state credit is not pledged. Linking reimbursement to specific triggers and limiting it 'to the extent permitted by law' keeps the clause within those statutory limits and follows standard public-sector contracting practice for managing risk. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title2.2/chapter18/section2.2-1837/",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/1226/15 CFR 734.15.pdf
documents/1226/15 CFR 758.1.pdf
documents/1226/15 CFR 772.1.pdf
documents/1226/15CFR758.3.pdf
documents/1226/49 CFR 172.204.pdf
documents/1226/49 CFR 173.185.pdf
documents/1226/7 CFR 319.40-3.pdf
documents/1226/Va._Code_2.2-1837.pdf
|
1,230
|
Legal
|
Our client, Homes, a large international residential property ownership group, has come to us seeking advice. Homes owns 11 single-family residential properties within the Eagle Trace Homeowners' Association ("the Association"). At the present time, 6 of the homes are occupied by tenants, and the other 5 remain vacant. There is no restriction contained within the Association's Declaration of Restrictive Covenants that prohibits an owner from renting, nor is there any prohibition against ownership by an institution. The Association simultaneously filed 11 lawsuits against Homes, each of them for minor violations of the Association's Declaration of Restrictive Covenants and Rules and Regulations related to landscaping, stains in driveways, and garbage cans left on the curb for longer than 24 hours after garbage collection. The Association is represented by the same attorney in all cases. In each case, the Association sent out the statutorily-required non-compliance and hearing notices, however, they were sent to various corporate offices for Homes parent company, White Glass, LLC, rather than to the address of Homes' registered agent which was listed as the point of contact on the owner information sheet for each property which had been supplied by Homes to the Association at the point of purchase. The notices were instead sent to addresses that match those listed on the rental agreements for each property, copies of which are also on file with the Association.
Each of the 11 complaints was worded the same way and was clearly created from the same base template with simple substitutions for the property addresses and dates. This was apparent because there were errors in several of the complaints where the same property address was used across multiple complaints, as well as instances where the facts were repeated verbatim for multiple properties. In each case, shortly after the complaints were served, the Association served Homes with Requests for Admission (in which there were 10 requests), First Sets of Interrogatories, and Requests for Production. As with the Complaints, it was readily apparent that each of these was created from the same base template, as they were all identical. After the discovery requests were served, Plaintiff's counsel, Steven McShady, contacted our office via email to request an in-person conference with Homes' counsel. We agreed on a date; however, several days before the meeting was set to take place, Mr. McShady called and canceled, stating that he had a conflict. Mr. McShady then sent follow-up letters for each case confirming the cancellation and another letter in each case several days later, requesting a new date. In the interim, one of the paralegals from our firm attempted to contact Mr. McShady's office several times by email and multiple times by phone to reschedule, but was told each time that "there were no times available." One of the senior associates for our firm, Vicky Virtue, then reached out to Mr. McShady directly via phone and email, again receiving no response. Less than 2 weeks after the first set of discovery requests were received, the Association filed a Second Request for Admissions (in which there were again 10 requests), a Second Set of Interrogatories, and a Request for Production in each case. Less than one week later, a third round of discovery requests was filed by the Association. Like the first discovery requests, each of the requests was duplicative and clearly created from a template.
Homes has now decided to sell two of the properties governed by the Association. To avoid having to disclose the pending litigation to prospective buyers, Homes has directed us to negotiate a global settlement with the Association in exchange for a dismissal of all pending actions. Ms. Virtue reached out to Mr. McShady to request a global settlement figure. In response, Mr. McShady supplied copies of his timesheets for each file, but has refused to provide a copy of his retainer with the Association, citing attorney/client privilege. A review of the timesheets makes it clear that 1) Mr. McShady billed each file separately for the same calls and emails, 2) Mr. McShady billed the time he spent reviewing scheduling emails at his hourly lawyer rate, 3) Mr. McShady billed each file the same hourly amount for each complaint and discovery request, 4) Mr. McShady billed a minimum of .3 hours on every entry, even those which reflected an email exchange of a single sentence, and 5) Mr. McShady billed more time for phone calls during which he spoke to Ms. Virtue than she did.
Ms. Virtue has finally secured a meeting time with Mr. McShady to discuss the settlement. In anticipation of the settlement conference, she requires a thorough understanding of Florida law regarding whether the Association is entitled to recover all of Mr. McShady's attorney's fees, whether Mr. McShady has committed any ethical violations in his handling of this matter under the Florida Bar Rules, and, if so, whether any such violation can or should be directly addressed by Ms. Virtue either during or after the settlement conference. Draft a memo discussing these issues. Please use the attached documents to carry out your analysis.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association failed to send the violation notices to the owner's designated address as required by law.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Florida Statute 720.305 outlines the procedure an Association must follow when dealing with a covenant violation like those described in the prompt. Section 720.305(2)(b) states, in relevant part: A fine or suspension levied by the board of administration may not be imposed unless the board first provides at least 14 days' written notice of the parcel owner's right to a hearing to the parcel owner at his or her DESIGNATED mailing or e-mail address in the association's official records and, if applicable, to any occupant, licensee, or invitee of the parcel owner, sought to be fined or suspended. https://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0700-0799/0720/Sections/0720.305.html The prompt in the present case doesn't actually state that the Association was attempting to levy a fine or suspend any access rights. Nor does it suggest that any hearing was held. Instead, they moved right to litigation on a covenant enforcement suit. Once litigation was initiated, notice was governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and \u00a748.062, Fla. Stat., which require service of process on the corporation's registered agent. Because the Association served notices and filings to tenant and corporate addresses instead of Homes' designated registered agent, the litigation notice was procedurally defective and not compliant with Florida law.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association failed to make a demand for pre-suit mediation as required by law.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Florida Statute 720.311(2)(a) states, in relevant part, Disputes between an association and a parcel owner regarding use of or changes to the parcel or the common areas and other covenant enforcement disputes ... shall be the subject of a demand for presuit mediation served by an aggrieved party before the dispute is filed in court. https://www.flsenate.gov/laws/statutes/2024/720.311 Here, the Association jumped the gun by filing a civil action instead of exhausting all available remedies.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association is precluded from recovering its attorney's fees related to subsequent litigation.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Florida Statute 720.311(2)(b) precludes parties who fail to mediate disputes related to restrictive covenant enforcement prior to litigating from recovering attorney's fees related to the subsequent litigation, even if they are ultimately the prevailing party. 'Additionally, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or document, persons who fail or refuse to participate in the entire mediation process may not recover attorney's fees and costs in subsequent litigation relating to the dispute.' https://www.flsenate.gov/laws/statutes/2024/720.311 In this case, the Association filed 11 lawsuits against Homes without completing the statutorily-required pre-suit mediation. Because the Association bypassed mediation entirely, it is barred from recovering any attorney's fees associated with these covenant enforcement actions, regardless of the outcome in the litigation. This statutory requirement is independent of the merits of the case and directly impacts the Association's entitlement to fees.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association's attorney improperly billed his time by billing multiple times for a single piece of created work.",
"sources": "Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, No. 1_2009cv23069 - Document 74 (S.D. Fla. 2010) __ Justia.pdf",
"justification": "Attorney's fees arising from hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from an award of attorney's fees, either by the applicant or the court. See Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, (S.D. Fla. 2010) https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flsdce/1:2009cv23069/344762/74/ In the present case it is clear that McShady was double billing against each of the files because both the complaints and the discovery requests were templates.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association's attorney improperly billed his time by billing at an attorney's rate for clerical work.",
"sources": "Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, No. 1_2009cv23069 - Document 74 (S.D. Fla. 2010) __ Justia.pdf",
"justification": "Attorney's fees arising from hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from an award of attorney's fees, either by the applicant or the court. See Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, (S.D. Fla. 2010) https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flsdce/1:2009cv23069/344762/74/ 'Work performed 'which can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help available' is not compensable at a lawyer's rate solely 'because a lawyer does it.' Johnson v. Ga. Case No. 09-23069-CIV-ALTONAGA/Brown' Id. at 5. 'The focus on the inquiry is . . . whether the work is traditionally performed by attorneys.' Williams v. R.W. Cannon, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1311 (S.D. Fla.2009). Clerical work, such as the compilation of facts and statistics, coordinating schedules, basic communications, procedural matters, and housekeeping matters is usually performed by legal assistants, not lawyers. Id. at 6. In the present case it is clear that McShady would not be entitled to his legal hourly rate for work done related to scheduling and other administrative/clerical tasks.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association's attorney improperly billed his time by billing amounts which do not reflect the actual amount of time spent on the work.",
"sources": "Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, No. 1_2009cv23069 - Document 74 (S.D. Fla. 2010) __ Justia.pdf",
"justification": "Attorney's fees arising from hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from an award of attorney's fees, either by the applicant or the court. See Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, (S.D. Fla. 2010) https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/florida/flsdce/1:2009cv23069/344762/74/ In the present case it is clear that McShady was padding his billing, both by only billing at .3 as the smallest increment of time and because the time entries do not match those of the person with whom he was speaking on a phone call. See Machado, pg. 8.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "Identifies that the Association's retainer agreement is not privileged.",
"sources": "COFFEY GARCIA v. SOUTH MIAMI HOSPITAL INC (2016) _ FindLaw.pdf, FL-Bar-Ethics-Op-60-33-2.pdf",
"justification": "'Courts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileged. Nor does the general purpose of a client's representation necessarily divulge a confidential professional communication, and therefore that data is not generally privileged.' COFFEY GARCIA v. SOUTH MIAMI HOSPITAL INC (2016) The distinction between what is privileged and what is confidential with regard to attorneys and their clients comes down to which sets of rules we are applying, the rules of evidence or the rules of ethics. Attorney client privilege is governed by the former and confidentiality by the latter. In general, a retainer agreement is not privileged because it is outlining the nature of the work to be performed on behalf of the client, rather than the divulging the work itself. An attorney can therefore be compelled to testify about generalities contained within the retainer agreement even those would otherwise be confidential under ethics rules.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 8": {
"description": "States that raising ethical concerns regarding opposing counsel's behavior may violate Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4.3(4)(h).",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Section 4.3(4)(h) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar specifically states a lawyer must not: '(h) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present disciplinary charges under these rules solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. ' It is a best practice to avoid even the inference that a threat is being made by avoiding specifically mentioning ethics at all.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/1230/COFFEY GARCIA v. SOUTH MIAMI HOSPITAL INC (2016) _ FindLaw.pdf
documents/1230/FL-Bar-Ethics-Op-60-33-2.pdf
documents/1230/Machado v. Da Vittorio, LLC, No. 1_2009cv23069 - Document 74 (S.D. Fla. 2010) __ Justia.pdf
|
1,246
|
Legal
|
Erika lives with her roommate and their two dogs in a condo next to a community park owned by the local parks district in a suburb in Southern California. The park has tennis courts, a basketball court, picnic tables, and a large grassy area informally known as the “dog meadow.” Although numerous posted signs state that dogs must remain leashed, the rule is rarely enforced, and the community has long treated the meadow as an off-leash area.
For years, Erika and several neighbors have met at the meadow after work to let their dogs run and to enjoy “happy hour,” bringing food and drinks to share. At one point, the group informally collected small donations to cover snacks, though no one considered it a business. After a neighbor joked that they should have a real bar, Erika found an old ice cream cart online, painted “Erika’s Place” on it, and stocked it with beer and wine she purchased at a local store. She began bringing it to the park on Fridays, offering drinks to her usual group of friends and asking for small “tips” to cover costs.
Word spread, and soon unfamiliar park-goers began approaching the cart. Some parents at the nearby playground complained to the city about off-leash dogs and “a woman selling alcohol to strangers in the park.” An undercover officer from the city police’s community enforcement unit arrived one Friday afternoon. He chatted with Erika, asked if she was “selling,” and offered her $20 for a beer. Erika initially said, “I don’t sell them, I just accept donations,” but he insisted, and then said, "How about $50?" Erika took the money. The officer cited her for violating the city’s open container ordinance, unlicensed sale of alcohol, and operation of an unpermitted business on public land. He also cited her and several dog owners for violating the leash law.
Erika argues that she was entrapped, that she was merely engaging in social hospitality among friends, and that the park’s “accepted practice” of off-leash play amounts to implied consent by the city. She also claims selective enforcement because the police ignored a nearby yoga group that routinely brings wine to evening classes at the same park.
Erika wants to challenge the charges - what are her available defenses, and what is the likelihood of success for each? Please refer to the included files to draft the response.
|
{
"criterion 1": {
"description": "Identifies that Erika can raise the defense of entrapment against the charge of unlawful sale of alcohol.",
"sources": "BUS_23300; BUS_23025; BUS_25607; People v. Barraza",
"justification": "Under California's Business Code \u00a723300, 'No person shall exercise the privilege or perform any act which a licensee may exercise or perform under the authority of a license unless the person is authorized to do so by a license issued pursuant to this division,' where 'sale' is defined as '...any transaction whereby, for any consideration, title to alcoholic beverages is transferred from one person to another, and includes the delivery of alcoholic beverages pursuant to an order placed for the purchase of such beverages and soliciting or receiving an order for such beverages.' (Cal. Bus. Code \u00a723025) Here, by accepting $50 for a beer, Erika engaged in a transaction for value. Her tips might also be construed as a sale if they were consistently part of an exchange for alcohol. Since 'Erika's Place' was unlicensed, Erika can be charged with violation of \u00a723300 for the unlicensed sale of alcohol \u2014 a misdemeanor. [See \u00a725607(a): 'Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), it is unlawful for any person or licensee to have upon any premises for which a license has been issued any alcoholic beverages other than the alcoholic beverage that the licensee is authorized to sell at the premises under their license. It shall be presumed that all alcoholic beverages found or located upon premises for which licenses have been issued belong to the person or persons to whom the licenses were issued. Any person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.'] Erika can argue that she did not sell alcohol unlawfully, because the only time she ever exchanged beer for money was when the plainclothes officer entrapped her into doing so, which should be inadmissible as evidence. The city's charge hinges on the evidence of her exchange with the plainclothes officer, whereby she traded a beer for $50, but Erika can argue that this evidence should be disregarded due to police entrapment. California defines entrapment when 'conduct of the law enforcement agent is likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.' [People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 690] Erika must persuade the court that she - normally a law-abiding citizen - would not typically have engaged in the unlawful sale of alcohol, were it not for the officer's inducement.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 2": {
"description": "Concludes that the entrapment defense against the unlawful sale of alcohol will be successful.",
"sources": "People v. Barraza",
"justification": "California defines entrapment when 'conduct of the law enforcement agent is likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.' [People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 690] There are two distinguishable factors to consider: first, whether the 'person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully;' and second, whether the officer acted in such a way as to 'make commission of the crime unusually attractive to a normally law-abiding person.' (Id.) Here, the officer initially offered Erika $20 for a beer and she declined; this speaks to the first part of the test, where Erika did indeed resist the temptation to commit the crime. In spite of Erika's refusal, the officer then offered $50, which can be viewed as an 'unusually attractive' enticement. The court in People v Barraza gives examples of types of affirmative police conduct that would make an offer unusually attractive, including 'an offer of exorbitant consideration.' (Id.) Fifty dollars for a beer is by most accounts, at least ten times its value, and qualifies as an offer of exorbitant consideration. Erika's defense of entrapment is therefore likely to succeed against the unlawful sale of alcohol charge.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
1
]
},
"criterion 3": {
"description": "Identifies that Erika can raise the defense of entrapment against the charge of operating an unpermitted business.",
"sources": "GOV_51039; People v. Barraza",
"justification": "California's Government Code lays out regulations by which a local authority can regulate sidewalk vendors; Violations of these rules are punishable under \u00a751039: 'If a local authority requires a sidewalk vendor to obtain a sidewalk vending permit from the local authority, vending without a sidewalk vending permit may be punishable by the following... [Cal. Gov. Code \u00a751039(a)(3)(A)]', which details a list of administrative fees for subsequent offenses. 'Erika's Place' is a cart with signage, alcohol service, and a tip jar - by all appearances it looks like an enterprise with commercial activity. Since Erika does not have a permit, she can be charged with a violation of any local ordinances drawn under \u00a751039 for unpermitted business operation on public lands, and faces potential citations and fees. Erika can argue that she did not violate permitting regulations, because 'Erika's Place' is not a business. Part of the city's charge hinges on the evidence of her exchange with the plainclothes officer, whereby she traded a beer for $50, but Erika can argue that this evidence should be disregarded due to police entrapment. California defines entrapment as when 'conduct of the law enforcement agent is likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense.' [People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 690] Erika must persuade the court that she - normally a law-abiding citizen - would not typically have engaged in operating an unpermitted business, were it not for the officer's inducement.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 4": {
"description": "Identifies that Erika did not intend to make a profit from Erika's Place.",
"sources": "GOV_51039",
"justification": "California's Government Code lays out regulations by which a local authority can regulate sidewalk vendors; Violations of these rules are punishable under \u00a751039: 'If a local authority requires a sidewalk vendor to obtain a sidewalk vending permit from the local authority, vending without a sidewalk vending permit may be punishable by the following... [Cal. Gov. Code \u00a751039(a)(3)(A)]', which details a list of administrative fees for subsequent offenses. In relation to the unpermitted business operation charge, Erika can argue that Erika's Place cannot be categorized as a business because she did not intend to engage in commerce or make a profit; she was acting as a social host, providing alcohol for friends at a private social gathering, rather than conducting a business operation While this argument is futile against the unlicensed sale of alcohol (since \u00a7 23300 imposes strict liablity), it may hold some weight against statutes that require intent to profit for commercial purpose. She can point to sections of the code that define business with the intent to profit (See Cal. Bus. Code \u00a7 82005: ' 'Business entity' means any organization or enterprise operated for profit, including but not limited to a proprietorship, partnership, firm, business trust, joint venture, syndicate, corporation or association'); or to the tax code, where ''Doing business' means actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit.' [Cal. Rev. Code \u00a7 23101(a)]",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 5": {
"description": "Concludes that Erika will likely be found guilty of operating an unpermitted business.",
"sources": "Prompt",
"justification": "Even if Erika succeeds in proving entrapment regarding the actual sale of beer to the officer, this is only one piece of evidence in a larger picture. The city can point to many other business-like features of 'Erika's Place,' including the rented cart, the frequency and duration of operation (seemingly often and routinely over a long period of time, rather than just once or twice), the signage and name, the stocked inventory (beyond personal use), and the tip jar. They might even consider the fact that news of the beer cart spread to other sections of the park to equate to word-of-mouth advertising. The bulk of the evidence is in favor of Erika's Place being classified as a business, and an unauthorized one at that. Erika's argument that she did not intend to operate a business may be somewhat persuasive to the court. Her argument relies on semantic definitions that a business is related to profit, as distinguished from her intent - which is to serve her friends, not to turn a profit. Erika's lack of criminal intent is not a full defense to the charge of unpermitted business operation, as intent is not an explicit factor of the statute, but it may be useful for mitigation or dismissal in the interests of justice.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": [
3,
4
]
},
"criterion 6": {
"description": "Identifies that Erika can argue the city violated the Equal Protection Clause by selectively enforcing the rules relating to possession of alcohol in public spaces.",
"sources": "BUS_25620",
"justification": "California Business Code \u00a7 25620 prohibits possession or consumption of open alcoholic beverages in public parks or other public spaces without a city permit. Erika and her friends openly consumed alcohol in the public park without a permit, so she may also be charged with an 'infraction' under the city code. ('Any person possessing any can, bottle, or other receptacle containing any alcoholic beverage that has been opened, or a seal broken, or the contents of which have been partially removed, in any city, county, or city and county owned park or other city, county, or city and county owned public place, or any recreation and park district, or any regional park or open-space district shall be guilty of an infraction if the city, county, or city and county has enacted an ordinance that prohibits the possession of those containers in those areas or the consumption of alcoholic beverages in those areas.' [Cal. Bus. Code \u00a7 25620(a)]) Erika can raise a constitutional defense, arguing that the city violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment by selectively enforcing the rules related to public possession or consumption of open alcohol. The facts state that the yoga group routinely brought wine to evening classes at the park; Erika can argue that the yogis were similarly situated (and not prosecuted), and that the decision to prosecute her was based on an arbitrary classification (as a dog owner). This is a weak argument, as there is nothing in the facts to suggest that the officer here chose to target Erika with a discriminatory motive, and her distinction from the yogis is not a constitutionally-protected class (e.g., gender, viewpoint, ethnicity, etc.)",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
},
"criterion 7": {
"description": "Identifies that Erika can raise equitable estoppel against the leash law violation.",
"sources": "PEN_597.1; City of Long Beach v Mansell",
"justification": "There is no uniform leash law in California, as the state defers to local municipalities to establish their own regulations. For example, California's Penal Code authorizes the seizure and citation of owners whose animals are not restrained as required by local ordinance. 'Every owner, driver, or keeper of any animal who permits the animal to be in any building, enclosure, lane, street, square, or lot of any city, county, city and county, or judicial district without proper care and attention is guilty of a misdemeanor.' [Cal. Pen. Code \u00a7 597.1(a)(1)] The facts indicate that Erika's city has clearly established laws in place, as shown by the various signs around the community park that require dogs to be leashed. Erika can be charged with a violation per the details of the local ordinance, though the specifics of this ordinance are not made clear by the prompt. Erika can argue that the city, through long-standing non-enforcement of the leash laws, created a de facto public custom amounting to implied consent. However, municipal nonfeasance does not equate to an authorization of unlawful conduct, and it does not estop future government enforcement. [See City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 493: 'It is settled that '[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the government where justice and right require it. (See generally 28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, \u00a7\u00a7 122-133, pp. 782-802; 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, \u00a7\u00a7 138-147, pp. 675-733.) Correlative to this general rule, however, is the well-established proposition that an estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify 'a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public'] Here, leash laws are in place to protect the public, and so the court would not be likely to impose the doctrine of estoppel against the city. Estoppel is therefore not a viable full legal defense, but it might be persuasive in seeking dismissal or diversion.",
"weight": "Primary objective(s)",
"human_rating": false,
"criterion_type": [
"Extraction (recall)",
"Reasoning"
],
"dependent_criteria": []
}
}
|
documents/1246/BPC_23025.pdf
documents/1246/BPC_25607.pdf
documents/1246/BPC_25620.pdf
documents/1246/BUS_23300_23301.pdf
documents/1246/City of Long Beach v. Mansell.pdf
documents/1246/GOV_51039.pdf
documents/1246/PEN_597.1.pdf
documents/1246/People v. Barraza.pdf
|
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